@askexenow/exe-os 0.9.286 → 0.9.288

package/dist/chunk-6DQNLI55.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+import {
+  getClient,
+  isCoordinatorName,
+  loadEmployeesSync
+} from "./chunk-WLDBPKRL.js";
+
+// src/lib/steward-gate.ts
+import crypto from "crypto";
+var ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
+  coordinator: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    "close_task",
+    "cancel_task",
+    "merge_entities",
+    "purge_document",
+    "deactivate_behavior",
+    "override"
+  ]),
+  manager: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    "close_task",
+    // their team only — enforced contextually
+    "deactivate_behavior"
+    // their team's behaviors
+  ]),
+  specialist: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    "deactivate_behavior_own",
+    // own behaviors only
+    "delete_own_memory"
+  ])
+};
+var UNIVERSAL_OPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "update_own_task",
+  "store_memory",
+  "store_behavior"
+]);
+var MANAGER_ROLES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["CTO", "CMO"]);
+var StewardGate = class {
+  /**
+   * Check whether an agent has authority for a destructive operation.
+   */
+  async checkAuthority(agent, operation, target) {
+    const role = await this.resolveRole(agent);
+    if (UNIVERSAL_OPS.has(operation)) {
+      const decision2 = {
+        allowed: true,
+        reason: `Operation "${operation}" is universally permitted.`,
+        confidence: 1,
+        requires_override: false
+      };
+      await this.logDecision(agent, operation, target, decision2);
+      return decision2;
+    }
+    const permissions = ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role];
+    let allowed = permissions.has(operation);
+    let reason;
+    if (!allowed && role === "specialist" && operation === "deactivate_behavior") {
+      const isOwn = await this.isOwnBehavior(agent, target);
+      if (isOwn) {
+        allowed = true;
+        reason = `Specialist "${agent}" can deactivate their own behavior.`;
+      } else {
+        reason = `Specialist "${agent}" cannot deactivate behaviors belonging to other agents.`;
+      }
+    } else if (allowed) {
+      reason = `Role "${role}" has authority for "${operation}".`;
+    } else {
+      reason = `Role "${role}" does not have authority for "${operation}". Requires coordinator override.`;
+    }
+    let requiresOverride = !allowed;
+    let confidence = allowed ? 0.95 : 0.9;
+    try {
+      const dreamingPath = "./dreaming.js";
+      const dreaming = await import(
+        /* @vite-ignore */
+        dreamingPath
+      );
+      if (typeof dreaming.calculateDrift === "function") {
+        const driftScore = await dreaming.calculateDrift(agent);
+        if (typeof driftScore === "number" && driftScore > 0.8) {
+          requiresOverride = true;
+          confidence = Math.max(0.5, confidence - 0.3);
+          reason += ` (\u26A0\uFE0F High drift score: ${driftScore.toFixed(2)} \u2014 requires override.)`;
+        }
+      }
+    } catch {
+    }
+    const decision = {
+      allowed: allowed && !requiresOverride,
+      reason,
+      confidence,
+      requires_override: requiresOverride
+    };
+    await this.logDecision(agent, operation, target, decision);
+    return decision;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Record an explicit coordinator override that bypasses the gate.
+   */
+  async override(agent, operation, target, reason) {
+    const role = await this.resolveRole(agent);
+    if (role !== "coordinator") {
+      const decision2 = {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: `Only coordinators can issue overrides. "${agent}" is a ${role}.`,
+        confidence: 1,
+        requires_override: false
+      };
+      await this.logDecision(agent, `override:${operation}`, target, decision2);
+      return decision2;
+    }
+    const decision = {
+      allowed: true,
+      reason: `Coordinator override: ${reason}`,
+      confidence: 1,
+      requires_override: false
+    };
+    await this.logDecision(agent, `override:${operation}`, target, decision);
+    return decision;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Query the audit trail.
+   */
+  async getAuditLog(opts) {
+    await this.ensureAuditTable();
+    const client = getClient();
+    const conditions = [];
+    const args = [];
+    if (opts?.agent) {
+      conditions.push("agent = ?");
+      args.push(opts.agent);
+    }
+    if (opts?.operation) {
+      conditions.push("operation = ?");
+      args.push(opts.operation);
+    }
+    const where = conditions.length > 0 ? `WHERE ${conditions.join(" AND ")}` : "";
+    const limit = opts?.limit ?? 50;
+    const result = await client.execute({
+      sql: `SELECT * FROM steward_audit ${where} ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?`,
+      args: [...args, limit]
+    });
+    return result.rows.map((row) => ({
+      id: String(row.id),
+      agent: String(row.agent),
+      operation: String(row.operation),
+      target: String(row.target),
+      decision: {
+        allowed: Number(row.allowed) === 1,
+        reason: String(row.reason),
+        confidence: Number(row.confidence),
+        requires_override: Number(row.requires_override) === 1
+      },
+      timestamp: String(row.created_at)
+    }));
+  }
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Internal methods
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  /**
+   * Resolve an agent name to a role category.
+   */
+  async resolveRole(agent) {
+    if (isCoordinatorName(agent)) return "coordinator";
+    try {
+      const employees = loadEmployeesSync();
+      const employee = employees.find((e) => e.name === agent);
+      if (employee && MANAGER_ROLES.has(employee.role)) return "manager";
+    } catch {
+    }
+    return "specialist";
+  }
+  /**
+   * Check if a behavior belongs to the given agent.
+   */
+  async isOwnBehavior(agent, behaviorId) {
+    try {
+      const client = getClient();
+      const result = await client.execute({
+        sql: "SELECT agent_id FROM behaviors WHERE id = ? LIMIT 1",
+        args: [behaviorId]
+      });
+      if (result.rows.length === 0) return false;
+      return String(result.rows[0].agent_id) === agent;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Ensure the steward_audit table exists.
+   */
+  async ensureAuditTable() {
+    const client = getClient();
+    await client.execute({
+      sql: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS steward_audit (
+        id                TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        agent             TEXT NOT NULL,
+        operation         TEXT NOT NULL,
+        target            TEXT NOT NULL,
+        allowed           INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        reason            TEXT NOT NULL,
+        confidence        REAL NOT NULL,
+        requires_override INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+        created_at        TEXT NOT NULL
+      )`,
+      args: []
+    });
+  }
+  /**
+   * Log a gate decision to the audit trail.
+   */
+  async logDecision(agent, operation, target, decision) {
+    try {
+      await this.ensureAuditTable();
+      const client = getClient();
+      await client.execute({
+        sql: `INSERT INTO steward_audit (id, agent, operation, target, allowed, reason, confidence, requires_override, created_at)
+              VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+        args: [
+          crypto.randomUUID(),
+          agent,
+          operation,
+          target,
+          decision.allowed ? 1 : 0,
+          decision.reason,
+          decision.confidence,
+          decision.requires_override ? 1 : 0,
+          (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
+        ]
+      });
+    } catch {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `[steward-gate] Audit log write failed for ${agent}:${operation}
+`
+      );
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+export {
+  StewardGate
+};