@apocaliss92/nodedreame 1.3.0 → 1.3.1

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // src/support/version.ts
 var LIBRARY_NAME = "nodedreame";
-var LIBRARY_VERSION = "1.3.0";
+var LIBRARY_VERSION = "1.3.1";
 
 // src/transport/errors.ts
 var DreameError = class extends Error {
@@ -4089,6 +4089,10 @@ var REDACTED = "[redacted]";
 var SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS = [
   // identity / secrets
   "did",
+  // `deviceid` is listed explicitly: the bare `did` fragment does NOT match
+  // `deviceid` (the substring `did` is absent from `d-e-v-i-c-e-i-d`), yet
+  // base-device sets the real `did` as `deviceId` on raw payloads (FIX 1).
+  "deviceid",
   "uid",
   "token",
   // accessToken, refreshToken, refresh_token, token_type stripped too (safe)
@@ -4127,14 +4131,24 @@ var SENSITIVE_KEY_FRAGMENTS = [
   "areaname",
   "segmentname",
   "segment_name",
+  // room/zone/map names are user-set PII (FIX 3).
+  "zone_name",
+  "zonename",
+  "map_name",
+  "mapname",
   // map binary / geometry (location-revealing)
   "map_info",
   "mapinfo",
   "mapblob",
   // free-text device names that may carry PII. NOTE: the bare fragment `name` is
   // intentionally NOT listed — it would over-match the catalog's command `name`
-  // field (an enum-derived, non-sensitive label). The specific custom-name
-  // fields below cover every PII-bearing case.
+  // field (an enum-derived, non-sensitive label like `START`). ACCEPTED
+  // TRADE-OFF: a bare `{ name: "..." }` in an event argument is NOT scrubbed by
+  // key. This is mitigated in practice by (a) the value-sanitizer below
+  // (sanitizeStringValue, applied to EVERY string scalar — it catches OSS
+  // paths / URLs / tokens regardless of key), and (b) the specific
+  // customName/deviceName/nickName/zoneName/mapName fragments which cover the
+  // realistic PII-bearing name cases.
   "customname",
   "devicename",
   "nickname"
@@ -4150,6 +4164,21 @@ function isSensitiveKey(key2) {
 function isPlainObject(v) {
   return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
 }
+var RISKY_VALUE_PATTERNS = [
+  /:\/\//,
+  // any URL scheme (https://, mqtts://, …) — signed URLs carry tokens
+  /ali_dreame\//i,
+  // OSS object path embedding uid/did
+  /[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/,
+  // a long opaque token run (base64/hex secrets)
+  /\b(did|uid|token)\s*=/i,
+  // query-param secrets (?did=…&token=…)
+  /access/i
+  // accessKey / access-token / x-access-key style markers
+];
+function sanitizeStringValue(s) {
+  return RISKY_VALUE_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(s)) ? REDACTED : s;
+}
 function redact(value) {
   if (Array.isArray(value)) {
     return value.map((v) => redact(v));
@@ -4161,6 +4190,9 @@ function redact(value) {
     }
     return out;
   }
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    return sanitizeStringValue(value);
+  }
   return value;
 }