@antzsoft/chat-core 1.3.3 → 1.3.5

package/README.md

@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ interface CrossConversationSyncResponse {
   deliveredReceipts: SyncDeliveredReceipt[];  // delivery receipts since `since`
   reactions: SyncReactions;      // v1.3.1+ — full current state for messages with reaction activity
   stars: SyncStarEntry[];        // v1.3.1+ — star/unstar records since `since`
+  deletedConversationIds: string[]; // v1.3.4+ — conversations the user deleted from their list since `since`
 }
 
 interface SyncDeletedForMe {
@@ -1861,6 +1862,7 @@ The built-in `SyncService.syncConversation()` in the RN app uses the backward di
 | `participantChanges` | ✅ | ✅ | Role changes, mute/unmute, removals (`isActive: false`) |
 | `readReceipts` | ✅ | ✅ | Read receipts — merge into `msg.readBy[]`, recompute status |
 | `deliveredReceipts` | ✅ | ✅ | Delivery receipts — merge into `msg.deliveredTo[]`, recompute status |
+| `deletedConversationIds` | ✅ v1.3.4 | — | Conversations this user deleted from their list — remove from local DB. Cursor-safe: won't reappear on next `pull()` |
 
 #### Stale handling
 
@@ -2139,7 +2141,7 @@ import type { SocketStatus } from '@antzsoft/chat-core';
 |---|---|---|
 | `connectSocket` | `(config: ResolvedConfig, getToken: () => string \| null \| undefined) => Promise<Socket>` | Initialize and connect the Socket.IO client. No-ops if already connected. |
 | `disconnectSocket` | `() => void` | Disconnect and clear the socket singleton. |
-| `reconnectSocket` | `(token: string) => void` | Update the auth token on the existing socket and reconnect. |
+| `reconnectSocket` | `(token: string) => void` | Update the auth token on the existing socket and reconnect. When transit encryption is enabled it re-runs the full `connectSocket()` handshake (re-establishing the transit session) rather than a bare auth swap, and dedupes concurrent calls. |
 | `getSocketStatus` | `() => SocketStatus` | Synchronously read the current connection status. |
 | `onSocketStatus` | `(listener: (status: SocketStatus) => void) => () => void` | Subscribe to status changes. Returns an unsubscribe function. |
 
@@ -3054,6 +3056,38 @@ document.querySelectorAll('[data-conv-id]').forEach((el) => {
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### v1.3.5
+
+- **Fix: `reconnectSocket()` no longer drops the transit-encryption handshake** — when transit encryption is enabled, `reconnectSocket()` now delegates to the full `connectSocket()` flow instead of doing a bare `_socket.auth` swap. `reconnectSocket()` predates transit encryption and was never migrated: it overwrote `_socket.auth` with only `{ token, userId, tenantId }`, dropping the `transitSessionId` / `transitEphemeralPub` fields that `connectSocket()` sets during the handshake. Combined with the `'disconnect'` handler clearing the cached transit session, a reconnect after the socket had disconnected (e.g. app returning to foreground on iOS/Android, where backgrounding fully disconnects) went out with no transit auth and no cached session → the server rejected the handshake with **"Transit encryption required: missing transitEphemeralPub/transitAlgo in handshake auth"**. It was intermittent — fast devices whose cached transit session survived the reconnect were unaffected.
+
+  Now, when transit encryption is on, `reconnectSocket()` re-runs `connectSocket()`, which re-establishes/reuses the transit session and rebuilds the handshake auth. It also inherits `connectSocket()`'s in-flight dedupe (`_connectingPromise`), so multiple rapid reconnect calls (a token refresh can trigger several) collapse into a single connect. Non-transit deployments keep the original fast bare auth-swap path unchanged.
+
+  The transit path is gated on the resolved config flag (`transitEncryption`), not the runtime `isTransitEnabled()` — the latter is `false` immediately after a disconnect clears the session, which is exactly when the transit-aware reconnect is needed.
+
+  **No integration changes required** — `reconnectSocket(token, userId, tenantId)` keeps the same signature; the SDK now handles the transit handshake internally on reconnect.
+
+### v1.3.4
+
+- **New: `deletedConversationIds` in `CrossConversationSyncResponse`** — `syncApi.pull(since)` now returns `deletedConversationIds: string[]`. Contains the IDs of conversations this user explicitly deleted from their list (via the delete-conversation action) since the `since` cursor. The client should remove these from local SQLite and the UI conversation list.
+
+  ```typescript
+  const result = await syncApi.pull(lastSyncedAt);
+
+  // Remove conversations the user deleted from their list
+  for (const convId of result.deletedConversationIds) {
+    await db.conversations.delete(convId);
+  }
+  ```
+
+  **Scoped to the requesting user only** — if another user deletes their copy of a shared DM, it does not appear in your `deletedConversationIds`. **Cursor-safe** — once the client saves the returned `syncedAt` as the new cursor, the same IDs will not reappear on the next `pull()` call. On the server side, this is detected via `participant.isHidden = true AND updatedAt > since` — the same flag set by `DELETE /conversations/:id`.
+
+- **Fix: Sync access guard parity with message listing API** — All three sync paths now enforce the same access rules as `GET /messages`:
+  - **`membershipPeriods` windows** — users who deleted and were re-added only see messages from their active membership periods; a deleted conversation with no periods returns no messages.
+  - **`status` filter** — active messages and deleted-for-everyone tombstones (so clients can render "This message was deleted") are included; `failed`-status messages are excluded.
+  - **`isHidden` group check** — hidden group participants (exit+delete) receive `403 Forbidden` on per-conversation sync, matching message listing behaviour. Hidden DM participants are still allowed.
+  - **Removed-member read access** — removed members (`isActive: false`) can still call per-conversation sync to retrieve history, matching the message listing API's `validateConversationAccess` which does not require `isActive: true` for reads.
+  - **No integration changes required.** These are server-side enforcement fixes — the response shape is unchanged, only the set of messages returned is now correctly filtered.
+
 ### v1.3.3
 
 - **New: `metadata` and `sender` fields in all sync message responses** — Messages returned by all three sync paths (`crossConversationSync`, `conversationSync`, `conversationSyncBySeq`) now include `metadata` (system message metadata — `actorUserId`, `targetUserId`, `action`) and `sender` (displayName, avatarUrl snapshot at send time). Both fields were already optional on the core SDK `Message` type so no SDK type changes were required. Previously absent from sync responses, meaning system message text could not be rendered and sender avatars were blank after an offline sync. The server batch-fetches sender profiles in a single `findByIds` call per sync request — one extra DB round trip per sync, not one per message. **No integration changes required.**

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -1516,6 +1516,7 @@ var _statusListeners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var _getToken = null;
 var _userId;
 var _tenantId;
+var _config2 = null;
 function setStatus(s) {
   _status = s;
   _statusListeners.forEach((l) => l(s));
@@ -1594,6 +1595,7 @@ async function _doConnect(config, getToken) {
   _getToken = getToken;
   _userId = config.userId;
   _tenantId = config.tenantId;
+  _config2 = config;
   const token = getToken();
   const socketHandshakeAuth = {
     token: token ? `Bearer ${token}` : "",
@@ -1756,16 +1758,21 @@ function disconnectSocket() {
   _getToken = null;
   _userId = void 0;
   _tenantId = void 0;
+  _config2 = null;
 }
 function reconnectSocket(token, userId, tenantId) {
-  if (_socket) {
-    _socket.auth = {
-      token: `Bearer ${token}`,
-      ...userId && { userId },
-      ...tenantId && { tenantId }
-    };
-    _socket.connect();
+  if (!_socket) return;
+  if (_config2?.transitEncryption && _getToken) {
+    if (!_socket.disconnected) _socket.disconnect();
+    void connectSocket(_config2, _getToken);
+    return;
   }
+  _socket.auth = {
+    token: `Bearer ${token}`,
+    ...userId && { userId },
+    ...tenantId && { tenantId }
+  };
+  _socket.connect();
 }
 function refreshSocketAuth() {
   if (!_socket || !_getToken) return false;