@andrewheberle/serverless-ssh-ca 0.23.0 → 0.24.0

package/src/utils.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { SshCaBindings } from "./types.js"
 import { JWKInvalid, JWKSInvalid, JWSInvalid, JWSSignatureVerificationFailed, JWTClaimValidationFailed, JWTExpired, JWTInvalid } from "jose/errors"
 import { CertificateParseError, SshCertificate } from "./ssh/certificate.js"
-import { KeyParseError, parsePrivateKey, PublicKey, UnsupportedKeyError, type PrivateKey } from "./ssh/keys.js"
+import { KeyParseError, MinimumRsaKeyBits, parsePrivateKey, PublicKey, rsaKeyBits, UnsupportedKeyError, type PrivateKey } from "./ssh/keys.js"
 import z from "zod"
-import { verifyJWT } from "./verify.js"
+import { MissingAudienceError, verifyJWT } from "./verify.js"
 import { CertificateRequestJWTPayload } from "./types.js"
 import { RenewalProofOfPossession, ProofOfPossession, PossessionParseError } from "./proof.js"
 import type { isRevoked as IsRevokedFn } from "./db/index.js"
@@ -56,6 +56,74 @@ type AccessToken = {
 	sub: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Thrown when a claim of a verified token is missing or is not of the
+ * expected type.
+ */
+export class TokenClaimError extends Error {
+	constructor(message: string) {
+		super(message)
+		this.name = "TokenClaimError"
+
+		Object.setPrototypeOf(this, TokenClaimError.prototype)
+	}
+}
+
+const SubjectClaimSchema = z.string().min(1)
+
+/**
+ * Returns the subject of a verified token, which is compared between the
+ * access and identity tokens so must always be present.
+ *
+ * @param payload The payload of a verified token
+ * @returns The `sub` claim of the token
+ * @throws {@link TokenClaimError} when the `sub` claim is missing, empty or not a string
+ */
+export const tokenSubject = (payload: { sub?: unknown }): string => {
+	const parsed = SubjectClaimSchema.safeParse(payload.sub)
+	if (!parsed.success) {
+		throw new TokenClaimError("JWT was verified but was missing required sub claim")
+	}
+
+	return parsed.data
+}
+
+/**
+ * The claims of an access token that identify the user's email address.
+ *
+ * `email_verified` is optional as not every IdP includes it, but when it is
+ * included it must be true, as an IdP may otherwise issue a token for an
+ * address the user has not shown they control.
+ */
+const EmailClaimsSchema = z.object({
+	email: z.email(),
+	email_verified: z.boolean().optional(),
+})
+
+/**
+ * Returns the email address of a verified access token, or why it cannot be
+ * used.
+ *
+ * @param payload The payload of a verified access token
+ * @returns The email address, or an error message if the claims are not acceptable
+ */
+export const tokenEmail = (payload: Record<string, unknown>): { ok: true, email: string } | { ok: false, error: string } => {
+	if (payload.email === undefined) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but was missing required email claim" }
+	}
+
+	const parsed = EmailClaimsSchema.safeParse(payload)
+	if (!parsed.success) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but the email or email_verified claim was not valid" }
+	}
+
+	if (parsed.data.email_verified === false) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but the email address has not been verified by the IdP" }
+	}
+
+	return { ok: true, email: parsed.data.email }
+}
+
 export const transformAuthorizationHeader = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: string, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Promise<AccessToken | never> => {
 	if (!val.startsWith("Bearer ") || val.length <= 7) {
 		return fatalIssue(ctx, "authorization header must be a Bearer token", val)
@@ -69,19 +137,28 @@ export const transformAuthorizationHeader = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: stri
 	}
 
 	try {
-		// verify jwt
-		const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt)
-
-		if (payload.email === undefined) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "JWT was verified but was missing required email claim", val)
+		// verify jwt, which must be issued for this CA
+		const aud = split(env.JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUD).length > 0 ? env.JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUD : env.JWT_AUD
+		const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, aud)
+
+		const email = tokenEmail(payload)
+		if (!email.ok) {
+			l.warn(email.error, "in", "transformAuthorizationHeader")
+			return fatalIssue(ctx, email.error, val)
 		}
 
 		return {
-			email: payload.email,
-			sub: payload.sub,
+			email: email.email,
+			sub: tokenSubject(payload),
 		}
 	} catch (err) {
 		switch (true) {
+			case (err instanceof MissingAudienceError):
+				// a misconfigured CA is a server error, not a validation failure
+				l.error(err.message, "in", "transformAuthorizationHeader")
+				throw new InternalServerErrorException(err.message)
+			case (err instanceof TokenClaimError):
+				return fatalIssue(ctx, err.message, val)
 			case (err instanceof JWSInvalid):
 				return fatalIssue(ctx, "the access token was invalid", val)
 			case (err instanceof JWTInvalid):
@@ -145,6 +222,36 @@ export const transformPublicKey = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * Returns why a public key cannot be issued a certificate, or undefined if it
+ * can be.
+ *
+ * RSA keys must be at least {@link MinimumRsaKeyBits} bits, as smaller keys
+ * can be factored and are refused by current OpenSSH releases.
+ *
+ * @param key The public key a certificate would be issued for
+ * @returns The reason the key cannot be used, or undefined if it can be
+ */
+export const subjectKeyIssue = (key: PublicKey): string | undefined => {
+	const bits = rsaKeyBits(key)
+	if (bits !== undefined && bits < MinimumRsaKeyBits) {
+		return `RSA keys must be at least ${MinimumRsaKeyBits} bits, not ${bits}`
+	}
+
+	return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refines a public key so only one allowed by {@link subjectKeyIssue} is
+ * accepted for a certificate request.
+ */
+export const refineSubjectKey = (val: PublicKey, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): void => {
+	const issue = subjectKeyIssue(val)
+	if (issue !== undefined) {
+		fatalIssue(ctx, issue, val.toString())
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * Thrown by {@link identityPrincipals} when the principals claim of an
  * identity token is not a string or an array of strings.
@@ -210,13 +317,13 @@ export const parseIdentity = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string | undefined,
 		throw new Error("missing identity token")
 	}
 
-	const aud = split(env.JWT_AUD)
-	const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, { aud: aud.length === 0 ? undefined : aud })
+	const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, env.JWT_AUD)
 
+	const sub = tokenSubject(payload)
 	const principals = identityPrincipals(env, payload, claim)
 
 	return {
-		sub: payload.sub,
+		sub: sub,
 		principals: principals,
 	}
 }
@@ -227,9 +334,14 @@ export const transformIdentityToken = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: string, ct
 
 		return identity
 	} catch (err) {
+		// a misconfigured CA is a server error, not a validation failure
+		if (err instanceof MissingAudienceError) {
+			logger(env).error(err.message, "in", "transformIdentityToken")
+			throw new InternalServerErrorException(err.message)
+		}
 		ctx.issues.push({
 			code: "custom",
-			message: err instanceof PrincipalsClaimError ? err.message : "problem parsing identity token",
+			message: err instanceof PrincipalsClaimError || err instanceof TokenClaimError ? err.message : "problem parsing identity token",
 			input: val
 		})
 		return z.NEVER
@@ -356,6 +468,51 @@ export const refineHostCertificateRequest = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: Pars
 	}
 }
 
+// characters that OpenSSH treats as pattern syntax when matching host
+// certificate principals, or that separate entries in a pattern list
+const HostPrincipalPatternChars = /[*?!,]/
+// whitespace and control characters, which no host name contains
+const HostPrincipalInvalidChars = /[\s\p{Cc}]/u
+
+/**
+ * Returns why a principal cannot be included on a host certificate, or
+ * undefined if it can be.
+ *
+ * OpenSSH matches the principals of a host certificate as patterns, so a
+ * principal such as `*` would make the certificate valid for every host that
+ * trusts the CA. Principals are otherwise not restricted, as hosts may be
+ * reached by IP address, bare host name or fully qualified domain name.
+ *
+ * @param principal The principal to check
+ * @returns The reason the principal cannot be used, or undefined if it can be
+ */
+export const hostPrincipalIssue = (principal: string): string | undefined => {
+	if (principal === "") {
+		return "host certificate principals must not be empty"
+	}
+
+	if (HostPrincipalPatternChars.test(principal)) {
+		return `host certificate principal ${JSON.stringify(principal)} must not contain wildcard or pattern characters (*, ?, ! or ,)`
+	}
+
+	if (HostPrincipalInvalidChars.test(principal)) {
+		return `host certificate principal ${JSON.stringify(principal)} must not contain whitespace or control characters`
+	}
+
+	return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refines a host certificate principal so only one allowed by
+ * {@link hostPrincipalIssue} is accepted.
+ */
+export const refineHostPrincipal = (val: string, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): void => {
+	const issue = hostPrincipalIssue(val)
+	if (issue !== undefined) {
+		fatalIssue(ctx, issue, val)
+	}
+}
+
 type ParsedHostCertificateRenewal = {
 	certificate: SshCertificate
 	proof: RenewalProofOfPossession
@@ -363,7 +520,8 @@ type ParsedHostCertificateRenewal = {
 
 /**
  * Checks a certificate presented for renewal was issued by this CA, is a host
- * certificate, is within its validity period and has not been revoked.
+ * certificate whose principals are allowed (see {@link hostPrincipalIssue}),
+ * is within its validity period and has not been revoked.
  *
  * @param env The CA bindings
  * @param isRevoked Returns whether a serial has been revoked
@@ -384,6 +542,22 @@ export const checkRenewableCertificate = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked: t
 		return "the provided certificate is not a host certificate"
 	}
 
+	// a certificate issued before small RSA keys were refused must not be
+	// renewed, as the renewal would keep its key
+	const keyIssue = subjectKeyIssue(certificate.publicKey)
+	if (keyIssue !== undefined) {
+		return `the provided certificate cannot be renewed: ${keyIssue}`
+	}
+
+	// a certificate issued before wildcard principals were refused must not
+	// be renewed, as the renewal would keep its principals
+	for (const principal of certificate.principals) {
+		const issue = hostPrincipalIssue(principal)
+		if (issue !== undefined) {
+			return `the provided certificate cannot be renewed: ${issue}`
+		}
+	}
+
 	// check certificate is within its validity period, allowing for clock
 	// skew at the start as a certificate issued moments ago may have a
 	// validity start up to a second in the future

package/src/verify.ts

@@ -3,23 +3,63 @@ import { CertificateRequestJWTPayload } from "./types.js"
 import type { SshCaBindings } from "./types.js"
 import { split } from "./utils.js"
 
-type VerifyOptions = {
-	aud?: string | string[]
+/**
+ * Thrown when no audience is configured for a token, as a token issued for
+ * any client of the IdP would otherwise be accepted.
+ */
+export class MissingAudienceError extends Error {
+	constructor(message: string) {
+		super(message)
+		this.name = "MissingAudienceError"
+
+		Object.setPrototypeOf(this, MissingAudienceError.prototype)
+	}
 }
 
-export const verifyJWT = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string, opts: VerifyOptions = {}) => {
-    const JWKS = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(env.JWT_JWKS_URL))
+type RemoteJWKSet = ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>
+
+// the remote JWKS for each URL, kept between requests so the keys that jose
+// caches are reused rather than fetched again for every token
+const remoteJWKSets = new Map<string, RemoteJWKSet>()
+
+/**
+ * Returns the remote JWKS for a URL, creating it on first use.
+ *
+ * jose caches the keys it fetches for up to 10 minutes and fetches them again
+ * sooner when a token is signed with a key it does not have, so keys rotated
+ * by the IdP are still picked up.
+ *
+ * @param url The URL of the JWKS
+ * @returns The remote JWKS for the URL
+ */
+const remoteJWKSet = (url: string): RemoteJWKSet => {
+	let jwks = remoteJWKSets.get(url)
+	if (jwks === undefined) {
+		jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(url))
+		remoteJWKSets.set(url, jwks)
+	}
+
+	return jwks
+}
 
-	if (opts.aud !== undefined) {
-		return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, JWKS, {
-			issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
-			algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
-			audience: opts.aud
-		})
+/**
+ * Verifies a JWT from the IdP, including that it was issued for one of the
+ * audiences given.
+ *
+ * @param env The CA bindings
+ * @param jwt The JWT to verify
+ * @param aud The audiences the JWT may be issued for, which must not be empty
+ * @throws {@link MissingAudienceError} when no audience is given
+ */
+export const verifyJWT = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string, aud: string | string[] | undefined) => {
+	const audience = split(aud)
+	if (audience.length === 0) {
+		throw new MissingAudienceError("no audience is configured for verifying tokens, set JWT_AUD")
 	}
 
-    return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, JWKS, {
-        issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
-        algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
-    })
+	return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, remoteJWKSet(env.JWT_JWKS_URL), {
+		issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
+		algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
+		audience: audience,
+	})
 }