@aooth/auth-moost 0.2.0 → 0.2.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -201,14 +201,14 @@ declare function authGuardInterceptor(opts?: AuthOptions): TInterceptorDef;
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  */
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  declare function AuthGuarded(opts?: AuthOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  //#endregion
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- //#region ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@wooksjs+event-wf@0.7.31_@prostojs+logger@0.4.3_@wooksjs+event-core@0.7.31_@wooksjs+eve_e8aba0a16501b60af733b247c57b6e07/node_modules/@wooksjs/event-wf/dist/index.d.ts
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+ //#region ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@wooksjs+event-wf@0.8.0_@prostojs+logger@0.4.3_@prostojs+router@0.3.6_@wooksjs+event-co_86044e452e9fcfb26549e7ecde073940/node_modules/@wooksjs/event-wf/dist/index.d.ts
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  interface WfFinishedResponse {
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  type: 'redirect' | 'data';
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  /** Redirect URL or response body */
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  value: unknown;
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  /** HTTP status code (default 200 for data, 302 for redirect) */
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  status?: number;
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- /** Cookies to set */
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+ /** Cookies to set — `options` are `setCookie()` attributes (`maxAge` in **seconds**, `expires` a Date or ms timestamp) */
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  cookies?: Record<string, {
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  value: string;
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  options?: Record<string, unknown>;
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ declare const AOOTH_MESSAGES: {
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  readonly INVALID_PASSWORD: "Invalid password";
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  readonly INCORRECT_PASSWORD: "Incorrect password";
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  readonly SESSION_LIMIT_REACHED: "Session limit reached";
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+ readonly PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN: "Your password was changed. Please sign in again.";
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  readonly INVALID_CODE: "Invalid code";
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  /** Params: `seconds`. */
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  readonly RESEND_WAIT: "Please wait {seconds}s before requesting a new code.";
@@ -827,7 +828,12 @@ interface RateLimitInterceptorOptions {
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  rules?: RateLimitRuleInput$1[];
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  /** Default key strategy for routes whose `@RateLimit` doesn't set one. Default: `'ip'`. */
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  key?: RateLimitKeyStrategy;
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- /** Trust `x-forwarded-for` for the client IP (behind a proxy). Default: `false`. */
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+ /**
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+ * Trust exactly ONE reverse proxy in front of the app: the client IP is the
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+ * right-most `x-forwarded-for` entry (the one that proxy wrote). Default:
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+ * `false` — the client IP as the HTTP app resolves it (`useRequest().getIp()`:
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+ * the socket peer, unless the wooks HTTP app configures `trustProxy`).
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+ */
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  trustProxy?: boolean;
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  /** Emit draft `RateLimit-*` headers on every response of a limited route. Default: `true`. */
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  headers?: boolean;
@@ -1720,9 +1726,12 @@ interface AuthWfSessionPolicy {
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  * `UserService.changePassword`), NOT rate limiting — so `rateLimit` is
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  * optional and off by default.
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  *
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- * - `revokeOtherSessions` — on success, revoke every session for the user then
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- * re-issue the acting session a fresh token (OWASP Session Management: kill
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- * ghost sessions after a credential change). Default `true`.
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+ * - `revokeOtherSessions` — on success, revoke the user's OTHER sessions (OWASP
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+ * Session Management: kill ghost sessions after a credential change). Default
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+ * `true`. Either way the acting device moves onto a fresh session and the
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+ * session the change was made from is revoked; when that session can't be
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+ * targeted (stateless JWT / encapsulated store, legacy pre-sessionId
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+ * credential) every session is revoked.
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  * - `rateLimit.minIntervalMs` — minimum gap between successive password changes
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  * (Okta "minimum password age"). Enforced against `password.lastChanged` with
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  * ZERO extra storage. Omit to disable.
@@ -2184,6 +2193,20 @@ interface AuthWfCtx {
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  aborted?: boolean;
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  isFirstLogin?: boolean;
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  newPasswordRequired?: boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * Set by `create-password-form` once it stored a new password. In login.flow
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+ * it gates the `revoke-sessions` step after the MFA loop (sessions opened
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+ * with the old password end) and exempts the run from
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+ * `check-password-unchanged`. Server-only flow control.
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+ */
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+ passwordChanged?: boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * `password.lastChanged` of the account as the `credentials` step verified
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+ * it. `check-password-unchanged` compares it before the login is recorded,
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+ * so a run paused across a password change can't finish on the replaced
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+ * password. Server-only flow control.
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+ */
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+ passwordStamp?: number;
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  /**
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  * Idempotency latch for the single `record-login` funnel step. Set true once
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  * a login has been stamped this run — by the `credentials` step (the password
@@ -2973,7 +2996,8 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  * successful change (OWASP Session Management) and applies NO rate limit —
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  * current-password re-entry (enforced by `UserService.changePassword`) is the
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  * primary protection, not throttling. Customers override to add a min-interval
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- * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive.
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+ * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive. The session the
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+ * change was made from is always ended (see `finish-change-password`).
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  *
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  * Whether the flow may be STARTED at all is governed by arbac on the trigger
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  * route (deny the `change-password` action to forbid it for SSO-only orgs) —
@@ -3738,11 +3762,28 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  */
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  changePasswordForm(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<unknown>;
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  /**
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- * Change-password terminal — rotate the acting session's token (so the
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- * current device stays signed in on a FRESH credential) and emit a success
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- * message. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so the net effect
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- * is "kill every other session, keep this one on a new token" (OWASP Session
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- * Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential change).
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+ * Change-password terminal — sign the current device in on a FRESH session
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+ * and end the one the change was made from, then emit a success message.
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+ * The new pair is minted under a new session id, so the pre-change session
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+ * (its access token, refresh token and every rotation) is revoked here —
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+ * whatever `revokeOtherSessions` says, since that policy covers only the
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+ * user's OTHER sessions. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so
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+ * the default net effect is "kill every old session, keep this device on a
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+ * new one" (OWASP Session Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential
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+ * change).
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+ *
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+ * The pre-change session is revoked BEFORE the issue, so a failed issue
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+ * (store error, `maxConcurrent` refusal) leaves the user signed out, never on
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+ * the old session. A refresh in flight during the change is covered by
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+ * `AuthCredential`'s revocation protocol (it can't leave live credentials in
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+ * a revoked session).
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+ *
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+ * When one session can't be targeted — a stateless store (JWT /
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+ * encapsulated), or a legacy credential minted before `sessionId` existed
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+ * (its fallback id, the access token's fingerprint, never reaches the refresh
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+ * row) — ALL of the user's sessions are revoked (`revokeAllForUser`, also
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+ * under `revokeOtherSessions: false`). A stateless store also denylists the
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+ * presented access token (best effort): its revocation epoch is process-local.
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  */
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  finishChangePassword(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
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  /**
@@ -4088,15 +4129,20 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  persistConsents(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
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  /**
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  * Revoke the user's existing sessions. Shared by recovery (gated upstream by
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- * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`) and authenticated change-password (gated
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- * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`).
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+ * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`), authenticated change-password (gated
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+ * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`) and the forced password change
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+ * at login / invite (gated by `ctx.passwordChanged`).
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  *
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  * - Change-password runs in an authenticated context, so we KEEP the caller's
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- * current device via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
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+ * current session via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
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  * OWASP "invalidate other sessions" without logging the user out of the tab
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- * they just changed their password in. If the current session can't be
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- * resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking everything (fail-secure).
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- * - Recovery is anonymous (no current session to keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
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+ * they just changed their password in. `finish-change-password` then moves
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+ * that tab onto a fresh session and revokes the kept one (and covers stores
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+ * that cannot enumerate, where `revokeOtherSessions` is a no-op). If the
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+ * current session can't be resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking
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+ * everything (fail-secure).
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+ * - Recovery and the forced change are anonymous (no current session to
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+ * keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
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  */
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  revokeSessions(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
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  /**
@@ -4107,6 +4153,16 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  * also zeroes `failedLoginAttempts`, so the next login starts clean.
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  */
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  unlockAccount(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
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+ /**
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+ * Login-only guard before the `record-login` funnel (and again before
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+ * `mint-authz-code`, past the consent pause): the account's
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+ * `password.lastChanged` must still be the one the `credentials` step
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+ * verified (`ctx.passwordStamp`). A run paused after the password check (MFA,
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+ * enrolment, consents …) and resumed after the password was changed
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+ * elsewhere finishes with an error instead of issuing tokens or minting an
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+ * authorization code. Skipped when this run changed the password itself.
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+ */
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+ checkPasswordUnchanged(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
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  /**
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  * The SINGLE login-completion funnel. Every flow that establishes an
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  * authenticated session routes through here — placed in each login schema
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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- import { C as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, D as StepUpConfirmForm, E as SignupForm, O as TermsBumpForm, T as SetPasswordForm, _ as PasswordReauthForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as ProveControlOtpForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteChooseUsernameForm, f as InviteForm, g as MfaCodeForm, h as ManageMfaForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as LoginCredentialsForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as PincodeForm, w as Select2faForm, y as ProveControlForm } from "./forms-C9Wey0e9.mjs";
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+ import { C as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, D as StepUpConfirmForm, E as SignupForm, O as TermsBumpForm, T as SetPasswordForm, _ as PasswordReauthForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as ProveControlOtpForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteChooseUsernameForm, f as InviteForm, g as MfaCodeForm, h as ManageMfaForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as LoginCredentialsForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as PincodeForm, w as Select2faForm, y as ProveControlForm } from "./forms-DDn6m5rP.mjs";
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  import { Controller, HandlerPaths, Inherit, Inject, InjectMoostLogger, Injectable, Intercept, MoostInit, Optional, Param, Resolve, TInterceptorPriority, defineAfterInterceptor, defineBeforeInterceptor, getMoostMate, useControllerContext, useLogger } from "moost";
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  import { AuthCredential, AuthError, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimitStoreMemory as RateLimitStoreMemory$1, RateLimiter, RateLimiter as RateLimiter$1, generateMagicLinkToken, generateOpaqueToken, parseRateLimitRule, pickGoverning } from "@aooth/auth";
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  import { current, defineWook, eventTypeKey, key } from "@wooksjs/event-core";
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- import { HttpError, useAuthorization, useCookies, useHeaders, useRequest, useResponse, useUrlParams } from "@wooksjs/event-http";
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+ import { HttpError, resolveForwarded, useAuthorization, useCookies, useHeaders, useRequest, useResponse, useUrlParams } from "@wooksjs/event-http";
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  import { ArbacAction, ArbacResource, getArbacMate, useArbac } from "@aooth/arbac-moost";
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  import { FederatedIdentityStore, SEEN_DEVICES_DEFAULT_CAP, UserAuthError, UserService, generateMfaCode, generateTotpSecret, generateTotpUri, maskEmail, maskPhone, pickDefinedProfile, verifyTotpCode } from "@aooth/user";
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  import { Body, Delete, Get, HttpError as HttpError$1, Post, Query } from "@moostjs/event-http";
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
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  const defaultRules = opts?.rules?.map((r) => parseRateLimitRule(r));
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  const limiter = opts?.limiter ?? new RateLimiter$1();
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  const emitHeaders = opts?.headers ?? true;
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- const ipOpts = { trustProxy: opts?.trustProxy ?? false };
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+ const trustProxy = opts?.trustProxy ?? false;
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  const routeConfigs = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
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  const resolveRouteConfig = (cc) => {
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  const ctor = cc.getController().constructor;
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
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  const decisions = [];
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  const headers = [];
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  for (const policy of owned) {
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- const subject = await resolveSubject(policy.keyStrategy, ipOpts, ctx);
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+ const subject = await resolveSubject(policy.keyStrategy, trustProxy, ctx);
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  if (subject == null) continue;
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  decisions.push(await limiter.check(policy.scope, subject, policy.rules, { ...policy.defaultMessage !== void 0 && { defaultMessage: policy.defaultMessage } }));
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  headers.push(policy.policyHeader);
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
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  };
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  return [defineBeforeInterceptor(() => evaluate("pre"), TInterceptorPriority.BEFORE_GUARD), defineBeforeInterceptor(() => evaluate("post"), TInterceptorPriority.AFTER_GUARD)];
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  }
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- async function resolveSubject(strategy, ipOpts, ctx) {
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+ async function resolveSubject(strategy, trustProxy, ctx) {
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  if (typeof strategy === "function") return await strategy();
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  if (strategy !== "ip") {
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  const subject = getRateLimitSubject(strategy, ctx);
@@ -556,7 +556,18 @@ async function resolveSubject(strategy, ipOpts, ctx) {
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  if (strategy === "user" && auth?.userId !== void 0) return `u:${auth.userId}`;
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  if (strategy === "session" && auth?.sessionId !== void 0) return `s:${auth.sessionId}`;
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  }
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- return `ip:${useRequest(ctx).getIp(ipOpts)}`;
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+ return `ip:${clientIp(trustProxy, ctx)}`;
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+ }
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+ /** Hop 0 (the socket peer) is the one trusted proxy. */
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+ const trustOneHop = (_addr, hop) => hop < 1;
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+ /**
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+ * `trustProxy: true` resolves like wooks' deprecated `getIp({ trustProxy: true })`
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+ * (one trusted hop, the right-most forwarded entry; `''` with no known peer)
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+ * without its deprecation notice; otherwise the app's own `getIp()`.
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+ */
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+ function clientIp(trustProxy, ctx) {
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+ const req = useRequest(ctx);
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+ return trustProxy ? resolveForwarded(req.raw, trustOneHop).ip : req.getIp();
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  }
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  //#endregion
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  //#region src/rate-limit/mate.ts
@@ -869,7 +880,7 @@ function oauthCsrfCookieAttrs(opts) {
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  secure: opts.secure,
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  sameSite: "Lax",
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  path: opts.path ?? "/",
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- maxAge: (opts.maxAgeSec ?? 600) * 1e3
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+ maxAge: `${opts.maxAgeSec ?? 600}s`
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  };
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  }
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  /**
@@ -1074,6 +1085,7 @@ const AOOTH_MESSAGES = {
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  INVALID_PASSWORD: "Invalid password",
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  INCORRECT_PASSWORD: "Incorrect password",
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  SESSION_LIMIT_REACHED: "Session limit reached",
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+ PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN: "Your password was changed. Please sign in again.",
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  INVALID_CODE: "Invalid code",
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  /** Params: `seconds`. */
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  RESEND_WAIT: "Please wait {seconds}s before requesting a new code.",
@@ -1285,6 +1297,9 @@ const mfaLoopSchema = [{ id: "prepare-mfa" }, {
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  /**
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  * Forced password change — used by login.flow + invite.start (NOT recovery — recovery's
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  * gating differs: gated directly on `otp.verified`, NOT `newPasswordRequired`).
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+ * login.flow revokes the user's existing sessions after its MFA loop (gated on
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+ * `ctx.passwordChanged`), never here: the old password alone must not be
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+ * enough to sign the user out everywhere.
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  */
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  const passwordPhaseSchema = [{
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  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.newPasswordRequired,
@@ -2086,7 +2101,8 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  * successful change (OWASP Session Management) and applies NO rate limit —
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  * current-password re-entry (enforced by `UserService.changePassword`) is the
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  * primary protection, not throttling. Customers override to add a min-interval
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- * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive.
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+ * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive. The session the
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+ * change was made from is always ended (see `finish-change-password`).
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  *
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  * Whether the flow may be STARTED at all is governed by arbac on the trigger
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  * route (deny the `change-password` action to forbid it for SSO-only orgs) —
@@ -3028,6 +3044,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  try {
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  const result = await this.users.login(input.username, input.password, this.lockoutOverride(ctx));
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  ctx.subject = result.user.id;
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+ ctx.passwordStamp = result.user.password.lastChanged ?? 0;
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  ctx.loginRecorded = true;
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  swapStrategy("store");
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  if (ctx.guards?.passwordInitial && result.user.password.isInitial) ctx.isPasswordInitial = true;
@@ -3736,6 +3753,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  this.processInlineConsent(ctx, input, wf);
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  ctx.isPasswordInitial = false;
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  ctx.isPasswordExpired = false;
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+ ctx.passwordChanged = true;
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  ctx.newPasswordRequired = false;
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  delete password.changeReason;
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  delete password.heading;
@@ -3801,16 +3819,42 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  }
3802
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  }
3803
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  /**
3804
- * Change-password terminal — rotate the acting session's token (so the
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- * current device stays signed in on a FRESH credential) and emit a success
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- * message. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so the net effect
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- * is "kill every other session, keep this one on a new token" (OWASP Session
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- * Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential change).
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+ * Change-password terminal — sign the current device in on a FRESH session
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+ * and end the one the change was made from, then emit a success message.
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+ * The new pair is minted under a new session id, so the pre-change session
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+ * (its access token, refresh token and every rotation) is revoked here —
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+ * whatever `revokeOtherSessions` says, since that policy covers only the
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+ * user's OTHER sessions. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so
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+ * the default net effect is "kill every old session, keep this device on a
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+ * new one" (OWASP Session Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential
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+ * change).
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+ *
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+ * The pre-change session is revoked BEFORE the issue, so a failed issue
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+ * (store error, `maxConcurrent` refusal) leaves the user signed out, never on
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+ * the old session. A refresh in flight during the change is covered by
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+ * `AuthCredential`'s revocation protocol (it can't leave live credentials in
3836
+ * a revoked session).
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+ *
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+ * When one session can't be targeted — a stateless store (JWT /
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+ * encapsulated), or a legacy credential minted before `sessionId` existed
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+ * (its fallback id, the access token's fingerprint, never reaches the refresh
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+ * row) — ALL of the user's sessions are revoked (`revokeAllForUser`, also
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+ * under `revokeOtherSessions: false`). A stateless store also denylists the
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+ * presented access token (best effort): its revocation epoch is process-local.
3809
3844
  */
3810
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  async finishChangePassword(ctx) {
3811
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  this.requireSubject(ctx);
3812
- const issue = await this.issueForContext(ctx);
3813
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  const auth = useAuth();
3848
+ const prior = auth.getAuthContext();
3849
+ const priorSessionId = prior?.sessionId;
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+ const stateful = this.auth.canEnumerateSessions;
3851
+ if (stateful && priorSessionId !== void 0 && priorSessionId !== prior?.credentialId) await this.auth.revokeSession(ctx.subject, priorSessionId);
3852
+ else {
3853
+ await this.auth.revokeAllForUser(ctx.subject);
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+ const accessToken = stateful ? void 0 : auth.extractToken();
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+ if (accessToken) await this.auth.revoke(accessToken).catch(() => void 0);
3856
+ }
3857
+ const issue = await this.issueForContext(ctx);
3814
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  const envelope = {
3815
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  finished: true,
3816
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  data: auth.buildLoginResponse(ctx.subject, issue),
@@ -4880,15 +4924,20 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4880
4924
  }
4881
4925
  /**
4882
4926
  * Revoke the user's existing sessions. Shared by recovery (gated upstream by
4883
- * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`) and authenticated change-password (gated
4884
- * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`).
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+ * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`), authenticated change-password (gated
4928
+ * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`) and the forced password change
4929
+ * at login / invite (gated by `ctx.passwordChanged`).
4885
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  *
4886
4931
  * - Change-password runs in an authenticated context, so we KEEP the caller's
4887
- * current device via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4932
+ * current session via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4888
4933
  * OWASP "invalidate other sessions" without logging the user out of the tab
4889
- * they just changed their password in. If the current session can't be
4890
- * resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking everything (fail-secure).
4891
- * - Recovery is anonymous (no current session to keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4934
+ * they just changed their password in. `finish-change-password` then moves
4935
+ * that tab onto a fresh session and revokes the kept one (and covers stores
4936
+ * that cannot enumerate, where `revokeOtherSessions` is a no-op). If the
4937
+ * current session can't be resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking
4938
+ * everything (fail-secure).
4939
+ * - Recovery and the forced change are anonymous (no current session to
4940
+ * keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4892
4941
  */
4893
4942
  async revokeSessions(ctx) {
4894
4943
  if (!ctx.subject) return void 0;
@@ -4907,6 +4956,25 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4907
4956
  await this.users.unlockAccount(ctx.subject);
4908
4957
  }
4909
4958
  /**
4959
+ * Login-only guard before the `record-login` funnel (and again before
4960
+ * `mint-authz-code`, past the consent pause): the account's
4961
+ * `password.lastChanged` must still be the one the `credentials` step
4962
+ * verified (`ctx.passwordStamp`). A run paused after the password check (MFA,
4963
+ * enrolment, consents …) and resumed after the password was changed
4964
+ * elsewhere finishes with an error instead of issuing tokens or minting an
4965
+ * authorization code. Skipped when this run changed the password itself.
4966
+ */
4967
+ async checkPasswordUnchanged(ctx) {
4968
+ this.requireSubject(ctx);
4969
+ if (((await this.users.getUser(ctx.subject)).password.lastChanged ?? 0) !== ctx.passwordStamp) {
4970
+ ctx.aborted = true;
4971
+ finishWf({ message: {
4972
+ level: "error",
4973
+ text: this.msg("PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN")
4974
+ } });
4975
+ }
4976
+ }
4977
+ /**
4910
4978
  * The SINGLE login-completion funnel. Every flow that establishes an
4911
4979
  * authenticated session routes through here — placed in each login schema
4912
4980
  * right after the guards and BEFORE the delivery terminal (`issue` /
@@ -4991,7 +5059,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4991
5059
  ...cookies,
4992
5060
  [name]: {
4993
5061
  value,
4994
- options: auth.cookieAttrs({ maxAge: ttlMs })
5062
+ options: auth.cookieAttrs({ maxAge: `${Math.max(0, Math.floor(ttlMs / 1e3))}s` })
4995
5063
  }
4996
5064
  };
4997
5065
  };
@@ -6423,6 +6491,14 @@ __decorate([
6423
6491
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
6424
6492
  __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Promise)
6425
6493
  ], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "unlockAccount", null);
6494
+ __decorate([
6495
+ Step("check-password-unchanged"),
6496
+ Public(),
6497
+ __decorateParam(0, WorkflowParam("context")),
6498
+ __decorateMetadata("design:type", Function),
6499
+ __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
6500
+ __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Promise)
6501
+ ], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "checkPasswordUnchanged", null);
6426
6502
  __decorate([
6427
6503
  Step("record-login"),
6428
6504
  Public(),
@@ -6654,6 +6730,10 @@ __decorate([
6654
6730
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.enrollment?.ensurePhone && !!ctx.channel?.phone && !ctx.channel?.phoneConfirmed
6655
6731
  },
6656
6732
  ...mfaLoopSchema,
6733
+ {
6734
+ id: "revoke-sessions",
6735
+ condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.passwordChanged && !ctx.aborted
6736
+ },
6657
6737
  {
6658
6738
  id: "device-trust",
6659
6739
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.deviceTrust?.enabled && !!ctx.otp?.verified && !!ctx.trust?.newDevice && (!ctx.deviceTrust?.optIn || !!ctx.trust?.rememberDevice)
@@ -6675,6 +6755,11 @@ __decorate([
6675
6755
  }]
6676
6756
  },
6677
6757
  { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6758
+ {
6759
+ id: "check-password-unchanged",
6760
+ condition: (ctx) => ctx.passwordStamp !== void 0 && !ctx.passwordChanged
6761
+ },
6762
+ { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6678
6763
  {
6679
6764
  id: "record-login",
6680
6765
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject && !ctx.authz?.silent
@@ -6695,6 +6780,11 @@ __decorate([
6695
6780
  id: "authz-consent",
6696
6781
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.authz
6697
6782
  },
6783
+ {
6784
+ id: "check-password-unchanged",
6785
+ condition: (ctx) => ctx.authz?.approved === true && ctx.passwordStamp !== void 0 && !ctx.passwordChanged
6786
+ },
6787
+ { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6698
6788
  {
6699
6789
  id: "mint-authz-code",
6700
6790
  condition: (ctx) => ctx.authz?.approved === true
@@ -7021,16 +7111,17 @@ let AuthController = class AuthController {
7021
7111
  const auth = useAuth();
7022
7112
  const refreshToken = resolveRefreshToken(auth, body);
7023
7113
  if (!refreshToken) throw new HttpError$1(401, "Missing refresh token");
7114
+ const fromBody = typeof body?.refreshToken === "string";
7024
7115
  let issue;
7025
7116
  try {
7026
7117
  issue = await this.auth.refresh(refreshToken);
7027
7118
  } catch (err) {
7028
- if (err instanceof AuthError) throw new HttpError$1(401, "Invalid refresh token");
7029
- throw err;
7119
+ if (!(err instanceof AuthError)) throw err;
7120
+ if (!fromBody) auth.clearCookies();
7121
+ throw new HttpError$1(401, "Invalid refresh token");
7030
7122
  }
7031
7123
  auth.writeCookies(issue);
7032
7124
  const validated = await this.auth.validate(issue.accessToken);
7033
- const fromBody = typeof body?.refreshToken === "string";
7034
7125
  return auth.buildLoginResponse(validated?.userId ?? "", issue, fromBody ? { exposeTokens: true } : void 0);
7035
7126
  }
7036
7127
  status() {
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@aooth/auth-moost",
3
- "version": "0.2.0",
3
+ "version": "0.2.1",
4
4
  "description": "Moost auth integration for aoothjs — AuthGuard interceptor, useAuth composable, REST endpoints, workflows",
5
5
  "keywords": [
6
6
  "aoothjs",
@@ -57,33 +57,33 @@
57
57
  "access": "public"
58
58
  },
59
59
  "dependencies": {
60
- "@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.160",
61
- "@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.7.31",
62
- "@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.2.0",
63
- "@aooth/idp": "0.2.0",
64
- "@aooth/auth": "0.2.0",
65
- "@aooth/user": "0.2.0"
60
+ "@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.162",
61
+ "@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.8.0",
62
+ "@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.2.1",
63
+ "@aooth/auth": "0.2.1",
64
+ "@aooth/idp": "0.2.1",
65
+ "@aooth/user": "0.2.1"
66
66
  },
67
67
  "devDependencies": {
68
- "@atscript/core": "^0.1.109",
69
- "@atscript/typescript": "^0.1.109",
70
- "@atscript/ui": "^0.1.160",
71
- "@atscript/ui-fns": "^0.1.160",
72
- "@moostjs/event-http": "^0.6.53",
73
- "@moostjs/event-wf": "^0.6.53",
74
- "moost": "^0.6.53",
75
- "unplugin-atscript": "^0.1.109",
76
- "wooks": "^0.7.31"
68
+ "@atscript/core": "^0.2.1",
69
+ "@atscript/typescript": "^0.2.1",
70
+ "@atscript/ui": "^0.1.162",
71
+ "@atscript/ui-fns": "^0.1.162",
72
+ "@moostjs/event-http": "^0.7.0",
73
+ "@moostjs/event-wf": "^0.7.0",
74
+ "moost": "^0.7.0",
75
+ "unplugin-atscript": "^0.2.1",
76
+ "wooks": "^0.8.0"
77
77
  },
78
78
  "peerDependencies": {
79
- "@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.160",
80
- "@atscript/typescript": "^0.1.109",
81
- "@moostjs/event-http": "^0.6.53",
82
- "@moostjs/event-wf": "^0.6.53",
83
- "@wooksjs/event-core": "^0.7.31",
84
- "@wooksjs/event-http": "^0.7.31",
85
- "@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.7.31",
86
- "moost": "^0.6.53"
79
+ "@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.162",
80
+ "@atscript/typescript": "^0.2.1",
81
+ "@moostjs/event-http": "^0.7.0",
82
+ "@moostjs/event-wf": "^0.7.0",
83
+ "@wooksjs/event-core": "^0.8.0",
84
+ "@wooksjs/event-http": "^0.8.0",
85
+ "@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.8.0",
86
+ "moost": "^0.7.0"
87
87
  },
88
88
  "peerDependenciesMeta": {
89
89
  "@atscript/typescript": {
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
7
7
  * Do not edit this file!
8
8
  */
9
9
 
10
- import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
10
+ import type { TAtscriptTypeObject, TAtscriptTypeComplex, TAtscriptTypeFinal, TAtscriptTypeArray, TAtscriptAnnotatedType, TAtscriptField, TMetadataMap, Validator, TValidatorOptions } from "@atscript/typescript/utils"
11
11
 
12
12
  /**
13
13
  * Atscript interface **WithInlineConsentForm**