@aooth/auth-moost 0.1.48 → 0.1.50

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -450,10 +450,11 @@ declare class ProveControlOtpForm {
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  }
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  /**
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  * Atscript interface **AuthorizeConsentForm**
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- * @see {@link ./forms.as:1048:18}
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+ * @see {@link ./forms.as:1050:18}
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  */
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  declare class AuthorizeConsentForm {
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  // notice: ui.paragraph
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+ // signedIn: ui.paragraph
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  // deny: ui.action
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  static __is_atscript_annotated_type: true;
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  static type: TAtscriptTypeObject<keyof AuthorizeConsentForm, AuthorizeConsentForm>;
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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- import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, O as WithInlineConsentForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as RecoveryFactorForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as MagicLinkRequestForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, x as RecoveryModeSelectForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "../forms-xaBNc5Ng.mjs";
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+ import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, O as WithInlineConsentForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as RecoveryFactorForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as MagicLinkRequestForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, x as RecoveryModeSelectForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "../forms-B9-r2zT5.mjs";
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  export { AskEmailForm, AskPhoneForm, AuthorizeConsentForm, ChangePasswordForm, ConcurrencyLimitForm, EmailIdentifierForm, EnrollAddressForm, EnrollConfirmForm, EnrollPickMethodForm, EnrollTotpQrForm, InviteForm, LoginCredentialsForm, MagicLinkRequestForm, ManageMfaForm, MfaCodeForm, PasswordReauthForm, PincodeForm, ProveControlForm, ProveControlOtpForm, RecoveryFactorForm, RecoveryModeSelectForm, RemoveMfaConfirmForm, Select2faForm, SetPasswordForm, SignupForm, StepUpConfirmForm, TermsBumpForm, WithInlineConsentForm };
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ defineAnnotatedType("object", ProveControlOtpForm).prop("intro", defineAnnotated
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  name: "align",
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  value: "center"
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  }, true).annotate("ui.form.pushDown", true).optional().$type).annotate("meta.label", "Confirm your identity").annotate("wf.context.pass", "public", true).annotate("ui.form.submit.text", "Verify and link");
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- defineAnnotatedType("object", AuthorizeConsentForm).prop("notice", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 1).annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? \" (\" + a.redirectHost + \")\" : \"\"; const who = a?.clientName ? \"“\" + a.clientName + \"”\" + host : \"A local application\"; const sc = a?.scope ? \" It is requesting access to: \" + a.scope + \".\" : \"\"; return who + \" wants to sign in to your account.\" + sc + \" Authorize this only if you started it.\"; }").$type).prop("deny", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("action", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 10).annotate("ui.form.action", {
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+ defineAnnotatedType("object", AuthorizeConsentForm).prop("notice", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 1).annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? \" (\" + a.redirectHost + \")\" : \"\"; const who = a?.clientName ? \"“\" + a.clientName + \"”\" + host : \"A local application\"; const sc = a?.scope ? \" It is requesting access to: \" + a.scope + \".\" : \"\"; return who + \" wants to sign in to your account.\" + sc + \" Authorize this only if you started it.\"; }").$type).prop("signedIn", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 2).annotate("ui.form.fn.hidden", "(_, _d, ctx) => !ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs").annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => \"Signed in as \" + (ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs || \"\") + \".\"").$type).prop("deny", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("action", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 10).annotate("ui.form.action", {
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  id: "deny",
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  label: "Deny"
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  }).annotate("ui.form.attr", {
package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -1521,6 +1521,42 @@ interface AuthWfFinalizePolicy {
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  notifyNewDevice: boolean;
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  redirect: LoginRedirect;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz` runs
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+ * only — a plain login visit never consults it). Resolved by
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+ * `resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(ctx)` and consumed once, inline in `init-login`
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+ * (which runs BEFORE the prepare-* block, like `credentials`' inline
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+ * resolver calls).
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+ *
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+ * - `'always-reauth'` (default) — today's behavior: every authorize leg
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+ * re-collects credentials, even with a live browser session.
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+ * - `'consent-only'` — with a live session on the trigger route, `init-login`
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+ * binds `ctx.subject` from it and the run skips the credentials form,
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+ * pausing straight on the authorize-consent screen (browser binding +
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+ * explicit approval still apply — see `authz-consent`). No session ⇒
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+ * unchanged credentials path. Requires the flow trigger route to see the
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+ * session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
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+ * SPA).
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+ */
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+ interface AuthzReauthPolicy {
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+ mode: "consent-only" | "always-reauth";
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+ /**
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+ * `'consent-only'` only: maximum age of the SESSION ORIGIN (the
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+ * `SessionInfo.createdAt` of the live session's family) for the silent
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+ * path. An older session — or one whose origin can't be established
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+ * (legacy token without a `sessionId`) — falls back to the credentials
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+ * form (GitHub sudo-style freshness). Omit for no ceiling.
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+ */
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+ maxSessionAgeMs?: number;
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+ /**
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+ * `'consent-only'` only: when `true`, a silently-bound subject still runs
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+ * the MFA challenge loop before consent (the session skips only the
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+ * password form). Default (`false`/omitted) pre-sets `otp.verified` — the
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+ * session already proved its factors at login time, so the whole loop
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+ * (including `risk-step-up`) is skipped.
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+ */
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+ requireMfa?: boolean;
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+ }
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  /** Login-time guards policy. */
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  interface AuthWfGuardsPolicy {
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  passwordInitial: boolean;
@@ -1948,15 +1984,17 @@ interface AuthWfPublicState {
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  newPasswordRequired?: boolean;
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  /**
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  * Mirrors the display-only fields of `ctx.authz` — the requesting client's
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- * id/name, granted scope, and the VALIDATED redirect host (the trustworthy
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- * identity shown next to the attacker-choosable `clientName`), shown on the
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- * authorize-consent form. The `handle` and the `approved` gate stay
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+ * id/name, granted scope, the VALIDATED redirect host (the trustworthy
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+ * identity shown next to the attacker-choosable `clientName`), and — on a
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+ * silent (consent-only) run — the acting identity (`signedInAs`), all shown
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+ * on the authorize-consent form. The `handle` and the `approved` gate stay
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  * server-only (never whitelisted onto the wire).
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  */
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  authz?: {
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  clientName?: string;
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  scope?: string;
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  redirectHost?: string;
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+ signedInAs?: string;
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  };
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  }
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  /** Unified workflow context shape — one type for all three flows. */
@@ -2057,6 +2095,20 @@ interface AuthWfCtx {
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  scope?: string;
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  redirectHost?: string;
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  approved?: boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * Consent-only marker: `init-login` bound `ctx.subject` from a live
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+ * browser session (per {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} `mode: 'consent-only'`)
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+ * instead of the credentials form. Gates `record-login` off (a silent
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+ * consent is not a login event — no `lastLogin` stamp, no `afterLogin`,
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+ * and `isFirstLogin`-gated steps never fire for it).
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+ */
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+ silent?: boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * Acting identity shown on the consent form when the run is silent
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+ * ("Signed in as …") so the user can catch a wrong-account grant.
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+ * Display-only; mirrored to `public.authz.signedInAs`.
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+ */
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+ signedInAs?: string;
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  };
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  /**
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  * FE-facing surface — the ONLY top-level ctx key whitelisted on form
@@ -2610,6 +2662,18 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  * emailVerifiedRequired). Reached from login.flow.
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  */
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  protected resolveGuards(_ctx: AuthWfCtx): NonNullable<AuthWfCtx["guards"]> | Promise<NonNullable<AuthWfCtx["guards"]>>;
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+ /**
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+ * Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz`
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+ * runs). Consulted inline by `init-login` — BEFORE `credentials`, like that
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+ * step's own inline resolver calls — and only when the START input carried
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+ * an `authz` handle; a plain login never consults it. Default keeps today's
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+ * behavior: every authorize leg re-collects credentials. Override to
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+ * `{ mode: 'consent-only' }` so a live browser session skips straight to
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+ * the authorize-consent screen (browser binding + explicit approval still
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+ * apply); see {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} for `maxSessionAgeMs` freshness and
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+ * the `requireMfa` knob.
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+ */
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+ protected resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(_ctx: AuthWfCtx): AuthzReauthPolicy | Promise<AuthzReauthPolicy>;
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  /**
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  * Resolve the session-policy (concurrency limit). Reached from login.flow.
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  */
@@ -3072,7 +3136,40 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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  * clobber the user's live factor, by construction.
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  */
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  protected handleEnrollExit(ctx: AuthWfCtx, action: string | undefined): boolean;
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- initLogin(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
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+ initLogin(ctx: AuthWfCtx): undefined | Promise<undefined>;
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+ /**
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+ * `init-login`'s consent-only dispatch: run {@link probeSilentAuthz} and, on
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+ * a successful bind, move to the durable store strategy (the run will pause
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+ * on the consent form; mirrors `credentials` / `sso-callback` post-subject).
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+ * Split from the probe so unit tests can exercise the probe without a live
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+ * wf engine (`swapStrategy` requires one).
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+ */
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+ private maybeBindSilentAuthz;
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+ /**
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+ * Silent-authorize session probe (consent-only re-auth policy). Reads the
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+ * auth context the guard interceptor stashed for THIS trigger request —
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+ * `getAuthContext()` is `null` for a missing, expired, or invalid credential
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+ * on a `@Public()` route, so the probe is non-throwing by construction (no
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+ * 401 can leak out of the flow). Requires the trigger route to actually see
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+ * the session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
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+ * SPA) and the guard interceptor to be mounted on it.
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+ *
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+ * Binds on success: `ctx.subject`, `ctx.authz.silent` (+ `signedInAs` for
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+ * the consent copy), pre-sets `otp.verified` unless `policy.requireMfa`, and
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+ * seeds channel state from the user row (same `seedChannelState` as the
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+ * federated path) so the shared enrolment / notice gates behave exactly as
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+ * after a fresh login. Fail-closed ordering mirrors `sso-callback`: the
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+ * ACCOUNT-STATE GATE runs before the subject is bound, so a locked/inactive
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+ * account falls back to the credentials form (where `users.login` rejects
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+ * it) instead of silently reaching consent.
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+ */
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+ /**
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+ * Account-state gate shared by the three no-password entry paths — the
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+ * silent-authorize probe, `sso-callback`'s success gate, and `prove-control`'s
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+ * candidate gate. A blocked account must never bind a subject on any of them.
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+ */
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+ protected isAccountBlocked(user: UserCredentials): boolean;
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+ protected probeSilentAuthz(ctx: AuthWfCtx, policy: AuthzReauthPolicy): Promise<boolean>;
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  initInviteAdmin(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
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  initInviteAccept(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
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  initRecovery(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
@@ -4107,4 +4204,4 @@ interface AuditEmitter {
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  emit(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void> | void;
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  }
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  //#endregion
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- export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, AuthController, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, AuthGuarded, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, AuthWorkflow, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, SessionEnricherProvider, type SessionInfo, SessionsController, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, UserId, WfTrigger, type WfTriggerOpts, WfTriggerProvider, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };
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+ export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, AuthController, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, AuthGuarded, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, AuthWorkflow, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, type AuthzReauthPolicy, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, SessionEnricherProvider, type SessionInfo, SessionsController, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, UserId, WfTrigger, type WfTriggerOpts, WfTriggerProvider, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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- import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "./forms-xaBNc5Ng.mjs";
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+ import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "./forms-B9-r2zT5.mjs";
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  import { Controller, HandlerPaths, Inherit, Inject, InjectMoostLogger, Injectable, Intercept, MoostInit, Optional, Param, Resolve, TInterceptorPriority, defineAfterInterceptor, defineBeforeInterceptor, getMoostMate, useControllerContext, useLogger } from "moost";
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  import { AuthCredential, AuthError, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimiter, RateLimiter as RateLimiter$1, generateMagicLinkToken, generateOpaqueToken, parseRateLimitRule } from "@aooth/auth";
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  import { current, defineWook, eventTypeKey, key } from "@wooksjs/event-core";
@@ -1606,6 +1606,20 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  };
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  }
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  /**
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+ * Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz`
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+ * runs). Consulted inline by `init-login` — BEFORE `credentials`, like that
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+ * step's own inline resolver calls — and only when the START input carried
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+ * an `authz` handle; a plain login never consults it. Default keeps today's
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+ * behavior: every authorize leg re-collects credentials. Override to
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+ * `{ mode: 'consent-only' }` so a live browser session skips straight to
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+ * the authorize-consent screen (browser binding + explicit approval still
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+ * apply); see {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} for `maxSessionAgeMs` freshness and
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+ * the `requireMfa` knob.
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+ */
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+ resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(_ctx) {
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+ return { mode: "always-reauth" };
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+ }
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+ /**
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  * Resolve the session-policy (concurrency limit). Reached from login.flow.
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  */
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  resolveSessionPolicy(_ctx) {
@@ -2094,7 +2108,8 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  const sub = pickDefined(ctx.authz, [
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  "clientName",
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  "scope",
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- "redirectHost"
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+ "redirectHost",
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+ "signedInAs"
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  ]);
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  if (sub) pub.authz = sub;
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  }
@@ -2386,6 +2401,73 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
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  }
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  const authz = getInputField("authz");
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  if (authz) ctx.authz = { handle: authz };
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+ if (authz && !ctx.idpInbound) {
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+ const policyResult = this.resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(ctx);
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+ if (policyResult instanceof Promise) return policyResult.then((policy) => this.maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policy));
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+ return this.maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policyResult);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * `init-login`'s consent-only dispatch: run {@link probeSilentAuthz} and, on
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+ * a successful bind, move to the durable store strategy (the run will pause
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+ * on the consent form; mirrors `credentials` / `sso-callback` post-subject).
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+ * Split from the probe so unit tests can exercise the probe without a live
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+ * wf engine (`swapStrategy` requires one).
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+ */
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+ maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policy) {
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+ if (policy.mode !== "consent-only") return void 0;
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+ return this.probeSilentAuthz(ctx, policy).then((bound) => {
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+ if (bound) swapStrategy("store");
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+ });
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Silent-authorize session probe (consent-only re-auth policy). Reads the
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+ * auth context the guard interceptor stashed for THIS trigger request —
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+ * `getAuthContext()` is `null` for a missing, expired, or invalid credential
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+ * on a `@Public()` route, so the probe is non-throwing by construction (no
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+ * 401 can leak out of the flow). Requires the trigger route to actually see
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+ * the session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
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+ * SPA) and the guard interceptor to be mounted on it.
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+ *
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+ * Binds on success: `ctx.subject`, `ctx.authz.silent` (+ `signedInAs` for
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+ * the consent copy), pre-sets `otp.verified` unless `policy.requireMfa`, and
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+ * seeds channel state from the user row (same `seedChannelState` as the
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+ * federated path) so the shared enrolment / notice gates behave exactly as
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+ * after a fresh login. Fail-closed ordering mirrors `sso-callback`: the
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+ * ACCOUNT-STATE GATE runs before the subject is bound, so a locked/inactive
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+ * account falls back to the credentials form (where `users.login` rejects
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+ * it) instead of silently reaching consent.
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+ */
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+ /**
2442
+ * Account-state gate shared by the three no-password entry paths — the
2443
+ * silent-authorize probe, `sso-callback`'s success gate, and `prove-control`'s
2444
+ * candidate gate. A blocked account must never bind a subject on any of them.
2445
+ */
2446
+ isAccountBlocked(user) {
2447
+ return user.account.locked || !user.account.active;
2448
+ }
2449
+ async probeSilentAuthz(ctx, policy) {
2450
+ const session = useAuth().getAuthContext();
2451
+ if (!session) return false;
2452
+ if (policy.maxSessionAgeMs !== void 0) {
2453
+ if (!session.sessionId) return false;
2454
+ const origin = (await this.auth.listSessions(session.userId)).find((s) => s.sessionId === session.sessionId);
2455
+ if (!origin || Date.now() - origin.createdAt > policy.maxSessionAgeMs) return false;
2456
+ }
2457
+ let user;
2458
+ try {
2459
+ user = await this.users.getUser(session.userId);
2460
+ } catch {
2461
+ return false;
2462
+ }
2463
+ if (this.isAccountBlocked(user)) return false;
2464
+ ctx.subject = session.userId;
2465
+ const authz = ctx.authz;
2466
+ authz.silent = true;
2467
+ authz.signedInAs = user.username;
2468
+ if (!policy.requireMfa) (ctx.otp ??= {}).verified = true;
2469
+ await this.seedChannelState(ctx, user);
2470
+ return true;
2389
2471
  }
2390
2472
  initInviteAdmin(ctx) {
2391
2473
  ctx.autoLogin = this.opts.autoLoginOnInvite;
@@ -4786,7 +4868,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4786
4868
  if (outcome.kind === "denied") return this.finishOAuth(ctx, "denied");
4787
4869
  if (outcome.kind === "needs-link") return this.stashPendingLink(ctx, profile, outcome.candidateUserId, redirect);
4788
4870
  const user = await this.users.getUser(outcome.userId);
4789
- if (user.account.locked || !user.account.active) return this.finishOAuth(ctx, "account-state");
4871
+ if (this.isAccountBlocked(user)) return this.finishOAuth(ctx, "account-state");
4790
4872
  ctx.subject = outcome.userId;
4791
4873
  ctx.oauth = {
4792
4874
  provider: profile.provider,
@@ -5004,7 +5086,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
5004
5086
  if (err instanceof UserAuthError && err.type === "LOCKED") throw this.throwPublic(ctx, wf, { formMessage: "Account locked, please try again later" });
5005
5087
  throw this.throwPublic(ctx, wf, { errors: { password: "Invalid password" } });
5006
5088
  }
5007
- if (candidate.account.locked || !candidate.account.active) {
5089
+ if (this.isAccountBlocked(candidate)) {
5008
5090
  delete ctx.pendingLink;
5009
5091
  return this.finishOAuth(ctx, "account-state");
5010
5092
  }
@@ -5128,7 +5210,7 @@ __decorate([
5128
5210
  __decorateParam(0, WorkflowParam("context")),
5129
5211
  __decorateMetadata("design:type", Function),
5130
5212
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
5131
- __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", void 0)
5213
+ __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Object)
5132
5214
  ], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "initLogin", null);
5133
5215
  __decorate([
5134
5216
  Step("init-invite-admin"),
@@ -5900,7 +5982,7 @@ __decorate([
5900
5982
  },
5901
5983
  {
5902
5984
  id: "credentials",
5903
- condition: (ctx) => !ctx.idpInbound
5985
+ condition: (ctx) => !ctx.idpInbound && !ctx.subject
5904
5986
  },
5905
5987
  {
5906
5988
  id: "prove-control",
@@ -5967,7 +6049,7 @@ __decorate([
5967
6049
  { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
5968
6050
  {
5969
6051
  id: "record-login",
5970
- condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject
6052
+ condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject && !ctx.authz?.silent
5971
6053
  },
5972
6054
  {
5973
6055
  condition: (ctx) => !ctx.authz,
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@aooth/auth-moost",
3
- "version": "0.1.48",
3
+ "version": "0.1.50",
4
4
  "description": "Moost auth integration for aoothjs — AuthGuard interceptor, useAuth composable, REST endpoints, workflows",
5
5
  "keywords": [
6
6
  "aoothjs",
@@ -59,10 +59,10 @@
59
59
  "dependencies": {
60
60
  "@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.121",
61
61
  "@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.7.19",
62
- "@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.1.48",
63
- "@aooth/auth": "0.1.48",
64
- "@aooth/idp": "0.1.48",
65
- "@aooth/user": "0.1.48"
62
+ "@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.1.50",
63
+ "@aooth/idp": "0.1.50",
64
+ "@aooth/auth": "0.1.50",
65
+ "@aooth/user": "0.1.50"
66
66
  },
67
67
  "devDependencies": {
68
68
  "@atscript/core": "^0.1.82",
@@ -1036,7 +1036,9 @@ export interface ProveControlOtpForm {
1036
1036
  * 'Deny' action 302s the client back with `error=access_denied`. The requesting
1037
1037
  * client + scope + validated redirect host ride the `@wf.context.pass 'public'`
1038
1038
  * `ctx.public.authz` whitelist (display-only — the handle / approval gate stay
1039
- * server-side). `clientName` is REGISTRANT-SUPPLIED text (a DCR client names
1039
+ * server-side); on a silent (consent-only) run the acting identity rides the
1040
+ * same whitelist (`signedInAs`) and renders as a "Signed in as …" line so the
1041
+ * user can catch a wrong-account grant. `clientName` is REGISTRANT-SUPPLIED text (a DCR client names
1040
1042
  * itself), so the copy pairs it with the validated redirect host — where the
1041
1043
  * code is actually delivered, which a self-chosen name can't fake — and the
1042
1044
  * `ui.paragraph` renderer emits a TEXT node (never markup/links), so a
@@ -1050,6 +1052,11 @@ export interface AuthorizeConsentForm {
1050
1052
  @ui.form.fn.value '(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? " (" + a.redirectHost + ")" : ""; const who = a?.clientName ? "“" + a.clientName + "”" + host : "A local application"; const sc = a?.scope ? " It is requesting access to: " + a.scope + "." : ""; return who + " wants to sign in to your account." + sc + " Authorize this only if you started it."; }'
1051
1053
  notice: ui.paragraph
1052
1054
 
1055
+ @ui.form.order 2
1056
+ @ui.form.fn.hidden '(_, _d, ctx) => !ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs'
1057
+ @ui.form.fn.value '(_, _d, ctx) => "Signed in as " + (ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs || "") + "."'
1058
+ signedIn: ui.paragraph
1059
+
1053
1060
  @ui.form.order 10
1054
1061
  @ui.form.action 'deny', 'Deny'
1055
1062
  @ui.form.attr 'align', 'center'
@@ -493,10 +493,11 @@ export declare class ProveControlOtpForm {
493
493
 
494
494
  /**
495
495
  * Atscript interface **AuthorizeConsentForm**
496
- * @see {@link ./forms.as:1048:18}
496
+ * @see {@link ./forms.as:1050:18}
497
497
  */
498
498
  export declare class AuthorizeConsentForm {
499
499
  // notice: ui.paragraph
500
+ // signedIn: ui.paragraph
500
501
  // deny: ui.action
501
502
  static __is_atscript_annotated_type: true
502
503
  static type: TAtscriptTypeObject<keyof AuthorizeConsentForm, AuthorizeConsentForm>