@aooth/auth 0.2.0 → 0.2.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/atscript-db.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/atscript-db.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/{auth-credential-BsH0E8hG.d.mts → auth-credential-CjCgZv7n.d.mts} +33 -0
- package/dist/{auth-credential-D1V5-2uy.d.cts → auth-credential-UV3sJ-lt.d.cts} +33 -0
- package/dist/authz.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/authz.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/{dynamic-client-store-D0RDGSSJ.d.cts → dynamic-client-store-B7EnHuRp.d.cts} +1 -1
- package/dist/{dynamic-client-store-CUGQiS08.d.mts → dynamic-client-store-BifZLGkT.d.mts} +1 -1
- package/dist/index.cjs +78 -18
- package/dist/index.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.mjs +78 -18
- package/dist/redis.cjs +7 -5
- package/dist/redis.d.cts +14 -2
- package/dist/redis.d.mts +14 -2
- package/dist/redis.mjs +7 -5
- package/package.json +9 -9
- package/src/atscript-db/auth-code.as.d.ts +1 -1
- package/src/atscript-db/auth-credential.as.d.ts +1 -1
- package/src/atscript-db/dynamic-client.as.d.ts +1 -1
- package/src/atscript-db/pending-authorization.as.d.ts +1 -1
package/dist/atscript-db.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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1
1
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import { c as CredentialSuccessorRef, r as CredentialStore, s as CredentialState, t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.cjs";
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2
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-
import { c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, m as PendingAuthorization, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient } from "./dynamic-client-store-
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import { c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, m as PendingAuthorization, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient } from "./dynamic-client-store-B7EnHuRp.cjs";
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//#region src/atscript-db/authz-stores.d.ts
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/**
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* atscript-db-backed durable implementations of the two short-lived
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package/dist/atscript-db.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { c as CredentialSuccessorRef, r as CredentialStore, s as CredentialState, t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.mjs";
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2
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-
import { c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, m as PendingAuthorization, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient } from "./dynamic-client-store-
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import { c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, m as PendingAuthorization, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient } from "./dynamic-client-store-BifZLGkT.mjs";
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//#region src/atscript-db/authz-stores.d.ts
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/**
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* atscript-db-backed durable implementations of the two short-lived
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@@ -291,6 +291,13 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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enrich?: SessionEnricher;
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kind?: string | string[];
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}): Promise<SessionInfo[] | EnrichedSession[]>;
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/**
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* Whether the store can enumerate a user's credentials — i.e. whether
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* {@link listSessions}, {@link revokeSession} and {@link revokeOtherSessions}
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* act at all. `false` for stateless stores (JWT, encapsulated), where those
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* are no-ops and {@link revokeAllForUser} is the only bulk revocation.
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*/
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get canEnumerateSessions(): boolean;
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/**
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* Revoke a single session — every token in its family (access + refresh +
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* rotations). No-op for stores that can't enumerate. Other sessions keep
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@@ -303,6 +310,22 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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* (returns 0) for stores that can't enumerate.
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*/
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revokeOtherSessions(userId: string, keepSessionId: string): Promise<number>;
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/**
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* Revoke every credential of `userId` whose session key matches, repeating
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* list-then-delete until a listing finds no match; returns the distinct
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* session keys revoked. No-op on stores that can't enumerate.
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*
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* Paired with the post-mint re-check in {@link assertStillLive}, this closes
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* the race with refreshes in flight. A refresh re-reads the row it was
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* minted from AFTER persisting its new rows, and revokes them if that row is
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* gone. So a row surviving the final (empty) listing would have to be minted
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* after that listing off a parent still alive after it — a parent that, not
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* being listed, was itself minted after it, and so on down a chain that
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* must start at a row that existed before the listing: a contradiction.
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* Typically two passes (the second finds nothing); capped, failing loudly
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* rather than spinning against a refresh loop.
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*/
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private sweepUntilEmpty;
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/**
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* Derive a stable 32-byte key from this credential's underlying store secret,
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* domain-separated by `label`. Lets adjacent subsystems (e.g. workflow-state
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@@ -321,6 +344,16 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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* rotated (keeping it valid through the grace window) instead of consuming it.
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*/
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private issueRotatedPair;
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/**
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* Post-mint half of the revocation protocol (see {@link sweepUntilEmpty}): after
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* a refresh persisted new credentials, the refresh row it was minted from
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* must still exist. If a revocation deleted it meanwhile, the new
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* credentials belong to a revoked session — revoke them and refuse.
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* Stateful stores only: a stateless refresh consumed (or keeps) a
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* self-contained token, and its revocation epoch already rejects a mint
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* stamped before the revocation.
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*/
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private assertStillLive;
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/**
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* Under `hashAtRest` the successor pair is stored encrypted with a key
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* derived from the old refresh token — only a holder of that token (the
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@@ -291,6 +291,13 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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enrich?: SessionEnricher;
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kind?: string | string[];
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}): Promise<SessionInfo[] | EnrichedSession[]>;
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/**
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* Whether the store can enumerate a user's credentials — i.e. whether
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* {@link listSessions}, {@link revokeSession} and {@link revokeOtherSessions}
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* act at all. `false` for stateless stores (JWT, encapsulated), where those
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* are no-ops and {@link revokeAllForUser} is the only bulk revocation.
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*/
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get canEnumerateSessions(): boolean;
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/**
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* Revoke a single session — every token in its family (access + refresh +
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* rotations). No-op for stores that can't enumerate. Other sessions keep
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@@ -303,6 +310,22 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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* (returns 0) for stores that can't enumerate.
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*/
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revokeOtherSessions(userId: string, keepSessionId: string): Promise<number>;
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/**
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* Revoke every credential of `userId` whose session key matches, repeating
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* list-then-delete until a listing finds no match; returns the distinct
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* session keys revoked. No-op on stores that can't enumerate.
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+
*
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318
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* Paired with the post-mint re-check in {@link assertStillLive}, this closes
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319
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+
* the race with refreshes in flight. A refresh re-reads the row it was
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320
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+
* minted from AFTER persisting its new rows, and revokes them if that row is
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321
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+
* gone. So a row surviving the final (empty) listing would have to be minted
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322
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+
* after that listing off a parent still alive after it — a parent that, not
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323
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* being listed, was itself minted after it, and so on down a chain that
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324
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* must start at a row that existed before the listing: a contradiction.
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325
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* Typically two passes (the second finds nothing); capped, failing loudly
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326
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+
* rather than spinning against a refresh loop.
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327
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*/
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328
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private sweepUntilEmpty;
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/**
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330
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* Derive a stable 32-byte key from this credential's underlying store secret,
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308
331
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* domain-separated by `label`. Lets adjacent subsystems (e.g. workflow-state
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@@ -321,6 +344,16 @@ declare class AuthCredential<TPayload extends object = object> {
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321
344
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* rotated (keeping it valid through the grace window) instead of consuming it.
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322
345
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*/
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323
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private issueRotatedPair;
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347
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+
/**
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348
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* Post-mint half of the revocation protocol (see {@link sweepUntilEmpty}): after
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349
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* a refresh persisted new credentials, the refresh row it was minted from
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350
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+
* must still exist. If a revocation deleted it meanwhile, the new
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351
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+
* credentials belong to a revoked session — revoke them and refuse.
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352
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+
* Stateful stores only: a stateless refresh consumed (or keeps) a
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353
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* self-contained token, and its revocation epoch already rejects a mint
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354
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* stamped before the revocation.
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*/
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private assertStillLive;
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/**
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* Under `hashAtRest` the successor pair is stored encrypted with a key
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326
359
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* derived from the old refresh token — only a holder of that token (the
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package/dist/authz.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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1
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import { t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.cjs";
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-
import { _ as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemoryOptions, a as DynamicClientStoreMemoryOptions, b as tokenPolicyToIssueOptions, c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, f as DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS, g as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, i as DynamicClientStoreMemory, l as AuthCodeStoreMemory, m as PendingAuthorization, n as DynamicClientAuthMethod, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient, u as AuthCodeStoreMemoryOptions, v as DEFAULT_AUTHZ_REFRESH_TTL_MS, y as TokenPolicy } from "./dynamic-client-store-
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import { _ as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemoryOptions, a as DynamicClientStoreMemoryOptions, b as tokenPolicyToIssueOptions, c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, f as DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS, g as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, i as DynamicClientStoreMemory, l as AuthCodeStoreMemory, m as PendingAuthorization, n as DynamicClientAuthMethod, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient, u as AuthCodeStoreMemoryOptions, v as DEFAULT_AUTHZ_REFRESH_TTL_MS, y as TokenPolicy } from "./dynamic-client-store-B7EnHuRp.cjs";
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import { JWK } from "jose";
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//#region src/authz/authz-errors.d.ts
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/**
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package/dist/authz.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.mjs";
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import { _ as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemoryOptions, a as DynamicClientStoreMemoryOptions, b as tokenPolicyToIssueOptions, c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, f as DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS, g as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, i as DynamicClientStoreMemory, l as AuthCodeStoreMemory, m as PendingAuthorization, n as DynamicClientAuthMethod, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient, u as AuthCodeStoreMemoryOptions, v as DEFAULT_AUTHZ_REFRESH_TTL_MS, y as TokenPolicy } from "./dynamic-client-store-
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import { _ as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemoryOptions, a as DynamicClientStoreMemoryOptions, b as tokenPolicyToIssueOptions, c as AuthCodeStore, d as NewAuthCode, f as DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS, g as PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory, h as PendingAuthorizationStore, i as DynamicClientStoreMemory, l as AuthCodeStoreMemory, m as PendingAuthorization, n as DynamicClientAuthMethod, o as NewDynamicClient, p as NewPendingAuthorization, r as DynamicClientStore, s as AuthCode, t as DynamicClient, u as AuthCodeStoreMemoryOptions, v as DEFAULT_AUTHZ_REFRESH_TTL_MS, y as TokenPolicy } from "./dynamic-client-store-BifZLGkT.mjs";
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import { JWK } from "jose";
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//#region src/authz/authz-errors.d.ts
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/**
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.cjs";
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-
import { r as IssueOptions } from "./auth-credential-
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import { r as IssueOptions } from "./auth-credential-UV3sJ-lt.cjs";
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//#region src/authz/token-policy.d.ts
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/**
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* What the authorization server mints for a completed grant — forwarded verbatim
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { t as Clock } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.mjs";
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import { r as IssueOptions } from "./auth-credential-
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import { r as IssueOptions } from "./auth-credential-CjCgZv7n.mjs";
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//#region src/authz/token-policy.d.ts
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/**
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* What the authorization server mints for a completed grant — forwarded verbatim
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package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -515,6 +515,14 @@ function stripJti(payload) {
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515
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const DEFAULT_ACCESS_TTL = 3600 * 1e3;
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516
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const DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS = 3e4;
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/**
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518
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* Upper bound on list-then-delete passes in one revocation. Two is the norm;
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519
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* more only while refreshes keep minting off the session being revoked.
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520
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*/
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521
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const MAX_REVOKE_PASSES = 8;
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522
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function revocationDidNotConverge() {
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523
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return /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`aooth: revocation did not converge after ${MAX_REVOKE_PASSES} passes (refreshes kept minting); retry it`);
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524
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+
}
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525
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/**
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518
526
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* Stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a token used as `credentialId` in
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519
527
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* {@link AuthContext}. Hashing avoids leaking a live bearer token whenever
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* downstream consumers log or persist `ctx.credentialId`.
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@@ -848,14 +856,15 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
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848
856
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await opts?.guard?.(oldState);
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849
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const rotation = oldState.metadata?.refreshRotation ?? (this.refreshConfig ? this.refreshConfig.rotation ?? "sliding" : "always");
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switch (rotation) {
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851
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-
case "none": return await this.refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, now);
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859
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case "none": return await this.refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
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852
860
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case "always": return await this.refreshAlways(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
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case "sliding": return await this.refreshSliding(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
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862
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default: throw new require_payload.AuthError("INVALID_CONFIG", `Unknown rotation: ${String(rotation)}`);
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}
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}
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857
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-
async refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, now) {
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865
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async refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, key, now) {
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const newAccess = await this.issueAccessFromRefresh(oldState, now);
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await this.assertStillLive(key, [newAccess.token]);
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return {
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accessToken: newAccess.token,
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accessExpiresAt: newAccess.expiresAt,
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@@ -957,7 +966,14 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
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async revokeAllForUser(userId) {
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958
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this.validated?.deleteUser(userId);
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try {
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-
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969
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+
const listForUser = this.store.listForUser?.bind(this.store);
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970
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let revoked = await this.store.revokeAllForUser(userId);
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971
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if (!listForUser) return revoked;
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for (let pass = 1; (await listForUser(userId)).length > 0; pass++) {
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revoked += await this.store.revokeAllForUser(userId);
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if (pass >= MAX_REVOKE_PASSES) throw revocationDidNotConverge();
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}
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return revoked;
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} finally {
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this.validated?.deleteUser(userId);
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}
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@@ -1032,14 +1048,21 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
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return Promise.all(sessions.map((s) => Promise.resolve(enrich(s))));
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}
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/**
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+
* Whether the store can enumerate a user's credentials — i.e. whether
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1052
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* {@link listSessions}, {@link revokeSession} and {@link revokeOtherSessions}
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* act at all. `false` for stateless stores (JWT, encapsulated), where those
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* are no-ops and {@link revokeAllForUser} is the only bulk revocation.
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*/
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get canEnumerateSessions() {
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1057
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return this.store.listForUser !== void 0;
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1058
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}
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/**
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* Revoke a single session — every token in its family (access + refresh +
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1036
1061
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* rotations). No-op for stores that can't enumerate. Other sessions keep
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1037
1062
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* validating.
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1038
1063
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*/
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1039
1064
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async revokeSession(userId, sessionId) {
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1040
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-
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1041
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-
const all = await this.store.listForUser(userId);
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1042
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-
await Promise.all(all.filter((entry) => this.sessionKeyOf(entry) === sessionId).map((entry) => this.revokeKey(entry.token)));
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1065
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+
await this.sweepUntilEmpty(userId, (key) => key === sessionId);
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1043
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}
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1044
1067
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/**
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1045
1068
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* Revoke every session for the user EXCEPT `keepSessionId` ("log out
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@@ -1047,18 +1070,39 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
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1047
1070
|
* (returns 0) for stores that can't enumerate.
|
|
1048
1071
|
*/
|
|
1049
1072
|
async revokeOtherSessions(userId, keepSessionId) {
|
|
1050
|
-
|
|
1051
|
-
|
|
1052
|
-
|
|
1053
|
-
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
|
-
|
|
1056
|
-
|
|
1057
|
-
|
|
1058
|
-
|
|
1073
|
+
return (await this.sweepUntilEmpty(userId, (key) => key !== keepSessionId)).size;
|
|
1074
|
+
}
|
|
1075
|
+
/**
|
|
1076
|
+
* Revoke every credential of `userId` whose session key matches, repeating
|
|
1077
|
+
* list-then-delete until a listing finds no match; returns the distinct
|
|
1078
|
+
* session keys revoked. No-op on stores that can't enumerate.
|
|
1079
|
+
*
|
|
1080
|
+
* Paired with the post-mint re-check in {@link assertStillLive}, this closes
|
|
1081
|
+
* the race with refreshes in flight. A refresh re-reads the row it was
|
|
1082
|
+
* minted from AFTER persisting its new rows, and revokes them if that row is
|
|
1083
|
+
* gone. So a row surviving the final (empty) listing would have to be minted
|
|
1084
|
+
* after that listing off a parent still alive after it — a parent that, not
|
|
1085
|
+
* being listed, was itself minted after it, and so on down a chain that
|
|
1086
|
+
* must start at a row that existed before the listing: a contradiction.
|
|
1087
|
+
* Typically two passes (the second finds nothing); capped, failing loudly
|
|
1088
|
+
* rather than spinning against a refresh loop.
|
|
1089
|
+
*/
|
|
1090
|
+
async sweepUntilEmpty(userId, matches) {
|
|
1091
|
+
const revoked = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
1092
|
+
const listForUser = this.store.listForUser?.bind(this.store);
|
|
1093
|
+
if (!listForUser) return revoked;
|
|
1094
|
+
for (let pass = 0;; pass++) {
|
|
1095
|
+
const revokes = [];
|
|
1096
|
+
for (const entry of await listForUser(userId)) {
|
|
1097
|
+
const key = this.sessionKeyOf(entry);
|
|
1098
|
+
if (!matches(key)) continue;
|
|
1099
|
+
revoked.add(key);
|
|
1100
|
+
revokes.push(this.revokeKey(entry.token));
|
|
1101
|
+
}
|
|
1102
|
+
if (revokes.length === 0) return revoked;
|
|
1103
|
+
await Promise.all(revokes);
|
|
1104
|
+
if (pass >= MAX_REVOKE_PASSES) throw revocationDidNotConverge();
|
|
1059
1105
|
}
|
|
1060
|
-
await Promise.all(revokes);
|
|
1061
|
-
return revokedSessions.size;
|
|
1062
1106
|
}
|
|
1063
1107
|
/**
|
|
1064
1108
|
* Derive a stable 32-byte key from this credential's underlying store secret,
|
|
@@ -1124,6 +1168,7 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1124
1168
|
});
|
|
1125
1169
|
const access = await this.issueAccessFromRefresh(oldRefreshState, now);
|
|
1126
1170
|
const newRefreshToken = await this.put(newRefreshState, refreshTtl);
|
|
1171
|
+
let liveKey = oldKey;
|
|
1127
1172
|
if (rotateOld) {
|
|
1128
1173
|
const rotatedState = {
|
|
1129
1174
|
...oldRefreshState,
|
|
@@ -1135,8 +1180,9 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1135
1180
|
refreshExpiresAt
|
|
1136
1181
|
}, oldRefreshToken)
|
|
1137
1182
|
};
|
|
1138
|
-
await this.store.update(oldKey, rotatedState);
|
|
1183
|
+
liveKey = await this.store.update(oldKey, rotatedState);
|
|
1139
1184
|
}
|
|
1185
|
+
await this.assertStillLive(liveKey, [access.token, newRefreshToken]);
|
|
1140
1186
|
return {
|
|
1141
1187
|
accessToken: access.token,
|
|
1142
1188
|
accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt,
|
|
@@ -1146,6 +1192,20 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1146
1192
|
};
|
|
1147
1193
|
}
|
|
1148
1194
|
/**
|
|
1195
|
+
* Post-mint half of the revocation protocol (see {@link sweepUntilEmpty}): after
|
|
1196
|
+
* a refresh persisted new credentials, the refresh row it was minted from
|
|
1197
|
+
* must still exist. If a revocation deleted it meanwhile, the new
|
|
1198
|
+
* credentials belong to a revoked session — revoke them and refuse.
|
|
1199
|
+
* Stateful stores only: a stateless refresh consumed (or keeps) a
|
|
1200
|
+
* self-contained token, and its revocation epoch already rejects a mint
|
|
1201
|
+
* stamped before the revocation.
|
|
1202
|
+
*/
|
|
1203
|
+
async assertStillLive(oldKey, minted) {
|
|
1204
|
+
if (!this.store.listForUser || await this.store.retrieve(oldKey)) return;
|
|
1205
|
+
await Promise.allSettled(minted.map((token) => this.revoke(token)));
|
|
1206
|
+
throw new require_payload.AuthError("INVALID_TOKEN");
|
|
1207
|
+
}
|
|
1208
|
+
/**
|
|
1149
1209
|
* Under `hashAtRest` the successor pair is stored encrypted with a key
|
|
1150
1210
|
* derived from the old refresh token — only a holder of that token (the
|
|
1151
1211
|
* grace-window re-presentation) can read the pair back.
|
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { a as AuthContext, d as RefreshConfig, f as RefreshResult, i as DenylistStore, l as EnrichedSession, m as SessionInfo, n as defaultClock, o as CredentialMetadata, p as SessionEnricher, r as CredentialStore, s as CredentialState, t as Clock, u as IssueResult } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.cjs";
|
|
2
|
-
import { i as RefreshCallOptions, n as AuthCredentialOptions, r as IssueOptions, t as AuthCredential } from "./auth-credential-
|
|
2
|
+
import { i as RefreshCallOptions, n as AuthCredentialOptions, r as IssueOptions, t as AuthCredential } from "./auth-credential-UV3sJ-lt.cjs";
|
|
3
3
|
import { n as RateLimitStoreMemory, t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-BaFYDHxn.cjs";
|
|
4
4
|
import { CryptoKey } from "jose";
|
|
5
5
|
//#region src/errors.d.ts
|
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { a as AuthContext, d as RefreshConfig, f as RefreshResult, i as DenylistStore, l as EnrichedSession, m as SessionInfo, n as defaultClock, o as CredentialMetadata, p as SessionEnricher, r as CredentialStore, s as CredentialState, t as Clock, u as IssueResult } from "./clock-CzAaCoZ5.mjs";
|
|
2
|
-
import { i as RefreshCallOptions, n as AuthCredentialOptions, r as IssueOptions, t as AuthCredential } from "./auth-credential-
|
|
2
|
+
import { i as RefreshCallOptions, n as AuthCredentialOptions, r as IssueOptions, t as AuthCredential } from "./auth-credential-CjCgZv7n.mjs";
|
|
3
3
|
import { n as RateLimitStoreMemory, t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-h-bLOAaS.mjs";
|
|
4
4
|
import { CryptoKey } from "jose";
|
|
5
5
|
//#region src/errors.d.ts
|
package/dist/index.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -514,6 +514,14 @@ function stripJti(payload) {
|
|
|
514
514
|
const DEFAULT_ACCESS_TTL = 3600 * 1e3;
|
|
515
515
|
const DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS = 3e4;
|
|
516
516
|
/**
|
|
517
|
+
* Upper bound on list-then-delete passes in one revocation. Two is the norm;
|
|
518
|
+
* more only while refreshes keep minting off the session being revoked.
|
|
519
|
+
*/
|
|
520
|
+
const MAX_REVOKE_PASSES = 8;
|
|
521
|
+
function revocationDidNotConverge() {
|
|
522
|
+
return /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`aooth: revocation did not converge after ${MAX_REVOKE_PASSES} passes (refreshes kept minting); retry it`);
|
|
523
|
+
}
|
|
524
|
+
/**
|
|
517
525
|
* Stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a token used as `credentialId` in
|
|
518
526
|
* {@link AuthContext}. Hashing avoids leaking a live bearer token whenever
|
|
519
527
|
* downstream consumers log or persist `ctx.credentialId`.
|
|
@@ -847,14 +855,15 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
847
855
|
await opts?.guard?.(oldState);
|
|
848
856
|
const rotation = oldState.metadata?.refreshRotation ?? (this.refreshConfig ? this.refreshConfig.rotation ?? "sliding" : "always");
|
|
849
857
|
switch (rotation) {
|
|
850
|
-
case "none": return await this.refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, now);
|
|
858
|
+
case "none": return await this.refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
|
|
851
859
|
case "always": return await this.refreshAlways(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
|
|
852
860
|
case "sliding": return await this.refreshSliding(oldState, refreshToken, found.key, now);
|
|
853
861
|
default: throw new AuthError("INVALID_CONFIG", `Unknown rotation: ${String(rotation)}`);
|
|
854
862
|
}
|
|
855
863
|
}
|
|
856
|
-
async refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, now) {
|
|
864
|
+
async refreshNone(oldState, refreshToken, key, now) {
|
|
857
865
|
const newAccess = await this.issueAccessFromRefresh(oldState, now);
|
|
866
|
+
await this.assertStillLive(key, [newAccess.token]);
|
|
858
867
|
return {
|
|
859
868
|
accessToken: newAccess.token,
|
|
860
869
|
accessExpiresAt: newAccess.expiresAt,
|
|
@@ -956,7 +965,14 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
956
965
|
async revokeAllForUser(userId) {
|
|
957
966
|
this.validated?.deleteUser(userId);
|
|
958
967
|
try {
|
|
959
|
-
|
|
968
|
+
const listForUser = this.store.listForUser?.bind(this.store);
|
|
969
|
+
let revoked = await this.store.revokeAllForUser(userId);
|
|
970
|
+
if (!listForUser) return revoked;
|
|
971
|
+
for (let pass = 1; (await listForUser(userId)).length > 0; pass++) {
|
|
972
|
+
revoked += await this.store.revokeAllForUser(userId);
|
|
973
|
+
if (pass >= MAX_REVOKE_PASSES) throw revocationDidNotConverge();
|
|
974
|
+
}
|
|
975
|
+
return revoked;
|
|
960
976
|
} finally {
|
|
961
977
|
this.validated?.deleteUser(userId);
|
|
962
978
|
}
|
|
@@ -1031,14 +1047,21 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1031
1047
|
return Promise.all(sessions.map((s) => Promise.resolve(enrich(s))));
|
|
1032
1048
|
}
|
|
1033
1049
|
/**
|
|
1050
|
+
* Whether the store can enumerate a user's credentials — i.e. whether
|
|
1051
|
+
* {@link listSessions}, {@link revokeSession} and {@link revokeOtherSessions}
|
|
1052
|
+
* act at all. `false` for stateless stores (JWT, encapsulated), where those
|
|
1053
|
+
* are no-ops and {@link revokeAllForUser} is the only bulk revocation.
|
|
1054
|
+
*/
|
|
1055
|
+
get canEnumerateSessions() {
|
|
1056
|
+
return this.store.listForUser !== void 0;
|
|
1057
|
+
}
|
|
1058
|
+
/**
|
|
1034
1059
|
* Revoke a single session — every token in its family (access + refresh +
|
|
1035
1060
|
* rotations). No-op for stores that can't enumerate. Other sessions keep
|
|
1036
1061
|
* validating.
|
|
1037
1062
|
*/
|
|
1038
1063
|
async revokeSession(userId, sessionId) {
|
|
1039
|
-
|
|
1040
|
-
const all = await this.store.listForUser(userId);
|
|
1041
|
-
await Promise.all(all.filter((entry) => this.sessionKeyOf(entry) === sessionId).map((entry) => this.revokeKey(entry.token)));
|
|
1064
|
+
await this.sweepUntilEmpty(userId, (key) => key === sessionId);
|
|
1042
1065
|
}
|
|
1043
1066
|
/**
|
|
1044
1067
|
* Revoke every session for the user EXCEPT `keepSessionId` ("log out
|
|
@@ -1046,18 +1069,39 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1046
1069
|
* (returns 0) for stores that can't enumerate.
|
|
1047
1070
|
*/
|
|
1048
1071
|
async revokeOtherSessions(userId, keepSessionId) {
|
|
1049
|
-
|
|
1050
|
-
|
|
1051
|
-
|
|
1052
|
-
|
|
1053
|
-
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
|
-
|
|
1056
|
-
|
|
1057
|
-
|
|
1072
|
+
return (await this.sweepUntilEmpty(userId, (key) => key !== keepSessionId)).size;
|
|
1073
|
+
}
|
|
1074
|
+
/**
|
|
1075
|
+
* Revoke every credential of `userId` whose session key matches, repeating
|
|
1076
|
+
* list-then-delete until a listing finds no match; returns the distinct
|
|
1077
|
+
* session keys revoked. No-op on stores that can't enumerate.
|
|
1078
|
+
*
|
|
1079
|
+
* Paired with the post-mint re-check in {@link assertStillLive}, this closes
|
|
1080
|
+
* the race with refreshes in flight. A refresh re-reads the row it was
|
|
1081
|
+
* minted from AFTER persisting its new rows, and revokes them if that row is
|
|
1082
|
+
* gone. So a row surviving the final (empty) listing would have to be minted
|
|
1083
|
+
* after that listing off a parent still alive after it — a parent that, not
|
|
1084
|
+
* being listed, was itself minted after it, and so on down a chain that
|
|
1085
|
+
* must start at a row that existed before the listing: a contradiction.
|
|
1086
|
+
* Typically two passes (the second finds nothing); capped, failing loudly
|
|
1087
|
+
* rather than spinning against a refresh loop.
|
|
1088
|
+
*/
|
|
1089
|
+
async sweepUntilEmpty(userId, matches) {
|
|
1090
|
+
const revoked = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
1091
|
+
const listForUser = this.store.listForUser?.bind(this.store);
|
|
1092
|
+
if (!listForUser) return revoked;
|
|
1093
|
+
for (let pass = 0;; pass++) {
|
|
1094
|
+
const revokes = [];
|
|
1095
|
+
for (const entry of await listForUser(userId)) {
|
|
1096
|
+
const key = this.sessionKeyOf(entry);
|
|
1097
|
+
if (!matches(key)) continue;
|
|
1098
|
+
revoked.add(key);
|
|
1099
|
+
revokes.push(this.revokeKey(entry.token));
|
|
1100
|
+
}
|
|
1101
|
+
if (revokes.length === 0) return revoked;
|
|
1102
|
+
await Promise.all(revokes);
|
|
1103
|
+
if (pass >= MAX_REVOKE_PASSES) throw revocationDidNotConverge();
|
|
1058
1104
|
}
|
|
1059
|
-
await Promise.all(revokes);
|
|
1060
|
-
return revokedSessions.size;
|
|
1061
1105
|
}
|
|
1062
1106
|
/**
|
|
1063
1107
|
* Derive a stable 32-byte key from this credential's underlying store secret,
|
|
@@ -1123,6 +1167,7 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1123
1167
|
});
|
|
1124
1168
|
const access = await this.issueAccessFromRefresh(oldRefreshState, now);
|
|
1125
1169
|
const newRefreshToken = await this.put(newRefreshState, refreshTtl);
|
|
1170
|
+
let liveKey = oldKey;
|
|
1126
1171
|
if (rotateOld) {
|
|
1127
1172
|
const rotatedState = {
|
|
1128
1173
|
...oldRefreshState,
|
|
@@ -1134,8 +1179,9 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1134
1179
|
refreshExpiresAt
|
|
1135
1180
|
}, oldRefreshToken)
|
|
1136
1181
|
};
|
|
1137
|
-
await this.store.update(oldKey, rotatedState);
|
|
1182
|
+
liveKey = await this.store.update(oldKey, rotatedState);
|
|
1138
1183
|
}
|
|
1184
|
+
await this.assertStillLive(liveKey, [access.token, newRefreshToken]);
|
|
1139
1185
|
return {
|
|
1140
1186
|
accessToken: access.token,
|
|
1141
1187
|
accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt,
|
|
@@ -1145,6 +1191,20 @@ var AuthCredential = class {
|
|
|
1145
1191
|
};
|
|
1146
1192
|
}
|
|
1147
1193
|
/**
|
|
1194
|
+
* Post-mint half of the revocation protocol (see {@link sweepUntilEmpty}): after
|
|
1195
|
+
* a refresh persisted new credentials, the refresh row it was minted from
|
|
1196
|
+
* must still exist. If a revocation deleted it meanwhile, the new
|
|
1197
|
+
* credentials belong to a revoked session — revoke them and refuse.
|
|
1198
|
+
* Stateful stores only: a stateless refresh consumed (or keeps) a
|
|
1199
|
+
* self-contained token, and its revocation epoch already rejects a mint
|
|
1200
|
+
* stamped before the revocation.
|
|
1201
|
+
*/
|
|
1202
|
+
async assertStillLive(oldKey, minted) {
|
|
1203
|
+
if (!this.store.listForUser || await this.store.retrieve(oldKey)) return;
|
|
1204
|
+
await Promise.allSettled(minted.map((token) => this.revoke(token)));
|
|
1205
|
+
throw new AuthError("INVALID_TOKEN");
|
|
1206
|
+
}
|
|
1207
|
+
/**
|
|
1148
1208
|
* Under `hashAtRest` the successor pair is stored encrypted with a key
|
|
1149
1209
|
* derived from the old refresh token — only a holder of that token (the
|
|
1150
1210
|
* grace-window re-presentation) can read the pair back.
|
package/dist/redis.cjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -61,13 +61,15 @@ var CredentialStoreRedis = class {
|
|
|
61
61
|
const existingRaw = await this.redis.get(this.tokenKey(token));
|
|
62
62
|
if (existingRaw === null) return token;
|
|
63
63
|
const existing = JSON.parse(existingRaw);
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
64
|
+
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
65
|
+
if (ttlMs <= 0) {
|
|
66
|
+
await this.revoke(token);
|
|
67
|
+
return token;
|
|
68
|
+
}
|
|
69
|
+
if (await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs, "XX") !== null && existing.userId !== state.userId) {
|
|
65
70
|
await this.redis.srem(this.userKey(existing.userId), token);
|
|
66
71
|
await this.redis.sadd(this.userKey(state.userId), token);
|
|
67
72
|
}
|
|
68
|
-
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
69
|
-
if (ttlMs > 0) await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs);
|
|
70
|
-
else await this.revoke(token);
|
|
71
73
|
return token;
|
|
72
74
|
}
|
|
73
75
|
async revoke(token) {
|
|
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ var CredentialStoreRedis = class {
|
|
|
88
90
|
state.lastSeenAt = at;
|
|
89
91
|
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
90
92
|
if (ttlMs <= 0) return;
|
|
91
|
-
await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs);
|
|
93
|
+
await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs, "XX");
|
|
92
94
|
}
|
|
93
95
|
async revokeAllForUser(userId) {
|
|
94
96
|
const setKey = this.userKey(userId);
|
package/dist/redis.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-BaFYDHxn.cjs";
|
|
|
19
19
|
*
|
|
20
20
|
* ```ts
|
|
21
21
|
* const redisLike: RedisLike = {
|
|
22
|
-
* set: (k, v, _px, ttlMs) => client.set(k, v, ttlMs
|
|
22
|
+
* set: (k, v, _px, ttlMs, xx) => client.set(k, v, { PX: ttlMs, ...(xx && { XX: true }) }),
|
|
23
23
|
* get: (k) => client.get(k),
|
|
24
24
|
* del: (...k) => client.del(k),
|
|
25
25
|
* exists: (k) => client.exists(k),
|
|
@@ -46,10 +46,17 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-BaFYDHxn.cjs";
|
|
|
46
46
|
* overload (it collides with the `set(key, value, cb?)` overload
|
|
47
47
|
* instead), which is exactly what broke structural assignment before.
|
|
48
48
|
* Every adapter call site already passes all four arguments.
|
|
49
|
+
* 3. The conditional `set(key, value, "PX", ms, "XX")` overload is REQUIRED
|
|
50
|
+
* (since 0.2.1): `CredentialStoreRedis` rewrites existing credentials
|
|
51
|
+
* (rotation stamp, `lastSeenAt`) only if the key still exists, so a write
|
|
52
|
+
* racing a revocation can never re-create a deleted credential. An
|
|
53
|
+
* adapter must forward `XX` and resolve `null` when the key is missing.
|
|
54
|
+
* ioredis exposes exactly this overload.
|
|
49
55
|
*
|
|
50
56
|
* Return types are chosen as a supertype of what real clients resolve, so an
|
|
51
57
|
* ioredis client stays assignable while the types remain useful to callers:
|
|
52
|
-
* - `set` returns `string | null` (ioredis resolves `"OK"`
|
|
58
|
+
* - `set` returns `string | null` (ioredis resolves `"OK"`, or `null` when
|
|
59
|
+
* an `XX` write found no key)
|
|
53
60
|
* - `del` / `pexpire` / `exists` / `incr` / `sadd` / `srem` return `number`
|
|
54
61
|
* - `get` returns `string | null`
|
|
55
62
|
* - `smembers` returns `string[]`
|
|
@@ -57,6 +64,11 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-BaFYDHxn.cjs";
|
|
|
57
64
|
interface RedisLike {
|
|
58
65
|
/** `SET key value PX ms` — `mode`/`ttlMs` are a required pair (see above). */
|
|
59
66
|
set(key: string, value: string, mode: "PX", ttlMs: number): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
67
|
+
/**
|
|
68
|
+
* `SET key value PX ms XX` — write only if `key` exists; resolves `null`
|
|
69
|
+
* (and writes nothing) when it doesn't. Required since 0.2.1.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
set(key: string, value: string, mode: "PX", ttlMs: number, condition: "XX"): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
60
72
|
get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
61
73
|
del(...keys: string[]): Promise<number>;
|
|
62
74
|
exists(key: string): Promise<number>;
|
package/dist/redis.d.mts
CHANGED
|
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-h-bLOAaS.mjs";
|
|
|
19
19
|
*
|
|
20
20
|
* ```ts
|
|
21
21
|
* const redisLike: RedisLike = {
|
|
22
|
-
* set: (k, v, _px, ttlMs) => client.set(k, v, ttlMs
|
|
22
|
+
* set: (k, v, _px, ttlMs, xx) => client.set(k, v, { PX: ttlMs, ...(xx && { XX: true }) }),
|
|
23
23
|
* get: (k) => client.get(k),
|
|
24
24
|
* del: (...k) => client.del(k),
|
|
25
25
|
* exists: (k) => client.exists(k),
|
|
@@ -46,10 +46,17 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-h-bLOAaS.mjs";
|
|
|
46
46
|
* overload (it collides with the `set(key, value, cb?)` overload
|
|
47
47
|
* instead), which is exactly what broke structural assignment before.
|
|
48
48
|
* Every adapter call site already passes all four arguments.
|
|
49
|
+
* 3. The conditional `set(key, value, "PX", ms, "XX")` overload is REQUIRED
|
|
50
|
+
* (since 0.2.1): `CredentialStoreRedis` rewrites existing credentials
|
|
51
|
+
* (rotation stamp, `lastSeenAt`) only if the key still exists, so a write
|
|
52
|
+
* racing a revocation can never re-create a deleted credential. An
|
|
53
|
+
* adapter must forward `XX` and resolve `null` when the key is missing.
|
|
54
|
+
* ioredis exposes exactly this overload.
|
|
49
55
|
*
|
|
50
56
|
* Return types are chosen as a supertype of what real clients resolve, so an
|
|
51
57
|
* ioredis client stays assignable while the types remain useful to callers:
|
|
52
|
-
* - `set` returns `string | null` (ioredis resolves `"OK"`
|
|
58
|
+
* - `set` returns `string | null` (ioredis resolves `"OK"`, or `null` when
|
|
59
|
+
* an `XX` write found no key)
|
|
53
60
|
* - `del` / `pexpire` / `exists` / `incr` / `sadd` / `srem` return `number`
|
|
54
61
|
* - `get` returns `string | null`
|
|
55
62
|
* - `smembers` returns `string[]`
|
|
@@ -57,6 +64,11 @@ import { t as RateLimitStore } from "./store-h-bLOAaS.mjs";
|
|
|
57
64
|
interface RedisLike {
|
|
58
65
|
/** `SET key value PX ms` — `mode`/`ttlMs` are a required pair (see above). */
|
|
59
66
|
set(key: string, value: string, mode: "PX", ttlMs: number): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
67
|
+
/**
|
|
68
|
+
* `SET key value PX ms XX` — write only if `key` exists; resolves `null`
|
|
69
|
+
* (and writes nothing) when it doesn't. Required since 0.2.1.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
set(key: string, value: string, mode: "PX", ttlMs: number, condition: "XX"): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
60
72
|
get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
|
|
61
73
|
del(...keys: string[]): Promise<number>;
|
|
62
74
|
exists(key: string): Promise<number>;
|
package/dist/redis.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -60,13 +60,15 @@ var CredentialStoreRedis = class {
|
|
|
60
60
|
const existingRaw = await this.redis.get(this.tokenKey(token));
|
|
61
61
|
if (existingRaw === null) return token;
|
|
62
62
|
const existing = JSON.parse(existingRaw);
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
63
|
+
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
64
|
+
if (ttlMs <= 0) {
|
|
65
|
+
await this.revoke(token);
|
|
66
|
+
return token;
|
|
67
|
+
}
|
|
68
|
+
if (await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs, "XX") !== null && existing.userId !== state.userId) {
|
|
64
69
|
await this.redis.srem(this.userKey(existing.userId), token);
|
|
65
70
|
await this.redis.sadd(this.userKey(state.userId), token);
|
|
66
71
|
}
|
|
67
|
-
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
68
|
-
if (ttlMs > 0) await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs);
|
|
69
|
-
else await this.revoke(token);
|
|
70
72
|
return token;
|
|
71
73
|
}
|
|
72
74
|
async revoke(token) {
|
|
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ var CredentialStoreRedis = class {
|
|
|
87
89
|
state.lastSeenAt = at;
|
|
88
90
|
const ttlMs = Math.max(0, state.expiresAt - Date.now());
|
|
89
91
|
if (ttlMs <= 0) return;
|
|
90
|
-
await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs);
|
|
92
|
+
await this.redis.set(this.tokenKey(token), JSON.stringify(state), "PX", ttlMs, "XX");
|
|
91
93
|
}
|
|
92
94
|
async revokeAllForUser(userId) {
|
|
93
95
|
const setKey = this.userKey(userId);
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@aooth/auth",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.1",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Auth method layer for aoothjs (sessions, tokens, password reset, MFA primitives)",
|
|
5
5
|
"keywords": [
|
|
6
6
|
"aoothjs",
|
|
@@ -104,22 +104,22 @@
|
|
|
104
104
|
},
|
|
105
105
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
106
106
|
"jose": "^6.2.3",
|
|
107
|
-
"@aooth/user": "0.2.
|
|
107
|
+
"@aooth/user": "0.2.1"
|
|
108
108
|
},
|
|
109
109
|
"devDependencies": {
|
|
110
|
-
"@atscript/core": "^0.1
|
|
111
|
-
"@atscript/db": "^0.1.
|
|
112
|
-
"@atscript/db-sql-tools": "^0.1.
|
|
113
|
-
"@atscript/db-sqlite": "^0.1.
|
|
114
|
-
"@atscript/typescript": "^0.1
|
|
110
|
+
"@atscript/core": "^0.2.1",
|
|
111
|
+
"@atscript/db": "^0.1.166",
|
|
112
|
+
"@atscript/db-sql-tools": "^0.1.166",
|
|
113
|
+
"@atscript/db-sqlite": "^0.1.166",
|
|
114
|
+
"@atscript/typescript": "^0.2.1",
|
|
115
115
|
"@types/better-sqlite3": "^7.6.13",
|
|
116
116
|
"@uniqu/core": "^0.1.15",
|
|
117
117
|
"better-sqlite3": "^12.6.2",
|
|
118
118
|
"ioredis": "^5.11.1",
|
|
119
|
-
"unplugin-atscript": "^0.1
|
|
119
|
+
"unplugin-atscript": "^0.2.1"
|
|
120
120
|
},
|
|
121
121
|
"peerDependencies": {
|
|
122
|
-
"@atscript/db": "^0.1.
|
|
122
|
+
"@atscript/db": "^0.1.166"
|
|
123
123
|
},
|
|
124
124
|
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
|
|
125
125
|
"@atscript/db": {
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
|
|
7
7
|
* Do not edit this file!
|
|
8
8
|
*/
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
10
|
+
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TAtscriptField, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
/**
|
|
13
13
|
* Atscript interface **AoothAuthCode**
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
|
|
7
7
|
* Do not edit this file!
|
|
8
8
|
*/
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
10
|
+
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TAtscriptField, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
/**
|
|
13
13
|
* Atscript type **AoothCredentialMetadataBase**
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
|
|
7
7
|
* Do not edit this file!
|
|
8
8
|
*/
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
10
|
+
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TAtscriptField, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
/**
|
|
13
13
|
* Atscript interface **AoothDynamicClient**
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
|
|
7
7
|
* Do not edit this file!
|
|
8
8
|
*/
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
10
|
+
import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TAtscriptField, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
/**
|
|
13
13
|
* Atscript interface **AoothPendingAuthorization**
|