@aooth/auth-moost 0.1.47 → 0.1.49
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/atscript/index.d.mts +2 -1
- package/dist/atscript/index.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/{forms-xaBNc5Ng.mjs → forms-B9-r2zT5.mjs} +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.mts +139 -18
- package/dist/index.mjs +165 -29
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/src/atscript/models/forms.as +8 -1
- package/src/atscript/models/forms.as.d.ts +2 -1
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@@ -450,10 +450,11 @@ declare class ProveControlOtpForm {
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}
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/**
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* Atscript interface **AuthorizeConsentForm**
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* @see {@link ./forms.as:
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* @see {@link ./forms.as:1050:18}
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*/
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declare class AuthorizeConsentForm {
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// notice: ui.paragraph
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// signedIn: ui.paragraph
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// deny: ui.action
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static __is_atscript_annotated_type: true;
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static type: TAtscriptTypeObject<keyof AuthorizeConsentForm, AuthorizeConsentForm>;
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package/dist/atscript/index.mjs
CHANGED
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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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1
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-
import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, O as WithInlineConsentForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as RecoveryFactorForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as MagicLinkRequestForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, x as RecoveryModeSelectForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "../forms-
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import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, O as WithInlineConsentForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as RecoveryFactorForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as MagicLinkRequestForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, x as RecoveryModeSelectForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "../forms-B9-r2zT5.mjs";
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export { AskEmailForm, AskPhoneForm, AuthorizeConsentForm, ChangePasswordForm, ConcurrencyLimitForm, EmailIdentifierForm, EnrollAddressForm, EnrollConfirmForm, EnrollPickMethodForm, EnrollTotpQrForm, InviteForm, LoginCredentialsForm, MagicLinkRequestForm, ManageMfaForm, MfaCodeForm, PasswordReauthForm, PincodeForm, ProveControlForm, ProveControlOtpForm, RecoveryFactorForm, RecoveryModeSelectForm, RemoveMfaConfirmForm, Select2faForm, SetPasswordForm, SignupForm, StepUpConfirmForm, TermsBumpForm, WithInlineConsentForm };
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@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ defineAnnotatedType("object", ProveControlOtpForm).prop("intro", defineAnnotated
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name: "align",
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value: "center"
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}, true).annotate("ui.form.pushDown", true).optional().$type).annotate("meta.label", "Confirm your identity").annotate("wf.context.pass", "public", true).annotate("ui.form.submit.text", "Verify and link");
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defineAnnotatedType("object", AuthorizeConsentForm).prop("notice", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 1).annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? \" (\" + a.redirectHost + \")\" : \"\"; const who = a?.clientName ? \"“\" + a.clientName + \"”\" + host : \"A local application\"; const sc = a?.scope ? \" It is requesting access to: \" + a.scope + \".\" : \"\"; return who + \" wants to sign in to your account.\" + sc + \" Authorize this only if you started it.\"; }").$type).prop("deny", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("action", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 10).annotate("ui.form.action", {
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defineAnnotatedType("object", AuthorizeConsentForm).prop("notice", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 1).annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? \" (\" + a.redirectHost + \")\" : \"\"; const who = a?.clientName ? \"“\" + a.clientName + \"”\" + host : \"A local application\"; const sc = a?.scope ? \" It is requesting access to: \" + a.scope + \".\" : \"\"; return who + \" wants to sign in to your account.\" + sc + \" Authorize this only if you started it.\"; }").$type).prop("signedIn", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("paragraph", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 2).annotate("ui.form.fn.hidden", "(_, _d, ctx) => !ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs").annotate("ui.form.fn.value", "(_, _d, ctx) => \"Signed in as \" + (ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs || \"\") + \".\"").$type).prop("deny", defineAnnotatedType().designType("phantom").tags("action", "ui").annotate("ui.form.order", 10).annotate("ui.form.action", {
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id: "deny",
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label: "Deny"
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}).annotate("ui.form.attr", {
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package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -1005,9 +1005,21 @@ interface TokenSuccess {
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access_token?: string;
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id_token?: string;
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expires_in?: number;
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/** Rotating refresh token — minted iff the grant's `TokenPolicy.refresh` opted in. */
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refresh_token?: string;
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/** The authenticated user id (`sub`) — convenience for a CLI; not part of the OIDC token response. */
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userId: string;
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}
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/** The `POST /auth/token` request body (RFC 6749 §4.1.3 / §6, form- or JSON-shaped). */
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interface TokenRequestBody {
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grant_type?: string;
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code?: string;
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code_verifier?: string;
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client_id?: string;
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client_secret?: string;
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refresh_token?: string;
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resource?: string | string[];
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}
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/** A minimal OIDC discovery document (`/.well-known/openid-configuration`). */
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interface OidcDiscoveryDocument {
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issuer: string;
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@@ -1023,11 +1035,15 @@ interface OidcDiscoveryDocument {
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code_challenge_methods_supported: string[];
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token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: string[];
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}
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/** RFC 7591 §3.2.1 registration response
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/** RFC 7591 §3.2.1 registration response. Secret fields present iff a secret was issued. */
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interface ClientRegistrationSuccess {
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client_id: string;
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/** Seconds since epoch (the RFC's unit — NOT ms). */
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client_id_issued_at: number;
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/** The minted secret (`client_secret_post` registrations) — disclosed HERE and only here. */
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client_secret?: string;
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/** REQUIRED when a secret is issued; `0` ⇒ the secret does not expire. */
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client_secret_expires_at?: number;
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redirect_uris: string[];
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token_endpoint_auth_method: string;
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grant_types: string[];
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@@ -1117,14 +1133,26 @@ declare class AuthorizeController {
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*/
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protected scopesSupported(): string[] | undefined;
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authorize(responseType: string | undefined, redirectUri: string | undefined, clientId: string | undefined, state: string | undefined, codeChallenge: string | undefined, codeChallengeMethod: string | undefined, scope: string | undefined, nonce: string | undefined, resource: string | undefined): Promise<string>;
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token(body:
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token(body: TokenRequestBody | undefined): Promise<TokenSuccess | TokenError>;
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/**
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* `grant_type=refresh_token` (OAuth 2.1 §4.3): rotate the presented refresh
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* token into a fresh access + refresh pair. Only a family minted BY this
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* token endpoint for a registered client redeems here — the
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* `metadata.authzClientId` stamp is the binding, checked BEFORE any rotation
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* (so a browser-session refresh token, or another client's, is a plain
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* `invalid_grant` with the family untouched). Client authentication mirrors
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* the code branch; the grant's authority (kind, payload, per-mint ttl) rides
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* the credential family — nothing is re-derived here. Reuse of an
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* already-rotated token revokes the whole family inside the session layer
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* (the standard theft response) and surfaces as `invalid_grant`.
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*/
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protected refreshTokenGrant(body: TokenRequestBody): Promise<TokenSuccess | TokenError>;
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/**
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* Client authentication shared by both grant branches (RFC 6749 §2.3):
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* `true` iff the policy accepts the presented credentials (or defines no
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* `authenticateClient` hook). Callers map `false` to `401 invalid_client`.
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*/
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protected clientAuthenticates(clientId: string, clientSecret: string | undefined): Promise<boolean>;
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/**
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* OIDC discovery (Tier 2). Derives every endpoint from the signer's `issuer`
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* (configured as `{origin}/auth`), so a relying `OidcProvider` configured with
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* RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration (OAUTH.md R2) — anonymous by spec;
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* 404 unless a registration operation is wired ({@link
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* getDynamicClientRegistration}). A thin HTTP adapter: validation, abuse
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* knobs (guard / cap / never-used GC) and persistence live
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* `DynamicClientRegistration` (`@aooth/auth`).
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*
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*
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* knobs (guard / cap / never-used GC), secret minting and persistence live
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* in `DynamicClientRegistration` (`@aooth/auth`). A `client_secret_post`
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* registration is echoed with its minted `client_secret` +
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* `client_secret_expires_at` — the ONE disclosure (only the hash is stored);
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* public (`"none"`) registrations carry neither field (RFC 7591 §3.2.1
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* requires them only when a secret is issued).
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register(body: unknown): Promise<ClientRegistrationSuccess | ClientRegistrationFailure | TokenError>;
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/** The signer's public JWKS (Tier 2). 404 when no signer is wired. */
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notifyNewDevice: boolean;
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redirect: LoginRedirect;
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}
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/**
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* Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz` runs
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* only — a plain login visit never consults it). Resolved by
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* `resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(ctx)` and consumed once, inline in `init-login`
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* (which runs BEFORE the prepare-* block, like `credentials`' inline
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* resolver calls).
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*
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* - `'always-reauth'` (default) — today's behavior: every authorize leg
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* re-collects credentials, even with a live browser session.
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* - `'consent-only'` — with a live session on the trigger route, `init-login`
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* binds `ctx.subject` from it and the run skips the credentials form,
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* pausing straight on the authorize-consent screen (browser binding +
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* explicit approval still apply — see `authz-consent`). No session ⇒
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* unchanged credentials path. Requires the flow trigger route to see the
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* session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
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* SPA).
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*/
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interface AuthzReauthPolicy {
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mode: "consent-only" | "always-reauth";
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/**
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* `'consent-only'` only: maximum age of the SESSION ORIGIN (the
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* `SessionInfo.createdAt` of the live session's family) for the silent
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* path. An older session — or one whose origin can't be established
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* (legacy token without a `sessionId`) — falls back to the credentials
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* form (GitHub sudo-style freshness). Omit for no ceiling.
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*/
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maxSessionAgeMs?: number;
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/**
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* `'consent-only'` only: when `true`, a silently-bound subject still runs
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* the MFA challenge loop before consent (the session skips only the
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* password form). Default (`false`/omitted) pre-sets `otp.verified` — the
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* session already proved its factors at login time, so the whole loop
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* (including `risk-step-up`) is skipped.
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*/
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requireMfa?: boolean;
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}
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/** Login-time guards policy. */
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interface AuthWfGuardsPolicy {
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passwordInitial: boolean;
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@@ -1918,15 +1984,17 @@ interface AuthWfPublicState {
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newPasswordRequired?: boolean;
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/**
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* Mirrors the display-only fields of `ctx.authz` — the requesting client's
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* id/name, granted scope,
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* identity shown next to the attacker-choosable `clientName`),
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*
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* id/name, granted scope, the VALIDATED redirect host (the trustworthy
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* identity shown next to the attacker-choosable `clientName`), and — on a
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* silent (consent-only) run — the acting identity (`signedInAs`), all shown
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* on the authorize-consent form. The `handle` and the `approved` gate stay
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* server-only (never whitelisted onto the wire).
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*/
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authz?: {
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clientName?: string;
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scope?: string;
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redirectHost?: string;
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signedInAs?: string;
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};
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}
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/** Unified workflow context shape — one type for all three flows. */
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@@ -2027,6 +2095,20 @@ interface AuthWfCtx {
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scope?: string;
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redirectHost?: string;
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approved?: boolean;
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/**
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* Consent-only marker: `init-login` bound `ctx.subject` from a live
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* browser session (per {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} `mode: 'consent-only'`)
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* instead of the credentials form. Gates `record-login` off (a silent
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* consent is not a login event — no `lastLogin` stamp, no `afterLogin`,
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* and `isFirstLogin`-gated steps never fire for it).
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*/
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silent?: boolean;
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/**
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* Acting identity shown on the consent form when the run is silent
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* ("Signed in as …") so the user can catch a wrong-account grant.
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* Display-only; mirrored to `public.authz.signedInAs`.
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*/
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signedInAs?: string;
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};
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/**
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* FE-facing surface — the ONLY top-level ctx key whitelisted on form
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* emailVerifiedRequired). Reached from login.flow.
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*/
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protected resolveGuards(_ctx: AuthWfCtx): NonNullable<AuthWfCtx["guards"]> | Promise<NonNullable<AuthWfCtx["guards"]>>;
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/**
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* Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz`
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* runs). Consulted inline by `init-login` — BEFORE `credentials`, like that
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* step's own inline resolver calls — and only when the START input carried
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* an `authz` handle; a plain login never consults it. Default keeps today's
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* behavior: every authorize leg re-collects credentials. Override to
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* `{ mode: 'consent-only' }` so a live browser session skips straight to
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* the authorize-consent screen (browser binding + explicit approval still
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* apply); see {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} for `maxSessionAgeMs` freshness and
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* the `requireMfa` knob.
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*/
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protected resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(_ctx: AuthWfCtx): AuthzReauthPolicy | Promise<AuthzReauthPolicy>;
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/**
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* Resolve the session-policy (concurrency limit). Reached from login.flow.
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*/
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@@ -3042,7 +3136,34 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
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* clobber the user's live factor, by construction.
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*/
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protected handleEnrollExit(ctx: AuthWfCtx, action: string | undefined): boolean;
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initLogin(ctx: AuthWfCtx):
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initLogin(ctx: AuthWfCtx): undefined | Promise<undefined>;
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/**
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* `init-login`'s consent-only dispatch: run {@link probeSilentAuthz} and, on
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* a successful bind, move to the durable store strategy (the run will pause
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|
+
* on the consent form; mirrors `credentials` / `sso-callback` post-subject).
|
|
3144
|
+
* Split from the probe so unit tests can exercise the probe without a live
|
|
3145
|
+
* wf engine (`swapStrategy` requires one).
|
|
3146
|
+
*/
|
|
3147
|
+
private maybeBindSilentAuthz;
|
|
3148
|
+
/**
|
|
3149
|
+
* Silent-authorize session probe (consent-only re-auth policy). Reads the
|
|
3150
|
+
* auth context the guard interceptor stashed for THIS trigger request —
|
|
3151
|
+
* `getAuthContext()` is `null` for a missing, expired, or invalid credential
|
|
3152
|
+
* on a `@Public()` route, so the probe is non-throwing by construction (no
|
|
3153
|
+
* 401 can leak out of the flow). Requires the trigger route to actually see
|
|
3154
|
+
* the session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
|
|
3155
|
+
* SPA) and the guard interceptor to be mounted on it.
|
|
3156
|
+
*
|
|
3157
|
+
* Binds on success: `ctx.subject`, `ctx.authz.silent` (+ `signedInAs` for
|
|
3158
|
+
* the consent copy), pre-sets `otp.verified` unless `policy.requireMfa`, and
|
|
3159
|
+
* seeds channel state from the user row (same `seedChannelState` as the
|
|
3160
|
+
* federated path) so the shared enrolment / notice gates behave exactly as
|
|
3161
|
+
* after a fresh login. Fail-closed ordering mirrors `sso-callback`: the
|
|
3162
|
+
* ACCOUNT-STATE GATE runs before the subject is bound, so a locked/inactive
|
|
3163
|
+
* account falls back to the credentials form (where `users.login` rejects
|
|
3164
|
+
* it) instead of silently reaching consent.
|
|
3165
|
+
*/
|
|
3166
|
+
protected probeSilentAuthz(ctx: AuthWfCtx, policy: AuthzReauthPolicy): Promise<boolean>;
|
|
3046
3167
|
initInviteAdmin(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
|
|
3047
3168
|
initInviteAccept(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
|
|
3048
3169
|
initRecovery(ctx: AuthWfCtx): void;
|
|
@@ -4077,4 +4198,4 @@ interface AuditEmitter {
|
|
|
4077
4198
|
emit(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void> | void;
|
|
4078
4199
|
}
|
|
4079
4200
|
//#endregion
|
|
4080
|
-
export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, AuthController, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, AuthGuarded, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, AuthWorkflow, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, SessionEnricherProvider, type SessionInfo, SessionsController, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, UserId, WfTrigger, type WfTriggerOpts, WfTriggerProvider, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };
|
|
4201
|
+
export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, AuthController, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, AuthGuarded, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, AuthWorkflow, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, type AuthzReauthPolicy, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, SessionEnricherProvider, type SessionInfo, SessionsController, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, UserId, WfTrigger, type WfTriggerOpts, WfTriggerProvider, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };
|
package/dist/index.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "./forms-
|
|
1
|
+
import { C as Select2faForm, D as TermsBumpForm, E as StepUpConfirmForm, S as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, T as SignupForm, _ as PincodeForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteForm, f as LoginCredentialsForm, g as PasswordReauthForm, h as MfaCodeForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, m as ManageMfaForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as ProveControlForm, w as SetPasswordForm, y as ProveControlOtpForm } from "./forms-B9-r2zT5.mjs";
|
|
2
2
|
import { Controller, HandlerPaths, Inherit, Inject, InjectMoostLogger, Injectable, Intercept, MoostInit, Optional, Param, Resolve, TInterceptorPriority, defineAfterInterceptor, defineBeforeInterceptor, getMoostMate, useControllerContext, useLogger } from "moost";
|
|
3
|
-
import { AuthCredential, AuthError, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimiter, RateLimiter as RateLimiter$1, generateMagicLinkToken, parseRateLimitRule } from "@aooth/auth";
|
|
3
|
+
import { AuthCredential, AuthError, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimiter, RateLimiter as RateLimiter$1, generateMagicLinkToken, generateOpaqueToken, parseRateLimitRule } from "@aooth/auth";
|
|
4
4
|
import { current, defineWook, eventTypeKey, key } from "@wooksjs/event-core";
|
|
5
5
|
import { HttpError, useAuthorization, useCookies, useHeaders, useRequest, useResponse, useUrlParams } from "@wooksjs/event-http";
|
|
6
6
|
import { ArbacAction, ArbacResource, getArbacMate, useArbac } from "@aooth/arbac-moost";
|
|
7
7
|
import { FederatedIdentityStore, SEEN_DEVICES_DEFAULT_CAP, UserAuthError, UserService, generateMfaCode, generateTotpSecret, generateTotpUri, maskEmail, maskPhone, pickDefinedProfile, verifyTotpCode } from "@aooth/user";
|
|
8
8
|
import { Body, Delete, Get, HttpError as HttpError$1, Post, Query } from "@moostjs/event-http";
|
|
9
|
-
import { createHash,
|
|
9
|
+
import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
|
|
10
10
|
import { createAsHttpOutlet, finishWf, handleAsOutletRequest, useAtscriptWf } from "@atscript/moost-wf";
|
|
11
11
|
import { EncapsulatedStateStrategy, MoostWf, Step, StepRetriableError, StepTTL, Workflow, WorkflowParam, WorkflowSchema, createEmailOutlet, outletEmail, swapStrategy, useWfFinished, useWfState } from "@moostjs/event-wf";
|
|
12
12
|
import { FederatedLoginService, OAuthError, OAuthProviderRegistry, generateRandomState, pkceChallengeFor } from "@aooth/idp";
|
|
13
|
-
import { ClientRegistrationError, DynamicClientRegistration, NoopOidcClaimsResolver, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata as buildAuthorizationServerMetadata$1, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, canonicalizeIssuer as canonicalizeIssuer$1 } from "@aooth/auth/authz";
|
|
13
|
+
import { ClientRegistrationError, DynamicClientRegistration, NoopOidcClaimsResolver, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata as buildAuthorizationServerMetadata$1, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, canonicalizeIssuer as canonicalizeIssuer$1, tokenPolicyToIssueOptions } from "@aooth/auth/authz";
|
|
14
14
|
//#region \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.133.0/helpers/esm/decorate.js
|
|
15
15
|
function __decorate(decorators, target, key, desc) {
|
|
16
16
|
var c = arguments.length, r = c < 3 ? target : desc === null ? desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, key) : desc, d;
|
|
@@ -1606,6 +1606,20 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
|
|
|
1606
1606
|
};
|
|
1607
1607
|
}
|
|
1608
1608
|
/**
|
|
1609
|
+
* Re-authentication policy for authorization-server logins (`ctx.authz`
|
|
1610
|
+
* runs). Consulted inline by `init-login` — BEFORE `credentials`, like that
|
|
1611
|
+
* step's own inline resolver calls — and only when the START input carried
|
|
1612
|
+
* an `authz` handle; a plain login never consults it. Default keeps today's
|
|
1613
|
+
* behavior: every authorize leg re-collects credentials. Override to
|
|
1614
|
+
* `{ mode: 'consent-only' }` so a live browser session skips straight to
|
|
1615
|
+
* the authorize-consent screen (browser binding + explicit approval still
|
|
1616
|
+
* apply); see {@link AuthzReauthPolicy} for `maxSessionAgeMs` freshness and
|
|
1617
|
+
* the `requireMfa` knob.
|
|
1618
|
+
*/
|
|
1619
|
+
resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(_ctx) {
|
|
1620
|
+
return { mode: "always-reauth" };
|
|
1621
|
+
}
|
|
1622
|
+
/**
|
|
1609
1623
|
* Resolve the session-policy (concurrency limit). Reached from login.flow.
|
|
1610
1624
|
*/
|
|
1611
1625
|
resolveSessionPolicy(_ctx) {
|
|
@@ -2094,7 +2108,8 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
|
|
|
2094
2108
|
const sub = pickDefined(ctx.authz, [
|
|
2095
2109
|
"clientName",
|
|
2096
2110
|
"scope",
|
|
2097
|
-
"redirectHost"
|
|
2111
|
+
"redirectHost",
|
|
2112
|
+
"signedInAs"
|
|
2098
2113
|
]);
|
|
2099
2114
|
if (sub) pub.authz = sub;
|
|
2100
2115
|
}
|
|
@@ -2386,6 +2401,65 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
|
|
|
2386
2401
|
}
|
|
2387
2402
|
const authz = getInputField("authz");
|
|
2388
2403
|
if (authz) ctx.authz = { handle: authz };
|
|
2404
|
+
if (authz && !ctx.idpInbound) {
|
|
2405
|
+
const policyResult = this.resolveAuthzReauthPolicy(ctx);
|
|
2406
|
+
if (policyResult instanceof Promise) return policyResult.then((policy) => this.maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policy));
|
|
2407
|
+
return this.maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policyResult);
|
|
2408
|
+
}
|
|
2409
|
+
}
|
|
2410
|
+
/**
|
|
2411
|
+
* `init-login`'s consent-only dispatch: run {@link probeSilentAuthz} and, on
|
|
2412
|
+
* a successful bind, move to the durable store strategy (the run will pause
|
|
2413
|
+
* on the consent form; mirrors `credentials` / `sso-callback` post-subject).
|
|
2414
|
+
* Split from the probe so unit tests can exercise the probe without a live
|
|
2415
|
+
* wf engine (`swapStrategy` requires one).
|
|
2416
|
+
*/
|
|
2417
|
+
maybeBindSilentAuthz(ctx, policy) {
|
|
2418
|
+
if (policy.mode !== "consent-only") return void 0;
|
|
2419
|
+
return this.probeSilentAuthz(ctx, policy).then((bound) => {
|
|
2420
|
+
if (bound) swapStrategy("store");
|
|
2421
|
+
});
|
|
2422
|
+
}
|
|
2423
|
+
/**
|
|
2424
|
+
* Silent-authorize session probe (consent-only re-auth policy). Reads the
|
|
2425
|
+
* auth context the guard interceptor stashed for THIS trigger request —
|
|
2426
|
+
* `getAuthContext()` is `null` for a missing, expired, or invalid credential
|
|
2427
|
+
* on a `@Public()` route, so the probe is non-throwing by construction (no
|
|
2428
|
+
* 401 can leak out of the flow). Requires the trigger route to actually see
|
|
2429
|
+
* the session credential (true for cookie-carried sessions on a same-origin
|
|
2430
|
+
* SPA) and the guard interceptor to be mounted on it.
|
|
2431
|
+
*
|
|
2432
|
+
* Binds on success: `ctx.subject`, `ctx.authz.silent` (+ `signedInAs` for
|
|
2433
|
+
* the consent copy), pre-sets `otp.verified` unless `policy.requireMfa`, and
|
|
2434
|
+
* seeds channel state from the user row (same `seedChannelState` as the
|
|
2435
|
+
* federated path) so the shared enrolment / notice gates behave exactly as
|
|
2436
|
+
* after a fresh login. Fail-closed ordering mirrors `sso-callback`: the
|
|
2437
|
+
* ACCOUNT-STATE GATE runs before the subject is bound, so a locked/inactive
|
|
2438
|
+
* account falls back to the credentials form (where `users.login` rejects
|
|
2439
|
+
* it) instead of silently reaching consent.
|
|
2440
|
+
*/
|
|
2441
|
+
async probeSilentAuthz(ctx, policy) {
|
|
2442
|
+
const session = useAuth().getAuthContext();
|
|
2443
|
+
if (!session) return false;
|
|
2444
|
+
if (policy.maxSessionAgeMs !== void 0) {
|
|
2445
|
+
if (!session.sessionId) return false;
|
|
2446
|
+
const origin = (await this.auth.listSessions(session.userId)).find((s) => s.sessionId === session.sessionId);
|
|
2447
|
+
if (!origin || Date.now() - origin.createdAt > policy.maxSessionAgeMs) return false;
|
|
2448
|
+
}
|
|
2449
|
+
let user;
|
|
2450
|
+
try {
|
|
2451
|
+
user = await this.users.getUser(session.userId);
|
|
2452
|
+
} catch {
|
|
2453
|
+
return false;
|
|
2454
|
+
}
|
|
2455
|
+
if (user.account.locked || !user.account.active) return false;
|
|
2456
|
+
ctx.subject = session.userId;
|
|
2457
|
+
const authz = ctx.authz;
|
|
2458
|
+
authz.silent = true;
|
|
2459
|
+
authz.signedInAs = user.username;
|
|
2460
|
+
if (!policy.requireMfa) (ctx.otp ??= {}).verified = true;
|
|
2461
|
+
await this.seedChannelState(ctx, user);
|
|
2462
|
+
return true;
|
|
2389
2463
|
}
|
|
2390
2464
|
initInviteAdmin(ctx) {
|
|
2391
2465
|
ctx.autoLogin = this.opts.autoLoginOnInvite;
|
|
@@ -5128,7 +5202,7 @@ __decorate([
|
|
|
5128
5202
|
__decorateParam(0, WorkflowParam("context")),
|
|
5129
5203
|
__decorateMetadata("design:type", Function),
|
|
5130
5204
|
__decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
|
|
5131
|
-
__decorateMetadata("design:returntype",
|
|
5205
|
+
__decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Object)
|
|
5132
5206
|
], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "initLogin", null);
|
|
5133
5207
|
__decorate([
|
|
5134
5208
|
Step("init-invite-admin"),
|
|
@@ -5900,7 +5974,7 @@ __decorate([
|
|
|
5900
5974
|
},
|
|
5901
5975
|
{
|
|
5902
5976
|
id: "credentials",
|
|
5903
|
-
condition: (ctx) => !ctx.idpInbound
|
|
5977
|
+
condition: (ctx) => !ctx.idpInbound && !ctx.subject
|
|
5904
5978
|
},
|
|
5905
5979
|
{
|
|
5906
5980
|
id: "prove-control",
|
|
@@ -5967,7 +6041,7 @@ __decorate([
|
|
|
5967
6041
|
{ break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
|
|
5968
6042
|
{
|
|
5969
6043
|
id: "record-login",
|
|
5970
|
-
condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject
|
|
6044
|
+
condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject && !ctx.authz?.silent
|
|
5971
6045
|
},
|
|
5972
6046
|
{
|
|
5973
6047
|
condition: (ctx) => !ctx.authz,
|
|
@@ -7029,7 +7103,7 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7029
7103
|
if (resource !== void 0) {
|
|
7030
7104
|
if (useUrlParams(current()).params().getAll("resource").length > 1 || resource.length > 2e3) return this.redirectError(resolved.redirectUri, "invalid_target", state);
|
|
7031
7105
|
}
|
|
7032
|
-
const binding =
|
|
7106
|
+
const binding = generateOpaqueToken();
|
|
7033
7107
|
const { handle, expiresAt } = await this.pending.create({
|
|
7034
7108
|
...resolved.clientId !== void 0 && { clientId: resolved.clientId },
|
|
7035
7109
|
...resolved.clientName !== void 0 && { clientName: resolved.clientName },
|
|
@@ -7057,6 +7131,7 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7057
7131
|
return "";
|
|
7058
7132
|
}
|
|
7059
7133
|
async token(body) {
|
|
7134
|
+
if (body?.grant_type === "refresh_token") return await this.refreshTokenGrant(body);
|
|
7060
7135
|
const res = useResponse(current());
|
|
7061
7136
|
if (body?.grant_type !== "authorization_code") {
|
|
7062
7137
|
res.status = 400;
|
|
@@ -7080,12 +7155,7 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7080
7155
|
res.status = 401;
|
|
7081
7156
|
return { error: "invalid_client" };
|
|
7082
7157
|
}
|
|
7083
|
-
|
|
7084
|
-
await this.policy.authenticateClient?.({
|
|
7085
|
-
clientId: row.clientId,
|
|
7086
|
-
...body.client_secret !== void 0 && { clientSecret: body.client_secret }
|
|
7087
|
-
});
|
|
7088
|
-
} catch {
|
|
7158
|
+
if (!await this.clientAuthenticates(row.clientId, body.client_secret)) {
|
|
7089
7159
|
res.status = 401;
|
|
7090
7160
|
return { error: "invalid_client" };
|
|
7091
7161
|
}
|
|
@@ -7122,10 +7192,12 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7122
7192
|
}
|
|
7123
7193
|
let accessToken;
|
|
7124
7194
|
let expiresIn;
|
|
7195
|
+
let refreshToken;
|
|
7125
7196
|
if (wantAccessToken) {
|
|
7126
|
-
const issued = await this.auth.issue(row.userId, tokenPolicyToIssueOptions(row.tokenPolicy));
|
|
7197
|
+
const issued = await this.auth.issue(row.userId, tokenPolicyToIssueOptions(row.tokenPolicy, row.clientId));
|
|
7127
7198
|
accessToken = issued.accessToken;
|
|
7128
|
-
expiresIn =
|
|
7199
|
+
expiresIn = expiresInSeconds(issued.accessExpiresAt);
|
|
7200
|
+
refreshToken = issued.refreshToken;
|
|
7129
7201
|
}
|
|
7130
7202
|
let idToken;
|
|
7131
7203
|
if (signing) {
|
|
@@ -7144,11 +7216,73 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7144
7216
|
access_token: accessToken,
|
|
7145
7217
|
expires_in: expiresIn
|
|
7146
7218
|
},
|
|
7219
|
+
...refreshToken !== void 0 && { refresh_token: refreshToken },
|
|
7147
7220
|
...idToken !== void 0 && { id_token: idToken },
|
|
7148
7221
|
userId: row.userId
|
|
7149
7222
|
};
|
|
7150
7223
|
}
|
|
7151
7224
|
/**
|
|
7225
|
+
* `grant_type=refresh_token` (OAuth 2.1 §4.3): rotate the presented refresh
|
|
7226
|
+
* token into a fresh access + refresh pair. Only a family minted BY this
|
|
7227
|
+
* token endpoint for a registered client redeems here — the
|
|
7228
|
+
* `metadata.authzClientId` stamp is the binding, checked BEFORE any rotation
|
|
7229
|
+
* (so a browser-session refresh token, or another client's, is a plain
|
|
7230
|
+
* `invalid_grant` with the family untouched). Client authentication mirrors
|
|
7231
|
+
* the code branch; the grant's authority (kind, payload, per-mint ttl) rides
|
|
7232
|
+
* the credential family — nothing is re-derived here. Reuse of an
|
|
7233
|
+
* already-rotated token revokes the whole family inside the session layer
|
|
7234
|
+
* (the standard theft response) and surfaces as `invalid_grant`.
|
|
7235
|
+
*/
|
|
7236
|
+
async refreshTokenGrant(body) {
|
|
7237
|
+
const res = useResponse(current());
|
|
7238
|
+
if (typeof body.refresh_token !== "string" || body.refresh_token.length === 0) {
|
|
7239
|
+
res.status = 400;
|
|
7240
|
+
return { error: "invalid_request" };
|
|
7241
|
+
}
|
|
7242
|
+
const clientId = body.client_id;
|
|
7243
|
+
if (typeof clientId !== "string" || clientId.length === 0) {
|
|
7244
|
+
res.status = 401;
|
|
7245
|
+
return { error: "invalid_client" };
|
|
7246
|
+
}
|
|
7247
|
+
if (!await this.clientAuthenticates(clientId, body.client_secret)) {
|
|
7248
|
+
res.status = 401;
|
|
7249
|
+
return { error: "invalid_client" };
|
|
7250
|
+
}
|
|
7251
|
+
let issued;
|
|
7252
|
+
try {
|
|
7253
|
+
issued = await this.auth.refresh(body.refresh_token, { guard: (state) => {
|
|
7254
|
+
if (state.metadata?.authzClientId !== clientId) throw new Error("refresh token was not issued to this client");
|
|
7255
|
+
} });
|
|
7256
|
+
} catch {
|
|
7257
|
+
res.status = 400;
|
|
7258
|
+
return { error: "invalid_grant" };
|
|
7259
|
+
}
|
|
7260
|
+
res.status = 200;
|
|
7261
|
+
return {
|
|
7262
|
+
token_type: "Bearer",
|
|
7263
|
+
access_token: issued.accessToken,
|
|
7264
|
+
expires_in: expiresInSeconds(issued.accessExpiresAt),
|
|
7265
|
+
...issued.refreshToken !== void 0 && { refresh_token: issued.refreshToken },
|
|
7266
|
+
userId: issued.userId
|
|
7267
|
+
};
|
|
7268
|
+
}
|
|
7269
|
+
/**
|
|
7270
|
+
* Client authentication shared by both grant branches (RFC 6749 §2.3):
|
|
7271
|
+
* `true` iff the policy accepts the presented credentials (or defines no
|
|
7272
|
+
* `authenticateClient` hook). Callers map `false` to `401 invalid_client`.
|
|
7273
|
+
*/
|
|
7274
|
+
async clientAuthenticates(clientId, clientSecret) {
|
|
7275
|
+
try {
|
|
7276
|
+
await this.policy.authenticateClient?.({
|
|
7277
|
+
clientId,
|
|
7278
|
+
...clientSecret !== void 0 && { clientSecret }
|
|
7279
|
+
});
|
|
7280
|
+
return true;
|
|
7281
|
+
} catch {
|
|
7282
|
+
return false;
|
|
7283
|
+
}
|
|
7284
|
+
}
|
|
7285
|
+
/**
|
|
7152
7286
|
* OIDC discovery (Tier 2). Derives every endpoint from the signer's `issuer`
|
|
7153
7287
|
* (configured as `{origin}/auth`), so a relying `OidcProvider` configured with
|
|
7154
7288
|
* the same `issuer` resolves `/authorize`, `/token`, and `/jwks` automatically.
|
|
@@ -7172,7 +7306,7 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7172
7306
|
jwks_uri: `${iss}/jwks`,
|
|
7173
7307
|
...this.getDynamicClientRegistration() && { registration_endpoint: `${iss}/register` },
|
|
7174
7308
|
response_types_supported: ["code"],
|
|
7175
|
-
grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code"],
|
|
7309
|
+
grant_types_supported: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
|
|
7176
7310
|
subject_types_supported: ["public"],
|
|
7177
7311
|
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [signer.alg],
|
|
7178
7312
|
scopes_supported: [
|
|
@@ -7215,10 +7349,12 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7215
7349
|
* RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration (OAUTH.md R2) — anonymous by spec;
|
|
7216
7350
|
* 404 unless a registration operation is wired ({@link
|
|
7217
7351
|
* getDynamicClientRegistration}). A thin HTTP adapter: validation, abuse
|
|
7218
|
-
* knobs (guard / cap / never-used GC) and persistence live
|
|
7219
|
-
* `DynamicClientRegistration` (`@aooth/auth`).
|
|
7220
|
-
*
|
|
7221
|
-
*
|
|
7352
|
+
* knobs (guard / cap / never-used GC), secret minting and persistence live
|
|
7353
|
+
* in `DynamicClientRegistration` (`@aooth/auth`). A `client_secret_post`
|
|
7354
|
+
* registration is echoed with its minted `client_secret` +
|
|
7355
|
+
* `client_secret_expires_at` — the ONE disclosure (only the hash is stored);
|
|
7356
|
+
* public (`"none"`) registrations carry neither field (RFC 7591 §3.2.1
|
|
7357
|
+
* requires them only when a secret is issued).
|
|
7222
7358
|
*/
|
|
7223
7359
|
async register(body) {
|
|
7224
7360
|
const res = useResponse(current());
|
|
@@ -7240,6 +7376,10 @@ let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
|
|
|
7240
7376
|
return {
|
|
7241
7377
|
client_id: client.clientId,
|
|
7242
7378
|
client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(client.createdAt / 1e3),
|
|
7379
|
+
...client.clientSecret !== void 0 && {
|
|
7380
|
+
client_secret: client.clientSecret,
|
|
7381
|
+
client_secret_expires_at: client.clientSecretExpiresAt
|
|
7382
|
+
},
|
|
7243
7383
|
redirect_uris: client.redirectUris,
|
|
7244
7384
|
token_endpoint_auth_method: client.tokenEndpointAuthMethod,
|
|
7245
7385
|
grant_types: client.grantTypes,
|
|
@@ -7355,13 +7495,9 @@ AuthorizeController = __decorate([
|
|
|
7355
7495
|
Object
|
|
7356
7496
|
])
|
|
7357
7497
|
], AuthorizeController);
|
|
7358
|
-
/**
|
|
7359
|
-
function
|
|
7360
|
-
return
|
|
7361
|
-
...policy.payload,
|
|
7362
|
-
...policy.kind !== void 0 && { kind: policy.kind },
|
|
7363
|
-
...policy.ttl !== void 0 && { ttl: policy.ttl }
|
|
7364
|
-
};
|
|
7498
|
+
/** RFC 6749 `expires_in`: whole seconds from now until `expiresAt`, floored at 0. */
|
|
7499
|
+
function expiresInSeconds(expiresAt) {
|
|
7500
|
+
return Math.max(0, Math.floor((expiresAt - Date.now()) / 1e3));
|
|
7365
7501
|
}
|
|
7366
7502
|
//#endregion
|
|
7367
7503
|
//#region src/workflows/auth-email-outlet.ts
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@aooth/auth-moost",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.1.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.1.49",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Moost auth integration for aoothjs — AuthGuard interceptor, useAuth composable, REST endpoints, workflows",
|
|
5
5
|
"keywords": [
|
|
6
6
|
"aoothjs",
|
|
@@ -59,10 +59,10 @@
|
|
|
59
59
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
60
60
|
"@atscript/moost-wf": "^0.1.121",
|
|
61
61
|
"@wooksjs/http-body": "^0.7.19",
|
|
62
|
-
"@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.1.
|
|
63
|
-
"@aooth/auth": "0.1.
|
|
64
|
-
"@aooth/
|
|
65
|
-
"@aooth/
|
|
62
|
+
"@aooth/arbac-moost": "^0.1.49",
|
|
63
|
+
"@aooth/auth": "0.1.49",
|
|
64
|
+
"@aooth/user": "0.1.49",
|
|
65
|
+
"@aooth/idp": "0.1.49"
|
|
66
66
|
},
|
|
67
67
|
"devDependencies": {
|
|
68
68
|
"@atscript/core": "^0.1.82",
|
|
@@ -1036,7 +1036,9 @@ export interface ProveControlOtpForm {
|
|
|
1036
1036
|
* 'Deny' action 302s the client back with `error=access_denied`. The requesting
|
|
1037
1037
|
* client + scope + validated redirect host ride the `@wf.context.pass 'public'`
|
|
1038
1038
|
* `ctx.public.authz` whitelist (display-only — the handle / approval gate stay
|
|
1039
|
-
* server-side)
|
|
1039
|
+
* server-side); on a silent (consent-only) run the acting identity rides the
|
|
1040
|
+
* same whitelist (`signedInAs`) and renders as a "Signed in as …" line so the
|
|
1041
|
+
* user can catch a wrong-account grant. `clientName` is REGISTRANT-SUPPLIED text (a DCR client names
|
|
1040
1042
|
* itself), so the copy pairs it with the validated redirect host — where the
|
|
1041
1043
|
* code is actually delivered, which a self-chosen name can't fake — and the
|
|
1042
1044
|
* `ui.paragraph` renderer emits a TEXT node (never markup/links), so a
|
|
@@ -1050,6 +1052,11 @@ export interface AuthorizeConsentForm {
|
|
|
1050
1052
|
@ui.form.fn.value '(_, _d, ctx) => { const a = ctx.public?.authz; const host = a?.clientName && a?.redirectHost ? " (" + a.redirectHost + ")" : ""; const who = a?.clientName ? "“" + a.clientName + "”" + host : "A local application"; const sc = a?.scope ? " It is requesting access to: " + a.scope + "." : ""; return who + " wants to sign in to your account." + sc + " Authorize this only if you started it."; }'
|
|
1051
1053
|
notice: ui.paragraph
|
|
1052
1054
|
|
|
1055
|
+
@ui.form.order 2
|
|
1056
|
+
@ui.form.fn.hidden '(_, _d, ctx) => !ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs'
|
|
1057
|
+
@ui.form.fn.value '(_, _d, ctx) => "Signed in as " + (ctx.public?.authz?.signedInAs || "") + "."'
|
|
1058
|
+
signedIn: ui.paragraph
|
|
1059
|
+
|
|
1053
1060
|
@ui.form.order 10
|
|
1054
1061
|
@ui.form.action 'deny', 'Deny'
|
|
1055
1062
|
@ui.form.attr 'align', 'center'
|
|
@@ -493,10 +493,11 @@ export declare class ProveControlOtpForm {
|
|
|
493
493
|
|
|
494
494
|
/**
|
|
495
495
|
* Atscript interface **AuthorizeConsentForm**
|
|
496
|
-
* @see {@link ./forms.as:
|
|
496
|
+
* @see {@link ./forms.as:1050:18}
|
|
497
497
|
*/
|
|
498
498
|
export declare class AuthorizeConsentForm {
|
|
499
499
|
// notice: ui.paragraph
|
|
500
|
+
// signedIn: ui.paragraph
|
|
500
501
|
// deny: ui.action
|
|
501
502
|
static __is_atscript_annotated_type: true
|
|
502
503
|
static type: TAtscriptTypeObject<keyof AuthorizeConsentForm, AuthorizeConsentForm>
|