@arkade-os/swap 0.0.4 → 0.0.5

package/dist/nostr.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   SwapRefusal
-} from "./chunk-DLM6BVTB.js";
+} from "./chunk-Q4FAYBXS.js";
 
 // src/nostr.ts
 import {
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ var RelayUnavailable = class extends Error {
     this.reasons = reasons;
   }
 };
+var TransportClosed = class extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("transport closed before the solver replied");
+    this.name = "TransportClosed";
+  }
+};
 var closeReasons = (raw) => raw.map((entry) => {
   if (typeof entry === "string") return entry;
   const { url, reason } = entry ?? {};
@@ -120,6 +126,7 @@ var nostrRfqTransport = (options) => {
     },
     async close() {
       closed = true;
+      for (const waiter of waiters.values()) waiter.reject(new TransportClosed());
       waiters.clear();
       if (ownsPool) pool.close(relays);
       else subscription.close();
@@ -130,5 +137,6 @@ export {
   RFQ_AD_KIND,
   RFQ_DIRECTED_KIND,
   RelayUnavailable,
+  TransportClosed,
   nostrRfqTransport
 };

package/dist/{rfq-DjZlesr4.d.cts → rfq-BH2yvo3O.d.cts}

@@ -355,20 +355,38 @@ declare const relayTransport: (relayUrl: string, options: {
     WebSocketCtor?: new (url: string) => RelaySocket;
     timeoutMs?: number;
 }) => RfqTransport;
+/**
+ * How long the sender's SOLO refund opens after the receiver's claim, seconds.
+ *
+ * This is the window in which a claimant holding the preimage must be able to
+ * finish taking their money before the funder could take it back. On a live
+ * Arkade server that is one collaborative spend; with the server gone it is a
+ * full unilateral exit — an unroll broadcast per chain step, each waiting on a
+ * confirmation, then the CSV spend.
+ *
+ * 4096s (eight 512s units, ~68 minutes) is sized for that worst case. It is
+ * REASONED, not measured, and it mirrors `SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS` in the
+ * reference solver's `src/core/timelocks.ts` — the two must move together or a
+ * trader derives an address the solver never quoted.
+ *
+ * A multiple of the granularity on purpose: BIP68 would round anything else,
+ * making the encoded timelock differ from the number written here.
+ */
+declare const SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS: number;
 /** The solver's unilateral-claim delay, derived from the Ark server's reported
  * exit delay exactly as the reference solver derives it — both sides read the
  * SAME server, so the derivation (not a quote field) is what keeps the two
  * scripts identical. */
 declare const unilateralClaimDelay: (serverExitDelaySeconds: number) => number;
-/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefund` tier: sender + solver, no server, one 512s step
- * past `claimDelay` — the middle rung between the fully-collaborative paths
- * and the sender's last-resort `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver`. Same
- * already-rounded `claimDelay` input as {@link unilateralClaimDelay}
- * produces — one rounding, shared across all three tiers. */
+/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefund` tier: sender + receiver, no server — LEVEL with
+ * `claimDelay`, not above it. Neither party can spend a two-signature leaf
+ * alone, so separating it buys no safety, and every second spent separating it
+ * is a second taken off the headroom that does matter. */
 declare const unilateralRefundDelay: (claimDelay: number) => number;
-/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver` tier: sender alone, needs
- * nobody — two 512s steps past `claimDelay`, past {@link
- * unilateralRefundDelay}. */
+/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver` tier: sender alone, needing
+ * nobody. The only leaf whose timing can steal — a funder able to refund
+ * before the claimant can claim takes money from someone holding the preimage
+ * — so it opens last, by {@link SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS}. */
 declare const unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay: (claimDelay: number) => number;
 /** Compile the lightning-send VHTLC from the quote's binding fields plus the
  * trader's own data. `paymentHash` is the BOLT11 payment hash (`sha256(P)`,
@@ -631,8 +649,9 @@ declare function requestOnchainSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, trans
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
     /** The VHTLC `sender` x-only key, bound into the covenant. Public. */
     senderPubkey: Uint8Array;
-    /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later. Persist it
-     * with the record BEFORE funding. */
+    /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE funding. Public unless
+     * `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 /** Default floor for the window between the last moment the hold invoice can
@@ -820,8 +839,9 @@ declare function requestLightningReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string,
     payoutAddress: string;
     /** The trader's covenant `receiver` key, bound into the tree. Public. */
     payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
-    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later. Persist it
-     * with the record BEFORE paying the invoice. */
+    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE paying the invoice.
+     * Public unless `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 /**
@@ -893,7 +913,10 @@ declare function requestOnchainReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tr
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
     payoutAddress: string;
     payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE funding. Public unless
+     * `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 
-export { paymentHashOf as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, buildHtlcClaim as B, type ChainSource as C, buildHtlcRefund as D, claimOnchainFill as E, classifyOnchainHtlc as F, deriveLightningReceive as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, deriveOnchainReceive as J, deriveOnchainSend as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, extractPreimage as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, httpTransport as P, lightningReceiveRequest as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SwapRefusal as S, lightningSendRequest as T, lightningSendVtxoScript as U, newPreimage as V, newRfqId as W, offerTermsFromQuote as X, onchainHtlcScript as Y, onchainReceiveRequest as Z, onchainSendRequest as _, type RfqTransport as a, receiveVtxoScript as a0, relayTransport as a1, requestLightningReceive as a2, requestLightningSend as a3, requestOnchainReceive as a4, requestOnchainSend as a5, rfqPair as a6, unilateralClaimDelay as a7, unilateralRefundDelay as a8, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as a9, verifyLockupAddress as aa, verifyReceiveInvoice as ab, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, arkadeSwapRequest as w, assertFundable as x, assertReceivable as y, awaitOnchainFill as z };
+export { onchainSendRequest as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, awaitOnchainFill as B, type ChainSource as C, buildHtlcClaim as D, buildHtlcRefund as E, claimOnchainFill as F, classifyOnchainHtlc as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, deriveLightningReceive as J, deriveOnchainReceive as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, deriveOnchainSend as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, extractPreimage as P, httpTransport as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, lightningReceiveRequest as T, lightningSendRequest as U, lightningSendVtxoScript as V, newPreimage as W, newRfqId as X, offerTermsFromQuote as Y, onchainHtlcScript as Z, onchainReceiveRequest as _, type RfqTransport as a, paymentHashOf as a0, receiveVtxoScript as a1, relayTransport as a2, requestLightningReceive as a3, requestLightningSend as a4, requestOnchainReceive as a5, requestOnchainSend as a6, rfqPair as a7, unilateralClaimDelay as a8, unilateralRefundDelay as a9, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as aa, verifyLockupAddress as ab, verifyReceiveInvoice as ac, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, SwapRefusal as w, arkadeSwapRequest as x, assertFundable as y, assertReceivable as z };

package/dist/{rfq-DjZlesr4.d.ts → rfq-BH2yvo3O.d.ts}

@@ -355,20 +355,38 @@ declare const relayTransport: (relayUrl: string, options: {
     WebSocketCtor?: new (url: string) => RelaySocket;
     timeoutMs?: number;
 }) => RfqTransport;
+/**
+ * How long the sender's SOLO refund opens after the receiver's claim, seconds.
+ *
+ * This is the window in which a claimant holding the preimage must be able to
+ * finish taking their money before the funder could take it back. On a live
+ * Arkade server that is one collaborative spend; with the server gone it is a
+ * full unilateral exit — an unroll broadcast per chain step, each waiting on a
+ * confirmation, then the CSV spend.
+ *
+ * 4096s (eight 512s units, ~68 minutes) is sized for that worst case. It is
+ * REASONED, not measured, and it mirrors `SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS` in the
+ * reference solver's `src/core/timelocks.ts` — the two must move together or a
+ * trader derives an address the solver never quoted.
+ *
+ * A multiple of the granularity on purpose: BIP68 would round anything else,
+ * making the encoded timelock differ from the number written here.
+ */
+declare const SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS: number;
 /** The solver's unilateral-claim delay, derived from the Ark server's reported
  * exit delay exactly as the reference solver derives it — both sides read the
  * SAME server, so the derivation (not a quote field) is what keeps the two
  * scripts identical. */
 declare const unilateralClaimDelay: (serverExitDelaySeconds: number) => number;
-/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefund` tier: sender + solver, no server, one 512s step
- * past `claimDelay` — the middle rung between the fully-collaborative paths
- * and the sender's last-resort `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver`. Same
- * already-rounded `claimDelay` input as {@link unilateralClaimDelay}
- * produces — one rounding, shared across all three tiers. */
+/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefund` tier: sender + receiver, no server — LEVEL with
+ * `claimDelay`, not above it. Neither party can spend a two-signature leaf
+ * alone, so separating it buys no safety, and every second spent separating it
+ * is a second taken off the headroom that does matter. */
 declare const unilateralRefundDelay: (claimDelay: number) => number;
-/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver` tier: sender alone, needs
- * nobody — two 512s steps past `claimDelay`, past {@link
- * unilateralRefundDelay}. */
+/** VHTLC's `unilateralRefundWithoutReceiver` tier: sender alone, needing
+ * nobody. The only leaf whose timing can steal — a funder able to refund
+ * before the claimant can claim takes money from someone holding the preimage
+ * — so it opens last, by {@link SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS}. */
 declare const unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay: (claimDelay: number) => number;
 /** Compile the lightning-send VHTLC from the quote's binding fields plus the
  * trader's own data. `paymentHash` is the BOLT11 payment hash (`sha256(P)`,
@@ -631,8 +649,9 @@ declare function requestOnchainSend(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, trans
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
     /** The VHTLC `sender` x-only key, bound into the covenant. Public. */
     senderPubkey: Uint8Array;
-    /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later. Persist it
-     * with the record BEFORE funding. */
+    /** How the preimage and the `sender` key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE funding. Public unless
+     * `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 /** Default floor for the window between the last moment the hold invoice can
@@ -820,8 +839,9 @@ declare function requestLightningReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string,
     payoutAddress: string;
     /** The trader's covenant `receiver` key, bound into the tree. Public. */
     payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
-    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later. Persist it
-     * with the record BEFORE paying the invoice. */
+    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE paying the invoice.
+     * Public unless `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 /**
@@ -893,7 +913,10 @@ declare function requestOnchainReceive(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, tr
     htlc: OnchainHtlc;
     payoutAddress: string;
     payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** How the preimage and the payout key are recovered later — map it
+     * through `swapSecretsToRecord` and persist BEFORE funding. Public unless
+     * `mustPersistPreimage` says the wallet could not derive P. */
     secrets: ProvisionedClaimSecret;
 }>;
 
-export { paymentHashOf as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, buildHtlcClaim as B, type ChainSource as C, buildHtlcRefund as D, claimOnchainFill as E, classifyOnchainHtlc as F, deriveLightningReceive as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, deriveOnchainReceive as J, deriveOnchainSend as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, extractPreimage as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, httpTransport as P, lightningReceiveRequest as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SwapRefusal as S, lightningSendRequest as T, lightningSendVtxoScript as U, newPreimage as V, newRfqId as W, offerTermsFromQuote as X, onchainHtlcScript as Y, onchainReceiveRequest as Z, onchainSendRequest as _, type RfqTransport as a, receiveVtxoScript as a0, relayTransport as a1, requestLightningReceive as a2, requestLightningSend as a3, requestOnchainReceive as a4, requestOnchainSend as a5, rfqPair as a6, unilateralClaimDelay as a7, unilateralRefundDelay as a8, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as a9, verifyLockupAddress as aa, verifyReceiveInvoice as ab, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, arkadeSwapRequest as w, assertFundable as x, assertReceivable as y, awaitOnchainFill as z };
+export { onchainSendRequest as $, ARKADE_ASSET as A, awaitOnchainFill as B, type ChainSource as C, buildHtlcClaim as D, buildHtlcRefund as E, claimOnchainFill as F, classifyOnchainHtlc as G, type HtlcUtxo as H, type InvoiceFacts as I, deriveLightningReceive as J, deriveOnchainReceive as K, LIGHTNING_BTC as L, MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS as M, deriveOnchainSend as N, type OnchainHtlc as O, extractPreimage as P, httpTransport as Q, type RfqStatus as R, SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS as S, lightningReceiveRequest as T, lightningSendRequest as U, lightningSendVtxoScript as V, newPreimage as W, newRfqId as X, offerTermsFromQuote as Y, onchainHtlcScript as Z, onchainReceiveRequest as _, type RfqTransport as a, paymentHashOf as a0, receiveVtxoScript as a1, relayTransport as a2, requestLightningReceive as a3, requestLightningSend as a4, requestOnchainReceive as a5, requestOnchainSend as a6, rfqPair as a7, unilateralClaimDelay as a8, unilateralRefundDelay as a9, unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay as aa, verifyLockupAddress as ab, verifyReceiveInvoice as ac, type ChainUtxo as b, type OnchainHtlcPhase as c, ARKADE_BTC as d, AddressMismatch as e, LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR as f, LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR as g, MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS as h, MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS as i, ONCHAIN_BTC as j, ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS as k, ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS as l, ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS as m, ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR as n, ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK as o, ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR as p, type OnchainHtlcParams as q, type OnchainNetwork as r, RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES as s, type RelaySocket as t, type RfqQuote as u, type RfqRefusalReason as v, SwapRefusal as w, arkadeSwapRequest as x, assertFundable as y, assertReceivable as z };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@arkade-os/swap",
-  "version": "0.0.4",
+  "version": "0.0.5",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Client-side Arkade Intents asset swaps: discover markets, quote, create/track/cancel offers, restore from chain.",
   "repository": {
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
     "@noble/hashes": "2.0.1",
     "@scure/base": "2.0.0",
     "@scure/btc-signer": "2.0.1",
-    "@arkade-os/sdk": "0.4.61"
+    "@arkade-os/sdk": "0.4.62"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "nostr-tools": "^2.12.0"