@aotter/mantle 0.2.0-alpha.1 → 0.2.0-alpha.10

package/docs/adr/0002-closed-enums-for-bindings.md

@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-# ADR-0002: Closed enums for identity/time bindings
-
-**Status:** Carried over from POC v0.0.x; refreshed for v0.1.0;
-amended 2026-07-15 for verified credentials and delegated scopes.
-
-**Date**: 2026-04-30 (POC); refreshed 2026-05-03
-
-**Deciders**: phsu
-
-**Related**: [ADR-0001](0001-four-atom-manifest-model.md)
-
----
-
-## Context
-
-Two places in the v0.1 grammar accept identity-or-time-shaped
-values:
-
-1. **`x-mantle-bind`** (Schema property extension) — declares that
-   a field is server-stamped at write. The SDK fills the value;
-   the caller must not supply it.
-2. **`requires.auth.all` predicates** (Procedure auth gate) —
-   names who must be acting for the call to proceed.
-
-The straightforward design would let authors put expressions in
-these slots:
-
-```yaml
-authorId: { x-mantle-bind: "${session.user.id}" }
-createdAt: { x-mantle-bind: "${request.timestamp}" }
-```
-
-```yaml
-requires:
-  auth:
-    all:
-      - "${session.user.id == row.authorId}"
-      - "${session.user.permissions includes 'write:posts'}"
-```
-
-This is the path most CMS-shaped products go down. It immediately
-becomes a problem:
-
-- Each new use case stretches the expression language (string
-  ops, array containment, date math, lookups). The language
-  compounds.
-- The expression evaluator becomes a dependency footprint
-  (Liquid, Jinja, JEXL, custom DSL). Each is a security surface
-  (server-side template injection, sandbox escape, ReDoS).
-- Static validation becomes intractable — to know whether a
-  manifest is correct, the validator would need to type-check the
-  expression language, including its host-environment access
-  shape.
-- Author tooling (autocomplete, type inference) does not survive
-  free-form strings.
-- AI authors writing manifests are particularly bad at templating
-  languages — model output drifts into a similar-looking but
-  subtly invalid syntax (Liquid filter where Jinja was expected,
-  etc.).
-
-The same product class has already invented several of these
-languages and inherited their footguns (Hasura's permissions
-expressions, Strapi's policies, PostgREST's `PRE_REQUEST` hooks).
-Every one of them ends up either gradually closing the
-expression set or wearing the support cost of an open-grammar
-DSL.
-
-## Decision
-
-**Both binding slots use closed enums.** Any value not in the
-enum is a parse error.
-
-### `x-mantle-bind` — closed enum (v0.1)
-
-```ts
-type MantleBindValue = "ctx.user" | "ctx.staff" | "now";
-```
-
-| Value | Resolves to | Typical use |
-|---|---|---|
-| `ctx.user` | UUID of the signed-in end-user (from session); `null` if anonymous | row ownership: `authorId`, `submittedBy`, `creatorId` |
-| `ctx.staff` | UUID of the staff member acting; `null` for end-user-only paths | audit trail: `approvedBy`, `moderatedBy`, `grantedBy` |
-| `now` | Server timestamp at write (ISO-8601 with timezone) | `createdAt`, `submittedAt`, `grantedAt` |
-
-### `requires.auth.all` predicate — closed vocabulary (v0.1)
-
-```yaml
-requires:
-  auth:
-    all:
-      - ctx.user                            # caller is any signed-in end-user
-      - ctx.staff: [editor, owner]          # caller is staff in one of these roles
-```
-
-The vocabulary is exactly:
-
-- `ctx.user` — caller is signed in as an end-user
-- `ctx.staff: [<role>, ...]` — caller is signed in as staff in one of these roles
-- `ctx.auth` — caller supplied an adapter-verified credential
-- `ctx.auth.scope: <scope>` — credential carries the exact scope
-
-### Adding a new entry is an explicit grammar-revise round
-
-New `x-mantle-bind` values or `ctx.*` predicates do not get added ad hoc:
-
-1. A documented use case showing the existing closed set cannot
-   express the requirement.
-2. A design pass on what the new value's runtime semantics are
-   (where does it come from? when is it null? what happens at
-   the storage layer?).
-3. A spec doc revision.
-4. Code that updates the validator to accept the new value.
-
-This treats the closed set as load-bearing infrastructure, not
-configuration.
-
-## Consequences
-
-### Pros
-
-- Validator can statically know all legal values for a binding
-  slot; static validation emits `V_BIND_VALUE_NOT_IN_ENUM` with
-  the full candidate list as a one-step fix for the AI author.
-- No expression-language dependency, no template injection
-  surface, no ReDoS, no sandbox escape.
-- Meaning of each value is documented in one place (the v0.1
-  grammar reference); authors do not have to read evaluator
-  source to know what `ctx.staff: [editor]` returns when there
-  is no staff session.
-- AI author hit rate goes way up: a closed enum of 3 values
-  (`x-mantle-bind`) is unambiguous; the model outputs the right
-  value or none at all.
-
-### Costs
-
-- Real use cases that don't fit get pushed to "use a custom
-  Procedure handler that does the binding inside TS." For an
-  expression like "stamp the user's team_id," the author writes
-  TS (cheap; the team_id lookup is in handler scope anyway).
-  For an expression like "stamp the value of an upstream API
-  call," the author writes TS (correct outcome — that work
-  belongs in handler logic, not in declarative metadata).
-- Adding a new enum entry is heavyweight (grammar revise) even
-  when the use case is obvious. The friction is the point;
-  resist optimizing it away.
-- The `ctx.user` vs `ctx.staff` split forces authors to
-  understand the user-vs-staff session distinction up front.
-  Acceptable cost; the distinction is fundamental to the
-  CMS's auth model.
-
-### Risks
-
-- **Pressure to add entries case-by-case.** First use case
-  shows up, "it's just one more value, what's the harm?" The
-  harm is that the enum stops being load-bearing — every
-  subsequent addition is precedent for the next. Mitigation:
-  document the grammar-revise process (ADR-0001 § Future
-  grammar discipline) and apply it.
-- **Underpowered for genuine multi-tenant deployments.**
-  `ctx.tenant` was considered + dropped in v0.1 because the
-  current product is single-tenant per deployment. If
-  multi-tenant SaaS is pursued later, `ctx.tenant` reintroduces
-  via grammar-revise.
-- **`now` semantics on D1 vs PG diverge.** D1 has no
-  column-level `DEFAULT now()`; SDK stamps. PG (v0.2+ via
-  Hyperdrive — see `mantle-cloudflare` README) has native defaults. Authors writing
-  `x-mantle-bind: now` on a future PG-targeted deployment may
-  expect column-level enforcement; v0.1.0 ships SDK-stamped
-  only.
-
-## Alternatives considered
-
-**(a) Open expression language with sandboxing**.
-Rejected: dependency footprint, security surface, AI author hit
-rate, static-validation tractability all bad. Hasura / Strapi /
-PostgREST precedent is not encouraging.
-
-**(b) Open expression language with a custom DSL written by
-us**.
-Rejected: same problems as (a), plus we own the DSL. The
-maintenance load on a custom evaluator is permanent.
-
-**(c) Open enum with documentation but no validator
-enforcement** (i.e. unknown values silently work if the
-runtime happens to handle them).
-Rejected: every undocumented usage drifts into precedent.
-Validator-enforced closure is the only durable form.
-
-**(d) `x-mantle-bind: ctx.user.id`, `ctx.user.email`,
-`ctx.user.locale`** (open path expressions on a structured
-ctx object).
-Rejected: turns `ctx.user` into an object with fields that have
-their own evolution. Each field path becomes a separate spec
-question (when is `ctx.user.email` null? what about
-`ctx.user.preferences.timezone`?). Cleanest decision is the
-opaque identity ID + a separate handler-side lookup if you need
-attributes.
-
-## How to apply
-
-- New manifest using a value not in the enum: parse error,
-  exact diagnostic shape with `candidates` populated. AI authors
-  fix in one turn.
-- New use case wanting an entry not in the enum: document the concrete
-  semantics and add validation, runtime behavior, and docs together.
-- Lookups (e.g. "stamp the team_id"): handler-side TS, not
-  binding metadata. The Procedure handler has the lookup
-  context anyway.
-- Reviewing PRs: any change to the validator's enum check is
-  itself a grammar-revise; flag.
-
-## Implementation status
-
-Closed-enum types live in `packages/mantle-spec/` and the
-parser rejects unknown values with the structured diagnostic
-shape. Verify in code review that new manifest grammar
-additions do not quietly widen these enums; widening is a
-grammar-revise, not a code-cleanup.
-
-## Amendment — 2026-07-15: verified credentials and delegated scopes
-
-Epic #467 supplied the required grammar-revise evidence: the existing
-`ctx.user` and `ctx.staff` predicates cannot represent service API keys or
-delegated OAuth/personal-token scopes without coupling Core to a credential
-store. The closed predicate vocabulary is therefore extended by exactly two
-entries:
-
-```yaml
-requires:
-  auth:
-    all:
-      - ctx.auth
-      - { "ctx.auth.scope": "orders:read" }
-```
-
-- `ctx.auth` requires any credential that an adapter has already verified and
-  normalized into `HandlerContext.auth`.
-- `{ "ctx.auth.scope": "<opaque site-owned scope>" }` requires that one exact
-  scope. Multiple scopes are expressed by repeating the predicate under the
-  existing `all` group.
-
-The full v0.1 vocabulary is now `ctx.user`, `ctx.staff`, `ctx.auth`, and
-`ctx.auth.scope`. The latter two do not add a credential-kind expression,
-`any` group, policy array, scope catalog, or entitlement lookup. API keys may
-have no `ctx.user`; OAuth and personal tokens may supply one. Missing identity
-or credential yields `UNAUTHENTICATED` (`401`), while a verified credential
-missing a required role/scope yields `AUTH_DENIED` (`403`).
-
-Current membership, payment, ownership, or transaction state is intentionally
-not a static predicate. A target may name one ordinary Procedure through
-`requires.guard.procedure`; that Procedure performs the site-owned dynamic
-check after target input validation and before target execution. This keeps
-the predicate set closed and preserves the four-atom model.