@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.1.4 → 0.2.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ interface SessionAlarms {
 interface SessionOptions {
     storage: SessionStorage;
     alarms: SessionAlarms;
-    /** Lock this long after the last `touch` / `unlock`. Default 15 min; 0 disables the timer (lock only on browser exit or explicit lock). */
+    /** Lock this long after the last `touch` / `unlock`. Default 15 min; 0 disables the timer (lock only on browser exit or explicit lock; stored as `expiresAt: null`). */
     autoLockMs?: number;
     /** Storage key and alarm name prefix. */
     name?: string;
@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ declare class Session {
     private _lockNow;
     private _expiry;
     private _arm;
+    /** The stored record, or `null` when locked. A record that is there but unreadable locks the wallet (removed, listeners told). */
     private _read;
 }
 /** In-memory `chrome.storage.session` stand-in. */
@@ -410,6 +411,25 @@ declare function isPageEvent(x: unknown): x is PageEvent;
 declare function isRelayRequest(x: unknown): x is RelayRequest;
 declare function isRelayToContent(x: unknown): x is RelayToContent;
 declare function newRequestId(): string;
+/** What a content script's `message` listener receives (structural `MessageEvent`). */
+interface PageMessageEvent {
+    data: unknown;
+    origin: string;
+    source: unknown;
+}
+/** The page window the content script shares (structural `window`). */
+interface PageWindow {
+    location: {
+        origin: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The page's own request, or `null`. A content script must take only messages the page itself
+ * posted — `event.source` is the page window and `event.origin` its origin — or an iframe on the
+ * page (an ad, an embed) would have its `parent.postMessage` stamped with the site's origin and
+ * shown in the approval window as the site (round 3, H6).
+ */
+declare function pageRequestFrom(event: PageMessageEvent, page: PageWindow): PageRequest | null;
 /** The content script's stamp: {@link PageRequest} + the page origin. */
 declare function stampOrigin(request: PageRequest, origin: string): RelayRequest;
 /** What `port.sender` looks like (structural `chrome.runtime.MessageSender`). */
@@ -530,7 +550,8 @@ declare class NetworksTable {
 }
 /**
  * EIP-3085 `wallet_addEthereumChain` parameter → {@link EvmNetwork}, or the error
- * to answer with. https RPC urls only; the chain id must be in the catalog.
+ * to answer with. Public https RPC urls only (a private / local host is dropped); the chain id
+ * must be in the catalog.
  */
 declare function parseAddChainParams(params: unknown, known?: (caip2: string) => boolean): EvmNetwork | RelayError;
 /** Solana mainnet as the catalog names it (`solana:mainnet`); the wallet package also accepts the genesis-hash form. */
@@ -641,6 +662,11 @@ declare class QueueLimitError extends Error {
     readonly code: number;
     constructor(code: number, message: string);
 }
+/** The origin is refused before any window opens (the shipped phishing list); EIP-1193 4100. */
+declare class OriginRefused extends Error {
+    readonly code: 4100;
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
 declare const APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN = 3;
 interface ApprovalRequest<P = unknown> {
     id: string;
@@ -658,6 +684,12 @@ interface ApprovalRequest<P = unknown> {
 interface ApprovalQueueOptions {
     /** Called for every request's origin; the lines are shown on the sheet (e.g. the shipped phishing list's verdict). */
     annotate?: (origin: string) => string[];
+    /**
+     * Called for every request's origin before anything is queued: a reason refuses the request with
+     * {@link OriginRefused} (4100) and no window opens. Wire `PhishingDetector.refusal` here — a
+     * warning on the sheet is one click away from a signature.
+     */
+    refuse?: (origin: string) => string | null | undefined;
     /** Requests one origin may have waiting (current + queued). Default {@link APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN}. */
     maxPendingPerOrigin?: number;
 }
@@ -757,6 +789,11 @@ interface RouterDeps {
         accounts: string[];
     }): Promise<unknown>;
     defaultChain?: string;
+    /**
+     * A reason to refuse every request from `origin` (reads, `eth_accounts`, an earlier permission
+     * included) with 4100, or nothing. Wire `PhishingDetector.refusal`.
+     */
+    refuse?(origin: string): string | null | undefined;
 }
 declare class RequestRouter {
     private readonly deps;
@@ -846,6 +883,15 @@ declare function describeSiwe(text: string, ctx: SiweContext): SiweInfo | null;
  * (Vaulty's `evmFees`), legacy `gasPrice` where a chain has no base fee, gas =
  * the page's limit or `eth_estimateGas` × 1.2.
  *
+ * The nonce the sheet shows is a guess: the one signed is read AFTER the
+ * approval, under a per-account lock that also covers the broadcast, and is
+ * never below the wallet's own next nonce (a node may not see the previous
+ * send yet). Two requests reviewed at once therefore get consecutive nonces.
+ * The fee caps signed are the ones shown, unless the network outgrew them
+ * while the sheet was open (EIP-1559: base fee + tip above the shown cap;
+ * legacy: a higher gas price) — then the user is asked again with the new
+ * numbers (`repriced: true`).
+ *
  * The review payload ({@link SignApproval}) carries what the window shows: the
  * classified request, the prepared fields, the fee, and the preview the wallet
  * attached (tx-preview-evm: decode, simulation, balance changes, checks). Only
@@ -903,6 +949,8 @@ interface SignApproval {
     request: SignRequestInfo;
     network: EvmNetwork;
     prepared?: PreparedTx;
+    /** A second sheet for the same transaction: the network's fee outgrew the cap the first one showed. */
+    repriced?: true;
     /** What the wallet attached (tx-preview-evm `TxPreview`, typed-data description…). */
     preview: unknown;
 }
@@ -972,17 +1020,21 @@ declare function createSignHandler(deps: SignDeps): NonNullable<RouterDeps['sign
  * A flow that reviewed a WHOLE plan in one sheet (a swap: approvals + source
  * leg) registers one matcher per operation it is about to perform; the
  * reviewed account then lets exactly those operations through without a second
- * window, each once, within `ttlMs`. Anything else still stops at the review.
+ * window, each once, within `ttlMs`, and only for the account that reviewed the
+ * plan. Anything else still stops at the review.
  */
-type GatedOp = {
+type GatedOp = ({
     kind: 'evm-tx';
     caip2: string;
     to: string;
     data?: string;
     value: bigint;
-} | {
+}
+/** EIP-712 data about to be signed: `typedDataHash` is `typedDataHash(typed)` from `@anywalletkit/wallet-evm` — the digest the account signs. */
+ | {
     kind: 'evm-typed-data';
     caip2: string;
+    typedDataHash: string;
 } | {
     kind: 'solana-transfer';
     to: string;
@@ -1008,14 +1060,21 @@ type GatedOp = {
     amount: bigint;
     token?: string | undefined;
     memo?: string | undefined;
+}) & {
+    /** The account about to sign or send. A pre-approval bound to an account passes only ops that name it. */
+    account?: string | undefined;
 };
 type GateMatcher = (op: GatedOp) => boolean;
 declare class ReviewGate {
     private readonly now;
     private approved;
     constructor(now?: () => number);
-    /** Each matcher passes ONE operation, within `ttlMs` (default 10 min). */
-    preApprove(matchers: GateMatcher[], ttlMs?: number): void;
+    /**
+     * Each matcher passes ONE operation, within `ttlMs` (default 10 min). With `account`, only an op
+     * whose `account` is that account (an op without one does not pass). `reviewSwapPlan` and
+     * `reviewEarnPlan` always bind.
+     */
+    preApprove(matchers: GateMatcher[], ttlMs?: number, account?: string): void;
     /** True (and the matcher is spent) when a pre-approval covers `op`. */
     consume(op: GatedOp): boolean;
     get pending(): number;
@@ -1028,6 +1087,11 @@ declare function evmCallMatcher(expected: {
     data?: string | undefined;
     value: bigint;
 }): GateMatcher;
+/** Matcher for one EIP-712 payload on one chain, by the digest the account signs (`typedDataHash` from `@anywalletkit/wallet-evm`). */
+declare function typedDataMatcher(expected: {
+    caip2: string;
+    typedDataHash: string;
+}): GateMatcher;
 /** Matcher for a non-EVM send: same chain, recipient, amount, token and memo. */
 declare function chainTxMatcher(expected: {
     chain: string;
@@ -1091,6 +1155,8 @@ declare function executionFloor(minDestAmount: bigint): bigint;
 interface SwapReviewMeta {
     /** Who runs the flow (the wallet's origin). */
     origin: string;
+    /** The account that signs the plan: the gate passes the plan's operations for this account only. */
+    account: string;
     providerLabel: string;
     fromSymbol: string;
     fromDecimals: number;
@@ -1147,8 +1213,12 @@ interface SwapApproval {
         memo?: string;
     } | {
         kind: 'serialized';
-    } | {
+    }
+    /** The EIP-712 order the account signs (gasless routes): `typedData` to render, `text` pretty JSON. */
+     | {
         kind: 'typed-order';
+        typedData: TypedData;
+        text: string;
     };
     checks: {
         status: 'ok' | 'warn' | 'unknown';
@@ -1178,7 +1248,7 @@ declare function reviewSwapPlan(approvals: ApprovalQueue, gate: ReviewGate, meta
 
 type SwapRecordStatus = IntentStatus['state'] | 'claiming';
 interface SwapRecord {
-    /** swap2 id — `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>]`. */
+    /** swap2 id — `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]`. */
     id: string;
     provider: string;
     fromChain: string;
@@ -1205,15 +1275,23 @@ interface SwapRecord {
     checks: number;
 }
 declare const ACTIVE_STATUSES: ReadonlySet<SwapRecordStatus>;
+/** `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2` returns. */
 declare function parseSwapId(id: string): {
     provider: string;
     intentId: string;
     sourceTxHash?: string;
+    destTxHash?: string;
 } | null;
 declare class SwapsStore {
     private readonly storage;
     private _records;
     private readonly _listeners;
+    /**
+     * add / update / remove run here one after another, each reading the list inside its turn: an
+     * alarm tick's update that read the list before a new swap was added would otherwise write the
+     * old list back and drop the swap.
+     */
+    private _queue;
     constructor(storage: JsonStorage<SwapRecord[]>);
     list(): Promise<SwapRecord[]>;
     get(id: string): Promise<SwapRecord | null>;
@@ -1222,6 +1300,8 @@ declare class SwapsStore {
     update(id: string, patch: Partial<SwapRecord>): Promise<SwapRecord | null>;
     remove(id: string): Promise<void>;
     onChange(listener: () => void): () => void;
+    private _all;
+    private _serial;
     private write;
 }
 interface SwapTrackerDeps {
@@ -1275,6 +1355,8 @@ interface EarnPlan {
 }
 interface EarnReviewMeta {
     origin: string;
+    /** The account that sends the plan: the gate passes its calls for this account only. */
+    account: string;
     /** 'Aave v3', 'Morpho', … */
     module: string;
     /** 'Supply', 'Withdraw', 'Borrow', 'Repay', 'Stake', … */
@@ -1368,14 +1450,14 @@ interface TonAddressParts {
     workchain: number;
     hash: Uint8Array;
 }
-/** The bytes a wallet signs for `ton_proof` (already hashed — sign them raw with ed25519). */
+/** The 32-byte digest a wallet signs for `ton_proof` — to verify a proof; sign with `WalletAccountTon.signTonProof`. */
 declare function tonProofMessage(input: {
     address: TonAddressParts;
     domain: string;
     timestamp: number;
     payload: string;
 }): Uint8Array;
-/** The bytes a wallet signs for `signData` (text / binary). */
+/** The 32-byte digest a wallet signs for `signData` (text / binary) — to verify; sign with `WalletAccountTon.signTonConnectData`. */
 declare function tonSignDataMessage(input: {
     address: TonAddressParts;
     domain: string;
@@ -1422,6 +1504,12 @@ declare class PhishingDetector {
     constructor(list: PhishingList);
     get size(): number;
     check(hostOrOrigin: string): HostCheck;
+    /**
+     * Why `hostOrOrigin` must be refused outright, or `null`: a host on the blocklist (or under a
+     * listed domain) and not on the allowlist. Lookalikes and punycode only warn ({@link check}).
+     * Wire it as `ApprovalQueueOptions.refuse` and `RouterDeps.refuse`.
+     */
+    refusal(hostOrOrigin: string): string | null;
     /**
      * `metamask.io-login.com`, `app-uniswap.com`, `uniswap.org.evil.net`: a known site's name used as (part of) a label
      * of a host that is not that site. Names shorter than 5 characters are skipped (too many honest matches).
@@ -1517,4 +1605,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ interface SessionAlarms {
 interface SessionOptions {
     storage: SessionStorage;
     alarms: SessionAlarms;
-    /** Lock this long after the last `touch` / `unlock`. Default 15 min; 0 disables the timer (lock only on browser exit or explicit lock). */
+    /** Lock this long after the last `touch` / `unlock`. Default 15 min; 0 disables the timer (lock only on browser exit or explicit lock; stored as `expiresAt: null`). */
     autoLockMs?: number;
     /** Storage key and alarm name prefix. */
     name?: string;
@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ declare class Session {
     private _lockNow;
     private _expiry;
     private _arm;
+    /** The stored record, or `null` when locked. A record that is there but unreadable locks the wallet (removed, listeners told). */
     private _read;
 }
 /** In-memory `chrome.storage.session` stand-in. */
@@ -410,6 +411,25 @@ declare function isPageEvent(x: unknown): x is PageEvent;
 declare function isRelayRequest(x: unknown): x is RelayRequest;
 declare function isRelayToContent(x: unknown): x is RelayToContent;
 declare function newRequestId(): string;
+/** What a content script's `message` listener receives (structural `MessageEvent`). */
+interface PageMessageEvent {
+    data: unknown;
+    origin: string;
+    source: unknown;
+}
+/** The page window the content script shares (structural `window`). */
+interface PageWindow {
+    location: {
+        origin: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The page's own request, or `null`. A content script must take only messages the page itself
+ * posted — `event.source` is the page window and `event.origin` its origin — or an iframe on the
+ * page (an ad, an embed) would have its `parent.postMessage` stamped with the site's origin and
+ * shown in the approval window as the site (round 3, H6).
+ */
+declare function pageRequestFrom(event: PageMessageEvent, page: PageWindow): PageRequest | null;
 /** The content script's stamp: {@link PageRequest} + the page origin. */
 declare function stampOrigin(request: PageRequest, origin: string): RelayRequest;
 /** What `port.sender` looks like (structural `chrome.runtime.MessageSender`). */
@@ -530,7 +550,8 @@ declare class NetworksTable {
 }
 /**
  * EIP-3085 `wallet_addEthereumChain` parameter → {@link EvmNetwork}, or the error
- * to answer with. https RPC urls only; the chain id must be in the catalog.
+ * to answer with. Public https RPC urls only (a private / local host is dropped); the chain id
+ * must be in the catalog.
  */
 declare function parseAddChainParams(params: unknown, known?: (caip2: string) => boolean): EvmNetwork | RelayError;
 /** Solana mainnet as the catalog names it (`solana:mainnet`); the wallet package also accepts the genesis-hash form. */
@@ -641,6 +662,11 @@ declare class QueueLimitError extends Error {
     readonly code: number;
     constructor(code: number, message: string);
 }
+/** The origin is refused before any window opens (the shipped phishing list); EIP-1193 4100. */
+declare class OriginRefused extends Error {
+    readonly code: 4100;
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
 declare const APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN = 3;
 interface ApprovalRequest<P = unknown> {
     id: string;
@@ -658,6 +684,12 @@ interface ApprovalRequest<P = unknown> {
 interface ApprovalQueueOptions {
     /** Called for every request's origin; the lines are shown on the sheet (e.g. the shipped phishing list's verdict). */
     annotate?: (origin: string) => string[];
+    /**
+     * Called for every request's origin before anything is queued: a reason refuses the request with
+     * {@link OriginRefused} (4100) and no window opens. Wire `PhishingDetector.refusal` here — a
+     * warning on the sheet is one click away from a signature.
+     */
+    refuse?: (origin: string) => string | null | undefined;
     /** Requests one origin may have waiting (current + queued). Default {@link APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN}. */
     maxPendingPerOrigin?: number;
 }
@@ -757,6 +789,11 @@ interface RouterDeps {
         accounts: string[];
     }): Promise<unknown>;
     defaultChain?: string;
+    /**
+     * A reason to refuse every request from `origin` (reads, `eth_accounts`, an earlier permission
+     * included) with 4100, or nothing. Wire `PhishingDetector.refusal`.
+     */
+    refuse?(origin: string): string | null | undefined;
 }
 declare class RequestRouter {
     private readonly deps;
@@ -846,6 +883,15 @@ declare function describeSiwe(text: string, ctx: SiweContext): SiweInfo | null;
  * (Vaulty's `evmFees`), legacy `gasPrice` where a chain has no base fee, gas =
  * the page's limit or `eth_estimateGas` × 1.2.
  *
+ * The nonce the sheet shows is a guess: the one signed is read AFTER the
+ * approval, under a per-account lock that also covers the broadcast, and is
+ * never below the wallet's own next nonce (a node may not see the previous
+ * send yet). Two requests reviewed at once therefore get consecutive nonces.
+ * The fee caps signed are the ones shown, unless the network outgrew them
+ * while the sheet was open (EIP-1559: base fee + tip above the shown cap;
+ * legacy: a higher gas price) — then the user is asked again with the new
+ * numbers (`repriced: true`).
+ *
  * The review payload ({@link SignApproval}) carries what the window shows: the
  * classified request, the prepared fields, the fee, and the preview the wallet
  * attached (tx-preview-evm: decode, simulation, balance changes, checks). Only
@@ -903,6 +949,8 @@ interface SignApproval {
     request: SignRequestInfo;
     network: EvmNetwork;
     prepared?: PreparedTx;
+    /** A second sheet for the same transaction: the network's fee outgrew the cap the first one showed. */
+    repriced?: true;
     /** What the wallet attached (tx-preview-evm `TxPreview`, typed-data description…). */
     preview: unknown;
 }
@@ -972,17 +1020,21 @@ declare function createSignHandler(deps: SignDeps): NonNullable<RouterDeps['sign
  * A flow that reviewed a WHOLE plan in one sheet (a swap: approvals + source
  * leg) registers one matcher per operation it is about to perform; the
  * reviewed account then lets exactly those operations through without a second
- * window, each once, within `ttlMs`. Anything else still stops at the review.
+ * window, each once, within `ttlMs`, and only for the account that reviewed the
+ * plan. Anything else still stops at the review.
  */
-type GatedOp = {
+type GatedOp = ({
     kind: 'evm-tx';
     caip2: string;
     to: string;
     data?: string;
     value: bigint;
-} | {
+}
+/** EIP-712 data about to be signed: `typedDataHash` is `typedDataHash(typed)` from `@anywalletkit/wallet-evm` — the digest the account signs. */
+ | {
     kind: 'evm-typed-data';
     caip2: string;
+    typedDataHash: string;
 } | {
     kind: 'solana-transfer';
     to: string;
@@ -1008,14 +1060,21 @@ type GatedOp = {
     amount: bigint;
     token?: string | undefined;
     memo?: string | undefined;
+}) & {
+    /** The account about to sign or send. A pre-approval bound to an account passes only ops that name it. */
+    account?: string | undefined;
 };
 type GateMatcher = (op: GatedOp) => boolean;
 declare class ReviewGate {
     private readonly now;
     private approved;
     constructor(now?: () => number);
-    /** Each matcher passes ONE operation, within `ttlMs` (default 10 min). */
-    preApprove(matchers: GateMatcher[], ttlMs?: number): void;
+    /**
+     * Each matcher passes ONE operation, within `ttlMs` (default 10 min). With `account`, only an op
+     * whose `account` is that account (an op without one does not pass). `reviewSwapPlan` and
+     * `reviewEarnPlan` always bind.
+     */
+    preApprove(matchers: GateMatcher[], ttlMs?: number, account?: string): void;
     /** True (and the matcher is spent) when a pre-approval covers `op`. */
     consume(op: GatedOp): boolean;
     get pending(): number;
@@ -1028,6 +1087,11 @@ declare function evmCallMatcher(expected: {
     data?: string | undefined;
     value: bigint;
 }): GateMatcher;
+/** Matcher for one EIP-712 payload on one chain, by the digest the account signs (`typedDataHash` from `@anywalletkit/wallet-evm`). */
+declare function typedDataMatcher(expected: {
+    caip2: string;
+    typedDataHash: string;
+}): GateMatcher;
 /** Matcher for a non-EVM send: same chain, recipient, amount, token and memo. */
 declare function chainTxMatcher(expected: {
     chain: string;
@@ -1091,6 +1155,8 @@ declare function executionFloor(minDestAmount: bigint): bigint;
 interface SwapReviewMeta {
     /** Who runs the flow (the wallet's origin). */
     origin: string;
+    /** The account that signs the plan: the gate passes the plan's operations for this account only. */
+    account: string;
     providerLabel: string;
     fromSymbol: string;
     fromDecimals: number;
@@ -1147,8 +1213,12 @@ interface SwapApproval {
         memo?: string;
     } | {
         kind: 'serialized';
-    } | {
+    }
+    /** The EIP-712 order the account signs (gasless routes): `typedData` to render, `text` pretty JSON. */
+     | {
         kind: 'typed-order';
+        typedData: TypedData;
+        text: string;
     };
     checks: {
         status: 'ok' | 'warn' | 'unknown';
@@ -1178,7 +1248,7 @@ declare function reviewSwapPlan(approvals: ApprovalQueue, gate: ReviewGate, meta
 
 type SwapRecordStatus = IntentStatus['state'] | 'claiming';
 interface SwapRecord {
-    /** swap2 id — `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>]`. */
+    /** swap2 id — `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]`. */
     id: string;
     provider: string;
     fromChain: string;
@@ -1205,15 +1275,23 @@ interface SwapRecord {
     checks: number;
 }
 declare const ACTIVE_STATUSES: ReadonlySet<SwapRecordStatus>;
+/** `awk1.<provider>.<intentId>[.<sourceTxHash>[.<claimTxHash>]]` — the 4th segment is on the id `claimSwap2` returns. */
 declare function parseSwapId(id: string): {
     provider: string;
     intentId: string;
     sourceTxHash?: string;
+    destTxHash?: string;
 } | null;
 declare class SwapsStore {
     private readonly storage;
     private _records;
     private readonly _listeners;
+    /**
+     * add / update / remove run here one after another, each reading the list inside its turn: an
+     * alarm tick's update that read the list before a new swap was added would otherwise write the
+     * old list back and drop the swap.
+     */
+    private _queue;
     constructor(storage: JsonStorage<SwapRecord[]>);
     list(): Promise<SwapRecord[]>;
     get(id: string): Promise<SwapRecord | null>;
@@ -1222,6 +1300,8 @@ declare class SwapsStore {
     update(id: string, patch: Partial<SwapRecord>): Promise<SwapRecord | null>;
     remove(id: string): Promise<void>;
     onChange(listener: () => void): () => void;
+    private _all;
+    private _serial;
     private write;
 }
 interface SwapTrackerDeps {
@@ -1275,6 +1355,8 @@ interface EarnPlan {
 }
 interface EarnReviewMeta {
     origin: string;
+    /** The account that sends the plan: the gate passes its calls for this account only. */
+    account: string;
     /** 'Aave v3', 'Morpho', … */
     module: string;
     /** 'Supply', 'Withdraw', 'Borrow', 'Repay', 'Stake', … */
@@ -1368,14 +1450,14 @@ interface TonAddressParts {
     workchain: number;
     hash: Uint8Array;
 }
-/** The bytes a wallet signs for `ton_proof` (already hashed — sign them raw with ed25519). */
+/** The 32-byte digest a wallet signs for `ton_proof` — to verify a proof; sign with `WalletAccountTon.signTonProof`. */
 declare function tonProofMessage(input: {
     address: TonAddressParts;
     domain: string;
     timestamp: number;
     payload: string;
 }): Uint8Array;
-/** The bytes a wallet signs for `signData` (text / binary). */
+/** The 32-byte digest a wallet signs for `signData` (text / binary) — to verify; sign with `WalletAccountTon.signTonConnectData`. */
 declare function tonSignDataMessage(input: {
     address: TonAddressParts;
     domain: string;
@@ -1422,6 +1504,12 @@ declare class PhishingDetector {
     constructor(list: PhishingList);
     get size(): number;
     check(hostOrOrigin: string): HostCheck;
+    /**
+     * Why `hostOrOrigin` must be refused outright, or `null`: a host on the blocklist (or under a
+     * listed domain) and not on the allowlist. Lookalikes and punycode only warn ({@link check}).
+     * Wire it as `ApprovalQueueOptions.refuse` and `RouterDeps.refuse`.
+     */
+    refusal(hostOrOrigin: string): string | null;
     /**
      * `metamask.io-login.com`, `app-uniswap.com`, `uniswap.org.evil.net`: a known site's name used as (part of) a label
      * of a host that is not that site. Names shorter than 5 characters are skipped (too many honest matches).
@@ -1517,4 +1605,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, OriginRefused, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageMessageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, type PageWindow, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, pageRequestFrom, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, typedDataMatcher, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };