@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.2.2 → 0.3.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV2 {
     createdAt: number;
     /** When a v1 envelope was re-sealed as v2. */
     upgradedAt?: number;
+    /** When {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} last replaced the DEK. */
+    rotatedAt?: number;
 }
 type VaultEnvelope = VaultEnvelopeV1 | VaultEnvelopeV2;
 /** Where the envelope lives. `chromeLocalVaultStorage()` for the extension, `memoryVaultStorage()` for tests. */
@@ -170,8 +172,24 @@ declare class Vault {
      */
     unlock(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     private _unlock;
-    /** Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched. */
+    /**
+     * Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched —
+     * and so is the DEK: after a suspected compromise (a copied profile, a leaked session, a lost passkey)
+     * this is not enough, because whoever holds the DEK still opens every secret, old and new. Use
+     * {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} then.
+     */
     changePassword(oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Replace the DEK (scan 2026-10-27 modules, F30): a fresh random DEK, every secret re-sealed under it,
+     * the DEK wrapped under `password` with a fresh salt — written as one envelope, so a failure leaves the
+     * old vault as it was. Returns the new DEK: hand it to `session.unlock(dek)`, which overwrites the old
+     * one in `chrome.storage.session`. A DEK copied before the rotation opens nothing in the new envelope,
+     * and {@link Vault.setSecret} refuses it, so a stale session cannot seal new secrets under it.
+     *
+     * Passkeys are dropped — their boxes hold the old DEK and cannot be re-wrapped without their PRF
+     * output — and must be registered again ({@link Vault.addPasskey} with the new DEK).
+     */
+    rotateVaultKey(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     /** Public view of the registered passkeys (ids, labels; whether each can verify assertions). */
     listPasskeys(): Promise<Array<{
         id: string;
@@ -200,9 +218,13 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _addPasskey;
     /** Unseal the DEK with a passkey's PRF output. `wrong-password` when the box does not open, `missing` when the id is unknown. */
     unlockWithPasskey(id: string, prf: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    /** Forget one passkey's box. A DEK that passkey already unwrapped stays valid: after a lost or compromised passkey, {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey}. */
     removePasskey(id: string): Promise<void>;
     listSecretIds(): Promise<string[]>;
-    /** Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). */
+    /**
+     * Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). The DEK must open the
+     * vault's secrets (`locked` otherwise): a key retired by {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} never seals a new one.
+     */
     setSecret(dek: Uint8Array, sourceId: string, secret: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
     /** Unseal one secret. `null` when the id is unknown; the caller zeroizes the result after use. */
     getSecret(dek: Uint8Array, sourceId: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
@@ -405,6 +427,15 @@ interface RelayEvent {
 }
 type RelayToWorker = RelayRequest;
 type RelayToContent = RelayResponse | RelayEvent;
+/** Longest method name a request may carry. */
+declare const RELAY_METHOD_MAX = 128;
+/**
+ * A method name as the providers spell them (`eth_sendTransaction`, `signAndSendTransaction`,
+ * `tron_requestAccounts`): letters, digits and `_`, at most {@link RELAY_METHOD_MAX}. Anything else
+ * is dropped at the relay, so a megabyte "method" never reaches a regex, a log or an error message
+ * (scan 2026-10-27 modules, F5).
+ */
+declare const isRelayMethod: (x: unknown) => x is string;
 declare function isPageRequest(x: unknown): x is PageRequest;
 declare function isPageResponse(x: unknown): x is PageResponse;
 declare function isPageEvent(x: unknown): x is PageEvent;
@@ -1605,4 +1636,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RELAY_METHOD_MAX, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayMethod, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ interface VaultEnvelopeV2 {
     createdAt: number;
     /** When a v1 envelope was re-sealed as v2. */
     upgradedAt?: number;
+    /** When {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} last replaced the DEK. */
+    rotatedAt?: number;
 }
 type VaultEnvelope = VaultEnvelopeV1 | VaultEnvelopeV2;
 /** Where the envelope lives. `chromeLocalVaultStorage()` for the extension, `memoryVaultStorage()` for tests. */
@@ -170,8 +172,24 @@ declare class Vault {
      */
     unlock(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     private _unlock;
-    /** Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched. */
+    /**
+     * Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched —
+     * and so is the DEK: after a suspected compromise (a copied profile, a leaked session, a lost passkey)
+     * this is not enough, because whoever holds the DEK still opens every secret, old and new. Use
+     * {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} then.
+     */
     changePassword(oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Replace the DEK (scan 2026-10-27 modules, F30): a fresh random DEK, every secret re-sealed under it,
+     * the DEK wrapped under `password` with a fresh salt — written as one envelope, so a failure leaves the
+     * old vault as it was. Returns the new DEK: hand it to `session.unlock(dek)`, which overwrites the old
+     * one in `chrome.storage.session`. A DEK copied before the rotation opens nothing in the new envelope,
+     * and {@link Vault.setSecret} refuses it, so a stale session cannot seal new secrets under it.
+     *
+     * Passkeys are dropped — their boxes hold the old DEK and cannot be re-wrapped without their PRF
+     * output — and must be registered again ({@link Vault.addPasskey} with the new DEK).
+     */
+    rotateVaultKey(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     /** Public view of the registered passkeys (ids, labels; whether each can verify assertions). */
     listPasskeys(): Promise<Array<{
         id: string;
@@ -200,9 +218,13 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _addPasskey;
     /** Unseal the DEK with a passkey's PRF output. `wrong-password` when the box does not open, `missing` when the id is unknown. */
     unlockWithPasskey(id: string, prf: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    /** Forget one passkey's box. A DEK that passkey already unwrapped stays valid: after a lost or compromised passkey, {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey}. */
     removePasskey(id: string): Promise<void>;
     listSecretIds(): Promise<string[]>;
-    /** Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). */
+    /**
+     * Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). The DEK must open the
+     * vault's secrets (`locked` otherwise): a key retired by {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} never seals a new one.
+     */
     setSecret(dek: Uint8Array, sourceId: string, secret: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
     /** Unseal one secret. `null` when the id is unknown; the caller zeroizes the result after use. */
     getSecret(dek: Uint8Array, sourceId: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
@@ -405,6 +427,15 @@ interface RelayEvent {
 }
 type RelayToWorker = RelayRequest;
 type RelayToContent = RelayResponse | RelayEvent;
+/** Longest method name a request may carry. */
+declare const RELAY_METHOD_MAX = 128;
+/**
+ * A method name as the providers spell them (`eth_sendTransaction`, `signAndSendTransaction`,
+ * `tron_requestAccounts`): letters, digits and `_`, at most {@link RELAY_METHOD_MAX}. Anything else
+ * is dropped at the relay, so a megabyte "method" never reaches a regex, a log or an error message
+ * (scan 2026-10-27 modules, F5).
+ */
+declare const isRelayMethod: (x: unknown) => x is string;
 declare function isPageRequest(x: unknown): x is PageRequest;
 declare function isPageResponse(x: unknown): x is PageResponse;
 declare function isPageEvent(x: unknown): x is PageEvent;
@@ -1605,4 +1636,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RELAY_METHOD_MAX, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayMethod, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -144,7 +144,12 @@ var Vault = class {
     const kek = await this._deriveScrypt(password, fromBase64(envelope.kdf.salt), envelope.kdf);
     return this._open(kek, envelope.dek, aadDekV2(envelope.kdf), "wrong-password");
   }
-  /** Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched. */
+  /**
+   * Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched —
+   * and so is the DEK: after a suspected compromise (a copied profile, a leaked session, a lost passkey)
+   * this is not enough, because whoever holds the DEK still opens every secret, old and new. Use
+   * {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} then.
+   */
   async changePassword(oldPassword, newPassword) {
     requirePassword(newPassword, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
     requirePassword(oldPassword);
@@ -160,6 +165,45 @@ var Vault = class {
       }
     });
   }
+  /**
+   * Replace the DEK (scan 2026-10-27 modules, F30): a fresh random DEK, every secret re-sealed under it,
+   * the DEK wrapped under `password` with a fresh salt — written as one envelope, so a failure leaves the
+   * old vault as it was. Returns the new DEK: hand it to `session.unlock(dek)`, which overwrites the old
+   * one in `chrome.storage.session`. A DEK copied before the rotation opens nothing in the new envelope,
+   * and {@link Vault.setSecret} refuses it, so a stale session cannot seal new secrets under it.
+   *
+   * Passkeys are dropped — their boxes hold the old DEK and cannot be re-wrapped without their PRF
+   * output — and must be registered again ({@link Vault.addPasskey} with the new DEK).
+   */
+  async rotateVaultKey(password) {
+    requirePassword(password);
+    return this._exclusive(async () => {
+      const oldDek = await this._unlock(password);
+      const dek = this._random(DEK_BYTES);
+      try {
+        const envelope = await this._load();
+        const [oldKey, newKey] = await Promise.all([this._importDek(oldDek), this._importDek(dek)]);
+        const secrets = {};
+        for (const [id, box] of Object.entries(envelope.secrets)) {
+          const plaintext = await this._open(oldKey, box, aadSecret(id), "locked");
+          try {
+            secrets[id] = await this._seal(newKey, plaintext, aadSecret(id));
+          } finally {
+            zeroize(plaintext);
+          }
+        }
+        const next = await this._sealEnvelope(password, dek, secrets, [], envelope.createdAt);
+        const upgradedAt = isEnvelopeV2(envelope) ? envelope.upgradedAt : void 0;
+        await this._write(isEnvelopeV2(next) ? { ...next, ...upgradedAt !== void 0 ? { upgradedAt } : {}, rotatedAt: Date.now() } : next);
+        return dek;
+      } catch (e) {
+        zeroize(dek);
+        throw e;
+      } finally {
+        zeroize(oldDek);
+      }
+    });
+  }
   // ---- passkeys (v2) ----
   /** Public view of the registered passkeys (ids, labels; whether each can verify assertions). */
   async listPasskeys() {
@@ -217,6 +261,7 @@ var Vault = class {
       zeroize(prf);
     }
   }
+  /** Forget one passkey's box. A DEK that passkey already unwrapped stays valid: after a lost or compromised passkey, {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey}. */
   async removePasskey(id) {
     requireId(id);
     return this._exclusive(async () => {
@@ -230,13 +275,17 @@ var Vault = class {
     const envelope = await this._storage.get();
     return envelope ? Object.keys(envelope.secrets) : [];
   }
-  /** Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). */
+  /**
+   * Seal `secret` under the DEK as `sourceId` (overwrites an entry with the same id). The DEK must open the
+   * vault's secrets (`locked` otherwise): a key retired by {@link Vault.rotateVaultKey} never seals a new one.
+   */
   async setSecret(dek, sourceId, secret) {
     requireId(sourceId);
     if (secret.length > VAULT_LIMITS.secretBytes) throw new VaultError(`A secret is at most ${VAULT_LIMITS.secretBytes} bytes.`, "invalid-input");
     const key = await this._importDek(dek);
     return this._exclusive(async () => {
       const envelope = await this._load();
+      if (Object.keys(envelope.secrets).length > 0) await this._requireDek(dek, envelope);
       if (!(sourceId in envelope.secrets) && Object.keys(envelope.secrets).length >= VAULT_LIMITS.secrets) {
         throw new VaultError(`A vault holds at most ${VAULT_LIMITS.secrets} secrets.`, "invalid-input");
       }
@@ -620,8 +669,10 @@ var RELAY_ERRORS = {
 var CHAINS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["eip155", "solana", "ton", "tron", "bip122", "near"]);
 var isRecord = (x) => typeof x === "object" && x !== null;
 var isId = (x) => typeof x === "string" && x.length > 0 && x.length <= 64;
+var RELAY_METHOD_MAX = 128;
+var isRelayMethod = (x) => typeof x === "string" && x.length > 0 && x.length <= RELAY_METHOD_MAX && /^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$/.test(x);
 function isPageRequest(x) {
-  return isRecord(x) && x.target === PAGE_TARGET.toContent && isId(x.id) && CHAINS.has(x.chain) && typeof x.method === "string";
+  return isRecord(x) && x.target === PAGE_TARGET.toContent && isId(x.id) && CHAINS.has(x.chain) && isRelayMethod(x.method);
 }
 function isPageResponse(x) {
   return isRecord(x) && x.target === PAGE_TARGET.toPage && isId(x.id);
@@ -630,7 +681,7 @@ function isPageEvent(x) {
   return isRecord(x) && x.target === PAGE_TARGET.toPage && !("id" in x) && CHAINS.has(x.chain) && typeof x.event === "string";
 }
 function isRelayRequest(x) {
-  return isRecord(x) && x.kind === "request" && isId(x.id) && typeof x.origin === "string" && CHAINS.has(x.chain) && typeof x.method === "string";
+  return isRecord(x) && x.kind === "request" && isId(x.id) && typeof x.origin === "string" && CHAINS.has(x.chain) && isRelayMethod(x.method);
 }
 function isRelayToContent(x) {
   return isRecord(x) && (x.kind === "response" && isId(x.id) || x.kind === "event" && typeof x.event === "string");
@@ -757,6 +808,7 @@ function vaultSecretStorage(vault, session) {
 }
 
 // src/networks.ts
+import { isPublicHttpsUrl } from "@anywalletkit/networks/url";
 import { ccChain } from "@anywalletkit/swap2-assets";
 var DEFAULT_CHAIN = "eip155:1";
 var net = (chainId, name, symbol, rpcs, explorer) => explorer === void 0 ? { caip2: `eip155:${chainId}`, chainId, name, symbol, rpcs } : { caip2: `eip155:${chainId}`, chainId, name, symbol, rpcs, explorer };
@@ -870,26 +922,14 @@ var NetworksTable = class {
     return this._loading;
   }
 };
-function isPrivateRpcHost(url) {
-  const m = /^https:\/\/(?:[^@/?#]*@)?(\[[^\]]+\]|[^:/?#]+)/i.exec(url);
-  if (!m) return true;
-  const h = m[1].toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "");
-  if (h === "localhost" || h.endsWith(".localhost") || h.endsWith(".local") || h === "0.0.0.0") return true;
-  const v4 = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.exec(h);
-  if (v4) {
-    const a = Number(v4[1]), b = Number(v4[2]);
-    return a === 127 || a === 10 || a === 0 || a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31 || a === 192 && b === 168 || a === 169 && b === 254;
-  }
-  if (h.includes(":")) return h === "::1" || h === "::" || /^f[cd]/.test(h) || /^fe[89ab]/.test(h);
-  return false;
-}
+var isSiteRpcUrl = (u) => typeof u === "string" && u.length <= 2048 && isPublicHttpsUrl(u);
 function parseAddChainParams(params, known = isCatalogChain) {
   const p = Array.isArray(params) ? params[0] : params;
   if (!p || typeof p !== "object") return relayError(RELAY_ERRORS.invalidParams, "wallet_addEthereumChain expects one object parameter.");
   const caip2 = caip2FromChainId(p.chainId);
   if (!caip2) return relayError(RELAY_ERRORS.invalidParams, "chainId must be a 0x-prefixed hex string.");
   if (!known(caip2)) return relayError(RELAY_ERRORS.chainNotAdded, `Chain ${String(p.chainId)} is not in this wallet's catalog.`);
-  const rpcs = Array.isArray(p.rpcUrls) ? p.rpcUrls.filter((u) => typeof u === "string" && /^https:\/\/[^\s/?#]+/i.test(u) && !isPrivateRpcHost(u)) : [];
+  const rpcs = Array.isArray(p.rpcUrls) ? p.rpcUrls.filter(isSiteRpcUrl) : [];
   if (rpcs.length === 0) return relayError(RELAY_ERRORS.invalidParams, "rpcUrls must contain at least one public https URL (a site cannot add a private / local endpoint).");
   const name = typeof p.chainName === "string" && p.chainName.trim() ? p.chainName.trim().slice(0, 64) : caip2;
   const currency = p.nativeCurrency;
@@ -1250,8 +1290,9 @@ var RouterError = class _RouterError extends Error {
 };
 var PROVIDER_CODES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([4001, 4100, 4200, 4900, 4901, 4902]);
 var isNodeCode = (code) => typeof code === "number" && Number.isInteger(code) && (code === 3 || code >= -32768 && code <= -32e3);
-var URL_RE = /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/[^\s"'<>()]+/gi;
-var pageText = (text) => text.replace(URL_RE, "[url]").split("\n")[0].slice(0, 300);
+var URL_RE = /[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,31}:\/\/[^\s"'<>()]+/gi;
+var PAGE_TEXT_WINDOW = 1024;
+var pageText = (text) => text.slice(0, PAGE_TEXT_WINDOW).split("\n", 1)[0].replace(URL_RE, "[url]").slice(0, 300);
 var isHexData = (v) => typeof v === "string" && /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(v) && v.length <= 2 + 2 * 8192;
 function nodeError(e) {
   for (let cur = e, depth = 0; cur && typeof cur === "object" && depth < 8; cur = cur.cause, depth++) {
@@ -1310,6 +1351,7 @@ var RequestRouter = class {
   async handle(origin, chain, method, rawParams) {
     const refused = this.deps.refuse?.(origin);
     if (refused) throw new RouterError(RELAY_ERRORS.unauthorized, refused);
+    if (!isRelayMethod(method)) throw new RouterError(RELAY_ERRORS.invalidRequest, "The request has no valid method name.");
     if (chain !== "eip155") throw new RouterError(RELAY_ERRORS.unsupportedMethod, `${chain} providers are not available yet.`);
     const params = Array.isArray(rawParams) ? rawParams : rawParams === void 0 ? [] : [rawParams];
     const network = await this.chainFor(origin);
@@ -2464,6 +2506,7 @@ export {
   QueueLimitError,
   READ_METHODS,
   RELAY_ERRORS,
+  RELAY_METHOD_MAX,
   RecipientBook,
   RequestRouter,
   ReviewDeclined,
@@ -2523,6 +2566,7 @@ export {
   isPageEvent,
   isPageRequest,
   isPageResponse,
+  isRelayMethod,
   isRelayRequest,
   isRelayToContent,
   levenshtein,