@aooth/auth 0.1.7 → 0.1.9

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package/dist/authz.mjs ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
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+ import { t as defaultClock } from "./clock-Bdsep_1j.mjs";
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+ import { randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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+ import { SignJWT, exportJWK, importPKCS8, importSPKI } from "jose";
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+ //#region src/authz/authz-errors.ts
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+ /** A typed authorization-server failure. */
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+ var AuthorizeError = class extends Error {
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+ code;
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+ constructor(code, message) {
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+ super(message);
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+ this.name = "AuthorizeError";
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+ this.code = code;
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/client-policy.ts
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+ /**
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+ * `true` when `uri` is a syntactically valid http(s) URL whose host is a
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+ * **loopback literal** — `127.0.0.1`, `::1`, or `localhost` — on any port (RFC
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+ * 8252 §7.3). Rejects everything else, including the classic bypasses: a
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+ * host-suffix (`127.0.0.1.evil.com`, `localhost.evil.com`), embedded credentials
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+ * (`http://127.0.0.1@evil.com` → host `evil.com`), a non-http scheme, and a bare
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+ * `0.0.0.0`. Only a local process can receive a loopback redirect, which is why
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+ * an arbitrary port is safe — the binding is the loopback host + PKCE.
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+ */
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+ function isLoopbackRedirectUri(uri) {
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+ let url;
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+ try {
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+ url = new URL(uri);
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") return false;
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+ if (url.username !== "" || url.password !== "") return false;
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+ const host = url.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
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+ return host === "127.0.0.1" || host === "::1" || host === "localhost";
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+ }
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+ const DEFAULT_CLI_TOKEN_POLICY = {
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+ kind: "cli-session",
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+ ttl: 720 * 60 * 6e4
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+ };
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+ /**
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+ * Tier-1 policy: accept any **loopback** `redirect_uri`, treat the client as a
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+ * public client (no `client_id` / secret — PKCE is the binding), and mint the
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+ * configured CLI token policy. Rejects every non-loopback redirect.
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+ */
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+ var LoopbackClientPolicy = class {
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+ tokenPolicy;
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ this.tokenPolicy = opts?.tokenPolicy ?? DEFAULT_CLI_TOKEN_POLICY;
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+ }
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+ resolveClient(args) {
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+ if (!isLoopbackRedirectUri(args.redirectUri)) throw new AuthorizeError("invalid_redirect", "redirect_uri must be a loopback address");
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+ return {
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+ redirectUri: args.redirectUri,
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+ tokenPolicy: structuredClone(this.tokenPolicy),
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+ ...args.scope !== void 0 && { scope: args.scope }
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+ };
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/oidc-claims-resolver.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Resolves the OIDC profile claims to embed in an `id_token` for a given user +
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+ * granted scope (AUTH-SERVER.md §4.9). The authorization server already controls
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+ * the registered claims (`iss`/`aud`/`sub`/`iat`/`exp`/`nonce`) itself — this seam
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+ * supplies the **profile** claims that depend on the consumer's user shape
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+ * (`email`/`email_verified`/`name`/`picture`), which `@aooth/auth` cannot know.
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+ *
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+ * Pluggable like every other store/policy: the no-op default ({@link NoopOidcClaimsResolver},
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+ * `sub`-only tokens) ships, and a consumer subclasses it to read its own user
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+ * record. Bound in `@aooth/auth-moost` under `OIDC_CLAIMS_RESOLVER_TOKEN`.
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+ *
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+ * The map's keys are standard OIDC claim names; values MUST be JSON-safe. Honour
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+ * the granted `scope` — only emit `email`/`email_verified` under `email`, and
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+ * `name`/`picture`/etc. under `profile`, so a client receives only what it asked
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+ * for (and was allowed).
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+ */
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+ var OidcClaimsResolver = class {};
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+ /** Default resolver: emits no profile claims, so the `id_token` carries only `sub` + the registered claims. */
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+ var NoopOidcClaimsResolver = class extends OidcClaimsResolver {
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+ resolveClaims() {
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+ return {};
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+ }
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+ };
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+ /** `true` when `scope` (space-joined) grants `claim` — `"email"`/`"profile"` etc. */
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+ function scopeGrants(scope, claim) {
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+ if (!scope) return false;
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+ return scope.split(/\s+/u).includes(claim);
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+ }
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/registered-client-policy.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Tier-2 policy: a static registry of first-party clients. `resolveClient`
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+ * authorizes the client + `redirect_uri` (against the registered allowlist) and
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+ * resolves the granted scope + what the grant delivers (`id_token`/`access_token`,
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+ * `aud = client_id`); `authenticateClient` authenticates the client at `/token`
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+ * (`client_secret` for confidential clients; PKCE is the binding for public ones).
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+ * An unregistered client or an unlisted redirect is rejected.
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+ */
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+ var RegisteredClientPolicy = class {
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+ clients = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ for (const c of opts.clients) this.clients.set(c.clientId, c);
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+ }
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+ resolveClient(args) {
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+ const client = this.requireClient(args.clientId);
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+ if (!this.redirectAllowed(client, args.redirectUri)) throw new AuthorizeError("invalid_redirect", "redirect_uri is not registered for this client");
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+ const scope = this.grantScope(client, args.scope);
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+ const idToken = client.idToken !== false && scopeGrants(scope, "openid");
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+ return {
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+ clientId: client.clientId,
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+ redirectUri: args.redirectUri,
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+ audience: client.clientId,
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+ idToken,
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+ accessToken: client.accessToken === true,
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+ tokenPolicy: client.tokenPolicy ? structuredClone(client.tokenPolicy) : {},
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+ ...scope !== void 0 && { scope }
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+ };
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+ }
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+ authenticateClient(args) {
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+ const client = this.requireClient(args.clientId);
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+ if ((client.type ?? "public") !== "confidential") return;
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+ if (!client.clientSecret || !args.clientSecret || !timingSafeEqualStr(args.clientSecret, client.clientSecret)) throw new AuthorizeError("invalid_client", "client authentication failed");
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+ }
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+ requireClient(clientId) {
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+ const client = clientId ? this.clients.get(clientId) : void 0;
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+ if (!client) throw new AuthorizeError("invalid_client", "unknown client");
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+ return client;
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+ }
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+ redirectAllowed(client, uri) {
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+ if (client.redirectUris?.includes(uri)) return true;
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+ if (!client.redirectPrefixes?.length) return false;
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+ let normalized;
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+ try {
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+ normalized = new URL(uri).href;
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ return client.redirectPrefixes.some((p) => {
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+ if (p.length === 0 || !normalized.startsWith(p)) return false;
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+ if (p.endsWith("/")) return true;
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+ const next = normalized[p.length];
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+ return next === void 0 || next === "/" || next === "?" || next === "#";
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+ });
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+ }
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+ grantScope(client, requested) {
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+ if (!requested) return void 0;
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+ const req = requested.split(/\s+/u).filter(Boolean);
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+ const granted = client.scopes ? req.filter((s) => client.scopes.includes(s)) : req;
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+ return granted.length > 0 ? granted.join(" ") : void 0;
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+ }
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+ };
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+ /** Constant-time string compare that also fails closed on a length mismatch. */
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+ function timingSafeEqualStr(a, b) {
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+ const ab = Buffer.from(a, "utf8");
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+ const bb = Buffer.from(b, "utf8");
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+ if (ab.length !== bb.length) return false;
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+ return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
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+ }
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/composite-client-policy.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Runs Tier-1 and Tier-2 side by side, dispatching on the **presence of
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+ * `client_id`** (AUTH-SERVER.md §10): a request with a `client_id` is a
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+ * registered client, one without is a loopback CLI. The split is the safety
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+ * boundary — a registered client is routed only to {@link RegisteredClientPolicy}
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+ * (which enforces ITS redirect allowlist, so it cannot smuggle a loopback
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+ * redirect), and a no-`client_id` request is routed only to the loopback policy
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+ * (so it cannot claim to be a registered client). Each sub-policy still owns its
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+ * own redirect validation; this only picks which one runs.
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+ */
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+ var CompositeClientPolicy = class {
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+ loopback;
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+ registered;
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ this.loopback = opts.loopback;
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+ this.registered = opts.registered;
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+ }
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+ resolveClient(args) {
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+ return args.clientId ? this.registered.resolveClient(args) : this.loopback.resolveClient(args);
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+ }
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+ authenticateClient(args) {
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+ if (args.clientId) return this.registered.authenticateClient?.(args);
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/id-token-signer.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Signs OIDC `id_token`s and publishes the matching JWKS (AUTH-SERVER.md §4.9).
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+ * Holds one asymmetric keypair; mints short-lived RS256/ES256 tokens with the
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+ * issuer + audience + subject a relying `OidcProvider` validates, and exports the
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+ * public half as a JWKS for `GET /auth/jwks`. Keys are imported lazily and cached
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+ * (the Apple-client-secret pattern), so construction is cheap and synchronous.
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+ *
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+ * Never used for the access token (that stays in `AuthCredential`'s store) — the
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+ * `id_token` is a separate, audience-bound identity assertion.
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+ */
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+ var IdTokenSigner = class {
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+ /** The `iss` claim + discovery `issuer` (read by `/.well-known/openid-configuration`). */
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+ issuer;
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+ /** Signature algorithm — published in discovery's `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`. */
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+ alg;
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+ /** Key id — the JWS header + JWKS entry `kid`. */
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+ kid;
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+ privateKeyPem;
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+ publicKeyPem;
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+ ttlSec;
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+ clock;
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+ privateKeyPromise;
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+ jwksPromise;
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ this.issuer = opts.issuer.replace(/\/$/u, "");
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+ this.alg = opts.alg ?? "RS256";
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+ this.kid = opts.kid;
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+ this.privateKeyPem = opts.privateKey;
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+ this.publicKeyPem = opts.publicKey;
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+ this.ttlSec = opts.ttlSec ?? 300;
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+ this.clock = opts.clock ?? defaultClock;
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+ }
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+ /** Mint a signed `id_token` JWT. Iat/exp come from the injected clock. */
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+ async sign(claims) {
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+ const key = await this.importPrivateKey();
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+ const nowSec = Math.floor(this.clock.now() / 1e3);
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+ const ttl = claims.ttlSec ?? this.ttlSec;
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+ const payload = { ...claims.extra };
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+ if (claims.nonce !== void 0) payload.nonce = claims.nonce;
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+ return new SignJWT(payload).setProtectedHeader({
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+ alg: this.alg,
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+ kid: this.kid,
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+ typ: "JWT"
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+ }).setIssuer(this.issuer).setSubject(claims.sub).setAudience(claims.aud).setIssuedAt(nowSec).setExpirationTime(nowSec + ttl).sign(key);
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * The JWKS document served at `/auth/jwks` — the public key as a single
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+ * `use: "sig"` entry tagged with the same `kid`/`alg` as the minted tokens, so
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+ * a verifier selects it by `kid`. Computed once and cached.
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+ */
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+ async jwks() {
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+ this.jwksPromise ??= (async () => {
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+ const jwk = await exportJWK(await importSPKI(this.publicKeyPem, this.alg, { extractable: true }));
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+ jwk.kid = this.kid;
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+ jwk.alg = this.alg;
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+ jwk.use = "sig";
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+ return { keys: [jwk] };
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+ })();
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+ return this.jwksPromise;
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+ }
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+ importPrivateKey() {
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+ this.privateKeyPromise ??= importPKCS8(this.privateKeyPem, this.alg);
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+ return this.privateKeyPromise;
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/pending-authorization-store.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Storage seam for in-flight authorizations (AUTH-SERVER.md §4.3). Short-lived
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+ * (≈ the login-session ceiling): created at `/authorize`, read+deleted at the
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+ * wf terminal. An in-memory impl ships for single-process apps + tests; a
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+ * multi-pod deployment provides a durable (e.g. Redis) impl under the same
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+ * `PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN` (from `@aooth/auth-moost`).
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+ */
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+ var PendingAuthorizationStore = class {};
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+ const DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS = 15 * 6e4;
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+ /**
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+ * In-memory {@link PendingAuthorizationStore} — the reference impl for a
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+ * single-process app + tests. `structuredClone` on read/write isolates callers.
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+ */
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+ var PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory = class extends PendingAuthorizationStore {
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+ store = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ clock;
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+ ttlMs;
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ super();
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+ this.clock = opts?.clock ?? defaultClock;
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+ this.ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS;
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+ }
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+ async create(rec) {
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+ const now = this.clock.now();
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+ const row = {
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+ handle: randomUUID(),
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+ redirectUri: rec.redirectUri,
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+ codeChallenge: rec.codeChallenge,
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+ tokenPolicy: structuredClone(rec.tokenPolicy),
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+ createdAt: now,
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+ expiresAt: now + this.ttlMs,
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+ ...rec.clientId !== void 0 && { clientId: rec.clientId },
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+ ...rec.clientState !== void 0 && { clientState: rec.clientState },
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+ ...rec.scope !== void 0 && { scope: rec.scope },
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+ ...rec.nonce !== void 0 && { nonce: rec.nonce },
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+ ...rec.idToken !== void 0 && { idToken: rec.idToken },
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+ ...rec.accessToken !== void 0 && { accessToken: rec.accessToken },
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+ ...rec.audience !== void 0 && { audience: rec.audience }
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+ };
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+ this.store.set(row.handle, structuredClone(row));
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+ return { handle: row.handle };
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+ }
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+ async get(handle) {
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+ const row = this.store.get(handle);
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+ if (!row) return null;
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+ if (row.expiresAt <= this.clock.now()) {
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+ this.store.delete(handle);
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ return structuredClone(row);
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+ }
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+ async delete(handle) {
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+ return this.store.delete(handle);
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ //#region src/authz/auth-code-store.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Storage seam for issued authorization codes (AUTH-SERVER.md §4.3). Very
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+ * short-lived (≈ 30–60 s) and **single-use**: {@link consume} returns the row
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+ * AND invalidates it in one atomic step, so a concurrent double-redeem (or a
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+ * back-button replay) yields the code to exactly one caller. An in-memory impl
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+ * ships (atomic for free in single-threaded JS); a durable impl must implement
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+ * `consume` as an atomic check-and-delete (e.g. `withCas` / `@db.column.version`,
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+ * or a Redis `GETDEL`).
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+ */
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+ var AuthCodeStore = class {};
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+ const DEFAULT_CODE_TTL_MS = 6e4;
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+ /**
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+ * In-memory {@link AuthCodeStore} — the reference impl. `consume` is atomic
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+ * because the `get` + `delete` run with no intervening `await`, so a second
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+ * concurrent `consume` of the same code always misses.
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+ */
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+ var AuthCodeStoreMemory = class extends AuthCodeStore {
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+ store = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ clock;
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+ ttlMs;
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+ constructor(opts) {
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+ super();
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+ this.clock = opts?.clock ?? defaultClock;
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+ this.ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_CODE_TTL_MS;
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+ }
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+ async mint(rec) {
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+ const code = randomUUID();
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+ const row = {
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+ code,
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+ userId: rec.userId,
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+ codeChallenge: rec.codeChallenge,
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+ redirectUri: rec.redirectUri,
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+ tokenPolicy: structuredClone(rec.tokenPolicy),
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+ expiresAt: this.clock.now() + this.ttlMs,
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+ ...rec.clientId !== void 0 && { clientId: rec.clientId },
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+ ...rec.scope !== void 0 && { scope: rec.scope },
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+ ...rec.nonce !== void 0 && { nonce: rec.nonce },
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+ ...rec.idToken !== void 0 && { idToken: rec.idToken },
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+ ...rec.accessToken !== void 0 && { accessToken: rec.accessToken },
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+ ...rec.audience !== void 0 && { audience: rec.audience }
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+ };
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+ this.store.set(code, structuredClone(row));
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+ return { code };
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+ }
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+ async consume(code) {
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+ const row = this.store.get(code);
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+ if (!row) return null;
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+ this.store.delete(code);
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+ if (row.expiresAt <= this.clock.now()) return null;
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+ return structuredClone(row);
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+ }
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+ };
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+ //#endregion
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+ export { AuthCodeStore, AuthCodeStoreMemory, AuthorizeError, CompositeClientPolicy, IdTokenSigner, LoopbackClientPolicy, NoopOidcClaimsResolver, OidcClaimsResolver, PendingAuthorizationStore, PendingAuthorizationStoreMemory, RegisteredClientPolicy, isLoopbackRedirectUri, scopeGrants };
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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+ Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
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+ //#region src/client/index.ts
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+ /**
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+ * Wraps `fetch` with cookie-session silent refresh. Every call forwards
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+ * credentials; a response whose status is in `refreshOn` (401 by default)
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+ * triggers a **single-flight** refresh — N concurrent failing requests share
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+ * exactly one `POST {refreshPath}` — and, on success, the original request is
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+ * retried **once**. A failed refresh fires `onLogout()` once and returns the
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+ * original failing response (no retry, no refresh storm).
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+ *
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+ * Browser-safe: pairs with the bundled `@aooth/auth-moost` httpOnly-cookie
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+ * transport, so the SPA never touches token material. The retried request reuses
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+ * the original `init`; passing a one-shot body (a consumed `ReadableStream`) is
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+ * not retry-safe — prefer string / `FormData` / `Blob` bodies.
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+ *
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+ * @example
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+ * ```ts
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+ * import { createAuthedFetch } from '@aooth/auth/client'
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+ * const api = createAuthedFetch({ refreshPath: '/auth/refresh', onLogout: () => location.assign('/login') })
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+ * const res = await api('/api/me') // 401 → silent refresh → retried once
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+ * ```
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+ */
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+ function createAuthedFetch(options = {}) {
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+ const refreshPath = options.refreshPath ?? "/auth/refresh";
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+ const onLogout = options.onLogout;
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+ const refreshOn = options.refreshOn ?? [401];
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+ const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;
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+ if (typeof baseFetch !== "function") throw new Error("createAuthedFetch: no fetch implementation available — pass options.fetch");
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+ let refreshInFlight = null;
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+ const runRefresh = () => {
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+ if (refreshInFlight) return refreshInFlight;
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+ refreshInFlight = (async () => {
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+ try {
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+ if ((await baseFetch(refreshPath, {
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+ method: "POST",
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+ credentials: "include"
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+ })).ok) return true;
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+ } catch {}
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+ onLogout?.();
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+ return false;
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+ })().finally(() => {
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+ refreshInFlight = null;
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+ });
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+ return refreshInFlight;
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+ };
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+ const authedFetch = async (input, init) => {
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+ const withCreds = {
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+ credentials: "include",
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+ ...init
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+ };
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+ const res = await baseFetch(input, withCreds);
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+ if (!refreshOn.includes(res.status)) return res;
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+ if (!await runRefresh()) return res;
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+ return baseFetch(input, withCreds);
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+ };
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+ return authedFetch;
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+ }
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+ //#endregion
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+ exports.createAuthedFetch = createAuthedFetch;
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
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+ //#region src/client/index.d.ts
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+ /** Minimal structural view of a fetch `Response` this helper reads. The DOM `Response` satisfies it. */
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+ interface MinimalResponse {
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+ readonly ok: boolean;
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+ readonly status: number;
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+ }
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+ /** Subset of `RequestInit` this helper sets or forwards. The DOM `RequestInit` satisfies it. */
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+ interface MinimalRequestInit {
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+ method?: string;
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+ headers?: Record<string, string>;
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+ body?: unknown;
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+ credentials?: "omit" | "same-origin" | "include";
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+ signal?: unknown;
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+ [key: string]: unknown;
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+ }
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+ /** A `fetch`-compatible function. The global `fetch` satisfies this. */
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+ type FetchFn = (input: string | URL, init?: MinimalRequestInit) => Promise<MinimalResponse>;
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+ /**
19
+ * Resolves to the ambient `fetch` type when the consumer's tsconfig includes the
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+ * DOM lib — so the returned wrapper yields a real `Response` with `.json()` etc.
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+ * — and falls back to the structural {@link FetchFn} otherwise. This keeps
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+ * `@aooth/auth/client` free of a hard DOM-lib dependency while preserving great
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+ * DX in browser projects.
24
+ */
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+ type DefaultFetch = typeof globalThis extends {
26
+ fetch: infer F extends FetchFn;
27
+ } ? F : FetchFn;
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+ interface CreateAuthedFetchOptions<TFetch extends FetchFn = DefaultFetch> {
29
+ /** Refresh endpoint path or URL. Default `'/auth/refresh'`. Match your `AuthController` mount. */
30
+ refreshPath?: string;
31
+ /**
32
+ * Called exactly once per failed refresh attempt (non-OK response or network
33
+ * error). Use it to redirect to login / clear app state. Never called on a
34
+ * successful refresh.
35
+ */
36
+ onLogout?: () => void;
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+ /** Underlying fetch implementation. Default: the global `fetch`. */
38
+ fetch?: TFetch;
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+ /** Response status codes that trigger a refresh + single retry. Default `[401]`. */
40
+ refreshOn?: number[];
41
+ }
42
+ /**
43
+ * Wraps `fetch` with cookie-session silent refresh. Every call forwards
44
+ * credentials; a response whose status is in `refreshOn` (401 by default)
45
+ * triggers a **single-flight** refresh — N concurrent failing requests share
46
+ * exactly one `POST {refreshPath}` — and, on success, the original request is
47
+ * retried **once**. A failed refresh fires `onLogout()` once and returns the
48
+ * original failing response (no retry, no refresh storm).
49
+ *
50
+ * Browser-safe: pairs with the bundled `@aooth/auth-moost` httpOnly-cookie
51
+ * transport, so the SPA never touches token material. The retried request reuses
52
+ * the original `init`; passing a one-shot body (a consumed `ReadableStream`) is
53
+ * not retry-safe — prefer string / `FormData` / `Blob` bodies.
54
+ *
55
+ * @example
56
+ * ```ts
57
+ * import { createAuthedFetch } from '@aooth/auth/client'
58
+ * const api = createAuthedFetch({ refreshPath: '/auth/refresh', onLogout: () => location.assign('/login') })
59
+ * const res = await api('/api/me') // 401 → silent refresh → retried once
60
+ * ```
61
+ */
62
+ declare function createAuthedFetch<TFetch extends FetchFn = DefaultFetch>(options?: CreateAuthedFetchOptions<TFetch>): TFetch;
63
+ //#endregion
64
+ export { CreateAuthedFetchOptions, DefaultFetch, FetchFn, MinimalRequestInit, MinimalResponse, createAuthedFetch };
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
1
+ //#region src/client/index.d.ts
2
+ /** Minimal structural view of a fetch `Response` this helper reads. The DOM `Response` satisfies it. */
3
+ interface MinimalResponse {
4
+ readonly ok: boolean;
5
+ readonly status: number;
6
+ }
7
+ /** Subset of `RequestInit` this helper sets or forwards. The DOM `RequestInit` satisfies it. */
8
+ interface MinimalRequestInit {
9
+ method?: string;
10
+ headers?: Record<string, string>;
11
+ body?: unknown;
12
+ credentials?: "omit" | "same-origin" | "include";
13
+ signal?: unknown;
14
+ [key: string]: unknown;
15
+ }
16
+ /** A `fetch`-compatible function. The global `fetch` satisfies this. */
17
+ type FetchFn = (input: string | URL, init?: MinimalRequestInit) => Promise<MinimalResponse>;
18
+ /**
19
+ * Resolves to the ambient `fetch` type when the consumer's tsconfig includes the
20
+ * DOM lib — so the returned wrapper yields a real `Response` with `.json()` etc.
21
+ * — and falls back to the structural {@link FetchFn} otherwise. This keeps
22
+ * `@aooth/auth/client` free of a hard DOM-lib dependency while preserving great
23
+ * DX in browser projects.
24
+ */
25
+ type DefaultFetch = typeof globalThis extends {
26
+ fetch: infer F extends FetchFn;
27
+ } ? F : FetchFn;
28
+ interface CreateAuthedFetchOptions<TFetch extends FetchFn = DefaultFetch> {
29
+ /** Refresh endpoint path or URL. Default `'/auth/refresh'`. Match your `AuthController` mount. */
30
+ refreshPath?: string;
31
+ /**
32
+ * Called exactly once per failed refresh attempt (non-OK response or network
33
+ * error). Use it to redirect to login / clear app state. Never called on a
34
+ * successful refresh.
35
+ */
36
+ onLogout?: () => void;
37
+ /** Underlying fetch implementation. Default: the global `fetch`. */
38
+ fetch?: TFetch;
39
+ /** Response status codes that trigger a refresh + single retry. Default `[401]`. */
40
+ refreshOn?: number[];
41
+ }
42
+ /**
43
+ * Wraps `fetch` with cookie-session silent refresh. Every call forwards
44
+ * credentials; a response whose status is in `refreshOn` (401 by default)
45
+ * triggers a **single-flight** refresh — N concurrent failing requests share
46
+ * exactly one `POST {refreshPath}` — and, on success, the original request is
47
+ * retried **once**. A failed refresh fires `onLogout()` once and returns the
48
+ * original failing response (no retry, no refresh storm).
49
+ *
50
+ * Browser-safe: pairs with the bundled `@aooth/auth-moost` httpOnly-cookie
51
+ * transport, so the SPA never touches token material. The retried request reuses
52
+ * the original `init`; passing a one-shot body (a consumed `ReadableStream`) is
53
+ * not retry-safe — prefer string / `FormData` / `Blob` bodies.
54
+ *
55
+ * @example
56
+ * ```ts
57
+ * import { createAuthedFetch } from '@aooth/auth/client'
58
+ * const api = createAuthedFetch({ refreshPath: '/auth/refresh', onLogout: () => location.assign('/login') })
59
+ * const res = await api('/api/me') // 401 → silent refresh → retried once
60
+ * ```
61
+ */
62
+ declare function createAuthedFetch<TFetch extends FetchFn = DefaultFetch>(options?: CreateAuthedFetchOptions<TFetch>): TFetch;
63
+ //#endregion
64
+ export { CreateAuthedFetchOptions, DefaultFetch, FetchFn, MinimalRequestInit, MinimalResponse, createAuthedFetch };
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
1
+ //#region src/client/index.ts
2
+ /**
3
+ * Wraps `fetch` with cookie-session silent refresh. Every call forwards
4
+ * credentials; a response whose status is in `refreshOn` (401 by default)
5
+ * triggers a **single-flight** refresh — N concurrent failing requests share
6
+ * exactly one `POST {refreshPath}` — and, on success, the original request is
7
+ * retried **once**. A failed refresh fires `onLogout()` once and returns the
8
+ * original failing response (no retry, no refresh storm).
9
+ *
10
+ * Browser-safe: pairs with the bundled `@aooth/auth-moost` httpOnly-cookie
11
+ * transport, so the SPA never touches token material. The retried request reuses
12
+ * the original `init`; passing a one-shot body (a consumed `ReadableStream`) is
13
+ * not retry-safe — prefer string / `FormData` / `Blob` bodies.
14
+ *
15
+ * @example
16
+ * ```ts
17
+ * import { createAuthedFetch } from '@aooth/auth/client'
18
+ * const api = createAuthedFetch({ refreshPath: '/auth/refresh', onLogout: () => location.assign('/login') })
19
+ * const res = await api('/api/me') // 401 → silent refresh → retried once
20
+ * ```
21
+ */
22
+ function createAuthedFetch(options = {}) {
23
+ const refreshPath = options.refreshPath ?? "/auth/refresh";
24
+ const onLogout = options.onLogout;
25
+ const refreshOn = options.refreshOn ?? [401];
26
+ const baseFetch = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;
27
+ if (typeof baseFetch !== "function") throw new Error("createAuthedFetch: no fetch implementation available — pass options.fetch");
28
+ let refreshInFlight = null;
29
+ const runRefresh = () => {
30
+ if (refreshInFlight) return refreshInFlight;
31
+ refreshInFlight = (async () => {
32
+ try {
33
+ if ((await baseFetch(refreshPath, {
34
+ method: "POST",
35
+ credentials: "include"
36
+ })).ok) return true;
37
+ } catch {}
38
+ onLogout?.();
39
+ return false;
40
+ })().finally(() => {
41
+ refreshInFlight = null;
42
+ });
43
+ return refreshInFlight;
44
+ };
45
+ const authedFetch = async (input, init) => {
46
+ const withCreds = {
47
+ credentials: "include",
48
+ ...init
49
+ };
50
+ const res = await baseFetch(input, withCreds);
51
+ if (!refreshOn.includes(res.status)) return res;
52
+ if (!await runRefresh()) return res;
53
+ return baseFetch(input, withCreds);
54
+ };
55
+ return authedFetch;
56
+ }
57
+ //#endregion
58
+ export { createAuthedFetch };
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
1
+ //#region src/utils/clock.ts
2
+ const defaultClock = { now: () => Date.now() };
3
+ //#endregion
4
+ export { defaultClock as t };
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
1
+ //#region src/utils/clock.d.ts
2
+ /**
3
+ * Minimal time abstraction shared across stores and orchestrators.
4
+ *
5
+ * Defaults to wall-clock; tests inject a fake clock to deterministically
6
+ * advance time. Kept tiny (single `now()` method) so any timing primitive
7
+ * — Date, performance.now-ish, monotonic, etc. — can be plugged in.
8
+ */
9
+ interface Clock {
10
+ now(): number;
11
+ }
12
+ declare const defaultClock: Clock;
13
+ //#endregion
14
+ export { defaultClock as n, Clock as t };
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
1
+ //#region src/utils/clock.d.ts
2
+ /**
3
+ * Minimal time abstraction shared across stores and orchestrators.
4
+ *
5
+ * Defaults to wall-clock; tests inject a fake clock to deterministically
6
+ * advance time. Kept tiny (single `now()` method) so any timing primitive
7
+ * — Date, performance.now-ish, monotonic, etc. — can be plugged in.
8
+ */
9
+ interface Clock {
10
+ now(): number;
11
+ }
12
+ declare const defaultClock: Clock;
13
+ //#endregion
14
+ export { defaultClock as n, Clock as t };
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
1
+ //#region src/utils/clock.ts
2
+ const defaultClock = { now: () => Date.now() };
3
+ //#endregion
4
+ Object.defineProperty(exports, "defaultClock", {
5
+ enumerable: true,
6
+ get: function() {
7
+ return defaultClock;
8
+ }
9
+ });