@archmax-ai/harness 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

package/skills/archmax-harness/references/workflow-schema.md

@@ -0,0 +1,1677 @@
+# workflow.yaml — exhaustive schema reference
+
+The complete, field-by-field reference for authoring a `workflow.yaml` (and its
+optional `WORKFLOW.md` prose addendum) plus the surrounding workspace. Targets
+**runtime contract version `"2"`**.
+
+## Contents
+
+- [File shape](#file-shape)
+- [Root fields](#root-fields)
+- [States (`MachineState`)](#states-machinestate)
+- [Transitions](#transitions)
+- [Tool governance](#tool-governance)
+- [Skill governance](#skill-governance)
+- [Mount governance](#mount-governance)
+- [Lifecycle hooks](#lifecycle-hooks)
+  — full script contract + worked examples in
+  [`hook-and-test-scripts.md`](hook-and-test-scripts.md)
+- [Budgets & error routing](#budgets--error-routing)
+- [Human states](#human-states)
+- [Sub-workflows are tools](#sub-workflows-are-tools)
+- [Removed keys you may meet in an older workflow](#removed-keys-you-may-meet-in-an-older-workflow)
+- [Workspace layout: skills, scripts](#workspace-layout)
+- [Cases](#cases)
+- [Code description docblocks](#code-description-docblocks)
+- [Read-only zones](#read-only-zones)
+- [Annotated example: order-lookup](#annotated-example-order-lookup)
+
+---
+
+## File shape
+
+**Two-file layout** under `workflows/<name>/`:
+
+- **`workflow.yaml`** — the canonical, enforced machine spec: a **pure YAML
+  mapping** (no `---` frontmatter fences, no markdown). Parsed with YAML 1.2
+  semantics and validated against the schema. Top-level keys: `title`,
+  `instructions`, `runtime`, `settings`, `tests`, `tools`, `skills`, `mounts`,
+  `extensions`, `editor`, `states`.
+- **`WORKFLOW.md`** (optional, beside it) — a plain-markdown prose addendum with
+  **no frontmatter**. A frontmatter block in `WORKFLOW.md` when `workflow.yaml`
+  exists is a **validation error**. The runtime renders the system prompt's
+  workflow header deterministically from the spec (`title` + `instructions`, and
+  NO state of the graph) and appends the `WORKFLOW.md` prose after it — prose is
+  never load-bearing and cannot disagree with enforcement. The graph is disclosed
+  per model call, for the ACTIVE STATE ONLY.
+  There is no "frontmatter wins" rule anymore; `workflow.yaml` is the only
+  authority.
+
+**Removed**: the single-file `WORKFLOW.md` layout (YAML frontmatter + markdown
+body, without a `workflow.yaml`) no longer loads — it is a load error. Migrate by
+moving the frontmatter into `workflow.yaml` and stripping the fences from the
+prose.
+
+## Root fields
+
+```yaml
+title?: string                # the workflow's HUMAN-READABLE name (metadata only).
+                              # Identity is the WORKFLOW SLUG — the directory name
+                              # (`workflows/<slug>/`, also the CLI argument), authored
+                              # in the SAME kebab-case as state slugs
+                              # (`order-lookup`); validate ERRORS on a missing or
+                              # non-kebab workflow slug, exactly as for a state slug.
+                              # A top-level `name:` is REMOVED — it is
+                              # a load/validate ERROR; rename it to `title:`.
+instructions?: string         # the workflow's STANDING instructions — free-form
+                              # markdown, direction that holds for the WHOLE run
+                              # (conventions, house rules, what "done" means).
+                              # Author it as a LITERAL block (`|-`), not folded
+                              # (`>-`): it renders as markdown, and folding
+                              # collapses blank lines into one run-on paragraph.
+                              # Rendered verbatim as an `## Instructions` block at
+                              # the top of the workflow prompt section (unlike a
+                              # state's `instructions`, which are per model call) —
+                              # so it lands in the static,
+                              # cacheable prefix. validate WARNS when absent,
+                              # ERRORS when present but not a non-empty string.
+                              # A top-level `description:` is REMOVED and now
+                              # simply ignored; use `instructions:`, rereading the
+                              # text as direction, not narration.
+                              # A test case's `description` is UNAFFECTED. A
+                              # TRANSITION's `description` is now REQUIRED and
+                              # non-empty (see `transitions` below).
+
+disabled?: boolean            # `true` = this machine STARTS NO NEW TURNS. Bounds
+                              # STARTING, not finishing.
+                              # REFUSES: `archmax run` (one line, non-zero exit, no
+                              # session minted); a host `invoke`; a firing on a fresh
+                              # session; a FOLLOW-UP message to a settled session
+                              # (a new turn is new work) — all rejected AT THE TURN
+                              # BOUNDARY with `status: rejected` and
+                              # "Refusing to start: workflow '<slug>' is disabled.",
+                              # before any state, hook or model call; and a caller's
+                              # `archmax_workflow_<slug>` call (blocked call, refusal
+                              # kind `disabled`, before a child is composed — it also
+                              # beats a declared MOCK, so a case can never assert a
+                              # delegation production would refuse).
+                              # STILL WORKS: assembly; `decide` / `reply` / `deliver`
+                              # (each resumes an unfinished turn, so parked human
+                              # decisions are never trapped); `archmax validate` (full,
+                              # plus a warning); and a CALLER's assembly — the tool is
+                              # still bound, so disabling one leaf never takes its
+                              # callers offline (validate WARNS on each state that
+                              # allows a disabled target).
+                              # `archmax test` SKIPS the suite and exits 0 — not run is
+                              # not failed. There is NO flag to force cases to run.
+                              # Read FAIL-CLOSED: anything but an absent key, `null` or
+                              # boolean `false` disables the workflow, so `disabled:
+                              # "no"` STOPS runs; validate ERRORS on a non-boolean.
+                              # NOT a kill switch for work in flight, and NOT a
+                              # per-state/per-trigger switch (that is a forbid list).
+
+runtime?:
+  engine?: string             # "archmax-harness"
+  version?: string | number   # target contract — use "2"
+
+settings?:
+  model?: string              # MODEL ID ONLY — the id every state of this workflow runs
+                              # on, over the endpoint/credentials the assembly already
+                              # has. Overrides ARCHMAX_MODEL; a state's `model` overrides
+                              # it. NOT a block: `{ id, temperature }` is a load error —
+                              # sampling and endpoint are env/host configuration.
+                              # Opaque: nothing validates the id against a list.
+                              # Does NOT change the case grader (tests.judge.model).
+  timeoutMs?: number          # default 15000; per eval/lifecycle script (sandbox budget)
+  memoryLimitBytes?: number
+  maxPtcCalls?: number | null
+  maxResultChars?: number
+  prompt_cache?:
+    enabled?: boolean         # default true (provider prompt caching)
+    ttl?: "5m" | "1h"         # default "5m"
+
+tests?:                       # cases suite config (declarative data;
+                              # tests.config.js is REMOVED — see Cases)
+  maxConcurrency?: number     # only 1 (or absent) accepted — concurrency is
+                              # not implemented; >1 is a validate error and
+                              # fails `archmax test` loudly
+  caseTimeoutMs?: number      # per-case WALL-CLOCK budget, default 120000 —
+                              # deliberately named differently from
+                              # settings.timeoutMs (per-script sandbox budget)
+  judge?:                     # {} = enable the grader with the
+    model?: string            #      env-configured default model
+    modelOptions?: { temperature?: number, maxTokens?: number }
+                              #      applied over the env model config, via the
+                              #      factory's `judge` role; other keys are errors
+
+tools?:
+  allow_always?: AllowEntry[] # grants added to every state's allowlist
+  forbid_always?: ForbidEntry[]
+                              # DENIED in EVERY state, and absolute: nothing reaches
+                              #      past it — no state grant, allow_always entry,
+                              #      argument guard or consumer rule. Same entry
+                              #      grammar as allow, plus the tool "*" meaning
+                              #      EVERY tool: { tool: "*", paths: ["logs/**"] }
+                              #      denies that path to everything. "*" in an
+                              #      ALLOW list is a load error.
+                              #      Guards narrow what is denied; globs match
+                              #      dotfiles (secrets/** covers secrets/.env).
+                              #      Inherited by every sub-workflow, naming the
+                              #      workflow that declared it. There is NO
+                              #      `policy:` block — writing one is a load error.
+
+skills?:
+  allow_always?: string[]     # SKILL SLUGS enabled in EVERY state of this workflow —
+                              # the bundle directory names under skills/, kebab-case.
+                              # NEVER paths, NEVER globs: the unit you govern is the
+                              # capability. This is the skills half of
+                              # tools.allow_always: a GRANT, which a state's own
+                              # `skills.allow` ADDS to (the enabled set is the UNION),
+                              # so no state repeats it and no state can subtract from
+                              # it. ABSENT = none granted workflow-wide, exactly like
+                              # `allow_always: []` — write the empty list when every
+                              # capability here is state-specific.
+                              # validate ERRORS on: a slug no source provides (it
+                              # lists the known ones), a path/glob/non-string entry,
+                              # a bundle whose SKILL.md `name:` ≠ its directory; and
+                              # WARNS on a state entry this list already grants
+                              # everywhere, and on a state's `allow: []` beside it
+                              # (an empty state list subtracts nothing).
+  forbid_always?: string[]    # SKILL SLUGS out of reach of EVERY state, whatever any
+                              # list grants. Deny beats allow. (The retired root
+                              # `allow` ceiling is a load error: one skills model.)
+
+mounts?:
+  allow_always?: MountGrant[] # MOUNT NAMES reachable in EVERY state of this workflow —
+                              # the keys of the HOST's mount table with their slashes
+                              # stripped (`reference`, `catalogs/eu`, `AGENTS.md`).
+                              # NEVER globs: scope paths WITHIN a reachable mount with
+                              # a tools.allow entry. Only a mount the host declared
+                              # `governed: true` needs a grant — an UNGOVERNED mount is
+                              # visible in every state already, and a grant naming one
+                              # is inert (validate warns). The skills model exactly: a
+                              # GRANT a state's `mounts.allow` ADDS to (the reachable
+                              # set is the UNION), never a ceiling. ABSENT = this
+                              # workflow reaches no governed mount; validate says so
+                              # ONCE, naming them — write `allow_always: []` to mean it.
+                              # An entry is a NAME, or `{ mount: <name>, access: read |
+                              # read_write }` to say what this level gives. The host's
+                              # readOnly is a CEILING: `read_write` on a read-only mount
+                              # opens nothing (validate warns); `read` NARROWS a
+                              # writable one, and no narrower level widens it back.
+                              # validate ERRORS on a name the table does not mount.
+  forbid_always?: string[]    # MOUNT NAMES out of reach of EVERY state, governed or
+                              # not, whatever any list grants. Deny beats allow.
+                              # Inherited by every sub-workflow, naming the workflow
+                              # that declared it. A NAME only — a denial is total, so
+                              # there is no `access` to qualify. (A root `mounts.allow`
+                              # is a load error: one mounts model.)
+
+extensions?:
+  hooks?: string[]            # custom hook kinds (beyond script/rubric) the
+                              # runtime registers executors for; undeclared
+                              # unknown hook kinds are validation errors
+
+editor?: Record<string, unknown>   # HOST PRESENTATION METADATA — an authoring
+                              # UI's own state (canvas state positions keyed by
+                              # slug, edge routing). The one key the runtime
+                              # never reads: not shape-checked, not prompted,
+                              # not governed, and excluded from the spec hash.
+                              # Do NOT author it by hand and do NOT invent a
+                              # use for it — but PRESERVE it verbatim when you
+                              # rewrite a spec that already carries one, or the
+                              # builder that wrote it loses every state position.
+                              # The root is otherwise STRICT: any other
+                              # unrecognized key is a load error.
+
+states: Record<slug, MachineState>     # REQUIRED; ≥1 state, ≥1 with a trigger
+                                       # the KEY is the state's SLUG (see below)
+```
+
+## States (`MachineState`)
+
+Each key under `states` is the state's **slug**: its identity, and the only thing
+that resolves it — `transitions[].to`, `on_error`, the `to` the agent passes to
+`archmax_advance`, emitted events, session artifacts, and cases
+`reachedState` assertions are all slugs. Author slugs as **hyphen-separated kebab-case** — lowercase alphanumeric
+segments joined by single hyphens (`^[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$`, e.g.
+`identify-case`, `report-requested`); no underscores, capitals, doubled hyphens,
+or leading/trailing hyphens —
+`validate` reports a nonconforming slug — or a state declared under an empty key,
+which has no identity at all — as an **error**. A slug is a reference target, so
+rename one only deliberately, and update every reference to it.
+
+```yaml
+states:
+  <state-slug>:
+    requires?: [string]        # RUN VARIABLES this state must have set before it can
+                               # be left: archmax_advance out of it is refused,
+                               # recoverably, while any is unset. Variables are not
+                               # declared anywhere, so this list — together with a
+                               # TRIGGER's `requires` (see below) — is
+                               # the only spec-visible statement that a variable will
+                               # exist, which is what makes a ${{name}} guard
+                               # reference GUARANTEED rather than dependent on agent
+                               # behavior. Name here anything a downstream guard
+                               # reads.
+    title?: string             # HUMAN-READABLE label. Presentational only: carried
+                               # in a human state's pending-decision record and shown
+                               # in host surfaces. REACHES NO MODEL CALL. Never a
+                               # routing target — `to` always takes a slug — so
+                               # rewording it changes no behavior. Not unique.
+                               # NOT a substitute for `instructions` (behavior
+                               # guidance) or a transition `description` (routing).
+
+    type?: "agent" | "human"
+                               # default "agent". "human" = a person routes.
+                               # (`workflow` was removed: a state CALLS another
+                               # workflow by allowing `archmax_workflow_<slug>`.)
+
+
+    triggers?: Record<triggerId, TriggerDeclaration | null>
+                               # marks a start state. The KEY is the trigger id
+                               # and THIS state is that trigger's entry state —
+                               # the one place a trigger is declared.
+                               #   manual:            = CLI/Deep-Agent entry
+                               #                        (prompt = input)
+                               #   <other id>:        = tool/event trigger
+                               #   a null/empty value = the id and nothing more
+                               # SEVERAL keys = the state is the entry for EVERY
+                               #   id, in declaration order (one state, one
+                               #   behavior, several ways in).
+                               # The value is the declaration (see below):
+                               #   session/message/connection/description/
+                               #   requires/returns
+                               #   plus any key the HOST adds — preserved,
+                               #   lint-warned, never interpreted.
+                               # NO `entry:` and NO `name:` inside a declaration:
+                               #   the state it sits on IS the entry and the key
+                               #   it sits under IS the id. Either one fails load
+                               #   naming the key. There is also no root
+                               #   `triggers:` block.
+                               # An id is AUTHORED, so deleting or reordering a
+                               #   sibling never moves it — hosts key deployments
+                               #   on that id.
+                               # two states declaring the same trigger id is a
+                               # validation ERROR (start states must be
+                               # unambiguous). A trigger has ONE entry state; a
+                               # mapping with several keys is several triggers
+                               # entering one state. A repeated id on one state
+                               # is impossible — YAML mappings cannot repeat a key.
+                               # A shared entry state has ONE behavior: branch on
+                               # `${{trigger}}` / `args.trigger` where the paths
+                               # differ, or use separate states.
+
+    summary?: string           # ONE-LINE label for AUTHORS AND HOSTS (an editor's
+                               # node caption, a generated diagram). RENDERED INTO
+                               # NO PART OF THE PROMPT — the model never reads it,
+                               # so it is free, and it can NOT carry routing logic.
+                               # The routing text the agent reads is the SOURCE
+                               # state's transition `description`s; nothing about a
+                               # target state is disclosed at all.
+
+    instructions?: string      # behavior guidance.
+                               #   agent node: surfaced to the LLM while active.
+                               #     Write the state's behavior INLINE here; a
+                               #     skill bundle (skills/<slug>/) is a capability
+                               #     with data or scripts, enabled by slug — not a
+                               #     per-state instruction sheet.
+                               #   human state: describes the decision for the packet
+
+    before?: HookSpec          # gate ENTRY to this state (fail-closed)
+    after?: HookSpec           # gate the archmax_advance OUT (or run at completion
+                               #   for a terminal state)
+
+    tools?:
+      allow?: AllowEntry[]     # grants beyond the always-on tools (plus
+                               # allow_always grants and the always-allowed
+                               # archmax_advance); an entry naming
+                               # an always-on tool NARROWS it.
+      forbid?: ForbidEntry[]   # what this state DENIES while active — beating the
+                               # workflow's allow_always, this state's own allow,
+                               # and the always-on surface alike. Deny beats allow.
+                               # Not inherited by a sub-workflow; a lifecycle hook
+                               # is exempt from it (runtime authority).
+
+    skills?:
+      allow?: string[]         # which CAPABILITIES this state ADDS, by SLUG — on top
+                               # of the root's `skills.allow_always`, which is enabled
+                               # here whatever this says. ABSENT = adds none, the same
+                               # as `allow: []`. An empty list is NOT a deny (validate
+                               # warns about one that reads like it) — `forbid` is.
+      forbid?: string[]        # SLUGS this state does NOT get, subtracting from the
+                               # workflow's allow_always and from its own allow.
+                               # Refused as `skill.forbidden` (vs `skill.not-allowed`
+                               # where nothing granted it).
+                               # Enabling a slug is a GRANT: skills/<slug>/** becomes
+                               # readable and its scripts runnable with NO tools.allow
+                               # path entry. Not enabling one makes the bundle
+                               # unreachable (read/ls/glob/grep/archmax_run all
+                               # blocked, rule `skill.not-allowed`, above every
+                               # declaration) AND undisclosed — its slug and
+                               # description never enter this state's prompt, and a
+                               # listing of skills/ does not show it.
+                               # A tools.allow entry still NARROWS within the enabled
+                               # set: the two compose as enabled AND allowed.
+                               # Lifecycle HOOKS are exempt — a `before` hook reading
+                               # skills/order-data/assets/orders.json still works in a
+                               # state that enables nothing, so you can gate the
+                               # agent's use of a capability while keeping the hook
+                               # that enforces it.
+
+    mounts?:
+      allow?: MountGrant[]     # which MOUNTS this state ADDS, by NAME — on top of the
+                               # root's `mounts.allow_always`, which is reachable here
+                               # whatever this says. ABSENT = adds none, the same as
+                               # `allow: []`. An empty list is NOT a deny (validate
+                               # warns about one that reads like it) — `forbid` is.
+                               # An entry may name its access:
+                               #   allow: [{ mount: shared, access: read }]
+                               # reads a writable mount without writing it here. The
+                               # host's posture is the ceiling — `read_write` cannot
+                               # open a read-only mount — and a `read` at either level
+                               # holds, so a state never widens what the workflow
+                               # narrowed. A write refused by THIS key is
+                               # `mount.read-only`; one refused by the WIRING is
+                               # `zone.read-only`.
+      forbid?: string[]        # MOUNT NAMES this state does NOT get, subtracting from
+                               # the workflow's allow_always, from its own allow, and
+                               # from an UNGOVERNED mount's standing visibility alike.
+                               # Refused as `mount.forbidden` (vs `mount.not-allowed`
+                               # where nothing enabled it).
+                               # A governed mount this state does not have is
+                               # unreachable (read/ls/glob/grep all blocked, above
+                               # every declaration) AND undisclosed — absent from the
+                               # volatile prompt block, and filtered out of every
+                               # ls/glob/grep result, the WORKSPACE ROOT LISTING
+                               # included. Lifecycle HOOKS are exempt from this key
+                               # (runtime authority), but not from `forbid_always`.
+
+    model?: string             # MODEL ID ONLY — this state's turns run on it (and the
+                               # handoff message of a park it holds). Most specific of
+                               # state.model > settings.model > the assembly's default
+                               # (createAgent `model`/`modelFactory`, else ARCHMAX_MODEL).
+                               # Same id as settings.model ⇒ validate WARNS (inert).
+                               # A rubric keeps its own `model`; a sub-workflow resolves
+                               # its OWN spec's ids — nothing is inherited across it.
+                               # A host passing an explicit `model` INSTANCE to
+                               # createAgent outranks every declared id (one assembly
+                               # warning names them); `modelFactory` is what honours one.
+
+    budget?:                   # per-state execution budget
+      maxTurns?: number        # bounds this turn's agent loop
+      timeoutMs?: number       # aborts the turn when exceeded
+    on_error?: string          # state to route to on a TERMINAL failure
+                               # (see Budgets & error routing)
+
+    transitions?: Transition[] # outgoing edges. EMPTY/absent ⇒ terminal state.
+                               # `parallel:`/`join:` are REMOVED — a run traverses
+                               # one state at a time; sequence what were branches.
+                               #
+                               # Transition = {
+                               #   to: string          # a declared state's SLUG
+                               #   description: string # REQUIRED, non-empty
+                               #   type?: "approve" | "reject" | "refine" | "none"
+                               # }
+                               #
+                               # THE AGENT SEES THIS STATE'S EDGES AND NOTHING
+                               # ELSE OF THE GRAPH — no other state's slug, title,
+                               # summary, hooks or transitions, and no count of
+                               # the states. So `description` is the whole of what
+                               # it knows about where an edge leads, and a missing
+                               # or blank one is a LOAD ERROR naming
+                               # states.<slug>.transitions.<i>.description.
+                               #
+                               # Write it for a reader standing in THIS state,
+                               # which knows nothing about the target:
+                               #   GOOD: "The refund is over $50."   (when)
+                               #   BAD:  "Go to refund-review."      (where)
+                               # A routing condition CANNOT live in the target's
+                               # summary/instructions — those are never disclosed
+                               # to the state routing into it.
+                               #
+                               # The rendered line marks a target that is a human
+                               # decision node or terminal (each changes the call
+                               # or what follows it); nothing else of the target.
+
+    # human states only (ignored on agent states):
+    evidence?: string[]        # workspace-relative paths always shown in the packet —
+                               # a baseline the advancing agent adds to (see Human states)
+    approvers?: string[]       # informational; not enforced
+```
+
+## Parking and sessions
+
+A state parks the run **itself**: once it has asked for what it needs, its agent
+calls `archmax_wait({ reason })` and the run suspends right there — no transition,
+no model call spent parking. A delivered event resumes that same state, which
+reads what arrived and then picks its own outgoing transition:
+
+```yaml
+clarify:
+  title: Ask a clarifying question
+  instructions: >-
+    Ask exactly one clarifying question, then call archmax_wait with a reason
+    naming what you are waiting for. When the reply arrives you continue here:
+    read it, and if it identifies the order, advance to answer.
+  transitions:
+    - { to: answer, description: The reply identifies the order. }
+    - { to: closed, description: The conversation closed before a usable reply. }
+```
+
+What to know:
+
+- `archmax_wait` is available in **every** state, terminal ones included — a run
+  that has answered and now awaits a reply parks where it answered instead of
+  finishing. `tools: { forbid_always: [archmax_wait] }` removes it workflow-wide.
+- The park is durable: status `awaiting_input` (classified **open**, never
+  finished), a checkpointed record of the state and the reason, and the process
+  may exit.
+- **Any** delivered trigger id resumes a park — the id is recorded as the run's
+  current trigger (`args.trigger`, `${{trigger}}`), never matched against an edge.
+  The delivered variables arrive **locked**, and the arrival is written into the
+  transcript as an `[event]` **runtime note** — a synthetic `archmax_note` tool
+  call and its result, which is how the runtime says something to a run in a
+  channel a model cannot read as a person. Nothing may call `archmax_note`, and
+  derived views (`calledTool`, `usedNoTools`, the CLI's flow) skip the pair.
+- The removed `type: wait` state kind is now an unknown state kind (`validate`
+  reports it as one), and a per-transition `on:` key is ignored. Call
+  `archmax_wait` instead.
+- When what the state waits for is a **time** rather than a reply, the call says so:
+  `archmax_wait({ reason, until: "1d" })` — a duration (`30m`, `2h`, `1d`) or an
+  ISO-8601 instant, normalized to an absolute `resumeAt` on the park record, the
+  session summary, and the park event. The runtime **schedules nothing**: `resumeAt`
+  tells the host's cron when to `deliver`, and an earlier event resumes the park
+  regardless. An unparseable `until` is a tool error and the run does not park.
+- A state that polls ("look for the transaction, else wait a day and retry") bounds
+  its own loop with `budget.maxParks` and sends the overrun somewhere with
+  `on_error`; the runtime counts parks per state in the checkpoint and refuses the
+  park that would exceed the bound as a turn failure:
+
+  ```yaml
+  check-bank:
+    summary: Look for the transaction; wait a day and retry if it has not posted.
+    budget: { maxParks: 5 }
+    on_error: escalate
+    transitions:
+      - { to: reconcile, description: The transaction was found. }
+  ```
+- A finished session re-invoked is a **new turn** — it continues in the state the
+  previous turn ended in, *not* at the trigger's entry state, which applies only to
+  a session's first turn. Give a state re-entry transitions if a conversation must
+  move on from it; otherwise the agent's way out is `archmax_reset`. To continue
+  mid-state instead, park rather than finish.
+
+A trigger's **declaration** sits under the `triggers:` of the state it enters,
+keyed by its id. It says which conversation a firing belongs to and what the run
+owes its caller:
+
+```yaml
+states:
+  intake:
+    triggers:
+      email_received:
+        session: conversation_id
+      email_reply:
+        session: triggers.-1.conversationId  # newest arrival's conversation id
+                                             # unknown/finished conversation → fresh run
+  enrich:
+    triggers:
+      manual:                                # the one entry: CLI, host firing, or a caller
+        description: Enrich one order and say whether it is late.  # for callers only
+        requires:                            # a firing must supply these to start
+          - order_id                         # bare name = untyped
+          - { name: due, type: date, description: The day the order is due. }
+        returns:                             # the run guarantees these when it completes
+          - enrichment_file
+          - { name: delayed, type: boolean }
+```
+
+- There is no `entry:` key and no root block: the state a declaration sits on is
+  the trigger's entry state, written once. `entry:` or `name:` inside a
+  declaration fails load naming the key — each would be a second spelling of
+  wiring the SDK already reads, and a loose declaration that swallowed one would
+  start the run somewhere you did not say.
+- `requires:` / `returns:` are the run's **signature**, and both are enforced. A
+  firing that does not supply every `requires` name does not start; a run that
+  reaches a terminal state without every `returns` name set is rejected (a run
+  that *parks* is not checked — it has not finished). Each entry is a bare
+  run-variable name (**untyped**: any value, `null` included) or a strict object
+  `{ name, type?, description? }` naming one; the spellings mix in one list and
+  names are distinct across both. What the agent must *do* to produce a
+  variable still belongs in the `instructions` that set it. The names — with
+  type and description when declared, as `name (type) — description` — are
+  rendered into the prompt under the trigger's entry state, so the agent is told
+  what to produce before it can be failed for omitting it. A trigger's
+  `requires:` also **guarantees** the variable for `${{…}}` guards, so `validate`
+  stops warning about a guard bound to it. This is what makes delegation
+  checkable — see [Sub-workflows are tools](#sub-workflows-are-tools).
+- **`type`** is one of `string`, `integer` (no fractional part), `number`
+  (finite), `boolean`, `date` (RFC 3339 `YYYY-MM-DD`, a real calendar day),
+  `date-time` (RFC 3339 with a mandatory `Z`/`±hh:mm` offset), `object` (not an
+  array) or `array`. Nothing is coerced (`"4"` is not an `integer`) and a typed
+  entry never takes `null`. It is held **at the start** (a mistyped seed is
+  refused before any model call), **at the write** (`archmax_set_variables` of a
+  mistyped typed return of the current trigger is a correctable refusal,
+  nothing written) and **at completion** (a mistyped typed return rejects the
+  run — in practice a script or hook write). There are no enums, item or
+  property schemas, ranges or optional inputs. An unknown `type`, an unknown
+  entry key (`default:`) or an empty `description` fails load.
+- **When to type.** Type an entry when something outside the session reads the
+  contract: a delegating model that must build the argument, a host publishing an
+  MCP tool or a start form. Leave it bare when any value will do. Typing a
+  `returns` entry also tells the agent the shape to write.
+- **`description` on the declaration** says, for a **caller**, what calling this
+  entry does. It leads the delegation tool's description and a host's MCP tool
+  description; it never reaches the model of the session it starts (that
+  session's brief is its `instructions`). An entry's own `description` is
+  different: it *is* shown to the agent, beside the name.
+- `session:` is a **dotted path over the run's variables** — the same syntax
+  `${{…}}` guards use, including array indices and negative indices
+  (`-1` = last). No script, no callback: name where the host already puts the
+  conversation id. A `${{…}}`-wrapped value is rejected — write the bare path.
+- Related triggers that must land in the same conversation declare the **same
+  path**. Each declares it itself: there is no shared lookup to change from
+  elsewhere in the document, and the duplication is the deliberate cost of a
+  state being legible on its own.
+- A trigger with no `session:` path — or a firing whose path does not resolve —
+  gives that run a session of its own (its session id). Every run has exactly one
+  session, so there is no absent case.
+- `message:` and `connection:` are **host-resolved** keys: shape-checked,
+  preserved and readable back (`messagePathForTrigger`, `connectionForTrigger`),
+  but nothing in the runtime acts on them. `message:` takes `session:`'s dotted
+  path — where a firing's words are — or the literal `false` for a trigger whose
+  firings carry no message; `connection:` is an opaque non-empty slug naming an
+  access connection in the host's own configuration. Author them only if the host
+  you are targeting reads them.
+- A declaration key the SDK does not define is a **warning**, not a load failure:
+  it is ignored, and the workflow still runs. Structural problems — a
+  non-mapping `triggers:`, a declaration that is neither a mapping nor empty, one
+  id declared by two states, a malformed `session`/`message` path, an empty
+  `connection`, an `entry:` or `name:` key — still fail load.
+- A host's own keys ride **inside the declaration**, keyed by the trigger id:
+
+  ```yaml
+  states:
+    intake:
+      triggers:                                  # one state, two event sources
+        outlook-mail: { type: ap, piece: microsoft-outlook, event: newEmail }
+        slack-message:
+          type: ap
+          piece: slack
+          event: newMessage
+          session: triggers.-1.threadId
+          connection: acme-slack
+  ```
+
+  One state, one behavior, one governance block; `${{trigger}}` and a hook's
+  `args.trigger` still read which one actually fired.
+- Every declared trigger **starts** a session. An event that must only ever reach
+  a live one — a ticket closing, a payment settling — is declared nowhere: the
+  host names the session it delivers into (`archmax deliver <session> --trigger
+  <id>`, `agent.workflow.send(sessionId, …)`), or passes a `sessionPath` with the
+  firing. A firing naming a trigger no state declares, with no session to reach,
+  is refused.
+
+Call `archmax_wait` when an **external event** is what lets the work continue (an
+email reply, a webhook, a scheduled reminder the host fires); author a `human`
+state when a **person** picks the edge. Both park the session durably; they differ
+in the resolution channel and in where the run continues — a decision advances
+along the chosen edge, a delivery resumes the parked state.
+
+**Runtime control tools** carry the `archmax_` prefix — `archmax_advance`,
+`archmax_reset`, `archmax_wait`, `archmax_run`, `archmax_get_variables`,
+`archmax_set_variables` — and are the names to write in `tools.allow`,
+`tools.allow_always`, and the `forbid`/`forbid_always` lists. These are the only spellings:
+an entry naming an unprefixed variant governs a tool that does not exist,
+silently granting nothing. A host tool may never claim the prefix. Deep Agents' built-ins
+(`read_file`, `task`, …) keep their own names.
+
+- A state with **no `tools` block** gets the **always-on tools only**
+  (`ls`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `edit_file`, `glob`, `grep`, `write_todos`,
+  `archmax_eval`, `archmax_run`, `task`, plus the always-allowed `archmax_advance` and `allow_always`
+  grants — minus
+  whatever a `forbid` list denies there, and read-only-zone protection).
+  Governance is closed by default; there is no way to declare a fully open state.
+- `tools.forbid` on a state **denies** while that state is active, beating every
+  grant that would otherwise reach it (see [Tool governance](#tool-governance)).
+- A state with **no transitions** is **terminal**: the run ends when the agent
+  finishes its turn there; it cannot call `archmax_advance`.
+
+## Transitions
+
+```yaml
+transitions:
+  - to: string                 # REQUIRED target state SLUG (must exist); never a title
+    description?: string        # shown to the agent (or human) to pick the edge
+    type?: "approve" | "reject" | "refine" | "none"   # default "none"
+```
+
+- On **agent** states the agent chooses one edge via
+  `archmax_advance({ to, reason })`; `type` is metadata only.
+- On **human** states each transition is a selectable outcome (a UI renders one
+  button per edge, labeled by `type`). `refine` conventionally loops back to a
+  prior state with the reviewer's comment as correction. Max one transition per
+  `type` on a human state.
+
+## Tool governance
+
+`AllowEntry` forms:
+
+```yaml
+# 1. bare tool name (any args)
+- read_file
+
+# 2. object with glob arg matchers (matches if the arg satisfies ANY glob)
+- tool: write_file
+  args:
+    file_path: ["reports/*.json"]
+
+# 3. `paths` shorthand for args.file_path (string or array)
+- tool: write_file
+  paths: ["reports/*.json"]
+```
+
+An object entry may also carry `connection` (the connection slug a
+platform-provided tool resolves through when its collection has several) and
+`source` (any string: a host's own label for where the tool came from) — the
+runtime matches governance by `tool` name alone and never reads `source`.
+
+**The model is closed by default, and a denial beats every grant.** Every state always has the
+**always-on tools** (`ls`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `edit_file`, `glob`,
+`grep`, `write_todos`, `archmax_eval`, `archmax_run`). One built-in is **never
+disclosed** and grantable by nothing: `task`, the runtime's own dispatch for
+grading rubrics — a rubric grades the agent rather than serving it, so naming
+`task` in an allow entry is a `validate` error and the kernel refuses the call.
+The planning scratchpad `write_todos` and the sandbox
+`archmax_eval` are standard equipment — always disclosed, always permitted,
+no setting; only a `forbid` list refuses them. The interpreter is safe as a
+default because the `tools.*` calls its code makes are decided against the active
+state by the same kernel: it adds computation over what the state permits, not
+access. `archmax_run` — executing an authored script **file** — is always on on
+the same terms (the script is a file the state could already read); declare it
+per state to **narrow** which files may run there. Any other tool
+must be declared in the state's `tools.allow` or workflow-level
+`tools.allow_always`. A `tools.allow` entry naming an always-on tool **narrows**
+it for that state.
+Denial is declared beside the grant, in the same two positions and with the same
+entries: `tools.forbid_always` at the root denies in every state,
+`tools.forbid` on a state denies while it is active — subtracting from the
+workflow's grant, the state's own `allow` and the always-on surface alike.
+**Deny beats allow, and no narrower level widens a denial.** A forbid entry may
+name the tool `*` (every tool); `*` in an allow list is a load error. A lifecycle
+hook is exempt from the state's `allow` **and** its `forbid` — runtime authority,
+outside that surface both ways — but never from `forbid_always`.
+
+Precedence (highest first):
+
+0. **Skill and mount governance** — a path inside a skill bundle the active state
+   does not enable is refused before anything below is consulted (rule
+   `skill.not-allowed`), and so is a path under a mount the state does not have
+   (`mount.not-allowed` / `mount.forbidden`, or `mount.read-only` for a write into
+   one a grant narrowed to reads). Nothing widens either: not a wildcard
+   `tools.allow` entry, not `allow_always`, not a consumer rule.
+1. **Declared denials** — `tools.forbid_always` denies in every state,
+   `tools.forbid` denies in the active state, both regardless of any allow list
+   (and regardless of always-allowed): deny beats allow, and no narrower level
+   widens a denial.
+2. **Always allowed**: `archmax_advance` (baked in, every state).
+3. **Per-state `tools.allow`** — the listed tools/arg-shapes. An entry for an
+   always-on tool (or one also in `allow_always`) takes precedence
+   (**narrower wins** — the state's arg globs apply, not the broader grant).
+4. **Essential built-ins** — always permitted when no state entry narrows
+   them. Listing one in `allow_always` is inert (`archmax validate` warns).
+5. **Workflow `tools.allow_always`** — grants tools that are not always on in every
+   state.
+6. **Default**: everything else is blocked.
+
+**Progressive disclosure.** The model is only shown the active state's tool
+surface: always-on tools + `allow_always` + the state's entries + `archmax_advance`
+(hidden in terminal states), minus every tool denied there by name. Disclosure is
+name-level (arg-constrained tools stay visible; the kernel enforces args at
+call time) and never replaces enforcement. **Skills are disclosed the same way**:
+each model call names only the skills the active state enables, with their
+descriptions — a disabled bundle's slug never reaches the prompt, and `ls skills/`
+does not list it.
+
+## Skill governance
+
+Govern a **capability** by its slug, not by path globs. The two levels compose
+exactly as tools do: `skills.allow_always` at the spec root is enabled in **every**
+state, and a state's `skills.allow` **adds** to it. **A skill is enabled only where
+a list names it** — an absent state block adds nothing, exactly as an absent
+`tools.allow` grants no tool — and a capability is declared **once**, at the level
+where the decision was made:
+
+```yaml
+skills:
+  allow_always: [order-data]             # enabled in every state, named once
+
+states:
+  orders-question: {}                    # no block, and it still has order-data
+  refund-review:
+    skills:
+      allow: [refund-policy]             # this state adds one, and has both
+  identify-case:
+    skills:
+      forbid: [order-data]               # routes only: opts out of the grant
+```
+
+A state's `allow: []` is not a deny — a state's `allow` only ever adds
+(`validate` warns about an entry that reads like a denial). **`skills.forbid` is
+what subtracts**: it removes a slug from that state's enabled set, the workflow's
+`allow_always` included, so one state opts out of a capability every other state
+keeps; `skills.forbid_always` at the root puts a bundle out of reach everywhere.
+There is no root `skills.allow` ceiling — writing one is a load error.
+
+Why by slug, and not with `tools.allow` paths:
+
+- **One declaration covers the whole bundle.** Enabling `order-data` makes
+  `skills/order-data/**` readable and its scripts runnable. The path-glob
+  alternative needs an entry per tool (`read_file`, `ls`, `glob`, `grep`,
+  `archmax_run`) and gets subtly wrong the moment a bundle grows a directory.
+- **Path entries do not un-advertise.** A blocked read still leaves the skill's
+  name and description in the prompt of every state, so the model keeps reaching
+  for a capability it cannot have. A skill that is not enabled is not disclosed.
+- **The two still compose** as *enabled AND allowed*: a `tools.allow` entry
+  narrows **within** the enabled set. `{ tool: archmax_run, paths:
+  ["skills/<slug>/scripts/**"] }` remains worth writing beside the list that
+  enables `<slug>` — the skills list puts every other capability out
+  of reach, while the entry confines execution to *this* capability's scripts.
+  Capability governance and execution governance are different questions.
+- **`archmax_run` can only ever be narrowed.** A non-overridable kernel rule
+  (`script.skill-only`) confines it to skill bundles, so a script the agent writes
+  into `scratchpad/` is unrunnable, a lifecycle hook script is unrunnable, and
+  `{ tool: archmax_run, paths: ["**"] }` grants nothing — `validate` reports such
+  an entry as inert.
+
+- **No skill enabled means no script at all.** Since `script.skill-only` confines
+  `archmax_run` to bundles, a state that enables no skill — nothing on
+  `allow_always`, nothing on its own list — can execute nothing: the tool stays on
+  the surface and refuses every path.
+
+`archmax validate` warns when a state entry names a slug `allow_always` already
+grants everywhere, when a state's `allow: []` beside such a grant subtracts
+nothing, and once when a spec declares no root `skills` block at all in a workspace
+that serves bundles, naming what the workflow cannot reach. Any root block silences
+that last one — write `skills: { allow_always: [] }` when a workflow grants no
+capability workflow-wide.
+
+Hooks are **exempt**: a `before`/`after` script reads authored data on runtime
+authority, so a state may enable nothing and still be gated by a hook that reads
+the very bundle the model cannot. That is the shape to reach for when a capability
+should *enforce* something without being *usable*.
+
+**`tools.forbid` on a state denies there**, and `tools.forbid_always` at the
+root denies everywhere. Both beat every grant. Migrating a workflow off the
+retired `policy` block:
+
+- `policy.forbid_tools: [x]` → `tools.forbid_always: [x]`.
+- `policy.forbid_paths: [g]` → `tools.forbid_always: [{ tool: write_file, paths:
+  [g] }, { tool: edit_file, paths: [g] }]` for the identical meaning (it only
+  ever blocked those two), or `[{ tool: "*", paths: [g] }]` to deny reads too.
+
+## Mount governance
+
+A **mount** is a folder (or a single file) the *host* routes into the agent's
+workspace: `skills/`, `AGENTS.md`, and whatever else the wiring composes
+(`reference/`, `catalogs/eu/`). The host owns which backend serves a mount, its
+write posture, and whether the spec governs it; the spec owns which states reach
+it, and what they may do there. **Neither is inferred from the other**, so you
+cannot make a folder appear by naming it — ask the host to mount it.
+
+A mount the host declares **governed** (`{ backend, governed: true }` in the
+wiring) is closed by default, exactly like a skill bundle: reachable only from the
+states a `mounts` list enables. An **ungoverned** mount — every mount of a
+zero-config workspace, and every mount of a host that marks nothing — is visible
+in every state, and only a `forbid` takes it away. So a spec with no `mounts`
+block runs unchanged over any table.
+
+The two levels compose exactly as `skills` does:
+
+```yaml
+mounts:
+  allow_always: [reference]              # reachable in every state, named once
+  forbid_always: [catalogs/uk]           # out of reach everywhere, and in every
+                                         # child session this workflow delegates to
+
+states:
+  intake: {}                             # no block, and it still has reference/
+  triage:
+    mounts:
+      allow: [catalogs/eu]               # this state adds one, and has both
+  route:
+    mounts:
+      forbid: [reference]                # opts out of the workflow's grant
+```
+
+A state's `allow: []` is not a deny — a state's `allow` only ever adds
+(`validate` warns about an entry that reads like a denial). **`mounts.forbid` is
+what subtracts**, the workflow's `allow_always` and an ungoverned mount's standing
+visibility alike. There is no root `mounts.allow` ceiling — writing one is a load
+error.
+
+### Read or read/write
+
+A grant entry is either a bare mount name — taking the posture the host wired — or
+a mapping naming the access this level gives:
+
+```yaml
+mounts:
+  allow_always:
+    - reference                                  # the host's posture
+    - { mount: shared, access: read_write }      # writable where the host allows it
+
+states:
+  review:
+    mounts:
+      allow: [{ mount: shared, access: read }]   # reads it, cannot write it here
+```
+
+The host's `readOnly` is a **ceiling**, not a default to argue with:
+
+- `access: read_write` on a mount the workspace serves read-only opens nothing,
+  and `validate` warns that the entry is inert. Ask the host to mount it
+  `{ readOnly: false }` instead.
+- `access: read` is a restriction, so it behaves like every other restriction
+  here: whichever level asks for it gets it, and **no narrower level widens it
+  back**. A state cannot re-open what the workflow narrowed.
+- A `forbid` entry is a name only. A denial is total, so there is no access to
+  qualify — `{ mount: x, access: read }` in a `forbid` list is a load error.
+
+Two refusals, because they are two different edits: a write into a mount the
+**host** serves read-only is `zone.read-only` (fix the wiring), and a write into
+one a **grant** narrowed is `mount.read-only` (fix the spec).
+
+### What the agent sees
+
+A governed mount the state does not have is not merely refused — it is not shown:
+
+- `ls`, `glob` and `grep` results lose every entry under it, the **workspace root
+  listing included**, so the agent is never shown a directory it then cannot read.
+- The static "Workspace zones" prompt section names ungoverned mounts only, one
+  line each with a `read-only` or `read/write` marker. The
+  governed mounts of *this* state are listed in the volatile "Current state"
+  block, read-only or read/write per the state's own grant — which is why the
+  cacheable prompt prefix stays byte-identical across states.
+- Every call is still decided by the kernel (`mount.not-allowed`,
+  `mount.forbidden`, `mount.read-only`), whether or not a listing showed the path.
+  Redaction is the courtesy; the kernel is the enforcement.
+
+### Nested and file mounts
+
+A mount key may be several segments deep (`catalogs/eu`), and a mount name is that
+key with its slashes stripped — that is the token a `mounts` list takes, never a
+glob (`reference/**` is a load error; scope paths *within* an enabled mount with a
+`tools.allow` entry). A path is matched to a mount by **longest prefix**, so
+`catalogs/eu` wins over a `catalogs` mounted beside it, and a sibling
+`catalogs/uk` matches neither. A file mount (`AGENTS.md`) matches its exact path,
+so `AGENTS.md.bak` is not captured.
+
+### Diagnostics
+
+`archmax validate` reports, given the host's mount table:
+
+- **error** — a name the table does not mount at all, naming the mounts it does;
+- a grant naming an **ungoverned** mount (it grants nothing: the mount is visible
+  everywhere already — use `forbid` to take one away);
+- an `access: read_write` on a mount the host serves **read-only**;
+- a name in both `allow_always` and a state's `allow` (unless the state entry
+  narrows the access, which does real work);
+- a state's `allow: []` beside a non-empty `allow_always`;
+- a `forbid` naming a governed mount nothing would have enabled there;
+- a `forbid_always` name some `allow` list also grants;
+- a `tools.allow` path entry that can only match inside a mount the state does not
+  enable (the grant reaches nothing);
+- **once**, when a spec declares no root `mounts` block at all in a workspace that
+  governs mounts, naming what the workflow cannot reach. Any root block silences
+  it — write `mounts: { allow_always: [] }` when a workflow reaches none.
+
+Hooks and rubric graders are bound by `mounts.forbid_always` and **not** by a
+state's `forbid` or its enabled set: they run on runtime authority, exactly as for
+tools, so a `before` hook can read a mount the model in that state cannot.
+
+## Session variables in guards
+
+A `tools.allow` argument glob may reference a **run variable** — `${{name}}` or
+`${{name.dotted.path}}` — resolved against the run's variables at call time:
+
+```yaml
+tools:
+  allow:
+    - { tool: gmail__send, args: { to: ["${{from_email}}"] } }
+    - { tool: crm__lookup, args: { region: ["${{account.region}}"] } }
+    - { tool: write_file, paths: ["reports/${{case_id}}/**"] }
+```
+
+There is **no `variables:` block** — a variable exists once something sets it:
+the host at assembly (`variables`, every seed locked), the agent mid-run
+(`archmax_set_variables`), or one of the two built-ins.
+
+**Two reserved names.** Do not claim either for something else:
+
+| | `trigger` | `title` |
+|---|---|---|
+| Set by | the runtime, at every arrival | the **agent**, prompted by the platform prompt |
+| Locked | always | **never**, by any route |
+| Guaranteed set | yes | no — absent until written |
+| In a trigger's `requires:` | accepted | accepted (seeded unlocked) |
+| In a trigger's `returns:` | refused | refused |
+
+`trigger` holds the current turn's trigger id. `title` holds a short one-line label
+naming the task the run is doing; the platform system prompt asks the agent to set
+one as its first activity and update it when the task changes significantly, so a
+host can name a run instead of showing a session id. A write must be a non-empty
+single-line string of at most 200 characters (stored trimmed) and must not pass
+`lock: true` — both are refused, atomically, like every other `set_variables`
+rejection. A host may seed a `title`; it lands **unlocked** (the one exception to
+"every seed is locked") as an opening label, and it will not overwrite one an
+earlier turn established.
+
+Do not confuse it with the spec-root and per-state `title:` keys, which are static
+human labels for the *workflow* and the *state*. The run variable names the **run**.
+
+Because nothing guarantees `title` is set, a guard on `${{title}}` still draws the
+assembly-time warning — correctly.
+
+Two declarations *guarantee* one: a state's `requires:` (checked when leaving that
+state) and a **trigger's** `requires:` (checked before the run starts, so a firing
+that omits it never runs). A trigger's `returns:` is the mirror — the variables a
+run guarantees it has set by the time it completes. See a trigger's declaration.
+
+A value belongs to the **session**: what one state records is readable by every
+state after it and by every later turn, so a downstream guard can bind to an
+upstream fact. Design for that — `requires` in an early state plus `lock: true` is
+how a later `${{name}}` becomes guaranteed rather than hopeful.
+
+**Paths.** Segments descend one level; a numeric segment indexes an array and a
+negative one counts from the end (`${{order.items.-1.sku}}` is the last item).
+Traversal reads own properties only, so `${{tags.length}}` and
+`${{v.constructor}}` do **not** resolve. A reference must resolve to a single
+scalar.
+
+**Authoring rules that matter:**
+
+- **Lock anything a guard reads.** Host seeds are locked automatically (`title`
+  excepted, which is never locked); for an agent-established fact pass `lock: true`. An unlocked variable can be
+  overwritten by any later state — that rewrite is permitted, being one writer
+  twice, and the later value simply wins — so a guard bound to an unlocked name is
+  a weak guard. A lock is the only thing that makes a fact settled.
+- **Guarantee the reference.** Name it in the `requires` of a state that runs
+  first, or seed it. Otherwise assembly only *warns*, and the run **fails** at
+  the guarded call if the agent never set it — an unresolvable reference is
+  terminal, not a retryable block, because a guard the runtime cannot evaluate
+  is not a guard.
+- **A positional index makes the guard move.** `${{order.items.-1.sku}}` permits
+  a different value as the array grows. Sometimes exactly right ("the newest
+  attachment"); when you want a *stable* guard, store the value you mean as its
+  own named variable.
+- **An `archmax_set_variables` typo creates a new variable** rather than erroring — there
+  are no declarations to check against. `requires` is the safety net that turns
+  that into a visible failure.
+
+Substituted values are matched **literally** (a value holding `*` matches `*`,
+not everything), so a variable can never widen the guard it lands in.
+
+### The same references work in the agent's own tool arguments
+
+`${{…}}` is not only an authoring syntax. Anywhere a tool argument is text, the
+runtime substitutes references from the run's variables **before** the call is
+governed or executed — and a reference may sit *inside* a longer string, and
+repeat:
+
+```
+"Thanks — your refund is on its way.
+
+--- Original message ---
+
+${{inbound.text}}"
+```
+
+So the agent quotes a stored value by naming it rather than retyping it. Three
+consequences worth authoring around:
+
+- **A reference is exact.** A copy the model retypes can truncate, paraphrase, or
+  drift; a reference cannot. When a state's job is to emit a large stored value,
+  its `instructions` should **name the variable to interpolate** rather than
+  telling the agent to include the original text.
+- **The guard and the argument meet on the value.** Substitution runs ahead of the
+  kernel, so `args: { to: ["${{from_email}}"] }` and an argument of
+  `"${{from_email}}"` resolve independently to the same string — they agree by
+  construction, not by the model having retyped an address correctly.
+- **A bad reference here is recoverable**, unlike a bad guard. The call is refused
+  with the reference named and the agent retries; only an unresolvable *guard* is
+  terminal, because that is a defect the agent cannot fix.
+
+The transcript keeps the reference — the substituted value goes to the tool and to
+the `tool-called` event a run trail renders, and no further, so the value's tokens
+are not re-sent on every later model call. An cases `calledTool` assertion
+therefore states the **reference** the agent wrote; pin the delivered text through
+the tool's effect instead (the file it wrote, the variable it set).
+
+To write the characters `${{…}}` literally — authoring a guard through
+`write_file`, or writing about the syntax — double the dollar: `$${{name}}`.
+
+This is **model-facing only**. An `archmax_eval` or hook script already holds the
+run's variables as `args.variables` and composes strings in JavaScript, so
+`${{…}}` in a script's `tools.*` call is ordinary text.
+
+## Lifecycle hooks
+
+```yaml
+# single hooks (the yaml wires the hook, nothing more):
+before:
+  script: hooks/check.js                   # hand-authored, self-contained JS file;
+                                           # resolves to workflows/<slug>/hooks/check.js
+after:  { rubric: reply-tone, max_iterations: 2 }   # per hook, not per state
+# a script after hook may carry the same budget:
+# after: { script: hooks/review.js, max_iterations: 2 }
+
+# or a list, run in sequence (short-circuits on veto):
+before:
+  - { script: hooks/pre.js }
+  - rubric: { instructions: judge the tone }
+```
+
+- A `HookSpec` is one hook or a list, run in order and short-circuiting on the
+  first non-ok. Each hook is either `{ script: <path> }` (JS in the QuickJS
+  sandbox) or `{ rubric: <declaration> }` (the grader itself, inline).
+- **A script hook's path is workflow-relative and lives under `hooks/`.**
+  `{ script: hooks/check.js }` resolves to `workflows/<slug>/hooks/check.js` on the
+  authoring plane. An absolute path, a `..` climb, or anything outside `hooks/`
+  (including the former `skills/<name>/scripts/…` spelling) is a load error and a
+  `validate` error. Hook scripts are **not** agent-readable and **not** runnable
+  with `archmax_run`: the runtime runs them, and that separation is what stops an
+  agent probing the guard that gates it.
+- **Reserved sidecar key** on a script or custom hook: `max_iterations` (see
+  Verdicts below). It is **refused beside a `rubric`**, whose budget is inside its
+  declaration. There is no `instructions`, `model` or `specification` sidecar on
+  any hook.
+- **Script hooks are hand-authored.** The script is an ordinary,
+  self-contained `.js` file you design and write directly against the sandbox
+  contract; it **must** open with a leading JSDoc title + description (plain
+  prose, no special tags) — see
+  [Code description docblocks](#code-description-docblocks).
+  `archmax validate` errors on a missing script file or a
+  foreign (non-`@archmax-ai/harness/*`) import; it does not check the docblock on a
+  hook script. The runtime never generates: a missing
+  script at run time vetoes (fail-closed).
+  (A rubric's contract is its own `instructions`.)
+- **Phases**: `before` runs before the agent acts in the state and gates entry;
+  `after` runs after the agent calls `archmax_advance`, before the transition
+  commits (the "veto window"), or at completion for a terminal state.
+- **Verdicts**: `ok` (proceed), `correct` (agent gets another attempt), `veto`
+  (block). Return the vocabulary or nothing: a bare `false` is **not** a veto, it
+  is no verdict, which fails closed. Both hook kinds
+  can return `correct` from an `after` hook — a script by evaluating to
+  `{ verdict: "correct", reason: "..." }`, a rubric in its response —
+  and both get the same bounded flow.
+- **`max_iterations`** bounds how many times a `correct` may send the agent back
+  before the hook becomes a hard veto: inside the declaration for a rubric, a
+  sidecar for a script or custom hook, else 0. It is counted **per hook by
+  position**, so two graders on one state never share a budget. An
+  exhausted budget is a *terminal failure* — see
+  [Budgets & error routing](#budgets--error-routing).
+- **`before` hooks are ok/veto only**: a `correct` verdict from a `before` hook
+  is treated as veto, and `max_iterations` on a `before` hook is a validation
+  error.
+- **Fail-closed**: a hook that *errors* vetoes the transition. A rubric
+  whose response cannot be parsed into a verdict also fails closed (**veto**),
+  never coerced to ok — as does a `model` id the host cannot serve.
+
+The hook contract — a default-export function called with one object:
+
+```js
+export default async function hook({
+  state, phase /* "before"|"after" */, trigger, variables, messages,
+  from, to, reason,                 // from/to/reason present on "after"
+  tools,                            // privileged tool bridge, e.g. tools.readFile
+}) {
+  return ok();                      // or veto(reason) / correct(reason)
+}
+```
+
+Returning nothing is `ok`; a thrown error vetoes (fail-closed); the reason of a
+`veto` is shown to the agent so it can correct itself. Full contract, field
+semantics, and complete worked `before`/`after` examples:
+[`hook-and-test-scripts.md`](hook-and-test-scripts.md).
+
+## Budgets & error routing
+
+```yaml
+states:
+  refund-request:
+    budget:
+      maxTurns: 24         # bounds this turn's agent loop
+      # timeoutMs: 60000   # aborts the turn when exceeded
+    on_error: escalation   # terminal-failure target
+  escalation: { instructions: "Explain the failure and hand off." }  # terminal
+```
+
+Two failure classes, routed differently:
+
+- **Recoverable rejections keep the agent in place**: an invalid edge in
+  `archmax_advance`, a deliberate hook `veto`, or an in-budget `correct` — the
+  agent sees the reason and retries within the same state. A **tool that
+  throws** is answered the same way: its error message is the call's
+  error-status answer, and it never routes to `on_error`.
+- **Terminal failures route to `on_error`**: a hook *execution error*, an
+  exhausted iteration budget (`max_iterations` used up), or an exhausted
+  `budget` (`maxTurns`/`timeoutMs`). With `on_error: <state>` declared, the run
+  routes to that state (the failure reason arrives as an `[error]` runtime note)
+  instead of ending; without it, the failure ends the run.
+
+**Recommendation**: declare `on_error` on states with strict `after` hooks, so
+an exhausted judge doesn't hard-fail the run. The bundled example demonstrates
+this: its `refund-request` state pairs `budget.maxTurns: 24` with
+`on_error: escalation`, a terminal escalation state.
+
+## Human states
+
+`type: human` state:
+- Parks the session with a checkpointed **pending-decision record** built from
+  `instructions`, evidence file paths, and the transition descriptions/`type`s.
+  Nothing is rendered to a file; `archmax run`/`archmax sessions` present that
+  context on demand.
+- **Evidence is declared plus attached.** The state's `evidence:` is the baseline
+  every reviewer sees; the agent advancing in may attach what this run produced —
+  `archmax_advance({ to: "refund-review", reason: "…", evidence: ["scratchpad/carrier-report.md"] })`
+  — and the record lists declared paths first, attached after, de-duplicated.
+  Attachments are refused (transition untaken, agent may retry) when `to` is not a
+  human state, when a path is not one the agent can read (`scratchpad/…`,
+  `scratchpad/…`, an authored mount), or when more than 20 are attached. Each
+  attachment belongs to the one decision it was made for. Author `evidence:` for
+  what must always be shown; leave run-specific artifacts to the attachment.
+- A **human** selects the outgoing edge (optionally with a comment). The LLM does
+  not choose. On resume the graph routes deterministically to the chosen target.
+- The target turn is told what happened by a `[decision]` **runtime note**
+  naming the edge, the comment, and the state the run is now in. It is a note,
+  not a human message: a model reads authorship from a message's channel, and a
+  routing event that looks like a person's request gets treated as one — routed
+  onward, answered in place, or waited on — instead of being the cue to do the
+  target state's work. Do not write instructions that tell a state to "answer
+  the user's latest message" when its only inbound edge is a human decision.
+- Resume programmatically with `agent.workflow.decide(sessionId, { target, comment })` or via
+  the CLI `archmax decide <sessionId> <target>`.
+
+## Sub-workflows are tools
+
+A state that may run another workflow names it in `tools.allow`. That entry is
+the whole declaration — there is no state kind and no second key.
+
+```yaml
+enrich:
+  instructions: >-
+    Enrich the account by calling archmax_workflow_enrich-account with its id,
+    then record what it returned with archmax_set_variables.
+  requires:
+    - enrichment            # nothing captures the result — this makes it mandatory
+  tools:
+    allow:
+      - archmax_workflow_enrich-account   # the slug, verbatim
+  budget: { timeoutMs: 120000 }          # bounds the whole turn, calls included
+  on_error: enrichment-failed
+  transitions:
+    - to: draft-reply
+      description: The account has been enriched.
+```
+
+- **The target's signature is the call signature.** Its `manual` trigger's
+  `requires:` are the tool's required parameters (typed in the tool schema
+  where the entries are typed, by the same mapping `signatureJsonSchema`
+  publishes); its `returns:` are what the result carries; its `description`
+  leads the tool description, and its `instructions` never reach the caller:
+
+  ```
+  archmax_workflow_enrich-account({ account_id: "acct-42" })
+    → { message: "Enriched acct-42.",
+        returns: { enrichment_file: "scratchpad/e/acct-42.json", risk_level: "low" } }
+  ```
+
+  A target declaring no `returns:` answers with the closing message alone.
+- **Nothing captures the result.** The agent records what it needs with
+  `archmax_set_variables`, or a script writes it. Declare the state's `requires:`
+  so it cannot advance without doing so — that is what replaces the old automatic
+  capture.
+- **One call runs one sub-run.** There is no fan-out argument: an agent fans out
+  with parallel tool calls, a script with `Promise.all`. Both are bounded by
+  the dispatcher's `maxConcurrent`, and each call succeeds or fails on its
+  own.
+- **A script is the deterministic fan-out.** Delegation tools are on the PTC
+  surface, so a script decides how many calls to make:
+
+  ```js
+  // the bridge camelCases tool names; a tool result arrives as text
+  const results = await Promise.all(
+    orders.map((o) => tools.archmaxWorkflowEnrichAccount({ account_id: o.id })),
+  );
+  const returns = results.map((r) => JSON.parse(r).returns);
+  ```
+
+  A script's delegation **cannot park**: a child that reaches a human state fails
+  that call closed with `parked`.
+- **Governance is ordinary.** The surface is closed by default, so a state naming
+  no target may call none; `tools.forbid_always` blocks a delegation tool like any
+  other.
+- **A failure is a tool error** the calling agent can handle; the state's
+  `on_error` catches the turn if it cannot. Depth, cycle, missing-input
+  (`missing-param`), mistyped-input (`invalid-param`), unresolvable-reference
+  (`unresolved-param`) and **disabled-target** refusals are blocked calls —
+  nothing ran, so correct the call and retry. A child whose returns are unset
+  (`missing-return`) or mistyped (`invalid-return`) is a failure: it ran.
+- **A whole-argument reference keeps its type.** `{ quantity: "${{count}}" }`
+  seeds the child with the number `count` holds, so it satisfies an `integer`
+  parameter; `{ note: "order ${{order_id}}" }` is substituted as text.
+- **A `disabled: true` target is refused at dispatch, not at assembly.** The tool is
+  still bound and the caller still assembles (disabling one leaf must not take every
+  caller — or its parked sessions — offline); the call is a blocked call of kind
+  `disabled`, and it beats a declared mock. `validate` **warns** on each state that
+  allows a disabled target: the caller's spec is not wrong.
+- **A caller enters the child's `manual` entry** — the one entry the CLI, a host
+  firing and a call all use. There is no opt-in on the target: whether a
+  delegation may happen is decided by the caller's `tools.allow` entry. A target
+  with no `manual` entry has no state to start in and fails closed. `session:` and
+  `message:` on that trigger are host-facing keys a delegation ignores: a sub-run
+  shares its parent's session, and carries no message. `sub-workflow` is no longer
+  a trigger id — load and `validate` report it with the rename.
+- **Declare the child's signature** on that trigger — the contract, enforced both
+  ways and at both ingresses:
+
+  ```yaml
+  states:
+    enrich:
+      triggers:
+        manual:
+          description: Enrich one order.       # leads the caller's tool description
+          requires:                            # a caller must supply these
+            - { name: order_id, type: string, description: The order to enrich. }
+          returns:                             # the child guarantees it sets these
+            - enrichment_file
+            - { name: delayed, type: boolean }
+  ```
+
+  Develop it standalone on the same contract:
+  `archmax run enrich-order --variables '{"order_id":"ORD-1003"}'`. `${{trigger}}`
+  reads `manual` either way, so the machine cannot branch on having been called.
+
+  A dispatch missing a `requires` name is **refused before the child is
+  composed**; a child that completes without every `returns` name set is
+  **rejected** rather than handing back half a contract (a child that *parks* is
+  not checked — it has not finished). A typed entry is held to its type at both
+  ends: a mistyped argument is refused `invalid-param` before the child runs, and
+  a mistyped return fails the call `invalid-return`. What the child must *do* to
+  produce a variable belongs in the state `instructions` that set it. The names,
+  with type and description where declared, are rendered into the child's prompt
+  under its entry state, so it is told what to produce before it can be failed
+  for omitting it.
+- **The call answers with the returns, by name.** A signed target answers
+  `{ message, returns: { enrichment_file, delayed } }`; one declaring no
+  `returns:` answers with the closing message alone. The message keeps its own
+  key rather than being folded into the data — prose the model reads, values a
+  guard or a script reads by name. **Nothing captures it into a variable**: the
+  agent records what it needs with `archmax_set_variables`, or a script writes it,
+  and the calling state's `requires:` is what makes that mandatory.
+- **Mocks are held to the same contract.** An `archmax_workflow_<slug>` mock for a
+  signed target supplies `returns:`, and one that omits a declared name
+  (`missing-return`) or supplies a mistyped typed one (`invalid-return`) fails
+  the mocked dispatch — a mock stands in for the sub-run, never for its agreement.
+- **No prose crosses the boundary.** A sub-run gets no instruction from its
+  caller — it works from its own state `instructions` plus the arguments it was
+  seeded with as locked variables, both of which reach the model through the
+  system prompt. Nothing to author, nothing to keep in sync.
+- **Same agent, isolated context, shared session.** Same model, backend, host
+  tools; its **own** grading rubrics, from its own spec; a fresh transcript; the child's *own* per-state
+  `tools.allow`. It shares the run's session, so it writes `scratchpad/…` and
+  `scratchpad/…` exactly as the parent does and the parent reads them afterwards.
+- **Nothing crosses implicitly.** Down: only the arguments the call passed —
+  the calling run's own variables are not copied. Up: only the result message
+  and the files. Everything the child sets is discarded when it finishes.
+- **Give each concurrent sub-run its own output path** — they share one run zone.
+- **Bounds** — the dispatcher's `bounds: { maxDepth: 3, maxConcurrent: 4 }`. No longer a spec key: the strict schema rejects `settings.sub_workflows` by name.
+  Excess concurrency queues; depth and cycles are refused.
+- **Params are the sub-run's initial variables** — same construction, same name
+  rule, same lock as a host's `variables`. So a delegated machine also runs
+  **standalone** with those inputs supplied directly:
+  `archmax run <child> --variables '{"order_id":"ORD-1003"}'` — no `--trigger`,
+  because a caller and the CLI enter the same `manual` entry. That is how you
+  develop one in isolation, on exactly the contract a caller holds it to.
+- **A child may stop for a person.** A `type: human` state in a delegated machine
+  suspends the sub-run *and* the delegating run; `archmax decide <sessionId>
+  <target>` resolves the **child's** decision, the sub-run finishes, and the
+  parent carries on with its result. This holds for a **fan-out** too: each
+  dispatch is its own checkpointed task, so resolving one decision re-runs only
+  that sub-run — siblings that finished keep their results.
+- **Fails closed** — rejection, budget, refusal or an unresolvable param routes
+  through `on_error` (or ends the run rejected); a suspension for a person is not
+  a failure. Ancestor
+  `forbid_always` rules bind inside the child, naming the workflow that
+  declared them.
+
+`archmax validate` checks all of this statically: target exists, opted in, no
+cycle, no over-deep chain, correct state shape — and the signature both ways. A
+parent reading a field the child does not return is an **error**; a state whose
+`params:` do not cover the target's `requires:` is a **warning** (the advance may
+still carry it), and a fan-out is exempt from that warning because its
+entries' keys are not knowable statically.
+
+### A parked run may speak, never act
+
+A park does not end the conversation. Two moments get a **reply-only turn** — one
+model call with *no tools bound at all*:
+
+- **The handoff.** Advancing into a human state always spends one, so the park
+  carries a message saying what was done and that a person now holds it. It runs
+  whether or not the state already spoke: the agent wrote before the transition
+  committed, so what it wrote was about its own work. (An `archmax_wait` park gets
+  the same turn only when the turn was silent — there the agent's own question
+  is the message.)
+- **While parked.** `agent.workflow.reply(sessionId, message)` / `archmax reply <session>
+  "<text>"` answers a message and parks again on the *same* record — same node,
+  `seq`, and park timestamp, so the reported human wait still measures the
+  original park. `resolveSession` classifies such a firing as the `reply`
+  disposition rather than failing.
+
+Nothing you author changes this and there is no field to declare: the message is
+always composed on a fresh turn from the transcript, under the workspace persona.
+The kernel refuses every tool call made during one (rule `tool.reply-only`,
+ordered ahead of `tools.allow`, `allow_always`, the `archmax_*` controls and the
+scratchpad), so a customer writing "just approve it" gets an answer and the
+reviewer still owns the edge.
+
+**What this means for authoring:** do not write state `instructions` that tell the
+agent to announce the handoff itself — the runtime turn does that, and having both
+produces two messages. Write instructions for the *work*.
+
+## Removed keys you may meet in an older workflow
+
+Every key here is **rejected**, with the key and its path named and guidance
+saying what replaced it. `workflow.yaml` is parsed through a strict schema, so a
+workflow still declaring one fails to load rather than running while silently
+doing nothing of what its author intended.
+
+This is a change: these keys used to be ignored without a diagnostic. A spec that
+"worked" by ignoring one now needs the migration below.
+
+| Removed | Replace with |
+| --- | --- |
+| `type: wait` state | The state that needs the answer calls `archmax_wait({ reason })`; a delivery resumes that same state (see [Parking and sessions](#parking-and-sessions)) |
+| transition `on: <trigger-id>` | Nothing — a delivered trigger no longer selects an edge; the resumed state picks its own transition |
+| state `parallel: [...]` + `join:` | Ordinary `transitions`, sequenced |
+| state `type: trigger` | A `trigger:` field on the state the trigger state routed to |
+| top-level `name:` | `title:` |
+| top-level `description:` | `instructions:` |
+| top-level `policy:` | `tools.forbid_always` (and `skills.forbid_always`) — a load error now |
+| root `skills.allow:` (the ceiling) | `skills.allow_always: []` plus the state lists — a load error now |
+| state `type: workflow` | An ordinary agent state allowing `archmax_workflow_<target>` and calling it (see [Sub-workflows are tools](#sub-workflows-are-tools)) |
+| state `workflow: <slug>` | The `archmax_workflow_<slug>` entry in that state's `tools.allow` — the allow entry *is* the declaration |
+| state `params:` | The call's arguments |
+| state `for_each:` | One call per entry — parallel tool calls from the agent, or `Promise.all` in a script |
+| state `result:` | The tool result; add `requires: [<name>]` to the state so it must record what it needs |
+| `archmax_advance({ params })` | The call's arguments |
+
+**No fan-out.** There is no concurrent branching: a run traverses **one state at a
+time**, moved only by `archmax_advance`, a human decision, or `on_error` routing.
+Sequence the states that were branches:
+
+```yaml
+# REMOVED — do not author this
+states:
+  gather:
+    parallel: [check-inventory, check-credit]
+    join: summarize
+
+# author this instead
+states:
+  check-inventory:
+    transitions: [{ to: check-credit }]
+  check-credit:
+    transitions: [{ to: summarize }]
+  summarize: { instructions: "..." }
+```
+
+Concurrent composition **is** sub-workflows: a state calling a delegation tool
+once per unit of work — the calls run concurrently (see
+[Sub-workflows are tools](#sub-workflows-are-tools)). Sequence anything that is not that —
+it costs latency, not correctness.
+
+## Workspace layout
+
+```
+workflows/<name>/workflow.yaml    # the machine (canonical spec)
+workflows/<name>/WORKFLOW.md      # OPTIONAL prose addendum (no frontmatter)
+workflows/<name>/hooks/*.js       # lifecycle hook scripts — run BY THE HARNESS.
+                                  # Authoring plane: the agent cannot read or run
+                                  # anything under workflows/
+workflows/<name>/tests/           # cases (*.test.yaml, one case per
+                                  # file; fixture files referenced with `from:`)
+skills/<capability>/SKILL.md      # a capability, bundled (Agent Skills format).
+                                  # Shared guidance for content that generalizes
+                                  # across MULTIPLE states — single-state
+                                  # behavior goes inline in that state's
+                                  # `instructions` (never one SKILL.md per state)
+skills/<capability>/scripts/*.js  # its archmax_run sources — run BY THE AGENT
+                                  # (lifecycle hook scripts are NOT here: they
+                                  # live in workflows/<name>/hooks/, are run by
+                                  # the runtime, and the agent cannot read them)
+skills/<capability>/assets/*      # its inputs (read-only)
+scratchpad/                       # THE working area: intermediate files and the
+                                  # artifacts a state produces. The run IS the
+                                  # workspace root — resolves to
+                                  # sessions/<sessionId>/scratchpad/. Always
+                                  # writable, per-session
+large_tool_results/               # runtime-offloaded tool results (read-only)
+conversation_history/             # runtime-offloaded history (read-only)
+AGENTS.md                         # workspace persona/system prompt
+```
+
+This is the **complete** directory contract — there are no other magic
+locations, so design the full file set up front instead of exploring.
+Reference these paths **workspace-relative, without a leading slash**
+(`skills/order-data/assets/orders.json`, `scratchpad/refund.json`) — in `instructions`, `evidence`,
+allow-entry globs, and paths referenced inside hook scripts alike.
+
+The authoring-plane prefix (`workflows/`) is **reserved**: a
+host cannot mount it (`MountCollisionError` at assembly), an allow entry naming
+it is a `validate` **error**, and a script that reads it is blocked with a
+diagnostic naming the prefix. Never write an allow entry, an `evidence` path, or a
+case `workspace:` key under it.
+
+### Grading rubrics — inline on the hook
+
+A grader is the **value** of the hook that applies it, not a file beside the spec
+and not a named entry a hook points at:
+
+```yaml
+states:
+  respond:
+    after:
+      - rubric:
+          instructions: |-       # REQUIRED — the criteria and the verdict
+            Judge the tone of the last assistant message. Return `ok`,
+            `correct` or `veto`, always with a concise `reason`.
+          max_iterations?: number  # the grade-and-retry budget, counted per hook
+          model?: string           # a model id to grade on, resolved through the
+                                   # assembly's modelFactory (third argument)
+          metadata?: object        # host data the runtime never reads
+```
+
+A rubric has **no name**, and there is deliberately **no `title`, `description`
+or `response_format`**: nothing routes to a rubric, nothing labels one in a prompt
+(a display label goes in `metadata`), and a rubric only ever grades — so every
+dispatch requests the verdict schema unconditionally.
+
+Verdict shape: `{ verdict: "ok"|"correct"|"veto", reason: string }`.
+
+Two states needing the same grader declare it **twice**: a state legible on its
+own beats a de-duplicated document. Its identity is its position (state, phase,
+index), which is what the runtime dispatches it under and what its retry budget
+is keyed against — so two graders on one state never share a budget.
+
+The agent learns nothing of it: the rendered graph says a phase carries a hook of
+kind `rubric`, there is no `task` tool to call one with, and no sandbox context
+has `task()`.
+
+## Cases
+
+Declarative YAML case documents under `workflows/<name>/tests/*.test.yaml`
+(or `.test.yml`) — **one case per file**; the case id is the tests/-relative
+path minus the extension. `archmax test <workflow>` interprets them
+**host-side**: no QuickJS sandbox runs a case (the sandbox serves only
+lifecycle hooks and `archmax_run` inside the driven agent). These are distinct
+from the runtime's own colocated unit tests. Only `*.test.yaml`/`*.test.yml`
+files are discovered — a leftover `*.test.js` is ignored without a diagnostic.
+
+A workflow declaring `disabled: true` runs **no** cases: the suite is reported as
+**skipped** and the exit code is **0** (not run is not failed, so retiring a
+workflow never reddens CI). There is no flag to force them; `archmax validate` is
+the static feedback while a workflow is out of service.
+
+**Suite config lives in the `tests:` block of `workflow.yaml`**
+(`maxConcurrency`, `caseTimeoutMs`, `judge` — see [Root fields](#root-fields)).
+`tests.config.js` is **REMOVED**: its presence is a hard error in
+`archmax test` and `archmax validate`. There is no `reporters` option.
+`judge: {}` enables the grader with the env-configured default model.
+
+**The complete case schema (top-level keys, the flat step-entry list, the
+assertion grammar, start conditions, mocks, `from:` fixture references) plus
+worked examples — routing,
+tool mocking, human-in-the-loop decide flows, triggered starts — and the
+JS→YAML migration table are in
+[`hook-and-test-scripts.md`](hook-and-test-scripts.md).**
+
+Every case carries two mandatory prose fields, both length-capped: a `title`
+(a short label, ≤ 60 chars, printed beside the verdict) and a `description`
+(≤ 200 chars — the scenario driven and what is asserted). `archmax validate`
+**errors** on a missing or over-long field; longer rationale belongs in a YAML
+comment above the document (see
+[Code description docblocks](#code-description-docblocks)). A case is one
+conversation on one session; `steps` is one flat list where actions (`send`,
+`decide`) and assertions are peers, each assertion evaluating against the
+nearest action above it. Unknown keys anywhere in a case are validation
+errors — fail closed.
+
+```yaml
+# Nothing is mocked — the case reads the real orders.json fixture, so the
+# denial is re-derived by the refund policy hook rather than asserted directly.
+title: Refund denied for a shipped order
+description: >-
+  A refund for shipped A-1002 parks at refund-review; the reviewer confirms the
+  denial via refund-closed, the run succeeds, and the reply names the order.
+steps:
+  - send: "Hi, I'm support@acmecorp.com. Please refund order A-1002."
+  - parked: true
+  - reachedState: refund-review
+  - decide:
+      to: refund-closed
+      comment: "The denial matches policy."
+  - succeeded: true
+  - reply:
+      includes: "A-1002"
+```
+
+## Code description docblocks
+
+**Every** code file in the workspace — both kinds: lifecycle hook scripts and
+`archmax_run` sources — MUST begin with a leading JSDoc block (`/** ... */`): a
+title line, a blank line, then prose stating what the code does **and how**.
+Cases are YAML documents, not code — they carry no JSDoc block;
+their mandatory `title` and `description` fields are short and capped instead,
+with any longer rationale in a YAML comment above the document. The canonical
+statement of the
+rule, with the required depth per file kind, is
+[SKILL.md → Code files are description-first](../SKILL.md#code-files-are-description-first).
+
+- The block is the **human-facing contract**: admin UIs display only this
+  description, and the code below it must honor it. Author
+  description-first; when behavior changes, update the description, then edit
+  the code to match — never leave the two contradicting each other.
+- Write it deep enough to review on its own: inputs read, the sequence of
+  checks or assertions, and each outcome the code can produce. A one-line label
+  is not enough.
+- It is inert at runtime — the QuickJS sandbox executes the source verbatim
+  (typed `@archmax-ai/harness/*` imports excepted; they are stripped).
+- The prose ends at the first `@tag` line (tags are allowed but not part of
+  the description), so keep the title and body above any tag. There is no
+  `@specification` tag and no generation marker: the block is a human
+  description, not a machine contract.
+- `archmax validate` **errors** when an cases is missing its
+  `description` (the case schema requires it). Hook scripts and `archmax_run`
+  sources are **not** checked — there the JSDoc rule is an authoring standard
+  you uphold yourself.
+- Backends/UIs extract it with the package's exported
+  `parseCodeDescription(source)` helper rather than scraping comments.
+
+## Read-only zones
+
+Writes (via `write_file`/`edit_file`) targeting any read-only authored mount —
+the conventional directories plus root files such as `AGENTS.md`, or whatever the
+wiring code mounted — are blocked, by the mount itself and by governance
+(`zone.read-only`). A mount key of several segments (`catalogs/eu`) is matched by
+**longest prefix**, so a nested mount is a read-only zone exactly as a
+single-segment one is, and a sibling under the same first segment (`catalogs/uk`)
+is not.
+
+A mount the host mounted **writable** is not a read-only zone — its paths are
+governed like ordinary run paths — but a state may still be given it read-only,
+with `mounts: { allow: [{ mount: <name>, access: read }] }`. A write refused by
+that grant is `mount.read-only`; one refused by the wiring is `zone.read-only`.
+See [Mount governance](#mount-governance).
+
+The run root is writable, and it has exactly one named working area:
+`scratchpad/**`, permitted (read and write) in **every** state regardless of
+`tools.allow`. Agent-visible `scratchpad/…` resolves to
+`sessions/<sessionId>/scratchpad/…`, so concurrent sessions never collide.
+
+Because that permission is unconditional, an allow entry naming a path *inside*
+`scratchpad/` does not constrain where within the area a write lands — `archmax
+validate` warns when a write entry's paths are all scratchpad paths. To govern
+*where* a result lands, name an ordinary run path instead (any run-root path
+outside the reserved areas — `reports/x.json`, or a root-level file); those are
+matched against the state's `tools.allow` like any other argument. The framework
+owns no second artifact area.
+
+## Annotated example: order-lookup
+
+The bundled reference workspace lives at
+`examples/customer-support/workflows/order-lookup/` and demonstrates the full
+v2 layout: `workflow.yaml` (the machine, including the `tests:` block and
+script/rubric hook wiring) plus a frontmatter-free `WORKFLOW.md` prose addendum
+(ASCII graph + domain constraints). Read both in full for a real, working
+example. It declares a top-level `title` and a `title` on every state, with the
+slugs below as the reference targets, plus a top-level `instructions` block
+holding the rules that hold across every state — where the data and artifacts
+live, the tenancy rule, and naming an order's exact status — so no state repeats
+them. Its shape:
+
+- `identify-case` (`triggers: { manual: , email_reply: }`, `before: check-requester.js`) routes to one
+  of three cases via transition descriptions.
+- `orders-question` (terminal) answers from `skills/order-data/assets/orders.json`; an
+  `after: { rubric: order-reply-tone }` grades the reply at completion.
+- `refund-request` records a decision to `scratchpad/refund.json` (no allow entry
+  narrows it — the working area is open in every state; what holds the agent to a
+  correct file is the hook), runs `after: check-refund.js`, and pairs
+  `budget.maxTurns: 24` with `on_error: escalation` so a terminal failure
+  (hook error, exhausted corrections, exhausted budget) routes to escalation
+  instead of ending the run. On success it advances to `refund-review`.
+- `refund-review` (`type: human`, `evidence: [scratchpad/refund.json]`) — a person
+  approves (→ terminal `refund-closed`) or refines (→ back to `refund-request`).
+- `escalation` (terminal) is the error handler entered only via
+  `refund-request`'s `on_error`.
+- `general-question` (terminal) answers and writes `scratchpad/answer.json`.
+
+### Source of truth in code
+
+If you need to confirm a detail, these files define the schema in the runtime:
+
+| Concern | File |
+| --- | --- |
+| Spec types (`MachineState`, `Transition`, `HookSpec`, `AllowEntry`, `WorkflowTestsConfig`) | `src/machine/types.ts` |
+| Two-file loading (`workflow.yaml` + prose addendum) | `src/machine/load-spec.ts` |
+| Spec parsing, `ALWAYS_ALLOWED_TOOLS` | `src/machine/machine.ts` |
+| allow-entry matching, hook normalization | `src/machine/allow.ts` |
+| Rendered workflow header + per-state graph block | `src/workflow/render-prompt.ts` |
+| Lifecycle running + verdicts | `src/lifecycle/` |
+| Governance kernel (precedence) | `src/kernel/kernel.ts` |
+| `archmax_advance` tool | `src/workflow/advance-state.ts` |
+| Checkpointed state, `WORKFLOW_STATUSES` | `src/workflow/state.ts` |
+| Grading rubrics, verdict schema | `src/rubrics/rubrics.ts` |