@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.1.2 → 0.1.4

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -39,6 +39,31 @@ declare const VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT: {
 };
 /** Shortest password `create` / `changePassword` accept. `unlock` takes whatever opens the vault. */
 declare const VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;
+/**
+ * Upper bounds on what an envelope (and the options) may carry, checked before any KDF runs: an
+ * envelope edited on disk must not make unlock hang (PBKDF2 iterations) or exhaust the worker's
+ * memory (scrypt N × r), and its size stays within what `chrome.storage.local` holds.
+ */
+declare const VAULT_LIMITS: Readonly<{
+    /** scrypt cost: 2^20 × 16 = 2 GiB is the most any envelope may ask for. */
+    scrypt: Readonly<{
+        N: number;
+        r: 16;
+        p: 4;
+    }>;
+    /** PBKDF2-SHA256 iterations (v1 envelopes). */
+    iterations: 5000000;
+    /** Sealed secrets in one vault. */
+    secrets: 1000;
+    /** Registered passkeys. */
+    passkeys: 32;
+    /** Plaintext bytes of one secret (`setSecret`). */
+    secretBytes: number;
+    /** base64 characters of one sealed box (iv or data). */
+    boxChars: number;
+    /** JSON characters of the whole envelope. */
+    envelopeChars: number;
+}>;
 interface SealedBox {
     /** 96-bit AES-GCM nonce, base64. */
     iv: string;
@@ -116,8 +141,14 @@ interface VaultKdfInfo {
     /** Human line for the UI, e.g. "scrypt N=2^17 r=8 p=1". */
     summary: string;
 }
+/**
+ * One `Vault` per storage area: writes to the envelope are serialized inside the instance, so two
+ * instances over the same area could still overwrite each other.
+ */
 declare class Vault {
     private readonly _storage;
+    /** Every read-modify-write of the envelope runs here, one after another (a parallel write would drop the other's change). */
+    private _queue;
     private readonly _kdf;
     private readonly _iterations;
     private readonly _scrypt;
@@ -138,6 +169,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * way out, secrets untouched.
      */
     unlock(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    private _unlock;
     /** Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched. */
     changePassword(oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Public view of the registered passkeys (ids, labels; whether each can verify assertions). */
@@ -156,7 +188,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
      * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
      * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-     * thereby upgraded) first.
+     * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
      */
     addPasskey(dek: Uint8Array, passkey: {
         id: string;
@@ -165,6 +197,7 @@ declare class Vault {
         publicKey?: string | undefined;
         alg?: number | undefined;
     }): Promise<void>;
+    private _addPasskey;
     /** Unseal the DEK with a passkey's PRF output. `wrong-password` when the box does not open, `missing` when the id is unknown. */
     unlockWithPasskey(id: string, prf: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     removePasskey(id: string): Promise<void>;
@@ -176,10 +209,16 @@ declare class Vault {
     deleteSecret(sourceId: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Remove the whole vault. The explicit destructive flow only (back up → wipe → create). */
     destroy(): Promise<void>;
+    private _exclusive;
+    /** Store an envelope this build will open again (bounds checked before it is written). */
+    private _write;
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
-    /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+    /**
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
     private _deriveScrypt;
@@ -232,6 +271,13 @@ declare class Session {
     private readonly _alarm;
     private readonly _now;
     private readonly _onLock;
+    /**
+     * Every operation on the stored record runs here, one after another: a `touch` that read the
+     * record before a `lock` removed it would otherwise write it back and undo the lock.
+     */
+    private _queue;
+    /** Bumped by every lock; a `touch` writes only when no lock happened since it read the record. */
+    private _epoch;
     constructor(options: SessionOptions);
     /** Store the DEK and arm the auto-lock. The caller's copy is zeroized. */
     unlock(dek: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
@@ -250,6 +296,9 @@ declare class Session {
     /** Change the timer (options page); re-arms from now when unlocked. 0 disables. */
     setAutoLockMs(ms: number): Promise<void>;
     onLock(callback: () => void): () => void;
+    private _serial;
+    /** The lock itself; callers are already in the queue. */
+    private _lockNow;
     private _expiry;
     private _arm;
     private _read;
@@ -655,33 +704,25 @@ declare function memoryApprovalWindow(): ApprovalWindow & {
     userClose(id: string): void;
 };
 
-/**
- * The request router: what a dApp may ask and what happens to each request.
- * Policy ported from Vaulty's in-app browser (`mobile/lib/browser.ts`):
- *
- * - the origin is the browser's (checked by the service worker before this runs);
- * - accounts are exposed only to origins the user connected (`eth_requestAccounts`
- *   → approval window); `eth_accounts` is `[]` otherwise;
- * - chain switching and adding go through the approval window; a chain can be
- *   added only if the asset catalog knows it, with https RPCs;
- * - read-only JSON-RPC is answered from the wallet's own clients (the networks
- *   table's failover list), never from a URL the page names;
- * - `eth_sign` (blind hash signing) is never offered; the other signing methods
- *   go to the `sign` hook (the review flow) when the wallet provides one;
- * - everything else is refused with 4200.
- *
- * Errors leave as {@link RouterError} (EIP-1193 codes) or {@link ReviewDeclined}
- * (4001); the service worker turns both into a `RelayResponse.error`.
- */
-
 declare class RouterError extends Error {
     readonly code: number;
     readonly data: unknown;
     constructor(code: number, message: string, data?: unknown);
     static from(e: RelayError): RouterError;
 }
-/** Any error → the `RelayError` for the page. Unknown errors keep their message but never their stack. */
-declare function toRelayError(e: unknown): RelayError;
+/** Options for {@link toRelayError}. */
+interface RelayErrorOptions {
+    /** Gets every error that is NOT passed to the page, in full — the extension's own log. */
+    log?: (error: unknown) => void;
+}
+/**
+ * Any error → the `RelayError` for the page. Wallet refusals keep their EIP-1193 code
+ * ({@link RouterError}, {@link ReviewDeclined}, a core `UserRejectedError` → 4001), a node's own
+ * JSON-RPC error keeps its code and revert data; their messages lose URLs. Everything else is
+ * `-32603 Internal error` on the page and goes to `options.log` in full — transport errors name
+ * the RPC URL (often with the provider key in it) and the request.
+ */
+declare function toRelayError(e: unknown, options?: RelayErrorOptions): RelayError;
 /** Read-only methods answered from our RPC without asking the user. */
 declare const READ_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string>;
 /** Methods that produce a signature — the review flow's business (step 4), never answered here. */
@@ -1476,4 +1517,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -39,6 +39,31 @@ declare const VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT: {
 };
 /** Shortest password `create` / `changePassword` accept. `unlock` takes whatever opens the vault. */
 declare const VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;
+/**
+ * Upper bounds on what an envelope (and the options) may carry, checked before any KDF runs: an
+ * envelope edited on disk must not make unlock hang (PBKDF2 iterations) or exhaust the worker's
+ * memory (scrypt N × r), and its size stays within what `chrome.storage.local` holds.
+ */
+declare const VAULT_LIMITS: Readonly<{
+    /** scrypt cost: 2^20 × 16 = 2 GiB is the most any envelope may ask for. */
+    scrypt: Readonly<{
+        N: number;
+        r: 16;
+        p: 4;
+    }>;
+    /** PBKDF2-SHA256 iterations (v1 envelopes). */
+    iterations: 5000000;
+    /** Sealed secrets in one vault. */
+    secrets: 1000;
+    /** Registered passkeys. */
+    passkeys: 32;
+    /** Plaintext bytes of one secret (`setSecret`). */
+    secretBytes: number;
+    /** base64 characters of one sealed box (iv or data). */
+    boxChars: number;
+    /** JSON characters of the whole envelope. */
+    envelopeChars: number;
+}>;
 interface SealedBox {
     /** 96-bit AES-GCM nonce, base64. */
     iv: string;
@@ -116,8 +141,14 @@ interface VaultKdfInfo {
     /** Human line for the UI, e.g. "scrypt N=2^17 r=8 p=1". */
     summary: string;
 }
+/**
+ * One `Vault` per storage area: writes to the envelope are serialized inside the instance, so two
+ * instances over the same area could still overwrite each other.
+ */
 declare class Vault {
     private readonly _storage;
+    /** Every read-modify-write of the envelope runs here, one after another (a parallel write would drop the other's change). */
+    private _queue;
     private readonly _kdf;
     private readonly _iterations;
     private readonly _scrypt;
@@ -138,6 +169,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * way out, secrets untouched.
      */
     unlock(password: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    private _unlock;
     /** Re-wrap the DEK under a new password (fresh salt, current KDF). Secrets and passkeys are untouched. */
     changePassword(oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Public view of the registered passkeys (ids, labels; whether each can verify assertions). */
@@ -156,7 +188,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
      * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
      * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-     * thereby upgraded) first.
+     * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
      */
     addPasskey(dek: Uint8Array, passkey: {
         id: string;
@@ -165,6 +197,7 @@ declare class Vault {
         publicKey?: string | undefined;
         alg?: number | undefined;
     }): Promise<void>;
+    private _addPasskey;
     /** Unseal the DEK with a passkey's PRF output. `wrong-password` when the box does not open, `missing` when the id is unknown. */
     unlockWithPasskey(id: string, prf: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
     removePasskey(id: string): Promise<void>;
@@ -176,10 +209,16 @@ declare class Vault {
     deleteSecret(sourceId: string): Promise<void>;
     /** Remove the whole vault. The explicit destructive flow only (back up → wipe → create). */
     destroy(): Promise<void>;
+    private _exclusive;
+    /** Store an envelope this build will open again (bounds checked before it is written). */
+    private _write;
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
-    /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+    /**
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
     private _deriveScrypt;
@@ -232,6 +271,13 @@ declare class Session {
     private readonly _alarm;
     private readonly _now;
     private readonly _onLock;
+    /**
+     * Every operation on the stored record runs here, one after another: a `touch` that read the
+     * record before a `lock` removed it would otherwise write it back and undo the lock.
+     */
+    private _queue;
+    /** Bumped by every lock; a `touch` writes only when no lock happened since it read the record. */
+    private _epoch;
     constructor(options: SessionOptions);
     /** Store the DEK and arm the auto-lock. The caller's copy is zeroized. */
     unlock(dek: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
@@ -250,6 +296,9 @@ declare class Session {
     /** Change the timer (options page); re-arms from now when unlocked. 0 disables. */
     setAutoLockMs(ms: number): Promise<void>;
     onLock(callback: () => void): () => void;
+    private _serial;
+    /** The lock itself; callers are already in the queue. */
+    private _lockNow;
     private _expiry;
     private _arm;
     private _read;
@@ -655,33 +704,25 @@ declare function memoryApprovalWindow(): ApprovalWindow & {
     userClose(id: string): void;
 };
 
-/**
- * The request router: what a dApp may ask and what happens to each request.
- * Policy ported from Vaulty's in-app browser (`mobile/lib/browser.ts`):
- *
- * - the origin is the browser's (checked by the service worker before this runs);
- * - accounts are exposed only to origins the user connected (`eth_requestAccounts`
- *   → approval window); `eth_accounts` is `[]` otherwise;
- * - chain switching and adding go through the approval window; a chain can be
- *   added only if the asset catalog knows it, with https RPCs;
- * - read-only JSON-RPC is answered from the wallet's own clients (the networks
- *   table's failover list), never from a URL the page names;
- * - `eth_sign` (blind hash signing) is never offered; the other signing methods
- *   go to the `sign` hook (the review flow) when the wallet provides one;
- * - everything else is refused with 4200.
- *
- * Errors leave as {@link RouterError} (EIP-1193 codes) or {@link ReviewDeclined}
- * (4001); the service worker turns both into a `RelayResponse.error`.
- */
-
 declare class RouterError extends Error {
     readonly code: number;
     readonly data: unknown;
     constructor(code: number, message: string, data?: unknown);
     static from(e: RelayError): RouterError;
 }
-/** Any error → the `RelayError` for the page. Unknown errors keep their message but never their stack. */
-declare function toRelayError(e: unknown): RelayError;
+/** Options for {@link toRelayError}. */
+interface RelayErrorOptions {
+    /** Gets every error that is NOT passed to the page, in full — the extension's own log. */
+    log?: (error: unknown) => void;
+}
+/**
+ * Any error → the `RelayError` for the page. Wallet refusals keep their EIP-1193 code
+ * ({@link RouterError}, {@link ReviewDeclined}, a core `UserRejectedError` → 4001), a node's own
+ * JSON-RPC error keeps its code and revert data; their messages lose URLs. Everything else is
+ * `-32603 Internal error` on the page and goes to `options.log` in full — transport errors name
+ * the RPC URL (often with the provider key in it) and the request.
+ */
+declare function toRelayError(e: unknown, options?: RelayErrorOptions): RelayError;
 /** Read-only methods answered from our RPC without asking the user. */
 declare const READ_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string>;
 /** Methods that produce a signature — the review flow's business (step 4), never answered here. */
@@ -1476,4 +1517,4 @@ declare class RecipientBook {
     }>;
 }
 
-export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };
+export { ACTIVE_STATUSES, APPROVALS_MAX_PENDING_PER_ORIGIN, type AddChainApproval, type AlarmsLike, type ApprovalKind, ApprovalQueue, type ApprovalQueueOptions, type ApprovalRequest, type ApprovalWindow, type AssertionExpectations, type AssertionInput, type AssertionVerdict, BTC_CHAIN, BTC_ESPLORA, CHAIN_ACCOUNT_KEYS, type ChainAccountsKey, type ChainDescriptor, type ConnectApproval, DEFAULT_CHAIN, DEFAULT_NETWORKS, type EarnApproval, type EarnPlan, type EarnReviewMeta, type EarnTx, type EvmNetwork, type EvmSigner, FLOOR_TOLERANCE_BPS, type GateMatcher, type GatedOp, type HostCheck, type JsonStorage, KEYRING_STORAGE_KEY, LOOKALIKE_PREFIX, LOOKALIKE_SUFFIX, NEAR_CHAIN, NEAR_PROVIDERS, NON_EVM_CHAINS, NetworksTable, type OriginPermission, type OriginVia, PAGE_TARGET, PORT_NAME, type PageEvent, type PageRequest, type PageResponse, PermissionStore, type PermissionsState, PhishingDetector, type PhishingList, type PortSender, type PreparedTx, QueueLimitError, type QuoteRoutesOptions, READ_METHODS, RELAY_ERRORS, RecipientBook, type RecipientsState, type RelayChain, type RelayError, type RelayErrorOptions, type RelayEvent, type RelayRequest, type RelayResponse, type RelayToContent, type RelayToWorker, RequestRouter, ReviewDeclined, ReviewGate, type RouteListView, type RouteView, type RouterDeps, RouterError, SESSION_DEFAULT_AUTOLOCK_MS, SIGNING_METHODS, SOLANA_CHAIN, SOLANA_RPCS, type SealedBox, Session, type SessionAlarms, type SessionOptions, type SessionStorage, type SignApproval, type SignDeps, type SignRequestInfo, type SiweContext, type SiweInfo, type SiweMessage, type StorageAreaLike, type SwapApproval, type SwapRecord, type SwapRecordStatus, type SwapReviewMeta, SwapTracker, type SwapTrackerDeps, SwapsStore, type SwitchChainApproval, TONCONNECT_ERRORS, TONCONNECT_MAX_MESSAGES, TON_CHAIN, TON_ENDPOINTS, TRON_CHAIN, TRON_PROVIDERS, type TonAddressParts, TonConnectError, type TonConnectMessage, type TonConnectRequest, type TonConnectSendTransaction, type TonSignDataPayload, type TypedData, VAULT_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, VAULT_LIMITS, VAULT_MIN_ITERATIONS, VAULT_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, VAULT_MIN_SCRYPT, VAULT_SCRYPT, VAULT_STORAGE_KEY, Vault, type VaultEnvelope, type VaultEnvelopeV1, type VaultEnvelopeV2, VaultError, type VaultErrorCode, type VaultKdfInfo, type VaultOptions, type VaultPasskey, type VaultStorage, ZCASH_BLOCKCHAIR, ZCASH_CHAIN, approvalChallenge, caip2FromChainId, chainHex, chainTxMatcher, checkSenderOrigin, chromeAlarms, chromeJsonStorage, chromeKeyringStorage, chromeLocalVaultStorage, chromeSessionStorage, classifySignRequest, createSignHandler, decodedMessage, derToRaw, describeSiwe, earnApprovalPayload, earnPlanMatchers, encodeApproveCalldata, evmCallMatcher, executionFloor, fromBase64Url, hostOf, isCatalogChain, isEnvelopeV1, isEnvelopeV2, isLocalHost, isPageEvent, isPageRequest, isPageResponse, isRelayRequest, isRelayToContent, levenshtein, lookalikeOf, memoryAlarms, memoryApprovalWindow, memoryJsonStorage, memorySessionStorage, memoryVaultStorage, messageText, newRequestId, nonEvmChain, normalizeHost, parseAddChainParams, parseConnectRequest, parseRawAddress, parseSendTransaction, parseSignData, parseSiwe, parseSwapId, planMatchers, prepareTransaction, proofDomain, quoteRoutes, rank, rawToDer, relayError, reviewEarnPlan, reviewSwapPlan, siweProblems, stampOrigin, swapApprovalPayload, toBase64Url, toRelayError, tonConnectErrorCode, tonProofMessage, tonSignDataMessage, vaultSecretStorage, verifyAssertion };