@apitap/core 1.4.0 → 1.4.2

package/src/native-host.ts

@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ async function signSkillJson(skillJson: string): Promise<string> {
 }
 
 export interface NativeRequest {
-  action: 'save_skill' | 'save_batch' | 'ping' | 'capture_request';
+  action: 'save_skill' | 'save_batch' | 'ping' | 'capture_request' | 'save_index';
   domain?: string;
   skillJson?: string;
   skills?: Array<{ domain: string; skillJson: string }>;
+  indexJson?: string;
 }
 
 export interface NativeResponse {
@@ -115,6 +116,32 @@ export async function handleNativeMessage(
       return { success: true, paths };
     }
 
+    if (request.action === 'save_index') {
+      if (!request.indexJson) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Missing indexJson' };
+      }
+      if (request.indexJson.length > 5 * 1024 * 1024) {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Index too large (max 5MB)' };
+      }
+      try {
+        JSON.parse(request.indexJson);
+      } catch {
+        return { success: false, error: 'Invalid JSON in indexJson' };
+      }
+
+      // index.json lives in ~/.apitap/ (parent of skills dir)
+      const apitapDir = path.dirname(skillsDir);
+      await fs.mkdir(apitapDir, { recursive: true });
+      const indexPath = path.join(apitapDir, 'index.json');
+
+      // Atomic write: temp file + rename
+      const tmpPath = indexPath + '.tmp.' + process.pid;
+      await fs.writeFile(tmpPath, request.indexJson, { mode: 0o600 });
+      await fs.rename(tmpPath, indexPath);
+
+      return { success: true, path: indexPath };
+    }
+
     return { success: false, error: `Unknown action: ${request.action}` };
   } catch (err) {
     return { success: false, error: String(err) };
@@ -124,7 +151,7 @@ export async function handleNativeMessage(
 // --- Relay handler ---
 
 // Actions handled locally by the native host (filesystem operations)
-const LOCAL_ACTIONS = new Set(['save_skill', 'save_batch', 'ping']);
+const LOCAL_ACTIONS = new Set(['save_skill', 'save_batch', 'ping', 'save_index']);
 
 // Actions relayed to the extension (browser operations)
 const EXTENSION_ACTIONS = new Set(['capture_request']);

package/src/orchestration/browse.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ import { replayEndpoint } from '../replay/engine.js';
 import { SessionCache } from './cache.js';
 import { read } from '../read/index.js';
 import { bridgeAvailable, requestBridgeCapture, DEFAULT_SOCKET } from '../bridge/client.js';
+import { signSkillFile } from '../skill/signing.js';
+import { deriveSigningKey } from '../auth/crypto.js';
+import { getMachineId } from '../auth/manager.js';
 
 export interface BrowseOptions {
   skillsDir?: string;
@@ -61,11 +64,14 @@ async function tryBridgeCapture(
 
   if (result.success && result.skillFiles && result.skillFiles.length > 0) {
     const skillFiles = result.skillFiles;
-    // Save each skill file to disk
+    // Sign and save each skill file to disk
     try {
       const { writeSkillFile: writeSF } = await import('../skill/store.js');
-      for (const skill of skillFiles) {
-        await writeSF(skill, options.skillsDir);
+      const mid = await getMachineId();
+      const sk = deriveSigningKey(mid);
+      for (let i = 0; i < skillFiles.length; i++) {
+        skillFiles[i] = signSkillFile(skillFiles[i], sk);
+        await writeSF(skillFiles[i], options.skillsDir);
       }
     } catch {
       // Saving failed — still have the data in memory
@@ -202,7 +208,10 @@ export async function browse(
         skill = discovery.skillFile;
         source = 'discovered';
 
-        // Save to disk
+        // Sign and save to disk (H1: skill files must be signed for verification)
+        const machineId = await getMachineId();
+        const sigKey = deriveSigningKey(machineId);
+        skill = signSkillFile(skill, sigKey);
         const { writeSkillFile: writeSF } = await import('../skill/store.js');
         await writeSF(skill, skillsDir);
         cache?.set(domain, skill, 'discovered');

package/src/plugin.ts

@@ -21,12 +21,17 @@ export interface Plugin {
 
 export interface PluginOptions {
   skillsDir?: string;
-  /** @internal Skip SSRF check — for testing only */
+  /** @internal Testing only — never expose to external callers (M14) */
   _skipSsrfCheck?: boolean;
 }
 
 const APITAP_DIR = join(homedir(), '.apitap');
 
+/** M20: Mark plugin responses as untrusted external content */
+function wrapUntrusted(data: unknown): unknown {
+  return { ...data as Record<string, unknown>, _meta: { externalContent: { untrusted: true } } };
+}
+
 export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
   const skillsDir = options.skillsDir;
 
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
     },
     execute: async (args) => {
       const query = args.query as string;
-      return searchSkills(query, skillsDir);
+      return wrapUntrusted(await searchSkills(query, skillsDir));
     },
   };
 
@@ -88,7 +93,7 @@ export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
       const endpointId = args.endpointId as string;
       const params = args.params as Record<string, string> | undefined;
 
-      const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, skillsDir);
+      const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, skillsDir, { trustUnsigned: true });
       if (!skill) {
         return {
           error: `No skill file found for "${domain}". Use apitap_capture to capture it first.`,
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
           domain,
           _skipSsrfCheck: options._skipSsrfCheck,
         });
-        return { status: result.status, data: result.data };
+        return wrapUntrusted({ status: result.status, data: result.data });
       } catch (err: any) {
         return { error: err.message };
       }
@@ -142,6 +147,13 @@ export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
       const duration = (args.duration as number) ?? 30;
       const allDomains = (args.allDomains as boolean) ?? false;
 
+      // M19: SSRF validation before capture
+      const { resolveAndValidateUrl } = await import('./skill/ssrf.js');
+      const ssrfCheck = await resolveAndValidateUrl(url);
+      if (!ssrfCheck.safe) {
+        return { error: `Blocked: ${ssrfCheck.reason}` };
+      }
+
       // Shell out to CLI for capture (it handles browser lifecycle, signing, etc.)
       const { execFile } = await import('node:child_process');
       const { promisify } = await import('node:util');
@@ -155,7 +167,7 @@ export function createPlugin(options: PluginOptions = {}): Plugin {
           timeout: (duration + 30) * 1000,
           env: { ...process.env, ...(skillsDir ? { APITAP_SKILLS_DIR: skillsDir } : {}) },
         });
-        return JSON.parse(stdout);
+        return wrapUntrusted(JSON.parse(stdout));
       } catch (err: any) {
         return { error: `Capture failed: ${err.message}` };
       }

package/src/read/decoders/reddit.ts

@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ async function recoverDeletedComments(
   const recovered = new Map<string, { author: string; body: string }>();
   if (commentIds.length === 0) return recovered;
 
-  // Third-party disclosure: PullPush is an external service.
-  // Users can opt out via APITAP_NO_THIRD_PARTY=1.
-  if (process.env.APITAP_NO_THIRD_PARTY === '1') return recovered;
+  // M21: Third-party requests are opt-in, not opt-out.
+  // PullPush is an external service — only contact it if explicitly enabled.
+  if (process.env.APITAP_THIRD_PARTY !== '1') return recovered;
 
   try {
     const ids = commentIds.join(',');

package/src/replay/engine.ts

@@ -139,6 +139,41 @@ function normalizeOptions(
   return { params: optionsOrParams as Record<string, string> };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Check if redirect host is safe to send auth to.
+ * Allows exact match or single-level subdomain only (H4 fix).
+ */
+function isSafeAuthRedirectHost(originalHost: string, redirectHost: string): boolean {
+  if (redirectHost === originalHost) return true;
+  if (redirectHost.endsWith('.' + originalHost)) {
+    const prefix = redirectHost.slice(0, -(originalHost.length + 1));
+    // Only allow single-level subdomain (no dots in prefix)
+    return !prefix.includes('.');
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Strip auth headers from redirect request if cross-domain (H4 fix).
+ * Shared between initial and retry redirect paths.
+ */
+function stripAuthForRedirect(
+  headers: Record<string, string>,
+  originalHost: string,
+  redirectHost: string,
+): Record<string, string> {
+  const redirectHeaders = { ...headers };
+  if (!isSafeAuthRedirectHost(originalHost, redirectHost)) {
+    delete redirectHeaders['authorization'];
+    for (const key of Object.keys(redirectHeaders)) {
+      if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' || redirectHeaders[key] === '[stored]') {
+        delete redirectHeaders[key];
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return redirectHeaders;
+}
+
 /**
  * Wrap a 401/403 response with structured auth guidance.
  */
@@ -209,7 +244,7 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
   // SSRF validation — resolve DNS and check the IP isn't private/internal.
   // We do NOT substitute the IP into the URL because that breaks TLS/SNI
   // for sites behind CDNs (Cloudflare, etc.) where the cert is for the hostname.
-  // The DNS check still prevents rebinding attacks by validating at request time.
+  // M15: We re-validate DNS after fetch to narrow the TOCTOU window.
   const fetchUrl = url.toString();
   if (!options._skipSsrfCheck) {
     const ssrfCheck = await resolveAndValidateUrl(url.toString());
@@ -237,6 +272,19 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
     }
   }
 
+  // Domain-lock: verify request URL matches skill domain before injecting auth (C1 fix).
+  // validateSkillFile() enforces baseUrl-domain consistency at load time.
+  // This is defense-in-depth for manually-constructed SkillFile objects.
+  if (authManager && domain && !options._skipSsrfCheck) {
+    const fetchHost = url.hostname;
+    if (fetchHost !== skill.domain && !fetchHost.endsWith('.' + skill.domain)) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Domain-lock violation: request host "${fetchHost}" does not match skill domain "${skill.domain}". ` +
+        `Auth injection blocked to prevent credential exfiltration.`
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
   // Inject auth header from auth manager (if available)
   if (authManager && domain) {
     const auth = endpoint.isolatedAuth
@@ -376,6 +424,16 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
     redirect: 'manual',  // Don't auto-follow redirects
   });
 
+  // M15: Post-fetch DNS re-validation to narrow TOCTOU window.
+  // Re-resolves DNS and checks if the hostname now points to a private IP
+  // (indicates DNS rebinding attack between our pre-check and the actual connection).
+  if (!options._skipSsrfCheck && url.hostname && !url.hostname.match(/^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/)) {
+    const postCheck = await resolveAndValidateUrl(fetchUrl);
+    if (!postCheck.safe) {
+      throw new Error(`DNS rebinding detected (post-fetch): ${postCheck.reason}`);
+    }
+  }
+
   // Handle redirects with SSRF validation (single hop only)
   if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
     const location = response.headers.get('location');
@@ -388,18 +446,8 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
           throw new Error(`Redirect blocked (SSRF): ${redirectCheck.reason}`);
         }
       }
-      // Strip auth headers before cross-domain redirect
-      const redirectHeaders = { ...headers };
-      const originalHost = url.hostname;
-      const redirectHost = redirectUrl.hostname;
-      if (redirectHost !== originalHost && !redirectHost.endsWith('.' + originalHost)) {
-        delete redirectHeaders['authorization'];
-        for (const key of Object.keys(redirectHeaders)) {
-          if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' || redirectHeaders[key] === '[stored]') {
-            delete redirectHeaders[key];
-          }
-        }
-      }
+      // Strip auth headers before cross-domain redirect (uses shared function)
+      const redirectHeaders = stripAuthForRedirect(headers, url.hostname, redirectUrl.hostname);
       // Follow the redirect manually (single hop to prevent chains)
       response = await fetch(redirectFetchUrl, {
         method: 'GET',  // Redirects typically become GET
@@ -437,7 +485,7 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
         redirect: 'manual',
       });
 
-      // Handle redirects on retry (single hop)
+      // Handle redirects on retry (single hop) — with auth stripping (H4 fix)
       if (retryResponse.status >= 300 && retryResponse.status < 400) {
         const location = retryResponse.headers.get('location');
         if (location) {
@@ -449,9 +497,11 @@ export async function replayEndpoint(
               throw new Error(`Redirect blocked (SSRF): ${redirectCheck.reason}`);
             }
           }
+          // Strip auth headers on cross-domain redirect (same logic as initial path)
+          const retryRedirectHeaders = stripAuthForRedirect(headers, url.hostname, redirectUrl.hostname);
           retryResponse = await fetch(retryRedirectFetchUrl, {
             method: 'GET',
-            headers,
+            headers: retryRedirectHeaders,
             signal: AbortSignal.timeout(30_000),
             redirect: 'manual',
           });

package/src/serve.ts

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ export function buildServeTools(skill: SkillFile): ServeTool[] {
 export interface ServeOptions {
   skillsDir?: string;
   noAuth?: boolean;
+  /** Allow loading unsigned skill files */
+  trustUnsigned?: boolean;
   /** @internal Skip SSRF validation — for testing only */
   _skipSsrfCheck?: boolean;
 }
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ export async function createServeServer(
   domain: string,
   options: ServeOptions = {},
 ): Promise<McpServer> {
-  const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, options.skillsDir);
+  const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, options.skillsDir, { trustUnsigned: options.trustUnsigned });
   if (!skill) {
     throw new Error(`No skill file found for "${domain}". Run: apitap capture ${domain}`);
   }
@@ -146,11 +148,18 @@ export async function createServeServer(
             _skipSsrfCheck: options._skipSsrfCheck,
           });
 
+          // M22: Mark responses as untrusted external content
           return {
             content: [{
               type: 'text' as const,
               text: JSON.stringify({ status: result.status, data: result.data }),
             }],
+            _meta: {
+              externalContent: {
+                untrusted: true,
+                source: `apitap-serve-${domain}`,
+              },
+            },
           };
         } catch (err: any) {
           console.error('Replay failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));

package/src/skill/generator.ts

@@ -316,10 +316,10 @@ export class SkillGenerator {
     this.totalNetworkBytes += exchange.response.body.length;
 
     if (this.endpoints.has(key)) {
-      // Store duplicate body for cross-request diffing (Strategy 1)
+      // Store duplicate body for cross-request diffing (Strategy 1) — scrubbed (H3 fix)
       if (exchange.request.postData) {
         const bodies = this.exchangeBodies.get(key);
-        if (bodies) bodies.push(exchange.request.postData);
+        if (bodies) bodies.push(this.scrubBodyString(exchange.request.postData));
       }
       return null;
     }
@@ -455,9 +455,17 @@ export class SkillGenerator {
 
     this.endpoints.set(key, endpoint);
 
-    // Store first body for cross-request diffing
+    // Store first body for cross-request diffing (scrub sensitive fields — H3 fix)
     if (exchange.request.postData) {
-      this.exchangeBodies.set(key, [exchange.request.postData]);
+      this.exchangeBodies.set(key, [this.scrubBodyString(exchange.request.postData)]);
+    }
+
+    // Clear auth values from exchange to reduce credential exposure window (H3 fix)
+    for (const key of Object.keys(exchange.request.headers)) {
+      const lower = key.toLowerCase();
+      if (AUTH_HEADERS.has(lower) || lower === 'cookie') {
+        exchange.request.headers[key] = '[scrubbed]';
+      }
     }
 
     return endpoint;
@@ -513,6 +521,23 @@ export class SkillGenerator {
     this.totalNetworkBytes += bytes;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Scrub sensitive fields from a POST body string for intermediate storage (H3 fix).
+   * Preserves structure for cross-request diffing while removing credentials.
+   */
+  private scrubBodyString(bodyStr: string): string {
+    try {
+      const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyStr);
+      if (typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null) {
+        const scrubbed = scrubBody(parsed, true) as Record<string, unknown>;
+        return JSON.stringify(scrubbed);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // Non-JSON body — apply PII scrubber
+    }
+    return scrubPII(bodyStr);
+  }
+
   /** Generate the complete skill file for a domain. */
   toSkillFile(domain: string, options?: { domBytes?: number; totalRequests?: number }): SkillFile {
     // Apply cross-request diffing (Strategy 1) to endpoints with multiple bodies
@@ -559,6 +584,9 @@ export class SkillGenerator {
       };
     }
 
+    // Clear intermediate body storage to reduce credential exposure window (H3 fix)
+    this.exchangeBodies.clear();
+
     return skill;
   }
 }

package/src/skill/search.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export async function searchSkills(
   const results: SearchResult[] = [];
 
   for (const summary of summaries) {
-    const skill = await readSkillFile(summary.domain, skillsDir);
+    const skill = await readSkillFile(summary.domain, skillsDir, { trustUnsigned: true });
     if (!skill) continue;
 
     const domainLower = skill.domain.toLowerCase();

package/src/skill/signing.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,26 @@ import type { SkillFile } from '../types.js';
  */
 export function canonicalize(skill: SkillFile): string {
   const { signature: _sig, provenance: _prov, ...rest } = skill;
-  return JSON.stringify(rest, Object.keys(rest).sort());
+  return JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(rest));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recursively sort all object keys for stable canonicalization (M10 fix).
+ * Ensures identical skill files always produce the same canonical string
+ * regardless of key insertion order at any nesting level.
+ */
+function sortKeysDeep(value: unknown): unknown {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return value.map(sortKeysDeep);
+  }
+  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
+    const sorted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {
+      sorted[key] = sortKeysDeep((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key]);
+    }
+    return sorted;
+  }
+  return value;
 }
 
 /**

package/src/skill/ssrf.ts

@@ -73,8 +73,12 @@ export function validateUrl(urlString: string): ValidationResult {
     return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets IPv6 unique-local address: ${hostname}` };
   }
 
-  // IPv4 private ranges
-  const ipv4Match = hostname.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
+  // Normalize IP representations: decimal integer, octal, hex → dotted-decimal (M17 fix)
+  const normalizedIp = normalizeIpv4(hostname);
+  const ipToCheck = normalizedIp ?? hostname;
+
+  // IPv4 private/reserved ranges (M16: added CGNAT, IETF, benchmarking, reserved)
+  const ipv4Match = ipToCheck.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
   if (ipv4Match) {
     const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number);
     const first = Number(a);
@@ -104,11 +108,70 @@ export function validateUrl(urlString: string): ValidationResult {
     if (first === 169 && second === 254) {
       return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets link-local address: ${hostname}` };
     }
+    // 100.64.0.0/10 — CGNAT (RFC 6598), used in cloud/Tailscale
+    if (first === 100 && second >= 64 && second <= 127) {
+      return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets CGNAT address: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // 192.0.0.0/24 — IETF Protocol Assignments (RFC 6890)
+    if (first === 192 && second === 0 && Number(ipv4Match[3]) === 0) {
+      return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets IETF reserved address: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // 198.18.0.0/15 — Benchmarking (RFC 2544)
+    if (first === 198 && (second === 18 || second === 19)) {
+      return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets benchmarking address: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // 240.0.0.0/4 — Reserved/future use
+    if (first >= 240) {
+      return { safe: false, reason: `URL targets reserved address: ${hostname}` };
+    }
   }
 
   return { safe: true };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Normalize alternative IPv4 representations to dotted-decimal.
+ * Handles decimal integer (2130706433), octal (0177.0.0.1), and hex (0x7f.0.0.1).
+ * Returns null if hostname is not an IP address or can't be parsed.
+ */
+function normalizeIpv4(hostname: string): string | null {
+  // Already standard dotted-decimal
+  if (/^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(hostname)) {
+    return hostname;
+  }
+
+  // Pure decimal integer (e.g. 2130706433 = 127.0.0.1)
+  if (/^\d+$/.test(hostname)) {
+    const num = parseInt(hostname, 10);
+    if (num >= 0 && num <= 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+      return `${(num >>> 24) & 0xFF}.${(num >>> 16) & 0xFF}.${(num >>> 8) & 0xFF}.${num & 0xFF}`;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Dotted with octal (0-prefixed) or hex (0x-prefixed) octets
+  const parts = hostname.split('.');
+  if (parts.length === 4) {
+    const octets: number[] = [];
+    for (const part of parts) {
+      let val: number;
+      if (/^0x[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(part)) {
+        val = parseInt(part, 16);
+      } else if (/^0[0-7]+$/.test(part)) {
+        val = parseInt(part, 8);
+      } else if (/^\d+$/.test(part)) {
+        val = parseInt(part, 10);
+      } else {
+        return null; // Not an IP
+      }
+      if (val < 0 || val > 255) return null;
+      octets.push(val);
+    }
+    return octets.join('.');
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
 /**
  * Check if a resolved IP address is in a private/reserved range.
  */
@@ -148,6 +211,10 @@ function isPrivateIp(ip: string): string | null {
   if (first === 192 && second === 168) return 'private (192.168.x)';
   if (first === 169 && second === 254) return 'link-local';
   if (first === 0) return 'unspecified';
+  // M16: additional reserved ranges
+  if (first === 100 && second >= 64 && second <= 127) return 'CGNAT (100.64/10)';
+  if (first === 198 && (second === 18 || second === 19)) return 'benchmarking (198.18/15)';
+  if (first >= 240) return 'reserved (240/4)';
 
   return null;
 }

package/src/skill/store.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export async function writeSkillFile(
   skill: SkillFile,
   skillsDir: string = DEFAULT_SKILLS_DIR,
 ): Promise<string> {
-  await mkdir(skillsDir, { recursive: true });
+  await mkdir(skillsDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
   await ensureGitignore(skillsDir);
   const filePath = skillPath(skill.domain, skillsDir);
   await writeFile(filePath, JSON.stringify(skill, null, 2) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
@@ -47,7 +47,12 @@ export async function writeSkillFile(
 export async function readSkillFile(
   domain: string,
   skillsDir: string = DEFAULT_SKILLS_DIR,
-  options?: { verifySignature?: boolean; signingKey?: Buffer }
+  options?: {
+    verifySignature?: boolean;
+    signingKey?: Buffer;
+    /** Allow loading unsigned files without throwing. Tampered signed files still reject. */
+    trustUnsigned?: boolean;
+  }
 ): Promise<SkillFile | null> {
   // Validate domain before file I/O — path traversal should throw, not return null
   const path = skillPath(domain, skillsDir);
@@ -56,18 +61,31 @@ export async function readSkillFile(
     const raw = JSON.parse(content);
     const skill = validateSkillFile(raw);
 
-    // If verification requested, check signature
-    if (options?.verifySignature && options.signingKey) {
+    // Signature verification is ON by default (H1 fix)
+    const shouldVerify = options?.verifySignature !== false;
+    if (shouldVerify) {
+      // Auto-derive signing key if not provided
+      let signingKey = options?.signingKey;
+      if (!signingKey) {
+        const { deriveSigningKey } = await import('../auth/crypto.js');
+        const { getMachineId } = await import('../auth/manager.js');
+        const machineId = await getMachineId();
+        signingKey = deriveSigningKey(machineId);
+      }
+
       if (skill.provenance === 'imported') {
-        // Imported files had foreign signature stripped — can't verify, warn only
-        // Future: re-sign on import with local key
+        // Imported files had foreign signature stripped — can't verify
       } else if (!skill.signature) {
-        // Phase 2: warn for unsigned files, don't reject
-        // (user-created or pre-signing files are legitimately unsigned)
-        console.error(`[apitap] Warning: skill file for ${domain} is unsigned`);
+        // Unsigned files are rejected unless trustUnsigned is set
+        if (!options?.trustUnsigned) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Skill file for ${domain} is unsigned and cannot be verified. ` +
+            `Re-capture or re-import the skill file, or use --trust-unsigned to load it.`
+          );
+        }
       } else {
         const { verifySignature } = await import('./signing.js');
-        if (!verifySignature(skill, options.signingKey)) {
+        if (!verifySignature(skill, signingKey)) {
           throw new Error(`Skill file signature verification failed for ${domain} — file may be tampered`);
         }
       }
@@ -96,7 +114,7 @@ export async function listSkillFiles(
     if (!file.endsWith('.json')) continue;
     const domain = file.replace(/\.json$/, '');
     if (!DOMAIN_RE.test(domain)) continue; // skip non-conforming filenames
-    const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, skillsDir);
+    const skill = await readSkillFile(domain, skillsDir, { trustUnsigned: true });
     if (skill) {
       summaries.push({
         domain: skill.domain,