@amritk/nish 0.13.0 → 0.14.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -0
- package/docs/AI.md +63 -26
- package/llms.txt +1 -1
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/runtime/nish.d.ts +65 -0
- package/runtime/nish.h +31 -0
- package/runtime/nish.mjs +35 -0
- package/runtime/runtime-host.c +178 -0
- package/runtime/runtime-os.c +15 -0
- package/runtime/shim.mjs +122 -0
- package/scripts/build.sh +8 -7
- package/scripts/gen-diagnostic-codes.mjs +47 -25
- package/std/README.md +40 -0
- package/std/crypto/base64url.ts +145 -0
- package/std/crypto/ct.ts +64 -0
- package/std/crypto/hkdf.ts +118 -0
- package/std/crypto/hmac.ts +155 -0
- package/std/crypto/sha256.ts +444 -0
- package/std/crypto/sha512.ts +510 -0
- package/std/crypto/x25519.ts +494 -0
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/**
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* `nish/crypto/hkdf` — HKDF as RFC 5869 defines it, over HMAC-SHA-256 and
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* HMAC-SHA-384.
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*
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* Two steps, each its own function, because TLS 1.3 calls them separately:
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*
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* PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) (§2.2)
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* OKM = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) = T(1) | T(2) | … truncated to L bytes (§2.3)
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* T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i-1) | info | i), T(0) empty, i one byte
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*
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* import { hkdfExtractSha256, hkdfExpandSha256 } from "nish/crypto/hkdf";
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*
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* const prk: u8[] = hkdfExtractSha256(salt, secret);
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* const okm: u8[] | null = hkdfExpandSha256(prk, info, 42);
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*
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* The counter `i` is one byte, so `L` is at most 255 × HashLen (§2.3): 8160
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* bytes for SHA-256 and 12240 for SHA-384. A longer `L`, or a negative one,
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* answers `null` rather than panicking, because `L` usually comes from a
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* protocol field; `L = 0` answers an empty array.
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*
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* HKDF-Expand-Label, TLS 1.3's wrapper around `expand`, belongs with TLS and is
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* not here. Written from RFC 5869, not ported from another implementation.
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*/
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import { HmacSha256, HmacSha384, hmacSha256, hmacSha384 } from "nish/crypto/hmac"
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import { SHA256_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha256"
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import { SHA384_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha512"
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/** The largest block counter, and so the most blocks `expand` can make (RFC 5869 §2.3). */
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const HKDF_MAX_BLOCKS: i32 = 255
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/** A typed zero for the offsets below: a bare literal is an `f64` under `--number-mode f64`. */
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const HKDF_FROM: i32 = 0
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/**
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* The salt `extract` keys HMAC with: `salt` itself, or HashLen zero bytes when
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* it is empty (RFC 5869 §2.2, "if not provided"). HMAC zero-pads a short key to
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* a block anyway, so the two give one PRK; the zeros are written out so the
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* code says what the RFC says.
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*/
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const hkdfSalt = (salt: u8[], hashLen: i32): u8[] =>
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toI32(salt.length) === 0 ? new Array<u8>(hashLen) : salt
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/**
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* Copies `block[0 .. n)` to `out[at .. at + n)`, where `n` is as much of the
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* block as `out` still has room for. Answers the new fill of `out`.
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*/
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const hkdfAppend = (out: u8[], at: i32, block: u8[]): i32 => {
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const outLength: i32 = toI32(out.length)
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const blockLength: i32 = toI32(block.length)
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let k: i32 = 0
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while (k < blockLength && at + k < outLength) {
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out[at + k] = block[k]
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k += 1
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}
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return at + k
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}
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/** HKDF-Extract with HMAC-SHA-256 (RFC 5869 §2.2): the 32-byte PRK. */
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export const hkdfExtractSha256 = (salt: u8[], ikm: u8[]): u8[] => hmacSha256(hkdfSalt(salt, SHA256_SIZE), ikm)
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/** HKDF-Extract with HMAC-SHA-384 (RFC 5869 §2.2): the 48-byte PRK. */
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export const hkdfExtractSha384 = (salt: u8[], ikm: u8[]): u8[] => hmacSha384(hkdfSalt(salt, SHA384_SIZE), ikm)
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/**
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* HKDF-Expand with HMAC-SHA-256 (RFC 5869 §2.3): `length` bytes of output
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* keying material from `prk` and `info`, or `null` when `length` is negative
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* or past 255 × 32.
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*/
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export const hkdfExpandSha256 = (prk: u8[], info: u8[], length: i32): u8[] | null => {
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if (length < 0 || length > HKDF_MAX_BLOCKS * SHA256_SIZE) {
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return null
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}
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const out: u8[] = new Array<u8>(length)
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const counter: u8[] = new Array<u8>(1)
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const counterLength: i32 = 1
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let previous: u8[] = []
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let at: i32 = 0
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let i: i32 = 1
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while (at < length) {
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const mac = new HmacSha256(prk)
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mac.update(previous, HKDF_FROM, toI32(previous.length))
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mac.update(info, HKDF_FROM, toI32(info.length))
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counter[0] = toU8(i)
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mac.update(counter, HKDF_FROM, counterLength)
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previous = mac.digest()
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at = hkdfAppend(out, at, previous)
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i += 1
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}
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return out
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}
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/**
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* HKDF-Expand with HMAC-SHA-384 (RFC 5869 §2.3): `length` bytes of output
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* keying material from `prk` and `info`, or `null` when `length` is negative
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* or past 255 × 48.
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*/
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export const hkdfExpandSha384 = (prk: u8[], info: u8[], length: i32): u8[] | null => {
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if (length < 0 || length > HKDF_MAX_BLOCKS * SHA384_SIZE) {
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return null
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}
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const out: u8[] = new Array<u8>(length)
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const counter: u8[] = new Array<u8>(1)
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const counterLength: i32 = 1
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let previous: u8[] = []
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let at: i32 = 0
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let i: i32 = 1
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while (at < length) {
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const mac = new HmacSha384(prk)
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mac.update(previous, HKDF_FROM, toI32(previous.length))
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mac.update(info, HKDF_FROM, toI32(info.length))
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counter[0] = toU8(i)
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mac.update(counter, HKDF_FROM, counterLength)
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previous = mac.digest()
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at = hkdfAppend(out, at, previous)
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i += 1
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}
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return out
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}
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/**
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* `nish/crypto/hmac` — HMAC as RFC 2104 defines it, over SHA-256 and SHA-384.
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*
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* H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text))
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*
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* `K` is the key zero-padded to the hash's block size, or first hashed when it
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* is longer than a block (RFC 2104 §2); `ipad` is the byte 0x36 and `opad` the
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* byte 0x5c, repeated a block long. The key is absorbed into both hashers in
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* the constructor, so a `HmacSha256` is a keyed inner hash waiting for the
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* message and a keyed outer hash waiting for the inner digest.
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*
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* import { HmacSha256, hmacSha256, hmacSha256Verify } from "nish/crypto/hmac";
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*
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* const tag: u8[] = hmacSha256(key, message);
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* const ok: boolean = hmacSha256Verify(key, message, received);
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*
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* const mac = new HmacSha256(key);
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* mac.update(record, off, len);
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* const tag2: u8[] = mac.digest();
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*
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* Like the hashers underneath, a `digest` ends the computation: a later
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* `update` or a second `digest` panics in the hasher it reaches, and so does
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* a window outside its buffer. The only branch on the key is on its length,
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* which HMAC does not keep secret; a received tag is compared with
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* `timingSafeEqual`, never `===`.
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*
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* Written from RFC 2104, not ported from another implementation.
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*/
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import { SHA256_BLOCK, SHA256_SIZE, Sha256, sha256 } from "nish/crypto/sha256"
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import { SHA384_SIZE, SHA512_BLOCK, Sha384, sha384 } from "nish/crypto/sha512"
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import { timingSafeEqual } from "nish/crypto/ct"
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/** RFC 2104 §2's `ipad`, the byte XORed into the key for the inner hash. */
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const HMAC_IPAD: i32 = 0x36
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/** RFC 2104 §2's `opad`, the byte XORed into the key for the outer hash. */
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const HMAC_OPAD: i32 = 0x5c
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/** A typed zero for the offsets below: a bare literal is an `f64` under `--number-mode f64`. */
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const HMAC_FROM: i32 = 0
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/**
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* `key XOR pad` over a whole block of `blockSize` bytes, with `key` already no
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* longer than a block: the key's bytes XOR `pad`, then `pad` alone where the
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* zero padding of RFC 2104 §2 step (1) would be.
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*/
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const hmacPadBlock = (key: u8[], blockSize: i32, pad: i32): u8[] => {
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const padByte: u8 = toU8(pad)
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const out: u8[] = new Array<u8>(blockSize)
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const outLength: i32 = toI32(out.length)
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const keyLength: i32 = toI32(key.length)
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// Bounded by both lengths, so both indices are proved in range.
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let i: i32 = 0
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while (i < keyLength && i < outLength) {
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out[i] = key[i] ^ padByte
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i += 1
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}
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while (i < outLength) {
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out[i] = padByte
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i += 1
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}
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return out
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}
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/**
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* HMAC-SHA-256 in progress (RFC 2104 with RFC 4231's SHA-256): feed the
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* message with `update`, as many windows as it takes, and take the 32-byte
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* tag with `digest`.
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*/
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export class HmacSha256 {
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/** H(K XOR ipad, …), fed the key block in the constructor and the message after. */
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inner: Sha256
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/** H(K XOR opad, …), fed the key block in the constructor and the inner digest last. */
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outer: Sha256
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/** Keys the computation. A key longer than 64 bytes is replaced by its SHA-256 (RFC 2104 §2). */
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constructor(key: u8[]) {
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const k: u8[] = toI32(key.length) > SHA256_BLOCK ? sha256(key) : key
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this.inner = new Sha256()
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this.inner.update(hmacPadBlock(k, SHA256_BLOCK, HMAC_IPAD), HMAC_FROM, SHA256_BLOCK)
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this.outer = new Sha256()
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this.outer.update(hmacPadBlock(k, SHA256_BLOCK, HMAC_OPAD), HMAC_FROM, SHA256_BLOCK)
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}
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/** Absorbs `data[off .. off + len)`; a window outside `data` panics in `Sha256.update`. */
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update(data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): void {
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this.inner.update(data, off, len)
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}
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/** The 32-byte tag, in a fresh array. Ends the computation. */
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digest(): u8[] {
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const innerDigest: u8[] = this.inner.digest()
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this.outer.update(innerDigest, HMAC_FROM, SHA256_SIZE)
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return this.outer.digest()
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}
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}
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/**
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* HMAC-SHA-384 in progress (RFC 2104 with RFC 4231's SHA-384), with
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* `HmacSha256`'s methods. The block is SHA-384's 128 bytes and the tag 48.
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*/
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export class HmacSha384 {
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/** H(K XOR ipad, …), fed the key block in the constructor and the message after. */
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inner: Sha384
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/** H(K XOR opad, …), fed the key block in the constructor and the inner digest last. */
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outer: Sha384
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/** Keys the computation. A key longer than 128 bytes is replaced by its SHA-384 (RFC 2104 §2). */
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constructor(key: u8[]) {
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const k: u8[] = toI32(key.length) > SHA512_BLOCK ? sha384(key) : key
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this.inner = new Sha384()
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this.inner.update(hmacPadBlock(k, SHA512_BLOCK, HMAC_IPAD), HMAC_FROM, SHA512_BLOCK)
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this.outer = new Sha384()
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this.outer.update(hmacPadBlock(k, SHA512_BLOCK, HMAC_OPAD), HMAC_FROM, SHA512_BLOCK)
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}
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/** Absorbs `data[off .. off + len)`; a window outside `data` panics in `Sha384.update`. */
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update(data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): void {
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this.inner.update(data, off, len)
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}
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/** The 48-byte tag, in a fresh array. Ends the computation. */
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digest(): u8[] {
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const innerDigest: u8[] = this.inner.digest()
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this.outer.update(innerDigest, HMAC_FROM, SHA384_SIZE)
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return this.outer.digest()
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}
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}
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/** The HMAC-SHA-256 of all of `data` under `key`, as a fresh 32-byte array. */
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export const hmacSha256 = (key: u8[], data: u8[]): u8[] => {
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const mac = new HmacSha256(key)
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mac.update(data, HMAC_FROM, toI32(data.length))
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return mac.digest()
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}
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/** The HMAC-SHA-384 of all of `data` under `key`, as a fresh 48-byte array. */
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export const hmacSha384 = (key: u8[], data: u8[]): u8[] => {
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const mac = new HmacSha384(key)
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mac.update(data, HMAC_FROM, toI32(data.length))
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return mac.digest()
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}
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/**
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* Whether `tag` is the HMAC-SHA-256 of `data` under `key`, compared by
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+
* `timingSafeEqual`. A tag that is not 32 bytes answers `false` without a
|
|
147
|
+
* byte compare, since its length is public; one that is is compared in full,
|
|
148
|
+
* so the time taken does not say how many leading bytes were right.
|
|
149
|
+
*/
|
|
150
|
+
export const hmacSha256Verify = (key: u8[], data: u8[], tag: u8[]): boolean =>
|
|
151
|
+
timingSafeEqual(hmacSha256(key, data), tag)
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
/** Whether `tag` is the HMAC-SHA-384 of `data` under `key`, compared as `hmacSha256Verify` does. */
|
|
154
|
+
export const hmacSha384Verify = (key: u8[], data: u8[], tag: u8[]): boolean =>
|
|
155
|
+
timingSafeEqual(hmacSha384(key, data), tag)
|