@arnilo/prism 0.2.6 → 0.2.7

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package/docs/index.md CHANGED
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Prism is a TypeScript/Node.js agent harness. Host apps and extension packages ow
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  ## Identity and governance
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  - [Agent identity](agent-identity.md): host-verified `Principal` / `AgentIdentity`, delegation narrowing, ownership projection, and redacted telemetry refs for enterprise runs/tools/MCP/A2A/workflows; optional OIDC/JWKS verifier adapter (`@arnilo/prism-credentials-node/oidc` — pinned issuer/audience/JWKS, bounded claims, fail closed).
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- - [Policy and audit](policy-and-audit.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-policy` decision ledger (allow/deny/modify/approval), evidence refs only, cursor-paginated WORM export, and durable PostgreSQL composition; 0.0.28 adds the OPA REST evaluator (`@arnilo/prism-policy/opa` — pinned SSRF-checked endpoint, redacted input, fail-closed deny, optional bundle-revision pin); 0.2.1 makes the OPA decision fetch DNS-pinned (core `pinnedFetch`).
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+ - [Policy and audit](policy-and-audit.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-policy` decision ledger (allow/deny/modify/approval), evidence refs only, cursor-paginated WORM export, durable PostgreSQL composition, and multi-party approvals — immutable requests with role/quorum requirements, requester/approver separation, expiry, revocation, bounded delegation, rejection, policy-revision pins, and atomic grant consumption via a host `ApprovalAuthority` (NIST AC-5 applied as control guidance, not certification); 0.0.28 adds the OPA REST evaluator (`@arnilo/prism-policy/opa` — pinned SSRF-checked endpoint, redacted input, fail-closed deny, optional bundle-revision pin); 0.2.1 makes the OPA decision fetch DNS-pinned (core `pinnedFetch`).
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+ - [Signed, hash-chained audit export](audit-export.md): `@arnilo/prism-policy` exports tenant-scoped audit records as signed, hash-chained batches — canonical RFC 8785 envelopes, SHA-256 record chain, host-signed manifests, WORM acknowledgement gating cursor advance, SIEM mirroring with replayable pending status, redaction/legal-hold provenance, and independent `verifyAuditBatch`/CLI verification with no key storage or vendor SDKs in Prism.
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  - [Model routing](model-routing.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-model-router` allow-list/residency/budget/rate/circuit/fallback governance with redacted diagnostics; budget admission reserves per-request caps atomically (commit/release/TTL reconciliation); durable state requires awaited identity-scoped calls; host-configurable selection policies (reference cost/latency policy ranks by `ModelCost` then in-memory latency EMA fed from `recordOutcome`).
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  ## Agent/session runtime
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ Prism is a TypeScript/Node.js agent harness. Host apps and extension packages ow
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  - [Guardrails](guardrails.md): typed fail-closed input/output/tool checks with buffered provider output and redacted decision records.
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  - [Agent events](agent-events.md): live `session.subscribe` plus durable `AgentEventSource` page/subscribe/resume for cross-replica reconnect; message/progress deltas never create spans. Durable sources: PostgreSQL `LISTEN`/`NOTIFY` (reference, `@arnilo/prism-session-store-postgres` root export) and NATS JetStream (`@arnilo/prism-session-store-nats`, FR-5) with restart-stable durable consumer identity (`prism_<hmac16>`) for cursor resume across crash/restart.
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  - [Observability](observability.md): OTel GenAI agent/provider/tool hierarchy, host context parenting, bounded trace linkage, safe evaluation events, controlled metrics, and exporter isolation.
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+ - [Operations runbook](operations.md): the high-availability/failover runbook for plan 027 Task 6 — LeaseStore/CheckpointStore fencing model, local-registry limitations, uncertain-commit replay rules, the recorded two-replica drill (`scripts/phase27-ha.test.mjs`, evidence in `docs/_evidence/phase27-ha-evidence.json`), failover ceiling, and the prohibition on manual lease unlocks.
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+ - [Disaster recovery and backup operations](disaster-recovery.md): the plan 027 Task 7 runbook — standard-tool backup/restore/migration-rollback/PITR/DR drill (`scripts/phase27-dr.test.mjs`), guarded commands, app-level verification, the rollback decision tree, and measured RPO/RTO in `docs/_evidence/phase27-dr-evidence.json`.
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+ - [Data classification and field-level redaction](data-classification.md): the plan 027 Task 8 contract — `applyFieldPolicy` walking JSON-like values with allow/redact/tokenize/deny decisions, the fail-closed protected default, per-boundary `labelFor` hints (no auto-discovery), sparse-copy overhead, and the ERP-T9 leak matrix incl. egress/audit/telemetry seams.
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  - [Evaluations](evaluations.md): deterministic and bounded trace/model-judge/pairwise scoring, CI thresholds, OTel trace-reference linkage, coding/browser adversarial fixtures, ID-only linkage to immutable owned run feedback, and optional durable PostgreSQL records.
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  - [Runs and usage ledger](runs-and-usage.md): durable run/event/tool/usage persistence, optional bounded FIFO durability policies, session snapshot caching, and immutable run/trace feedback.
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  - [Performance limits](performance.md): **0.1.0 capacity envelopes** (frozen performance contract, 24 network-free + 16 protected p95 rows, startup/pack rows), 0.0.26 coding-intelligence/process/forge/egress network-free evidence, 0.0.25 durable-loop/HITL/A2UI network-free evidence, 0.0.24 distributed event/effect PostgreSQL evidence, 0.0.23 enterprise state evidence, 0.0.15 network-free provider/RAG/memory benchmark evidence and frozen caps, bounded evaluation traces/judges/reports, and production sizing assumptions.
@@ -34,7 +38,7 @@ Prism is a TypeScript/Node.js agent harness. Host apps and extension packages ow
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  - [Database persistence](database-persistence.md): production persistence contracts, shared checksummed migration/full-shape catalog primitives (`@arnilo/prism/testing/persistence-schema`), conditional append, indexes, `readBranchPath`, reference relational schema, retention/legal-hold/quota lifecycle (`lifecycle`), and NoSQL mapping. `appendSession` gains version/CAS (migration `008_session_version`); durable adapters must pass `assertStateConcurrencyConforms` (`@arnilo/prism/testing/state-concurrency-conformance`: approval/checkpoint-CAS/cursor/idempotency/reservation/conversation-metadata/unknown-outcome probes; memory leg in `npm test`, durable legs in `test:postgres`/`test:nats`, `scripts/phase22-conformance.test.mjs` gate accounting).
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  - [SQLite persistence](sqlite-persistence.md): optional `better-sqlite3` adapter with session/run storage, checkpoints/leases, feedback, FTS `searchSessions` (migration-v4), and transactionally verified/backfilled migration metadata.
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  - [PostgreSQL persistence](postgres-persistence.md): optional pooled `pg` adapter with session/run/checkpoint/lease/feedback storage, FTS `searchSessions` (migration-v4), advisory-locked checksummed/full-shape migrations, and opt-in live conformance.
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- - [Enterprise PostgreSQL state](enterprise-postgres-state.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-enterprise-postgres` composition for durable policy/evaluation/work-idempotency/model-router/`toolEffects` state, exact ownership, checksummed migrations (001-003; 003 adds router budget reservation slots), and explicit cleanup.
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+ - [Enterprise PostgreSQL state](enterprise-postgres-state.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-enterprise-postgres` composition for durable policy/evaluation/work-idempotency/model-router/`toolEffects` state, transactional ERP outbox/inbox messaging, and multi-party approval records (`createPostgresApprovalStore`, migration 005 — one locked row per request, revision-checked terminal transitions, caller-transaction grant consumption), exact tenant ownership, checksummed migrations (001-005; 003 adds router budget reservation slots; 004 adds bounded at-least-once dispatch), and explicit cleanup.
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  - [Migration guide](migration.md): **0.1.4 → 0.1.5** documented breaking cut — deprecated-option removal (the inert provider request knobs, `maxToolRounds` alias, observational-memory flat keys/worker aliases, `autoResizeImages`, `INIT_PROVIDERS`) with exact replacement table, before/after examples, and fail-closed refusal behavior; **0.0.28 → 0.1.0** release-candidate hardening (no migration); **0.0.17 → 0.1.0 upgrade matrix** (store compatibility per release line: compatible / tested migration / tested refusal, plus breaking-default callouts); **0.0.27** ACP coding-host interop (capability advertise-when, session modes/config, MCP select, lifecycle events, elicitation); **0.0.26** coding intelligence, managed processes, forge, and safe egress; **0.0.25** durable custom loops and shared human-in-the-loop decisions; **0.0.24** distributed events and recoverable tool effects; **0.0.23** enterprise PostgreSQL state adapters (async router and work reconciliation); **0.0.22** third-party behavior integrations (Caveman, Ponytail); **0.0.21** coding-tool capability gaps (`outputMode`, glob, read-before-write, delete/move, aggregator 9/4); **0.0.20** progressive skill disclosure, empty registry default, `load_skill`, priority budget demotion, optional tool-result fold; **0.0.19** observational memory lifecycle; **0.0.15** OpenAI hosted tools/continuation/Realtime, exact AI SDK v4 matrix, RAG lifecycle/reranking/trust/status, and memory export/rebuild; **0.0.14** conversations, memory consent/lifecycle, artifact co-work review, AG-UI co-work events, scoped M365/GWS OAuth connectors, browser checkpoints, device contracts, and Alibaba/Ollama providers; plus prior release migrations.
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  - [Node JSONL session store](node-jsonl-session-store.md): development-only JSONL file adapter for single-process Node hosts; no cross-process safety; `searchSessions` throws `SessionSearchUnsupportedError`.
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  - [Persistence, credentials, and multimodality primitives](persistence-credentials-multimodality-primitives.md): Plan 056 inventory — session/run-ledger/persistence contracts, credential/OAuth seams, content/resource/model capabilities, package dependency matrix, conformance matrix, and threat model for production adapters.
@@ -104,7 +108,7 @@ Prism is a TypeScript/Node.js agent harness. Host apps and extension packages ow
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  ## CLI/RPC
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  - [CLI/RPC](cli-rpc.md): Run print/json modes and LF-delimited RPC over the public AgentSession runtime, including mid-run `steer`, branch-handle results, fixed `forkSession`, and `checkout`. `prism init` scaffolds a tiny TypeScript project with one selected provider and an offline mock test; `prism providers add <name>` scaffolds an OpenAI-compatible provider package (manifest, provider, models, cache helpers, conformance test, docs stub).
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- - [Workflows](workflows.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-workflows` typed bounded DAG orchestration — explicit recursive definition revisions, exact-owner cancellation/active identity, finite hard limits, durable human suspend/resume, schedules/background execution, revocable proactive schedule capability tokens, nested workflows, replay, coordination, events, and optional RPC/Web bindings. Compose coding plans/checkpoints via workspace Markdown + `state.coding` without a second runtime. Active-run registry is non-durable, in-process only, with bounded sweep/cap cleanup. Interactive TUI (C-012) deferred.
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+ - [Workflows](workflows.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-workflows` typed bounded DAG orchestration plus linear durable sagas — explicit recursive definition revisions, exact-owner cancellation/active identity, finite hard limits, durable human suspend/resume, schedules/background execution, revocable proactive schedule capability tokens, nested workflows, replay, coordination, events, saga compensation/reconciliation, and optional RPC/Web bindings. Compose coding plans/checkpoints via workspace Markdown + `state.coding` without a second runtime. Active-run registry is non-durable, in-process only, with bounded sweep/cap cleanup. Interactive TUI (C-012) deferred.
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  - [Workflow orchestration primitives](workflow-orchestration-primitives.md): architecture inventory — workflow adapters consume core `CheckpointStore`, `LeaseStore`, and bounded `EventMultiplexer`; run control and optional RPC commands stay package-local.
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  - [Workflow/TUI scope](workflow-tui-primitives.md): records why 0.0.5 ships workflow APIs/RPC control but no interactive terminal UI.
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@@ -129,7 +133,8 @@ Prism is a TypeScript/Node.js agent harness. Host apps and extension packages ow
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  - [Ponytail behavior integration](ponytail.md): optional `@arnilo/prism-ponytail` — upstream Ponytail skills/commands, `ponytail-mode` injector, session `ponytail-mode` persistence; resolves peer `@dietrichgebert/ponytail` or `upstreamPath`; opt-in (not in code/sdk profiles).
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  ## Release and install
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- - [Release and install](release-and-install.md): current **0.2.6** 50-package graph (root + 49 workspace packages) — plan 026 the fully-featured coding-agent-readiness cut: **host-selected PTY** (`pty: true` delegates only to the host `ptyBackend`, fails closed as unsupported when absent, bounded resize/TERM/attach caps), **indexed code search** (host-owned incremental index seam with explicit `indexed_literal`/`semantic` modes, literal remains the default, stale/failed/untrusted indexes fail closed `ERR_PRISM_INDEX_*`, results labeled `untrusted_index`), **coding workspaces** (`createCodingWorkspaceLifecycle`: durable CheckpointStore CAS records + LeaseStore fencing, locked worktrees, credential-free fingerprints, cleanup refusal matrix), **durable recovery** (process intent/ACP `activeRun` refs over Postgres/SQLite stores with attach-if-attested `recover()` and durable fence-checked cancellation, never fabricated exits), **patch review and diagnostics** (`createCodingPatchReviewManifest` + `assertCodingPatchAccepted` with pending/accepted/rejected/superseded bound to digest + revision + identity, opt-in LSP `syncDocument`/`diagnosticDelta`), and the **protected real coding journey** (packed consumer through real provider/Docker/Postgres/GitHub/Playwright/PTY services with retained evidence report; forge breadth GitLab/Bitbucket stays demand-gated); then plan 025 the maintainability-and-bounded-performance cut: **god-module splits** (the six remaining implementation monoliths — `src/contracts-core.ts` 1,719 L, `src/agent-session.ts` 2,049 L, `workflows/src/run.ts` 1,227 L, `server/src/handler.ts` 1,005 L, `coding-agent/src/repository.ts` 974 L, `ag-ui/src/acp/agent.ts` 836 L — split into cohesive family files behind preserved barrels, compat-preserving with zero breaking deltas, no `exports`-map subpath, `RuntimeAgentSession` kept as one class with a recorded reason), **persistence-mechanics dedup** (21 pure ownership/cursor/checkpoint/lifecycle/search helpers moved into the dependency-free `session-store-codecs`; postgres/sqlite adapters shrank 273 lines; SQL dialect stays per-adapter; no schema/shape change; cross-store conformance green), **bounded accumulation removed** (per-push `Buffer.concat` in language framing + tar parsing → chunk-array readers; framing ~100–200× faster at 4,000 chunks, tar linear at 8 MiB, caps fail-closed byte-identical; CLI `collectOutput` audited already linear), **dead-code cleanup internal-only** (62 candidates triaged: 2 internal removals + 60 allow-listed in `docs/_evidence/phase25-dead-exports-triage.md`), and **coverage close** (76 behavior-backed regressions; core 90.53/84.20/90.54 → 91.43/84.80/91.60); additive-only compat (105 helper exports), no migration; then plan 024 the package-documentation-and-compatibility-truth cut: **umbrella wording matches manifests** (`@arnilo/prism-providers` installs 11 of 14 provider adapters — Azure/Bedrock/Vertex are added separately by `prism-all`; `prism-all` installs 20 direct / 43 transitive packages and omits document-reader, OpenAPI tools, NATS, Caveman, Ponytail; membership unchanged in 0.2.x), **manifest-derived package truth** (`scripts/package-truth.mjs` → `scripts/package-truth.json` is the single source for counts, provider membership, and closures; docs literals regenerate from it and drift fails the gates), **peer-version policy Decision A** (exact `@arnilo/prism: 0.2.4` pins, atomic-upgrade rule, ERESOLVE refusal for partial upgrades, `^1.0.0` widening at 1.x), and **current-line truth** (`docs/0.1.0-readiness.md` at the 0.2.x line with 0.1.7 as the terminal 0.1.x baseline); no runtime contract delta (compat gate at 0.2.4: version literal only), no migration; then plan 023 the build-coverage-and-release-evidence-integrity cut: **build serialization** (dependency-free `scripts/with-build-lock.mjs` — one O_EXCL lockfile at `node_modules/.prism-build.lock` serializing every emit/test leaf so concurrent compilers can never expose a partial live `dist/`, stale-PID reclaim, env-overridable `PRISM_BUILD_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS`, fail-closed; documented direct-`tsc` caveat), **corrected workspace coverage denominators** (package-local `--test-coverage-include=dist/**` so imported core `dist` no longer pollutes workspace rows — `mcp` 45.47→90.25, `rag` 19.70→94.82; evidence-based per-package thresholds in `scripts/coverage-thresholds.json` with `protectedException` for durable-leg packages shown separately, machine-readable `scripts/coverage-summary.json`), **machine-auditable release skip manifest** (`scripts/release-skip-manifest.mjs` → `scripts/release-evidence.json`: every surface recorded `pass`/`skip`/`blocked`/`protected` with reason and required env; the 33 protected/live skips named; a required surface without evidence records `blocked` and fails the release gate fail-closed — missing credentials/services can never convert into a green release), and **stabilized quality gates** (Biome 2.x `preset` config migration with zero lint diagnostics, the racy 150ms MCP bridge timing assert replaced by a deterministic barrier, load-sensitive guards carry documented `ponytail:` ceilings, machine-readable `lint-report.sarif` + `unused-report.json` retained by CI); no runtime contract delta (compat gate at 0.2.3: version literal only), no migration; then plan 022 the concurrent-state-and-durability-integrity cut: atomic model-budget reservation (`ModelRouterStateStore.reserveBudget`/`commitBudget`/`releaseBudget` with fencing tokens, `reservationTtlMs` expiry and unknown-usage reconciliation, rate/budget key-map caps with LRU eviction that never drops a held reservation), atomic conversation metadata (`SessionRecord.version` + `appendSession` `expectedVersion` CAS across Postgres/SQLite — create-only `0`, exact-version `N>0`, legacy last-write-wins when omitted; `SessionMetadataConflictError` `metadata_conflict` with versions only, HTTP 409; concurrent create/branch/archive single-statement with branch caps inside the CAS, archive wins, deleted rows never resurrect), single-consumer `EventMultiplexer` (`EventMultiplexerError` `ERR_PRISM_EVENT_MULTIPLEXER_SINGLE_CONSUMER` instead of silent queue sharing), restart-stable NATS durable consumer identity (`prism_<hmac16>` with no random suffix — crash-resumed subscribe continues from the last ack, orphaned 0.2.1 consumers reclaimed on clean stop), and bounded non-durable active-run registries (sweep + fail-closed 512 cap `ERR_PRISM_WORKFLOW_RUN_REGISTRY_OVERFLOW`); new regression surface `scripts/phase22-security.test.mjs` (4 blockers + gate accounting over built public entrypoints) + packed plain-JS `security22.mjs` consumer + the `@arnilo/prism/testing/state-concurrency-conformance` harness (7 probes across memory/Postgres/SQLite/NATS legs, no timing-only sleeps) + the `scripts/phase22-conformance.test.mjs` gate; additive-only compat (new exports only, no removals); forward-only migrations 008 (`prism_sessions.version`) and 003 (`prism_model_router_budgets.reservations`); migration `0.2.1 → 0.2.2`; then plan 021 the provider-completion-and-outbound-trust-boundaries cut: strict stream completion is the shared OpenAI-compatible default (truncated streams fail `incomplete_delta`, explicit `strictCompletion: false` opt-out), bounded success bodies via `readBoundedResponseJson` on all discovery/quota/embeddings/upload/OAuth JSON endpoints (65,536-byte ceiling, depth/property/shape caps), DNS-pinned OIDC JWKS/OPA/content fetches through the core `pinnedFetch` primitive with 3xx redirects rejected outright (private/metadata answers fail closed `ssrf_denied`), shared bounded OAuth device/token polling (`pollDeviceCodeToken`) across provider-openai and credentials-node, and the four edge fixes (Azure/Vertex credential-once, Bedrock duplicate-case/repeated-query SigV4 canonicalization, OpenAI upload failed-DELETE retention, cache `__overflow__` tokens-only); public-entrypoint threat-suite `scripts/phase21-security.test.mjs` + packed plain-JS consumer; additive-only compat (MCP transport helpers re-exported from core, no removals); migration `0.2.0 → 0.2.1`; then plan 020 the fail-closed runtime-and-sandbox-security cut on the 0.2.x review-remediation line: durable-resume decision validation in core (`assertValidAgentRunResume` — unknown decisions/malformed batches fail closed with `ERR_PRISM_DECISION_*` before any state claim, checkpoint write, or tool execution; server parser remains defense in depth), isolated work-tool subprocess environments (`@arnilo/prism-work-tools` — fixed base allow-list + explicit env + forced HOME/telemetry + late-bound per-identity tokens, 64-name/64-KiB caps, absolute binary/configDir, linear output capture), and explicit sandbox capabilities (`@arnilo/prism-coding-security` — `SandboxAdapter.capabilities` with omission-is-false fail-closed resolution, `SandboxCodingComposition.capabilities` from verified wiring, `containmentClaim` deprecated as the conservative projection; Docker reports only verified controls, native reports filesystem/process/privilege `false`); public-entrypoint security conformance (`scripts/phase20-security.test.mjs`, wired into `security:threat-suites`), packed plain-JS consumer regressions, and the sandbox-browser workflow's fail-loud Docker/native capability evidence gate — 0.2.0 never ships while a blocker is skipped; migration and rollback notes in `docs/migration.md` `0.1.7 → 0.2.0`, store-compatible with 0.1.7 in both directions; 0.1.7 was the performance-and-DX patch — dependency-free `createCacheTelemetry()` per-provider/model cache hit/miss aggregator (bounded cardinality with `__overflow__`, token counters/rates only, host-activated), host-configurable `ModelRouterSelectionPolicy` on `createModelRouter` with the reference `createCostLatencySelection` (ModelCost rank then in-memory latency EMA, default ordered behavior byte-identical), `prism providers add <name>` OpenAI-compatible provider scaffold (manifest/provider/models/cache/conformance test/docs stub, npm-name + traversal + symlink-escape validation, placeholders only), and the async `AgUiProjection` verification closeout (plan 009 Task 15 evidence recorded, no new code); plan 017 the documented breaking cut — deprecated-option removal with `docs/migration.md` `0.1.4 → 0.1.5` section and reviewed compat-baseline regeneration via `--allow-break` then `--update-baseline`: the inert provider request knobs, `RunOptions.maxToolRounds`, observational-memory flat settings keys + top-level worker aliases, `ReadToolOptions.autoResizeImages`, `INIT_PROVIDERS`; all removals fail closed naming their replacement; plan 016 internal god-module split — `agents.ts`/`contracts.ts` reorganized behind barrel re-exports with a byte-identical public entry surface, measured tree-shaking improvement in `scripts/phase16-baseline.json`, and additive `@arnilo/prism-browser` Chrome DevTools Protocol capabilities — `browser_evaluate`/`browser_observe` and `block_urls`/`unblock_urls`/`throttle`/`emulate` act actions; plan 015 dead-code and deprecation hygiene on the frozen 0.1.x line — parameterized benchmark runner `scripts/benchmark.mjs` absorbing the per-version runners, archived review-coverage evidence in `docs/_evidence/`, non-blocking unused-code sweep `npm run sweep:unused`, opt-in checkpoint persistence for loaded-skill names and read-path sets; plan 014 Alibaba provider enrichment — embeddings, video input, verified compatible-mode surface decision table; plan 013 post-release hardening — build single-flight, MCP SSE relay test, combined coverage summary, canonical manifest-count narrative, ACP modes/config persistence guidance; Phase 12 release-candidate hardening; plan 012 — freeze manifest, compatibility matrix, upgrade matrix, packed-install e2e journeys, restart-recovery evidence, capacity envelopes, security policy), exact-peer/install/tarball rules, deterministic resumable publication and publish dry-run, frozen 0.1.x compatibility and support matrix (Node/PostgreSQL/platform/provider/protocol pins and unsupported combinations, machine-checked against `scripts/phase12-freeze-manifest.json`), protected PostgreSQL gate, pinned supply-chain gates, offline tests, the 0.0.15 provider/AI-SDK/RAG/memory protected live-canary matrix, and sandbox-browser Docker/Playwright gates. 0.2.6 (plan 026 Task 7) adds the protected coding journey: `scripts/phase26-coding-journey.test.mjs` runs a packed consumer through real provider calls, a digest-pinned Docker sandbox, the durable Postgres worktree lifecycle, provider-driven ACP edits with policy approval, named checks with `diagnosticDelta`, patch review over the server ArtifactService, cross-replica process recovery, durable cancellation, real GitHub PR push/reconcile/cleanup, host Playwright inspection, and the host PTY adapter (frozen profile) — the retained `scripts/phase26-coding-journey-report.json` gates release evidence (pass/blocked/protected, never a passing skip).
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+ - [0.2.7 Task 0 scope evidence](release-0.2.7-evidence.md): frozen ERP primitives, demand decisions, threat mappings, budgets, protected-gate policy, and API ownership; not a production-readiness claim.
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+ - [Release and install](release-and-install.md): current **0.2.7** 50-package graph (root + 49 workspace packages) — plan 026 the fully-featured coding-agent-readiness cut: **host-selected PTY** (`pty: true` delegates only to the host `ptyBackend`, fails closed as unsupported when absent, bounded resize/TERM/attach caps), **indexed code search** (host-owned incremental index seam with explicit `indexed_literal`/`semantic` modes, literal remains the default, stale/failed/untrusted indexes fail closed `ERR_PRISM_INDEX_*`, results labeled `untrusted_index`), **coding workspaces** (`createCodingWorkspaceLifecycle`: durable CheckpointStore CAS records + LeaseStore fencing, locked worktrees, credential-free fingerprints, cleanup refusal matrix), **durable recovery** (process intent/ACP `activeRun` refs over Postgres/SQLite stores with attach-if-attested `recover()` and durable fence-checked cancellation, never fabricated exits), **patch review and diagnostics** (`createCodingPatchReviewManifest` + `assertCodingPatchAccepted` with pending/accepted/rejected/superseded bound to digest + revision + identity, opt-in LSP `syncDocument`/`diagnosticDelta`), and the **protected real coding journey** (packed consumer through real provider/Docker/Postgres/GitHub/Playwright/PTY services with retained evidence report; forge breadth GitLab/Bitbucket stays demand-gated); then plan 025 the maintainability-and-bounded-performance cut: **god-module splits** (the six remaining implementation monoliths — `src/contracts-core.ts` 1,719 L, `src/agent-session.ts` 2,049 L, `workflows/src/run.ts` 1,227 L, `server/src/handler.ts` 1,005 L, `coding-agent/src/repository.ts` 974 L, `ag-ui/src/acp/agent.ts` 836 L — split into cohesive family files behind preserved barrels, compat-preserving with zero breaking deltas, no `exports`-map subpath, `RuntimeAgentSession` kept as one class with a recorded reason), **persistence-mechanics dedup** (21 pure ownership/cursor/checkpoint/lifecycle/search helpers moved into the dependency-free `session-store-codecs`; postgres/sqlite adapters shrank 273 lines; SQL dialect stays per-adapter; no schema/shape change; cross-store conformance green), **bounded accumulation removed** (per-push `Buffer.concat` in language framing + tar parsing → chunk-array readers; framing ~100–200× faster at 4,000 chunks, tar linear at 8 MiB, caps fail-closed byte-identical; CLI `collectOutput` audited already linear), **dead-code cleanup internal-only** (62 candidates triaged: 2 internal removals + 60 allow-listed in `docs/_evidence/phase25-dead-exports-triage.md`), and **coverage close** (76 behavior-backed regressions; core 90.53/84.20/90.54 → 91.43/84.80/91.60); additive-only compat (105 helper exports), no migration; then plan 024 the package-documentation-and-compatibility-truth cut: **umbrella wording matches manifests** (`@arnilo/prism-providers` installs 11 of 14 provider adapters — Azure/Bedrock/Vertex are added separately by `prism-all`; `prism-all` installs 20 direct / 43 transitive packages and omits document-reader, OpenAPI tools, NATS, Caveman, Ponytail; membership unchanged in 0.2.x), **manifest-derived package truth** (`scripts/package-truth.mjs` → `scripts/package-truth.json` is the single source for counts, provider membership, and closures; docs literals regenerate from it and drift fails the gates), **peer-version policy Decision A** (exact `@arnilo/prism: 0.2.4` pins, atomic-upgrade rule, ERESOLVE refusal for partial upgrades, `^1.0.0` widening at 1.x), and **current-line truth** (`docs/0.1.0-readiness.md` at the 0.2.x line with 0.1.7 as the terminal 0.1.x baseline); no runtime contract delta (compat gate at 0.2.4: version literal only), no migration; then plan 023 the build-coverage-and-release-evidence-integrity cut: **build serialization** (dependency-free `scripts/with-build-lock.mjs` — one O_EXCL lockfile at `node_modules/.prism-build.lock` serializing every emit/test leaf so concurrent compilers can never expose a partial live `dist/`, stale-PID reclaim, env-overridable `PRISM_BUILD_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS`, fail-closed; documented direct-`tsc` caveat), **corrected workspace coverage denominators** (package-local `--test-coverage-include=dist/**` so imported core `dist` no longer pollutes workspace rows — `mcp` 45.47→90.25, `rag` 19.70→94.82; evidence-based per-package thresholds in `scripts/coverage-thresholds.json` with `protectedException` for durable-leg packages shown separately, machine-readable `scripts/coverage-summary.json`), **machine-auditable release skip manifest** (`scripts/release-skip-manifest.mjs` → `scripts/release-evidence.json`: every surface recorded `pass`/`skip`/`blocked`/`protected` with reason and required env; the 33 protected/live skips named; a required surface without evidence records `blocked` and fails the release gate fail-closed — missing credentials/services can never convert into a green release), and **stabilized quality gates** (Biome 2.x `preset` config migration with zero lint diagnostics, the racy 150ms MCP bridge timing assert replaced by a deterministic barrier, load-sensitive guards carry documented `ponytail:` ceilings, machine-readable `lint-report.sarif` + `unused-report.json` retained by CI); no runtime contract delta (compat gate at 0.2.3: version literal only), no migration; then plan 022 the concurrent-state-and-durability-integrity cut: atomic model-budget reservation (`ModelRouterStateStore.reserveBudget`/`commitBudget`/`releaseBudget` with fencing tokens, `reservationTtlMs` expiry and unknown-usage reconciliation, rate/budget key-map caps with LRU eviction that never drops a held reservation), atomic conversation metadata (`SessionRecord.version` + `appendSession` `expectedVersion` CAS across Postgres/SQLite — create-only `0`, exact-version `N>0`, legacy last-write-wins when omitted; `SessionMetadataConflictError` `metadata_conflict` with versions only, HTTP 409; concurrent create/branch/archive single-statement with branch caps inside the CAS, archive wins, deleted rows never resurrect), single-consumer `EventMultiplexer` (`EventMultiplexerError` `ERR_PRISM_EVENT_MULTIPLEXER_SINGLE_CONSUMER` instead of silent queue sharing), restart-stable NATS durable consumer identity (`prism_<hmac16>` with no random suffix — crash-resumed subscribe continues from the last ack, orphaned 0.2.1 consumers reclaimed on clean stop), and bounded non-durable active-run registries (sweep + fail-closed 512 cap `ERR_PRISM_WORKFLOW_RUN_REGISTRY_OVERFLOW`); new regression surface `scripts/phase22-security.test.mjs` (4 blockers + gate accounting over built public entrypoints) + packed plain-JS `security22.mjs` consumer + the `@arnilo/prism/testing/state-concurrency-conformance` harness (7 probes across memory/Postgres/SQLite/NATS legs, no timing-only sleeps) + the `scripts/phase22-conformance.test.mjs` gate; additive-only compat (new exports only, no removals); forward-only migrations 008 (`prism_sessions.version`) and 003 (`prism_model_router_budgets.reservations`); migration `0.2.1 → 0.2.2`; then plan 021 the provider-completion-and-outbound-trust-boundaries cut: strict stream completion is the shared OpenAI-compatible default (truncated streams fail `incomplete_delta`, explicit `strictCompletion: false` opt-out), bounded success bodies via `readBoundedResponseJson` on all discovery/quota/embeddings/upload/OAuth JSON endpoints (65,536-byte ceiling, depth/property/shape caps), DNS-pinned OIDC JWKS/OPA/content fetches through the core `pinnedFetch` primitive with 3xx redirects rejected outright (private/metadata answers fail closed `ssrf_denied`), shared bounded OAuth device/token polling (`pollDeviceCodeToken`) across provider-openai and credentials-node, and the four edge fixes (Azure/Vertex credential-once, Bedrock duplicate-case/repeated-query SigV4 canonicalization, OpenAI upload failed-DELETE retention, cache `__overflow__` tokens-only); public-entrypoint threat-suite `scripts/phase21-security.test.mjs` + packed plain-JS consumer; additive-only compat (MCP transport helpers re-exported from core, no removals); migration `0.2.0 → 0.2.1`; then plan 020 the fail-closed runtime-and-sandbox-security cut on the 0.2.x review-remediation line: durable-resume decision validation in core (`assertValidAgentRunResume` — unknown decisions/malformed batches fail closed with `ERR_PRISM_DECISION_*` before any state claim, checkpoint write, or tool execution; server parser remains defense in depth), isolated work-tool subprocess environments (`@arnilo/prism-work-tools` — fixed base allow-list + explicit env + forced HOME/telemetry + late-bound per-identity tokens, 64-name/64-KiB caps, absolute binary/configDir, linear output capture), and explicit sandbox capabilities (`@arnilo/prism-coding-security` — `SandboxAdapter.capabilities` with omission-is-false fail-closed resolution, `SandboxCodingComposition.capabilities` from verified wiring, `containmentClaim` deprecated as the conservative projection; Docker reports only verified controls, native reports filesystem/process/privilege `false`); public-entrypoint security conformance (`scripts/phase20-security.test.mjs`, wired into `security:threat-suites`), packed plain-JS consumer regressions, and the sandbox-browser workflow's fail-loud Docker/native capability evidence gate — 0.2.0 never ships while a blocker is skipped; migration and rollback notes in `docs/migration.md` `0.1.7 → 0.2.0`, store-compatible with 0.1.7 in both directions; 0.1.7 was the performance-and-DX patch — dependency-free `createCacheTelemetry()` per-provider/model cache hit/miss aggregator (bounded cardinality with `__overflow__`, token counters/rates only, host-activated), host-configurable `ModelRouterSelectionPolicy` on `createModelRouter` with the reference `createCostLatencySelection` (ModelCost rank then in-memory latency EMA, default ordered behavior byte-identical), `prism providers add <name>` OpenAI-compatible provider scaffold (manifest/provider/models/cache/conformance test/docs stub, npm-name + traversal + symlink-escape validation, placeholders only), and the async `AgUiProjection` verification closeout (plan 009 Task 15 evidence recorded, no new code); plan 017 the documented breaking cut — deprecated-option removal with `docs/migration.md` `0.1.4 → 0.1.5` section and reviewed compat-baseline regeneration via `--allow-break` then `--update-baseline`: the inert provider request knobs, `RunOptions.maxToolRounds`, observational-memory flat settings keys + top-level worker aliases, `ReadToolOptions.autoResizeImages`, `INIT_PROVIDERS`; all removals fail closed naming their replacement; plan 016 internal god-module split — `agents.ts`/`contracts.ts` reorganized behind barrel re-exports with a byte-identical public entry surface, measured tree-shaking improvement in `scripts/phase16-baseline.json`, and additive `@arnilo/prism-browser` Chrome DevTools Protocol capabilities — `browser_evaluate`/`browser_observe` and `block_urls`/`unblock_urls`/`throttle`/`emulate` act actions; plan 015 dead-code and deprecation hygiene on the frozen 0.1.x line — parameterized benchmark runner `scripts/benchmark.mjs` absorbing the per-version runners, archived review-coverage evidence in `docs/_evidence/`, non-blocking unused-code sweep `npm run sweep:unused`, opt-in checkpoint persistence for loaded-skill names and read-path sets; plan 014 Alibaba provider enrichment — embeddings, video input, verified compatible-mode surface decision table; plan 013 post-release hardening — build single-flight, MCP SSE relay test, combined coverage summary, canonical manifest-count narrative, ACP modes/config persistence guidance; Phase 12 release-candidate hardening; plan 012 — freeze manifest, compatibility matrix, upgrade matrix, packed-install e2e journeys, restart-recovery evidence, capacity envelopes, security policy), exact-peer/install/tarball rules, deterministic resumable publication and publish dry-run, frozen 0.1.x compatibility and support matrix (Node/PostgreSQL/platform/provider/protocol pins and unsupported combinations, machine-checked against `scripts/phase12-freeze-manifest.json`), protected PostgreSQL gate, pinned supply-chain gates, offline tests, the 0.0.15 provider/AI-SDK/RAG/memory protected live-canary matrix, and sandbox-browser Docker/Playwright gates. 0.2.6 (plan 026 Task 7) adds the protected coding journey: `scripts/phase26-coding-journey.test.mjs` runs a packed consumer through real provider calls, a digest-pinned Docker sandbox, the durable Postgres worktree lifecycle, provider-driven ACP edits with policy approval, named checks with `diagnosticDelta`, patch review over the server ArtifactService, cross-replica process recovery, durable cancellation, real GitHub PR push/reconcile/cleanup, host Playwright inspection, and the host PTY adapter (frozen profile) — the retained `scripts/phase26-coding-journey-report.json` gates release evidence (pass/blocked/protected, never a passing skip).
133
138
  - [0.1.0 / 1.0 readiness gates](0.1.0-readiness.md): command-per-gate 1.0 readiness table — frozen API surface + compat gate, migration/docs tripwires, budget table, live-suite matrix, security matrix, current-line status (**0.2.5** current line; 0.1.7 terminal 0.1.x baseline), signed-publication/live-canary prerequisites for 1.0, and Phase 12 demand-evidence entry criteria.
134
139
  - [Review coverage archive](_evidence/): per-phase evidence freezes (plans 067–079, releases 0.0.4–0.0.16) — traceability matrices, provider validation, capability/primitive/limit matrices, benchmark budgets, and artifact-diet findings; tarball-excluded, kept in-repo for audit.
135
140
 
package/docs/migration.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
1
1
  # Migration guide
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.2.6 → 0.2.7 enterprise ERP production readiness (additive)
4
+
5
+ Release **0.2.7** (plan 027) adds the enterprise ERP production-readiness primitives behind optional host-activated seams: the transactional outbox/inbox + bounded dispatcher, the durable saga compensation/reconciliation engine, multi-party separation-of-duties approvals, signed hash-chained audit export with WORM/SIEM sinks, field-level classification + fail-closed redaction, and the deterministic ERP invariant evals. **Additive-only: no exported declaration removed or changed, no persisted 0.2.6 shape repurposed.**
6
+
7
+ New ERP tables use **separate forward-only migrations** (no down migrations exist; production rollback is roll-forward repair only):
8
+
9
+ - `prism_erp_outbox` / `prism_erp_inbox` (migration `004_erp_messaging`, version 4) — transactional outbox/inbox with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` claim, `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` idempotent append, claim-token CAS, and three partial indexes. Outbox append must run in the caller-owned `PoolClient` transaction with the business mutation (atomicity is the host's responsibility).
10
+ - `prism_erp_approvals` (migration `005_erp_approvals`, version 5) — multi-party approval requests with decisions stored as JSONB, `FOR UPDATE` row locking for atomic quorum recomputation, rejection as any-party veto, expiry checked at every protected transition, and atomic grant consumption in the host transaction.
11
+
12
+ Saga state persists as a surrogate `WorkflowCheckpointRecord` through the existing `WorkflowCheckpointAdapter` (private workflow id `__prism_saga__/<key>`) — no saga-specific SQL or 0.2.6 shape is repurposed. Audit export, field policy, and ERP invariant evals are stateless or in-memory and add no persisted shape. Secret-manager adapters (Vault/AWS/Azure/GCP) stay **deferred** behind the demand gate; no adapter ships and no ambient credential discovery is added.
13
+
14
+ **Rollback notes.** Rollback = restore the 0.2.6 manifests/tag. The two new ERP migrations are forward-only; before downgrading, stop all 0.2.7 workers (outbox dispatcher, saga engine, audit exporter) and drop or ignore the `prism_erp_outbox`/`prism_erp_inbox`/`prism_erp_approvals` tables (they hold no 0.2.6 data). No 0.2.6 persisted shape changed, so an ordinary downgrade is store-safe; the added exports and ERP tables simply disappear. **"ERP production ready" remains blocked until the 0.3.0 live-service matrix is recorded** — this release adds the primitives and the protected journey evidence, not the live-service matrix.
15
+
3
16
  ## 0.2.5 → 0.2.6 durable recovery, workspaces, and coding-agent readiness (additive)
4
17
 
5
18
  Release **0.2.6** (plan 026) adds the coding-agent readiness capabilities behind optional host-activated seams: host-selected PTY backends, the indexed/semantic repository-search seam, the ownership-scoped multi-repository/worktree lifecycle, durable process/ACP recovery, and the patch-review/diagnostics workflow. **Additive-only: no exported declaration removed or changed, no persisted 0.2.5 shape repurposed.**
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
1
+ # Operations runbook: high availability, failover, and fencing
2
+
3
+ ## What it does
4
+
5
+ This page is the operator runbook for the high-availability story proven by plan 027 Task 6: two replicas can serve, inspect, cancel, resume, and reconcile durable ACP/workflow/saga/outbox/export operations after either replica dies. Correctness never depends on a dead process's in-memory registry — it comes from the durable `LeaseStore` (owner, token, fencing counter, expiry, renewal), the `CheckpointStore` (version CAS plus monotonic fencing token), and idempotent side-effect sinks such as the ERP outbox (`ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` on a stable message id). The two-process proof is `scripts/phase27-ha-worker.mjs` orchestrated by `scripts/phase27-ha.test.mjs`, which records exact commands, process IDs, injected failures, timings, and durable final states in `docs/_evidence/phase27-ha-evidence.json`.
6
+
7
+ ## When to use it
8
+
9
+ - Before running any multi-replica deployment of the server, workflow coordinator, saga runner, ACP host, or enterprise dispatcher — read the local-registry limitations and the lease/fence model.
10
+ - When an operator or on-call engineer sees a hung lease, an uncertain commit, or a split-brain suspicion: follow "Failover procedure" and "Uncertain commits" below before touching anything.
11
+ - When sizing leases: the failover ceiling is lease TTL plus the peer's acquisition poll interval; the drill asserts `failoverMs <= ttlMs + 5000`.
12
+
13
+ ## Inputs / request
14
+
15
+ - A `LeaseStore` and `CheckpointStore` backed by the same durable store (PostgreSQL through `createPostgresPersistence`, or the corresponding production adapter). Lease keys carry an ownership scope (tenant/account/user) that is part of the trust boundary.
16
+ - Operations that need a leader: `acquireLease({ namespace, key, ownerId, ttlMs })` returns a lease with `token` and monotonic `fencingToken`, or `null` while another owner holds it.
17
+ - Durable progress: `saveCheckpoint({ namespace, key, version, expectedVersion, fencingToken, value })` — versions strictly increase, `expectedVersion` must match the current version, and a lower or absent fencing token can never replace a fenced record.
18
+ - Idempotent side effects: give every external effect a stable id (ERP outbox `messageId` is the designed carrier) so replay is safe.
19
+
20
+ ## Outputs / response / events
21
+
22
+ - A lease record: `{ namespace, key, ownerId, token, fencingToken, acquiredAt, expiresAt, updatedAt }`. Expired rows retain their fencing counter; the next owner inherits `fencingToken + 1`.
23
+ - A checkpoint record: `{ namespace, key, version, fencingToken?, value, createdAt, updatedAt }`. Cursor/value changes are CAS-committed; a peer can replay an unfinished step but can never skip ahead or move the cursor backward.
24
+ - Failover timing: the drill reports `failoverMs` (wall time between the owner's death and the peer's acquisition) and asserts it against the frozen ceiling.
25
+
26
+ ## Request/response example
27
+
28
+ ```ts
29
+ const lease = await stores.leases.tryAcquireLease({
30
+ namespace: "erp.ops", key: "invoice-42", ownerId: "worker-b", ttlMs: 30_000,
31
+ });
32
+ if (!lease) return "another replica owns invoice-42";
33
+ await stores.checkpoints.saveCheckpoint({
34
+ namespace: "erp.ops", key: "invoice-42",
35
+ version: 3, expectedVersion: 2, fencingToken: lease.fencingToken,
36
+ value: { cursor: 2, steps: ["reserve", "charge"] },
37
+ });
38
+ // Side effect with a stable id (idempotent replay):
39
+ await outbox.append(client, { tenantId, messageId: "pay-t/invoice-42/charge", topic: "erp.payment.requested", payload });
40
+ await stores.leases.releaseLease({ namespace: "erp.ops", key: "invoice-42", ownerId: "worker-b", token: lease.token });
41
+ ```
42
+
43
+ ## Implementation example
44
+
45
+ ```sh
46
+ # Protected two-replica drill (requires PRISM_TEST_POSTGRES_URL; Docker image
47
+ # postgres:16-alpine is the local stand-in). Recorded evidence lands in
48
+ # docs/_evidence/phase27-ha-evidence.json.
49
+ `PRISM_TEST_POSTGRES_URL` set to the protected connection string (locally a disposable `postgres:16-alpine` container): `node --test scripts/phase27-ha.test.mjs`
50
+ ```
51
+
52
+ The drill: worker A acquires, heartbeats, commits the charge effect into the
53
+ outbox, and is SIGKILLed inside the window between the effect commit and its
54
+ final cursor save. Worker B (separate process, own pool, no access to A's
55
+ registry) reads the durable state, waits out the lease expiry, acquires,
56
+ replays the uncertain commit idempotently (outbox count stays 1), finishes,
57
+ and releases. A stale-fence/stale-revision write and an old-token renewal are
58
+ rejected; two simultaneous acquisitions yield exactly one owner; a foreign
59
+ tenant's reads, writes, and lease takeover all fail closed.
60
+
61
+ ## Extension and configuration notes
62
+
63
+ - Lease TTL is the availability knob: too short spams contention, too long
64
+ delays failover. The frozen drill ceiling is `ttlMs + 5000` ms; renew at
65
+ `ttlMs / 3` (the workflow coordinator, saga engine, and this drill all
66
+ follow this pattern).
67
+ - Local in-memory registries (workflow active-run map, coordinator active
68
+ map, A2A live-task registry, ACP session registry, coding-agent sessions,
69
+ RPC active runs) are optional fast paths only. On restart, every component
70
+ reloads authority, status, and cursors from durable stores; a killed
71
+ replica's registry is never required to make progress.
72
+ - SIEM/alerting: emit owner/fence/lease-age/state metadata only — never tenant
73
+ payloads, tokens, or credentials. Metrics to watch: lease-acquire latency,
74
+ fence counter jumps (a jump means a takeover happened), and outbox pending
75
+ depth.
76
+
77
+ ## Security and performance notes
78
+
79
+ - Fencing is enforced at the store: a stale owner's write fails with
80
+ `ERR_PRISM_CHECKPOINT_CONFLICT` (stale version, failed CAS, or stale
81
+ fencing token), and a stale token's renewal returns `null`. There is
82
+ intentionally no "force unlock" operation — deleting a lease row manually
83
+ bypasses fencing and can cause split-brain writes; never do it.
84
+ - Tenant ownership is checked on every durable read/write; cross-tenant
85
+ reads, saves, and lease acquisitions fail closed with ownership-mismatch
86
+ errors.
87
+ - An uncertain commit (side effect landed, cursor not advanced) is resolved
88
+ by replaying the effect with its stable id — never by guessing. Reload
89
+ durable state before any retry; retries that skip the reload risk
90
+ overwriting a peer's fenced progress.
91
+ - Failover is bounded but not instantaneous: the peer cannot acquire until
92
+ the lease expires, so recovery time is at least the remaining TTL.
93
+ Performance is linear in record size; the drill records contention/latency
94
+ with bounded, jittered acquisition polls (no hot loops) and reports the
95
+ measured numbers in the evidence JSON.
96
+
97
+ ## Related APIs
98
+
99
+ - `LeaseStore` / `CheckpointStore` — the durable contracts this runbook relies on.
100
+ - `createPostgresPersistence` — the PostgreSQL adapter used by the drill.
101
+ - `ErpOutboxStore` — the idempotent side-effect carrier used to make replay safe.
102
+ - `createWorkflowCoordinator` and `defineSaga`/`runSaga`/`resumeSaga` — higher-level consumers with the same fencing/cursor semantics.
103
+ - `scripts/phase27-ha-worker.mjs` / `scripts/phase27-ha.test.mjs` — the reproducible drill; `docs/_evidence/phase27-ha-evidence.json` — the recorded run.
104
+ - [Signed, hash-chained audit export](audit-export.md) — the cursor/CAS pattern applied to audit exports.
@@ -118,6 +118,40 @@ Policy is optional. Hosts wire `record*` helpers or `evaluateAndAppend` at permi
118
118
  - The OPA decision fetch (0.2.1) is DNS-pinned through the core `pinnedFetch` primitive: one resolve per request, every resolved address SSRF-checked before the connect (rebinding defense), redirects rejected outright, timeouts/retries unchanged, and private-answer denials surface `MediaContentError` (`ssrf_denied`) rather than a transport error.
119
119
  - Export never full-scans: page size is capped; raise hard caps only with Phase 8 freeze + tests + docs updates.
120
120
 
121
+ ## Multi-party approvals
122
+
123
+ Immutable approval requests carry an action digest, requester, and required roles/quorum; verified host identities vote through an explicit `ApprovalAuthority`. Prism records decisions and enforces separation-of-duties, expiry, revocation, bounded delegation, rejection, and policy-revision pins — it never resolves identities or roles itself.
124
+
125
+ | API / field | Meaning |
126
+ | --- | --- |
127
+ | `ApprovalAuthority` | Host-owned `policyRevision` + `resolveRoles(identity, request)` returning role grants (and delegation chains) |
128
+ | `ApprovalRequest` | Immutable request: `action {kind, digest}`, `requirements [{role, quorum}]`, `separateFromRequester`, `expiresAt`, `delegationMaxDepth` |
129
+ | `ApprovalRecord` | Request + `status` (`pending/approved/rejected/revoked/consumed`) + `revision` + immutable `decisions` + `policyRevision` |
130
+ | `ApprovalStore.create/decide/revoke/consume/get/query` | Durable transitions; every transition records an `auditRef` |
131
+ | `createMemoryApprovalStore({ authority })` | Single-process reference adapter sharing the pure transition logic |
132
+ | `createPostgresApprovalStore({ pool, schema, authority })` | Cross-replica storage (migration `005_erp_approvals`, `@arnilo/prism-enterprise-postgres`) |
133
+
134
+ Quorum rules:
135
+
136
+ - Each requirement needs `quorum` **distinct approved principals** through that role. Same principal voting the same role twice is idempotent; changing a vote is a conflict.
137
+ - A rejection is terminal and vetoes the request (`rejected`), so `consume` always denies.
138
+ - `separateFromRequester: true` denies the requester (and any authority chain deriving from the requester) from deciding.
139
+ - `delegationMaxDepth` bounds the persisted delegation chain (delegator first); grants cannot outlive the request, leave the tenant, or widen the action.
140
+ - Pin: `ApprovalAuthority.policyRevision` must equal the record's revision; a policy bump invalidates outstanding approvals (release denied).
141
+
142
+ Revocation semantics: `revoke` is only valid for `pending`/`approved` grants, is taken by a verified tenant actor with an `auditRef`, and is terminal. After consumption, revocation cannot undo the effect — the record stays `consumed` as provenance, and reconciliation is host work.
143
+
144
+ Operator audit queries: `query({ tenantId, status })` pages by `(created_at, id)`; `get({ tenantId, requestId })` returns full immutable decisions with grants and delegation chains. Every decision and manual transition carries the host `auditRef`.
145
+
146
+ ```sql
147
+ -- pending approvals that never released (example host view)
148
+ SELECT id, policy_revision, expires_at, decisions
149
+ FROM prism.prism_erp_approvals
150
+ WHERE status = 'pending' AND expires_at < now();
151
+ ```
152
+
153
+ Hosts own identity verification and the role source; Prism does not certify NIST compliance. NIST SP 800-53 AC-5 (separation of duties) and AC-6 (least privilege) are control guidance only, not certification claims.
154
+
121
155
  ## OPA external policy adapter (`@arnilo/prism-policy/opa`, 0.0.28)
122
156
 
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  Optional `createOpaPolicyEvaluator` evaluates `PolicyEvaluateRequest`s against a host-pinned OPA REST endpoint (`POST /v1/data/<path>` with `{"input": <document>}`) and returns a core `PolicyEvaluator` for `evaluateAndAppend`. Native `fetch` only; no OPA SDK dependency.