@anchrd/intel-api 0.7.0 → 0.10.0

package/dist/agent-runtime/agent-runtime.types.d.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,19 @@ export interface AgentActor extends Actor {
     canRun: boolean;
 }
 export interface AgentRuntimeDeps {
+    /**
+     * The shared secret that proves a key handover came down this binding (D29, #207).
+     *
+     * ⚠️ The SAME value the agent Worker holds as `AGENT_HANDOVER_SECRET`, and it travels on exactly
+     * one route. It is not a substitute for the caller's bearer, which travels beside it: the bearer
+     * says who is asking, this says the request came through Intel at all. The runtime cannot check
+     * Intel's resource ACLs — it knows Gate and nothing about the tree — so without this a published
+     * runtime hostname would let anybody with `knowledge/write` write the key of any agent.
+     *
+     * Absent, `storeKey` refuses by name rather than dialling the binding and being refused there:
+     * the deployment is misconfigured, and saying so beats a 403 that reads like a permission problem.
+     */
+    handoverSecret?: string;
     /**
      * Absent where a deployment runs no agent Worker. Every call then refuses by name instead of
      * failing somewhere unreadable — a customer may deploy Intel without agents.
@@ -44,9 +57,61 @@ export interface ForwardInput {
     body?: string;
     signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
+/**
+ * One agent's Application key, on its way from Gate into the agent's Durable Object (D29, #207).
+ *
+ * ⚠️ It exists as a parameter and never as a field of anything stored. The value is in one local
+ * variable from the moment Gate answers until this call returns, exactly as it was before D29 — what
+ * changed is where it goes: into the runtime instead of into a response the browser reads.
+ */
+export interface StoreKeyInput {
+    /** The caller's own Gate bearer, passed on unchanged. Never a service key (D19). */
+    token: string;
+    agentId: string;
+    key: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Which agent's alarm has to be brought in line with the definition Intel just wrote (#214).
+ *
+ * ⚠️ It carries no schedules. The runtime re-reads the definition from Intel itself, with the
+ * agent's own token, so this is a "look again" and never a second copy of the document — a schedule
+ * pushed down this call would be one the agent could act on without it ever having been written.
+ */
+export interface SyncSchedulesInput {
+    /** The caller's own Gate bearer, passed on unchanged. Never a service key (D19). */
+    token: string;
+    agentId: string;
+}
 export interface AgentRuntimeService {
     /** The browser's way through: the runtime's answer, body and headers untouched. */
     forward(input: ForwardInput): Promise<Response>;
+    /**
+     * Hands an agent the key of the Gate Application it runs as.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ The one door here that does NOT ask `canRun`, and that is deliberate. Its two callers —
+     * creating an agent and rotating its key — have already decided who may act: `knowledge/create`
+     * with a writable parent, or `knowledge/write` with the resource ACL of the agent node. Requiring
+     * `agents/run` on top would mean a person who may create agents but never run one creates keyless
+     * agents, which is #200 arrived at from the other side. The runtime makes the same distinction at
+     * its own door.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ It fails loudly. A handover that quietly did not happen is an agent that exists, looks
+     * right, and dies at its first run — the whole failure this ticket removes.
+     */
+    storeKey(input: StoreKeyInput): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Arms the agent's alarm for whatever the definition Intel just wrote schedules (#214).
+     *
+     * ⚠️ Like `storeKey` and unlike everything else here, it does NOT ask `canRun`. Its two callers —
+     * creating an agent and saving its definition — have already decided who may act: `knowledge/
+     * create` with a writable parent, or `knowledge/write` with the resource ACL of the agent node.
+     * Requiring `agents/run` on top would mean an editor who may not drive agents saves a schedule
+     * that is never armed, which is the failure this exists to remove.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ It fails loudly, for the same reason `storeKey` does. A sync that quietly did not happen is
+     * an agent whose profile shows a schedule that will never fire.
+     */
+    syncSchedules(input: SyncSchedulesInput): Promise<void>;
     /** The same door for a caller that wants the answer, not the response — Intel MCP uses this. */
     request(input: ForwardInput): Promise<unknown>;
     /**

package/dist/bundle/bundle.js

@@ -915,6 +915,19 @@ export function createBundle(deps) {
                         }
                         const remapped = {
                             ...definition,
+                            /**
+                             * ⚠️ A delegation NEVER travels in a file (#208, D30). `tools.delegatedBy` names
+                             * whose portal connection an agent acts on, and the only thing that may write it is
+                             * a person saving the agent in a session Intel authorized — the save path proves
+                             * they reach every named server first. A bundle is a document somebody hands over;
+                             * carrying the field through would let a crafted file name a local user and hand an
+                             * imported agent that person's connection, with no act of theirs anywhere.
+                             *
+                             * The consequence is deliberate and mild: an imported agent arrives with no tools,
+                             * and whoever wants it to have some gives them in the profile — which is the same
+                             * act D30 made the only way in.
+                             */
+                            tools: null,
                             references: definition.references.map((reference) => idMap.has(reference.nodeId)
                                 ? { ...reference, nodeId: idMap.get(reference.nodeId) }
                                 : reference),

package/dist/http/http.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { AppendTableRowsInput, ArchiveFlowInput, ArchiveNodeInput, CancelFlowRunInput, CompleteFlowRunStepInput, CreateAgentInput, CreateFlowInput, CreateNodeInput, DefineTableInput, DeleteTableRowsInput, ExecuteToolInput, GetFlowInput, GetFlowRunInput, GetFlowVersionInput, GetNodeInput, GetNodeVersionInput, ListAgentsInput, ListFlowRunsInput, ListFlowsInput, ListNodesInput, NodeGraphInput, PreviewFlowPublishInput, PublishFlowInput, RedefineTableInput, RelationGraphInput, ResolveNodeLinksInput, RevokeGrantInput, SaveAgentDefinitionInput, SaveAttachmentInput, SaveFlowVersionInput, SaveNodeVersionInput, SearchInput, ShareInput, StartFlowRunInput, TestToolInput, UnpublishFlowInput, UpdateFlowInput, UpdateNodeInput, UpdateTableRowsInput, } from "@anchrd/intel-contract";
+import { AppendTableRowsInput, ArchiveFlowInput, ArchiveNodeInput, CancelFlowRunInput, CompleteFlowRunStepInput, CreateAgentInput, CreateFlowInput, CreateNodeInput, DefineTableInput, DeleteTableRowsInput, ExecuteToolInput, GetFlowInput, GetFlowRunInput, GetFlowVersionInput, GetNodeInput, GetNodeVersionInput, ListAgentsInput, ListFlowRunsInput, ListFlowsInput, ListNodesInput, NodeGraphInput, PreviewFlowPublishInput, PublishFlowInput, RedefineTableInput, RelationGraphInput, ResolveNodeLinksInput, RevokeGrantInput, RotateAgentKeyInput, SaveAgentDefinitionInput, SaveAttachmentInput, SaveFlowVersionInput, SaveNodeVersionInput, SearchInput, ShareInput, StartFlowRunInput, TestToolInput, UnpublishFlowInput, UpdateFlowInput, UpdateNodeInput, UpdateTableRowsInput, } from "@anchrd/intel-contract";
 import { Hono } from "hono";
 import { z } from "zod";
 import { authorizeBearer, bearer, permits, } from "../shared/gate-authorization/gate-authorization.js";
@@ -231,19 +231,34 @@ export function createHttp(deps) {
         return context.json(await deps.nodes.listAgents(asActor(auth), input));
     });
     /**
-     * ⚠️ The one response in Intel's HTTP surface that carries a credential (#182, D27).
+     * ⚠️ NO response in Intel's HTTP surface carries a credential any more (D29, #207).
      *
-     * `applicationKey` is the Gate Application key of the new agent, in plain text, exactly once —
-     * Gate issues it once and keeps only a hash, and Intel writes it nowhere. It belongs in the agent
-     * runtime's `AGENT_APPLICATION_KEYS` secret; the answer says so rather than assuming the caller
-     * knows. The caller's own bearer is what creates the principal, so this needs `applications:write`
-     * in Gate on top of `knowledge:create` in Intel.
+     * Creating an agent still mints its Gate Application with the caller's own bearer — so this needs
+     * `applications:write` in Gate on top of `knowledge:create` in Intel — but the key Gate issues
+     * once goes straight into the agent runtime over the service binding, inside this request. The
+     * answer is the same shape every agent read has. Until #207 it carried the key in plain text and
+     * a person had to put it into a Worker secret by hand, which is why an agent created here could
+     * never run (#200).
      */
     app.post("/nodes/agents", async (context) => {
         const auth = requireCapability(context, "knowledge", "create");
         const input = CreateAgentInput.parse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));
         return context.json(await deps.nodes.createAgent(asActor(auth), input, { token: context.get("token") }), 201);
     });
+    /**
+     * The repair path, and the only one an agent that lost its key has (D29, #207).
+     *
+     * ⚠️ `knowledge/write`, not `agents/run`. Which principal an agent acts as is a property of the
+     * agent, changed by whoever may change the agent; being allowed to press "Run now" is a different
+     * question and answers a different one. The resource ACL on the node is checked by the service.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ Before `/nodes/:nodeId`, like every other literal segment under `/nodes`.
+     */
+    app.post("/nodes/agents/:nodeId/rotate-key", async (context) => {
+        const auth = requireCapability(context, "knowledge", "write");
+        const input = RotateAgentKeyInput.parse({ nodeId: context.req.param("nodeId") });
+        return context.json(await deps.nodes.rotateAgentKey(asActor(auth), input, { token: context.get("token") }));
+    });
     // ⚠️ Before `/nodes/:nodeId`, or the router would read "export" as a node ID. The root has no
     // node to address, so the whole installation — as this caller may read it — exports here (#136).
     app.get("/nodes/export", async (context) => {
@@ -295,7 +310,9 @@ export function createHttp(deps) {
         if (input.nodeId !== context.req.param("nodeId")) {
             throw new IntelError(400, "node_id_mismatch", "Path and body node IDs differ");
         }
-        return context.json(await deps.nodes.saveAgentDefinition(asActor(auth), input), 201);
+        // ⚠️ The caller's own bearer travels on, like it does when an agent is created: writing a
+        // definition also arms what it schedules, and that call is made as the person saving (#214).
+        return context.json(await deps.nodes.saveAgentDefinition(asActor(auth), input, { token: context.get("token") }), 201);
     });
     app.get("/nodes/:nodeId/versions", async (context) => {
         const auth = requireCapability(context, "knowledge", "read");
@@ -673,6 +690,13 @@ export function createHttp(deps) {
         const auth = requireCapability(context, "tools", "read");
         return context.json(await deps.tools.catalog(asToolActor(auth)));
     });
+    // ⚠️ Registered before `/tools/test` and `/tools/execute` and behind `tools/read`, not a new
+    // capability: it answers strictly less than `/tools` does — the servers behind the same live
+    // list, with no schemas (D30).
+    app.get("/tools/servers", async (context) => {
+        const auth = requireCapability(context, "tools", "read");
+        return context.json(await deps.tools.servers(asToolActor(auth)));
+    });
     app.post("/tools/test", async (context) => {
         const auth = requireCapability(context, "tools", "test");
         const input = TestToolInput.parse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));

package/dist/mcp/mcp.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { AppendTableRowsInput, ArchiveFlowInput, ArchiveNodeInput, CancelFlowRunInput, CompleteFlowRunStepInput, CreateAgentInput, CreateFlowInput, CreateNodeInput, DefineTableInput, DeleteTableRowsInput, ExecuteToolInput, GetAgentInput, GetFlowInput, GetFlowRunInput, GetFlowVersionInput, GetNodeInput, GetNodeVersionInput, GetTableInput, IntelId, ListAgentsInput, ListFlowRunsInput, ListFlowsInput, ListGrantsInput, ListNodesInput, NodeGraphInput, PauseAgentInput, PreviewFlowPublishInput, PublishFlowInput, RedefineTableInput, RelationGraphInput, ResolveNodeLinksInput, RevokeGrantInput, RunAgentNowInput, SaveAgentDefinitionInput, SaveAttachmentInput, SaveFlowVersionInput, SaveNodeVersionInput, SearchInput, ShareInput, StartFlowRunInput, TestToolInput, UnpublishFlowInput, UpdateFlowInput, UpdateNodeInput, UpdateTableRowsInput, } from "@anchrd/intel-contract";
+import { AppendTableRowsInput, ArchiveFlowInput, ArchiveNodeInput, CancelFlowRunInput, CompleteFlowRunStepInput, CreateAgentInput, CreateFlowInput, CreateNodeInput, DefineTableInput, DeleteTableRowsInput, ExecuteToolInput, GetAgentInput, GetFlowInput, GetFlowRunInput, GetFlowVersionInput, GetNodeInput, GetNodeVersionInput, GetTableInput, IntelId, ListAgentsInput, ListFlowRunsInput, ListFlowsInput, ListGrantsInput, ListNodesInput, NodeGraphInput, PauseAgentInput, PreviewFlowPublishInput, PublishFlowInput, RedefineTableInput, RelationGraphInput, ResolveNodeLinksInput, RevokeGrantInput, RotateAgentKeyInput, RunAgentNowInput, SaveAgentDefinitionInput, SaveAttachmentInput, SaveFlowVersionInput, SaveNodeVersionInput, SearchInput, ShareInput, StartFlowRunInput, TestToolInput, UnpublishFlowInput, UpdateFlowInput, UpdateNodeInput, UpdateTableRowsInput, } from "@anchrd/intel-contract";
 import { McpServer, ResourceTemplate, } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
 import { WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/webStandardStreamableHttp.js";
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -342,19 +342,18 @@ export async function handleMcp(request, deps) {
             },
         }, async (input) => text(await deps.nodes.create(actor, input)));
         /**
-         * ⚠️ The ONE tool result in Intel that contains a secret, and it is a decision rather than an
-         * oversight (#182, D27). Everywhere else in this file a credential in a result would be a leak
-         * into model context; here the result IS the credential — Gate issues an Application key once
-         * and keeps only its hash, so a redacted answer would mean "an agent you can create but never
-         * run", and the same administrator would get less through MCP than through the browser. Gate
-         * made the identical exception for `application_create` (`anchrd/gate` GATE-75).
-         *
-         * The exception is this tool and nothing beside it: `agent_get`, `agent_list` and every node
-         * read answer with `applicationId` alone, which names the principal without authenticating it.
+         * ⚠️ There is no longer ANY tool result in Intel that contains a secret, and that is the whole
+         * of D29 seen from here. Until #207 this one tool answered with the Application key in plain
+         * text — a deliberate exception, because the result WAS the credential and a redacted answer
+         * would have meant "an agent you can create but never run". The exception is gone rather than
+         * weakened: the key now travels from Gate into the agent runtime over Intel's service binding
+         * inside this call, so there is nothing left to hand to a model. `agent_create`, `agent_get`,
+         * `agent_list` and every node read answer with `applicationId` alone, which names the principal
+         * without authenticating it.
          */
         server.registerTool("agent_create", {
             title: "Create agent",
-            description: "Create an agent node with its first definition, and the Gate application it runs as. The definition names nodes and their role, schedules and a model — never accounts, secrets or channels. The response carries the application key ONCE, in plain text: put it into the agent runtime's AGENT_APPLICATION_KEYS secret and store it nowhere else. A repeated idempotency key returns the existing agent with no key.",
+            description: "Create an agent node with its first definition, and the Gate application it runs as. The definition names nodes and their role, schedules and a model — never accounts, secrets or channels. The agent's application key is handed to the agent runtime internally and never appears in this result; the agent can run straight away. A repeated idempotency key returns the existing agent and mints nothing.",
             inputSchema: CreateAgentInput,
             annotations: {
                 title: "Create agent",
@@ -378,7 +377,29 @@ export async function handleMcp(request, deps) {
                 idempotentHint: true,
                 openWorldHint: false,
             },
-        }, async (input) => text(await deps.nodes.saveAgentDefinition(actor, input)));
+        }, async (input) => text(await deps.nodes.saveAgentDefinition(actor, input, { token: deps.bearer })));
+        /**
+         * The MCP half of the "Replace key" action in the agent profile (D29, #207).
+         *
+         * ⚠️ `knowledge/write` like `agent_update`, not `agents/run`: which principal an agent acts as
+         * is a property of the agent, changed by whoever may change the agent. And the result names the
+         * principal and the moment — never the key, which went to the runtime and nowhere else.
+         */
+        server.registerTool("agent_rotate_key", {
+            title: "Replace an agent's application key",
+            description: "Issue a new Gate application key for an agent and give it to the agent runtime. The previous key stops working immediately. Use it when a run fails with agent_key_missing, or when a key may have been exposed. The key itself is never returned.",
+            inputSchema: RotateAgentKeyInput,
+            annotations: {
+                title: "Replace an agent's application key",
+                readOnlyHint: false,
+                // The old key stops working the moment this runs, and anything still using it breaks.
+                destructiveHint: true,
+                // Asking twice issues twice, and the second answer invalidates the first key.
+                idempotentHint: false,
+                // The principal lives in Gate, which is a system outside Intel.
+                openWorldHint: true,
+            },
+        }, async (input) => text(await deps.nodes.rotateAgentKey(actor, input, { token: deps.bearer })));
         registerWithAlias(server, { name: "node_save", deprecated: "knowledge_save" }, {
             title: "Save node version",
             description: "Append an immutable content version using an optimistic base version.",
@@ -927,6 +948,21 @@ export async function handleMcp(request, deps) {
                 openWorldHint: false,
             },
         }, async () => text(await deps.tools.catalog(toolActor)));
+        // The MCP twin of the picker in the agent profile (D30): whole servers, so an agent can be
+        // given tools from a client instead of from the screen. Assigning and removing is
+        // `agent_update` — a delegation is a field of the definition, not a surface of its own.
+        server.registerTool("tools_servers_list", {
+            title: "List tool servers",
+            description: "List the MCP servers the calling user reaches through the portal, as the portal itself names them. These are the handles an agent definition may delegate.",
+            inputSchema: EmptyInput,
+            annotations: {
+                title: "List tool servers",
+                readOnlyHint: true,
+                destructiveHint: false,
+                idempotentHint: true,
+                openWorldHint: false,
+            },
+        }, async () => text(await deps.tools.servers(toolActor)));
     }
     if (permits(deps.authorization, "tools", "test")) {
         server.registerTool("tools_test", {

package/dist/nodes/nodes.js

@@ -327,6 +327,34 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
             throw new IntelError(500, "content_missing", "Version content is missing");
         return { node, version, definition: parseStoredDefinition(body), applicationId };
     }
+    /**
+     * The one place a caller's asked-for definition becomes the definition Intel stores (D30).
+     *
+     * ⚠️ `delegatedBy` is ADDED here, from the session, and could not have arrived any other way:
+     * `AgentDefinitionInput` has no field for it, so a body naming somebody else is a parse error at
+     * the boundary rather than a value this function has to remember to ignore. Adding it here is
+     * safe in exactly one direction — the writer must prove below that they reach every named server
+     * themselves, so the delegation can only ever move to somebody who already had it.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ The check is a live `tools/list` through the portal, before anything is written. A server the
+     * saver cannot reach is refused BY NAME — a silent drop would leave a person looking at a saved
+     * agent that quietly has one tool fewer than they picked.
+     */
+    async function delegationOf(actor, definition) {
+        const tools = definition.tools;
+        if (!tools)
+            return { ...definition, tools: null };
+        const servers = [...new Set(tools.servers)];
+        if (servers.length === 0) {
+            return { ...definition, tools: { delegatedBy: actor.id, servers: [] } };
+        }
+        const reachable = new Set(await deps.toolServers(actor));
+        const missing = servers.filter((server) => !reachable.has(server));
+        if (missing.length > 0) {
+            throw new IntelError(403, "tool_server_not_delegatable", `You do not reach these MCP servers, so you cannot delegate them: ${missing.join(", ")}`);
+        }
+        return { ...definition, tools: { delegatedBy: actor.id, servers } };
+    }
     /**
      * One immutable definition version, written exactly the way a document's content is (ADR-0005 §1).
      *
@@ -694,10 +722,12 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
          * would make the second write look like a replay of the first. A caller who repeats the
          * request gets the agent that already exists rather than a second one beside it.
          *
-         * ⚠️ A REPLAY MAKES NO SECOND APPLICATION and answers `applicationKey: null`. It still returns
-         * the agent that exists — that promise is not weakened — but a repeat that minted a fresh
-         * principal to fill the field would leave the installation with two machine accounts for one
-         * agent, one of which nobody would ever switch off. Gate is not asked at all on that path.
+         * ⚠️ A REPLAY MAKES NO SECOND APPLICATION. It still returns the agent that exists — that promise
+         * is not weakened — but a repeat that minted a fresh principal would leave the installation with
+         * two machine accounts for one agent, one of which nobody would ever switch off, and would
+         * replace a working agent's key with one it never asked for. Gate is not asked at all on that
+         * path, and no key travels either. What a replay DOES do is arm the agent's schedules again
+         * (#214) — that is idempotent, and it is the repair for a create whose arming failed.
          *
          * ⚠️ Gate is asked BEFORE anything is written, and that ordering IS the answer to "what if Gate
          * is down". Nothing exists yet at that moment, so a Gate that does not answer leaves no node, no
@@ -722,14 +752,21 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
             const definitionKey = `${input.idempotencyKey}:definition`;
             const existingId = await deps.repository.findIdempotentNode(actor.id, "node.create", input.idempotencyKey);
             if (existingId) {
-                return {
-                    ...(await agentOf(await requireVisible(actor, existingId))),
-                    applicationKey: null,
-                };
+                const existing = await agentOf(await requireVisible(actor, existingId));
+                // ⚠️ A replay arms as well, and that is what makes a create whose sync failed repairable
+                // (#214): repeating it with the same key mints nothing, returns this agent, and puts its
+                // alarm right. Without it the only repair left would be a fresh key — a second agent.
+                if ((existing.definition?.schedules.length ?? 0) > 0) {
+                    await deps.agentSchedules.sync({ token: caller.token, agentId: existing.node.id });
+                }
+                return existing;
             }
             if (input.parentId !== null && !(await deps.repository.can(actor, input.parentId, "write"))) {
                 throw new IntelError(403, "node_forbidden", "Parent folder cannot be edited");
             }
+            // Before Gate, for the same reason the runtime check is before Gate: a delegation the saver
+            // cannot back must not leave a machine principal behind for an agent that was never created.
+            const definition = await delegationOf(actor, input.definition);
             const nodeId = deps.id();
             // The Application's name is what a person reads in Gate's list, so it has to be enough to
             // recognise the agent by. Title alone would leave two agents called "Research" indis-
@@ -738,6 +775,22 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
                 token: caller.token,
                 name: `Intel agent ${input.title} (${nodeId})`,
             });
+            // ⚠️ The handover happens BEFORE the node is written, for the same reason Gate is asked before
+            // it: at this moment nothing exists on Intel's side, so a runtime that does not take the key
+            // leaves no node, no version, no R2 object and no audit event — the agent simply does not come
+            // into being and the caller repeats the request. The other order would produce exactly the
+            // agent #200 is about: a node that looks finished and dies at its first run. What it can leave
+            // behind is a Durable Object holding a key for a node id that will never exist, which is
+            // ciphertext nobody can address — ULIDs are not reused.
+            try {
+                await deps.agentKeys.store({ token: caller.token, agentId: nodeId, key: application.key });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                await deps.applications
+                    .setEnabled({ token: caller.token, applicationId: application.id, enabled: false })
+                    .catch(() => undefined);
+                throw error;
+            }
             const timestamp = deps.now().toISOString();
             let node;
             try {
@@ -766,21 +819,95 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
                     .catch(() => undefined);
                 throw error;
             }
-            const agent = await writeAgentVersion(actor, node, input.definition, null, definitionKey);
-            return {
-                ...agent,
-                // ⚠️ The one place a credential is put into an answer, and it is assembled here rather than
-                // carried around: `application.key` has been in one local variable since Gate returned it
-                // and reaches no store, no audit row and no log on the way (D27).
-                applicationKey: {
-                    agentId: node.id,
-                    applicationId: application.id,
-                    key: application.key,
-                    notice: "This key is shown once. Add it to the agent runtime's AGENT_APPLICATION_KEYS secret as { agentId, key } — the whole list, not just this entry — and store it nowhere else. Intel keeps only the application ID; Gate keeps only a hash.",
-                },
-            };
+            // ⚠️ No key in the answer, and no field one could travel in (D29). `application.key` has been
+            // in one local variable since Gate returned it, went into the runtime, and is out of reach of
+            // every surface above this line.
+            const created = (await writeAgentVersion(actor, node, definition, null, definitionKey));
+            /**
+             * ⚠️ Only when this definition actually schedules something — unlike the save below, which
+             * arms unconditionally. A brand-new agent has no earlier definition, so there is no alarm that
+             * could be left standing: no schedules means there is nothing to arm and nothing to clear, and
+             * the screen creates every agent that way (the profile is where schedules are added).
+             *
+             * ⚠️ It fails loudly, and the agent stays. Everything is written by now and nothing here can
+             * roll an agent back, so the caller is told the one thing they can act on: the schedules are
+             * not armed. The repair is repeating the create with the SAME idempotency key — which returns
+             * this agent, mints no second Application, and arms it. A fresh key would create a second
+             * agent beside this one, which is why the message says "again" and not "retry".
+             */
+            if (definition.schedules.length > 0) {
+                await deps.agentSchedules.sync({ token: caller.token, agentId: node.id });
+            }
+            return created;
         },
-        async saveAgentDefinition(actor, input) {
+        /**
+         * A new key for the Application this agent runs as, handed straight to the runtime (D29, #207).
+         *
+         * ⚠️ A write on the agent node, not a run: `knowledge/write` at the door and the resource ACL
+         * here. Whoever may change what an agent does may change which key it does it with; being
+         * allowed to press "Run now" says nothing about being allowed to decide its principal.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ Gate first, runtime second, and nothing in between. Gate issues the replacement before it
+         * revokes the old one, so a rotation that fails at Gate changes nothing at all; one that fails
+         * at the handover leaves the agent with a key it no longer has — named, repairable, and fixed by
+         * rotating again. The alternative order cannot exist: the runtime has nothing to store until
+         * Gate has answered.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ The key is in one local variable and in no answer. This is the operation that exists BECAUSE
+         * Gate hands a key out exactly once — reading one back is not something any repair can do.
+         */
+        async rotateAgentKey(actor, input, caller) {
+            const node = await requireVisible(actor, input.nodeId);
+            if (node.kind !== "agent") {
+                throw new IntelError(409, "not_an_agent", "Only agents have an application key");
+            }
+            if (!(await deps.repository.can(actor, node.id, "write"))) {
+                throw new IntelError(403, "node_forbidden", "This agent cannot be edited");
+            }
+            if (!deps.agentRuntimeAvailable()) {
+                throw new IntelError(503, "agent_runtime_not_configured", "This installation has no agent runtime, so there is nothing to give a key to");
+            }
+            const applicationId = await deps.repository.agentApplicationId(node.id);
+            if (applicationId === null) {
+                // An agent written before #182, restored from a bundle, or imported. Giving it a principal
+                // is an act in Gate, and inventing one here would make Intel the author of a machine
+                // account nobody asked for.
+                throw new IntelError(409, "agent_application_missing", "This agent has no Gate application, so there is no key to replace");
+            }
+            const rotated = await deps.applications.rotateKey({ token: caller.token, applicationId });
+            await deps.agentKeys.store({ token: caller.token, agentId: node.id, key: rotated.key });
+            const rotatedAt = deps.now().toISOString();
+            // ⚠️ Written LAST, and only once both sides took the change. An event ahead of the runtime
+            // would record a rotation that may not have arrived, and this row is the only trace the act
+            // leaves in Intel — nothing about the node itself changes, so a reader who diffed versions
+            // would see an agent that silently began acting with a different credential.
+            await deps.repository.recordAgentKeyRotation({
+                auditId: deps.id(),
+                actorId: actor.id,
+                nodeId: node.id,
+                applicationId,
+                occurredAt: rotatedAt,
+            });
+            return { nodeId: node.id, applicationId, rotatedAt };
+        },
+        /**
+         * A new definition version, and the alarm that has to match it (#214).
+         *
+         * ⚠️ The runtime is told to re-arm after EVERY definition write, not only after one that names a
+         * schedule. The alternative — comparing against the definition that was there before — needs the
+         * previous document read back out of R2, and it is wrong in exactly the direction that matters:
+         * a save that removes the LAST schedule has nothing to compare against in the new definition and
+         * is precisely the write that has to clear the alarm. One binding call per save buys the rule
+         * "what is written is what is armed" without a comparison anybody could get backwards.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ Written first, armed second, and the definition STAYS when the arming fails. It has to: the
+         * runtime reads the definition back out of Intel to arm it, so there is no order in which it
+         * could be armed before it exists. What the caller gets instead of silence is
+         * `agent_schedules_not_armed` — the version is in the history, the profile shows it, and saving
+         * again arms it. Rolling the version back would be worse than the unarmed alarm: it would throw
+         * away an edit somebody made because a Worker was briefly unreachable.
+         */
+        async saveAgentDefinition(actor, input, caller) {
             const existingId = await deps.repository.findIdempotentNode(actor.id, "node.save", input.idempotencyKey);
             if (existingId)
                 return await agentOf(await requireVisible(actor, input.nodeId));
@@ -794,7 +921,9 @@ export function createNodes(deps) {
             if (node.currentVersionId !== input.baseVersionId) {
                 throw new IntelError(409, "version_conflict", "A newer version already exists");
             }
-            return await writeAgentVersion(actor, node, input.definition, input.baseVersionId, input.idempotencyKey);
+            const saved = await writeAgentVersion(actor, node, await delegationOf(actor, input.definition), input.baseVersionId, input.idempotencyKey);
+            await deps.agentSchedules.sync({ token: caller.token, agentId: node.id });
+            return saved;
         },
         async saveAttachment(actor, input) {
             const existingId = await deps.repository.findIdempotentNode(actor.id, "node.save", input.idempotencyKey);