@apifuse/provider-sdk 2.2.0-beta.4 → 2.2.0-beta.41

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import type ms from "ms";
+import type { HealthScenario } from "./health-scenario.js";
+import type { SerializedCookieJar } from "tough-cookie";
 import type { infer as ZodInfer, ZodType } from "zod";
 /** Minimal Standard Schema v1 shape accepted by provider operations. */
 export interface StandardSchemaV1<Input = unknown, Output = Input> {
@@ -46,6 +48,8 @@ export interface OperationToolRouterMetadata {
     riskClass?: OperationRiskClass;
     /** OpenAI remote-MCP approval hint. Defaults from riskClass. */
     approval?: OperationApprovalPolicy;
+    /** Canonical operation-level connection requirement consumed by the registry and Gateway. */
+    connectionMode?: "none" | "optional" | "required";
     /** Override connection requirement when provider auth + openWorld inference is insufficient. */
     requiresConnection?: boolean;
     /** Public argument used to resolve the tenant-owned connection. Defaults to externalRef. */
@@ -193,6 +197,54 @@ export interface SmsOtpMatcherDefinition {
     /** Runtime/fixture helper. Not serialized into generated registry artifacts. */
     extractOtp(body: string): string | null;
 }
+export interface ProviderOcrConfig {
+    readonly mode: "required" | "optional";
+}
+export type OcrImageInput = {
+    readonly kind: "base64";
+    readonly data: string;
+    readonly mediaType?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "url";
+    readonly url: string;
+};
+export interface OcrRecognizeRequest {
+    readonly image: OcrImageInput;
+    readonly hint?: "captcha" | "document" | "generic";
+    readonly prompt?: string;
+    readonly maxTokens?: number;
+    readonly timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+export interface OcrWarning {
+    readonly code: string;
+    readonly message: string;
+}
+export interface OcrResult {
+    readonly text: string;
+    readonly model: string;
+    readonly warnings?: readonly OcrWarning[];
+}
+export interface OcrCaptchaOptions {
+    readonly length?: number;
+    /** Allowed characters. A RegExp is applied to each character, not to the whole text. */
+    readonly charset?: string | RegExp;
+    readonly caseSensitive?: boolean;
+    readonly maxCandidates?: number;
+}
+export interface OcrCaptchaCandidate {
+    readonly text: string;
+    readonly satisfiesConstraints: boolean;
+}
+export interface OcrCaptchaResult {
+    readonly text: string;
+    readonly candidates: readonly OcrCaptchaCandidate[];
+    readonly satisfiesConstraints: boolean;
+    readonly model: string;
+}
+export interface OcrContext {
+    recognize(request: OcrRecognizeRequest): Promise<OcrResult>;
+    extractCaptchaText(image: OcrImageInput, options?: OcrCaptchaOptions): Promise<OcrCaptchaResult>;
+}
 export type SttTranscribeMode = "general" | "otp";
 export type SttPromptPolicy = "none" | "default-hint" | "custom-hint";
 export type SttUnsupportedOptionPolicy = "warn" | "error";
@@ -200,6 +252,106 @@ export type ProviderSttMode = "optional" | "required";
 export interface ProviderSttConfig {
     mode: ProviderSttMode;
 }
+/**
+ * Union order is documentation only.
+ *
+ * The SDK owns the default hosted-vendor fallback policy and derives the chain
+ * from each provider's declared challenge kinds. Hosted solvers are preferred
+ * with `capsolver` ahead of `2captcha` in that policy.
+ *
+ * `browser` is the in-house CDP pool and remains opt-in; it is excluded from the
+ * default chain. `custom` is likewise reserved for provider-specific configuration.
+ *
+ * `ProviderResolverConfig.vendors` overrides the SDK policy when declared.
+ */
+export type ProviderResolverVendor = "browser" | "capsolver" | "capmonster" | "2captcha" | "custom";
+/**
+ * Token-family kinds resolve to `{ form: "token" }`. Cookie-family kinds resolve
+ * to `{ form: "cookies" }`; network-identity binding is defined per kind. `aws_waf`
+ * was measured portable across residential leases on buyee, while `cf_clearance`
+ * remains unmeasured here and is treated as identity-scoped because it is widely
+ * described as IP-bound.
+ */
+export type ProviderChallenge = {
+    readonly kind: "turnstile";
+    readonly siteKey: string;
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    readonly action?: string;
+    readonly cdata?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "recaptcha_v2";
+    readonly siteKey: string;
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "recaptcha_v3";
+    readonly siteKey: string;
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    readonly action: string;
+    readonly minScore?: number;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "hcaptcha";
+    readonly siteKey: string;
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "cloudflare_interstitial";
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    readonly blockedHtml?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "aws_waf";
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    /** `window.gokuProps.key`; solver vendors require it, while `"browser"` does not. */
+    readonly siteKey?: string;
+    readonly captchaScript?: string;
+    readonly context?: string;
+    readonly iv?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "akamai_sec_cpt";
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    /** The admitted challenge document, needed for tile/context extraction. */
+    readonly challengeHtml?: string;
+} | {
+    readonly kind: "akamai_sensor";
+    readonly pageUrl: string;
+    /** Upstream sensor script URL the payload must be POSTed to. */
+    readonly scriptUrl: string;
+    /** Current `_abck` cookie value, rotates each round. */
+    readonly abck?: string;
+    /** Current `bm_sz` / `ak_bmsc` value when the upstream set one. */
+    readonly bmsz?: string;
+    /** Bot Manager major version when known ("3" measured on zozo.jp). */
+    readonly version?: string;
+};
+export type ProviderChallengeKind = ProviderChallenge["kind"];
+/**
+ * Token solutions carry no network-identity binding. Cookie-solution binding is
+ * per challenge kind: `aws_waf` was measured portable across residential leases
+ * on buyee, while `cf_clearance` is unmeasured here and treated as scoped to the
+ * identity that produced it. The provider attaches the returned cookies to its
+ * own requests.
+ */
+export type ChallengeSolution = {
+    readonly form: "token";
+    readonly token: string;
+} | {
+    readonly form: "cookies";
+    readonly cookies: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+    readonly userAgent: string;
+    /** Epoch seconds copied from the upstream cookie's own expiry attribute; never a constant. */
+    readonly expires?: number;
+};
+export interface ProviderResolverConfig {
+    /** Optional ordered override for the SDK-owned vendor fallback chain. */
+    readonly vendors?: readonly ProviderResolverVendor[];
+    /** Challenge kinds this provider is permitted to request. */
+    readonly kinds: readonly ProviderChallengeKind[];
+    /**
+     * Client fingerprint profile the SDK must use when reaching this upstream.
+     * Measured on zozo.jp: Chrome/Firefox profiles are refused 403 before any
+     * challenge is served, while a Safari profile is admitted. Provider-declared
+     * because only the provider knows its upstream's admission rule.
+     */
+    readonly clientProfile?: string;
+}
 export type SttAudioInput = {
     kind: "base64";
     data: string;
@@ -264,6 +416,9 @@ export interface SttContext {
     transcribe(request: SttTranscribeRequest): Promise<SttTranscript>;
     extractVerificationCode(text: string, options?: SttVerificationCodeOptions): VerificationCodeExtractionResult;
 }
+export interface ResolverContext {
+    solve(challenge: ProviderChallenge, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<ChallengeSolution>;
+}
 export interface HealthJourneySchedule {
     kind: "interval";
     /** ISO 8601 duration, for example PT8H. */
@@ -395,7 +550,7 @@ export interface HealthJourneyRunResult {
     label?: string;
     metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
-export interface HealthJourneyDefinition {
+interface HealthJourneyDefinitionBase {
     id: string;
     title?: string;
     description?: string;
@@ -407,8 +562,14 @@ export interface HealthJourneyDefinition {
     requiredSecrets?: readonly string[];
     manualTrigger?: HealthJourneyManualTriggerPolicy;
     steps: readonly [HealthJourneyStep, ...HealthJourneyStep[]];
-    run?: (ctx: HealthJourneyRunContext) => Promise<HealthJourneyRunResult | undefined>;
 }
+export type HealthJourneyDefinition = HealthJourneyDefinitionBase & ({
+    run: (ctx: HealthJourneyRunContext) => Promise<HealthJourneyRunResult | undefined>;
+    scenario?: never;
+} | {
+    scenario: HealthScenario;
+    run?: never;
+});
 /**
  * Health-check authoring surface owned by `@apifuse/provider-sdk`.
  *
@@ -479,13 +640,22 @@ export interface HealthCheckCaseResult {
  * so authors get IntelliSense and compile-time errors when accessing fields
  * that do not exist on the operation's declared output schema.
  */
-export interface HealthCheckCase<TInput = unknown, TOutput = unknown> {
+export type HealthCheckCase<TInput = unknown, TOutput = unknown> = {
     /** Human-readable case name; unique within the suite. */
     name: string;
     /** Optional longer description shown on ops dashboards. */
     description?: string;
     /** Input passed to the operation handler for this case. */
     input: TInput;
+    /** Override per-case degradation threshold (ms); falls back to the suite default. */
+    degradedThresholdMs?: number;
+    /** Override per-case timeout in milliseconds; falls back to the suite/provider/runtime default. */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Expected outcome for "negative" cases (e.g., expecting a degraded baseline). Default: `"ok"`. */
+    expectedStatus?: "ok" | "degraded";
+    /** Runtime gate (env-driven); if returns false the case is skipped & logged. */
+    enabled?: () => boolean;
+} & ({
     /**
      * Optional runtime input preparation hook for volatile probes. Use this when
      * the durable probe input must be derived from a live read-only operation
@@ -503,15 +673,14 @@ export interface HealthCheckCase<TInput = unknown, TOutput = unknown> {
      * + lambda only.
      */
     assertions: (ctx: HealthCheckAssertionContext<TOutput>) => void | Promise<void> | HealthCheckCaseResult | Promise<HealthCheckCaseResult>;
-    /** Override per-case degradation threshold (ms); falls back to the suite default. */
-    degradedThresholdMs?: number;
-    /** Override per-case timeout in milliseconds; falls back to the suite/provider/runtime default. */
-    timeoutMs?: number;
-    /** Expected outcome for "negative" cases (e.g., expecting a degraded baseline). Default: `"ok"`. */
-    expectedStatus?: "ok" | "degraded";
-    /** Runtime gate (env-driven); if returns false the case is skipped & logged. */
-    enabled?: () => boolean;
-}
+    /** Declarative scenarios replace the imperative preparation and assertion hooks. */
+    scenario?: never;
+} | {
+    /** Declarative scenario executed by the health-monitor runtime. */
+    scenario: HealthScenario;
+    prepareInput?: never;
+    assertions?: never;
+});
 /**
  * Operation-level health-check suite. At least one case is required when
  * present. All cases share the suite's interval and default timeout.
@@ -609,9 +778,11 @@ export interface HealthMonitorProbeOverride {
     /** Optional degraded threshold override for generated registry probes. */
     degradedThresholdMs?: number;
 }
+export declare const VALID_OPERATION_ERROR_STATUSES: readonly [400, 401, 404, 409, 410, 422, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504];
+export type ProviderErrorStatus = (typeof VALID_OPERATION_ERROR_STATUSES)[number];
 export interface OperationErrorCode {
     code: string;
-    status?: number;
+    status?: ProviderErrorStatus;
     description: string;
     retryable?: boolean;
 }
@@ -645,12 +816,32 @@ export interface StealthProfile {
     h2Settings?: Record<string, unknown>;
     headerOrder?: string[];
 }
-export type AuthMode = "none" | "platform-managed" | "credentials" | "oauth2";
+export type AuthMode = "none" | "platform-managed" | "credentials" | "oauth2" | "oauth2_proxied";
 export type ConnectionMode = AuthMode;
 export type ProviderReviewed = "first-party" | "community" | "staging";
 export type ProviderAccessVisibility = "public" | "early_access";
 export type ProviderProxyMode = "disabled" | "optional" | "required";
-export type ProviderProxyProvider = "smartproxy" | "decodo" | "custom";
+/**
+ * Proxy egress vendors. These are FOUR DISTINCT services — do not conflate them
+ * (a common mistake because the names collide with a well-known rebrand):
+ *
+ * - `smartproxy` — **api.smartproxy.org**, a residential proxy with an IP
+ *	 *extraction/allocation* API (app_key → a pool of raw `ip:port` CONNECT
+ *	 endpoints). This is our own vendor. It is NOT the company formerly named
+ *	 "Smartproxy". Credentials: `APIFUSE__PROXY__SMARTPROXY_APP_KEY`.
+ * - `nodemaven` — **gate.nodemaven.com**, a *gateway* proxy with static
+ *	 credentials; geo/session encoded in the username, no allocation API.
+ * - `decodo` — **decodo.com**, the *gateway* proxy that was named "Smartproxy"
+ *	 (smartproxy.com) before its 2025 rebrand to Decodo. Sticky sessions via
+ *	 username params. A different company from `smartproxy` above.
+ *	 **@deprecated** — unused; no managed adapter. Declare a
+ *	 `ProviderProxyPolicy` using `smartproxy` or `nodemaven` instead; the
+ *	 `smartproxy` allocator requires `APIFUSE__PROXY__SMARTPROXY_APP_KEY`.
+ * - `custom` — **@deprecated** static proxy marker with no managed adapter.
+ *	 Use `ProviderProxyPolicy` with `smartproxy`/`nodemaven`; the `smartproxy`
+ *	 allocator requires `APIFUSE__PROXY__SMARTPROXY_APP_KEY`.
+ */
+export type ProviderProxyProvider = "smartproxy" | "nodemaven" | "decodo" | "custom";
 export type ProviderProxySessionAffinity = "request" | "operation" | "auth-flow" | "connection";
 export interface ProviderProxyPolicy {
     /**
@@ -658,7 +849,18 @@ export interface ProviderProxyPolicy {
      * certificate verification, and vendor allocator endpoints are SDK-owned.
      */
     mode: ProviderProxyMode;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Use `providers: [...]` to declare an ordered vendor fallback
+     * chain. A single-element `providers` list is equivalent to this field.
+     */
     provider?: ProviderProxyProvider;
+    /**
+     * Ordered proxy-vendor fallback chain. The SDK tries each vendor in order and
+     * fails over to the next when a vendor lacks credentials or its allocation /
+     * transport is exhausted. When omitted, `provider` (or the platform default)
+     * is used as a single-vendor chain.
+     */
+    providers?: ProviderProxyProvider[];
     geo?: {
         /** ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code, for example KR or US. */
         country?: Iso3166Alpha2CountryCode;
@@ -669,6 +871,12 @@ export interface ProviderProxyPolicy {
         affinity?: ProviderProxySessionAffinity;
         lifetimeMinutes?: number;
         poolSize?: number;
+        /**
+         * Seconds before hard sticky expiry at which native connections receive
+         * the `expiring` event so the provider can drain and reconnect cleanly.
+         * Declared by the provider; the SDK does not assume a default cut point.
+         */
+        drainLeadSeconds?: number;
     };
 }
 export type ProviderProxyConfig = boolean | ProviderProxyPolicy;
@@ -677,9 +885,9 @@ export interface ProviderAccessConfig {
      * Provider-level rollout visibility.
      *
      * - `public`: visible in public docs/catalog/OpenAPI and callable through
-     *   the existing provider policy stack.
+     *	 the existing provider policy stack.
      * - `early_access`: hidden from public discovery and callable only when the
-     *   active customer organization has a provider-level access grant.
+     *	 active customer organization has a provider-level access grant.
      *
      * This is intentionally provider-level only. It does not alter auth mode,
      * operation schemas, health-check authoring, `openWorld`, or Connection
@@ -810,6 +1018,11 @@ export interface HttpRetrySummary {
 export interface RequestOptions {
     headers?: Record<string, string>;
     params?: RequestParams;
+    /**
+     * Query parameters whose values contain credentials or other secret material.
+     * They are sent like `params`, but redacted from SDK errors, traces, and recorded fixtures.
+     */
+    sensitiveParams?: Record<string, string>;
     proxy?: string;
     timeout?: number;
     /**
@@ -818,12 +1031,33 @@ export interface RequestOptions {
      */
     throwOnHttpError?: boolean;
     retry?: boolean | HttpRetryPreset | HttpRetryOptions;
+    /**
+     * Opt-in redirect-hop enforcement for ctx.http. When present, redirects are
+     * evaluated before the next request is issued. Existing callers that omit
+     * this policy retain the native fetch redirect behavior.
+     */
+    redirectPolicy?: HttpRedirectPolicy;
 }
+export type RedirectRunReason = "completed" | "stopped" | "max_hops" | "missing_location" | "loop";
+export type HttpRedirectPolicyMode = "same-origin";
+export interface HttpRedirectPolicy {
+    /** Only follow redirects whose canonical scheme, host, and port match the initial URL. */
+    mode: HttpRedirectPolicyMode;
+    /** Maximum number of redirect hops that may be followed. Must be an integer from 0 to 20. */
+    maxHops: number;
+}
+export type HttpRedirectFailureReason = Exclude<RedirectRunReason, "completed">;
 export type HttpMethod = "HEAD" | "head" | "GET" | "get" | "POST" | "post" | "PUT" | "put" | "DELETE" | "delete" | "OPTIONS" | "options" | "TRACE" | "trace" | "PATCH" | "patch";
-export interface StealthFetchOptions extends RequestOptions {
+export interface StealthFetchOptions extends Omit<RequestOptions, "redirectPolicy"> {
     method?: HttpMethod;
     body?: string | Buffer;
     redirect?: "follow" | "manual" | "error";
+    /**
+     * Maximum decoded response-body bytes to buffer. When set, the stealth
+     * transport aborts the response and throws `response_too_large` if the
+     * declared or streamed body exceeds this limit.
+     */
+    maxBodyBytes?: number;
     /**
      * Offsets policy-managed proxy pool selection for caller-managed retries.
      * Use when a request receives an upstream challenge page rather than a
@@ -843,17 +1077,42 @@ export interface StealthFetchOptions extends RequestOptions {
     };
 }
 export interface CookieJar {
-    get(name: string): string | undefined;
-    getAll(): Record<string, string>;
-    toString(): string;
-    find?(predicate: (cookie: string) => boolean): string | undefined;
+    /** URL-less reads use the jar's response URL or session base URL. */
+    get(name: string, url?: string): string | undefined;
+    getAll(url?: string): Record<string, string>;
+    toString(url?: string): string;
+    find?(predicate: (cookie: string) => boolean, url?: string): string | undefined;
 }
+/**
+ * Version 1 of the JSON-safe, attribute-preserving stealth cookie store.
+ * The nested jar is tough-cookie's serialized form and retains cookie origin,
+ * Path, Secure, expiry, host-only, and other RFC attributes.
+ */
+export interface StealthCookieStoreV1 {
+    readonly version: 1;
+    readonly jar: SerializedCookieJar;
+}
+/** Cookie persistence formats understood by this SDK version. */
+export type StealthCookieStore = StealthCookieStoreV1;
 export interface StealthSessionCookies extends CookieJar {
-    has(name: string): boolean;
-    setFromCookieStrings(cookieStrings: readonly string[]): void;
-    toHeader(): string;
+    has(name: string, url?: string): boolean;
+    /** URL-less writes are scoped to the session base URL. */
+    setFromCookieStrings(cookieStrings: readonly string[], url?: string): void;
+    toHeader(url?: string): string;
+    /**
+     * Returns every cookie as a flat name/value map, collapsing duplicate names.
+     * @deprecated Use serialize() for lossless, attribute-preserving persistence.
+     */
     snapshot(): Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Restores flat values as host-only, Path=/ cookies on the session base URL.
+     * @deprecated Use deserialize() with state produced by serialize().
+     */
     restore(cookies: Record<string, string>): void;
+    /** Returns a versioned, JSON-safe, attribute-preserving representation of every cookie. */
+    serialize(): StealthCookieStoreV1;
+    /** Replaces the jar with a previously serialized, attribute-preserving cookie store. */
+    deserialize(state: StealthCookieStore): void;
     clear(): void;
 }
 export interface DeclarativeStealthResponse {
@@ -895,8 +1154,14 @@ export interface StealthRedirectRunOptions extends Omit<StealthFetchOptions, "re
 export interface StealthRedirectRunResult {
     final: StealthResponse;
     hops: StealthRedirectHop[];
-    reason: "completed" | "stopped" | "max_hops" | "missing_location" | "loop";
+    reason: RedirectRunReason;
+    /**
+     * Complete flat view across all redirect hosts. Attributes and duplicate names are lost.
+     * @deprecated Use cookieStore for lossless persistence.
+     */
     cookies: Record<string, string>;
+    /** Versioned, attribute-preserving cookie state accumulated across the redirect chain. */
+    cookieStore: StealthCookieStoreV1;
 }
 export interface StealthSession {
     fetch(url: string, options?: StealthFetchOptions): Promise<StealthResponse>;
@@ -959,11 +1224,157 @@ export interface HttpClient {
     stream(url: string, options?: RequestWithMethodOptions): Promise<HttpStreamResponse>;
     sse(url: string, options?: RequestWithMethodOptions): Promise<AsyncIterable<SseMessage>>;
 }
+/** Request-scoped file reference accepted by provider operation inputs. */
+export interface ProviderFileRef {
+    readonly type: "request_file";
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly filename: string;
+    readonly mime_type?: string;
+    readonly size: number;
+    readonly sha256?: string;
+}
+/** File body resolved from a request-scoped {@link ProviderFileRef}. */
+export type ProviderResolvedFile = Omit<ProviderFileRef, "mime_type"> & {
+    readonly mimeType?: string;
+    arrayBuffer(): Promise<ArrayBuffer>;
+    bytes(): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    stream(): ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
+};
+/** Resolver supplied by runtimes that accept request-scoped file inputs. */
+export interface ProviderFilesContext {
+    has(input: string | ProviderFileRef): boolean;
+    resolve(input: string | ProviderFileRef): Promise<ProviderResolvedFile>;
+}
+export type NativeTcpTlsMode = "required" | "allowed" | "disabled";
+export interface NativeTcpPortRange {
+    readonly start: number;
+    readonly end: number;
+}
+/** Static native TCP egress declared by a provider. */
+export interface NativeTcpEgressRule {
+    readonly host: string;
+    readonly ports: readonly number[];
+    readonly tls: NativeTcpTlsMode;
+}
+/**
+ * Bounded native TCP egress discovered through a declared bootstrap endpoint.
+ * Host suffixes are exact DNS suffixes, not wildcard patterns.
+ * Dynamic rules must declare at least one target host selector through
+ * targetHostSuffixes, targetIpv4Cidrs, and/or targetIpv6Cidrs. Literal grant
+ * sources and targets match only same-family selectors (except exact
+ * sourceHost); DNS names match only host/suffix selectors. IPv4-mapped and
+ * IPv4-compatible IPv6 literals are authorized only by IPv4 CIDRs.
+ *
+ * Dynamic rules are ordered. The first rule whose source, target, port, and TLS
+ * selectors match exclusively owns the grant; its ttlMs and maxGrants bounds
+ * apply, and an exhausted/shorter rule never falls through to a later overlap.
+ * Every rule must declare a source host selector, source port list/range, and
+ * target port list/range; omitted ttlMs/maxGrants remain unbounded.
+ */
+export interface NativeTcpDynamicEgressRule {
+    readonly sourceHost?: string;
+    readonly sourceHostSuffixes?: readonly string[];
+    readonly sourceIpv4Cidrs?: readonly string[];
+    readonly sourceIpv6Cidrs?: readonly string[];
+    readonly sourcePorts?: readonly number[];
+    readonly sourcePortRanges?: readonly NativeTcpPortRange[];
+    readonly targetHostSuffixes?: readonly string[];
+    readonly targetIpv4Cidrs?: readonly string[];
+    readonly targetIpv6Cidrs?: readonly string[];
+    readonly targetPorts?: readonly number[];
+    readonly targetPortRanges?: readonly NativeTcpPortRange[];
+    readonly tls: NativeTcpTlsMode;
+    readonly ttlMs?: number;
+    readonly maxGrants?: number;
+}
+/** Common TCP/TLS connection input supported by the native runtime. */
+export interface NativeNetworkConnectInput {
+    readonly host: string;
+    readonly port: number;
+    readonly serverName?: string;
+    readonly rejectUnauthorized?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Maximum time without a successful socket read before the connection is
+     * closed. Opt-in; when absent, reads can remain pending indefinitely.
+     */
+    readonly idleTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Maximum time allowed to establish the TCP/SOCKS/TLS connection. */
+    readonly timeoutMs?: number;
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /** Overrides the credential-derived sticky affinity key. */
+    readonly affinityKey?: string;
+}
+export type NativeNetworkConnectOptions = Omit<NativeNetworkConnectInput, "serverName" | "rejectUnauthorized">;
+export type NativeTlsConnectOptions = NativeNetworkConnectInput;
+export interface NativeNetworkDynamicGrantOptions {
+    readonly sourceHost: string;
+    readonly sourcePort: number;
+    readonly host: string;
+    readonly port: number;
+    readonly tls: NativeTcpTlsMode;
+    readonly ttlMs?: number;
+}
+export interface NativeNetworkEgressGrant {
+    revoke(): void;
+}
+/** Consumer-facing alias used by native TCP providers. */
+export type NativeTcpEgressGrant = NativeNetworkEgressGrant;
+/** Resolved egress identity for a native connection routed through a proxy. */
+export interface NativeProxyEgressInfo {
+    readonly vendor: ProviderProxyProvider;
+    readonly sticky: boolean;
+    /** Vendor sticky session id (sid). Absent for rotating sessions. */
+    readonly sessionId?: string;
+    /** Hard expiry of the sticky binding, ISO 8601. */
+    readonly expiresAt?: string;
+}
+export type NativeProxyExpiringReason = "sticky_expiry";
+export interface NativeProxyExpiringEvent {
+    readonly expiresAt: string;
+    readonly leadSeconds: number;
+    readonly reason: NativeProxyExpiringReason;
+}
+/**
+ * Cooperative drain handler. The SDK awaits this before closing a socket whose
+ * sticky proxy binding is about to expire, then force-closes at hard expiry.
+ */
+export type NativeProxyDrainHandler = (event: NativeProxyExpiringEvent) => void | Promise<void>;
+/** Typed reason recorded when the SDK closes a native connection intentionally. */
+export interface NativeNetworkCloseReason {
+    readonly code: string;
+    readonly message: string;
+}
+/** Byte-oriented connection returned by the native TCP/TLS runtime. */
+export interface NativeNetworkConnection {
+    /** Present when the connection was routed through a proxy. */
+    readonly proxy?: NativeProxyEgressInfo;
+    /** Present after an SDK-planned close, such as sticky proxy expiry. */
+    readonly closeReason?: NativeNetworkCloseReason;
+    /** Register a cooperative drain handler for sticky-expiry reconnects. */
+    onExpiring?(handler: NativeProxyDrainHandler): void;
+    read(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
+    write(data: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
+    close(): Promise<void>;
+}
+export interface NativeNetworkClient {
+    connectTcp(input: NativeNetworkConnectOptions): Promise<NativeNetworkConnection>;
+    connectTls(input: NativeTlsConnectOptions): Promise<NativeNetworkConnection>;
+    grantTcpEgress(input: NativeNetworkDynamicGrantOptions): NativeNetworkEgressGrant;
+}
+export interface NativeContext {
+    readonly network: NativeNetworkClient;
+}
+export interface NativeProviderConfig {
+    readonly network?: {
+        readonly tcp?: readonly NativeTcpEgressRule[];
+        readonly dynamicTcp?: readonly NativeTcpDynamicEgressRule[];
+    };
+}
 export interface ProviderCacheKeyOptions {
     /**
-     * Additional field names to omit from stable key material. The SDK always
-     * omits known secret-bearing names such as serviceKey, authorization,
-     * cookie, token, password, and secret.
+     * Additional field names whose values are hashed in stable key material. The
+     * SDK always hashes values under known secret-bearing names such as serviceKey,
+     * authorization, cookie, token, password, and secret.
      */
     redactFields?: string[];
 }
@@ -1036,7 +1447,18 @@ export interface BrowserFrame {
     evaluate<T>(fn: string | (() => T)): Promise<T>;
     locator(selector: string): BrowserLocator;
 }
-export type BrowserResourceMethod = "GET" | "HEAD";
+export interface BrowserCookie {
+    readonly name: string;
+    readonly value: string;
+    readonly domain: string;
+    readonly path: string;
+    /** Unix seconds. Absent for a session cookie. */
+    readonly expires?: number;
+    readonly httpOnly: boolean;
+    readonly secure: boolean;
+    readonly sameSite?: "Strict" | "Lax" | "None";
+}
+export type BrowserResourceMethod = "GET" | "HEAD" | "POST";
 export type BrowserResourceRequest = {
     readonly url: string;
     readonly method: BrowserResourceMethod;
@@ -1045,6 +1467,8 @@ export type BrowserResourceRequest = {
 };
 export type BrowserResourceBody = Buffer | Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer | string;
 export type BrowserResourceDecision = {
+    readonly action: "continue";
+} | {
     readonly action: "fulfill";
     readonly status?: number;
     readonly headers?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
@@ -1060,12 +1484,29 @@ export type BrowserResourceRoute = {
 export type BrowserResourcePolicy = {
     readonly defaultAction?: "block";
     readonly allowedMethods?: readonly BrowserResourceMethod[];
+    /**
+     * Appends an enforcing CSP header to every renderable document response
+     * while the policy is active. Existing CSP headers are retained, so this
+     * can only further restrict the document.
+     */
+    readonly documentContentSecurityPolicy?: string;
     readonly routes: readonly BrowserResourceRoute[];
 };
 export interface BrowserPage extends BrowserFrame {
     close(): Promise<void>;
+    /** Returns the user agent used by this page's browser context. */
+    userAgent(): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * Reads the browser context's cookie jar, including httpOnly cookies.
+     * Cookie expiry values are Unix seconds and are absent for session cookies.
+     */
+    cookies(): Promise<readonly BrowserCookie[]>;
     fill(selector: string, text: string): Promise<void>;
     goto(url: string): Promise<void>;
+    goto(url: string, options?: {
+        readonly timeout?: number;
+        readonly waitUntil?: "load" | "domcontentloaded";
+    }): Promise<void>;
     pageId?: string;
     screenshot(options?: {
         fullPage?: boolean;
@@ -1138,6 +1579,26 @@ export interface ProviderChoiceBindingOptions {
     connection?: boolean;
     credentialKeys?: readonly string[];
 }
+export type ProviderChoiceConsumeMode = "never" | "on-parse" | "explicit";
+export type ProviderChoiceConsumeResult = {
+    readonly status: "consumed";
+} | {
+    readonly status: "already-consumed";
+} | {
+    readonly status: "unsupported";
+};
+export type ProviderChoiceExplicitParseResult = {
+    readonly status: "active";
+    readonly payload: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Stable, opaque key for provider-owned idempotency records. */
+    readonly replayKey: string;
+    /** Atomically claims a word token. Inline tokens report unsupported. */
+    consume(): Promise<ProviderChoiceConsumeResult>;
+} | {
+    readonly status: "consumed";
+    /** Use this key to read the provider-owned result before returning an error. */
+    readonly replayKey: string;
+};
 export type ProviderChoiceStorageOptions = {
     readonly mode: "inline";
 } | {
@@ -1165,6 +1626,8 @@ export interface ProviderChoiceIssueOptions<TPayload extends Record<string, unkn
     ttlMs: number;
     nowMs?: number;
     bind?: ProviderChoiceBindingOptions;
+    /** Server storage only: standard emits four words; high emits five. */
+    strength?: "standard" | "high";
     storage?: ProviderChoiceStorageOptions;
 }
 export interface ProviderChoiceParseOptions {
@@ -1176,6 +1639,8 @@ export interface ProviderChoiceParseOptions {
     futureToleranceMs?: number;
     bind?: ProviderChoiceBindingOptions;
     storage?: ProviderChoiceStorageOptions;
+    /** Defaults to never, preserving reusable choice-token parse semantics. */
+    consume?: ProviderChoiceConsumeMode;
 }
 export interface ProviderChoiceContext {
     issue<TPayload extends Record<string, unknown>>(options: ProviderChoiceIssueOptions<TPayload> & {
@@ -1194,6 +1659,9 @@ export interface ProviderChoiceContext {
         }>;
     }): string | Promise<string>;
     issue<TPayload extends Record<string, unknown>>(options: ProviderChoiceIssueOptions<TPayload>): string | Promise<string>;
+    parse(options: ProviderChoiceParseOptions & {
+        readonly consume: "explicit";
+    }): Promise<ProviderChoiceExplicitParseResult>;
     parse(options: ProviderChoiceParseOptions & {
         readonly storage?: {
             readonly mode: "inline";
@@ -1209,7 +1677,7 @@ export interface ProviderChoiceContext {
             readonly mode: "auto";
         }>;
     }): Record<string, unknown> | Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
-    parse(options: ProviderChoiceParseOptions): Record<string, unknown>;
+    parse(options: ProviderChoiceParseOptions): Record<string, unknown> | Promise<Record<string, unknown> | ProviderChoiceExplicitParseResult>;
 }
 export interface ContextScratchpad {
     get(key: string): unknown;
@@ -1285,16 +1753,34 @@ export interface AuthFlowTerminalContext {
     }): AuthTurn;
 }
 export interface FlowContext {
+    /** Gateway auth-flow id. Required by flow-scoped auth ceremonies. */
+    flowId?: string;
     connectionId?: string;
     externalRef?: string;
     tenantId: string;
     providerId: string;
     http: HttpClient;
+    /** Durable connection-scoped runtime state. Present when the host runtime
+     * supplies one; auth ceremonies must fail closed when absent rather than
+     * fall back to bypassable in-process storage.
+     *
+     * Scoped via `ProviderRuntimeState.forConnection`: requests that resolve no
+     * connection id (pre-connection ceremonies such as first-time logins) share
+     * the documented isolated missing-connection scope. That sharing is the
+     * intended semantic — it lets counters keyed by caller identity (e.g. a
+     * login email) persist across separate ceremonies for the same caller.
+     * Flows storing entries in that scope MUST key them by caller identity;
+     * un-keyed entries would be shared across all connectionless ceremonies. */
+    readonly state?: ProviderRuntimeState;
+    /** Present when the selected runtime supplies native network capabilities. */
+    readonly native?: NativeContext;
     stealth: StealthClient;
     env: EnvContext;
     credential?: CredentialContext;
     context: ContextScratchpad;
+    ocr: OcrContext;
     stt: SttContext;
+    resolver: ResolverContext;
     auth: AuthFlowTerminalContext;
 }
 export interface AuthTurn {
@@ -1326,7 +1812,13 @@ export interface AuthFlowDefinition {
     refresh?: AuthFlowInputHandler;
 }
 export type ProviderStateDurationString = `${number}${"ms" | "s" | "m" | "h" | "d"}` | `PT${string}`;
+export type StateNamespaceScope = "connection" | "provider";
 export interface StateNamespaceOptions {
+    /**
+     * State isolation boundary. Connection scope is the default; provider scope
+     * must be selected explicitly for provider-wide coordination state.
+     */
+    scope?: StateNamespaceScope;
     /** Default TTL used when a write omits ttl. Required to avoid unbounded state. */
     defaultTtl: ProviderStateDurationString;
     /** Maximum allowed TTL; writes are rejected when they exceed this policy. */
@@ -1368,6 +1860,11 @@ export interface ProviderStateNamespace {
     increment(key: string, field: string, delta?: number, options?: StateWriteOptions): Promise<StateValue<Record<string, unknown>>>;
 }
 export interface ProviderRuntimeState {
+    /**
+     * Returns an immutable view bound to one request connection. An unresolved
+     * connection uses an isolated reserved sentinel, never the provider-global scope.
+     */
+    forConnection(connectionId: string | undefined): ProviderRuntimeState;
     namespace(name: string, options: StateNamespaceOptions): ProviderStateNamespace;
 }
 export interface ProviderContext {
@@ -1375,17 +1872,41 @@ export interface ProviderContext {
     credential: CredentialContext;
     request?: ProviderRequestContext;
     http: HttpClient;
+    /** Present for requests carrying runtime-resolvable file references. */
+    readonly files?: ProviderFilesContext;
+    /** Native network capability selected by declaration-derived contexts. */
+    readonly native: NativeContext;
     cache: ProviderCache;
     state: ProviderRuntimeState;
     stealth: StealthClient;
     browser: BrowserClient;
     trace: TraceContext;
     auth: AuthContext;
+    ocr: OcrContext;
     stt: SttContext;
+    resolver: ResolverContext;
     choice: ProviderChoiceContext;
 }
+/**
+ * The operation context exposed for one provider declaration. Capability
+ * bindings are present only when their corresponding declaration is present;
+ * trace and request remain ambient runtime bindings.
+ */
+export type ProviderContextFor<TConfig> = Pick<ProviderContext, "trace" | "request"> & ("env" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "env"> : Record<never, never>) & ("credential" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "credential"> : Record<never, never>) & ("http" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "http"> : Record<never, never>) & ("files" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "files"> : Record<never, never>) & ("native" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "native"> : Record<never, never>) & ("cache" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "cache"> : Record<never, never>) & ("state" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "state"> : Record<never, never>) & ("stealth" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "stealth"> : Record<never, never>) & ("browser" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "browser"> : Record<never, never>) & ("auth" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "auth"> : Record<never, never>) & ("ocr" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "ocr"> : Record<never, never>) & ("stt" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "stt"> : Record<never, never>) & ("resolver" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "resolver"> : Record<never, never>) & ("choice" extends keyof TConfig ? Pick<ProviderContext, "choice"> : Record<never, never>);
+export interface ProxiedOAuthConfig {
+    authorizeUrl: string;
+    tokenUrl: string;
+    customScheme: string;
+    rewriteProfile: string;
+    clientIdEnvKey: string;
+    pkce?: "S256" | "none";
+    authorizeParams?: Record<string, string>;
+    tokenParams?: Record<string, string>;
+}
 export interface AuthConfig {
     mode: AuthMode;
+    /** Browser reverse-proxy contract for providers with custom-scheme OAuth callbacks. */
+    proxied?: ProxiedOAuthConfig;
     flow?: AuthFlowDefinition;
 }
 export interface ProviderSecretDeclaration {
@@ -1417,7 +1938,7 @@ export interface OperationContractMetadata {
     lifecycle?: OperationLifecycle;
     deprecation?: OperationDeprecationMetadata;
 }
-export interface OperationDefinition<TInput extends SchemaLike = SchemaLike, TOutput extends SchemaLike = SchemaLike> {
+export interface OperationDefinition<TInput extends SchemaLike = SchemaLike, TOutput extends SchemaLike = SchemaLike, TContext = ProviderContext> {
     /**
      * Short English display title for the operation. The SDK passes it through
      * verbatim; the APIFuse registry derives the operation's en locale title
@@ -1447,10 +1968,15 @@ export interface OperationDefinition<TInput extends SchemaLike = SchemaLike, TOu
     retryOnAuthRefresh?: boolean;
     input: TInput;
     output: TOutput;
-    handler(ctx: ProviderContext, input: InferSchemaOutput<TInput>): OperationHandlerResult<InferSchemaOutput<TOutput>> | Promise<OperationHandlerResult<InferSchemaOutput<TOutput>>>;
+    handler(ctx: TContext, input: InferSchemaOutput<TInput>): OperationHandlerResult<InferSchemaOutput<TOutput>> | Promise<OperationHandlerResult<InferSchemaOutput<TOutput>>>;
     fixtures?: {
         request: InferSchemaOutput<TInput>;
         response: InferSchemaOutput<TOutput>;
+        /**
+         * KST calendar date when `response` evidence was captured. Date fields in
+         * the response align with this date, not a resolved relative request date.
+         */
+        recordedAt?: string;
     };
     upstream?: {
         baseUrl?: string;
@@ -1509,12 +2035,15 @@ export interface ProviderDefinition {
      */
     deployment?: ProviderDeploymentOverrides;
     allowedHosts?: string[];
+    native?: NativeProviderConfig;
     stealth?: {
         profile: string;
         platform: StealthPlatform;
     };
     proxy?: ProviderProxyConfig;
+    ocr?: ProviderOcrConfig;
     stt?: ProviderSttConfig;
+    resolver?: ProviderResolverConfig;
     browser?: {
         engine: BrowserEngine;
     };
@@ -1531,3 +2060,4 @@ export interface ProviderDefinition {
     healthProbe?: ProviderHealthProbeConfig;
     healthJourneys?: readonly HealthJourneyDefinition[];
 }
+export {};