@arbidocs/client 0.4.85 → 0.4.86

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -31114,6 +31114,8 @@ interface CryptoProvider {
 interface SessionKeys {
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey?: Uint8Array;
+    /** The identity wrapped under the password key (see SessionData.wrappedIdentityKey). */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 interface SessionStorageProvider {
     getSession(): Promise<SessionKeys | null>;
@@ -31139,6 +31141,8 @@ interface LoginResult$1 {
     accessToken: string;
     sessionKey: Uint8Array;
     userExtId?: string;
+    /** The login response's `wrapped_identity_key`, saved with the session. */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 /** Performs the login API call. Transport details are the consumer's concern. */
 interface LoginProvider {
@@ -31451,10 +31455,15 @@ declare function generateUserKeypairs(username: string, password: string, deploy
  * Generates registration, login, and password-change credentials.
  * Uses inline type definitions (structurally identical to OpenAPI schema types)
  * to avoid coupling the crypto module to the schema file.
+ *
+ * Two keys are in play (see ./identity.ts): the account identity, a fixed random Ed25519 keypair, and the
+ * password key, derived from email + password, which signs password logins and wraps the identity.
  */
 interface RegisterRequest {
     email: string;
     signing_key: string;
+    login_key?: string | null;
+    wrapped_identity_key?: string | null;
     verification_credential: string;
     given_name?: string | null;
     family_name?: string | null;
@@ -31469,8 +31478,8 @@ interface LoginRequest {
 interface ChangePasswordRequest {
     signature: string;
     timestamp: number;
-    new_signing_key: string;
-    rewrapped_workspace_keys: Record<string, string>;
+    new_login_key: string;
+    wrapped_identity_key: string;
 }
 /**
  * Credentials returned by generate functions.
@@ -31479,76 +31488,77 @@ interface ChangePasswordRequest {
  */
 interface RegistrationCredentials {
     request: RegisterRequest;
+    /** The new account's identity secret key (what the session keeps, and the recovery key). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
 }
 interface LoginCredentials {
     request: LoginRequest;
+    /**
+     * The password key that signed the request. Not the identity: open it from the response with
+     * `unwrapIdentityKey(response.wrapped_identity_key, passwordPrivateKey)`.
+     */
+    passwordPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
+}
+interface KeyLoginCredentials {
+    request: LoginRequest;
+    /** The identity secret key that signed the request (recovery key, session re-login). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
 }
 interface PasswordChangeCredentials {
-    request: Omit<ChangePasswordRequest, 'rewrapped_workspace_keys'>;
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
+    request: ChangePasswordRequest;
 }
 /**
- * Generate registration credentials with Ed25519 signing key.
- *
- * Creates Ed25519 keypair deterministically from email + password.
- * Server receives the Ed25519 public key (signing_key) and derives X25519 from it.
+ * Generate registration credentials: a random identity, wrapped under the password key.
  *
- * @param registrationData - Registration fields (signing_key will be generated)
- * @param password - User's password (to generate keypair)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns RegistrationCredentials with request body and private key (kept separate)
+ * The server stores the identity public key (signing_key, and the X25519 key it derives from it), the password
+ * key (login_key) and the wrapped identity.
  */
-declare function generateRegistrationCredentials(registrationData: Omit<RegisterRequest, 'signing_key'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<RegistrationCredentials>;
+declare function generateRegistrationCredentials(registrationData: Omit<RegisterRequest, 'signing_key' | 'login_key' | 'wrapped_identity_key'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<RegistrationCredentials>;
 /**
- * Generate login credentials with Ed25519 signature authentication.
- *
- * Derives Ed25519 keypair from email + password and signs "email|timestamp".
- * Server verifies signature using stored Ed25519 public key.
- *
- * @param loginData - Login fields (signature and timestamp will be generated)
- * @param password - User's password (to regenerate keypair)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns LoginCredentials with request body and private key (kept separate)
+ * Generate password-login credentials: derive the password key and sign "email|timestamp" with it.
  */
 declare function generateLoginCredentials(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<LoginCredentials>;
 /**
- * Generate login credentials using an existing signing key (for password recovery).
- *
- * Bypasses password derivation and uses the provided key directly.
- *
- * @param loginData - Login fields (signature and timestamp will be generated)
- * @param signingPrivateKey - The Ed25519 signing private key (64 bytes)
- * @returns LoginCredentials with request body and private key
+ * Generate login credentials signed by the identity key itself (recovery key, session re-login).
  */
-declare function generateLoginCredentialsFromKey(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array): LoginCredentials;
+declare function generateLoginCredentialsFromKey(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array): KeyLoginCredentials;
 /**
- * Generate change password credentials with Ed25519 signature authentication.
- *
- * Signs "email|timestamp" with current Ed25519 key to prove knowledge of current password.
- * Provides new Ed25519 public key derived from new password.
+ * Generate a password change: the identity is kept, re-wrapped under the new password key.
  *
- * @param email - User's email address
- * @param currentPassword - Current password (to sign with current key)
- * @param newPassword - New password (to generate new key)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns PasswordChangeCredentials with request body and new private key (kept separate)
+ * Signed with the current password key when `currentPassword` is given (proves it), else with the identity key
+ * (recovery: the user signed in with the recovery key and no longer knows the password).
  */
-declare function generatePasswordChangeCredentials(email: string, currentPassword: string, newPassword: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+declare function generatePasswordChangeCredentials(params: {
+    email: string;
+    identitySecretKey: Uint8Array;
+    newPassword: string;
+    currentPassword?: string;
+}, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+
 /**
- * Generate password change credentials for recovery mode.
+ * The account identity and the password key that wraps it.
  *
- * Used when the user is recovering their account with a recovery key.
- * Signs with the existing signing key (from recovery) instead of deriving from password.
+ * The identity is a fixed Ed25519 keypair (its X25519 form is what workspace keys, mailbox keys and direct
+ * messages are encrypted to). The password derives a separate "password key" (Argon2id, `generateUserKeypairs`)
+ * that signs password logins and wraps the identity's secret key. Changing the password re-wraps the identity
+ * and re-encrypts nothing.
  *
- * @param email - User's email address
- * @param currentSigningKey - Current signing key (from recovery)
- * @param newPassword - New password (to generate new key)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns PasswordChangeCredentials with request body and new private key
+ * Accounts registered before this existed have no wrap: their password key IS the identity
+ * (`wrapped_identity_key` is null in the login response).
+ *
+ * Same scheme as the Python SDK (`arbi_client.sdk.crypto`): BLAKE2b-256 keyed by the password key's seed over
+ * a fixed context gives a SecretBox key; the wrap is base64 of `nonce(24) ‖ secretbox(identity secret key)`.
+ */
+
+/** A fresh random identity (Ed25519; secretKey is the 64-byte form). */
+declare function generateIdentityKeypair(): KeyPair;
+/** Wrap the identity's 64-byte Ed25519 secret key under a password key. */
+declare function wrapIdentityKey(identitySecretKey: Uint8Array, passwordSecretKey: Uint8Array): string;
+/**
+ * The identity's 64-byte Ed25519 secret key a password key opens: unwrapped from `wrapped`, or the password key
+ * itself when nothing is wrapped. Throws when the password key does not open the wrap (a wrong password).
  */
-declare function generateRecoveryPasswordChangeCredentials(email: string, currentSigningKey: Uint8Array, newPassword: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+declare function unwrapIdentityKey(wrapped: string | null | undefined, passwordSecretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * storage.ts - IndexedDB Storage Module
@@ -31585,9 +31595,16 @@ declare function canPersistSession(): boolean;
  * Note: accessToken is stored in Zustand (persisted separately), not here.
  */
 interface SessionData {
+    /** The account identity's Ed25519 secret key (64 bytes) - X25519 derived from this */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey?: Uint8Array;
     userExtId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The identity wrapped under the password key, as the last login returned it (null: the password key is
+     * the identity). Lets a typed password be checked, and the identity opened, without the server (offline
+     * unlock, step-up confirmations). Ciphertext under the password key, so it is stored as is.
+     */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 /**
  * Initialize IndexedDB database.
@@ -31617,12 +31634,11 @@ declare function saveSession(sessionData: SessionData): Promise<void>;
  */
 declare function getSession(): Promise<SessionData | null>;
 /**
- * Update the signing private key in IndexedDB (used when changing password).
- * This re-encrypts the new key while preserving other session data.
+ * Replace the stored wrapped identity (after a password change), keeping the rest of the session.
  *
- * @param newSigningPrivateKey - New Ed25519 private key to store
+ * @param wrappedIdentityKey - The identity wrapped under the new password key
  */
-declare function updateSigningPrivateKey(newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
+declare function updateWrappedIdentityKey(wrappedIdentityKey: string): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Clear session data from IndexedDB.
  */
@@ -31668,7 +31684,8 @@ interface RegisterResult {
 /**
  * Login flow
  *
- * Generates Ed25519 signature → posts to /v1/user/login → saves session
+ * Signs "email|timestamp" (password key, or the identity key itself) → posts to /v1/user/login → opens the
+ * identity → saves session
  */
 
 interface LoginParams {
@@ -31700,6 +31717,7 @@ interface LoginResult {
     parentExtId?: string | null;
     /** The profile from the login response, so hosts need no second request for the name. */
     profile?: LoginProfile;
+    /** The account identity's secret key (the session key material, and the recovery key). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey: Uint8Array;
 }
@@ -31707,46 +31725,57 @@ interface LoginResult {
 /**
  * Change password flow
  *
- * Generates old + new credentials → posts to /v1/user/change_password → updates stored key
+ * The password only wraps the account identity (see ../crypto/identity.ts). Changing it derives the new password
+ * key, re-wraps the session's identity under it and posts both to /v1/user/change_password: one request, O(1).
+ * Workspace keys, mailbox keys and direct messages stay encrypted to the unchanged identity, so nothing is
+ * re-encrypted, nothing can be missed and the other party of a conversation is unaffected. The recovery key
+ * (the identity secret key) is unchanged too.
  */
 
 interface ChangePasswordParams {
     email: string;
-    currentPassword: string;
     newPassword: string;
-    rewrappedWorkspaceKeys?: Record<string, string>;
-}
-interface ChangePasswordResult {
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
-}
-interface RekeyedPasswordChangeParams {
-    email: string;
-    newPassword: string;
-    /** The current password. Omit in recovery mode: the session's own signing key proves identity. */
+    /** The current password. Omit in recovery mode: the session's identity key signs instead. */
     currentPassword?: string;
-    /** The caller's `usr-` id; needed to tell sent from received direct messages. */
-    userExtId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The account identity's secret key. Omitted: read from the browser session store, which is then
+     * updated with the new wrap (hosts with their own key store pass it and keep `wrappedIdentityKey`).
+     */
+    identitySecretKey?: Uint8Array;
 }
-interface RekeyedPasswordChangeResult {
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
-    /** Workspaces the server re-keyed. */
-    workspacesUpdated: number;
-    /** Direct messages re-encrypted for the new key. */
-    messagesReEncrypted: number;
+interface ChangePasswordResult {
+    /** The identity wrapped under the new password key (what a password login now returns). */
+    wrappedIdentityKey: string;
 }
-type FetchClient = ReturnType<typeof createFetchClient<paths>>;
 /** Pull a readable message out of whatever shape a failed call carried (`{ detail }`, `Error`). */
 declare function passwordChangeErrorMessage(err: unknown): string;
 /**
- * Change (or, in recovery mode, set) the master password: derive the new keys, re-wrap the key of
- * every workspace the user is a member of for them, re-encrypt direct messages, post it all to
- * `/v1/user/change_password`, then store the new signing key. The caller shows the recovery key
- * for `newSigningPrivateKey` afterwards.
+ * Change (or, in recovery mode, set) the master password of the signed-in account.
  */
-declare function changePasswordWithRekey(params: RekeyedPasswordChangeParams, deps: {
-    fetchClient: FetchClient;
+declare function changePassword(params: ChangePasswordParams, deps: {
+    fetchClient: ReturnType<typeof createFetchClient<paths>>;
     deploymentDomain: string;
-}): Promise<RekeyedPasswordChangeResult>;
+}): Promise<ChangePasswordResult>;
+
+/**
+ * Opening the account identity with a password (see ../crypto/identity.ts).
+ */
+/**
+ * The identity a password login opened: unwrapped from the response with the password key that signed it (or
+ * the password key itself for an account whose password key is its identity). Refuses an identity that is not
+ * the account's, so a wrong wrap cannot become the session's key.
+ */
+declare function identityFromLoginResponse(passwordPrivateKey: Uint8Array, response: {
+    wrapped_identity_key?: string | null;
+    user: {
+        encryption_public_key: string;
+    };
+}): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Check a typed password against the signed-in session and return the identity it opens (step-up
+ * confirmations, offline unlock). Uses the wrap saved at the last login; throws "Incorrect password".
+ */
+declare function unlockIdentityWithPassword(email: string, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 
 /**
  * createArbiClient() — SDK entry point
@@ -31970,4 +31999,4 @@ interface ReopenDeps {
  */
 declare function createWorkspaceReopener(deps: ReopenDeps): () => Promise<boolean>;
 
-export { type $defs, API_PREFIX, type ArbiClient, type ArbiClientOptions, type AuthStateProvider, type AutoReloginMiddlewareConfig, type BearerAuthMiddlewareConfig, CALL_KEY_BYTES, type ChangePasswordParams, type ChangePasswordRequest, type ChangePasswordResult, type CryptoProvider, type KeyPair, type LoginCredentials, type LoginParams, type LoginProfile, type LoginProvider, type LoginRequest, type LoginResult, type LoginWithKeyParams, type OnReloginSuccess, type PasswordChangeCredentials, type RegisterParams, type RegisterRequest, type RegisterResult, type RegistrationCredentials, type RekeyedPasswordChangeParams, type RekeyedPasswordChangeResult, type ReloginDeps, type ReloginHandler, type ReopenDeps, type SessionData, type SessionKeys, type SessionManager, type SessionState, type SessionStorageProvider, type SsoTokenProvider, type TokenProvider, type UserKeypairs, type WebSocketClientMessage, type WebSocketServerMessage, type WorkspaceKeyRefreshProvider, type WorkspaceOpenProvider, type WsAuthMessage, type WsAuthResultMessage, type WsBatchCompleteMessage, type WsConnectionClosedMessage, type WsConversationMessagePostedMessage, type WsErrorMessage, type WsNotificationResponse, type WsPresenceUpdateMessage, type WsResponseCompleteMessage, type WsTaskUpdateMessage, base64Decode, base64Encode, base64ToBytes, buildCallFragment, buildWebSocketUrl, bytesToBase64, canPersistSession, changePasswordWithRekey, clearAllData, clearSession, type components, computeSharedSecret, createArbiClient, createAuthMessage, createAutoReloginMiddleware, createBearerAuthMiddleware, createContentHash, createReloginHandler, createSessionManager, createWorkspaceReopener, decodeCallKey, decryptCallTitle, decryptFile, decryptMessage, decryptMessageWithSharedSecret, deriveEncryptionKeypairFromSigning, derivePublicKey, encodeCallKey, encryptCallTitle, encryptFile, encryptMessage, encryptMessageWithSharedSecret, generateCallKey, generateKeyPairs, generateLoginCredentials, generateLoginCredentialsFromKey, generatePasswordChangeCredentials, generateRandomSigningKeypair, generateRecoveryPasswordChangeCredentials, generateRegistrationCredentials, generateUserKeypairs, getSession, getUserEncryptionKeypair, hasSession, initSodium, initializeDatabase, isMessageType, openSealedCallKey, type operations, parseCallFragment, parseServerMessage, passwordChangeErrorMessage, type paths, prewarmKeyPairs, saveSession, sealCallKey, sealKeyForSession, sealedBoxDecrypt, sealedBoxEncrypt, signMessage, updateSigningPrivateKey, type webhooks };
+export { type $defs, API_PREFIX, type ArbiClient, type ArbiClientOptions, type AuthStateProvider, type AutoReloginMiddlewareConfig, type BearerAuthMiddlewareConfig, CALL_KEY_BYTES, type ChangePasswordParams, type ChangePasswordRequest, type ChangePasswordResult, type CryptoProvider, type KeyLoginCredentials, type KeyPair, type LoginCredentials, type LoginParams, type LoginProfile, type LoginProvider, type LoginRequest, type LoginResult, type LoginWithKeyParams, type OnReloginSuccess, type PasswordChangeCredentials, type RegisterParams, type RegisterRequest, type RegisterResult, type RegistrationCredentials, type ReloginDeps, type ReloginHandler, type ReopenDeps, type SessionData, type SessionKeys, type SessionManager, type SessionState, type SessionStorageProvider, type SsoTokenProvider, type TokenProvider, type UserKeypairs, type WebSocketClientMessage, type WebSocketServerMessage, type WorkspaceKeyRefreshProvider, type WorkspaceOpenProvider, type WsAuthMessage, type WsAuthResultMessage, type WsBatchCompleteMessage, type WsConnectionClosedMessage, type WsConversationMessagePostedMessage, type WsErrorMessage, type WsNotificationResponse, type WsPresenceUpdateMessage, type WsResponseCompleteMessage, type WsTaskUpdateMessage, base64Decode, base64Encode, base64ToBytes, buildCallFragment, buildWebSocketUrl, bytesToBase64, canPersistSession, changePassword, clearAllData, clearSession, type components, computeSharedSecret, createArbiClient, createAuthMessage, createAutoReloginMiddleware, createBearerAuthMiddleware, createContentHash, createReloginHandler, createSessionManager, createWorkspaceReopener, decodeCallKey, decryptCallTitle, decryptFile, decryptMessage, decryptMessageWithSharedSecret, deriveEncryptionKeypairFromSigning, derivePublicKey, encodeCallKey, encryptCallTitle, encryptFile, encryptMessage, encryptMessageWithSharedSecret, generateCallKey, generateIdentityKeypair, generateKeyPairs, generateLoginCredentials, generateLoginCredentialsFromKey, generatePasswordChangeCredentials, generateRandomSigningKeypair, generateRegistrationCredentials, generateUserKeypairs, getSession, getUserEncryptionKeypair, hasSession, identityFromLoginResponse, initSodium, initializeDatabase, isMessageType, openSealedCallKey, type operations, parseCallFragment, parseServerMessage, passwordChangeErrorMessage, type paths, prewarmKeyPairs, saveSession, sealCallKey, sealKeyForSession, sealedBoxDecrypt, sealedBoxEncrypt, signMessage, unlockIdentityWithPassword, unwrapIdentityKey, updateWrappedIdentityKey, type webhooks, wrapIdentityKey };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -31114,6 +31114,8 @@ interface CryptoProvider {
 interface SessionKeys {
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey?: Uint8Array;
+    /** The identity wrapped under the password key (see SessionData.wrappedIdentityKey). */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 interface SessionStorageProvider {
     getSession(): Promise<SessionKeys | null>;
@@ -31139,6 +31141,8 @@ interface LoginResult$1 {
     accessToken: string;
     sessionKey: Uint8Array;
     userExtId?: string;
+    /** The login response's `wrapped_identity_key`, saved with the session. */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 /** Performs the login API call. Transport details are the consumer's concern. */
 interface LoginProvider {
@@ -31451,10 +31455,15 @@ declare function generateUserKeypairs(username: string, password: string, deploy
  * Generates registration, login, and password-change credentials.
  * Uses inline type definitions (structurally identical to OpenAPI schema types)
  * to avoid coupling the crypto module to the schema file.
+ *
+ * Two keys are in play (see ./identity.ts): the account identity, a fixed random Ed25519 keypair, and the
+ * password key, derived from email + password, which signs password logins and wraps the identity.
  */
 interface RegisterRequest {
     email: string;
     signing_key: string;
+    login_key?: string | null;
+    wrapped_identity_key?: string | null;
     verification_credential: string;
     given_name?: string | null;
     family_name?: string | null;
@@ -31469,8 +31478,8 @@ interface LoginRequest {
 interface ChangePasswordRequest {
     signature: string;
     timestamp: number;
-    new_signing_key: string;
-    rewrapped_workspace_keys: Record<string, string>;
+    new_login_key: string;
+    wrapped_identity_key: string;
 }
 /**
  * Credentials returned by generate functions.
@@ -31479,76 +31488,77 @@ interface ChangePasswordRequest {
  */
 interface RegistrationCredentials {
     request: RegisterRequest;
+    /** The new account's identity secret key (what the session keeps, and the recovery key). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
 }
 interface LoginCredentials {
     request: LoginRequest;
+    /**
+     * The password key that signed the request. Not the identity: open it from the response with
+     * `unwrapIdentityKey(response.wrapped_identity_key, passwordPrivateKey)`.
+     */
+    passwordPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
+}
+interface KeyLoginCredentials {
+    request: LoginRequest;
+    /** The identity secret key that signed the request (recovery key, session re-login). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
 }
 interface PasswordChangeCredentials {
-    request: Omit<ChangePasswordRequest, 'rewrapped_workspace_keys'>;
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
+    request: ChangePasswordRequest;
 }
 /**
- * Generate registration credentials with Ed25519 signing key.
- *
- * Creates Ed25519 keypair deterministically from email + password.
- * Server receives the Ed25519 public key (signing_key) and derives X25519 from it.
+ * Generate registration credentials: a random identity, wrapped under the password key.
  *
- * @param registrationData - Registration fields (signing_key will be generated)
- * @param password - User's password (to generate keypair)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns RegistrationCredentials with request body and private key (kept separate)
+ * The server stores the identity public key (signing_key, and the X25519 key it derives from it), the password
+ * key (login_key) and the wrapped identity.
  */
-declare function generateRegistrationCredentials(registrationData: Omit<RegisterRequest, 'signing_key'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<RegistrationCredentials>;
+declare function generateRegistrationCredentials(registrationData: Omit<RegisterRequest, 'signing_key' | 'login_key' | 'wrapped_identity_key'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<RegistrationCredentials>;
 /**
- * Generate login credentials with Ed25519 signature authentication.
- *
- * Derives Ed25519 keypair from email + password and signs "email|timestamp".
- * Server verifies signature using stored Ed25519 public key.
- *
- * @param loginData - Login fields (signature and timestamp will be generated)
- * @param password - User's password (to regenerate keypair)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns LoginCredentials with request body and private key (kept separate)
+ * Generate password-login credentials: derive the password key and sign "email|timestamp" with it.
  */
 declare function generateLoginCredentials(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<LoginCredentials>;
 /**
- * Generate login credentials using an existing signing key (for password recovery).
- *
- * Bypasses password derivation and uses the provided key directly.
- *
- * @param loginData - Login fields (signature and timestamp will be generated)
- * @param signingPrivateKey - The Ed25519 signing private key (64 bytes)
- * @returns LoginCredentials with request body and private key
+ * Generate login credentials signed by the identity key itself (recovery key, session re-login).
  */
-declare function generateLoginCredentialsFromKey(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array): LoginCredentials;
+declare function generateLoginCredentialsFromKey(loginData: Omit<LoginRequest, 'signature' | 'timestamp'>, signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array): KeyLoginCredentials;
 /**
- * Generate change password credentials with Ed25519 signature authentication.
- *
- * Signs "email|timestamp" with current Ed25519 key to prove knowledge of current password.
- * Provides new Ed25519 public key derived from new password.
+ * Generate a password change: the identity is kept, re-wrapped under the new password key.
  *
- * @param email - User's email address
- * @param currentPassword - Current password (to sign with current key)
- * @param newPassword - New password (to generate new key)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns PasswordChangeCredentials with request body and new private key (kept separate)
+ * Signed with the current password key when `currentPassword` is given (proves it), else with the identity key
+ * (recovery: the user signed in with the recovery key and no longer knows the password).
  */
-declare function generatePasswordChangeCredentials(email: string, currentPassword: string, newPassword: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+declare function generatePasswordChangeCredentials(params: {
+    email: string;
+    identitySecretKey: Uint8Array;
+    newPassword: string;
+    currentPassword?: string;
+}, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+
 /**
- * Generate password change credentials for recovery mode.
+ * The account identity and the password key that wraps it.
  *
- * Used when the user is recovering their account with a recovery key.
- * Signs with the existing signing key (from recovery) instead of deriving from password.
+ * The identity is a fixed Ed25519 keypair (its X25519 form is what workspace keys, mailbox keys and direct
+ * messages are encrypted to). The password derives a separate "password key" (Argon2id, `generateUserKeypairs`)
+ * that signs password logins and wraps the identity's secret key. Changing the password re-wraps the identity
+ * and re-encrypts nothing.
  *
- * @param email - User's email address
- * @param currentSigningKey - Current signing key (from recovery)
- * @param newPassword - New password (to generate new key)
- * @param deploymentDomain - Deployment domain for salt derivation
- * @returns PasswordChangeCredentials with request body and new private key
+ * Accounts registered before this existed have no wrap: their password key IS the identity
+ * (`wrapped_identity_key` is null in the login response).
+ *
+ * Same scheme as the Python SDK (`arbi_client.sdk.crypto`): BLAKE2b-256 keyed by the password key's seed over
+ * a fixed context gives a SecretBox key; the wrap is base64 of `nonce(24) ‖ secretbox(identity secret key)`.
+ */
+
+/** A fresh random identity (Ed25519; secretKey is the 64-byte form). */
+declare function generateIdentityKeypair(): KeyPair;
+/** Wrap the identity's 64-byte Ed25519 secret key under a password key. */
+declare function wrapIdentityKey(identitySecretKey: Uint8Array, passwordSecretKey: Uint8Array): string;
+/**
+ * The identity's 64-byte Ed25519 secret key a password key opens: unwrapped from `wrapped`, or the password key
+ * itself when nothing is wrapped. Throws when the password key does not open the wrap (a wrong password).
  */
-declare function generateRecoveryPasswordChangeCredentials(email: string, currentSigningKey: Uint8Array, newPassword: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<PasswordChangeCredentials>;
+declare function unwrapIdentityKey(wrapped: string | null | undefined, passwordSecretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * storage.ts - IndexedDB Storage Module
@@ -31585,9 +31595,16 @@ declare function canPersistSession(): boolean;
  * Note: accessToken is stored in Zustand (persisted separately), not here.
  */
 interface SessionData {
+    /** The account identity's Ed25519 secret key (64 bytes) - X25519 derived from this */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey?: Uint8Array;
     userExtId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The identity wrapped under the password key, as the last login returned it (null: the password key is
+     * the identity). Lets a typed password be checked, and the identity opened, without the server (offline
+     * unlock, step-up confirmations). Ciphertext under the password key, so it is stored as is.
+     */
+    wrappedIdentityKey?: string | null;
 }
 /**
  * Initialize IndexedDB database.
@@ -31617,12 +31634,11 @@ declare function saveSession(sessionData: SessionData): Promise<void>;
  */
 declare function getSession(): Promise<SessionData | null>;
 /**
- * Update the signing private key in IndexedDB (used when changing password).
- * This re-encrypts the new key while preserving other session data.
+ * Replace the stored wrapped identity (after a password change), keeping the rest of the session.
  *
- * @param newSigningPrivateKey - New Ed25519 private key to store
+ * @param wrappedIdentityKey - The identity wrapped under the new password key
  */
-declare function updateSigningPrivateKey(newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
+declare function updateWrappedIdentityKey(wrappedIdentityKey: string): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Clear session data from IndexedDB.
  */
@@ -31668,7 +31684,8 @@ interface RegisterResult {
 /**
  * Login flow
  *
- * Generates Ed25519 signature → posts to /v1/user/login → saves session
+ * Signs "email|timestamp" (password key, or the identity key itself) → posts to /v1/user/login → opens the
+ * identity → saves session
  */
 
 interface LoginParams {
@@ -31700,6 +31717,7 @@ interface LoginResult {
     parentExtId?: string | null;
     /** The profile from the login response, so hosts need no second request for the name. */
     profile?: LoginProfile;
+    /** The account identity's secret key (the session key material, and the recovery key). */
     signingPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
     serverSessionKey: Uint8Array;
 }
@@ -31707,46 +31725,57 @@ interface LoginResult {
 /**
  * Change password flow
  *
- * Generates old + new credentials → posts to /v1/user/change_password → updates stored key
+ * The password only wraps the account identity (see ../crypto/identity.ts). Changing it derives the new password
+ * key, re-wraps the session's identity under it and posts both to /v1/user/change_password: one request, O(1).
+ * Workspace keys, mailbox keys and direct messages stay encrypted to the unchanged identity, so nothing is
+ * re-encrypted, nothing can be missed and the other party of a conversation is unaffected. The recovery key
+ * (the identity secret key) is unchanged too.
  */
 
 interface ChangePasswordParams {
     email: string;
-    currentPassword: string;
     newPassword: string;
-    rewrappedWorkspaceKeys?: Record<string, string>;
-}
-interface ChangePasswordResult {
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
-}
-interface RekeyedPasswordChangeParams {
-    email: string;
-    newPassword: string;
-    /** The current password. Omit in recovery mode: the session's own signing key proves identity. */
+    /** The current password. Omit in recovery mode: the session's identity key signs instead. */
     currentPassword?: string;
-    /** The caller's `usr-` id; needed to tell sent from received direct messages. */
-    userExtId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The account identity's secret key. Omitted: read from the browser session store, which is then
+     * updated with the new wrap (hosts with their own key store pass it and keep `wrappedIdentityKey`).
+     */
+    identitySecretKey?: Uint8Array;
 }
-interface RekeyedPasswordChangeResult {
-    newSigningPrivateKey: Uint8Array;
-    /** Workspaces the server re-keyed. */
-    workspacesUpdated: number;
-    /** Direct messages re-encrypted for the new key. */
-    messagesReEncrypted: number;
+interface ChangePasswordResult {
+    /** The identity wrapped under the new password key (what a password login now returns). */
+    wrappedIdentityKey: string;
 }
-type FetchClient = ReturnType<typeof createFetchClient<paths>>;
 /** Pull a readable message out of whatever shape a failed call carried (`{ detail }`, `Error`). */
 declare function passwordChangeErrorMessage(err: unknown): string;
 /**
- * Change (or, in recovery mode, set) the master password: derive the new keys, re-wrap the key of
- * every workspace the user is a member of for them, re-encrypt direct messages, post it all to
- * `/v1/user/change_password`, then store the new signing key. The caller shows the recovery key
- * for `newSigningPrivateKey` afterwards.
+ * Change (or, in recovery mode, set) the master password of the signed-in account.
  */
-declare function changePasswordWithRekey(params: RekeyedPasswordChangeParams, deps: {
-    fetchClient: FetchClient;
+declare function changePassword(params: ChangePasswordParams, deps: {
+    fetchClient: ReturnType<typeof createFetchClient<paths>>;
     deploymentDomain: string;
-}): Promise<RekeyedPasswordChangeResult>;
+}): Promise<ChangePasswordResult>;
+
+/**
+ * Opening the account identity with a password (see ../crypto/identity.ts).
+ */
+/**
+ * The identity a password login opened: unwrapped from the response with the password key that signed it (or
+ * the password key itself for an account whose password key is its identity). Refuses an identity that is not
+ * the account's, so a wrong wrap cannot become the session's key.
+ */
+declare function identityFromLoginResponse(passwordPrivateKey: Uint8Array, response: {
+    wrapped_identity_key?: string | null;
+    user: {
+        encryption_public_key: string;
+    };
+}): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Check a typed password against the signed-in session and return the identity it opens (step-up
+ * confirmations, offline unlock). Uses the wrap saved at the last login; throws "Incorrect password".
+ */
+declare function unlockIdentityWithPassword(email: string, password: string, deploymentDomain: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 
 /**
  * createArbiClient() — SDK entry point
@@ -31970,4 +31999,4 @@ interface ReopenDeps {
  */
 declare function createWorkspaceReopener(deps: ReopenDeps): () => Promise<boolean>;
 
-export { type $defs, API_PREFIX, type ArbiClient, type ArbiClientOptions, type AuthStateProvider, type AutoReloginMiddlewareConfig, type BearerAuthMiddlewareConfig, CALL_KEY_BYTES, type ChangePasswordParams, type ChangePasswordRequest, type ChangePasswordResult, type CryptoProvider, type KeyPair, type LoginCredentials, type LoginParams, type LoginProfile, type LoginProvider, type LoginRequest, type LoginResult, type LoginWithKeyParams, type OnReloginSuccess, type PasswordChangeCredentials, type RegisterParams, type RegisterRequest, type RegisterResult, type RegistrationCredentials, type RekeyedPasswordChangeParams, type RekeyedPasswordChangeResult, type ReloginDeps, type ReloginHandler, type ReopenDeps, type SessionData, type SessionKeys, type SessionManager, type SessionState, type SessionStorageProvider, type SsoTokenProvider, type TokenProvider, type UserKeypairs, type WebSocketClientMessage, type WebSocketServerMessage, type WorkspaceKeyRefreshProvider, type WorkspaceOpenProvider, type WsAuthMessage, type WsAuthResultMessage, type WsBatchCompleteMessage, type WsConnectionClosedMessage, type WsConversationMessagePostedMessage, type WsErrorMessage, type WsNotificationResponse, type WsPresenceUpdateMessage, type WsResponseCompleteMessage, type WsTaskUpdateMessage, base64Decode, base64Encode, base64ToBytes, buildCallFragment, buildWebSocketUrl, bytesToBase64, canPersistSession, changePasswordWithRekey, clearAllData, clearSession, type components, computeSharedSecret, createArbiClient, createAuthMessage, createAutoReloginMiddleware, createBearerAuthMiddleware, createContentHash, createReloginHandler, createSessionManager, createWorkspaceReopener, decodeCallKey, decryptCallTitle, decryptFile, decryptMessage, decryptMessageWithSharedSecret, deriveEncryptionKeypairFromSigning, derivePublicKey, encodeCallKey, encryptCallTitle, encryptFile, encryptMessage, encryptMessageWithSharedSecret, generateCallKey, generateKeyPairs, generateLoginCredentials, generateLoginCredentialsFromKey, generatePasswordChangeCredentials, generateRandomSigningKeypair, generateRecoveryPasswordChangeCredentials, generateRegistrationCredentials, generateUserKeypairs, getSession, getUserEncryptionKeypair, hasSession, initSodium, initializeDatabase, isMessageType, openSealedCallKey, type operations, parseCallFragment, parseServerMessage, passwordChangeErrorMessage, type paths, prewarmKeyPairs, saveSession, sealCallKey, sealKeyForSession, sealedBoxDecrypt, sealedBoxEncrypt, signMessage, updateSigningPrivateKey, type webhooks };
+export { type $defs, API_PREFIX, type ArbiClient, type ArbiClientOptions, type AuthStateProvider, type AutoReloginMiddlewareConfig, type BearerAuthMiddlewareConfig, CALL_KEY_BYTES, type ChangePasswordParams, type ChangePasswordRequest, type ChangePasswordResult, type CryptoProvider, type KeyLoginCredentials, type KeyPair, type LoginCredentials, type LoginParams, type LoginProfile, type LoginProvider, type LoginRequest, type LoginResult, type LoginWithKeyParams, type OnReloginSuccess, type PasswordChangeCredentials, type RegisterParams, type RegisterRequest, type RegisterResult, type RegistrationCredentials, type ReloginDeps, type ReloginHandler, type ReopenDeps, type SessionData, type SessionKeys, type SessionManager, type SessionState, type SessionStorageProvider, type SsoTokenProvider, type TokenProvider, type UserKeypairs, type WebSocketClientMessage, type WebSocketServerMessage, type WorkspaceKeyRefreshProvider, type WorkspaceOpenProvider, type WsAuthMessage, type WsAuthResultMessage, type WsBatchCompleteMessage, type WsConnectionClosedMessage, type WsConversationMessagePostedMessage, type WsErrorMessage, type WsNotificationResponse, type WsPresenceUpdateMessage, type WsResponseCompleteMessage, type WsTaskUpdateMessage, base64Decode, base64Encode, base64ToBytes, buildCallFragment, buildWebSocketUrl, bytesToBase64, canPersistSession, changePassword, clearAllData, clearSession, type components, computeSharedSecret, createArbiClient, createAuthMessage, createAutoReloginMiddleware, createBearerAuthMiddleware, createContentHash, createReloginHandler, createSessionManager, createWorkspaceReopener, decodeCallKey, decryptCallTitle, decryptFile, decryptMessage, decryptMessageWithSharedSecret, deriveEncryptionKeypairFromSigning, derivePublicKey, encodeCallKey, encryptCallTitle, encryptFile, encryptMessage, encryptMessageWithSharedSecret, generateCallKey, generateIdentityKeypair, generateKeyPairs, generateLoginCredentials, generateLoginCredentialsFromKey, generatePasswordChangeCredentials, generateRandomSigningKeypair, generateRegistrationCredentials, generateUserKeypairs, getSession, getUserEncryptionKeypair, hasSession, identityFromLoginResponse, initSodium, initializeDatabase, isMessageType, openSealedCallKey, type operations, parseCallFragment, parseServerMessage, passwordChangeErrorMessage, type paths, prewarmKeyPairs, saveSession, sealCallKey, sealKeyForSession, sealedBoxDecrypt, sealedBoxEncrypt, signMessage, unlockIdentityWithPassword, unwrapIdentityKey, updateWrappedIdentityKey, type webhooks, wrapIdentityKey };