@amsterdamdatalabs/adl-agent-control-linux-x64 0.1.9 → 0.1.12

package/packages/azdo/src/azdo-repo-doctor.ts

@@ -85,13 +85,24 @@
  * as its own finding. checkBuildServiceCanRelease() answers one narrow
  * question directly, per the real failure above: can the identity that
  * ACTUALLY RUNS THE PIPELINE (repo scope) push a `***NO_CI***` bump commit
- * to `integration` (GenericContribute), bypass `integration`'s own policies
- * while doing so (PolicyExempt), and create/update the `integration -> main`
- * PR and set auto-complete (PullRequestContribute) — and it FAILS loudly,
+ * to the PR's source (feature) branch (GenericContribute), and create/update
+ * the `integration -> main` PR and set auto-complete
+ * (PullRequestContribute) — and it FAILS loudly,
  * naming the permission, the identity's display name and the fix path, on
  * any of: the permission not effectively allowed, the identity not
  * resolvable, or the ACL itself not readable by the calling agent.
  *
+ * New release flow (Tarun, 2026-09-30): the CI pipeline runs on PRs into
+ * `integration` and its stage 1 pushes the version bump to the PR's SOURCE
+ * (feature) branch; a promote pipeline on `integration` pushes only opens the
+ * `integration -> main` PR; a CD pipeline runs on pushes to `main`. Nothing
+ * pushes directly to `integration` any more, so (a) the build service no
+ * longer needs PolicyExempt on `integration` — and, by least privilege,
+ * having it there is drift; (b) the release-identity check no longer needs
+ * PolicyExempt; (c) the promotion PR gets NO build validation (Tarun's
+ * approval is the only gate; CD runs after the merge), so `main` no longer
+ * requires a build-validation policy and an enabled one is drift.
+ *
  * Policy type GUIDs (verified against the azure-devops-cli-extension source,
  * packages/repo-controls already hardcodes the first three the same way):
  *   minimum reviewers   fa4e907d-c16b-4a4c-9dfa-4906e5d171dd
@@ -178,7 +189,11 @@ export const REPO_STANDARD = {
     forbiddenReviewerPolicies: [POLICY_TYPE.requiredReviewers] as const,
     mergeStrategy: { allowSquash: false, allowRebase: false, allowRebaseMerge: false, allowNoFastForward: true },
     commentRequirementsRequired: true,
-    buildValidationRequiredWhenPipelineExists: true,
+    // Tarun, 2026-09-30, new release flow: the integration -> main promotion
+    // PR must NOT run a build (Tarun's approval is the only gate; the CD
+    // pipeline runs after the merge, on pushes to main). An ENABLED build
+    // policy on main is drift (`main.build-validation-present`).
+    buildValidationForbidden: true,
   },
   // One table for every effective-permission expectation this checker reads
   // via the Git Repositories security namespace ACL, so the standard never
@@ -216,9 +231,13 @@ export const REPO_STANDARD = {
      * — Tarun, 2026-09-27, cross-checked against
      * /Users/tarunrana/Documents/ADL-ISMS-Policies/.scratchpad/ci_build_service_grant.py,
      * which grants exactly these bits on adl-agent-control). CI needs to push
-     * and complete PRs on the repo, and needs PolicyExempt only on
-     * `integration` (so a version-bump commit made by CI itself is not
-     * blocked by its own policies) — never on `main`.
+     * and complete PRs on the repo (Contribute is also what the version-bump
+     * push to the PR's SOURCE feature branch needs — Tarun, 2026-09-30, new
+     * release flow). It needs PolicyExempt NOWHERE: nothing pushes directly to
+     * `integration` any more (the bump lands on the feature branch), so
+     * PolicyExempt on `integration` is no longer required and, by least
+     * privilege, is drift (`permissions.build-service.has-policyExempt-integration`);
+     * never on `main` either (existing rule).
      *
      * NOT forcePush (Tarun, 2026-09-30): the bump is a plain fast-forward
      * `git push origin HEAD:integration`; agent-identities' build service has
@@ -229,33 +248,28 @@ export const REPO_STANDARD = {
       repo: { allow: ["genericContribute", "pullRequestContribute"] } as {
         allow: readonly PermissionBitName[];
       },
-      integrationRef: { allow: ["policyExempt"] } as { allow: readonly PermissionBitName[] },
+      integrationRef: { deny: ["policyExempt"] } as { deny: readonly PermissionBitName[] },
       mainRef: { deny: ["policyExempt"] } as { deny: readonly PermissionBitName[] },
     },
     /**
      * checkBuildServiceCanRelease() (file header, "checkBuildServiceCanRelease()"):
-     * the exact three permissions the release flow needs from whichever
-     * build service identity actually runs the pipeline — the real failure
-     * this check exists for was a 403 on `pullRequestContribute`.
+     * the permissions the release flow needs from whichever build service
+     * identity actually runs the pipeline — the real failure this check
+     * exists for was a 403 on `pullRequestContribute`.
      *
-     * `policyExempt` ("Bypass policies when pushing") is checked at the
-     * `integration` REF token, never the repo-scope token — verified live
-     * 2026-09-30 against adl-agent-control: the Infrastructure-AzDo Build
-     * Service demonstrably bypassed `integration`'s own policies to push
-     * `chore: bump version 0.1.6 to 0.1.7 ***NO_CI***` (c966e6a) straight to
-     * that protected branch, yet its repo-scope effective allow bitmask
-     * (16430) does not include PolicyExempt (128) at all — only its
-     * `refs/heads/integration`-scope effective allow (16558) does. Checking
-     * `policyExempt` at repo scope produced a false
-     * `permissions.release.<slug>.missing-policyExempt` finding that
-     * contradicted this observed reality. `genericContribute` and
-     * `pullRequestContribute` stay checked at repo scope — both bits ARE
-     * present there for real, and PR operations are a repo-level, not
-     * branch-level, permission.
+     * `policyExempt` ("Bypass policies when pushing") is NOT required any
+     * more (Tarun, 2026-09-30, new release flow): the version bump now lands
+     * on the PR's SOURCE (feature) branch, not on `integration`, so nothing
+     * needs to bypass `integration`'s policies. (History: it used to be
+     * checked at the `integration` REF token, never repo scope — verified
+     * live 2026-09-30 against adl-agent-control, where the build service
+     * pushed `chore: bump version 0.1.6 to 0.1.7 ***NO_CI***` (c966e6a)
+     * straight to `integration`.) `genericContribute` (the bump push to the
+     * feature branch) and `pullRequestContribute` stay checked at repo scope
+     * — PR operations are a repo-level, not branch-level, permission.
      */
     buildServiceRelease: {
       repoScoped: ["genericContribute", "pullRequestContribute"] as const,
-      integrationRefScoped: ["policyExempt"] as const,
     },
   },
 } as const;
@@ -518,11 +532,7 @@ function checkMainMergeStrategy(policies: readonly PolicyConfiguration[], drifts
   });
 }
 
-function checkMainCommentsAndBuild(
-  policies: readonly PolicyConfiguration[],
-  hasPipeline: boolean,
-  drifts: RepoDoctorDrift[],
-): void {
+function checkMainCommentsAndBuild(policies: readonly PolicyConfiguration[], drifts: RepoDoctorDrift[]): void {
   const comments = enabledPolicyOfType(policies, POLICY_TYPE.commentRequirements);
   if (!comments) {
     drifts.push({
@@ -531,21 +541,27 @@ function checkMainCommentsAndBuild(
     });
   }
 
-  if (!hasPipeline) return;
+  // Tarun, 2026-09-30, new release flow: the promotion PR must not run a
+  // build — main no longer requires build validation, and an enabled one is
+  // drift (regardless of whether a pipeline exists).
   const build = enabledPolicyOfType(policies, POLICY_TYPE.build);
-  if (!build) drifts.push({ id: "main.build-validation-missing", message: "missing build validation" });
+  if (build) {
+    drifts.push({
+      id: "main.build-validation-present",
+      message: `main has an enabled build-validation policy (#${build.id}); the promotion PR must not run a build (CD runs after merge) — Tarun's approval is the only gate`,
+    });
+  }
 }
 
 function checkMainPolicies(
   policies: readonly PolicyConfiguration[],
-  hasPipeline: boolean,
   strictMainBranchRules: boolean,
   drifts: RepoDoctorDrift[],
 ): void {
   checkMainRequiredReviewer(policies, drifts);
   checkMainMinimumReviewers(policies, strictMainBranchRules, drifts);
   checkMainMergeStrategy(policies, drifts);
-  checkMainCommentsAndBuild(policies, hasPipeline, drifts);
+  checkMainCommentsAndBuild(policies, drifts);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -823,10 +839,11 @@ async function resolveBuildServiceDescriptor(namespaceId: string, projectId: str
 }
 
 /**
- * CI needs to push and complete PRs on the repo itself, and needs to bypass
- * policy only on `integration` (so its own version-bump commit is not
- * blocked by the very policies it satisfies) — never on `main`, where a
- * bypass would defeat the human-reviewer gate entirely.
+ * CI needs to push (the version bump to the PR's source branch) and complete
+ * PRs on the repo itself. It needs to bypass policy NOWHERE (Tarun,
+ * 2026-09-30, new release flow: nothing pushes directly to `integration`
+ * any more, so PolicyExempt there is drift; on `main` a bypass would defeat
+ * the human-reviewer gate entirely).
  */
 async function checkBuildServicePermissions(
   namespaceId: string,
@@ -885,11 +902,14 @@ async function checkBuildServicePermissions(
     drifts,
   );
   if (integrationEffective) {
-    for (const bitName of REPO_STANDARD.permissions.buildService.integrationRef.allow) {
-      if ((effectiveAllowBits(integrationEffective) & GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_BIT[bitName]) === 0) {
+    // Tarun, 2026-09-30, new release flow: nothing pushes directly to
+    // integration any more, so PolicyExempt there is no longer required and
+    // is flagged when effectively allowed (least privilege).
+    for (const bitName of REPO_STANDARD.permissions.buildService.integrationRef.deny) {
+      if ((effectiveAllowBits(integrationEffective) & GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_BIT[bitName]) !== 0) {
         drifts.push({
-          id: `permissions.build-service.missing-${bitName}-integration`,
-          message: `the project build service does not effectively have ${bitName} on refs/heads/integration`,
+          id: `permissions.build-service.has-${bitName}-integration`,
+          message: `the project build service effectively has ${bitName} on refs/heads/integration, which the standard forbids (nothing pushes directly to integration; the version bump lands on the PR's source branch)`,
         });
       }
     }
@@ -941,16 +961,6 @@ function releaseFixPath(repository: string, identityDisplayName: string, bitName
   return `Project settings → Repositories → \`${repository}\` → Security → \`${identityDisplayName}\` → \`${GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_UI_LABEL[bitName]}\` = Allow`;
 }
 
-/** Same as releaseFixPath() but for a bit that is granted per-BRANCH (verified live 2026-09-30: PolicyExempt on this org's build service lives on refs/heads/integration's own security page, never the repo-root one). */
-function releaseFixPathForRef(
-  repository: string,
-  ref: string,
-  identityDisplayName: string,
-  bitName: PermissionBitName,
-): string {
-  return `Repos → \`${repository}\` → Branches → \`${ref}\` → ⋯ → Branch security → \`${identityDisplayName}\` → \`${GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_UI_LABEL[bitName]}\` = Allow`;
-}
-
 /**
  * Which build service identity actually runs the pipeline, per Build —
  * General Settings — Get's `enforceJobAuthScope` (file header) — "Limit job
@@ -973,12 +983,10 @@ async function fetchEnforceJobAuthScope(c: AdoClient): Promise<boolean | undefin
 /**
  * One identity's answer to "can it release": resolve its descriptor by exact
  * display name (Identities — Read Identities, file header), then check
- * `buildServiceRelease.repoScoped` on the repository token AND
- * `buildServiceRelease.integrationRefScoped` on the `integration` ref token
- * — NOT the same token for all three (see REPO_STANDARD.permissions.
- * buildServiceRelease's own doc comment: PolicyExempt is a per-BRANCH grant
- * in this org, verified live against real bypass-on-push evidence, and
- * checking it at repo scope produced a false "missing" finding). Every
+ * `buildServiceRelease.repoScoped` on the repository token. PolicyExempt is
+ * no longer part of what a release needs (Tarun, 2026-09-30, new release
+ * flow: the bump lands on the PR's source branch, not on integration — see
+ * REPO_STANDARD.permissions.buildServiceRelease's own doc comment). Every
  * failure mode is its own loud, distinct drift — an unresolvable identity,
  * an ACL the calling agent cannot read, and each missing permission named
  * with its fix path — never a silent pass.
@@ -986,7 +994,6 @@ async function fetchEnforceJobAuthScope(c: AdoClient): Promise<boolean | undefin
 async function checkOneBuildServiceCanRelease(
   namespaceId: string,
   repoToken: string,
-  integrationRefToken: string,
   repository: string,
   displayName: string,
   drifts: RepoDoctorDrift[],
@@ -1013,8 +1020,7 @@ async function checkOneBuildServiceCanRelease(
   }
 
   // LOW, independent review 2026-09-30: name WHICH token failed — "the ACL"
-  // alone left a human unable to tell a repo-scope 403 from a
-  // refs/heads/integration-scope one without re-running this by hand.
+  // alone left a human unable to tell which token's read 403'd.
   async function effectiveAt(token: string, tokenLabel: string): Promise<{ allow: number; deny: number } | undefined> {
     let effective: EffectivePermissionsResult;
     try {
@@ -1039,16 +1045,6 @@ async function checkOneBuildServiceCanRelease(
       message: `'${displayName}' does not effectively have ${GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_UI_LABEL[bitName]} on '${repository}' — the release pipeline will 403 the way agent-identities build 4897 did. Fix: ${releaseFixPath(repository, displayName, bitName)}`,
     });
   }
-
-  const integrationEffective = await effectiveAt(integrationRefToken, "refs/heads/integration");
-  if (!integrationEffective) return;
-  for (const bitName of REPO_STANDARD.permissions.buildServiceRelease.integrationRefScoped) {
-    if ((effectiveAllowBits(integrationEffective) & GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_BIT[bitName]) !== 0) continue;
-    drifts.push({
-      id: `permissions.release.${slug}.missing-${bitName}`,
-      message: `'${displayName}' does not effectively have ${GIT_REPO_PERMISSION_UI_LABEL[bitName]} on 'refs/heads/integration' of '${repository}' — its own version-bump commit would be blocked by integration's own policies. Fix: ${releaseFixPathForRef(repository, "integration", displayName, bitName)}`,
-    });
-  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1079,9 +1075,8 @@ async function checkBuildServiceCanRelease(
         : [projectScoped, collectionScoped];
 
   const repoToken = `repoV2/${projectId}/${repositoryId}`;
-  const integrationRefToken = `${repoToken}/refs/heads/${refNameHexUtf16Le("integration")}`;
   for (const displayName of displayNames) {
-    await checkOneBuildServiceCanRelease(namespaceId, repoToken, integrationRefToken, repository, displayName, drifts);
+    await checkOneBuildServiceCanRelease(namespaceId, repoToken, repository, displayName, drifts);
   }
 }
 
@@ -1140,7 +1135,7 @@ export async function repoDoctorCheck(options: RepoDoctorOptions = {}): Promise<
   const integrationPolicies = await fetchBranchPolicies(c, repositoryId, "integration");
   const mainPolicies = await fetchBranchPolicies(c, repositoryId, "main");
   checkIntegrationPolicies(integrationPolicies, hasPipeline, drifts);
-  checkMainPolicies(mainPolicies, hasPipeline, strictMainBranchRules, drifts);
+  checkMainPolicies(mainPolicies, strictMainBranchRules, drifts);
 
   await checkAgentPermissions(projectId, repositoryId, strictMainBranchRules, drifts);
   await checkBuildServicePermissions(

package/packages/fleet/manifest.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
     "schema": 1,
     "repository": "https://dev.azure.com/amsterdamdatalabs/Infrastructure-AzDo/_git/adl-agent-control",
     "branch": "main",
-    "interval_seconds": 21600,
+    "interval_seconds": 43200,
     "update_policy": "latest-stable",
     "allow_major_updates": true,
     "remove_deleted_entries": true,
@@ -33,12 +33,6 @@
     "git_global_config": {
       "lfs.ssh://ssh.dev.azure.com/.sshtransfer": "never",
       "lfs.https://ssh.dev.azure.com/.locksverify": "false"
-    },
-    "azure_agents": {
-      "organization": "amsterdamdatalabs",
-      "pool_id": 1,
-      "coordinator": "hostinger-vps-1",
-      "enabled_agents": ["mac-m5-ci", "hostinger-vps-1-agent-1", "hostinger-vps-1-agent-2"]
     }
   },
   "mac": {
@@ -70,21 +64,6 @@
         "shfmt": {"manager": "brew", "package": "shfmt", "executable": "shfmt"},
         "uv": {"manager": "brew", "package": "uv", "executable": "uv"},
         "yq": {"manager": "brew", "package": "yq", "executable": "yq"}
-      },
-      "launch_agents": {
-        "git-maintain": {
-          "label": "com.adl.git-maintain",
-          "source": "packages/fleet/jobs/git-maintain",
-          "entry": "src/main.ts",
-          "start_interval_seconds": 86400,
-          "run_at_load": true,
-          "repo_scope": {"root": "Documents", "glob": "*", "recursive": true},
-          "environment": {
-            "PATH": "/usr/local/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
-          },
-          "log": "Library/Logs/adl/git-maintain.log",
-          "replaces": [".local/bin/git-maintain.sh"]
-        }
       }
     },
     "devices": {
@@ -94,6 +73,7 @@
         "home": "/Users/tarunrana",
         "minimum_free_gib": 20,
         "schedule_minute": 5,
+        "repo_location": "/Users/tarunrana/Documents/Repos",
         "brew_upgrade_all": true,
         "surface_clis": [
           {"name": "claude", "manager": "native", "command": "claude", "update_args": ["update"]},
@@ -114,6 +94,7 @@
         "home": "/Users/ranahome",
         "minimum_free_gib": 20,
         "schedule_minute": 35,
+        "repo_location": "/Users/ranahome/Documents",
         "brew_upgrade_all": true,
         "surface_clis": [
           {"name": "claude", "manager": "native", "command": "claude", "update_args": ["update"]},
@@ -169,7 +150,7 @@
         "minimum_free_gib": 25,
         "schedule_minute": 50,
         "scratch_repos": ["/root/enact-webview"],
-        "git_maintain_repos": ["/opt/adl-azdo"],
+        "repo_location": "/root/workspace",
         "brew_upgrade_all": true,
         "surface_clis": [
           {"name": "claude", "manager": "native", "command": "claude", "update_args": ["update"]},
@@ -190,7 +171,7 @@
         "minimum_free_gib": 25,
         "schedule_minute": 20,
         "scratch_repos": ["/root/enact-webview"],
-        "git_maintain_repos": ["/opt/adl-azdo"],
+        "repo_location": "/root/workspace",
         "brew_upgrade_all": true,
         "surface_clis": [
           {"name": "opencode", "manager": "npm", "command": "opencode", "update_args": ["upgrade"]},

package/packages/fleet/manifest.schema.json

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
   "properties": {
     "config": {
       "type": "object",
-      "required": ["schema", "repository", "branch", "interval_seconds", "update_policy", "allow_major_updates", "remove_deleted_entries", "global_surface_sweep", "kimi_hooks", "surface_policy", "global_agents", "vscode_settings", "scratch_reap", "protected_tools", "git_global_config", "azure_agents"],
+      "required": ["schema", "repository", "branch", "interval_seconds", "update_policy", "allow_major_updates", "remove_deleted_entries", "global_surface_sweep", "kimi_hooks", "surface_policy", "global_agents", "vscode_settings", "scratch_reap", "protected_tools", "git_global_config"],
       "properties": {
         "global_surface_sweep": {
           "type": "object",
@@ -72,20 +72,8 @@
         }
       }
     },
-    "mac": {
-      "allOf": [{"$ref": "#/$defs/platform"}],
-      "properties": {
-        "common": {"properties": {"launch_agents": {"$ref": "#/$defs/launch_agents"}}},
-        "devices": {"additionalProperties": {"properties": {"launch_agents": {"$ref": "#/$defs/launch_agents"}}}}
-      }
-    },
-    "linux": {
-      "allOf": [{"$ref": "#/$defs/platform"}],
-      "properties": {
-        "common": {"not": {"required": ["launch_agents"]}},
-        "devices": {"additionalProperties": {"not": {"required": ["launch_agents"]}}}
-      }
-    }
+    "mac": {"$ref": "#/$defs/platform"},
+    "linux": {"$ref": "#/$defs/platform"}
   },
   "$defs": {
     "tool": {
@@ -157,7 +145,6 @@
       "type": "object",
       "additionalProperties": {"$ref": "#/$defs/tool"}
     },
-    "relative_path": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^(?!/)(?!.*(^|/)\\.\\.(/|$)).+$"},
     "surface_cli": {
       "type": "object",
       "additionalProperties": false,
@@ -197,46 +184,13 @@
         }
       ]
     },
-    "launch_agent": {
-      "type": "object",
-      "additionalProperties": false,
-      "required": ["label", "source", "entry", "start_interval_seconds", "run_at_load", "environment", "log"],
-      "properties": {
-        "label": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$"},
-        "source": {"$ref": "#/$defs/relative_path", "description": "Checkout-relative job directory; reconcile compiles it to a dedicated signed binary, rebuilt when its content hash changes."},
-        "entry": {"$ref": "#/$defs/relative_path", "description": "TypeScript entry file relative to source."},
-        "start_interval_seconds": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 60},
-        "run_at_load": {"type": "boolean"},
-        "repo_scope": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "additionalProperties": false,
-          "required": ["root", "glob", "recursive"],
-          "properties": {
-            "root": {"$ref": "#/$defs/relative_path", "description": "Repository scan root relative to the device administrator's home."},
-            "glob": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
-            "recursive": {"const": true}
-          }
-        },
-        "environment": {
-          "type": "object",
-          "propertyNames": {"pattern": "^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$"},
-          "additionalProperties": {"type": "string"}
-        },
-        "log": {"$ref": "#/$defs/relative_path"},
-        "replaces": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/$defs/relative_path"}}
-      }
-    },
-    "launch_agents": {
-      "description": "User LaunchAgents enact-vps installs for the device administrator (macOS only).",
-      "type": "object",
-      "additionalProperties": {"$ref": "#/$defs/launch_agent"}
-    },
     "platform": {
       "type": "object",
       "required": ["common", "devices"],
       "properties": {
         "common": {
           "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
           "required": ["tools"],
           "properties": {
             "os_upgrade": {"type": "boolean"},
@@ -274,14 +228,10 @@
                 "items": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^/[^\\s]*[^/\\s]$"},
                 "uniqueItems": true
               },
-              "git_maintain_repos": {
-                "type": "array",
-                "description": "An explicit, closed list of repositories bin/reconcile passes to git-maintain's --repo argv, for a device whose enrolled checkout sits at a fixed path outside any device's home (the Linux VPSes' /opt/adl-azdo) rather than under a recursively-scanned ~/Documents. Never a scan root: each entry is one exact repository path, so this can never walk into an unrelated directory the way scanning a shared parent like /opt could. Case-insensitive azagent/vsts.agent ban: git-maintain itself refuses the same names again, by realpath too, at the point of actual use.",
-                "items": {
-                  "type": "string",
-                  "pattern": "^/(?!$)(?!.*\\s)(?!.*/$)(?!.*\\.\\.)(?!.*[aA][zZ][aA][gG][eE][nN][tT])(?!.*[vV][sS][tT][sS]\\.[aA][gG][eE][nN][tT]).+$"
-                },
-                "uniqueItems": true
+              "repo_location": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "One absolute directory on this host. `adl reconcile` maintains (fetch --prune, fast-forward integration and main, safe branch prune, then `adl install --repo`) every IMMEDIATE child of it that carries adl-config.toml and is a git top-level, as the device administrator. It is the entire scope of that step: nothing outside it is scanned or touched, and a child that resolves outside it is refused. A missing or unreadable location fails the run; a host that declares none skips the step with a log line. The case-insensitive azagent/vsts.agent ban keeps it away from Azure Pipelines agent installs (JSON Schema `pattern` has no case-insensitive flag, so the classes are spelled out).",
+                "pattern": "^/(?!$)(?!.*\\s)(?!.*/$)(?!.*\\.\\.)(?!.*[aA][zZ][aA][gG][eE][nN][tT])(?!.*[vV][sS][tT][sS]\\.[aA][gG][eE][nN][tT]).+$"
               },
               "tools": {"$ref": "#/$defs/tools"}
             }

package/packages/fleet/src/install-embedding-model.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * bytes because they merely arrived over HTTPS. `revision` is then recorded
  * in the installed `manifest.json` so the next run can skip the rebuild
  * (network round-trip to resolve latest + a local file read) instead of
- * re-downloading and re-verifying multi-hundred-MB files on every six-hour
+ * re-downloading and re-verifying multi-hundred-MB files on every 12-hour
  * reconcile just to reach the same answer.
  *
  * `manifest.json`'s `source`, `vocab_limit`, and `dim` come from