@ashlr/hub 2.2.0 → 3.0.1

package/dist/core/sandbox/confine.js

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+/**
+ * confine.ts — M52: OS-level confinement (closes v4 read-residual).
+ *
+ * Wraps the contained engine spawn with a platform-native read-jail +
+ * network-egress gate. ENTIRELY OPT-IN — absent cfg.foundry.confinement the
+ * launcher is null and spawnEngine behaves byte-identically to v4.
+ *
+ * SUPPORTED PLATFORMS:
+ *   macOS (darwin)  — sandbox-exec(1) with a custom SBPL profile.
+ *   Linux           — bwrap (bubblewrap) when on PATH; else null.
+ *   Other           — null (env-only v4 behavior).
+ *
+ * THREAT MODEL (macOS sandbox-exec):
+ *   Goal: prevent the contained CLI from reading arbitrary paths outside its
+ *   worktree — specifically other source trees (e.g. sibling repos) and
+ *   secrets dirs (e.g. ~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.aws).
+ *
+ *   Strategy: (allow default) keeps the process functional (dynamic linker,
+ *   frameworks, sockets for IPC, etc.). We then layer targeted denials:
+ *
+ *     1. (deny file-read*) — blocks all file reads by default.
+ *     2. (allow file-read* (subpath "<worktree>"))   — re-allow the worktree.
+ *     3. (allow file-read* (subpath "<$HOME/.claude>")) etc. — re-allow each
+ *        vendor config home the agent needs for its own auth (read-only).
+ *     4. (allow file-read* (subpath "<readAllowed[i]>")) — caller extras.
+ *     5. (allow file-read* (subpath "/usr") (subpath "/lib") ...)
+ *        — allow system paths needed for the OS and CLIs to function.
+ *     6. (deny network-outbound*) unless networkEgress:true.
+ *     7. (allow file-write* (subpath "<worktree>") (subpath "<TMPDIR>")
+ *           (subpath "<home>/.claude") ...)
+ *        — write inside worktree + tmp + vendor config dirs (HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS
+ *          + VENDOR_HOME_ENVS values) so confined agents can write session state.
+ *
+ *   What this DOES NOT protect:
+ *     - Reads of /proc, /dev, and similar pseudo-filesystems that have no
+ *       file-read* equivalent in SBPL. These are generally safe (no user data).
+ *     - Writes to paths outside worktree/TMPDIR that are NOT covered by the
+ *       allow-file-write* list. Those writes ARE blocked (allow default does
+ *       not include file-write*).
+ *     - Against a process that can exploit the macOS sandbox itself. This is
+ *       an OS-level trust boundary, not a VM boundary.
+ *
+ *   IMPORTANT LIMITATION: sandbox-exec's SBPL `(deny file-read*)` interacts
+ *   with macOS's TCC/SIP stack. On some system paths (Frameworks, dylibs) the
+ *   deny fires before dyld can load, causing the wrapped binary to crash. The
+ *   system subpath allow-list below is empirically derived to keep `cat`,
+ *   `sh`, and major CLIs (claude, codex) functional. For production hardening,
+ *   run the profile under `sandbox-exec -D/tmp/sbpl.profile.tmp` and check
+ *   sandbox-violation lines in the system log.
+ *
+ * INJECTION SAFETY:
+ *   All caller-supplied paths are escaped via escapeSbplPath() before
+ *   embedding in the SBPL profile string. The escaper replaces `"` and `\`
+ *   with their escaped forms so a malicious path cannot break out of the
+ *   (subpath "...") SBPL string literal.
+ */
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { realpathSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
+/**
+ * Resolve a path to its canonical realpath. macOS `sandbox-exec` resolves
+ * symlinks before matching (subpath ...) clauses, so e.g. a worktree under
+ * `/var/folders/...` (a symlink to `/private/var/folders/...`) must be emitted
+ * as its resolved target or the re-allow clause never matches and the agent is
+ * denied its own workspace. Falls back to the input when the path does not yet
+ * exist or cannot be resolved.
+ */
+function resolveReal(p) {
+    try {
+        return existsSync(p) ? realpathSync(p) : p;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return p;
+    }
+}
+import { audit } from './audit.js';
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// SBPL path escaping — injection safety
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Escape a path for safe embedding in a SBPL (sandbox profile language) string
+ * literal. SBPL string literals are delimited by `"`. Only `"` and `\` need
+ * escaping — forward slashes and parens in paths are literal and valid.
+ *
+ * A path containing `)` is safe because it appears inside `"..."` — the
+ * parser reads the closing `"` to end the literal before looking for `)`.
+ *
+ * PROOF: sandbox-exec's parser (Scheme-like) reads `(subpath "<escaped>")`.
+ * The literal ends at the first unescaped `"`. After escaping, `"` → `\"` and
+ * `\` → `\\`, so no injected character can terminate the string early.
+ */
+export function escapeSbplPath(p) {
+    return p.replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/"/g, '\\"');
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// macOS SBPL profile builder
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * System paths the agent binary needs to read on macOS. Empirically derived
+ * to keep sandbox-exec-wrapped CLIs functional (dyld, shells, frameworks).
+ */
+// (M52 revision) The macOS profile no longer enumerates system read paths: an
+// allow-list of dyld/framework paths is brittle across macOS versions and aborts
+// the agent process. The profile instead starts from (allow default) and denies
+// reads under $HOME — see buildMacosSbplProfile's threat-model note.
+/**
+ * Vendor config-home env vars whose values (absolute paths) the agent CLI
+ * may need to read for its own auth/subscription. We allow reading these
+ * paths but NOT writing to them (except worktree + TMPDIR).
+ */
+const VENDOR_HOME_ENVS = [
+    'CODEX_HOME',
+    'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR',
+    'XDG_CONFIG_HOME',
+    'XDG_DATA_HOME',
+];
+/**
+ * Subdirectories under HOME that are standard vendor config homes when the
+ * dedicated env vars are absent. We allow these so agent CLIs can read their
+ * own on-disk auth without needing an explicit env var.
+ */
+const HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS = [
+    '.claude',
+    '.config',
+    '.local/share',
+    '.hermes',
+    '.opencode',
+    '.codex',
+    '.npm', // node_modules cache needed by some CLIs
+    '.node_repl_history',
+];
+/**
+ * Build a macOS SBPL profile string for sandbox-exec.
+ *
+ * The profile:
+ *   (version 1)
+ *   (allow default)              — keep process functional
+ *   (deny file-read*)            — block all file reads by default
+ *   (allow file-read* ...)       — re-allow: worktree, vendor homes, system
+ *   (deny network-outbound*)     — block egress (omitted when networkEgress)
+ *   (allow file-write* ...)      — write only under worktree + TMPDIR
+ */
+export function buildMacosSbplProfile(profile, ctx) {
+    const env = ctx.env ?? process.env;
+    const home = ctx.home ?? env.HOME ?? env.USERPROFILE ?? '';
+    const tmp = env.TMPDIR ?? tmpdir();
+    const sub = (p) => `(subpath "${escapeSbplPath(resolveReal(p))}")`;
+    // Subtrees the agent may READ even under HOME: its worktree, its vendor config
+    // homes (subscription auth/session), and any caller-supplied extras.
+    const reallowRead = [ctx.worktree];
+    for (const key of VENDOR_HOME_ENVS) {
+        const val = env[key];
+        if (val)
+            reallowRead.push(val);
+    }
+    if (home) {
+        for (const s of HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS)
+            reallowRead.push(`${home}/${s}`);
+    }
+    if (profile.readAllowed) {
+        for (const p of profile.readAllowed)
+            if (p)
+                reallowRead.push(p);
+    }
+    // Subtrees the agent may WRITE: its worktree, vendor config homes (session
+    // state, logs, auth), and tmp. HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS are included so that when
+    // CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME/etc. are NOT set in the env (the common case —
+    // e.g. claude writes session state to ~/.claude by default), the confined
+    // agent can still write its own config dirs. The VENDOR_HOME_ENVS values cover
+    // the explicit-env-var override case. Other source trees and secrets dirs that
+    // are NOT in HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS or VENDOR_HOME_ENVS remain WRITE-denied
+    // (as they are READ-denied); the confinement residual is unchanged.
+    const reallowWrite = [ctx.worktree, tmp, '/tmp', '/private/tmp'];
+    for (const key of VENDOR_HOME_ENVS) {
+        const val = env[key];
+        if (val)
+            reallowWrite.push(val);
+    }
+    if (home) {
+        for (const s of HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS)
+            reallowWrite.push(`${home}/${s}`);
+    }
+    const reallowReadClauses = reallowRead.map(sub).join('\n    ');
+    const reallowWriteClauses = reallowWrite.map(sub).join('\n    ');
+    const networkClause = profile.networkEgress
+        ? '(comment "network egress allowed by profile")'
+        : '(deny network*)';
+    // THREAT MODEL — the documented v4 residual is that a contained CLI can READ
+    // arbitrary paths outside its worktree, chiefly the user's OTHER source trees
+    // and secrets, which all live under $HOME (e.g. ~/Desktop/github, ~/.ssh,
+    // ~/.aws). We start from (allow default) so system libraries load and the agent
+    // CLI can actually run — an exhaustive allow-list of dyld/system paths is
+    // brittle across macOS versions and aborts the process (SIGABRT) — then DENY
+    // all reads/writes under $HOME and re-allow ONLY the worktree, the agent's own
+    // vendor config homes (HOME_CONFIG_SUBDIRS + VENDOR_HOME_ENVS), and caller
+    // extras. Vendor config dirs are BOTH read- and write-allowed so an agent can
+    // write session state/logs even when CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME are unset.
+    // Network egress is denied unless opted in.
+    // Residual: non-$HOME system paths stay readable (acceptable — no user
+    // repos/secrets live there); other $HOME paths (source trees, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws,
+    // etc.) remain denied for BOTH read and write; full VM isolation is future work.
+    const lines = [
+        '(version 1)',
+        '',
+        '; Allow default (process exec, dyld, IPC, mach) so the agent CLI can run.',
+        '(allow default)',
+        '',
+        '; Network egress gate.',
+        networkClause,
+    ];
+    if (home) {
+        lines.push('', '; Deny reading the user HOME (other source trees + secrets) ...', `(deny file-read* ${sub(home)})`, '; ... but re-allow the worktree, vendor config homes, and caller extras.', '(allow file-read*', `    ${reallowReadClauses}`, ')', '', '; Restrict writes under HOME to the worktree + vendor homes (+ tmp).', `(deny file-write* ${sub(home)})`, '(allow file-write*', `    ${reallowWriteClauses}`, ')');
+    }
+    else {
+        // No resolvable HOME: the HOME read-jail is inexpressible; degrade to the
+        // network gate only — still never weaker than v4's env-only containment.
+        lines.push('', '; No resolvable HOME — read-jail not expressible; network gate only.');
+    }
+    return lines.join('\n');
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Linux bwrap launcher builder
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** Check whether a binary is on PATH. Returns the binary name or null. */
+function findBinary(name) {
+    try {
+        execFileSync('which', [name], { stdio: 'ignore', timeout: 3_000 });
+        return name;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Build a Linux bwrap (bubblewrap) launcher for the contained engine.
+ *
+ * Strategy: bind the root filesystem read-only, bind the worktree read-write,
+ * and optionally unshare the network namespace.
+ */
+function buildBwrapLauncher(profile, ctx) {
+    const bwrap = findBinary('bwrap');
+    if (!bwrap)
+        return null;
+    const env = ctx.env ?? process.env;
+    const tmp = env.TMPDIR ?? tmpdir();
+    const args = [
+        // Bind root read-only (gives access to system paths).
+        '--ro-bind', '/', '/',
+        // Bind worktree read-write (agent's workspace).
+        '--bind', ctx.worktree, ctx.worktree,
+        // Bind TMPDIR read-write.
+        '--bind', tmp, tmp,
+        // New temp filesystem.
+        '--tmpfs', '/tmp',
+        // Proc/dev for process functionality.
+        '--proc', '/proc',
+        '--dev', '/dev',
+        // Die with parent.
+        '--die-with-parent',
+    ];
+    if (!profile.networkEgress) {
+        args.push('--unshare-net');
+    }
+    // Extra read-allowed paths: bind them read-only.
+    if (profile.readAllowed) {
+        for (const p of profile.readAllowed) {
+            if (p) {
+                args.push('--ro-bind', p, p);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // Separator: everything after '--' is the command to run.
+    args.push('--');
+    return { bin: bwrap, prefixArgs: args };
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Primary public API
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Build the OS sandbox launcher for the given confinement profile and context.
+ *
+ * Returns `{ bin, prefixArgs }` that callers prepend to the engine spawn, or
+ * `null` when confinement is off or not supported on this platform.
+ *
+ * This function is PURE on the happy path (macOS profile string is built from
+ * inputs only). The only side-effect is the bwrap PATH probe on Linux and the
+ * audit call on fallback/unsupported.
+ *
+ * Invariant: when `profile.mode === 'off'` (or undefined), always returns null
+ * with no side effects — byte-identical v4 behavior.
+ */
+export function buildSandboxLauncher(profile, ctx) {
+    // Flag-off: v4 env-only behavior.
+    if (!profile.mode || profile.mode === 'off') {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const platform = process.platform;
+    const onUnsupported = profile.onUnsupported ?? 'fallback';
+    if (platform === 'darwin') {
+        const sbplProfile = buildMacosSbplProfile(profile, ctx);
+        return {
+            bin: 'sandbox-exec',
+            prefixArgs: ['-p', sbplProfile],
+        };
+    }
+    if (platform === 'linux') {
+        const launcher = buildBwrapLauncher(profile, ctx);
+        if (launcher)
+            return launcher;
+        // bwrap absent — fall through to unsupported handling.
+    }
+    // Platform unsupported or bwrap absent.
+    return _handleUnsupported(profile, ctx, onUnsupported, platform);
+}
+function _handleUnsupported(_profile, ctx, onUnsupported, platform) {
+    const reason = platform === 'linux'
+        ? 'bwrap not found on PATH'
+        : `unsupported platform: ${platform}`;
+    if (onUnsupported === 'fail') {
+        throw new ConfinementUnsupportedError(`M52 confinement required but unavailable: ${reason}. ` +
+            `Set onUnsupported:'fallback' to allow env-only v4 behavior.`);
+    }
+    // 'fallback': audit the downgrade and return null (env-only v4).
+    audit({
+        action: 'confinement.fallback',
+        repo: ctx.worktree,
+        sandboxId: null,
+        summary: `OS confinement not available (${reason}); running with env-only containment (v4 behavior).`,
+        result: 'ok',
+    });
+    return null;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// confinementProfileFor — resolve effective profile from cfg
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Resolve the effective ConfinementProfile for a specific engine from
+ * `cfg.foundry.confinement`. Per-engine key overrides the `*` (fleet-wide)
+ * default; absent → mode:'off' (v4 env-only, no side effects).
+ *
+ * A `*` key in cfg.foundry.confinement sets the fleet-wide default.
+ */
+export function confinementProfileFor(engine, cfg) {
+    const confinement = cfg.foundry?.confinement;
+    if (!confinement)
+        return { mode: 'off' };
+    // Per-engine key overrides the fleet-wide `*` default.
+    const perEngine = confinement[engine];
+    const fleetDefault = confinement['*'];
+    const merged = {
+        mode: 'off',
+        ...fleetDefault,
+        ...perEngine,
+    };
+    return merged;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Error type
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Terminal error thrown when OS confinement is required (mode:'os',
+ * onUnsupported:'fail') but the platform has no supported jail binary.
+ */
+export class ConfinementUnsupportedError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'ConfinementUnsupportedError';
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=confine.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/confine.js.map

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