@antzsoft/chat-core 1.4.7 → 1.4.8

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ declare const authApi: {
     login(credentials: LoginCredentials): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     register(payload: RegisterData): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     refresh(refreshToken: string): Promise<AuthTokens>;
+    /**
+     * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+     * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+     *
+     * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+     * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+     * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+     * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+     */
     logout(refreshToken?: string): Promise<void>;
     logoutAll(): Promise<void>;
     getMe(): Promise<User>;
@@ -327,6 +336,28 @@ type TokenStore = {
 };
 declare function setAuthReadyPromise(promise: Promise<unknown> | null): void;
 declare function isApiClientConfigured(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Per-request opt-out of the transit GATE (not of transit itself).
+ *
+ * Set via `{ headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: '1' } }` on the axios call.
+ * A request marked this way still encrypts normally whenever a session happens
+ * to be ready — it simply refuses to BLOCK waiting for one, and goes out
+ * unencrypted rather than failing when the channel is down.
+ *
+ * This exists for teardown calls (logout, logout-all, device de-registration).
+ * Those must succeed precisely when the secure channel is degraded: a control
+ * that prevents a user from ending their own session is inverted. Their server
+ * routes are marked @PreTransit() so they accept an unencrypted request, and
+ * JwtAuthGuard still authenticates them — transit is a confidentiality layer,
+ * never an authenticity one (POST /crypto/session is itself unauthenticated, so
+ * holding a transit session proves nothing about the caller).
+ *
+ * Do NOT add this to ordinary routes: they are not @PreTransit() server-side and
+ * would 403 with "Transit encryption required" the moment the gate is skipped.
+ *
+ * The marker header is stripped before the request leaves the client.
+ */
+declare const TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER = "x-antz-transit-optional";
 declare function initApiClient(config: ResolvedConfig, tokenStore: TokenStore): AxiosInstance;
 declare function setApiClientInstance(instance: AxiosInstance): void;
 declare function getApiClient(): AxiosInstance;
@@ -856,4 +887,4 @@ declare class AntzChatClient {
     uploadIcon(conversationId: string, file: UploadableFile): Promise<Conversation>;
 }
 
-export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };
+export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ declare const authApi: {
     login(credentials: LoginCredentials): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     register(payload: RegisterData): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     refresh(refreshToken: string): Promise<AuthTokens>;
+    /**
+     * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+     * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+     *
+     * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+     * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+     * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+     * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+     */
     logout(refreshToken?: string): Promise<void>;
     logoutAll(): Promise<void>;
     getMe(): Promise<User>;
@@ -327,6 +336,28 @@ type TokenStore = {
 };
 declare function setAuthReadyPromise(promise: Promise<unknown> | null): void;
 declare function isApiClientConfigured(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Per-request opt-out of the transit GATE (not of transit itself).
+ *
+ * Set via `{ headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: '1' } }` on the axios call.
+ * A request marked this way still encrypts normally whenever a session happens
+ * to be ready — it simply refuses to BLOCK waiting for one, and goes out
+ * unencrypted rather than failing when the channel is down.
+ *
+ * This exists for teardown calls (logout, logout-all, device de-registration).
+ * Those must succeed precisely when the secure channel is degraded: a control
+ * that prevents a user from ending their own session is inverted. Their server
+ * routes are marked @PreTransit() so they accept an unencrypted request, and
+ * JwtAuthGuard still authenticates them — transit is a confidentiality layer,
+ * never an authenticity one (POST /crypto/session is itself unauthenticated, so
+ * holding a transit session proves nothing about the caller).
+ *
+ * Do NOT add this to ordinary routes: they are not @PreTransit() server-side and
+ * would 403 with "Transit encryption required" the moment the gate is skipped.
+ *
+ * The marker header is stripped before the request leaves the client.
+ */
+declare const TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER = "x-antz-transit-optional";
 declare function initApiClient(config: ResolvedConfig, tokenStore: TokenStore): AxiosInstance;
 declare function setApiClientInstance(instance: AxiosInstance): void;
 declare function getApiClient(): AxiosInstance;
@@ -856,4 +887,4 @@ declare class AntzChatClient {
     uploadIcon(conversationId: string, file: UploadableFile): Promise<Conversation>;
 }
 
-export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };
+export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import {
   AntzChatPermissionError,
   AntzChatServerError,
   AntzChatValidationError,
+  TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER,
   TransitRateLimitedError,
   awaitTransitReadyOr,
   clearTransitSession,
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ import {
   setTransitSession,
   storageApi,
   uploadBatch
-} from "./chunk-U637W5MD.js";
+} from "./chunk-L537XWRD.js";
 import {
   useChatStore
 } from "./chunk-QHELYVNT.js";
@@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ function resolveConfig(config) {
 }
 
 // src/api/auth.ts
+var teardownRequest = { headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: "1" } };
 var authApi = {
   async login(credentials) {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().post("/auth/login", credentials);
@@ -118,11 +120,22 @@ var authApi = {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().post("/auth/refresh", { refreshToken });
     return data;
   },
+  /**
+   * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+   * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+   *
+   * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+   * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+   * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+   * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+   */
   async logout(refreshToken) {
-    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout", refreshToken ? { refreshToken } : {});
+    const encrypted = getTransitSession() != null;
+    const body = refreshToken && encrypted ? { refreshToken } : {};
+    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout", body, teardownRequest);
   },
   async logoutAll() {
-    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout-all");
+    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout-all", {}, teardownRequest);
   },
   async getMe() {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().get("/users/me");
@@ -1202,7 +1215,9 @@ var devicesApi = {
    * Call this on logout so the user stops receiving push notifications on this device.
    */
   async remove(deviceId) {
-    await getApiClient().post(`/users/me/devices/${deviceId}/remove`);
+    await getApiClient().post(`/users/me/devices/${deviceId}/remove`, {}, {
+      headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: "1" }
+    });
   }
 };
 
@@ -1388,6 +1403,7 @@ export {
   HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD,
   MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS,
   MENTION_ALL_ID,
+  TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER,
   TransitRateLimitedError,
   appConfigApi,
   authApi,