@arkyc/types 1.2.11 → 2.1.0

package/dist/providers.d.mts

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 import { Entity, Id, IsoDate, ProjectScoped } from "./common.mjs";
 import { AddressMethod } from "./workflow.mjs";
-
 //#region src/providers.d.ts
 /** Supported identity document categories. */
-type DocumentType = 'passport' | 'id_card' | 'drivers_license' | 'residence_permit';
+export type DocumentType = 'passport' | 'id_card' | 'drivers_license' | 'residence_permit';
 /** Structured identity fields extracted from a document via OCR. */
-interface OcrFields {
+export interface OcrFields {
   firstName?: string;
   lastName?: string;
   fullName?: string;
   dateOfBirth?: IsoDate;
   documentNumber?: string;
   expiryDate?: IsoDate;
+  issueDate?: IsoDate;
   nationality?: string;
 }
 /**
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ interface OcrFields {
  * (the `ai` vision driver). Advisory anti-spoofing signals — a flagged document
  * is routed to manual review, never auto-rejected on the model's say-so.
  */
-interface OcrAuthenticity {
+export interface OcrAuthenticity {
   /** False when any tamper/replay signal fired. */
   genuine: boolean;
   /** Model's authenticity confidence in [0, 1]: 1 = clearly an original, 0 = clearly fake/replayed. */
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ interface OcrAuthenticity {
   observations: string[];
 }
 /** The shape returned by any OCR driver. */
-interface OcrResultData {
+export interface OcrResultData {
   fields: OcrFields;
   /** Overall extraction confidence in [0, 1]. */
   confidence: number;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ interface OcrResultData {
   raw?: unknown;
 }
 /** Anti-spoofing signals surfaced by a liveness driver. */
-interface SpoofSignals {
+export interface SpoofSignals {
   screenReplay?: boolean;
   printedPhoto?: boolean;
   maskDetected?: boolean;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ interface SpoofSignals {
   poorLighting?: boolean;
 }
 /** The shape returned by any passive-liveness driver. */
-interface LivenessResultData {
+export interface LivenessResultData {
   passed: boolean;
   /** Liveness confidence in [0, 1]. */
   score: number;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ interface LivenessResultData {
   raw?: unknown;
 }
 /** The shape returned by any face-match driver. */
-interface FaceMatchResultData {
+export interface FaceMatchResultData {
   passed: boolean;
   /** Similarity between document portrait and selfie in [0, 1]. */
   similarityScore: number;
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ interface FaceMatchResultData {
   raw?: unknown;
 }
 /** A normalized postal address. Any field may be absent depending on the source. */
-interface PostalAddress {
+export interface PostalAddress {
   line1?: string;
   line2?: string;
   city?: string;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ interface PostalAddress {
   longitude?: number;
 }
 /** One method's contribution to address verification. */
-interface AddressMethodResult {
+export interface AddressMethodResult {
   method: AddressMethod;
   /** Whether this method produced a usable, valid result. */
   passed: boolean;
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ interface AddressMethodResult {
   raw?: unknown;
 }
 /** The shape returned by an address verifier — the aggregate of its methods. */
-interface AddressResultData {
+export interface AddressResultData {
   passed: boolean;
   /** Overall confidence in [0, 1]. */
   score: number;
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ interface AddressResultData {
   raw?: unknown;
 }
 /** A captured identity document (front and optional back) for a session. */
-interface DocumentCapture extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface DocumentCapture extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   country: string | null;
   document_type: DocumentType | null;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ interface DocumentCapture extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   quality_score: number | null;
 }
 /** Persisted OCR output for a document capture. */
-interface OcrResult extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface OcrResult extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   document_capture_id: Id;
   fields: OcrFields;
@@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ interface OcrResult extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   raw_response: unknown;
 }
 /** The portrait region extracted from a document, used for face matching. */
-interface DocumentPortrait extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface DocumentPortrait extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   document_capture_id: Id;
   portrait_image_path: string;
   detection_confidence: number;
 }
 /** Persisted passive-liveness result for a session. */
-interface LivenessCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface LivenessCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   selfie_image_path: string | null;
   video_path: string | null;
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ interface LivenessCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   raw_response: unknown;
 }
 /** Persisted face-match result comparing document portrait to selfie. */
-interface FaceMatchCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface FaceMatchCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   id_portrait_image_path: string | null;
   selfie_image_path: string | null;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ interface FaceMatchCheck extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   raw_response: unknown;
 }
 /** Persisted address-verification result for a session. */
-interface AddressVerification extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface AddressVerification extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   /** The address the user claimed (typed in the widget), when provided. */
   claimed_address: PostalAddress | null;
@@ -180,5 +180,4 @@ interface AddressVerification extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   raw_response: unknown;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { AddressMethodResult, AddressResultData, AddressVerification, DocumentCapture, DocumentPortrait, DocumentType, FaceMatchCheck, FaceMatchResultData, LivenessCheck, LivenessResultData, OcrAuthenticity, OcrFields, OcrResult, OcrResultData, PostalAddress, SpoofSignals };
 //# sourceMappingURL=providers.d.mts.map

package/dist/providers.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"providers.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/providers.ts"],"mappings":";;;;YAIY;;iBAGK;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA,cAAc;EACd;EACA,aAAa;EACb,YAAY;EACZ;;;;;;;iBAQe;;EAEf;;EAEA;;EAEA;;EAEA;;EAEA;;EAEA;;EAEA;;;iBAIe;EACf,QAAQ;;EAER;;EAEA,eAAe;;EAEf;;;iBAIe;EACf;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;;iBAIe;EACf;;EAEA;EACA,cAAc;EACd;;;iBAIe;EACf;;EAEA;;EAEA;EACA;;;iBAIe;EACf;EACA;EACA;;EAEA;EACA;;EAEA;;EAEA;EACA;;;iBAIe;EACf,QAAQ;;EAER;;EAEA;;EAEA,WAAW;;;;;;EAMX;;EAEA;EACA;;;iBAIe;EACf;;EAEA;;EAEA,SAAS;;EAET;EACA;;;iBAIe,wBAAwB,QAAQ;EAC/C,YAAY;EACZ;EACA,eAAe;EACf;EACA;EACA;;;iBAIe,kBAAkB,QAAQ;EACzC,YAAY;EACZ,qBAAqB;EACrB,QAAQ;EACR;EACA;;;iBAIe,yBAAyB,QAAQ;EAChD,YAAY;EACZ,qBAAqB;EACrB;EACA;;;iBAIe,sBAAsB,QAAQ;EAC7C,YAAY;EACZ;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,eAAe;EACf;EACA;;;iBAIe,uBAAuB,QAAQ;EAC9C,YAAY;EACZ;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA;;;iBAIe,4BAA4B,QAAQ;EACnD,YAAY;;EAEZ,iBAAiB;;EAEjB;;EAEA;EACA;EACA;;EAEA;;EAEA,SAAS;EACT;EACA"}

package/dist/rbac.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import { Entity, Id, OrganizationScoped } from "./common.mjs";
-
 //#region src/rbac.d.ts
 /**
  * The full catalogue of permission strings recognised by Arkyc.
@@ -8,27 +7,27 @@ import { Entity, Id, OrganizationScoped } from "./common.mjs";
  * a user is the union of their role permissions and any directly-assigned
  * permissions (see `@arkyc/permissions`).
  */
-type PermissionKey = 'organizations.view' | 'organizations.update' | 'organizations.delete' | 'members.view' | 'members.invite' | 'members.update' | 'members.remove' | 'projects.view' | 'projects.create' | 'projects.update' | 'projects.delete' | 'api_keys.view' | 'api_keys.create' | 'api_keys.revoke' | 'webhooks.view' | 'webhooks.create' | 'webhooks.update' | 'webhooks.delete' | 'webhooks.test' | 'workflows.view' | 'workflows.create' | 'workflows.update' | 'workflows.delete' | 'sessions.view' | 'sessions.create' | 'sessions.cancel' | 'sessions.retry' | 'sessions.export' | 'reviews.view' | 'reviews.assign' | 'reviews.approve' | 'reviews.reject' | 'reviews.request_retry' | 'reviews.note' | 'audit_logs.view' | 'settings.view' | 'settings.update' | 'billing.view' | 'billing.update';
+export type PermissionKey = 'organizations.view' | 'organizations.update' | 'organizations.delete' | 'members.view' | 'members.invite' | 'members.update' | 'members.remove' | 'projects.view' | 'projects.create' | 'projects.update' | 'projects.delete' | 'api_keys.view' | 'api_keys.create' | 'api_keys.revoke' | 'webhooks.view' | 'webhooks.create' | 'webhooks.update' | 'webhooks.delete' | 'webhooks.test' | 'workflows.view' | 'workflows.create' | 'workflows.update' | 'workflows.delete' | 'sessions.view' | 'sessions.create' | 'sessions.cancel' | 'sessions.retry' | 'sessions.export' | 'reviews.view' | 'reviews.assign' | 'reviews.approve' | 'reviews.reject' | 'reviews.request_retry' | 'reviews.note' | 'audit_logs.view' | 'settings.view' | 'settings.update' | 'billing.view' | 'billing.update';
 /** The domain groups permissions are organised under. */
-type PermissionGroup = 'organizations' | 'members' | 'projects' | 'api_keys' | 'webhooks' | 'workflows' | 'sessions' | 'reviews' | 'audit_logs' | 'settings' | 'billing';
+export type PermissionGroup = 'organizations' | 'members' | 'projects' | 'api_keys' | 'webhooks' | 'workflows' | 'sessions' | 'reviews' | 'audit_logs' | 'settings' | 'billing';
 /** The built-in system roles seeded for every organization. */
-type SystemRoleSlug = 'owner' | 'admin' | 'reviewer' | 'developer' | 'readonly';
+export type SystemRoleSlug = 'owner' | 'admin' | 'reviewer' | 'developer' | 'readonly';
 /**
  * Platform-scope permission strings, distinct from organization {@link PermissionKey}.
  * These gate the super-admin surface above organizations and are only ever granted
  * through {@link AdminPermission} (never an organization role). Rows carry `admin: true`.
  */
-type AdminPermissionKey = 'admin.organizations.view' | 'admin.organizations.manage' | 'admin.users.view' | 'admin.users.manage' | 'admin.settings.view' | 'admin.settings.update' | 'admin.audit.view' | 'admin.billing.view' | 'admin.billing.update' | 'admin.extended_access.view' | 'admin.extended_access.manage';
+export type AdminPermissionKey = 'admin.organizations.view' | 'admin.organizations.manage' | 'admin.users.view' | 'admin.users.manage' | 'admin.settings.view' | 'admin.settings.update' | 'admin.audit.view' | 'admin.billing.view' | 'admin.billing.update' | 'admin.extended_access.view' | 'admin.extended_access.manage';
 /** The domain groups platform-admin permissions are organised under. */
-type AdminPermissionGroup = 'admin.organizations' | 'admin.users' | 'admin.settings' | 'admin.audit' | 'admin.billing' | 'admin.extended_access';
+export type AdminPermissionGroup = 'admin.organizations' | 'admin.users' | 'admin.settings' | 'admin.audit' | 'admin.billing' | 'admin.extended_access';
 /** Any permission string, organization- or platform-scope. */
-type AnyPermissionKey = PermissionKey | AdminPermissionKey;
+export type AnyPermissionKey = PermissionKey | AdminPermissionKey;
 /** Any permission group, organization- or platform-scope. */
-type AnyPermissionGroup = PermissionGroup | AdminPermissionGroup;
+export type AnyPermissionGroup = PermissionGroup | AdminPermissionGroup;
 /** The built-in platform-admin role slug. */
-type AdminRoleSlug = 'platform-owner';
+export type AdminRoleSlug = 'platform-owner';
 /** A permission definition row. Permissions are global (not organization-scoped). */
-interface Permission extends Entity {
+export interface Permission extends Entity {
   /** The permission string, e.g. `sessions.view` or `admin.settings.view`. */
   name: AnyPermissionKey;
   description: string | null;
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ interface Permission extends Entity {
  * A role within an organization. System roles (`is_system`) are seeded and cannot be
  * deleted; organizations may also define custom roles.
  */
-interface Role extends Entity {
+export interface Role extends Entity {
   /** Null for platform-admin roles (`admin: true`); set for organization roles. */
   organization_id: Id | null;
   name: string;
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ interface Role extends Entity {
   admin: boolean;
 }
 /** Join row granting a {@link Permission} to a {@link Role}. */
-interface RolePermission extends Entity {
+export interface RolePermission extends Entity {
   role_id: Id;
   permission_id: Id;
 }
@@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ interface RolePermission extends Entity {
  * A permission assigned directly to a user, on top of their role permissions.
  * `project_id` is null for organization-level grants, set for project-level grants.
  */
-interface UserPermission extends Entity, OrganizationScoped {
+export interface UserPermission extends Entity, OrganizationScoped {
   project_id: Id | null;
   user_id: Id;
   permission_id: Id;
@@ -70,11 +69,10 @@ interface UserPermission extends Entity, OrganizationScoped {
  * permission grant (`permission_id` set). Effective admin access is the union of
  * both, resolved by `@arkyc/permissions`.
  */
-interface AdminPermission extends Entity {
+export interface AdminPermission extends Entity {
   user_id: Id;
   permission_id: Id | null;
   role_id: Id | null;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { AdminPermission, AdminPermissionGroup, AdminPermissionKey, AdminRoleSlug, AnyPermissionGroup, AnyPermissionKey, Permission, PermissionGroup, PermissionKey, Role, RolePermission, SystemRoleSlug, UserPermission };
 //# sourceMappingURL=rbac.d.mts.map

package/dist/rbac.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"rbac.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/rbac.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;YASY;;YA0CA;;YAcA;;;;;;YAOA;;YAcA;;YASA,mBAAmB,gBAAgB;;YAGnC,qBAAqB,kBAAkB;;YAGvC;;iBAGK,mBAAmB;;EAElC,MAAM;EACN;EACA,OAAO;;EAEP;;;;;;iBAOe,aAAa;;EAE5B,iBAAiB;EACjB;EACA;EACA;EACA;;EAEA;;;iBAIe,uBAAuB;EACtC,SAAS;EACT,eAAe;;;;;;iBAOA,uBAAuB,QAAQ;EAC9C,YAAY;EACZ,SAAS;EACT,eAAe;;;;;;;;iBASA,wBAAwB;EACvC,SAAS;EACT,eAAe;EACf,SAAS"}

package/dist/realtime.d.mts

@@ -1,41 +1,35 @@
 import { Id } from "./common.mjs";
 import { VerificationStatus } from "./verification.mjs";
-
 //#region src/realtime.d.ts
 /**
- * Realtime transport contracts (Phase 16). Pure, dependency-free helpers shared
- * by the API (server publish) and the dashboard/widget (client subscribe), so
- * channel and event names never drift between them.
+ * Realtime contracts shared by the API (server publish) and the dashboard and
+ * widget (client subscribe), so channel and event names never drift between them.
  */
 /** Events the API broadcasts. Clients react by invalidating their caches. */
-declare const REALTIME_EVENT: {
-  /** A verification session changed status (the `transitionTo` choke point). */readonly sessionTransition: "session.transition"; /** A reviewer acted on a session (assign/note/suspicious/decision/retry). */
+export declare const REALTIME_EVENT: {
+  /** A verification session changed status (the `transitionTo` choke point). */
+  readonly sessionTransition: "session.transition";
+  /** A reviewer acted on a session (assign/note/suspicious/decision/retry). */
   readonly reviewAction: "review.action";
 };
-type RealtimeEventName = (typeof REALTIME_EVENT)[keyof typeof REALTIME_EVENT];
+export type RealtimeEventName = (typeof REALTIME_EVENT)[keyof typeof REALTIME_EVENT];
 /**
- * Private channel name builders. All channels are `private-` (Pusher protocol),
- * so a subscription must be authorized server-side against the caller's scope.
+ * Private channel name builders. Every channel is `private-`, so a subscription
+ * must be authorized by the API. Segments are dot-separated so the API's channel
+ * rules can capture each id.
  */
-declare const realtimeChannels: {
-  /** Everything in an organization. */organization: (organizationId: Id) => string; /** Everything in a project. */
-  project: (organizationId: Id, projectId: Id) => string; /** A single verification session (used by the widget via client token). */
+export declare const realtimeChannels: {
+  /** A user's own notifications. */
+  user: (userId: Id) => string;
+  /** Everything in an organization. */
+  organization: (organizationId: Id) => string;
+  /** Everything in a project. */
+  project: (organizationId: Id, projectId: Id) => string;
+  /** A single verification session (used by the widget via client token). */
   session: (sessionId: Id) => string;
 };
-/** Parse a private channel name back into its scope, or null if unrecognized. */
-declare function parseRealtimeChannel(channel: string): {
-  kind: 'organization';
-  organizationId: string;
-} | {
-  kind: 'project';
-  organizationId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-} | {
-  kind: 'session';
-  sessionId: string;
-} | null;
 /** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.sessionTransition}. */
-interface SessionTransitionEvent {
+export interface SessionTransitionEvent {
   session_id: Id;
   organization_id: Id;
   project_id: Id | null;
@@ -43,7 +37,7 @@ interface SessionTransitionEvent {
   previous_status: VerificationStatus | null;
 }
 /** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.reviewAction}. */
-interface ReviewActionEvent {
+export interface ReviewActionEvent {
   session_id: Id;
   organization_id: Id;
   project_id: Id | null;
@@ -52,5 +46,4 @@ interface ReviewActionEvent {
   actor_id: Id | null;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { REALTIME_EVENT, RealtimeEventName, ReviewActionEvent, SessionTransitionEvent, parseRealtimeChannel, realtimeChannels };
 //# sourceMappingURL=realtime.d.mts.map

package/dist/realtime.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"realtime.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/realtime.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;qBASa;;WAAA;;WAAA;;YAOD,4BAA4B,6BAA6B;;;;;;qBAOxD;;EAEI,OAAA,QAAA;;EAEgB,eAAA,gBAAA;;EAEL,UAAA,gBAAA,IAAE,WAAa;;EAEpB,UAAA,WAAA;;;iBAIN;EACf,YAAY;EACZ,iBAAiB;EACjB,YAAY;EACZ,QAAQ;EACR,iBAAiB;;;iBAIF;EACf,YAAY;EACZ,iBAAiB;EACjB,YAAY;;EAEZ;EACA,UAAU"}

package/dist/realtime.mjs

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 //#region src/realtime.ts
 /**
-* Realtime transport contracts (Phase 16). Pure, dependency-free helpers shared
-* by the API (server publish) and the dashboard/widget (client subscribe), so
-* channel and event names never drift between them.
+* Realtime contracts shared by the API (server publish) and the dashboard and
+* widget (client subscribe), so channel and event names never drift between them.
 */
 /** Events the API broadcasts. Clients react by invalidating their caches. */
 const REALTIME_EVENT = {
@@ -12,38 +11,21 @@ const REALTIME_EVENT = {
 	reviewAction: "review.action"
 };
 /**
-* Private channel name builders. All channels are `private-` (Pusher protocol),
-* so a subscription must be authorized server-side against the caller's scope.
+* Private channel name builders. Every channel is `private-`, so a subscription
+* must be authorized by the API. Segments are dot-separated so the API's channel
+* rules can capture each id.
 */
 const realtimeChannels = {
+	/** A user's own notifications. */
+	user: (userId) => `private-user.${userId}`,
 	/** Everything in an organization. */
-	organization: (organizationId) => `private-organization-${organizationId}`,
+	organization: (organizationId) => `private-organization.${organizationId}`,
 	/** Everything in a project. */
-	project: (organizationId, projectId) => `private-organization-${organizationId}-project-${projectId}`,
+	project: (organizationId, projectId) => `private-organization.${organizationId}.project.${projectId}`,
 	/** A single verification session (used by the widget via client token). */
-	session: (sessionId) => `private-session-${sessionId}`
+	session: (sessionId) => `private-session.${sessionId}`
 };
-/** Parse a private channel name back into its scope, or null if unrecognized. */
-function parseRealtimeChannel(channel) {
-	const project = /^private-organization-(.+)-project-(.+)$/.exec(channel);
-	if (project) return {
-		kind: "project",
-		organizationId: project[1],
-		projectId: project[2]
-	};
-	const organization = /^private-organization-(.+)$/.exec(channel);
-	if (organization) return {
-		kind: "organization",
-		organizationId: organization[1]
-	};
-	const session = /^private-session-(.+)$/.exec(channel);
-	if (session) return {
-		kind: "session",
-		sessionId: session[1]
-	};
-	return null;
-}
 //#endregion
-export { REALTIME_EVENT, parseRealtimeChannel, realtimeChannels };
+export { REALTIME_EVENT, realtimeChannels };
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=realtime.mjs.map

package/dist/realtime.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"realtime.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/realtime.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Id } from './common'\nimport type { VerificationStatus } from './verification'\n\n/**\n * Realtime transport contracts (Phase 16). Pure, dependency-free helpers shared\n * by the API (server publish) and the dashboard/widget (client subscribe), so\n * channel and event names never drift between them.\n */\n\n/** Events the API broadcasts. Clients react by invalidating their caches. */\nexport const REALTIME_EVENT = {\n  /** A verification session changed status (the `transitionTo` choke point). */\n  sessionTransition: 'session.transition',\n  /** A reviewer acted on a session (assign/note/suspicious/decision/retry). */\n  reviewAction: 'review.action',\n} as const\n\nexport type RealtimeEventName = (typeof REALTIME_EVENT)[keyof typeof REALTIME_EVENT]\n\n/**\n * Private channel name builders. All channels are `private-` (Pusher protocol),\n * so a subscription must be authorized server-side against the caller's scope.\n */\nexport const realtimeChannels = {\n  /** Everything in an organization. */\n  organization: (organizationId: Id): string => `private-organization-${organizationId}`,\n  /** Everything in a project. */\n  project: (organizationId: Id, projectId: Id): string => `private-organization-${organizationId}-project-${projectId}`,\n  /** A single verification session (used by the widget via client token). */\n  session: (sessionId: Id): string => `private-session-${sessionId}`,\n}\n\n/** Parse a private channel name back into its scope, or null if unrecognized. */\nexport function parseRealtimeChannel(\n  channel: string,\n):\n  | { kind: 'organization'; organizationId: string }\n  | { kind: 'project'; organizationId: string; projectId: string }\n  | { kind: 'session'; sessionId: string }\n  | null {\n  const project = /^private-organization-(.+)-project-(.+)$/.exec(channel)\n  if (project) return { kind: 'project', organizationId: project[1]!, projectId: project[2]! }\n  const organization = /^private-organization-(.+)$/.exec(channel)\n  if (organization) return { kind: 'organization', organizationId: organization[1]! }\n  const session = /^private-session-(.+)$/.exec(channel)\n  if (session) return { kind: 'session', sessionId: session[1]! }\n  return null\n}\n\n/** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.sessionTransition}. */\nexport interface SessionTransitionEvent {\n  session_id: Id\n  organization_id: Id\n  project_id: Id | null\n  status: VerificationStatus\n  previous_status: VerificationStatus | null\n}\n\n/** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.reviewAction}. */\nexport interface ReviewActionEvent {\n  session_id: Id\n  organization_id: Id\n  project_id: Id | null\n  /** The audit action, e.g. `review.assigned`, `review.note`, `review.approved`. */\n  action: string\n  actor_id: Id | null\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAUA,MAAa,iBAAiB;;CAE5B,mBAAmB;;CAEnB,cAAc;AAChB;;;;;AAQA,MAAa,mBAAmB;;CAE9B,eAAe,mBAA+B,wBAAwB;;CAEtE,UAAU,gBAAoB,cAA0B,wBAAwB,eAAe,WAAW;;CAE1G,UAAU,cAA0B,mBAAmB;AACzD;;AAGA,SAAgB,qBACd,SAKO;CACP,MAAM,UAAU,2CAA2C,KAAK,OAAO;CACvE,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;EAAE,MAAM;EAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ;EAAK,WAAW,QAAQ;CAAI;CAC3F,MAAM,eAAe,8BAA8B,KAAK,OAAO;CAC/D,IAAI,cAAc,OAAO;EAAE,MAAM;EAAgB,gBAAgB,aAAa;CAAI;CAClF,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,KAAK,OAAO;CACrD,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;EAAE,MAAM;EAAW,WAAW,QAAQ;CAAI;CAC9D,OAAO;AACT"}
+{"version":3,"file":"realtime.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/realtime.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Id } from './common'\nimport type { VerificationStatus } from './verification'\n\n/**\n * Realtime contracts shared by the API (server publish) and the dashboard and\n * widget (client subscribe), so channel and event names never drift between them.\n */\n\n/** Events the API broadcasts. Clients react by invalidating their caches. */\nexport const REALTIME_EVENT = {\n  /** A verification session changed status (the `transitionTo` choke point). */\n  sessionTransition: 'session.transition',\n  /** A reviewer acted on a session (assign/note/suspicious/decision/retry). */\n  reviewAction: 'review.action',\n} as const\n\nexport type RealtimeEventName = (typeof REALTIME_EVENT)[keyof typeof REALTIME_EVENT]\n\n/**\n * Private channel name builders. Every channel is `private-`, so a subscription\n * must be authorized by the API. Segments are dot-separated so the API's channel\n * rules can capture each id.\n */\nexport const realtimeChannels = {\n  /** A user's own notifications. */\n  user: (userId: Id): string => `private-user.${userId}`,\n  /** Everything in an organization. */\n  organization: (organizationId: Id): string => `private-organization.${organizationId}`,\n  /** Everything in a project. */\n  project: (organizationId: Id, projectId: Id): string => `private-organization.${organizationId}.project.${projectId}`,\n  /** A single verification session (used by the widget via client token). */\n  session: (sessionId: Id): string => `private-session.${sessionId}`,\n}\n\n/** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.sessionTransition}. */\nexport interface SessionTransitionEvent {\n  session_id: Id\n  organization_id: Id\n  project_id: Id | null\n  status: VerificationStatus\n  previous_status: VerificationStatus | null\n}\n\n/** Payload for {@link REALTIME_EVENT.reviewAction}. */\nexport interface ReviewActionEvent {\n  session_id: Id\n  organization_id: Id\n  project_id: Id | null\n  /** The audit action, e.g. `review.assigned`, `review.note`, `review.approved`. */\n  action: string\n  actor_id: Id | null\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AASA,MAAa,iBAAiB;;CAE5B,mBAAmB;;CAEnB,cAAc;AAChB;;;;;;AASA,MAAa,mBAAmB;;CAE9B,OAAO,WAAuB,gBAAgB;;CAE9C,eAAe,mBAA+B,wBAAwB;;CAEtE,UAAU,gBAAoB,cAA0B,wBAAwB,eAAe,WAAW;;CAE1G,UAAU,cAA0B,mBAAmB;AACzD"}

package/dist/review.d.mts

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 import { Entity, Id, ProjectScoped } from "./common.mjs";
 import { VerificationStatus } from "./verification.mjs";
-
 //#region src/review.d.ts
 /** Actions a human reviewer can take on a session. */
-type ReviewAction = 'approve' | 'reject' | 'request_document_retry' | 'request_selfie_retry' | 'request_full_retry' | 'mark_suspicious' | 'note';
+export type ReviewAction = 'approve' | 'reject' | 'request_document_retry' | 'request_selfie_retry' | 'request_full_retry' | 'mark_suspicious' | 'note';
 /**
  * An audited review action recording a status transition performed by a
  * reviewer (or the system) on a session.
  */
-interface Review extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface Review extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   reviewer_id: Id | null;
   previous_status: VerificationStatus;
@@ -17,11 +16,10 @@ interface Review extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   note: string | null;
 }
 /** A free-standing reviewer note attached to a session. */
-interface ReviewNote extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
+export interface ReviewNote extends Entity, ProjectScoped {
   session_id: Id;
   reviewer_id: Id;
   note: string;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { Review, ReviewAction, ReviewNote };
 //# sourceMappingURL=review.d.mts.map

package/dist/review.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"review.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/review.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;KAIY,YAAA;AAAZ;;;;AAAA,UAaiB,MAAA,SAAe,MAAA,EAAQ,aAAA;EACtC,UAAA,EAAY,EAAA;EACZ,WAAA,EAAa,EAAA;EACb,eAAA,EAAiB,kBAAA;EACjB,UAAA,EAAY,kBAAA;EACZ,MAAA;EACA,IAAA;AAAA;;UAIe,UAAA,SAAmB,MAAA,EAAQ,aAAA;EAC1C,UAAA,EAAY,EAAA;EACZ,WAAA,EAAa,EAAA;EACb,IAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"review.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/review.ts"],"mappings":";;;;YAIY;;;;;iBAaK,eAAe,QAAQ;EACtC,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,iBAAiB;EACjB,YAAY;EACZ;EACA;;;iBAIe,mBAAmB,QAAQ;EAC1C,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb"}

package/dist/risk.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+import { Id, IsoDateTime } from "./common.mjs";
+import { DecisionReason } from "./verification.mjs";
+//#region src/risk.d.ts
+/** A fraud or compliance signal a detector can raise against a session. */
+export type RiskSignalKey = 'duplicate_document' | 'duplicate_identity' | 'duplicate_face' | 'document_tampering' | 'document_inconsistent' | 'sanctions_match' | 'pep_match' | 'adverse_media' | 'high_risk_network' | 'ip_country_mismatch' | 'velocity_exceeded' | 'underage';
+/** Every signal key, in decision precedence order (most severe first). */
+export declare const RISK_SIGNAL_KEYS: readonly RiskSignalKey[];
+/** What a signal does to the decision: nothing (`info`), manual review, or rejection. */
+export type RiskSeverity = 'info' | 'review' | 'reject';
+/** How a workflow treats a signal key. */
+export type RiskSignalPolicy = 'ignore' | 'review' | 'reject';
+/** Per-key policy overrides. Keys left out use {@link DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY}. */
+export type RiskPolicyConfig = Partial<Record<RiskSignalKey, RiskSignalPolicy>>;
+/** Signals route to review unless an organization opts a key into `ignore` or `reject`. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY: RiskSignalPolicy;
+/** Signals that never reject, whatever the policy says: their evidence is too soft. */
+export declare const REVIEW_ONLY_RISK_SIGNALS: readonly RiskSignalKey[];
+/** The decision reason each signal key reports when it decides a session. */
+export declare const RISK_SIGNAL_REASONS: Record<RiskSignalKey, DecisionReason>;
+/** A signal raised by a detector, before it is stored. */
+export interface RiskSignal {
+  key: RiskSignalKey;
+  severity: RiskSeverity;
+  /** How much the signal adds to the session's risk score, in [0, 1]. */
+  score: number;
+  /** Advisory signals (model opinions) are capped at review. */
+  advisory?: boolean;
+  /** Detector-specific facts that justify the signal. */
+  evidence: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/** A stored risk signal, as the dashboard API returns it. */
+export interface SessionRiskSignal extends RiskSignal {
+  id: Id;
+  session_id: Id;
+  /** Which detector raised it. */
+  source: string;
+  cleared_at: IsoDateTime | null;
+  cleared_by: Id | null;
+  clear_reason: string | null;
+  created_at: IsoDateTime;
+}
+/** The risk block of a webhook payload. */
+export interface WebhookRiskCheck {
+  score: number | null;
+  signals: Array<{
+    key: RiskSignalKey;
+    severity: RiskSeverity;
+    cleared: boolean;
+  }>;
+}
+/** A category of screening hit. */
+export type ScreeningHitCategory = 'sanction' | 'pep' | 'adverse_media' | 'other';
+/** One watchlist entity a screened identity matched. */
+export interface ScreeningHit {
+  /** Provider entity id, stable across re-screens. */
+  entity_id: string;
+  name: string;
+  /** Match score in [0, 1]. */
+  score: number;
+  category: ScreeningHitCategory;
+  /** Provider topic tags, e.g. `sanction`, `role.pep`. */
+  topics: string[];
+  /** Source lists the entity appears on. */
+  datasets: string[];
+  birth_dates: string[];
+  countries: string[];
+  /** A page describing the entity, when the provider has one. */
+  url?: string;
+}
+/** What a screening hit does to the session. */
+export type ScreeningOnHit = 'review' | 'reject';
+/** Configuration for the `screening` workflow stage. */
+export interface ScreeningStepConfig {
+  /** Minimum match score in [0, 1] that counts as a hit. */
+  threshold: number;
+  /** What a sanctions hit does. PEP and adverse media hits follow the workflow's risk policy. */
+  on_hit: ScreeningOnHit;
+  /** Re-screen the identity on a schedule after the session completes. */
+  monitor: boolean;
+}
+/** The default screening config applied when the stage is enabled without one. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_SCREENING_CONFIG: ScreeningStepConfig;
+/** Project limits for repeat sessions from one network address. */
+export interface VelocitySettings {
+  /** Sessions from one IP, under different user references, before the signal fires. */
+  max_sessions: number;
+  /** The look-back window in minutes. */
+  window_minutes: number;
+}
+export declare const DEFAULT_VELOCITY_SETTINGS: VelocitySettings;
+/** Organization-level opt-in for storing face embeddings. Off by default. */
+export interface FaceEmbeddingSettings {
+  enabled: boolean;
+  /** Days to keep an embedding before it is deleted. */
+  retention_days: number;
+}
+export declare const DEFAULT_FACE_EMBEDDING_SETTINGS: FaceEmbeddingSettings;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=risk.d.mts.map

package/dist/risk.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"risk.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../src/risk.ts"],"mappings":";;;;YAIY;;qBAeC,2BAA2B;;YAgB5B;;YAGA;;YAGA,mBAAmB,QAAQ,OAAO,eAAe;;qBAGhD,4BAA4B;;qBAG5B,mCAAmC;;qBAGnC,qBAAqB,OAAO,eAAe;;iBAgBvC;EACf,KAAK;EACL,UAAU;;EAEV;;EAEA;;EAEA,UAAU;;;iBAIK,0BAA0B;EACzC,IAAI;EACJ,YAAY;;EAEZ;EACA,YAAY;EACZ,YAAY;EACZ;EACA,YAAY;;;iBAIG;EACf;EACA,SAAS;IACP,KAAK;IACL,UAAU;IACV;;;;YAKQ;;iBAGK;;EAEf;EACA;;EAEA;EACA,UAAU;;EAEV;;EAEA;EACA;EACA;;EAEA;;;YAIU;;iBAGK;;EAEf;;EAEA,QAAQ;;EAER;;;qBAIW,0BAA0B;;iBAOtB;;EAEf;;EAEA;;qBAGW,2BAA2B;;iBAMvB;EACf;;EAEA;;qBAGW,iCAAiC"}

package/dist/risk.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+//#region src/risk.ts
+/** Every signal key, in decision precedence order (most severe first). */
+const RISK_SIGNAL_KEYS = [
+	"sanctions_match",
+	"underage",
+	"duplicate_document",
+	"duplicate_face",
+	"document_tampering",
+	"document_inconsistent",
+	"pep_match",
+	"adverse_media",
+	"duplicate_identity",
+	"high_risk_network",
+	"ip_country_mismatch",
+	"velocity_exceeded"
+];
+/** Signals route to review unless an organization opts a key into `ignore` or `reject`. */
+const DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY = "review";
+/** Signals that never reject, whatever the policy says: their evidence is too soft. */
+const REVIEW_ONLY_RISK_SIGNALS = ["duplicate_identity", "ip_country_mismatch"];
+/** The decision reason each signal key reports when it decides a session. */
+const RISK_SIGNAL_REASONS = {
+	duplicate_document: "DUPLICATE_DOCUMENT",
+	duplicate_identity: "DUPLICATE_IDENTITY",
+	duplicate_face: "DUPLICATE_FACE",
+	document_tampering: "DOCUMENT_TAMPERING",
+	document_inconsistent: "DOCUMENT_TAMPERING",
+	sanctions_match: "SANCTIONS_MATCH",
+	pep_match: "PEP_MATCH",
+	adverse_media: "ADVERSE_MEDIA_MATCH",
+	high_risk_network: "HIGH_RISK_DEVICE",
+	ip_country_mismatch: "HIGH_RISK_DEVICE",
+	velocity_exceeded: "VELOCITY_EXCEEDED",
+	underage: "UNDERAGE"
+};
+/** The default screening config applied when the stage is enabled without one. */
+const DEFAULT_SCREENING_CONFIG = {
+	threshold: .7,
+	on_hit: "review",
+	monitor: false
+};
+const DEFAULT_VELOCITY_SETTINGS = {
+	max_sessions: 5,
+	window_minutes: 60
+};
+const DEFAULT_FACE_EMBEDDING_SETTINGS = {
+	enabled: false,
+	retention_days: 365
+};
+//#endregion
+export { DEFAULT_FACE_EMBEDDING_SETTINGS, DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY, DEFAULT_SCREENING_CONFIG, DEFAULT_VELOCITY_SETTINGS, REVIEW_ONLY_RISK_SIGNALS, RISK_SIGNAL_KEYS, RISK_SIGNAL_REASONS };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=risk.mjs.map

package/dist/risk.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"risk.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/risk.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Id, IsoDateTime } from './common'\nimport type { DecisionReason } from './verification'\n\n/** A fraud or compliance signal a detector can raise against a session. */\nexport type RiskSignalKey =\n  | 'duplicate_document'\n  | 'duplicate_identity'\n  | 'duplicate_face'\n  | 'document_tampering'\n  | 'document_inconsistent'\n  | 'sanctions_match'\n  | 'pep_match'\n  | 'adverse_media'\n  | 'high_risk_network'\n  | 'ip_country_mismatch'\n  | 'velocity_exceeded'\n  | 'underage'\n\n/** Every signal key, in decision precedence order (most severe first). */\nexport const RISK_SIGNAL_KEYS: readonly RiskSignalKey[] = [\n  'sanctions_match',\n  'underage',\n  'duplicate_document',\n  'duplicate_face',\n  'document_tampering',\n  'document_inconsistent',\n  'pep_match',\n  'adverse_media',\n  'duplicate_identity',\n  'high_risk_network',\n  'ip_country_mismatch',\n  'velocity_exceeded',\n]\n\n/** What a signal does to the decision: nothing (`info`), manual review, or rejection. */\nexport type RiskSeverity = 'info' | 'review' | 'reject'\n\n/** How a workflow treats a signal key. */\nexport type RiskSignalPolicy = 'ignore' | 'review' | 'reject'\n\n/** Per-key policy overrides. Keys left out use {@link DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY}. */\nexport type RiskPolicyConfig = Partial<Record<RiskSignalKey, RiskSignalPolicy>>\n\n/** Signals route to review unless an organization opts a key into `ignore` or `reject`. */\nexport const DEFAULT_RISK_SIGNAL_POLICY: RiskSignalPolicy = 'review'\n\n/** Signals that never reject, whatever the policy says: their evidence is too soft. */\nexport const REVIEW_ONLY_RISK_SIGNALS: readonly RiskSignalKey[] = ['duplicate_identity', 'ip_country_mismatch']\n\n/** The decision reason each signal key reports when it decides a session. */\nexport const RISK_SIGNAL_REASONS: Record<RiskSignalKey, DecisionReason> = {\n  duplicate_document: 'DUPLICATE_DOCUMENT',\n  duplicate_identity: 'DUPLICATE_IDENTITY',\n  duplicate_face: 'DUPLICATE_FACE',\n  document_tampering: 'DOCUMENT_TAMPERING',\n  document_inconsistent: 'DOCUMENT_TAMPERING',\n  sanctions_match: 'SANCTIONS_MATCH',\n  pep_match: 'PEP_MATCH',\n  adverse_media: 'ADVERSE_MEDIA_MATCH',\n  high_risk_network: 'HIGH_RISK_DEVICE',\n  ip_country_mismatch: 'HIGH_RISK_DEVICE',\n  velocity_exceeded: 'VELOCITY_EXCEEDED',\n  underage: 'UNDERAGE',\n}\n\n/** A signal raised by a detector, before it is stored. */\nexport interface RiskSignal {\n  key: RiskSignalKey\n  severity: RiskSeverity\n  /** How much the signal adds to the session's risk score, in [0, 1]. */\n  score: number\n  /** Advisory signals (model opinions) are capped at review. */\n  advisory?: boolean\n  /** Detector-specific facts that justify the signal. */\n  evidence: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** A stored risk signal, as the dashboard API returns it. */\nexport interface SessionRiskSignal extends RiskSignal {\n  id: Id\n  session_id: Id\n  /** Which detector raised it. */\n  source: string\n  cleared_at: IsoDateTime | null\n  cleared_by: Id | null\n  clear_reason: string | null\n  created_at: IsoDateTime\n}\n\n/** The risk block of a webhook payload. */\nexport interface WebhookRiskCheck {\n  score: number | null\n  signals: Array<{\n    key: RiskSignalKey\n    severity: RiskSeverity\n    cleared: boolean\n  }>\n}\n\n/** A category of screening hit. */\nexport type ScreeningHitCategory = 'sanction' | 'pep' | 'adverse_media' | 'other'\n\n/** One watchlist entity a screened identity matched. */\nexport interface ScreeningHit {\n  /** Provider entity id, stable across re-screens. */\n  entity_id: string\n  name: string\n  /** Match score in [0, 1]. */\n  score: number\n  category: ScreeningHitCategory\n  /** Provider topic tags, e.g. `sanction`, `role.pep`. */\n  topics: string[]\n  /** Source lists the entity appears on. */\n  datasets: string[]\n  birth_dates: string[]\n  countries: string[]\n  /** A page describing the entity, when the provider has one. */\n  url?: string\n}\n\n/** What a screening hit does to the session. */\nexport type ScreeningOnHit = 'review' | 'reject'\n\n/** Configuration for the `screening` workflow stage. */\nexport interface ScreeningStepConfig {\n  /** Minimum match score in [0, 1] that counts as a hit. */\n  threshold: number\n  /** What a sanctions hit does. PEP and adverse media hits follow the workflow's risk policy. */\n  on_hit: ScreeningOnHit\n  /** Re-screen the identity on a schedule after the session completes. */\n  monitor: boolean\n}\n\n/** The default screening config applied when the stage is enabled without one. */\nexport const DEFAULT_SCREENING_CONFIG: ScreeningStepConfig = {\n  threshold: 0.7,\n  on_hit: 'review',\n  monitor: false,\n}\n\n/** Project limits for repeat sessions from one network address. */\nexport interface VelocitySettings {\n  /** Sessions from one IP, under different user references, before the signal fires. */\n  max_sessions: number\n  /** The look-back window in minutes. */\n  window_minutes: number\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_VELOCITY_SETTINGS: VelocitySettings = {\n  max_sessions: 5,\n  window_minutes: 60,\n}\n\n/** Organization-level opt-in for storing face embeddings. Off by default. */\nexport interface FaceEmbeddingSettings {\n  enabled: boolean\n  /** Days to keep an embedding before it is deleted. */\n  retention_days: number\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_FACE_EMBEDDING_SETTINGS: FaceEmbeddingSettings = {\n  enabled: false,\n  retention_days: 365,\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AAmBA,MAAa,mBAA6C;CACxD;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACF;;AAYA,MAAa,6BAA+C;;AAG5D,MAAa,2BAAqD,CAAC,sBAAsB,qBAAqB;;AAG9G,MAAa,sBAA6D;CACxE,oBAAoB;CACpB,oBAAoB;CACpB,gBAAgB;CAChB,oBAAoB;CACpB,uBAAuB;CACvB,iBAAiB;CACjB,WAAW;CACX,eAAe;CACf,mBAAmB;CACnB,qBAAqB;CACrB,mBAAmB;CACnB,UAAU;AACZ;;AAuEA,MAAa,2BAAgD;CAC3D,WAAW;CACX,QAAQ;CACR,SAAS;AACX;AAUA,MAAa,4BAA8C;CACzD,cAAc;CACd,gBAAgB;AAClB;AASA,MAAa,kCAAyD;CACpE,SAAS;CACT,gBAAgB;AAClB"}