@antzsoft/chat-core 1.4.6 → 1.4.8

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ declare const authApi: {
     login(credentials: LoginCredentials): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     register(payload: RegisterData): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     refresh(refreshToken: string): Promise<AuthTokens>;
+    /**
+     * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+     * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+     *
+     * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+     * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+     * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+     * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+     */
     logout(refreshToken?: string): Promise<void>;
     logoutAll(): Promise<void>;
     getMe(): Promise<User>;
@@ -327,6 +336,28 @@ type TokenStore = {
 };
 declare function setAuthReadyPromise(promise: Promise<unknown> | null): void;
 declare function isApiClientConfigured(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Per-request opt-out of the transit GATE (not of transit itself).
+ *
+ * Set via `{ headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: '1' } }` on the axios call.
+ * A request marked this way still encrypts normally whenever a session happens
+ * to be ready — it simply refuses to BLOCK waiting for one, and goes out
+ * unencrypted rather than failing when the channel is down.
+ *
+ * This exists for teardown calls (logout, logout-all, device de-registration).
+ * Those must succeed precisely when the secure channel is degraded: a control
+ * that prevents a user from ending their own session is inverted. Their server
+ * routes are marked @PreTransit() so they accept an unencrypted request, and
+ * JwtAuthGuard still authenticates them — transit is a confidentiality layer,
+ * never an authenticity one (POST /crypto/session is itself unauthenticated, so
+ * holding a transit session proves nothing about the caller).
+ *
+ * Do NOT add this to ordinary routes: they are not @PreTransit() server-side and
+ * would 403 with "Transit encryption required" the moment the gate is skipped.
+ *
+ * The marker header is stripped before the request leaves the client.
+ */
+declare const TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER = "x-antz-transit-optional";
 declare function initApiClient(config: ResolvedConfig, tokenStore: TokenStore): AxiosInstance;
 declare function setApiClientInstance(instance: AxiosInstance): void;
 declare function getApiClient(): AxiosInstance;
@@ -339,6 +370,7 @@ declare function getSocket(): Socket;
 declare function tryGetSocket(): Socket | null;
 declare function getSocketStatus(): SocketStatus;
 declare function onSocketStatus(listener: StatusListener): () => void;
+declare function registerTeardownHook(hook: () => void): () => void;
 /** Drop all tracked rooms. Call on a genuine identity change (user/tenant
  *  switch) so the reconnect re-flush can't re-join the previous user's rooms.
  *  NOT called from disconnectSocket() — a token refresh is not an intent change. */
@@ -353,6 +385,9 @@ declare function reconnectSocket(token: string, userId?: string, tenantId?: stri
  */
 declare function refreshSocketAuth(): boolean;
 
+/** Clears the typing throttle state. Call on teardown/identity change so a new
+ *  session cannot inherit the previous one's suppression window. */
+declare function resetTypingThrottle(): void;
 declare const socketEmit: {
     joinRoom(conversationId: string): void;
     leaveRoom(conversationId: string): void;
@@ -584,6 +619,10 @@ interface ChatState {
     } | null) => void;
     addTypingUser: (conversationId: string, user: TypingUser) => void;
     removeTypingUser: (conversationId: string, userId: string) => void;
+    /** Drops every typing indicator and cancels their expiry timers. For teardown
+     *  and identity change — a socket drop no longer needs it, since indicators
+     *  expire on their own. */
+    clearTypingUsers: () => void;
     setUserOnline: (userId: string) => void;
     setUserOffline: (userId: string) => void;
     setOnlineUsers: (userIds: string[]) => void;
@@ -848,4 +887,4 @@ declare class AntzChatClient {
     uploadIcon(conversationId: string, file: UploadableFile): Promise<Conversation>;
 }
 
-export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };
+export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ declare const authApi: {
     login(credentials: LoginCredentials): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     register(payload: RegisterData): Promise<AuthResponse>;
     refresh(refreshToken: string): Promise<AuthTokens>;
+    /**
+     * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+     * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+     *
+     * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+     * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+     * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+     * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+     */
     logout(refreshToken?: string): Promise<void>;
     logoutAll(): Promise<void>;
     getMe(): Promise<User>;
@@ -327,6 +336,28 @@ type TokenStore = {
 };
 declare function setAuthReadyPromise(promise: Promise<unknown> | null): void;
 declare function isApiClientConfigured(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Per-request opt-out of the transit GATE (not of transit itself).
+ *
+ * Set via `{ headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: '1' } }` on the axios call.
+ * A request marked this way still encrypts normally whenever a session happens
+ * to be ready — it simply refuses to BLOCK waiting for one, and goes out
+ * unencrypted rather than failing when the channel is down.
+ *
+ * This exists for teardown calls (logout, logout-all, device de-registration).
+ * Those must succeed precisely when the secure channel is degraded: a control
+ * that prevents a user from ending their own session is inverted. Their server
+ * routes are marked @PreTransit() so they accept an unencrypted request, and
+ * JwtAuthGuard still authenticates them — transit is a confidentiality layer,
+ * never an authenticity one (POST /crypto/session is itself unauthenticated, so
+ * holding a transit session proves nothing about the caller).
+ *
+ * Do NOT add this to ordinary routes: they are not @PreTransit() server-side and
+ * would 403 with "Transit encryption required" the moment the gate is skipped.
+ *
+ * The marker header is stripped before the request leaves the client.
+ */
+declare const TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER = "x-antz-transit-optional";
 declare function initApiClient(config: ResolvedConfig, tokenStore: TokenStore): AxiosInstance;
 declare function setApiClientInstance(instance: AxiosInstance): void;
 declare function getApiClient(): AxiosInstance;
@@ -339,6 +370,7 @@ declare function getSocket(): Socket;
 declare function tryGetSocket(): Socket | null;
 declare function getSocketStatus(): SocketStatus;
 declare function onSocketStatus(listener: StatusListener): () => void;
+declare function registerTeardownHook(hook: () => void): () => void;
 /** Drop all tracked rooms. Call on a genuine identity change (user/tenant
  *  switch) so the reconnect re-flush can't re-join the previous user's rooms.
  *  NOT called from disconnectSocket() — a token refresh is not an intent change. */
@@ -353,6 +385,9 @@ declare function reconnectSocket(token: string, userId?: string, tenantId?: stri
  */
 declare function refreshSocketAuth(): boolean;
 
+/** Clears the typing throttle state. Call on teardown/identity change so a new
+ *  session cannot inherit the previous one's suppression window. */
+declare function resetTypingThrottle(): void;
 declare const socketEmit: {
     joinRoom(conversationId: string): void;
     leaveRoom(conversationId: string): void;
@@ -584,6 +619,10 @@ interface ChatState {
     } | null) => void;
     addTypingUser: (conversationId: string, user: TypingUser) => void;
     removeTypingUser: (conversationId: string, userId: string) => void;
+    /** Drops every typing indicator and cancels their expiry timers. For teardown
+     *  and identity change — a socket drop no longer needs it, since indicators
+     *  expire on their own. */
+    clearTypingUsers: () => void;
     setUserOnline: (userId: string) => void;
     setUserOffline: (userId: string) => void;
     setOnlineUsers: (userIds: string[]) => void;
@@ -848,4 +887,4 @@ declare class AntzChatClient {
     uploadIcon(conversationId: string, file: UploadableFile): Promise<Conversation>;
 }
 
-export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };
+export { AntzChatAuthError, AntzChatClient, AntzChatConfig, AntzChatError, AntzChatNetworkError, AntzChatPermissionError, AntzChatServerError, AntzChatValidationError, AppConfig, AuthResponse, AuthTokens, BatchUploadResult, CompletedPart, Conversation, ConversationListParams, ConversationSyncResponse, ConversationUnreadCount, type CreateDirectData, type CreateGroupData, CrossConversationSyncResponse, CursorPaginatedResponse, FileResponse, FileType, ForwardAckPayload, ForwardMessagePayload, type ForwardResult, HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD, type LastReadEntry, type ListMessagesParams, LoginCredentials, MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS, type MentionPart, type MentionSegment, Message, MessageReactionsResponse, MessageReceiptsResponse, type MobileDeviceToken, PaginatedResponse, type ParsedMention, Participant, PersistStorage, PresignedUrlRequest, PresignedUrlResponse, RegisterData, type RegisterDeviceTokenPayload, ResolvedCompressionConfig, ResolvedConfig, type SearchParams, type SendData, SendMessagePayload, type SocketStatus, type StatusListener, TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER, type TokenStore, type TransitIdentity, TransitRateLimitedError, UnreadSummary, type UpdateConversationData, type UpdateProfilePayload, UploadableFile, User, UserPreferences, type WebPushDeviceToken, appConfigApi, authApi, buildMentionText, connectSocket, conversationsApi, createAuthStore, createRestTransitSession, decryptPayload, devicesApi, disconnectSocket, encryptPayload, extractMentionIds, fetchServerKeys, generateEphemeralKey, getApiClient, getAuthStore, getCompressionStrategy, getSessionId, getSessionKey, getSocket, getSocketStatus, initApiClient, initAuthStore, isApiClientConfigured, isMentionAll, isTransitEnvelope, messagesApi, normalizeAxiosError, normalizeConversation, onSocketStatus, parseMentions, performHandshake, readRetryAfterMs, reconnectSocket, refreshSocketAuth, registerTeardownHook, renderMentionParts, resetAuthStore, resetTrackedRooms, resetTypingThrottle, resolveSystemMessageText, setApiClientInstance, setAuthReadyPromise, setTransitSession, socketEmit, syncApi, tryGetSocket, useChatStore, usersApi };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import {
   AntzChatPermissionError,
   AntzChatServerError,
   AntzChatValidationError,
+  TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER,
   TransitRateLimitedError,
   awaitTransitReadyOr,
   clearTransitSession,
@@ -38,10 +39,10 @@ import {
   setTransitSession,
   storageApi,
   uploadBatch
-} from "./chunk-U637W5MD.js";
+} from "./chunk-L537XWRD.js";
 import {
   useChatStore
-} from "./chunk-UIYJAOGL.js";
+} from "./chunk-QHELYVNT.js";
 
 // src/config/types.ts
 function resolveConfig(config) {
@@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ function resolveConfig(config) {
 }
 
 // src/api/auth.ts
+var teardownRequest = { headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: "1" } };
 var authApi = {
   async login(credentials) {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().post("/auth/login", credentials);
@@ -118,11 +120,22 @@ var authApi = {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().post("/auth/refresh", { refreshToken });
     return data;
   },
+  /**
+   * Ends the session. Never blocks on the transit handshake: logout has to work
+   * on a degraded channel, which is exactly when it matters most.
+   *
+   * The refreshToken is dropped when no transit session exists, so it is never
+   * sent in the clear. Losing it costs nothing meaningful — the server revokes
+   * against the JWT's own user id either way; passing it only lets the server
+   * target that one refresh token instead of the caller's session set.
+   */
   async logout(refreshToken) {
-    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout", refreshToken ? { refreshToken } : {});
+    const encrypted = getTransitSession() != null;
+    const body = refreshToken && encrypted ? { refreshToken } : {};
+    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout", body, teardownRequest);
   },
   async logoutAll() {
-    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout-all");
+    await getApiClient().post("/auth/logout-all", {}, teardownRequest);
   },
   async getMe() {
     const { data } = await getApiClient().get("/users/me");
@@ -405,6 +418,19 @@ function secureOn(socket, event, handler) {
     handler(raw);
   });
 }
+var _teardownHooks = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+function registerTeardownHook(hook) {
+  _teardownHooks.add(hook);
+  return () => _teardownHooks.delete(hook);
+}
+function runTeardownHooks() {
+  _teardownHooks.forEach((hook) => {
+    try {
+      hook();
+    } catch {
+    }
+  });
+}
 var _joinedRooms = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 function trackRoomJoin(conversationId) {
   _joinedRooms.add(conversationId);
@@ -548,13 +574,13 @@ async function _doConnect(config, getToken) {
     });
   }
   secureOn(_socket, "read_receipt", (event) => {
-    import("./chat.store-UVTDBPEC.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
+    import("./chat.store-TA6G7PD6.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
       const e = event;
       useChatStore2.getState().setLastRead(e.conversationId, e.messageId, e.readAt);
     });
   });
   secureOn(_socket, "user_online", (event) => {
-    import("./chat.store-UVTDBPEC.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
+    import("./chat.store-TA6G7PD6.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
       const store = useChatStore2.getState();
       const e = event;
       store.setUserOnline(e.userId);
@@ -562,7 +588,7 @@ async function _doConnect(config, getToken) {
     });
   });
   secureOn(_socket, "user_offline", (event) => {
-    import("./chat.store-UVTDBPEC.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
+    import("./chat.store-TA6G7PD6.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
       const e = event;
       const store = useChatStore2.getState();
       store.setUserOffline(e.userId);
@@ -600,6 +626,10 @@ function disconnectSocket() {
   }
   clearTransitSession();
   resetAlgoCache();
+  runTeardownHooks();
+  import("./chat.store-TA6G7PD6.js").then(({ useChatStore: useChatStore2 }) => {
+    useChatStore2.getState().clearTypingUsers();
+  });
   _getToken = null;
   _userId = void 0;
   _tenantId = void 0;
@@ -651,6 +681,12 @@ var RECONNECT_WAIT_TIMEOUT = 15e3;
 var QUEUE_MAX_SIZE = 100;
 var QUEUE_ENTRY_TTL = 3e4;
 var sendQueues = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+var TYPING_THROTTLE_MS = 3e3;
+var _lastTypingSentAt = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function resetTypingThrottle() {
+  _lastTypingSentAt.clear();
+}
+registerTeardownHook(resetTypingThrottle);
 var sendQueueRunning = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 async function drainSendQueue(conversationId) {
   if (sendQueueRunning.get(conversationId)) return;
@@ -781,8 +817,40 @@ var socketEmit = {
     return withAck("unpin_message", { messageId });
   },
   // markRead and typing are best-effort — silently dropped if socket not ready
+  //
+  // Typing is additionally LEADING-THROTTLED here rather than in the UI layer,
+  // so every consumer (both UI SDKs and any host calling socketEmit directly)
+  // gets the same emit budget and none can bypass it.
+  //
+  // The composer calls this on EVERY keystroke. A 40-word message is ~200 calls
+  // of which exactly one carries information: "this person started typing".
+  // Each one previously cost a round trip plus real server work, making typing
+  // the single most expensive event in the system per unit of user value.
+  //
+  // Shape of the throttle:
+  //   isTyping:true  — passed through at most once per TYPING_THROTTLE_MS per
+  //                    conversation. A continuous typist emits ~20/min instead
+  //                    of ~200/min.
+  //   isTyping:false — ALWAYS passed through, and resets the window. It is the
+  //                    edge that clears the indicator on every peer, it is
+  //                    already debounced by the composer, and dropping it is
+  //                    exactly the failure that leaves "is typing…" stuck.
+  //
+  // The server refreshes its typing key on each true edge (10s TTL) and
+  // receivers expire their own indicators after TYPING_EXPIRY_MS, both of which
+  // are comfortably longer than TYPING_THROTTLE_MS — so a throttled-away event
+  // never lets an indicator lapse mid-typing.
   typing(conversationId, isTyping) {
-    fireAndForget("typing", { conversationId, isTyping });
+    if (!isTyping) {
+      _lastTypingSentAt.delete(conversationId);
+      fireAndForget("typing", { conversationId, isTyping: false });
+      return;
+    }
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const last = _lastTypingSentAt.get(conversationId) ?? 0;
+    if (now - last < TYPING_THROTTLE_MS) return;
+    _lastTypingSentAt.set(conversationId, now);
+    fireAndForget("typing", { conversationId, isTyping: true });
   },
   markRead(conversationId, messageId) {
     fireAndForget("mark_read", { conversationId, ...messageId ? { messageId } : {} });
@@ -1147,7 +1215,9 @@ var devicesApi = {
    * Call this on logout so the user stops receiving push notifications on this device.
    */
   async remove(deviceId) {
-    await getApiClient().post(`/users/me/devices/${deviceId}/remove`);
+    await getApiClient().post(`/users/me/devices/${deviceId}/remove`, {}, {
+      headers: { [TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER]: "1" }
+    });
   }
 };
 
@@ -1333,6 +1403,7 @@ export {
   HIGHLY_FORWARDED_DEPTH_THRESHOLD,
   MAX_FORWARD_TARGETS,
   MENTION_ALL_ID,
+  TRANSIT_OPTIONAL_HEADER,
   TransitRateLimitedError,
   appConfigApi,
   authApi,
@@ -1369,9 +1440,11 @@ export {
   readRetryAfterMs,
   reconnectSocket,
   refreshSocketAuth,
+  registerTeardownHook,
   renderMentionParts,
   resetAuthStore,
   resetTrackedRooms,
+  resetTypingThrottle,
   resolveConfig,
   resolveSystemMessageText,
   setApiClientInstance,