@arkade-os/swap 0.0.10 → 0.0.12

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import { ProvisionedKey, ProvisionedClaimSecret, asset, IWallet, arkade, RestIndexerProvider, Transaction, IContractManager, VHTLC, Identity, ActivityResolver } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
-import { S as SwapSecretsProjection, R as RfqSwapRecord, A as AssetSwapRepository, a as AssetSwap, M as MarketsCacheEntry, b as RefundArkProvider, c as RefundIndexer, L as LockupVtxo, d as RfqSwap, e as ArkadeRefundResult, f as LockupSpendIndexer, g as RfqSwapState } from './repository-C8FXlmHY.cjs';
-export { h as AssetSwapStatus, i as AvailableRfqSwapManagerCallbacks, B as BTC_ASSET_ID, I as InMemoryAssetSwapRepository, j as LightningReceiveSwap, k as LightningSendSwap, l as LockupFate, m as LockupNeedsRecoveryError, n as LockupParams, o as LockupSpend, O as OnchainSendAction, p as OnchainSendSwap, P as PersistableRfqSwap, q as PreimageBlockedReason, r as PreimageNotRecoverableError, s as REFUND_MTP_LAG_SECONDS, t as RFQ_RESOLVED_STATES, u as RFQ_SWAP_RETENTION_SECONDS, v as RFQ_SWAP_TERMINAL_STATES, w as RefundOutcome, x as RfqRestoreFailure, y as RfqRestoreOptions, z as RfqRestoreResult, C as RfqSwapActionName, D as RfqSwapLockup, E as RfqSwapManager, F as RfqSwapManagerCallbacks, G as RfqSwapManagerConfig, H as RfqSwapManagerDeps, J as RfqSwapManagerEvents, K as RfqSwapOrigin, N as RfqSwapOriginRequired, Q as RfqSwapOutcome, T as RfqSwapRecordStore, U as SwapContractRegistry, V as addAssetSwap, W as awaitRfqResolution, X as createRfqSwapRecord, Y as findLockupVtxos, Z as getAssetSwaps, _ as getAssetSwapsOrThrow, $ as isRfqSwapTerminal, a0 as isRfqTerminal, a1 as nextOnchainAction, a2 as preimageForSwapRecord, a3 as pushRefundWithoutReceiver, a4 as readLockupFate, a5 as rebuildRfqSwap, a6 as refundIfUnresolved, a7 as rfqSwapOriginOf, a8 as shouldRetainRfqSwap, a9 as swapSecretsToRecord, aa as updateAssetSwap, ab as updateAssetSwapBestEffort, ac as updateRfqSwapRecord } from './repository-C8FXlmHY.cjs';
+import { ProvisionedKey, ProvisionedClaimSecret, asset, RelativeTimelock, IWallet, arkade, RestIndexerProvider, Transaction, IContractManager, OnchainProvider, PaymentRail, VHTLC, Identity, ActivityResolver } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
+import { S as SwapSecretsProjection, R as RfqSwapRecord, A as AssetSwapRepository, a as AssetSwap, M as MarketsCacheEntry, b as RefundArkProvider, c as RefundIndexer, L as LockupVtxo, d as RfqSwap, e as ArkadeRefundResult, f as LockupSpendIndexer, g as RfqSwapState } from './repository-DaK1RzRq.cjs';
+export { h as AssetSwapStatus, i as AvailableRfqSwapManagerCallbacks, B as BTC_ASSET_ID, I as InMemoryAssetSwapRepository, j as LightningReceiveSwap, k as LightningSendSwap, l as LockupFate, m as LockupNeedsRecoveryError, n as LockupParams, o as LockupSpend, O as OnchainSendAction, p as OnchainSendSwap, P as PersistableRfqSwap, q as PreimageBlockedReason, r as PreimageNotRecoverableError, s as REFUND_MTP_LAG_SECONDS, t as RFQ_RESOLVED_STATES, u as RFQ_SWAP_RETENTION_SECONDS, v as RFQ_SWAP_TERMINAL_STATES, w as RefundOutcome, x as RfqRestoreFailure, y as RfqRestoreOptions, z as RfqRestoreResult, C as RfqSwapActionName, D as RfqSwapLockup, E as RfqSwapManager, F as RfqSwapManagerCallbacks, G as RfqSwapManagerConfig, H as RfqSwapManagerDeps, J as RfqSwapManagerEvents, K as RfqSwapOrigin, N as RfqSwapOriginRequired, Q as RfqSwapOutcome, T as RfqSwapRecordStore, U as SwapContractRegistry, V as addAssetSwap, W as awaitRfqResolution, X as createRfqSwapRecord, Y as findLockupVtxos, Z as getAssetSwaps, _ as getAssetSwapsOrThrow, $ as isRfqSwapTerminal, a0 as isRfqTerminal, a1 as nextOnchainAction, a2 as preimageForSwapRecord, a3 as pushRefundWithoutReceiver, a4 as readLockupFate, a5 as rebuildRfqSwap, a6 as refundIfUnresolved, a7 as rfqSwapOriginOf, a8 as shouldRetainRfqSwap, a9 as swapSecretsToRecord, aa as updateAssetSwap, ab as updateAssetSwapBestEffort, ac as updateRfqSwapRecord } from './repository-DaK1RzRq.cjs';
 import { Network, LocalCardInput, DiscoveredMarket, Side, OfferPlan } from '@arkade-os/solver-discovery';
-import { O as OnchainNetwork, a as OnchainHtlc, b as OnchainHtlcParams } from './rfq-DglvHMNC.cjs';
-export { A as ARKADE_ASSET, c as ARKADE_BTC, d as AddressMismatch, C as ChainSource, e as ChainUtxo, H as HtlcUtxo, I as InvoiceFacts, L as LIGHTNING_BTC, f as LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR, g as LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR, h as LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD, i as LightningReceiveTreeParams, j as LightningSendTreeParams, M as MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS, k as MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS, l as MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS, m as ONCHAIN_BTC, n as ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS, o as ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS, p as ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS, q as ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR, r as ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK, s as ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR, t as OnchainHtlcPhase, R as RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES, u as RelaySocket, v as RfqQuote, w as RfqRefusalReason, x as RfqStatus, y as RfqTransport, S as SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS, z as SwapRefusal, B as arkadeAssetLeg, D as arkadeSwapRequest, E as assertFundable, F as assertReceivable, G as awaitOnchainFill, J as buildHtlcClaim, K as buildHtlcRefund, N as claimOnchainFill, P as classifyOnchainHtlc, Q as deriveLightningReceive, T as deriveOnchainReceive, U as deriveOnchainSend, V as extractPreimage, W as httpTransport, X as lightningReceiveRequest, Y as lightningSendRequest, Z as lightningSendVtxoScript, _ as newPreimage, $ as newRfqId, a0 as offerTermsFromQuote, a1 as onchainHtlcScript, a2 as onchainReceiveRequest, a3 as onchainSendRequest, a4 as paymentHashOf, a5 as receiveVtxoScript, a6 as relayTransport, a7 as requestLightningReceive, a8 as requestLightningSend, a9 as requestOnchainReceive, aa as requestOnchainSend, ab as rfqPair, ac as unilateralClaimDelay, ad as unilateralRefundDelay, ae as unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay, af as verifyLockupAddress, ag as verifyReceiveInvoice } from './rfq-DglvHMNC.cjs';
+import { O as OnchainNetwork, a as OnchainHtlc, b as OnchainHtlcParams, C as ChainSource, R as RfqTransport, r as requestOnchainSend, I as InvoiceFacts, c as requestLightningSend } from './rfq-DzsmhXX3.cjs';
+export { A as ARKADE_ASSET, d as ARKADE_BTC, e as AddressMismatch, f as ChainUtxo, H as HtlcUtxo, L as LIGHTNING_BTC, g as LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR, h as LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR, i as LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD, j as LightningReceiveTreeParams, k as LightningSendTreeParams, M as MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS, l as MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS, m as MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS, n as ONCHAIN_BTC, o as ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS, p as ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS, q as ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS, s as ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR, t as ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK, u as ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR, v as OnchainHtlcPhase, w as RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES, x as RelaySocket, y as RfqQuote, z as RfqRefusalReason, B as RfqStatus, S as SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS, D as SwapRefusal, E as arkadeAssetLeg, F as arkadeSwapRequest, G as assertFundable, J as assertReceivable, K as awaitOnchainFill, N as buildHtlcClaim, P as buildHtlcRefund, Q as claimOnchainFill, T as classifyOnchainHtlc, U as deriveLightningReceive, V as deriveOnchainReceive, W as deriveOnchainSend, X as extractPreimage, Y as httpTransport, Z as l1ScriptForAddress, _ as lightningReceiveRequest, $ as lightningSendRequest, a0 as lightningSendVtxoScript, a1 as newPreimage, a2 as newRfqId, a3 as offerTermsFromQuote, a4 as onchainHtlcScript, a5 as onchainReceiveRequest, a6 as onchainSendRequest, a7 as paymentHashOf, a8 as receiveVtxoScript, a9 as relayTransport, aa as requestLightningReceive, ab as requestOnchainReceive, ac as rfqPair, ad as unilateralClaimDelay, ae as unilateralRefundDelay, af as unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay, ag as verifyLockupAddress, ah as verifyReceiveInvoice } from './rfq-DzsmhXX3.cjs';
 
 /**
  * Which wallet key signs this leg. Stored at `profile.signer`.
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ interface OnchainSendProfile extends Record<string, unknown> {
     htlcAddress: string;
     /** `profile.min_confirmations`; gates when the fill is claimable. */
     minConfirmations: number;
+    /** Where the claim PAYS, hex. The spender's own choice, so nothing else
+     * gives it back — and `buildHtlcClaim` needs it. */
+    payoutPkScript: string;
     /** The fill's outpoint, learned on first sighting. Without it a SPENT htlc
      * reads as never funded — see `classifyOnchainHtlc`. */
     funding?: {
@@ -180,9 +183,21 @@ declare function onchainSendProfile(result: {
     htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
     l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
     minConfirmations: number;
+    payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): Omit<OnchainSendProfile, "signer" | "hashlock">;
 
-/** The contracts — pure data, shared verbatim with any other implementation. */
+/**
+ * The contracts, one per WANT side — pure data, shared verbatim with any other
+ * implementation.
+ *
+ * **These are the base: an offer carrying an exit delay compiles to a third
+ * closure that is not in either file.** The tree is not fixed-shape — the
+ * protocol defines the exit as `iff ExitDelay`, and solverd appends it the same
+ * way (`pkg/swap/contract/offer.go`, `VtxoScript`) — so it cannot be a function
+ * in a static artifact without splitting these into one file per exit variant.
+ * {@link withExitClosure} owns that step, and the golden in `offer.test.ts`
+ * pins the artifact it produces so the whole contract is still readable as data.
+ */
 declare const swapPrograms: Record<"wantAsset" | "wantBtc", ReturnType<typeof arkade.parseArtifact>>;
 /** A full-fill offer. Exactly one field names an asset: `wantAsset` set = the
  * fill must deliver that asset (the deposit may be BTC or another asset,
@@ -203,6 +218,14 @@ interface Offer {
     makerPublicKey: Uint8Array;
     /** Covenant co-signer (emulator) x-only key (32 bytes). */
     emulatorPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** Partial-fill numerator. Reserved wire space in V1: carried through the
+     * codec so an offer that sets it decodes, never interpreted here. */
+    ratioNum?: bigint;
+    /** Partial-fill denominator. Set with {@link Offer.ratioNum} or not at all. */
+    ratioDen?: bigint;
+    /** The maker's unilateral exit path. Present adds a third closure to the
+     * taproot tree, so it changes `swapPkScript` — see {@link offerVtxoScript}. */
+    exitDelay?: RelativeTimelock;
 }
 /** Compile the offer's contract: program + args -> taproot tree. */
 declare function offerVtxoScript(offer: Omit<Offer, "swapPkScript">, serverPubkey: Uint8Array): InstanceType<typeof arkade.ArkadeProgramScript>;
@@ -233,6 +256,14 @@ declare function decodeOffer(data: Uint8Array): Offer;
  * funding rather than after: nothing is at stake yet, so a failure can throw
  * and be retried, where the same failure after `wallet.send` would leave a
  * funded deposit unwatched with no way to notice.
+ *
+ * **The maker's unilateral exit closure is built by default**, at the server's
+ * own `unilateralExitDelay` — the same thing solverd does. Without it `cancel`
+ * is the only way back out, and `cancel` needs the server's signature: a server
+ * that will not co-sign leaves the deposit stuck at the swap address until the
+ * VTXO expires and the operator sweeps it. An offer has no expiry of its own,
+ * so that exposure has no end. `noExit` opts out for a caller who wants the
+ * smaller tree and accepts the dependency.
  */
 declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
     wantAmount: bigint;
@@ -241,6 +272,12 @@ declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
     /** Co-signer key override (33-byte compressed hex); see
      * {@link resolveEmulatorPubkey}. */
     emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    /** Override the exit closure's delay. Defaults to the server's own
+     * `unilateralExitDelay`, which is the delay solverd uses too. */
+    exitDelay?: RelativeTimelock;
+    /** Publish without the exit closure, leaving `cancel` — which needs the
+     * server — as the only way back out. See the note on this function. */
+    noExit?: boolean;
 }): Promise<{
     /** The encoded offer, hex. **Persist this** — it is the only input
      * `cancelOffer` needs to rebuild the covenant, and the restore scan reads
@@ -263,19 +300,23 @@ declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
 /**
  * Cancel an offer: spend the swap VTXO back to the user. Returns the ark txid.
  *
- * This is the refund path — how a user takes back a deposit no solver filled.
- * **Neither program carries a timelock**, so an unfilled deposit keeps its
- * place at the swap address rather than expiring: no deadline to miss and no
- * "expired" state to unwind, at the cost of the refund being something the
+ * This is the cooperative refund path — how a user takes back a deposit no
+ * solver filled. **No path here is on a deadline**, so an unfilled deposit
+ * keeps its place at the swap address rather than expiring: nothing to miss and
+ * no "expired" state to unwind, at the cost of the refund being something the
  * user asks for rather than something a clock delivers.
  *
- * Both paths out of the covenant are deliberately asymmetric:
+ * The routes out of the covenant are deliberately asymmetric:
  *   - `fulfill` is signed by the **server alone**, but the covenant constrains
  *     it to pay output 0 to `makerWP` for at least `wantAmount` — a solver
  *     cannot take the deposit without delivering.
  *   - `cancel` is a **2-of-2 of the user and the server**, so cancelling is
  *     cooperative: the server co-signs. No solver signature is involved, so the
  *     refund never depends on the counterparty being reachable.
+ *   - `exit` is the user **alone** after a relative timelock, present unless the
+ *     offer was created with `noExit`. It is the route that survives a server
+ *     that will not co-sign this one, and it is reached by unrolling the VTXO
+ *     onchain rather than through this function.
  *
  * Cancel therefore races a fill rather than pre-empting it. An offer the solver
  * is filling in the same moment may be spent by `fulfill` first, in which case
@@ -451,10 +492,19 @@ type SpendKind = "cancelled" | "fulfilled" | "indeterminate";
 /**
  * Classify a spend by the covenant leaf it took.
  *
- * The covenant's whole vocabulary is two leaves: `cancel` returns the deposit
- * to the user, `fulfill` is the solver paying for it. A submitted ark tx keeps
- * each input's `tapLeafScript`, so the spend *states* which one it used — this
- * reads an answer rather than inferring one.
+ * The vocabulary is what became of the deposit, not which key moved it:
+ * `fulfill` is the solver paying for it, and everything else returns it to the
+ * user. A submitted ark tx keeps each input's `tapLeafScript`, so the spend
+ * *states* which one it used — this reads an answer rather than inferring one.
+ *
+ * **`exit` reports `cancelled`, like `cancel` does.** The two differ in who had
+ * to agree — `cancel` is cooperative with the signer, `exit` is the maker alone
+ * after a delay — but not in outcome: the deposit went back unfilled either
+ * way, which is the question this answers. Reporting the exit leaf as
+ * `indeterminate` instead would be worse than imprecise: no status is written,
+ * so the swap stays `pending`, `restoreAssetSwaps` re-queues it on every scan,
+ * and `retireOfferContract` never runs — leaving a dead script in the
+ * subscription and the failsafe poll for the life of the wallet.
  *
  * **Hand it the transaction that actually spends the deposit outpoint, which is
  * the checkpoint, not the ark tx.** A spend is two linked transactions: the
@@ -621,6 +671,111 @@ type OfferContractRetirer = Pick<IContractManager, "setContractWatchState">;
  */
 declare function retireSettledOfferContracts(manager: OfferContractRetirer, swaps: AssetSwap[]): Promise<void>;
 
+/** `network` is `requestOnchainSend`'s `l1Network`, and only decodes scripts to
+ *  addresses — the provider decides which chain is read, so mismatching the two
+ *  yields addresses it knows nothing about rather than an error. */
+declare const chainSourceFrom: (provider: OnchainProvider, network: OnchainNetwork) => ChainSource;
+
+/**
+ * Choosing which solver to negotiate with. Both send corridors pick a card the
+ * same way and differ only in the payout-side corridor they look for.
+ */
+
+/** Where to reach a solver. Bounds are indicative — the quote binds.
+ *
+ *  No `emulatorPubkey`: the card's key only FILTERS here — the covenant is
+ *  built from `deps.emulatorPubkey` or the pinned default, never from it. */
+interface SolverRendezvous {
+    solverPubkey: string;
+    transports: {
+        nostr: {
+            relays: string[];
+        };
+    };
+    minSats: number;
+    maxSats: number;
+}
+/** The size check is not a courtesy: quoting outside a card's advertised range
+ *  burns a negotiation, tells a third party what the user is about to do, and
+ *  is refused anyway. A card that serves the corridor but not the size is
+ *  skipped, not fatal — another may take it. */
+declare const solverRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], payoutCorridor: "onchain" | "lightning", amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * `solver-onchain` — pay an L1 address out of an Arkade balance through a
+ * solver. Registered by the app: the SDK does not depend on this package, and
+ * `RouterContext.swaps` is boltz-swap's. Every refusal is `available()`
+ * returning false, so the router drops the rail and the collaborative exit
+ * `onchain` wins by ranking.
+ */
+
+declare const SOLVER_ONCHAIN_RAIL = "solver-onchain";
+/** What a record needs. Pass the whole object to `onchainSendProfile()`: only
+ *  this carries `payoutPkScript`. */
+type SolverOnchainSend = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof requestOnchainSend>> & {
+    rendezvous: SolverRendezvous;
+    /** Where the claim pays. Named nowhere else — the claim's output is the
+     *  spender's choice. `onchainSendProfile()` hex-encodes it; a store fed
+     *  these bytes raw returns an object with no `.length`. */
+    payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
+};
+interface SolverOnchainRailDeps {
+    arkServerUrl: string;
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
+    /** x-only L1 key that AUTHORISES the claim — not where it pays. */
+    payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** Called by `available()` and again by `quote()` — pass the caching
+     *  `discoverMarkets`, not a bare registry fetch. */
+    discover(): Promise<DiscoveredMarket[]>;
+    connect<T>(rendezvous: SolverRendezvous, fn: (transport: RfqTransport) => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    /** Runs BEFORE funding, and a rejection cancels the send: a funded lockup
+     *  with no record cannot be refunded. */
+    persist(swap: SolverOnchainSend): Promise<void>;
+    /** Resolve once the L1 fill is claimed. Optional: without it the handle
+     *  stops at `"sent"`. `RfqSwapManager` drives the swap either way. */
+    awaitSettlement?(swap: SolverOnchainSend): Promise<{
+        txid: string;
+    }>;
+    emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array;
+}
+declare const solverOnchainRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+/** Register alongside the core `onchain` rail, ranked first:
+ *  `priority: ["ark", "solver-onchain", "onchain"]`. Both stay registered. */
+declare function solverOnchainRail(deps: SolverOnchainRailDeps): PaymentRail;
+
+/**
+ * `solver-lightning` — the sibling of `solver-onchain` on the BOLT11 corridor.
+ * Boltz's `lightning` rail matches the same invoices and both stay registered.
+ * The invoice fixes the amount, so a `req.amount` that disagrees is refused
+ * rather than ignored; `decodeInvoice` is injected because this package
+ * carries no bolt11 dependency.
+ */
+
+declare const SOLVER_LIGHTNING_RAIL = "solver-lightning";
+type SolverLightningSend = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof requestLightningSend>> & {
+    invoice: InvoiceFacts;
+    rendezvous: SolverRendezvous;
+};
+/** Mirrors {@link SolverOnchainRailDeps}; see there for the shared seams. */
+interface SolverLightningRailDeps {
+    arkServerUrl: string;
+    /** A decoder that throws drops the rail rather than taking the router
+     *  down — correct, since an undecodable invoice cannot be paid. */
+    decodeInvoice(bolt11: string): InvoiceFacts;
+    discover(): Promise<DiscoveredMarket[]>;
+    connect<T>(rendezvous: SolverRendezvous, fn: (transport: RfqTransport) => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    persist(swap: SolverLightningSend): Promise<void>;
+    /** Optional; without it the handle stops at `"sent"`. */
+    awaitSettlement?(swap: SolverLightningSend): Promise<{
+        preimage?: string;
+    }>;
+    emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array;
+}
+declare const solverLightningRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+declare function solverLightningRail(deps: SolverLightningRailDeps): PaymentRail;
+
 interface SealedClaimPacket {
     /** `ephPub(33) ‖ nonce(12) ‖ ciphertext`, base64 — wire-ready. This is
      * the whole packet: the RFQ request's `claim_packet` field carries
@@ -978,4 +1133,4 @@ interface RfqSwapActivityDeps {
  */
 declare function rfqSwapActivityInputs(deps: RfqSwapActivityDeps): Promise<SwapActivityInput[]>;
 
-export { ArkadeRefundResult, type ArkadeRefunderDeps, AssetSwap, AssetSwapRepository, type ClaimArkProvider, type ClaimPacketInput, type DiscoverMarketsOptions, IndexedDbAssetSwapRepository, type LightningReceiveProfile, type LightningSendProfile, LockupAmountMismatchError, LockupContractMissing, type LockupContractReader, type LockupContractWriter, LockupRegistrationFailed, LockupSpendIndexer, LockupVtxo, MarketsCacheEntry, OFFER_PACKET_TYPE, type Offer, type OfferContractRetirer, type OfferSwapWatcher, OnchainHtlc, OnchainHtlcParams, OnchainNetwork, type OnchainSendProfile, type PlanError, QUOTE_OPTIONS, RefundArkProvider, type RefundBlockedReason, RefundIndexer, RefundNotLocallyPossibleError, type RestoreIndexer, type RfqClaimSecretProjection, type RfqHashlockProjection, type RfqSignerProjection, RfqSwap, type RfqSwapActivityDeps, RfqSwapRecord, RfqSwapState, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_KIND, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_LABEL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_TYPE, type SealedClaimPacket, type SpendKind, type SwapActivityInput, SwapSecretsProjection, type Tx, type WatchOfferSwapsParams, arkadeRefunder, awaitLockupFunding, cancelOffer, claimReceiveLockup, classifyDepositSpend, classifySpend, createOffer, decodeOffer, discoverMarkets, encodeOffer, findMarket, lockupContractParams, makeCachedFeedFetch, offerVtxoScript, onchainSendProfile, pushClaim, registerLockupContract, restoreAssetSwaps, retireSettledOfferContracts, rfqClaimSecretOf, rfqSecretsProfile, rfqSignerOf, rfqSwapActivityInputs, sealClaimPacket, senderIdentityForSwapRecord, spendTxidsOf, spendUpdate, swapActivityResolver, swapPrograms, validatePlan, watchOfferSwaps };
+export { ArkadeRefundResult, type ArkadeRefunderDeps, AssetSwap, AssetSwapRepository, ChainSource, type ClaimArkProvider, type ClaimPacketInput, type DiscoverMarketsOptions, IndexedDbAssetSwapRepository, InvoiceFacts, type LightningReceiveProfile, type LightningSendProfile, LockupAmountMismatchError, LockupContractMissing, type LockupContractReader, type LockupContractWriter, LockupRegistrationFailed, LockupSpendIndexer, LockupVtxo, MarketsCacheEntry, OFFER_PACKET_TYPE, type Offer, type OfferContractRetirer, type OfferSwapWatcher, OnchainHtlc, OnchainHtlcParams, OnchainNetwork, type OnchainSendProfile, type PlanError, QUOTE_OPTIONS, RefundArkProvider, type RefundBlockedReason, RefundIndexer, RefundNotLocallyPossibleError, type RestoreIndexer, type RfqClaimSecretProjection, type RfqHashlockProjection, type RfqSignerProjection, RfqSwap, type RfqSwapActivityDeps, RfqSwapRecord, RfqSwapState, RfqTransport, SOLVER_LIGHTNING_RAIL, SOLVER_ONCHAIN_RAIL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_KIND, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_LABEL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_TYPE, type SealedClaimPacket, type SolverLightningRailDeps, type SolverLightningSend, type SolverOnchainRailDeps, type SolverOnchainSend, type SolverRendezvous, type SpendKind, type SwapActivityInput, SwapSecretsProjection, type Tx, type WatchOfferSwapsParams, arkadeRefunder, awaitLockupFunding, cancelOffer, chainSourceFrom, claimReceiveLockup, classifyDepositSpend, classifySpend, createOffer, decodeOffer, discoverMarkets, encodeOffer, findMarket, lockupContractParams, makeCachedFeedFetch, offerVtxoScript, onchainSendProfile, pushClaim, registerLockupContract, requestLightningSend, requestOnchainSend, restoreAssetSwaps, retireSettledOfferContracts, rfqClaimSecretOf, rfqSecretsProfile, rfqSignerOf, rfqSwapActivityInputs, sealClaimPacket, senderIdentityForSwapRecord, solverLightningRail, solverLightningRendezvous, solverOnchainRail, solverOnchainRendezvous, solverRendezvous, spendTxidsOf, spendUpdate, swapActivityResolver, swapPrograms, validatePlan, watchOfferSwaps };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import { ProvisionedKey, ProvisionedClaimSecret, asset, IWallet, arkade, RestIndexerProvider, Transaction, IContractManager, VHTLC, Identity, ActivityResolver } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
-import { S as SwapSecretsProjection, R as RfqSwapRecord, A as AssetSwapRepository, a as AssetSwap, M as MarketsCacheEntry, b as RefundArkProvider, c as RefundIndexer, L as LockupVtxo, d as RfqSwap, e as ArkadeRefundResult, f as LockupSpendIndexer, g as RfqSwapState } from './repository-Cw2EvvZG.js';
-export { h as AssetSwapStatus, i as AvailableRfqSwapManagerCallbacks, B as BTC_ASSET_ID, I as InMemoryAssetSwapRepository, j as LightningReceiveSwap, k as LightningSendSwap, l as LockupFate, m as LockupNeedsRecoveryError, n as LockupParams, o as LockupSpend, O as OnchainSendAction, p as OnchainSendSwap, P as PersistableRfqSwap, q as PreimageBlockedReason, r as PreimageNotRecoverableError, s as REFUND_MTP_LAG_SECONDS, t as RFQ_RESOLVED_STATES, u as RFQ_SWAP_RETENTION_SECONDS, v as RFQ_SWAP_TERMINAL_STATES, w as RefundOutcome, x as RfqRestoreFailure, y as RfqRestoreOptions, z as RfqRestoreResult, C as RfqSwapActionName, D as RfqSwapLockup, E as RfqSwapManager, F as RfqSwapManagerCallbacks, G as RfqSwapManagerConfig, H as RfqSwapManagerDeps, J as RfqSwapManagerEvents, K as RfqSwapOrigin, N as RfqSwapOriginRequired, Q as RfqSwapOutcome, T as RfqSwapRecordStore, U as SwapContractRegistry, V as addAssetSwap, W as awaitRfqResolution, X as createRfqSwapRecord, Y as findLockupVtxos, Z as getAssetSwaps, _ as getAssetSwapsOrThrow, $ as isRfqSwapTerminal, a0 as isRfqTerminal, a1 as nextOnchainAction, a2 as preimageForSwapRecord, a3 as pushRefundWithoutReceiver, a4 as readLockupFate, a5 as rebuildRfqSwap, a6 as refundIfUnresolved, a7 as rfqSwapOriginOf, a8 as shouldRetainRfqSwap, a9 as swapSecretsToRecord, aa as updateAssetSwap, ab as updateAssetSwapBestEffort, ac as updateRfqSwapRecord } from './repository-Cw2EvvZG.js';
+import { ProvisionedKey, ProvisionedClaimSecret, asset, RelativeTimelock, IWallet, arkade, RestIndexerProvider, Transaction, IContractManager, OnchainProvider, PaymentRail, VHTLC, Identity, ActivityResolver } from '@arkade-os/sdk';
+import { S as SwapSecretsProjection, R as RfqSwapRecord, A as AssetSwapRepository, a as AssetSwap, M as MarketsCacheEntry, b as RefundArkProvider, c as RefundIndexer, L as LockupVtxo, d as RfqSwap, e as ArkadeRefundResult, f as LockupSpendIndexer, g as RfqSwapState } from './repository-DlLvj_y6.js';
+export { h as AssetSwapStatus, i as AvailableRfqSwapManagerCallbacks, B as BTC_ASSET_ID, I as InMemoryAssetSwapRepository, j as LightningReceiveSwap, k as LightningSendSwap, l as LockupFate, m as LockupNeedsRecoveryError, n as LockupParams, o as LockupSpend, O as OnchainSendAction, p as OnchainSendSwap, P as PersistableRfqSwap, q as PreimageBlockedReason, r as PreimageNotRecoverableError, s as REFUND_MTP_LAG_SECONDS, t as RFQ_RESOLVED_STATES, u as RFQ_SWAP_RETENTION_SECONDS, v as RFQ_SWAP_TERMINAL_STATES, w as RefundOutcome, x as RfqRestoreFailure, y as RfqRestoreOptions, z as RfqRestoreResult, C as RfqSwapActionName, D as RfqSwapLockup, E as RfqSwapManager, F as RfqSwapManagerCallbacks, G as RfqSwapManagerConfig, H as RfqSwapManagerDeps, J as RfqSwapManagerEvents, K as RfqSwapOrigin, N as RfqSwapOriginRequired, Q as RfqSwapOutcome, T as RfqSwapRecordStore, U as SwapContractRegistry, V as addAssetSwap, W as awaitRfqResolution, X as createRfqSwapRecord, Y as findLockupVtxos, Z as getAssetSwaps, _ as getAssetSwapsOrThrow, $ as isRfqSwapTerminal, a0 as isRfqTerminal, a1 as nextOnchainAction, a2 as preimageForSwapRecord, a3 as pushRefundWithoutReceiver, a4 as readLockupFate, a5 as rebuildRfqSwap, a6 as refundIfUnresolved, a7 as rfqSwapOriginOf, a8 as shouldRetainRfqSwap, a9 as swapSecretsToRecord, aa as updateAssetSwap, ab as updateAssetSwapBestEffort, ac as updateRfqSwapRecord } from './repository-DlLvj_y6.js';
 import { Network, LocalCardInput, DiscoveredMarket, Side, OfferPlan } from '@arkade-os/solver-discovery';
-import { O as OnchainNetwork, a as OnchainHtlc, b as OnchainHtlcParams } from './rfq-DglvHMNC.js';
-export { A as ARKADE_ASSET, c as ARKADE_BTC, d as AddressMismatch, C as ChainSource, e as ChainUtxo, H as HtlcUtxo, I as InvoiceFacts, L as LIGHTNING_BTC, f as LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR, g as LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR, h as LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD, i as LightningReceiveTreeParams, j as LightningSendTreeParams, M as MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS, k as MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS, l as MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS, m as ONCHAIN_BTC, n as ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS, o as ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS, p as ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS, q as ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR, r as ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK, s as ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR, t as OnchainHtlcPhase, R as RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES, u as RelaySocket, v as RfqQuote, w as RfqRefusalReason, x as RfqStatus, y as RfqTransport, S as SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS, z as SwapRefusal, B as arkadeAssetLeg, D as arkadeSwapRequest, E as assertFundable, F as assertReceivable, G as awaitOnchainFill, J as buildHtlcClaim, K as buildHtlcRefund, N as claimOnchainFill, P as classifyOnchainHtlc, Q as deriveLightningReceive, T as deriveOnchainReceive, U as deriveOnchainSend, V as extractPreimage, W as httpTransport, X as lightningReceiveRequest, Y as lightningSendRequest, Z as lightningSendVtxoScript, _ as newPreimage, $ as newRfqId, a0 as offerTermsFromQuote, a1 as onchainHtlcScript, a2 as onchainReceiveRequest, a3 as onchainSendRequest, a4 as paymentHashOf, a5 as receiveVtxoScript, a6 as relayTransport, a7 as requestLightningReceive, a8 as requestLightningSend, a9 as requestOnchainReceive, aa as requestOnchainSend, ab as rfqPair, ac as unilateralClaimDelay, ad as unilateralRefundDelay, ae as unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay, af as verifyLockupAddress, ag as verifyReceiveInvoice } from './rfq-DglvHMNC.js';
+import { O as OnchainNetwork, a as OnchainHtlc, b as OnchainHtlcParams, C as ChainSource, R as RfqTransport, r as requestOnchainSend, I as InvoiceFacts, c as requestLightningSend } from './rfq-DzsmhXX3.js';
+export { A as ARKADE_ASSET, d as ARKADE_BTC, e as AddressMismatch, f as ChainUtxo, H as HtlcUtxo, L as LIGHTNING_BTC, g as LIGHTNING_RECEIVE_PAIR, h as LIGHTNING_SEND_PAIR, i as LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD, j as LightningReceiveTreeParams, k as LightningSendTreeParams, M as MAX_MIN_CONFIRMATIONS, l as MIN_CLAIM_WINDOW_SECONDS, m as MIN_HEADROOM_SECONDS, n as ONCHAIN_BTC, o as ONCHAIN_CLAIM_MARGIN_SECONDS, p as ONCHAIN_DUST_SATS, q as ONCHAIN_ORDER_MARGIN_SECONDS, s as ONCHAIN_RECEIVE_PAIR, t as ONCHAIN_SECONDS_PER_BLOCK, u as ONCHAIN_SEND_PAIR, v as OnchainHtlcPhase, w as RFQ_TERMINAL_STATES, x as RelaySocket, y as RfqQuote, z as RfqRefusalReason, B as RfqStatus, S as SOLO_REFUND_HEADROOM_SECONDS, D as SwapRefusal, E as arkadeAssetLeg, F as arkadeSwapRequest, G as assertFundable, J as assertReceivable, K as awaitOnchainFill, N as buildHtlcClaim, P as buildHtlcRefund, Q as claimOnchainFill, T as classifyOnchainHtlc, U as deriveLightningReceive, V as deriveOnchainReceive, W as deriveOnchainSend, X as extractPreimage, Y as httpTransport, Z as l1ScriptForAddress, _ as lightningReceiveRequest, $ as lightningSendRequest, a0 as lightningSendVtxoScript, a1 as newPreimage, a2 as newRfqId, a3 as offerTermsFromQuote, a4 as onchainHtlcScript, a5 as onchainReceiveRequest, a6 as onchainSendRequest, a7 as paymentHashOf, a8 as receiveVtxoScript, a9 as relayTransport, aa as requestLightningReceive, ab as requestOnchainReceive, ac as rfqPair, ad as unilateralClaimDelay, ae as unilateralRefundDelay, af as unilateralRefundWithoutReceiverDelay, ag as verifyLockupAddress, ah as verifyReceiveInvoice } from './rfq-DzsmhXX3.js';
 
 /**
  * Which wallet key signs this leg. Stored at `profile.signer`.
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ interface OnchainSendProfile extends Record<string, unknown> {
     htlcAddress: string;
     /** `profile.min_confirmations`; gates when the fill is claimable. */
     minConfirmations: number;
+    /** Where the claim PAYS, hex. The spender's own choice, so nothing else
+     * gives it back — and `buildHtlcClaim` needs it. */
+    payoutPkScript: string;
     /** The fill's outpoint, learned on first sighting. Without it a SPENT htlc
      * reads as never funded — see `classifyOnchainHtlc`. */
     funding?: {
@@ -180,9 +183,21 @@ declare function onchainSendProfile(result: {
     htlcParams: OnchainHtlcParams;
     l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
     minConfirmations: number;
+    payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
 }): Omit<OnchainSendProfile, "signer" | "hashlock">;
 
-/** The contracts — pure data, shared verbatim with any other implementation. */
+/**
+ * The contracts, one per WANT side — pure data, shared verbatim with any other
+ * implementation.
+ *
+ * **These are the base: an offer carrying an exit delay compiles to a third
+ * closure that is not in either file.** The tree is not fixed-shape — the
+ * protocol defines the exit as `iff ExitDelay`, and solverd appends it the same
+ * way (`pkg/swap/contract/offer.go`, `VtxoScript`) — so it cannot be a function
+ * in a static artifact without splitting these into one file per exit variant.
+ * {@link withExitClosure} owns that step, and the golden in `offer.test.ts`
+ * pins the artifact it produces so the whole contract is still readable as data.
+ */
 declare const swapPrograms: Record<"wantAsset" | "wantBtc", ReturnType<typeof arkade.parseArtifact>>;
 /** A full-fill offer. Exactly one field names an asset: `wantAsset` set = the
  * fill must deliver that asset (the deposit may be BTC or another asset,
@@ -203,6 +218,14 @@ interface Offer {
     makerPublicKey: Uint8Array;
     /** Covenant co-signer (emulator) x-only key (32 bytes). */
     emulatorPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** Partial-fill numerator. Reserved wire space in V1: carried through the
+     * codec so an offer that sets it decodes, never interpreted here. */
+    ratioNum?: bigint;
+    /** Partial-fill denominator. Set with {@link Offer.ratioNum} or not at all. */
+    ratioDen?: bigint;
+    /** The maker's unilateral exit path. Present adds a third closure to the
+     * taproot tree, so it changes `swapPkScript` — see {@link offerVtxoScript}. */
+    exitDelay?: RelativeTimelock;
 }
 /** Compile the offer's contract: program + args -> taproot tree. */
 declare function offerVtxoScript(offer: Omit<Offer, "swapPkScript">, serverPubkey: Uint8Array): InstanceType<typeof arkade.ArkadeProgramScript>;
@@ -233,6 +256,14 @@ declare function decodeOffer(data: Uint8Array): Offer;
  * funding rather than after: nothing is at stake yet, so a failure can throw
  * and be retried, where the same failure after `wallet.send` would leave a
  * funded deposit unwatched with no way to notice.
+ *
+ * **The maker's unilateral exit closure is built by default**, at the server's
+ * own `unilateralExitDelay` — the same thing solverd does. Without it `cancel`
+ * is the only way back out, and `cancel` needs the server's signature: a server
+ * that will not co-sign leaves the deposit stuck at the swap address until the
+ * VTXO expires and the operator sweeps it. An offer has no expiry of its own,
+ * so that exposure has no end. `noExit` opts out for a caller who wants the
+ * smaller tree and accepts the dependency.
  */
 declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
     wantAmount: bigint;
@@ -241,6 +272,12 @@ declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
     /** Co-signer key override (33-byte compressed hex); see
      * {@link resolveEmulatorPubkey}. */
     emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    /** Override the exit closure's delay. Defaults to the server's own
+     * `unilateralExitDelay`, which is the delay solverd uses too. */
+    exitDelay?: RelativeTimelock;
+    /** Publish without the exit closure, leaving `cancel` — which needs the
+     * server — as the only way back out. See the note on this function. */
+    noExit?: boolean;
 }): Promise<{
     /** The encoded offer, hex. **Persist this** — it is the only input
      * `cancelOffer` needs to rebuild the covenant, and the restore scan reads
@@ -263,19 +300,23 @@ declare function createOffer(wallet: IWallet, arkServerUrl: string, params: {
 /**
  * Cancel an offer: spend the swap VTXO back to the user. Returns the ark txid.
  *
- * This is the refund path — how a user takes back a deposit no solver filled.
- * **Neither program carries a timelock**, so an unfilled deposit keeps its
- * place at the swap address rather than expiring: no deadline to miss and no
- * "expired" state to unwind, at the cost of the refund being something the
+ * This is the cooperative refund path — how a user takes back a deposit no
+ * solver filled. **No path here is on a deadline**, so an unfilled deposit
+ * keeps its place at the swap address rather than expiring: nothing to miss and
+ * no "expired" state to unwind, at the cost of the refund being something the
  * user asks for rather than something a clock delivers.
  *
- * Both paths out of the covenant are deliberately asymmetric:
+ * The routes out of the covenant are deliberately asymmetric:
  *   - `fulfill` is signed by the **server alone**, but the covenant constrains
  *     it to pay output 0 to `makerWP` for at least `wantAmount` — a solver
  *     cannot take the deposit without delivering.
  *   - `cancel` is a **2-of-2 of the user and the server**, so cancelling is
  *     cooperative: the server co-signs. No solver signature is involved, so the
  *     refund never depends on the counterparty being reachable.
+ *   - `exit` is the user **alone** after a relative timelock, present unless the
+ *     offer was created with `noExit`. It is the route that survives a server
+ *     that will not co-sign this one, and it is reached by unrolling the VTXO
+ *     onchain rather than through this function.
  *
  * Cancel therefore races a fill rather than pre-empting it. An offer the solver
  * is filling in the same moment may be spent by `fulfill` first, in which case
@@ -451,10 +492,19 @@ type SpendKind = "cancelled" | "fulfilled" | "indeterminate";
 /**
  * Classify a spend by the covenant leaf it took.
  *
- * The covenant's whole vocabulary is two leaves: `cancel` returns the deposit
- * to the user, `fulfill` is the solver paying for it. A submitted ark tx keeps
- * each input's `tapLeafScript`, so the spend *states* which one it used — this
- * reads an answer rather than inferring one.
+ * The vocabulary is what became of the deposit, not which key moved it:
+ * `fulfill` is the solver paying for it, and everything else returns it to the
+ * user. A submitted ark tx keeps each input's `tapLeafScript`, so the spend
+ * *states* which one it used — this reads an answer rather than inferring one.
+ *
+ * **`exit` reports `cancelled`, like `cancel` does.** The two differ in who had
+ * to agree — `cancel` is cooperative with the signer, `exit` is the maker alone
+ * after a delay — but not in outcome: the deposit went back unfilled either
+ * way, which is the question this answers. Reporting the exit leaf as
+ * `indeterminate` instead would be worse than imprecise: no status is written,
+ * so the swap stays `pending`, `restoreAssetSwaps` re-queues it on every scan,
+ * and `retireOfferContract` never runs — leaving a dead script in the
+ * subscription and the failsafe poll for the life of the wallet.
  *
  * **Hand it the transaction that actually spends the deposit outpoint, which is
  * the checkpoint, not the ark tx.** A spend is two linked transactions: the
@@ -621,6 +671,111 @@ type OfferContractRetirer = Pick<IContractManager, "setContractWatchState">;
  */
 declare function retireSettledOfferContracts(manager: OfferContractRetirer, swaps: AssetSwap[]): Promise<void>;
 
+/** `network` is `requestOnchainSend`'s `l1Network`, and only decodes scripts to
+ *  addresses — the provider decides which chain is read, so mismatching the two
+ *  yields addresses it knows nothing about rather than an error. */
+declare const chainSourceFrom: (provider: OnchainProvider, network: OnchainNetwork) => ChainSource;
+
+/**
+ * Choosing which solver to negotiate with. Both send corridors pick a card the
+ * same way and differ only in the payout-side corridor they look for.
+ */
+
+/** Where to reach a solver. Bounds are indicative — the quote binds.
+ *
+ *  No `emulatorPubkey`: the card's key only FILTERS here — the covenant is
+ *  built from `deps.emulatorPubkey` or the pinned default, never from it. */
+interface SolverRendezvous {
+    solverPubkey: string;
+    transports: {
+        nostr: {
+            relays: string[];
+        };
+    };
+    minSats: number;
+    maxSats: number;
+}
+/** The size check is not a courtesy: quoting outside a card's advertised range
+ *  burns a negotiation, tells a third party what the user is about to do, and
+ *  is refused anyway. A card that serves the corridor but not the size is
+ *  skipped, not fatal — another may take it. */
+declare const solverRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], payoutCorridor: "onchain" | "lightning", amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * `solver-onchain` — pay an L1 address out of an Arkade balance through a
+ * solver. Registered by the app: the SDK does not depend on this package, and
+ * `RouterContext.swaps` is boltz-swap's. Every refusal is `available()`
+ * returning false, so the router drops the rail and the collaborative exit
+ * `onchain` wins by ranking.
+ */
+
+declare const SOLVER_ONCHAIN_RAIL = "solver-onchain";
+/** What a record needs. Pass the whole object to `onchainSendProfile()`: only
+ *  this carries `payoutPkScript`. */
+type SolverOnchainSend = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof requestOnchainSend>> & {
+    rendezvous: SolverRendezvous;
+    /** Where the claim pays. Named nowhere else — the claim's output is the
+     *  spender's choice. `onchainSendProfile()` hex-encodes it; a store fed
+     *  these bytes raw returns an object with no `.length`. */
+    payoutPkScript: Uint8Array;
+};
+interface SolverOnchainRailDeps {
+    arkServerUrl: string;
+    l1Network: OnchainNetwork;
+    /** x-only L1 key that AUTHORISES the claim — not where it pays. */
+    payoutPubkey: Uint8Array;
+    /** Called by `available()` and again by `quote()` — pass the caching
+     *  `discoverMarkets`, not a bare registry fetch. */
+    discover(): Promise<DiscoveredMarket[]>;
+    connect<T>(rendezvous: SolverRendezvous, fn: (transport: RfqTransport) => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    /** Runs BEFORE funding, and a rejection cancels the send: a funded lockup
+     *  with no record cannot be refunded. */
+    persist(swap: SolverOnchainSend): Promise<void>;
+    /** Resolve once the L1 fill is claimed. Optional: without it the handle
+     *  stops at `"sent"`. `RfqSwapManager` drives the swap either way. */
+    awaitSettlement?(swap: SolverOnchainSend): Promise<{
+        txid: string;
+    }>;
+    emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array;
+}
+declare const solverOnchainRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+/** Register alongside the core `onchain` rail, ranked first:
+ *  `priority: ["ark", "solver-onchain", "onchain"]`. Both stay registered. */
+declare function solverOnchainRail(deps: SolverOnchainRailDeps): PaymentRail;
+
+/**
+ * `solver-lightning` — the sibling of `solver-onchain` on the BOLT11 corridor.
+ * Boltz's `lightning` rail matches the same invoices and both stay registered.
+ * The invoice fixes the amount, so a `req.amount` that disagrees is refused
+ * rather than ignored; `decodeInvoice` is injected because this package
+ * carries no bolt11 dependency.
+ */
+
+declare const SOLVER_LIGHTNING_RAIL = "solver-lightning";
+type SolverLightningSend = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof requestLightningSend>> & {
+    invoice: InvoiceFacts;
+    rendezvous: SolverRendezvous;
+};
+/** Mirrors {@link SolverOnchainRailDeps}; see there for the shared seams. */
+interface SolverLightningRailDeps {
+    arkServerUrl: string;
+    /** A decoder that throws drops the rail rather than taking the router
+     *  down — correct, since an undecodable invoice cannot be paid. */
+    decodeInvoice(bolt11: string): InvoiceFacts;
+    discover(): Promise<DiscoveredMarket[]>;
+    connect<T>(rendezvous: SolverRendezvous, fn: (transport: RfqTransport) => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+    persist(swap: SolverLightningSend): Promise<void>;
+    /** Optional; without it the handle stops at `"sent"`. */
+    awaitSettlement?(swap: SolverLightningSend): Promise<{
+        preimage?: string;
+    }>;
+    emulatorPubkey?: string;
+    fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array;
+}
+declare const solverLightningRendezvous: (markets: DiscoveredMarket[], amountSats: number, fallbackEmulatorPubkey?: Uint8Array) => SolverRendezvous | undefined;
+declare function solverLightningRail(deps: SolverLightningRailDeps): PaymentRail;
+
 interface SealedClaimPacket {
     /** `ephPub(33) ‖ nonce(12) ‖ ciphertext`, base64 — wire-ready. This is
      * the whole packet: the RFQ request's `claim_packet` field carries
@@ -978,4 +1133,4 @@ interface RfqSwapActivityDeps {
  */
 declare function rfqSwapActivityInputs(deps: RfqSwapActivityDeps): Promise<SwapActivityInput[]>;
 
-export { ArkadeRefundResult, type ArkadeRefunderDeps, AssetSwap, AssetSwapRepository, type ClaimArkProvider, type ClaimPacketInput, type DiscoverMarketsOptions, IndexedDbAssetSwapRepository, type LightningReceiveProfile, type LightningSendProfile, LockupAmountMismatchError, LockupContractMissing, type LockupContractReader, type LockupContractWriter, LockupRegistrationFailed, LockupSpendIndexer, LockupVtxo, MarketsCacheEntry, OFFER_PACKET_TYPE, type Offer, type OfferContractRetirer, type OfferSwapWatcher, OnchainHtlc, OnchainHtlcParams, OnchainNetwork, type OnchainSendProfile, type PlanError, QUOTE_OPTIONS, RefundArkProvider, type RefundBlockedReason, RefundIndexer, RefundNotLocallyPossibleError, type RestoreIndexer, type RfqClaimSecretProjection, type RfqHashlockProjection, type RfqSignerProjection, RfqSwap, type RfqSwapActivityDeps, RfqSwapRecord, RfqSwapState, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_KIND, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_LABEL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_TYPE, type SealedClaimPacket, type SpendKind, type SwapActivityInput, SwapSecretsProjection, type Tx, type WatchOfferSwapsParams, arkadeRefunder, awaitLockupFunding, cancelOffer, claimReceiveLockup, classifyDepositSpend, classifySpend, createOffer, decodeOffer, discoverMarkets, encodeOffer, findMarket, lockupContractParams, makeCachedFeedFetch, offerVtxoScript, onchainSendProfile, pushClaim, registerLockupContract, restoreAssetSwaps, retireSettledOfferContracts, rfqClaimSecretOf, rfqSecretsProfile, rfqSignerOf, rfqSwapActivityInputs, sealClaimPacket, senderIdentityForSwapRecord, spendTxidsOf, spendUpdate, swapActivityResolver, swapPrograms, validatePlan, watchOfferSwaps };
+export { ArkadeRefundResult, type ArkadeRefunderDeps, AssetSwap, AssetSwapRepository, ChainSource, type ClaimArkProvider, type ClaimPacketInput, type DiscoverMarketsOptions, IndexedDbAssetSwapRepository, InvoiceFacts, type LightningReceiveProfile, type LightningSendProfile, LockupAmountMismatchError, LockupContractMissing, type LockupContractReader, type LockupContractWriter, LockupRegistrationFailed, LockupSpendIndexer, LockupVtxo, MarketsCacheEntry, OFFER_PACKET_TYPE, type Offer, type OfferContractRetirer, type OfferSwapWatcher, OnchainHtlc, OnchainHtlcParams, OnchainNetwork, type OnchainSendProfile, type PlanError, QUOTE_OPTIONS, RefundArkProvider, type RefundBlockedReason, RefundIndexer, RefundNotLocallyPossibleError, type RestoreIndexer, type RfqClaimSecretProjection, type RfqHashlockProjection, type RfqSignerProjection, RfqSwap, type RfqSwapActivityDeps, RfqSwapRecord, RfqSwapState, RfqTransport, SOLVER_LIGHTNING_RAIL, SOLVER_ONCHAIN_RAIL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_KIND, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_LABEL, SWAP_LOCKUP_CONTRACT_TYPE, type SealedClaimPacket, type SolverLightningRailDeps, type SolverLightningSend, type SolverOnchainRailDeps, type SolverOnchainSend, type SolverRendezvous, type SpendKind, type SwapActivityInput, SwapSecretsProjection, type Tx, type WatchOfferSwapsParams, arkadeRefunder, awaitLockupFunding, cancelOffer, chainSourceFrom, claimReceiveLockup, classifyDepositSpend, classifySpend, createOffer, decodeOffer, discoverMarkets, encodeOffer, findMarket, lockupContractParams, makeCachedFeedFetch, offerVtxoScript, onchainSendProfile, pushClaim, registerLockupContract, requestLightningSend, requestOnchainSend, restoreAssetSwaps, retireSettledOfferContracts, rfqClaimSecretOf, rfqSecretsProfile, rfqSignerOf, rfqSwapActivityInputs, sealClaimPacket, senderIdentityForSwapRecord, solverLightningRail, solverLightningRendezvous, solverOnchainRail, solverOnchainRendezvous, solverRendezvous, spendTxidsOf, spendUpdate, swapActivityResolver, swapPrograms, validatePlan, watchOfferSwaps };