@arkade-os/swap 0.0.7 → 0.0.9

package/dist/{rfq-DfT9dAss.d.cts → rfq-hbzhTWHT.d.cts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { asset, VHTLC, IWallet, ProvisionedClaimSecret, ProvisionedKey } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
+import { VHTLC, asset, IWallet, ProvisionedClaimSecret, ProvisionedKey } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
 
 /** L1 confirmation-depth and reorg margin between dependent timelocks. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ declare const ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
 declare const ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
 /** Bounds on the confirmation depth a quote may demand. */
 declare const MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS = 6;
+/**
+ * BIP65's boundary between the two things an absolute locktime can mean.
+ * Below it consensus reads the value as a block height; at or above it, as a
+ * unix timestamp. 500,000,000 itself is 1985-07-05 and is a timestamp, so the
+ * comparison against it is strict.
+ */
+declare const LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD = 500000000;
 /** Conservative block interval for converting depths into wall-clock time. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK = 600;
 /**
@@ -239,7 +246,7 @@ declare const ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR: string;
 /** On-board: a Bitcoin-L1 HTLC in, Arkade sats out. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR: string;
 /** The closed refusal set. Treat any unknown reason as a generic decline. */
-type RfqRefusalReason = "unsupported_pair" | "unsupported_payload" | "amount_out_of_range" | "exposure_cap" | "invoice_expired" | "quote_conflict" | "pricing_unavailable";
+type RfqRefusalReason = "unsupported_pair" | "unsupported_payload" | "amount_out_of_range" | "exposure_cap" | "invoice_expired" | "quote_conflict" | "pricing_unavailable" | "rate_limited";
 /** Lifecycle vocabulary; states after which nothing more will happen. */
 declare const RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES: readonly ["settled", "refused", "expired", "refunded", "stuck"];
 /** A refusal from the solver, carrying its closed-set reason. */
@@ -444,6 +451,9 @@ declare function lightningSendVtxoScript(params: {
      * this value. P2TR pkScript, 34 bytes. */
     receiverPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
+/** Every input {@link lightningSendVtxoScript} builds from. Derived from the
+ * builder rather than restated, so the two cannot drift. */
+type LightningSendTreeParams = Parameters<typeof lightningSendVtxoScript>[0];
 /** The BOLT11 facts the trader read from its OWN decode — this module takes
  * the facts, not the decoder, so any wallet's existing decoder serves. */
 interface InvoiceFacts {
@@ -512,6 +522,22 @@ declare function requestLightningSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tra
     /** How the `sender` key is recovered later. Persist it with the record;
      * it holds nothing secret. */
     secrets: ProvisionedKey;
+    /**
+     * Every input the covenant was built from, as it was AT REQUEST TIME.
+     *
+     * Returned so a consumer can persist the swap without re-deriving any of
+     * it. Half of these are not on the quote: `serverPubkey` and `claimDelay`
+     * come from this wallet's own `getInfo()`, `emulatorPubkey` from a
+     * per-network pin, `refundPkScript` from decoding an address.
+     *
+     * All public. Persisting them is optional: this call also registers the
+     * lockup as a contract, and that row is where `rebuildRfqSwap` takes its
+     * covenant from — see `rfqRecord.ts`. Keep a copy only to hold a record
+     * that rebuilds without the wallet's contract store, and keep it as
+     * `VHTLCV2ContractHandler.serializeParams(script.options)`, the shape the
+     * rebuild accepts.
+     */
+    treeParams: LightningSendTreeParams;
 }>;
 /**
  * Map an arkade↔arkade quote onto `createOffer` terms. The trader takes the
@@ -610,6 +636,15 @@ declare function deriveOnchainSend(input: {
      * so the row can never key on a script other than the derived one. */
     script: InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
+    /** The inputs {@link htlc} was built from. Returned because nothing else
+     * can give them back: `OnchainHtlc` exposes only derived values, and this
+     * contract is Bitcoin L1 — there is no Arkade contract row for it, so a
+     * consumer persisting the swap has no other route to rebuilding it. */
+    htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
+    /** Echoed from the input, so a result is a complete description of the L1
+     * half rather than one a caller has to re-assemble from what it passed in.
+     * {@link onchainSendProfile} reads it from here. */
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
     refundLocktime: number;
     htlcLocktime: number;
     minConfirmations: number;
@@ -660,6 +695,30 @@ declare function requestOnchainSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, trans
     refundAddress: string;
     /** The EXPECTED L1 fill, derived locally — watch and claim against this. */
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
+    /** The inputs {@link htlc} was built from — persist these to rebuild it
+     * after a restart. Nothing else gives them back: `OnchainHtlc` exposes only
+     * derived values, and this contract is Bitcoin L1, so unlike the arkade
+     * lockup there is no contract row holding its parameters. Persist
+     * `htlc.address` alongside them (`OnchainSendProfile.htlcAddress`): the
+     * rebuild checks the two against each other, which is the only check
+     * available on a leg with no second copy of its covenant.
+     *
+     * `onchainSendProfile(result)` does all of that mapping for you; prefer it
+     * to reading these fields across by hand. */
+    htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
+    /**
+     * Which bitcoin network the L1 HTLC was derived for.
+     *
+     * Returned because it is NOT the ark network name and cannot be recovered
+     * from one by inspection: this call maps `info.network` through a private
+     * narrowing where signet, mutinynet and testnet4 all become `"testnet"`.
+     * A caller reconstructing it from context would be re-deriving a mapping
+     * it cannot see, and a value the profile needs verbatim.
+     */
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
+    /** `profile.min_confirmations`; gates when the L1 fill becomes claimable,
+     * and part of what a restored swap needs to drive its own claim. */
+    minConfirmations: number;
     /** The VHTLC `sender` x-only key, bound into the covenant. Public. */
     senderPubkey: Uint8Array;
     /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later — map it
@@ -757,6 +816,9 @@ declare function receiveVtxoScript(params: {
      * address) — `nonInteractiveClaim`'s pinned destination. */
     payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
+/** Every input {@link receiveVtxoScript} builds from; see
+ * {@link LightningSendTreeParams}. */
+type LightningReceiveTreeParams = Parameters<typeof receiveVtxoScript>[0];
 /**
  * The pure core of {@link requestLightningReceive}: derive the solver-funded
  * covenant locally from the quote's binding fields plus the trader's own data
@@ -781,6 +843,9 @@ declare function deriveLightningReceive(input: {
     /** The solver's hold invoice on `H` — what the trader pays to arm the swap. */
     invoice: string;
     refundLocktime: number;
+    /** Every input the covenant was built from — see the same field on
+     * `requestLightningSend`'s result for why a consumer needs them. */
+    treeParams: LightningReceiveTreeParams;
 };
 /**
  * The `lightning:BTC->arkade:BTC` user flow: quote → derive the covenant
@@ -856,6 +921,9 @@ declare function requestLightningReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string,
      * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE paying the invoice.
      * Public unless `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
+    /** Every input the covenant was built from; see the same field on
+     * `requestLightningSend`'s result. */
+    treeParams: LightningReceiveTreeParams;
 }>;
 /**
  * The pure core of {@link requestOnchainReceive}: derive BOTH contracts
@@ -932,4 +1000,4 @@ declare function requestOnchainReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tr
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 
-export { onchainReceiveRequest as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, assertReceivable as B, type ChainSource as C, awaitOnchainFill as D, buildHtlcClaim as E, buildHtlcRefund as F, claimOnchainFill as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, classifyOnchainHtlc as J, deriveLightningReceive as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, deriveOnchainReceive as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, deriveOnchainSend as P, extractPreimage as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, httpTransport as T, lightningReceiveRequest as U, lightningSendRequest as V, lightningSendVtxoScript as W, newPreimage as X, newRfqId as Y, offerTermsFromQuote as Z, onchainHtlcScript as _, type RfqTransport as a, onchainSendRequest as a0, paymentHashOf as a1, receiveVtxoScript as a2, relayTransport as a3, requestLightningReceive as a4, requestLightningSend as a5, requestOnchainReceive as a6, requestOnchainSend as a7, rfqPair as a8, unilateralClaimDelay as a9, unilateralRefundDelay as aa, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as ab, verifyLockupAddress as ac, verifyReceiveInvoice as ad, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, SwapRefusal as w, arkadeAssetLeg as x, arkadeSwapRequest as y, assertFundable as z };
+export { newRfqId as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, arkadeAssetLeg as B, type ChainSource as C, arkadeSwapRequest as D, assertFundable as E, assertReceivable as F, awaitOnchainFill as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, buildHtlcClaim as J, buildHtlcRefund as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, claimOnchainFill as N, type OnchainNetwork as O, classifyOnchainHtlc as P, deriveLightningReceive as Q, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, deriveOnchainReceive as T, deriveOnchainSend as U, extractPreimage as V, httpTransport as W, lightningReceiveRequest as X, lightningSendRequest as Y, lightningSendVtxoScript as Z, newPreimage as _, type OnchainHtlc as a, offerTermsFromQuote as a0, onchainHtlcScript as a1, onchainReceiveRequest as a2, onchainSendRequest as a3, paymentHashOf as a4, receiveVtxoScript as a5, relayTransport as a6, requestLightningReceive as a7, requestLightningSend as a8, requestOnchainReceive as a9, requestOnchainSend as aa, rfqPair as ab, unilateralClaimDelay as ac, unilateralRefundDelay as ad, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as ae, verifyLockupAddress as af, verifyReceiveInvoice as ag, type OnchainHtlcParams as b, ARKADE_BTC as c, AddressMismatch as d, type ChainUtxo as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD as h, type LightningReceiveTreeParams as i, type LightningSendTreeParams as j, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as k, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as l, ONCHAIN_BTC as m, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as n, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as o, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as p, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as q, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as r, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as s, type OnchainHtlcPhase as t, type RelaySocket as u, type RfqQuote as v, type RfqRefusalReason as w, type RfqStatus as x, type RfqTransport as y, SwapRefusal as z };

package/dist/{rfq-DfT9dAss.d.ts → rfq-hbzhTWHT.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { asset, VHTLC, IWallet, ProvisionedClaimSecret, ProvisionedKey } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
+import { VHTLC, asset, IWallet, ProvisionedClaimSecret, ProvisionedKey } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
 
 /** L1 confirmation-depth and reorg margin between dependent timelocks. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ declare const ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
 declare const ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS: number;
 /** Bounds on the confirmation depth a quote may demand. */
 declare const MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS = 6;
+/**
+ * BIP65's boundary between the two things an absolute locktime can mean.
+ * Below it consensus reads the value as a block height; at or above it, as a
+ * unix timestamp. 500,000,000 itself is 1985-07-05 and is a timestamp, so the
+ * comparison against it is strict.
+ */
+declare const LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD = 500000000;
 /** Conservative block interval for converting depths into wall-clock time. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK = 600;
 /**
@@ -239,7 +246,7 @@ declare const ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR: string;
 /** On-board: a Bitcoin-L1 HTLC in, Arkade sats out. */
 declare const ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR: string;
 /** The closed refusal set. Treat any unknown reason as a generic decline. */
-type RfqRefusalReason = "unsupported_pair" | "unsupported_payload" | "amount_out_of_range" | "exposure_cap" | "invoice_expired" | "quote_conflict" | "pricing_unavailable";
+type RfqRefusalReason = "unsupported_pair" | "unsupported_payload" | "amount_out_of_range" | "exposure_cap" | "invoice_expired" | "quote_conflict" | "pricing_unavailable" | "rate_limited";
 /** Lifecycle vocabulary; states after which nothing more will happen. */
 declare const RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES: readonly ["settled", "refused", "expired", "refunded", "stuck"];
 /** A refusal from the solver, carrying its closed-set reason. */
@@ -444,6 +451,9 @@ declare function lightningSendVtxoScript(params: {
      * this value. P2TR pkScript, 34 bytes. */
     receiverPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
+/** Every input {@link lightningSendVtxoScript} builds from. Derived from the
+ * builder rather than restated, so the two cannot drift. */
+type LightningSendTreeParams = Parameters<typeof lightningSendVtxoScript>[0];
 /** The BOLT11 facts the trader read from its OWN decode — this module takes
  * the facts, not the decoder, so any wallet's existing decoder serves. */
 interface InvoiceFacts {
@@ -512,6 +522,22 @@ declare function requestLightningSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tra
     /** How the `sender` key is recovered later. Persist it with the record;
      * it holds nothing secret. */
     secrets: ProvisionedKey;
+    /**
+     * Every input the covenant was built from, as it was AT REQUEST TIME.
+     *
+     * Returned so a consumer can persist the swap without re-deriving any of
+     * it. Half of these are not on the quote: `serverPubkey` and `claimDelay`
+     * come from this wallet's own `getInfo()`, `emulatorPubkey` from a
+     * per-network pin, `refundPkScript` from decoding an address.
+     *
+     * All public. Persisting them is optional: this call also registers the
+     * lockup as a contract, and that row is where `rebuildRfqSwap` takes its
+     * covenant from — see `rfqRecord.ts`. Keep a copy only to hold a record
+     * that rebuilds without the wallet's contract store, and keep it as
+     * `VHTLCV2ContractHandler.serializeParams(script.options)`, the shape the
+     * rebuild accepts.
+     */
+    treeParams: LightningSendTreeParams;
 }>;
 /**
  * Map an arkade↔arkade quote onto `createOffer` terms. The trader takes the
@@ -610,6 +636,15 @@ declare function deriveOnchainSend(input: {
      * so the row can never key on a script other than the derived one. */
     script: InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
+    /** The inputs {@link htlc} was built from. Returned because nothing else
+     * can give them back: `OnchainHtlc` exposes only derived values, and this
+     * contract is Bitcoin L1 — there is no Arkade contract row for it, so a
+     * consumer persisting the swap has no other route to rebuilding it. */
+    htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
+    /** Echoed from the input, so a result is a complete description of the L1
+     * half rather than one a caller has to re-assemble from what it passed in.
+     * {@link onchainSendProfile} reads it from here. */
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
     refundLocktime: number;
     htlcLocktime: number;
     minConfirmations: number;
@@ -660,6 +695,30 @@ declare function requestOnchainSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, trans
     refundAddress: string;
     /** The EXPECTED L1 fill, derived locally — watch and claim against this. */
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
+    /** The inputs {@link htlc} was built from — persist these to rebuild it
+     * after a restart. Nothing else gives them back: `OnchainHtlc` exposes only
+     * derived values, and this contract is Bitcoin L1, so unlike the arkade
+     * lockup there is no contract row holding its parameters. Persist
+     * `htlc.address` alongside them (`OnchainSendProfile.htlcAddress`): the
+     * rebuild checks the two against each other, which is the only check
+     * available on a leg with no second copy of its covenant.
+     *
+     * `onchainSendProfile(result)` does all of that mapping for you; prefer it
+     * to reading these fields across by hand. */
+    htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
+    /**
+     * Which bitcoin network the L1 HTLC was derived for.
+     *
+     * Returned because it is NOT the ark network name and cannot be recovered
+     * from one by inspection: this call maps `info.network` through a private
+     * narrowing where signet, mutinynet and testnet4 all become `"testnet"`.
+     * A caller reconstructing it from context would be re-deriving a mapping
+     * it cannot see, and a value the profile needs verbatim.
+     */
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
+    /** `profile.min_confirmations`; gates when the L1 fill becomes claimable,
+     * and part of what a restored swap needs to drive its own claim. */
+    minConfirmations: number;
     /** The VHTLC `sender` x-only key, bound into the covenant. Public. */
     senderPubkey: Uint8Array;
     /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later — map it
@@ -757,6 +816,9 @@ declare function receiveVtxoScript(params: {
      * address) — `nonInteractiveClaim`'s pinned destination. */
     payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): InstanceType<typeof VHTLC.ScriptV2>;
+/** Every input {@link receiveVtxoScript} builds from; see
+ * {@link LightningSendTreeParams}. */
+type LightningReceiveTreeParams = Parameters<typeof receiveVtxoScript>[0];
 /**
  * The pure core of {@link requestLightningReceive}: derive the solver-funded
  * covenant locally from the quote's binding fields plus the trader's own data
@@ -781,6 +843,9 @@ declare function deriveLightningReceive(input: {
     /** The solver's hold invoice on `H` — what the trader pays to arm the swap. */
     invoice: string;
     refundLocktime: number;
+    /** Every input the covenant was built from — see the same field on
+     * `requestLightningSend`'s result for why a consumer needs them. */
+    treeParams: LightningReceiveTreeParams;
 };
 /**
  * The `lightning:BTC->arkade:BTC` user flow: quote → derive the covenant
@@ -856,6 +921,9 @@ declare function requestLightningReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string,
      * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE paying the invoice.
      * Public unless `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
+    /** Every input the covenant was built from; see the same field on
+     * `requestLightningSend`'s result. */
+    treeParams: LightningReceiveTreeParams;
 }>;
 /**
  * The pure core of {@link requestOnchainReceive}: derive BOTH contracts
@@ -932,4 +1000,4 @@ declare function requestOnchainReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tr
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 
-export { onchainReceiveRequest as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, assertReceivable as B, type ChainSource as C, awaitOnchainFill as D, buildHtlcClaim as E, buildHtlcRefund as F, claimOnchainFill as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, classifyOnchainHtlc as J, deriveLightningReceive as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, deriveOnchainReceive as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, deriveOnchainSend as P, extractPreimage as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, httpTransport as T, lightningReceiveRequest as U, lightningSendRequest as V, lightningSendVtxoScript as W, newPreimage as X, newRfqId as Y, offerTermsFromQuote as Z, onchainHtlcScript as _, type RfqTransport as a, onchainSendRequest as a0, paymentHashOf as a1, receiveVtxoScript as a2, relayTransport as a3, requestLightningReceive as a4, requestLightningSend as a5, requestOnchainReceive as a6, requestOnchainSend as a7, rfqPair as a8, unilateralClaimDelay as a9, unilateralRefundDelay as aa, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as ab, verifyLockupAddress as ac, verifyReceiveInvoice as ad, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, SwapRefusal as w, arkadeAssetLeg as x, arkadeSwapRequest as y, assertFundable as z };
+export { newRfqId as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, arkadeAssetLeg as B, type ChainSource as C, arkadeSwapRequest as D, assertFundable as E, assertReceivable as F, awaitOnchainFill as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, buildHtlcClaim as J, buildHtlcRefund as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, claimOnchainFill as N, type OnchainNetwork as O, classifyOnchainHtlc as P, deriveLightningReceive as Q, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, deriveOnchainReceive as T, deriveOnchainSend as U, extractPreimage as V, httpTransport as W, lightningReceiveRequest as X, lightningSendRequest as Y, lightningSendVtxoScript as Z, newPreimage as _, type OnchainHtlc as a, offerTermsFromQuote as a0, onchainHtlcScript as a1, onchainReceiveRequest as a2, onchainSendRequest as a3, paymentHashOf as a4, receiveVtxoScript as a5, relayTransport as a6, requestLightningReceive as a7, requestLightningSend as a8, requestOnchainReceive as a9, requestOnchainSend as aa, rfqPair as ab, unilateralClaimDelay as ac, unilateralRefundDelay as ad, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as ae, verifyLockupAddress as af, verifyReceiveInvoice as ag, type OnchainHtlcParams as b, ARKADE_BTC as c, AddressMismatch as d, type ChainUtxo as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD as h, type LightningReceiveTreeParams as i, type LightningSendTreeParams as j, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as k, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as l, ONCHAIN_BTC as m, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as n, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as o, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as p, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as q, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as r, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as s, type OnchainHtlcPhase as t, type RelaySocket as u, type RfqQuote as v, type RfqRefusalReason as w, type RfqStatus as x, type RfqTransport as y, SwapRefusal as z };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@arkade-os/swap",
-  "version": "0.0.7",
+  "version": "0.0.9",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Client-side Arkade Intents asset swaps: discover markets, quote, create/track/cancel offers, restore from chain.",
   "repository": {
@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
   "license": "MIT",
   "dependencies": {
     "@arkade-os/solver-discovery": "0.2.3",
+    "@noble/ciphers": "2.1.1",
     "@noble/curves": "2.0.1",
     "@noble/hashes": "2.0.1",
     "@scure/base": "2.0.0",
     "@scure/btc-signer": "2.0.1",
-    "@arkade-os/sdk": "0.4.64"
+    "@arkade-os/sdk": "0.4.66"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "nostr-tools": "^2.12.0"

package/dist/repository-BwnZ8N62.d.cts

@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-import { DiscoveredMarket } from '@arkade-os/solver-discovery';
-import { IWallet, ProvisionedKey, ProvisionedClaimSecret } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
-
-type AssetSwapStatus = "pending" | "cancelling" | "fulfilled" | "cancelled" | "recoverable" | "awaiting_fill" | "claimable" | "claimed" | "refunded_l1";
-/** The sentinel asset id for BTC itself, as opposed to a 68-hex asset id.
- * Lives here with the {@link AssetSwap} fields it describes so the market and
- * restore layers share one spelling instead of re-typing the literal. */
-declare const BTC_ASSET_ID = "btc";
-/**
- * The record fields a wallet-provisioned secret becomes — what
- * {@link swapSecretsToRecord} emits, and what every record type carrying swap
- * secrets embeds.
- *
- * A named type rather than four fields restated per record: the mapper and the
- * records it feeds must agree exactly, and a record that silently omits one of
- * these round-trips a swap whose preimage cannot be re-derived. Embedding makes
- * the omission a compile error instead.
- *
- * **Only `preimageHex` is secret.** `signingDescriptor` and `preimageSaltHex`
- * are public derivation inputs — they must survive a field-mapped backend, but
- * they leak nothing without the seed.
- */
-interface SwapSecretsProjection {
-    /**
-     * The wallet descriptor this swap's sender key comes from — a fresh HD
-     * child, or a static wallet's `tr(pubkey)`. Public — the signer
-     * re-derives from the wallet, so the record carries no key material.
-     */
-    signingDescriptor?: string;
-    /** P, hex, when it cannot be re-derived from the seed at all: the user
-     * supplied it, or the signer cannot sign deterministically. The swap's only
-     * claim secret when present. */
-    preimageHex?: string;
-    /**
-     * The salt P derives from, hex, on the salted arm — what a static wallet
-     * gets instead of storing P. **Public**, and unlike every other field here
-     * it is minted per swap: it is what stops one repeating key from handing
-     * every swap the same preimage.
-     */
-    preimageSaltHex?: string;
-}
-interface AssetSwap extends SwapSecretsProjection {
-    /** Funding txid — the swap's identity. */
-    id: string;
-    /** 'btc' or a 68-hex asset id. */
-    fromAsset: string;
-    toAsset: string;
-    /** Atomic amounts as strings (bigint is not JSON-safe). */
-    fromAmount: string;
-    /** The covenant wantAmount — a floor, the fill pays >= this. */
-    toAmount: string;
-    swapAddress: string;
-    /** Hex pkScript of the swap contract — the indexer monitoring key. */
-    swapPkScript: string;
-    /** TLV offer — needed to rebuild the contract for cancel. */
-    offerHex: string;
-    fundingTxid: string;
-    spentTxid?: string;
-    status: AssetSwapStatus;
-    createdAt: number;
-    completedAt?: number;
-    /** RFQ pair string, e.g. `arkade:BTC->onchain:BTC`. */
-    pair?: string;
-    /** `sha256(P)`, hex. Public, and how a restore confirms a candidate
-     * derivation is the right one. */
-    paymentHash?: string;
-    /** The L1 HTLC's pkScript, hex — the chain-watch key. */
-    htlcPkScriptHex?: string;
-    htlcLocktime?: number;
-    /** The L1 funding txid, once observed. */
-    l1Txid?: string;
-}
-/** All swaps, newest-first. Insertion order is not chronological — the restore
- * scan rebuilds records in tx-scan order — so sort at read to keep
- * newest-first canonical for every consumer. */
-declare const getAssetSwapsOrThrow: (repository: AssetSwapRepository) => Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-/** The consumer read: a broken backend reads as no swaps rather than crashing
- * a history view. Mutations must use {@link getAssetSwapsOrThrow} instead —
- * swallowing the read there would let "the backend is gone" masquerade as "no
- * such swap" and skip the write silently. */
-declare const getAssetSwaps: (repository: AssetSwapRepository) => Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-/** Add a swap; no-op if the id is already stored. Returns the updated list.
- * THROWS on a failed write — nothing irreversible may happen until this record
- * is durable, so the caller must not fund on a failure. */
-declare const addAssetSwap: (repository: AssetSwapRepository, swap: AssetSwap) => Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-/** Merge changes into a swap by id. Returns the updated list.
- * THROWS on a failed read or write, like {@link addAssetSwap} — use this for a
- * write that gates something irreversible. Transitions written *after* the
- * irreversible act belong on {@link updateAssetSwapBestEffort}. */
-declare const updateAssetSwap: (repository: AssetSwapRepository, id: string, changes: Partial<Omit<AssetSwap, "id">>) => Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-/**
- * {@link updateAssetSwap} for transitions that follow an irreversible action (a
- * broadcast claim, a spent lockup): failing the caller there would report as
- * failed a swap whose funds already moved, and a stale status is recoverable —
- * crash recovery re-derives the true state from the chain
- * (`classifyOnchainHtlc`).
- *
- * `persisted` is the part that must not be hidden: a caller that notifies on a
- * change, or treats one as terminal, has to know the store did not agree.
- */
-declare const updateAssetSwapBestEffort: (repository: AssetSwapRepository, id: string, changes: Partial<Omit<AssetSwap, "id">>) => Promise<{
-    swaps: AssetSwap[];
-    persisted: boolean;
-}>;
-/**
- * The record fields a wallet-provisioned secret becomes.
- *
- * `signingDescriptor` is public and always stored — it is what recovers the
- * signer. Then at most one of: `preimageHex`, when the wallet says it cannot
- * re-derive P and it becomes the swap's only claim secret; or
- * `preimageSaltHex`, the public input a derivable-but-repeating key needs.
- */
-declare const swapSecretsToRecord: (secrets: ProvisionedKey | ProvisionedClaimSecret) => SwapSecretsProjection & {
-    signingDescriptor: string;
-};
-/** Why a wallet cannot produce a swap's preimage. */
-type PreimageBlockedReason = 
-/** The record carries no `signingDescriptor`. */
-"no-secrets"
-/** `preimageHex` or `preimageSaltHex` is present but not 32 bytes of hex. */
- | "malformed-record"
-/**
- * Nothing to derive from: a descriptor that repeats across swaps, with
- * neither a stored preimage nor a salt — or one this wallet holds no key
- * for. Merged deliberately: `contractSigner` reports a key it does not
- * hold as a plain `Error` for static wallets and a `ForeignDescriptorError`
- * for HD ones, so splitting the two here would mean matching on message
- * text, which is the thing this type exists to avoid. The `cause` carries
- * whichever it was.
- */
- | "not-derivable"
-/** Derived, but it does not hash to the record's `paymentHash`. */
- | "hash-mismatch";
-/**
- * The wallet cannot produce this swap's preimage, and which of the four ways
- * is `reason`.
- *
- * Deliberately **not** {@link RefundNotLocallyPossibleError}: that one means
- * "no local refund is possible", and `RfqSwapManager` acts on it by reporting
- * `needs_counterparty`. A claim-path read failure is a different verdict, and
- * borrowing the refund error would have the manager announce one for the
- * other.
- */
-declare class PreimageNotRecoverableError extends Error {
-    readonly reason: PreimageBlockedReason;
-    readonly name = "PreimageNotRecoverableError";
-    constructor(reason: PreimageBlockedReason, message: string, options?: {
-        cause?: unknown;
-    });
-}
-/**
- * The preimage a swap record claims with — stored, or re-derived from the
- * wallet.
- *
- * The record-shaped inverse of {@link swapSecretsToRecord}, and the one place
- * that knows which of a record's fields `contractPreimage` needs. Wire claim
- * paths here rather than composing it by hand: a caller that forgets to pass
- * `preimageSaltHex` gets a *wrong* preimage from a wallet that can derive,
- * not an error.
- *
- * Verifies the result against `paymentHash` when the record carries one. The
- * salted arm has two inputs that can be wrong — the key and the salt — where
- * the HD arm had one, and a wrong P otherwise surfaces as an opaque script
- * failure at claim time, long after the mistake.
- *
- * Every refusal is a {@link PreimageNotRecoverableError} carrying a `reason`,
- * so a caller can tell "this record predates the descriptor" from "the salt is
- * corrupt" without reading message text.
- */
-declare const preimageForSwapRecord: (wallet: IWallet, record: SwapSecretsProjection & {
-    paymentHash?: string;
-}) => Promise<Uint8Array>;
-
-/** A registry discovery result held for reuse. Refetchable — unlike a swap
- * record, losing it costs one network round trip — but it must survive a cold
- * boot: serving it stale is what keeps quoting alive while a registry is down. */
-interface MarketsCacheEntry {
-    markets: DiscoveredMarket[];
-    fetchedAt: number;
-}
-/**
- * Everything the package persists, following the monorepo repository
- * convention (versioned interface, AsyncDisposable, one backend per
- * platform — see the Boltz plugin's SwapRepository). Consumers construct
- * exactly one of these; there is no second storage seam.
- *
- * Durable records (swaps) and rebuildable state (the restore scan's txid
- * cursor, the markets cache) live side by side because they share a
- * lifetime: all three belong to one wallet on one device, and a consumer
- * that wipes one wants all three gone.
- *
- * ponytail: no query filters — every consumer reads all swaps and filters
- * in memory; mirror the Boltz plugin's GetSwapsFilter when a consumer needs
- * subset queries.
- */
-interface AssetSwapRepository extends AsyncDisposable {
-    readonly version: 2;
-    /** Insert or replace a swap by id. Store the record whole: `preimageHex`
-     * and `preimageSaltHex` both leave the swap unclaimable if a field-mapped
-     * backend drops them — the first is the only claim secret of a swap whose
-     * signer cannot derive, the second the public input every other static
-     * wallet's preimage derives from.
-     *
-     * Records must be **JSON-safe**: the SQLite and Realm backends serialize
-     * the record to JSON, so a `Date` in a consumer-added field comes back a
-     * string, a `Set`/`Map` comes back empty, and a `bigint` throws here —
-     * none of which happens on IndexedDB's structured clone. `AssetSwap` as
-     * declared is JSON-safe; keep added fields that way. */
-    saveSwap(swap: AssetSwap): Promise<void>;
-    /** All stored swaps, in no particular order — `getAssetSwaps` is the
-     * canonical newest-first read. */
-    getAllSwaps(): Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-    /** Sent txids already checked for offer packets (see restore.ts). */
-    getScannedTxids(): Promise<Set<string>>;
-    markTxidsScanned(txids: Iterable<string>): Promise<void>;
-    /** Cached registry markets, or undefined on a miss. */
-    getCachedMarkets(network: string, registry: string): Promise<MarketsCacheEntry | undefined>;
-    saveCachedMarkets(network: string, registry: string, entry: MarketsCacheEntry): Promise<void>;
-    clear(): Promise<void>;
-}
-declare class InMemoryAssetSwapRepository implements AssetSwapRepository {
-    readonly version: 2;
-    private readonly swaps;
-    private readonly scanned;
-    private readonly markets;
-    saveSwap(swap: AssetSwap): Promise<void>;
-    getAllSwaps(): Promise<AssetSwap[]>;
-    getScannedTxids(): Promise<Set<string>>;
-    markTxidsScanned(txids: Iterable<string>): Promise<void>;
-    getCachedMarkets(network: string, registry: string): Promise<MarketsCacheEntry | undefined>;
-    saveCachedMarkets(network: string, registry: string, entry: MarketsCacheEntry): Promise<void>;
-    clear(): Promise<void>;
-    [Symbol.asyncDispose](): Promise<void>;
-}
-
-export { type AssetSwapRepository as A, BTC_ASSET_ID as B, InMemoryAssetSwapRepository as I, type MarketsCacheEntry as M, type PreimageBlockedReason as P, type SwapSecretsProjection as S, type AssetSwap as a, type AssetSwapStatus as b, PreimageNotRecoverableError as c, addAssetSwap as d, getAssetSwapsOrThrow as e, updateAssetSwapBestEffort as f, getAssetSwaps as g, preimageForSwapRecord as p, swapSecretsToRecord as s, updateAssetSwap as u };