@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.3.2 → 0.3.5

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV1 {
     dek: SealedBox;
     /** One box per key source (keyring source id), sealed under the DEK. AAD `forgewallet-vault/secret/<id>`. */
     secrets: Record<string, SealedBox>;
+    /** A fixed value sealed under the DEK (AAD `forgewallet-vault/dek-check`): proves a key is this vault's while it holds no secret. Absent in envelopes written before it existed. */
+    dekCheck?: SealedBox;
     createdAt: number;
 }
 interface VaultPasskey {
@@ -106,6 +108,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV2 {
     };
     dek: SealedBox;
     secrets: Record<string, SealedBox>;
+    /** See {@link VaultEnvelopeV1.dekCheck}. */
+    dekCheck?: SealedBox;
     passkeys: VaultPasskey[];
     createdAt: number;
     /** When a v1 envelope was re-sealed as v2. */
@@ -237,9 +241,12 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
+    /** The DEK check box: {@link DEK_CHECK} sealed under `dek`. */
+    private _sealDekCheck;
     /**
-     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
-     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's DEK check (or, in an envelope written before it, its
+     * first secret) — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. An old empty envelope has
+     * nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
      */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
@@ -1306,12 +1313,16 @@ interface SwapRecord {
     checks: number;
 }
 declare const ACTIVE_STATUSES: ReadonlySet<SwapRecordStatus>;
-/** `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2` returns. */
+/**
+ * `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>[.ok]]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2`
+ * returns, and `.ok` after it when the destination account saw the claim succeed (`destTxConfirmed`).
+ */
 declare function parseSwapId(id: string): {
     provider: string;
     intentId: string;
     sourceTxHash?: string;
     destTxHash?: string;
+    destTxConfirmed?: true;
 } | null;
 declare class SwapsStore {
     private readonly storage;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV1 {
     dek: SealedBox;
     /** One box per key source (keyring source id), sealed under the DEK. AAD `forgewallet-vault/secret/<id>`. */
     secrets: Record<string, SealedBox>;
+    /** A fixed value sealed under the DEK (AAD `forgewallet-vault/dek-check`): proves a key is this vault's while it holds no secret. Absent in envelopes written before it existed. */
+    dekCheck?: SealedBox;
     createdAt: number;
 }
 interface VaultPasskey {
@@ -106,6 +108,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV2 {
     };
     dek: SealedBox;
     secrets: Record<string, SealedBox>;
+    /** See {@link VaultEnvelopeV1.dekCheck}. */
+    dekCheck?: SealedBox;
     passkeys: VaultPasskey[];
     createdAt: number;
     /** When a v1 envelope was re-sealed as v2. */
@@ -237,9 +241,12 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
+    /** The DEK check box: {@link DEK_CHECK} sealed under `dek`. */
+    private _sealDekCheck;
     /**
-     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
-     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's DEK check (or, in an envelope written before it, its
+     * first secret) — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. An old empty envelope has
+     * nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
      */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
@@ -1306,12 +1313,16 @@ interface SwapRecord {
     checks: number;
 }
 declare const ACTIVE_STATUSES: ReadonlySet<SwapRecordStatus>;
-/** `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2` returns. */
+/**
+ * `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>[.ok]]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2`
+ * returns, and `.ok` after it when the destination account saw the claim succeed (`destTxConfirmed`).
+ */
 declare function parseSwapId(id: string): {
     provider: string;
     intentId: string;
     sourceTxHash?: string;
     destTxHash?: string;
+    destTxConfirmed?: true;
 } | null;
 declare class SwapsStore {
     private readonly storage;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ var aadDekV1 = (kdf) => `forgewallet-vault/1/dek/${kdf.name}/${kdf.iterations}/$
 var aadDekV2 = (kdf) => `forgewallet-vault/2/dek/scrypt/${kdf.N}/${kdf.r}/${kdf.p}/${kdf.salt}`;
 var aadPasskey = (id) => `forgewallet-vault/2/passkey/${id}`;
 var aadSecret = (id) => `forgewallet-vault/secret/${id}`;
+var AAD_DEK_CHECK = "forgewallet-vault/dek-check";
+var DEK_CHECK = "forgewallet-vault/dek-check/1";
 var HKDF_INFO = "forgewallet-vault/2/passkey";
 var Vault = class {
   _storage;
@@ -285,7 +287,7 @@ var Vault = class {
     const key = await this._importDek(dek);
     return this._exclusive(async () => {
       const envelope = await this._load();
-      if (Object.keys(envelope.secrets).length > 0) await this._requireDek(dek, envelope);
+      if (envelope.dekCheck !== void 0 || Object.keys(envelope.secrets).length > 0) await this._requireDek(dek, envelope);
       if (!(sourceId in envelope.secrets) && Object.keys(envelope.secrets).length >= VAULT_LIMITS.secrets) {
         throw new VaultError(`A vault holds at most ${VAULT_LIMITS.secrets} secrets.`, "invalid-input");
       }
@@ -338,19 +340,31 @@ var Vault = class {
     if (this._kdf === "pbkdf2") {
       const kdf2 = { name: "PBKDF2-SHA256", iterations: this._iterations, salt: toBase64(salt) };
       const kek2 = await this._derivePbkdf2(password, salt, this._iterations);
-      return { v: 1, kdf: kdf2, dek: await this._seal(kek2, dek, aadDekV1(kdf2)), secrets, createdAt };
+      return { v: 1, kdf: kdf2, dek: await this._seal(kek2, dek, aadDekV1(kdf2)), secrets, dekCheck: await this._sealDekCheck(dek), createdAt };
     }
     const kdf = { name: "scrypt", ...this._scrypt, salt: toBase64(salt) };
     const kek = await this._deriveScrypt(password, salt, kdf);
-    return { v: 2, kdf, dek: await this._seal(kek, dek, aadDekV2(kdf)), secrets, passkeys, createdAt };
+    return { v: 2, kdf, dek: await this._seal(kek, dek, aadDekV2(kdf)), secrets, dekCheck: await this._sealDekCheck(dek), passkeys, createdAt };
+  }
+  /** The DEK check box: {@link DEK_CHECK} sealed under `dek`. */
+  async _sealDekCheck(dek) {
+    return this._seal(await this._importDek(dek), new TextEncoder().encode(DEK_CHECK), AAD_DEK_CHECK);
   }
   /**
-   * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
-   * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+   * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's DEK check (or, in an envelope written before it, its
+   * first secret) — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. An old empty envelope has
+   * nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
    */
   async _requireDek(dek, envelope) {
     const ids = Object.keys(envelope.secrets);
     const key = await this._importDek(dek);
+    if (envelope.dekCheck !== void 0) {
+      const check = await this._open(key, envelope.dekCheck, AAD_DEK_CHECK, "locked");
+      const ok = new TextDecoder().decode(check) === DEK_CHECK;
+      zeroize(check);
+      if (!ok) throw new VaultError("The vault key does not open this entry; lock and unlock again.", "locked");
+      return;
+    }
     if (ids.length === 0) throw new VaultError("Add a secret to the vault before a passkey: an empty vault cannot prove the key is its own.", "invalid-input");
     const probe = await this._open(key, envelope.secrets[ids[0]], aadSecret(ids[0]), "locked");
     zeroize(probe);
@@ -420,13 +434,13 @@ function isEnvelopeV1(x) {
   if (typeof x !== "object" || x === null) return false;
   const e = x;
   const kdf = e.kdf;
-  return e.v === 1 && typeof kdf === "object" && kdf !== null && kdf.name === "PBKDF2-SHA256" && Number.isInteger(kdf.iterations) && typeof kdf.salt === "string" && isBox(e.dek) && typeof e.secrets === "object" && e.secrets !== null && Object.values(e.secrets).every(isBox);
+  return e.v === 1 && typeof kdf === "object" && kdf !== null && kdf.name === "PBKDF2-SHA256" && Number.isInteger(kdf.iterations) && typeof kdf.salt === "string" && isBox(e.dek) && typeof e.secrets === "object" && e.secrets !== null && Object.values(e.secrets).every(isBox) && (e.dekCheck === void 0 || isBox(e.dekCheck));
 }
 function isEnvelopeV2(x) {
   if (typeof x !== "object" || x === null) return false;
   const e = x;
   const kdf = e.kdf;
-  return e.v === 2 && typeof kdf === "object" && kdf !== null && kdf.name === "scrypt" && Number.isInteger(kdf.N) && Number.isInteger(kdf.r) && Number.isInteger(kdf.p) && typeof kdf.salt === "string" && isBox(e.dek) && typeof e.secrets === "object" && e.secrets !== null && Object.values(e.secrets).every(isBox) && Array.isArray(e.passkeys) && e.passkeys.every((p) => typeof p === "object" && p !== null && typeof p.id === "string" && typeof p.label === "string" && isBox(p.dek));
+  return e.v === 2 && typeof kdf === "object" && kdf !== null && kdf.name === "scrypt" && Number.isInteger(kdf.N) && Number.isInteger(kdf.r) && Number.isInteger(kdf.p) && typeof kdf.salt === "string" && isBox(e.dek) && typeof e.secrets === "object" && e.secrets !== null && Object.values(e.secrets).every(isBox) && (e.dekCheck === void 0 || isBox(e.dekCheck)) && Array.isArray(e.passkeys) && e.passkeys.every((p) => typeof p === "object" && p !== null && typeof p.id === "string" && typeof p.label === "string" && isBox(p.dek));
 }
 function isBox(x) {
   return typeof x === "object" && x !== null && typeof x.iv === "string" && typeof x.data === "string";
@@ -441,7 +455,7 @@ function envelopeProblem(e) {
   if (secrets.length > VAULT_LIMITS.secrets) return `${secrets.length} secrets > ${VAULT_LIMITS.secrets}`;
   const passkeys = e.v === 2 ? e.passkeys : [];
   if (passkeys.length > VAULT_LIMITS.passkeys) return `${passkeys.length} passkeys > ${VAULT_LIMITS.passkeys}`;
-  for (const box of [e.dek, ...secrets, ...passkeys.map((p) => p.dek)]) {
+  for (const box of [e.dek, ...e.dekCheck ? [e.dekCheck] : [], ...secrets, ...passkeys.map((p) => p.dek)]) {
     if (box.iv.length > VAULT_LIMITS.boxChars || box.data.length > VAULT_LIMITS.boxChars) return `a sealed box above ${VAULT_LIMITS.boxChars} characters`;
   }
   if (JSON.stringify(e).length > VAULT_LIMITS.envelopeChars) return `envelope above ${VAULT_LIMITS.envelopeChars} characters`;
@@ -1677,6 +1691,12 @@ function outgrown(shown, now) {
   if ("gasPrice" in now) return shown.gasPrice === void 0 || now.gasPrice > big(shown.gasPrice);
   return shown.maxFeePerGas === void 0 || now.base + now.tip > big(shown.maxFeePerGas);
 }
+var STALE_FEE_FACTOR = 4n;
+function overpriced(shown, fresh) {
+  if (shown.gasPrice !== void 0 && fresh.gasPrice !== void 0) return big(shown.gasPrice) > STALE_FEE_FACTOR * big(fresh.gasPrice);
+  if (shown.maxFeePerGas !== void 0 && fresh.maxFeePerGas !== void 0) return big(shown.maxFeePerGas) > STALE_FEE_FACTOR * big(fresh.maxFeePerGas);
+  return false;
+}
 async function prepareTransaction(deps, network, from, tx) {
   const call = { from, to: tx.to, value: hex(BigInt(tx.value)), ...tx.data ? { data: tx.data } : {} };
   const [nonceHex, block, gasHex] = await Promise.all([
@@ -1722,6 +1742,8 @@ function createSignHandler(deps) {
             await deps.approvals.request({ origin, chain: network.caip2, kind: info.kind, payload: { ...payload, prepared: shown, repriced: true } });
             continue;
           }
+          const fresh = withFees(network.chainId, nonce, big(shown.gasLimit), fees);
+          if (overpriced(shown, fresh)) shown = fresh;
           const handle2 = await deps.signerFor(info.account, network);
           let raw;
           try {
@@ -1978,13 +2000,14 @@ var ACTIVE_STATUSES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["pending", "action-required", "re
 function parseSwapId(id) {
   if (!id.startsWith(`${SWAP2_ID_PREFIX}.`)) return null;
   const parts = id.slice(SWAP2_ID_PREFIX.length + 1).split(".");
-  if (parts.length < 2 || parts.length > 4 || !parts[0] || !parts[1]) return null;
+  if (parts.length < 2 || parts.length > 5 || !parts[0] || !parts[1]) return null;
+  if (parts[4] !== void 0 && (parts[4] !== "ok" || !parts[3])) return null;
   const provider = decodeURIComponent(parts[0]);
   const intentId = decodeURIComponent(parts[1]);
   const sourceTxHash = parts[2] ? decodeURIComponent(parts[2]) : void 0;
   const destTxHash = parts[3] ? decodeURIComponent(parts[3]) : void 0;
   if (destTxHash && !sourceTxHash) return null;
-  return { provider, intentId, ...sourceTxHash ? { sourceTxHash } : {}, ...destTxHash ? { destTxHash } : {} };
+  return { provider, intentId, ...sourceTxHash ? { sourceTxHash } : {}, ...destTxHash ? { destTxHash } : {}, ...parts[4] !== void 0 ? { destTxConfirmed: true } : {} };
 }
 var SwapsStore = class {
   constructor(storage) {