@anvia/sandbox 1.1.7 → 1.2.0

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
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- # `@anvia/sandbox`
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+ # @anvia/sandbox
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- Docker-backed sandbox ownership and tools for Anvia applications.
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+ Give agents a workspace where they can run commands and work with files. Docker-backed sandboxes keep execution infrastructure explicit and under your application’s control.
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+
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+ ## Installation
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ pnpm add @anvia/sandbox @anvia/core
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Quick start
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+
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+ Requires Node.js 20.12 or later and an accessible Docker daemon. Pull an image before creating a sandbox.
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  ```ts
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  import { createDockerSandboxTools, DockerSandboxClient } from "@anvia/sandbox";
@@ -18,67 +28,32 @@ const tools = createDockerSandboxTools({
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  sandbox: sandbox.runtime,
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  tools: ["exec_command", "read_file", "write_file", "list_files"],
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  });
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+ // Pass tools to new Agent({ id, model, tools }).
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  ```
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- `DockerSandboxClient` performs explicit infrastructure operations. Its constructor performs no I/O,
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- and `createSandbox()` and `resumeSandbox()` never pull images. `DockerSandbox` owns the container and,
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- for an ephemeral workspace, its Docker volume. Dispose it asynchronously or call `destroy()`.
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-
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- `stop()` preserves the container and workspace. `resumeSandbox({ id })` creates a fresh live handle for
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- that container; workspace files persist, while the in-memory managed-process registry starts empty. A
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- caller-owned `{ type: "docker-volume", name }` workspace is never deleted by the sandbox.
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-
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- Networking is explicit. Use `{ mode: "none" }` or `{ mode: "bridge", ports: [...] }`; published ports
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- bind only to `127.0.0.1`. Runtime methods use object arguments, propagate abort signals, and expose
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- command and process output as bytes. Tool wrappers decode UTF-8 strictly and return structured values.
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-
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- `exec_command` accepts a complete shell command line in `command`, including pipes, redirects, and
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- multiline scripts. For exact argv execution without shell parsing, provide the executable in
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- `command` and its arguments in `args`. Command policies apply to the implicit `sh` executable when a
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- shell command line is used. Natural command lines are rejected with block-mode command policies
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- because arbitrary shell syntax cannot be checked safely against an executable block list; use exact
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- `command` and `args` input in that configuration.
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-
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- File paths and command working directories passed to agent tools may be workspace-relative (for
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- example `notes/result.txt`) or absolute paths inside the sandbox workdir (for example
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- `/workspace/notes/result.txt` with the default workdir). Paths outside the sandbox workdir are
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- rejected.
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-
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- With `exec.commands.mode: "allow"`, both `exec_command` and `start_process` reject known shell
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- executables by default, including path-qualified names such as `/bin/sh`. To permit an allowlisted
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- shell, set `exec.commands.allowShellInterpreters` to the boolean `true`. Omitted or `false` keeps the
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- guard enabled; non-boolean values such as `"false"` are rejected when creating tools. This guard
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- checks executable names only: allowlisted runtimes such as Node.js or Python can still launch other
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- commands, so the command policy does not restrict what those programs can execute.
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-
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- `resources.sharedMemoryMb` maps to a private Docker `/dev/shm` size. A security configuration may use
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- explicit `dropCapabilities` and `addCapabilities` arrays, plus
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- `seccompProfile: { type: "path", path }` with an absolute host path. These options are used by
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- `@anvia/browser` to keep Chromium's own process sandbox enabled.
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-
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- `createSandbox()` accepts `containerRuntime` — the runtime name registered in the Docker daemon (for
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- example `runsc` for gVisor). The runtime must already be registered (`runsc install` followed by a
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- daemon restart); creation fails with a `runtime_not_found` error otherwise. `resumeSandbox()` keeps
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- the container's original runtime. Under gVisor, workspace files persist through
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- `stop()`/`resumeSandbox()` because they live on a Docker volume, but changes to the container's
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- writable rootfs outside the workspace do not survive a resume, and `security.seccompProfile` is not
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- enforced the way it is on the default runtime because the gVisor sentry mediates application
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- syscalls itself.
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-
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- Studio does not discover sandboxes through tool metadata. Register a read-only inspector explicitly:
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+ ## What you get
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- ```ts
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- const studio = new Studio([agent], {
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- sandboxes: [
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- {
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- inspector: sandbox.inspector({ files: true, ports: true, processes: true }),
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- agentIds: [agent.id],
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- toolNames: tools.map((tool) => tool.name),
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- },
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- ],
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- });
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- ```
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+ - Command execution, file access, and managed processes.
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+ - Ephemeral workspaces or caller-owned Docker volumes.
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+ - Explicit networking, resource limits, and command policies.
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+ - Stop/resume lifecycle and automatic disposal.
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+ - Read-only sandbox inspection in Anvia Studio.
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+
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+ `await using` destroys the owned container and ephemeral volume at scope exit. Keep the scope open while agents use its tools. Command policies filter executable names; they do not restrict what an allowed interpreter can execute.
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+
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+ ## Shell command lines
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+
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+ `exec_command` and `start_process` use `/bin/bash -c` for natural command lines when `/bin/bash`
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+ is executable, falling back to `sh -c` when it is absent. Availability is cached per live sandbox
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+ runtime handle. Explicit `command` plus `args` remains exact argv; use
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+ `{ command: "sh", args: ["-c", script] }` to retain the previous POSIX shell behavior.
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+
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+ Allow policies must permit the selected executable (`/bin/bash` or `sh`) and set
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+ `allowShellInterpreters: true`. Allowing only `sh` does not implicitly authorize Bash.
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+ Block-mode policies continue to reject natural command lines. See the usage guide for details.
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+
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+ ## Learn more
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- The `anvia-sandbox create-image` CLI only builds images. It does not create, resume, stop, or destroy
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- sandboxes. Its `playwright` feature remains a general code-sandbox image; the visible Chromium/CDP/
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- noVNC appliance is source-controlled and owned by `@anvia/browser`.
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+ - [Usage guide](https://github.com/anvia-hq/anvia/blob/main/docs/packages/tool-sandbox.md)
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+ - [Anvia](https://github.com/anvia-hq/anvia/blob/main/README.md)
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+ - [Contributing](https://github.com/anvia-hq/anvia/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -2007,6 +2007,47 @@ function isRecord(value) {
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  import { createTool } from "@anvia/core/tool";
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  import { z } from "zod";
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+ // src/shell.ts
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+ var shells = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
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+ async function sandboxShell(sandbox, abortSignal) {
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+ abortSignal?.throwIfAborted();
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+ let pending = shells.get(sandbox);
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+ if (pending === void 0) {
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+ pending = detectShell(sandbox).catch((error) => {
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+ shells.delete(sandbox);
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+ throw error;
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+ });
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+ shells.set(sandbox, pending);
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+ }
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+ if (abortSignal === void 0) return pending;
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+ let abort;
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+ try {
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+ return await Promise.race([
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+ pending,
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+ new Promise((_, reject) => {
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+ abort = () => reject(abortSignal.reason);
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+ if (abortSignal.aborted) abort();
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+ else abortSignal.addEventListener("abort", abort, { once: true });
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+ })
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+ ]);
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+ } finally {
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+ if (abort !== void 0) abortSignal.removeEventListener("abort", abort);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ async function detectShell(sandbox) {
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+ const result = await sandbox.exec({
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+ command: "sh",
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+ args: ["-c", "test -x /bin/bash"],
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+ timeoutMs: 5e3
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+ });
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+ if (result.status === "timed_out") {
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+ throw new DockerSandboxError("Sandbox shell detection timed out.", "timeout");
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+ }
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+ if (result.exitCode === 0) return "/bin/bash";
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+ if (result.exitCode === 1) return "sh";
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+ throw new DockerSandboxError("Could not detect the sandbox shell.", "docker_command_failed");
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+ }
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+
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  // src/types.ts
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  var shellInterpreters = [
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  "sh",
@@ -2036,7 +2077,7 @@ var allToolNames = [
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  ];
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  var execCommandInput = z.object({
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  command: z.string().min(1).describe(
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- "Command to run. Complete shell command lines are supported; use args for exact argv execution."
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+ "Command to run. Natural command lines use /bin/bash -c when available, otherwise sh -c. Use args for exact argv execution."
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  ),
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  args: z.array(z.string()).describe("Optional exact arguments. Omit when command contains the complete command line.").optional(),
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  cwd: z.string().describe("Workspace-relative directory or an absolute directory inside the sandbox workdir.").optional(),
@@ -2105,8 +2146,8 @@ var publishedPortOutput = z.object({
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  });
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  var listPortsOutput = z.object({ ports: z.array(publishedPortOutput) });
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  var startProcessInput = z.object({
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- command: z.string().min(1),
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- args: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
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+ command: execCommandInput.shape.command,
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+ args: execCommandInput.shape.args,
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  cwd: z.string().describe("Workspace-relative directory or an absolute directory inside the sandbox workdir.").optional(),
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  env: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional()
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  });
@@ -2168,19 +2209,20 @@ function createDockerSandboxTools(options) {
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  function createExecCommandTool(options) {
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  return createTool({
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  name: "exec_command",
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- description: "Run a command inside the sandbox, including natural shell command lines.",
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+ description: "Run a command inside the sandbox. Natural command lines use /bin/bash -c when available, otherwise sh -c; supply args for exact argv execution.",
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  inputSchema: execCommandInput,
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  outputSchema: execResultOutput,
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  execute: async ({ command, args, cwd, env, timeoutMs, input }, context) => {
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- const invocation = resolveExecInvocation(command, args, options.exec?.commands);
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  const effectiveTimeoutMs = timeoutMs ?? options.exec?.defaultTimeoutMs;
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  assertTimeoutAllowed(effectiveTimeoutMs, options.exec?.maxTimeoutMs);
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+ const normalizedCwd = cwd === void 0 ? void 0 : normalizeToolPath(options.sandbox, cwd, true);
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+ const invocation = await resolveExecInvocation(options, command, args, context.abortSignal);
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  let execOptions = {
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  command: invocation.command
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  };
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  if (invocation.args !== void 0) execOptions = { ...execOptions, args: invocation.args };
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- if (cwd !== void 0) {
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- execOptions = { ...execOptions, cwd: normalizeToolPath(options.sandbox, cwd, true) };
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+ if (normalizedCwd !== void 0) {
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+ execOptions = { ...execOptions, cwd: normalizedCwd };
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  }
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  if (env !== void 0) execOptions = { ...execOptions, env };
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  if (effectiveTimeoutMs !== void 0) {
@@ -2275,15 +2317,15 @@ function createListPortsTool(sandbox) {
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  function createStartProcessTool(options) {
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  return createTool({
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  name: "start_process",
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- description: "Start a managed long-running process inside the sandbox.",
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+ description: "Start a managed long-running process inside the sandbox. Natural command lines use /bin/bash -c when available, otherwise sh -c; supply args for exact argv execution.",
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  inputSchema: startProcessInput,
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  outputSchema: processInfoOutput,
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  execute: async ({ command, args, cwd, env }, context) => {
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- assertCommandAllowed(command, options.exec?.commands);
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- let startOptions = { command };
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- if (args !== void 0) startOptions = { ...startOptions, args };
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- if (cwd !== void 0) {
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- startOptions = { ...startOptions, cwd: normalizeToolPath(options.sandbox, cwd, true) };
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+ const normalizedCwd = cwd === void 0 ? void 0 : normalizeToolPath(options.sandbox, cwd, true);
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+ const invocation = await resolveExecInvocation(options, command, args, context.abortSignal);
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+ let startOptions = { ...invocation };
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+ if (normalizedCwd !== void 0) {
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+ startOptions = { ...startOptions, cwd: normalizedCwd };
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  }
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  if (env !== void 0) startOptions = { ...startOptions, env };
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  if (context.abortSignal !== void 0) {
@@ -2538,15 +2580,22 @@ function assertCommandAllowed(command, policy) {
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  }
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  }
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  }
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- function resolveExecInvocation(command, args, policy) {
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+ async function resolveExecInvocation(options, command, args, abortSignal) {
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+ abortSignal?.throwIfAborted();
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+ const policy = options.exec?.commands;
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  if (args === void 0 && requiresShell(command)) {
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  if (policy?.mode === "block") {
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  throw toolPolicyError(
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  "Natural command lines cannot be used with block-mode command policies. Use command and args instead."
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  );
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  }
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- assertCommandAllowed("sh", policy);
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- return { command: "sh", args: ["-c", command] };
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+ if (policy?.mode === "allow" && policy.allowShellInterpreters !== true) {
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+ throw toolPolicyError("Natural command lines require allowShellInterpreters: true.");
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+ }
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+ const shell = await sandboxShell(options.sandbox, abortSignal);
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+ abortSignal?.throwIfAborted();
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+ assertCommandAllowed(shell, policy);
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+ return { command: shell, args: ["-c", command] };
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  }
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  assertCommandAllowed(command, policy);
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  return args === void 0 ? { command } : { command, args };