@appforge-ci/core 0.2.3 → 0.3.1

package/dist/attestation-workerd.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createRequire } from "node:module";
+import { createServer } from "node:net";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+/**
+ * Ed25519 signing and verification in the real Workers runtime (workerd, the
+ * engine production runs on), not only in Node. PR-J only had this from the
+ * documentation; this runs the actual signing module inside workerd, with the
+ * compatibility date apps/admin-api deploys with.
+ *
+ * What it proves, in workerd: WebCrypto `Ed25519` import of a PKCS#8 key (the
+ * form `ATTESTATION_SIGNING_KEY` takes), public-key derivation through JWK
+ * export (how the signer learns its own key id), signing, verification, and
+ * that the bytes equal the pinned vectors an independent Node implementation
+ * produced (Ed25519 is deterministic, so any runtime must agree exactly).
+ *
+ * The workerd binary and esbuild are not direct dependencies: they come with
+ * `wrangler` (a root devDependency) and are resolved from there, so the
+ * lockfile does not change. workerd is run directly rather than through
+ * Miniflare, whose 5.x alpha configuration API is still moving. If they cannot
+ * be loaded this skips locally, and FAILS when CI is set, so the check cannot
+ * silently disappear from the pipeline.
+ */
+const COMPAT_DATE = "2025-04-01"; // apps/admin-api/wrangler.jsonc
+async function loadTooling() {
+    try {
+        const req = createRequire(import.meta.url);
+        const fromWrangler = createRequire(req.resolve("wrangler/package.json"));
+        const workerdMod = (await import(fromWrangler.resolve("workerd")));
+        const esbuild = (await import(fromWrangler.resolve("esbuild")));
+        const build = esbuild.build ?? esbuild.default?.build;
+        if (!build || typeof workerdMod.default !== "string")
+            return "workerd or esbuild did not expose the expected entry points";
+        return { workerd: workerdMod.default, build };
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return `wrangler's workerd/esbuild could not be loaded (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)})`;
+    }
+}
+function freePort() {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const srv = createServer();
+        srv.once("error", reject);
+        srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+            const { port } = srv.address();
+            srv.close(() => resolve(port));
+        });
+    });
+}
+const WORKER_ENTRY = `
+import { ed25519KeyId, ed25519SeedToPkcs8, bytesToBase64, auditCheckpointStatement, signAuditCheckpoint, createEd25519Signer, verifyEd25519, hexToBytes, bytesToHex } from ${JSON.stringify(fileURLToPath(new URL("./attestation.ts", import.meta.url)))};
+import { ATTESTATION_DOMAIN, buildAttestationKeySet, loadAttestationSigner, signWithDomain, verifyAuditCheckpoint, verifyWithDomain } from ${JSON.stringify(fileURLToPath(new URL("./attestation-signing.ts", import.meta.url)))};
+
+export default {
+  async fetch() {
+    const out = {};
+    // The same deterministic test key the Node tests pin (derived from a label, never a production key).
+    const seed = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode("appforge-test-vector-seed-v1")));
+    const pkcs8 = ed25519SeedToPkcs8(seed);
+    const secret = bytesToBase64(pkcs8);
+
+    // RFC 8032 test vector 1: the runtime's Ed25519 is the standard algorithm.
+    const rfcSigner = await createEd25519Signer("k", ed25519SeedToPkcs8(hexToBytes("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60")));
+    const rfcSig = await rfcSigner.sign(new Uint8Array());
+    out.rfc8032 = bytesToHex(rfcSig) === "e5564300c360ac729086e2cc806e828a84877f1eb8e5d974d873e065224901555fb8821590a33bacc61e39701cf9b46bd25bf5f0595bbe24655141438e7a100b"
+      && (await verifyEd25519(hexToBytes("d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a"), new Uint8Array(), rfcSig));
+
+    // Derive the public key from the PKCS#8 secret exactly as the production signer does (JWK export), and publish it.
+    const probe = await loadAttestationSigner(secret, [], new Date("2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"));
+    out.unpublishedKeyId = probe.state === "unpublished" ? probe.keyId : probe.state;
+    const pub = await crypto.subtle.importKey("pkcs8", pkcs8, { name: "Ed25519" }, true, ["sign"]);
+    const jwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", pub);
+    const x = jwk.x.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
+    const entry = { kid: probe.keyId, alg: "Ed25519", publicKey: x + "=".repeat((4 - (x.length % 4)) % 4), notBefore: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", status: "active" };
+
+    const state = await loadAttestationSigner(secret, [entry], new Date("2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"));
+    out.state = state.state;
+    out.keyId = state.keyId;
+    const keys = await buildAttestationKeySet([entry]);
+    out.keySetOk = keys.ok;
+
+    const stmt = auditCheckpointStatement({ orgId: "org_acme", seq: 7, hash: "ab".repeat(32), issuedAt: "2026-10-02T14:03:50Z" });
+    out.checkpointSignature = await signAuditCheckpoint(state.signer, stmt);
+    out.checkpointVerifies = (await verifyAuditCheckpoint(keys.keys, { orgId: "org_acme", seq: 7, hash: "ab".repeat(32), issuedAt: "2026-10-02T14:03:50Z", keyId: state.keyId, signature: out.checkpointSignature })).ok;
+    out.tamperRejected = (await verifyAuditCheckpoint(keys.keys, { orgId: "org_acme", seq: 8, hash: "ab".repeat(32), issuedAt: "2026-10-02T14:03:50Z", keyId: state.keyId, signature: out.checkpointSignature })).ok === false;
+
+    const doc = { issuedAt: "2026-10-02T14:03:50Z", subject: { buildId: "bld_1", orgId: "org_acme" } };
+    out.attestationSignature = await signWithDomain(state.signer, ATTESTATION_DOMAIN, doc);
+    out.attestationVerifies = (await verifyWithDomain(keys.keys, { domain: ATTESTATION_DOMAIN, value: doc, keyId: state.keyId, signature: out.attestationSignature, issuedAt: doc.issuedAt })).ok;
+
+    // A non-Ed25519 / garbage secret is refused in this runtime too.
+    out.garbageRefused = (await loadAttestationSigner("AAAA", [entry])).state === "invalid";
+    return Response.json(out);
+  },
+};
+`;
+test("Ed25519 signing, key derivation and verification work in workerd and match the pinned vectors", async (t) => {
+    const tooling = await loadTooling();
+    if (typeof tooling === "string") {
+        if (process.env.CI)
+            assert.fail(tooling);
+        t.skip(tooling);
+        return;
+    }
+    const built = await tooling.build({
+        stdin: { contents: WORKER_ENTRY, resolveDir: fileURLToPath(new URL(".", import.meta.url)), sourcefile: "worker-entry.js", loader: "js" },
+        bundle: true,
+        format: "esm",
+        platform: "neutral",
+        target: "es2022",
+        write: false,
+        logLevel: "silent",
+        // The sources import each other with ".js" specifiers that name their ".ts" files (NodeNext style).
+        plugins: [
+            {
+                name: "ts-js-specifiers",
+                setup(b) {
+                    const src = fileURLToPath(new URL(".", import.meta.url));
+                    b.onResolve({ filter: /^\.\.?\/.*\.js$/ }, (args) => {
+                        if (!args.resolveDir.startsWith(src.replace(/\/$/, "")))
+                            return undefined; // only this package's own sources (zod etc. resolve normally)
+                        return { path: fileURLToPath(new URL(args.path.replace(/\.js$/, ".ts"), `file://${args.resolveDir}/`)) };
+                    });
+                },
+            },
+        ],
+    });
+    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "appforge-workerd-"));
+    let child;
+    try {
+        writeFileSync(join(dir, "worker.mjs"), built.outputFiles[0].text);
+        const port = await freePort();
+        writeFileSync(join(dir, "config.capnp"), `using Workerd = import "/workerd/workerd.capnp";
+const config :Workerd.Config = (
+  services = [(name = "main", worker = .w)],
+  sockets = [(name = "http", address = "127.0.0.1:${port}", http = (), service = "main")]
+);
+const w :Workerd.Worker = (
+  modules = [(name = "worker", esModule = embed "worker.mjs")],
+  compatibilityDate = "${COMPAT_DATE}",
+);
+`);
+        child = spawn(tooling.workerd, ["serve", "config.capnp"], { cwd: dir, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] });
+        let log = "";
+        child.stdout?.on("data", (d) => (log += d.toString()));
+        child.stderr?.on("data", (d) => (log += d.toString()));
+        let res;
+        for (let i = 0; i < 100 && !res; i++) {
+            try {
+                res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`);
+            }
+            catch {
+                if (child.exitCode !== null)
+                    assert.fail(`workerd exited early: ${log}`);
+                await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
+            }
+        }
+        assert.ok(res, `workerd never answered: ${log}`);
+        assert.equal(res.status, 200, log);
+        const out = (await res.json());
+        assert.equal(out.rfc8032, true, "RFC 8032 vector 1 reproduces in workerd");
+        assert.equal(out.state, "ready");
+        assert.equal(out.keyId, "fa0e09426c7aabe2", "public-key derivation (JWK export) in workerd yields the same key id as Node");
+        assert.equal(out.unpublishedKeyId, "fa0e09426c7aabe2");
+        assert.equal(out.keySetOk, true);
+        assert.equal(out.checkpointSignature, "WaJ3iUH1znI8fEAV3o/zvtO6LaP9VIpOTcuuzE0PVqFb/DHJ636nUZXal7I1qME9CJcxGiQMb9S28CsmLHO5DQ==", "byte-identical to the signature Node produces");
+        assert.equal(out.attestationSignature, "5SPJuifSVWrD32lYkGeUQUGi9WZ9IP4axfjWSj0kDmaz3J9UUiBN99/zApL0zCtXr8cxnDRaSLwcAQuphHfvBA==");
+        assert.equal(out.checkpointVerifies, true);
+        assert.equal(out.attestationVerifies, true);
+        assert.equal(out.tamperRejected, true);
+        assert.equal(out.garbageRefused, true);
+    }
+    finally {
+        child?.kill("SIGKILL");
+        rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=attestation-workerd.test.js.map

package/dist/attestation-workerd.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/attestation.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+import { z } from "zod";
+/**
+ * Tamper-evident audit chain primitives for the regulated-VPN program
+ * (PR-J). Pure and runtime-neutral: WebCrypto only (`globalThis.crypto`,
+ * present in Cloudflare Workers, Node 20+ and browsers), no `node:crypto`,
+ * so the Worker sealer (`@appforge/db`'s `audit-chain.ts`), the future
+ * signing module and the offline verifier share one implementation of
+ * what is hashed and signed.
+ *
+ * What the chain is: one append-only hash chain per org. Each entry holds
+ * the exact canonical JSON that was hashed (`payload`), so verification
+ * never has to re-read a mutable source row.
+ *
+ *   hash(seq 1)  = sha256("appforge-audit-v1\n" + genesis(orgId) + "\n" + canonicalJson(payload))
+ *   hash(seq n)  = sha256("appforge-audit-v1\n" + hash(n-1)      + "\n" + canonicalJson(payload))
+ *   genesis(org) = sha256("appforge-audit-genesis-v1:" + orgId)
+ *
+ * What it is not: on its own the chain proves nothing against someone
+ * who can write to the database, because they can recompute every hash.
+ * The protection comes from signed checkpoints (`AuditCheckpoint`, signed
+ * by a key the database does not hold) and from copies of a head hash
+ * that the customer keeps. Until checkpoints are signed and issued
+ * (PR-K) this is hash-chaining only.
+ */
+/** Prefix of every chain-entry hash input. */
+export declare const AUDIT_ENTRY_DOMAIN = "appforge-audit-v1\n";
+/** `genesis(orgId)` input prefix: one org's chain cannot be spliced into another's. */
+export declare const AUDIT_GENESIS_PREFIX = "appforge-audit-genesis-v1:";
+/** Prefix of every checkpoint signature input: a checkpoint signature can never validate as anything else. */
+export declare const AUDIT_CHECKPOINT_DOMAIN = "appforge-checkpoint-v1\n";
+/**
+ * Canonical JSON: the RFC 8785 (JCS) subset this product needs. Object keys
+ * sorted by UTF-16 code unit, no whitespace, strings as `JSON.stringify`
+ * writes them (identical to RFC 8785's string rules for well-formed text).
+ * Numbers must be safe integers: the audit schema has no floats (timestamps
+ * are strings, sizes are integer bytes), which removes the one place two
+ * implementations could disagree. Throws on `undefined`, floats, NaN,
+ * bigint, functions, non-plain objects, sparse arrays, lone surrogates and
+ * absurd nesting, so a value that cannot be hashed identically everywhere
+ * is rejected rather than hashed differently.
+ */
+export declare function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string;
+export declare function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+export declare function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array;
+export declare function bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+export declare function base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array;
+export declare function sha256Hex(data: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string>;
+/** Hash a chain starts from, so `prevHash` of seq 1 is org-specific. */
+export declare function auditGenesisHash(orgId: string): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Hash of one chain entry. `payload` is the value (or its already-canonical
+ * JSON text) that is stored verbatim next to the hash.
+ */
+export declare function auditEntryHash(prevHash: string, payload: unknown): Promise<string>;
+/** Snapshot of a `VpnEvent` row, taken when it is sealed. Later changes to the row (e.g. `tunnelId` going NULL when a tunnel is deleted) never change a hashed value. */
+export declare const auditVpnEventDataSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    type: z.ZodString;
+    tunnelId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+    buildId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+    agentId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+    detail: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    type: string;
+    tunnelId: string | null;
+    buildId: string | null;
+    agentId: string | null;
+    detail: string | null;
+}, {
+    type: string;
+    tunnelId: string | null;
+    buildId: string | null;
+    agentId: string | null;
+    detail: string | null;
+}>;
+/**
+ * A chain entry that registers a per-build attestation (PR-M): "this exact document, by this key (or by none),
+ * was issued". `docSha256` is the sha256 of the document's canonical JSON, which is what ties the entry to the
+ * signed document; the offline verifier requires the entry right after the document's own chain head to carry
+ * the document's hash and build id. `keyId` is null for an attestation issued while signing was unavailable.
+ */
+export declare const auditAttestationDataSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    buildId: z.ZodString;
+    docSha256: z.ZodString;
+    keyId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+    completeness: z.ZodEnum<["full", "partial", "server_observed_only"]>;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    buildId: string;
+    docSha256: string;
+    keyId: string | null;
+    completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+}, {
+    buildId: string;
+    docSha256: string;
+    keyId: string | null;
+    completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+}>;
+export type AuditAttestationData = z.infer<typeof auditAttestationDataSchema>;
+/**
+ * A chain entry that records evidence which was expected and is missing, so the absence itself is part of the
+ * tamper-evident history (PR-M: a regulated build whose agent never reported).
+ */
+export declare const auditGapDataSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    buildId: z.ZodString;
+    reason: z.ZodString;
+    detail: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    buildId: string;
+    detail: string;
+    reason: string;
+}, {
+    buildId: string;
+    detail: string;
+    reason: string;
+}>;
+export type AuditGapData = z.infer<typeof auditGapDataSchema>;
+/**
+ * What a chain entry's `payload` column holds. The known `kind`s are `vpn_event`, `attestation` and `gap`;
+ * a verifier must reject a kind it does not know rather than skip it, and `scripts/appforge-verify.mjs`
+ * (KNOWN_KINDS) is kept to this list by a test.
+ */
+export declare const auditEntryPayloadSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<"kind", [z.ZodObject<{
+    kind: z.ZodLiteral<"vpn_event">;
+    data: z.ZodObject<{
+        type: z.ZodString;
+        tunnelId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+        buildId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+        agentId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+        detail: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+    }, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+        type: string;
+        tunnelId: string | null;
+        buildId: string | null;
+        agentId: string | null;
+        detail: string | null;
+    }, {
+        type: string;
+        tunnelId: string | null;
+        buildId: string | null;
+        agentId: string | null;
+        detail: string | null;
+    }>;
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    orgId: z.ZodString;
+    /** The source row's id (`VpnEvent.id`), or the attestation / gap id this entry registers. */
+    ref: z.ZodString;
+    /** When the source event was recorded (UTC). */
+    at: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    kind: "vpn_event";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        type: string;
+        tunnelId: string | null;
+        buildId: string | null;
+        agentId: string | null;
+        detail: string | null;
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}, {
+    kind: "vpn_event";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        type: string;
+        tunnelId: string | null;
+        buildId: string | null;
+        agentId: string | null;
+        detail: string | null;
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}>, z.ZodObject<{
+    kind: z.ZodLiteral<"attestation">;
+    data: z.ZodObject<{
+        buildId: z.ZodString;
+        docSha256: z.ZodString;
+        keyId: z.ZodNullable<z.ZodString>;
+        completeness: z.ZodEnum<["full", "partial", "server_observed_only"]>;
+    }, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+        buildId: string;
+        docSha256: string;
+        keyId: string | null;
+        completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+    }, {
+        buildId: string;
+        docSha256: string;
+        keyId: string | null;
+        completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+    }>;
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    orgId: z.ZodString;
+    /** The source row's id (`VpnEvent.id`), or the attestation / gap id this entry registers. */
+    ref: z.ZodString;
+    /** When the source event was recorded (UTC). */
+    at: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    kind: "attestation";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        buildId: string;
+        docSha256: string;
+        keyId: string | null;
+        completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}, {
+    kind: "attestation";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        buildId: string;
+        docSha256: string;
+        keyId: string | null;
+        completeness: "full" | "partial" | "server_observed_only";
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}>, z.ZodObject<{
+    kind: z.ZodLiteral<"gap">;
+    data: z.ZodObject<{
+        buildId: z.ZodString;
+        reason: z.ZodString;
+        detail: z.ZodString;
+    }, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+        buildId: string;
+        detail: string;
+        reason: string;
+    }, {
+        buildId: string;
+        detail: string;
+        reason: string;
+    }>;
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    orgId: z.ZodString;
+    /** The source row's id (`VpnEvent.id`), or the attestation / gap id this entry registers. */
+    ref: z.ZodString;
+    /** When the source event was recorded (UTC). */
+    at: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    kind: "gap";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        buildId: string;
+        detail: string;
+        reason: string;
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}, {
+    kind: "gap";
+    at: string;
+    orgId: string;
+    data: {
+        buildId: string;
+        detail: string;
+        reason: string;
+    };
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    ref: string;
+}>]>;
+export type AuditEntryPayload = z.infer<typeof auditEntryPayloadSchema>;
+export type AuditVpnEventData = z.infer<typeof auditVpnEventDataSchema>;
+/** The chain's known entry kinds, from the schema above. */
+export declare const AUDIT_ENTRY_KINDS: readonly string[];
+/** What a checkpoint signature covers: "org X's chain had head hash H at seq N when this was issued". */
+export declare const auditCheckpointStatementSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    type: z.ZodLiteral<"appforge.audit.checkpoint">;
+    orgId: z.ZodString;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    hash: z.ZodString;
+    issuedAt: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    orgId: string;
+    type: "appforge.audit.checkpoint";
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    hash: string;
+    issuedAt: string;
+}, {
+    orgId: string;
+    type: "appforge.audit.checkpoint";
+    v: 1;
+    seq: number;
+    hash: string;
+    issuedAt: string;
+}>;
+export type AuditCheckpointStatement = z.infer<typeof auditCheckpointStatementSchema>;
+/** A stored checkpoint: the statement's fields plus the signature envelope. */
+export declare const auditCheckpointSchema: z.ZodObject<Omit<{
+    v: z.ZodLiteral<1>;
+    type: z.ZodLiteral<"appforge.audit.checkpoint">;
+    orgId: z.ZodString;
+    seq: z.ZodNumber;
+    hash: z.ZodString;
+    issuedAt: z.ZodString;
+}, "type" | "v"> & {
+    keyId: z.ZodString;
+    /** base64 Ed25519 signature over `auditCheckpointSigningBytes(statement)`. */
+    signature: z.ZodString;
+}, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
+    orgId: string;
+    keyId: string;
+    seq: number;
+    hash: string;
+    issuedAt: string;
+    signature: string;
+}, {
+    orgId: string;
+    keyId: string;
+    seq: number;
+    hash: string;
+    issuedAt: string;
+    signature: string;
+}>;
+export type AuditCheckpoint = z.infer<typeof auditCheckpointSchema>;
+export declare function auditCheckpointStatement(input: {
+    orgId: string;
+    seq: number;
+    hash: string;
+    issuedAt: string;
+}): AuditCheckpointStatement;
+/** The exact bytes a checkpoint signature covers. */
+export declare function auditCheckpointSigningBytes(statement: AuditCheckpointStatement): Uint8Array;
+/** `VpnEvent.createdAt` is SQLite's `datetime('now')` (`YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS`, UTC). The chain records ISO-8601. */
+export declare function sqliteUtcToIso(createdAt: string): string;
+/** An ISO-8601 UTC string with whole seconds, as the chain and checkpoints use. */
+export declare function toIsoUtcSeconds(date: Date): string;
+export interface AuditChainEntryInput {
+    seq: number;
+    prevHash: string;
+    hash: string;
+    /** The stored payload: canonical JSON text (what the sealer writes), or the parsed object. */
+    payload: string | Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+export type AuditChainVerification = {
+    ok: true;
+    headSeq: number;
+    headHash: string;
+    entries: number;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    problems: string[];
+};
+/**
+ * Recomputes a slice of one org's chain from the stored payloads alone.
+ *
+ * `anchor` is the `(seq, hash)` of the entry just before the slice: omit it
+ * for a chain that starts at seq 1 (the genesis hash is then the anchor), or
+ * pass the covering checkpoint's `(seq, hash)` for a chain whose oldest
+ * entries were pruned. Checks, per entry: contiguous seq, `prevHash` links to
+ * the previous hash, the payload is canonical JSON of a known schema, its
+ * `seq` and `orgId` match the entry and the org, and the hash recomputes.
+ * Reports every problem found rather than the first.
+ *
+ * Authenticity of the anchor / head is the caller's job (verify a checkpoint
+ * signature, or compare to a head the customer kept): this proves only that
+ * the entries are internally consistent with them.
+ */
+export declare function verifyAuditChain(input: {
+    orgId: string;
+    anchor?: {
+        seq: number;
+        hash: string;
+    };
+    entries: readonly AuditChainEntryInput[];
+}): Promise<AuditChainVerification>;
+/**
+ * Signs bytes with a key the database does not hold. The interface exists
+ * so the sealer can issue checkpoints without knowing where the key lives;
+ * the production implementation (a Worker secret) lives in
+ * apps/admin-api/src/lib/audit-signing.ts. Implementations must be Ed25519 (RFC 8032).
+ */
+export interface AuditSigner {
+    /** Self-certifying key id: see `ed25519KeyId`. */
+    readonly keyId: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional guard: why this key may not vouch for something issued at `issuedAt`
+     * (ISO-8601 UTC), or null if it may. Callers that stamp an `issuedAt` check it
+     * at that instant, right before signing, and refuse to store a signature a
+     * verifier would reject.
+     */
+    problemAt?(issuedAt: string): string | null;
+    sign(message: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+}
+/** `sha256(raw 32-byte public key)`, first 16 hex characters. A key set cannot mislabel a key because the id is recomputed from it. */
+export declare function ed25519KeyId(rawPublicKey: Uint8Array): Promise<string>;
+/** Wraps a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed as PKCS#8, the form Workers' `importKey` takes. */
+export declare function ed25519SeedToPkcs8(seed: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
+/** An `AuditSigner` over a PKCS#8 Ed25519 private key via WebCrypto (`{name: "Ed25519"}`). */
+export declare function createEd25519Signer(keyId: string, pkcs8: Uint8Array): Promise<AuditSigner>;
+/** Verifies an Ed25519 signature against a raw 32-byte public key. Never throws: a malformed key or signature is a `false`. */
+export declare function verifyEd25519(rawPublicKey: Uint8Array, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean>;
+/** Signs a checkpoint statement; returns the base64 signature the `AuditCheckpoint` row stores. */
+export declare function signAuditCheckpoint(signer: AuditSigner, statement: AuditCheckpointStatement): Promise<string>;
+/** Verifies a stored checkpoint's signature against a raw public key. */
+export declare function verifyAuditCheckpointSignature(rawPublicKey: Uint8Array, statement: AuditCheckpointStatement, signatureB64: string): Promise<boolean>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=attestation.d.ts.map

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