@amritk/nish-x86_64-linux 0.24.0 → 0.26.0

package/std/net/tls/client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1094 @@
+/**
+ * `nish/net/tls/client` — the client side of a TLS 1.3 handshake (RFC 8446),
+ * from its ClientHello to its Finished, carrier-agnostic and sans-IO: the
+ * mirror of `nish/net/tls`'s `TlsServer`.
+ *
+ *     import { TlsClient, TlsClientConfig } from "nish/net/tls/client";
+ *
+ *     const client = new TlsClient(new TlsClientConfig("example.com", ["h2"]), random, x25519Key, p256Key);
+ *     client.start();
+ *     // send client.takeOutput(TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL); hand the server's bytes to
+ *     // client.receive(level, bytes, 0, n); install secrets as they are known;
+ *     // at TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH check peerCertificates() and the
+ *     // signature, then client.authenticate(ok) (or client.reject(alert)).
+ *
+ * It lives in a module of its own, beside `nish/net/tls` and not re-exported
+ * by it, since Nish has no re-exports; the levels and `TLS_SECRET_*` indices
+ * it shares with the server are `nish/net/tls`'s.
+ *
+ * **Carrier-agnostic.** As the server does, the client reads and writes
+ * handshake *messages* tagged with their level — the ClientHello and the
+ * ServerHello at Initial, the rest of the server's flight and the client's
+ * Finished at Handshake — and its secrets are readable as they become known.
+ * `nish/net/tls/record-client` puts it on a byte stream.
+ *
+ * **Sans-IO.** The client random and both private keys, x25519's and P-256's,
+ * are constructor arguments. Nothing here reads a socket, a clock or the
+ * random device.
+ *
+ * **Authentication is the caller's.** Once the server's CertificateVerify is
+ * read, the client stops at `TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH` without looking at
+ * the chain or the signature: `peerCertificates`, `verifyScheme`,
+ * `verifyContent` and `verifySignature` hand them out, and only
+ * `authenticate(true)` goes on to the server's Finished and writes the
+ * client's. A caller that drives this class directly must make that call
+ * itself, after checking the chain against its trust anchors and the
+ * signature over `verifyContent()` under the leaf's key: nothing here does
+ * either, and nothing proves the peer is who `serverName` says until then
+ * (`docs/security/tls.md`, "The client").
+ *
+ * **What is offered.** TLS 1.3 only, with a 32-byte `legacy_session_id` for
+ * middlebox compatibility (§D.4). The suites, groups and first key share are
+ * the configuration's: by default the three suites this tree negotiates and
+ * the group x25519; `secp256r1` may be configured too, for the first share or
+ * for a HelloRetryRequest to pick. `signature_algorithms` lists ECDSA
+ * P-256 and P-384 and RSA-PSS; `server_name` is sent unless the name is an
+ * IP literal (RFC 6066 §3); ALPN is the configuration's. One
+ * HelloRetryRequest is answered (§4.1.4); resumption, 0-RTT and client
+ * certificates are not here, and a NewSessionTicket is read and dropped.
+ *
+ * **Refusals are alerts.** `receive`, `authenticate` and `reject` answer 0 or
+ * a TLS alert description (`TLS_ALERT_*` in `nish/net/tls/codec`); after one
+ * the client is in `TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED`, every secret it held is wiped,
+ * and it answers the same alert to every call. Nothing the peer sends can
+ * make it panic.
+ *
+ * **Secrets.** Both private keys are copied into `Secret` fields and the
+ * caller's arrays zeroed; the one the server did not pick is wiped when it
+ * picks, and both once the exchange is done. The ECDHE secret is a `Secret`
+ * wiped on every path; the handshake, traffic and exporter secrets are the
+ * fields of two `TlsSecretPool`s. `fail` and `wipe` zero them all.
+ *
+ * The state is a class and a `switch`, with no closures. Written from RFC
+ * 8446, RFC 7301 and RFC 6066, not ported from another implementation.
+ */
+import { Secret, expose, exposeWith, secret, wipe } from "nish:secret"
+import { SHA256_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha256"
+import { SHA384_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha512"
+import { timingSafeEqualAt } from "nish/crypto/ct"
+import { X25519_SIZE, x25519, x25519Base } from "nish/crypto/x25519"
+import { P256_SCALAR_SIZE, p256Ecdh, p256PublicKey } from "nish/crypto/p256"
+import {
+  TLS_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
+  TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR,
+  TLS_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR,
+  TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+  TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+  TLS_ALERT_MISSING_EXTENSION,
+  TLS_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+  TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+  TLS_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
+  TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
+  TLS_GROUP_X25519,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO,
+  TLS_LEGACY_VERSION,
+  TLS_P256_SHARE_SIZE,
+  TLS_RANDOM_SIZE,
+  TLS_VERSION_13,
+  TLS_X25519_SHARE_SIZE,
+  TlsServerFlightView,
+  tlsCertificateVerifyContent,
+  tlsClientOffersScheme,
+  tlsCopyCertificates,
+  tlsReadCertificate,
+  tlsReadCertificateVerify,
+  tlsReadEncryptedExtensions,
+  tlsReadNewSessionTicket,
+  tlsReadServerHello,
+  tlsServerHelloDowngrade,
+  tlsCopyWindow,
+  tlsWindowString,
+  tlsWriteClientHello,
+  tlsWriteFinished,
+} from "nish/net/tls/codec"
+import {
+  TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+  TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+  TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+  TlsTranscript,
+  tlsDeriveSecretHeld,
+  tlsEarlySecret,
+  tlsFinishedVerifyDataHeld,
+  tlsHandshakeSecretHeld,
+  tlsMasterSecretHeld,
+  tlsSuiteHashLength,
+} from "nish/net/tls/schedule"
+import {
+  TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL,
+  TLS_MAX_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE,
+  TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_SECRET_EXPORTER,
+  TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_SECRET_SERVER_HANDSHAKE,
+  TlsSecretPool,
+  tlsHeldCopyIn,
+  tlsIsZeroSecret,
+  tlsZeroHeld,
+} from "nish/net/tls"
+
+/** Built; `start` has not written the ClientHello yet. */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_START: i32 = 0
+/** The ClientHello is out; a ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest comes next, at the Initial level. */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_SERVER_HELLO: i32 = 1
+/** The handshake secrets are known; EncryptedExtensions comes next, at the Handshake level. */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: i32 = 2
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE: i32 = 3
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: i32 = 4
+/**
+ * The server's chain and signature are read and wait for the caller's
+ * verdict: `authenticate` or `reject`. Bytes that arrive meanwhile are held,
+ * not read.
+ */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH: i32 = 5
+/** The caller accepted the server; its Finished comes next. */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_FINISHED: i32 = 6
+/** Both Finished are done and the application secrets known. */
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED: i32 = 7
+export const TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED: i32 = 8
+
+/** A typed zero for the offsets below: a bare literal is an `f64` under `--number-mode f64`. */
+const TLS_CLIENT_FROM: i32 = 0
+
+/** The legacy_session_id the client sends (§4.1.2, §D.4): 32 bytes, so that middleboxes see a resumption. */
+const TLS_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_SIZE: i32 = 32
+
+/** The longest `server_name` a ClientHello carries: a DNS name's 253 characters, under the extension's own bound. */
+const TLS_CLIENT_SERVER_NAME_MAX: i32 = 253
+
+/**
+ * What a client is configured with, the same for every connection. The
+ * constructor fills in the defaults; a caller may narrow `suites` or `groups`
+ * or change `shareGroup` before handing it to a `TlsClient`, which checks it.
+ */
+export class TlsClientConfig {
+  /** The host the client means to reach: sent as `server_name` unless it is an IP literal, and the name the caller authenticates. */
+  serverName: string
+  /** The ALPN protocols offered, most preferred first; empty sends no ALPN. Each is 1 to 255 bytes. */
+  alpn: string[]
+  /** The cipher suites offered, most preferred first: a non-empty subset of the three this tree negotiates. */
+  suites: i32[]
+  /** The groups offered in `supported_groups`: a non-empty subset of x25519 and secp256r1. */
+  groups: i32[]
+  /** The group of the one key share the first ClientHello carries; one of `groups`. */
+  shareGroup: i32
+
+  constructor(serverName: string, alpn: string[]) {
+    this.serverName = serverName
+    this.alpn = alpn
+    this.suites = [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256]
+    this.groups = [TLS_GROUP_X25519]
+    this.shareGroup = TLS_GROUP_X25519
+  }
+}
+
+/** Whether `suite` is one this tree negotiates. */
+const tlsClientKnowsSuite = (suite: i32): boolean => tlsSuiteHashLength(suite) !== 0
+
+/** Whether `group` is one the client can send a share for. */
+const tlsClientKnowsGroup = (group: i32): boolean =>
+  group === TLS_GROUP_X25519 || group === TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1
+
+/**
+ * Whether `name` is an IP literal, which RFC 6066 §3 keeps out of
+ * `server_name`: dotted decimal (digits and dots only), or anything with a
+ * colon, which no DNS name has.
+ */
+export const tlsClientIsIpLiteral = (name: string): boolean => {
+  let digits: boolean = true
+  for (let k: i32 = 0; k < toI32(name.length); k++) {
+    const c: i32 = toI32(name.charCodeAt(k))
+    if (c === 58) {
+      return true
+    }
+    if (c !== 46 && (c < 48 || c > 57)) {
+      digits = false
+    }
+  }
+  return digits && toI32(name.length) > 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * The ClientHello's bytes before its extensions, less the session id and
+ * suites: the message header (4), version (2), random (32), the session id's
+ * length (1), the suites' length (2), compression (2) and the extensions'
+ * own length (2).
+ */
+const TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_FIXED: i32 = 45
+
+/** Whether every character of `text` is ASCII, so it goes on the wire a byte each as it is. */
+const tlsClientIsAscii = (text: string): boolean => {
+  for (let k: i32 = 0; k < toI32(text.length); k++) {
+    if (toI32(text.charCodeAt(k)) > 127) {
+      return false
+    }
+  }
+  return true
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether `config` can be offered: suites and groups non-empty and known, the
+ * share's group among the groups, every ALPN protocol 1 to 255 bytes, and a
+ * server name of at most 253 bytes.
+ */
+const tlsClientConfigFits = (config: TlsClientConfig): boolean => {
+  if (toI32(config.suites.length) === 0 || toI32(config.groups.length) === 0) {
+    return false
+  }
+  for (const suite of config.suites) {
+    if (!tlsClientKnowsSuite(suite)) {
+      return false
+    }
+  }
+  for (const group of config.groups) {
+    if (!tlsClientKnowsGroup(group)) {
+      return false
+    }
+  }
+  if (config.groups.indexOf(config.shareGroup) < 0) {
+    return false
+  }
+  for (const protocol of config.alpn) {
+    if (toI32(protocol.length) < 1 || toI32(protocol.length) > 255 || !tlsClientIsAscii(protocol)) {
+      return false
+    }
+  }
+  return toI32(config.serverName.length) <= TLS_CLIENT_SERVER_NAME_MAX && tlsClientIsAscii(config.serverName)
+}
+
+export class TlsClient {
+  config: TlsClientConfig
+  clientRandom: u8[]
+  /** The x25519 private key, copied in by the constructor; wiped once the server picks a group, unless it picked x25519, then once the exchange is done. */
+  readonly x25519Key: Secret<u8[]>
+  /** The P-256 private key, held the same way. */
+  readonly p256Key: Secret<u8[]>
+  /** The legacy_session_id sent, which the ServerHello must echo. */
+  sessionId: u8[]
+  transcript: TlsTranscript
+  /**
+   * The first ClientHello, kept plain until the ServerHello names the hash:
+   * the transcript feeds one hash only, so it starts from this copy.
+   */
+  firstHello: u8[]
+  /** The bytes received at the current level and not yet read: `input[0 .. inputLength)`, whole messages and the start of the next. */
+  input: u8[]
+  /** What the client has written at the Initial level and not handed on. */
+  outputInitial: u8[]
+  /** What the client has written at the Handshake level and not handed on: its Finished. */
+  outputHandshake: u8[]
+  secrets256: TlsSecretPool
+  secrets384: TlsSecretPool
+  /** The server message last read, as windows into `input`. */
+  view: TlsServerFlightView
+  /** The HelloRetryRequest's cookie, echoed in the second ClientHello; empty if it sent none. */
+  cookie: u8[]
+  /** The server's DER certificates, leaf first, once its Certificate is read. */
+  certificates: u8[][]
+  /** What the server's CertificateVerify signs (§4.4.3), once its Certificate is read. */
+  content: u8[]
+  /** The CertificateVerify signature, as it came on the wire. */
+  signature: u8[]
+  /** A transcript hash on its way into the schedule: HashLen bytes of it. */
+  hashes: u8[]
+  /** The ALPN protocol the server chose, one of the configuration's, or empty. */
+  alpnChosen: string = ""
+  /** Which of the negotiated pool's secrets are known: bit `1 << TLS_SECRET_*` for each, as `TlsServer.held`. */
+  held: i32 = 0
+  state: i32 = 0
+  /** The alert the client failed with, or 0. */
+  alert: i32 = 0
+  /** The negotiated cipher suite, or 0 before the ServerHello (or HelloRetryRequest) is read. */
+  suite: i32 = 0
+  hashLength: i32 = 0
+  /** The group of the key share the last ClientHello carried. */
+  shareGroup: i32 = 0
+  /** The CertificateVerify scheme. */
+  scheme: i32 = 0
+  inputLength: i32 = 0
+  outputInitialLength: i32 = 0
+  outputHandshakeLength: i32 = 0
+  /** Whether a HelloRetryRequest was read, so a second is fatal. */
+  retried: boolean = false
+  /** Whether `server_name` was sent, so that only then may the server acknowledge it. */
+  sentServerName: boolean = false
+
+  /**
+   * A client for one connection under `config`, with the 32-byte client
+   * random and the 32-byte x25519 and P-256 private keys drawn for it; both
+   * keys are copied in and the caller's arrays zeroed. A random or key of
+   * another length, or a configuration it cannot offer, leaves the client
+   * failed with `internal_error` before it writes anything.
+   */
+  constructor(config: TlsClientConfig, clientRandom: u8[], x25519Private: u8[], p256Private: u8[]) {
+    const x25519Length: i32 = toI32(x25519Private.length)
+    const p256Length: i32 = toI32(p256Private.length)
+    this.config = config
+    this.clientRandom =
+      toI32(clientRandom.length) === TLS_RANDOM_SIZE
+        ? tlsCopyWindow(clientRandom, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, TLS_RANDOM_SIZE)
+        : []
+    this.x25519Key = secret(new Array<u8>(X25519_SIZE))
+    this.p256Key = secret(new Array<u8>(P256_SCALAR_SIZE))
+    exposeWith(this.x25519Key, x25519Private, tlsHeldCopyIn)
+    exposeWith(this.p256Key, p256Private, tlsHeldCopyIn)
+    secureZero(x25519Private)
+    secureZero(p256Private)
+    // Public, and derived from the public random, so it gives nothing away;
+    // its only job is to make the hello look like a resumption (§D.4).
+    this.sessionId = tlsCopyWindow(this.clientRandom, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, TLS_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_SIZE)
+    this.transcript = new TlsTranscript(0)
+    this.firstHello = []
+    this.input = new Array<u8>(1024)
+    this.outputInitial = []
+    this.outputHandshake = new Array<u8>(4 + SHA384_SIZE)
+    this.secrets256 = new TlsSecretPool(SHA256_SIZE)
+    this.secrets384 = new TlsSecretPool(SHA384_SIZE)
+    this.view = new TlsServerFlightView()
+    this.cookie = []
+    this.certificates = []
+    this.content = []
+    this.signature = []
+    this.hashes = new Array<u8>(SHA384_SIZE)
+    this.shareGroup = config.shareGroup
+    if (
+      toI32(this.clientRandom.length) !== TLS_RANDOM_SIZE ||
+      x25519Length !== X25519_SIZE ||
+      p256Length !== P256_SCALAR_SIZE ||
+      !tlsClientConfigFits(config)
+    ) {
+      this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Writes the first ClientHello at the Initial level. Answers 0, or the alert the client failed with; a second call is `internal_error`. */
+  start(): i32 {
+    if (this.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return this.alert
+    }
+    if (this.state !== TLS_CLIENT_STATE_START) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+    const at: i32 = this.outputInitialLength
+    const end: i32 = this.writeHello()
+    if (end < 0) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+    this.firstHello = tlsCopyWindow(this.outputInitial, at, end - at)
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_SERVER_HELLO
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Writes a ClientHello with a share of `shareGroup` and the cookie, if any,
+   * after what the Initial output holds, and answers where it ends; -1 when
+   * the key for the share gives no public key, or when the extensions would
+   * pass the 65,535 bytes their length can say (a HelloRetryRequest's cookie
+   * near that size).
+   */
+  writeHello(): i32 {
+    const share: u8[] | null =
+      this.shareGroup === TLS_GROUP_X25519 ? x25519Base(this.x25519Key) : p256PublicKey(this.p256Key)
+    if (share === null) {
+      return -1
+    }
+    const serverName: string = tlsClientIsIpLiteral(this.config.serverName) ? "" : this.config.serverName
+    this.sentServerName = toI32(serverName.length) > 0
+    const none: u8[] = []
+    const at: i32 = this.outputInitialLength
+    const length: i32 = tlsWriteClientHello(
+      none,
+      TLS_CLIENT_FROM,
+      this.clientRandom,
+      this.sessionId,
+      this.config.suites,
+      this.config.groups,
+      this.shareGroup,
+      share,
+      serverName,
+      this.config.alpn,
+      this.cookie
+    )
+    const before: i32 =
+      TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_FIXED + toI32(this.sessionId.length) + 2 * toI32(this.config.suites.length)
+    if (length - before > 65535) {
+      return -1
+    }
+    this.reserveOutput(at + length)
+    const end: i32 = tlsWriteClientHello(
+      this.outputInitial,
+      at,
+      this.clientRandom,
+      this.sessionId,
+      this.config.suites,
+      this.config.groups,
+      this.shareGroup,
+      share,
+      serverName,
+      this.config.alpn,
+      this.cookie
+    )
+    this.sent(TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL, at, end)
+    return end
+  }
+
+  /** Fails the handshake with `alert` and answers it, wiping every secret the client holds. */
+  fail(alert: i32): i32 {
+    this.wipe()
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED
+    this.alert = alert
+    return alert
+  }
+
+  /** The pool of the negotiated hash: SHA-384's for a SHA-384 suite, SHA-256's otherwise. */
+  secrets(): TlsSecretPool {
+    return this.hashLength === SHA384_SIZE ? this.secrets384 : this.secrets256
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the handshake has derived secret `index` (`TLS_SECRET_*`). */
+  known(index: i32): boolean {
+    return index >= 0 && index < 31 && (this.held & (1 << index)) !== 0
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the secret the client *reads* `level` under — the server's, `serverHandshake` or `serverApplication` — is known yet. */
+  readKnown(level: i32): boolean {
+    if (level === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE) {
+      return this.known(TLS_SECRET_SERVER_HANDSHAKE)
+    }
+    return level === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION && this.known(TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION)
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the secret the client *writes* `level` under — `clientHandshake` or `clientApplication` — is known yet. */
+  writeKnown(level: i32): boolean {
+    if (level === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE) {
+      return this.known(TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE)
+    }
+    return level === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION && this.known(TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION)
+  }
+
+  /** Zeroes secret `index` of `secrets()` once a carrier has taken what it needs from it; it stays known. */
+  wipeSecret(index: i32): void {
+    this.secrets().zero(index)
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Wipes every secret the client holds, both private keys and both pools,
+   * and fails it: a wiped client has nothing left to go on with. `fail`
+   * calls it, and the carriers when a connection ends; wiped without a
+   * failure, it answers `internal_error` from then on.
+   */
+  wipe(): void {
+    wipe(this.x25519Key)
+    wipe(this.p256Key)
+    this.secrets256.wipe()
+    this.secrets384.wipe()
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED
+    if (this.alert === 0) {
+      this.alert = TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** The level the server's next bytes must arrive at, or -1 when the state expects none. */
+  expectedLevel(): i32 {
+    switch (this.state) {
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_SERVER_HELLO:
+        return TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE:
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH:
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_FINISHED:
+        return TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED:
+        return TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+      default:
+        return -1
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Makes `input` hold at least `need` bytes, keeping the ones it holds; it doubles, and never grows past one largest message. */
+  reserveInput(need: i32): void {
+    const capacity: i32 = toI32(this.input.length)
+    if (need <= capacity) {
+      return
+    }
+    let size: i32 = capacity
+    while (size < need) {
+      size = size * 2
+    }
+    const most: i32 = TLS_MAX_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE + 4
+    const grown: u8[] = new Array<u8>(size > most ? most : size)
+    for (let k: i32 = 0; k < this.inputLength && k < toI32(grown.length) && k < capacity; k++) {
+      grown[k] = this.input[k]
+    }
+    this.input = grown
+  }
+
+  /** Makes the Initial output hold at least `need` bytes, keeping the ones it holds. */
+  reserveOutput(need: i32): void {
+    const capacity: i32 = toI32(this.outputInitial.length)
+    if (need <= capacity) {
+      return
+    }
+    const grown: u8[] = new Array<u8>(need)
+    for (let k: i32 = 0; k < toI32(grown.length) && k < this.outputInitialLength && k < capacity; k++) {
+      grown[k] = this.outputInitial[k]
+    }
+    this.outputInitial = grown
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Takes the handshake bytes `data[off .. off + len)` the server sent at
+   * `level`, a whole message, part of one or several, and reads every
+   * message they complete. Answers 0, or the alert the client fails with.
+   *
+   * A level other than the one the state expects is `unexpected_message`, as
+   * is a byte left over once a message ends the server's flight at its level
+   * (a ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest or a Finished): RFC 8446 §5.1 forbids
+   * a message to straddle a key change. A window outside `data` is
+   * `internal_error`. At `TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH` the bytes are held
+   * until `authenticate`. Once connected, the Application level takes
+   * NewSessionTickets, which are checked and dropped; anything else there is
+   * `unexpected_message`, KeyUpdate being the record layer's.
+   */
+  receive(level: i32, data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): i32 {
+    if (this.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return this.alert
+    }
+    if (off < 0 || len < 0 || off > toI32(data.length) - len) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+    if (len === 0) {
+      return 0
+    }
+    if (level !== this.expectedLevel()) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
+    }
+    const most: i32 = TLS_MAX_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE + 4
+    let taken: i32 = 0
+    while (taken < len) {
+      // A level's bytes may hold several messages, so they are taken a
+      // largest message at a time, each read before the next is copied in.
+      if (level !== this.expectedLevel()) {
+        return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
+      }
+      const room: i32 = most - this.inputLength
+      if (room <= 0) {
+        return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR)
+      }
+      const take: i32 = len - taken < room ? len - taken : room
+      this.reserveInput(this.inputLength + take)
+      for (
+        let k: i32 = 0;
+        k < take && off + taken + k < toI32(data.length) && this.inputLength < toI32(this.input.length);
+        k++
+      ) {
+        this.input[this.inputLength] = data[off + taken + k]
+        this.inputLength = this.inputLength + 1
+      }
+      taken = taken + take
+      const alert: i32 = this.drain()
+      if (alert !== 0) {
+        return this.fail(alert)
+      }
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Reads every whole message at the front of `input`, dropping each once
+   * read, until a partial one is left or the state waits on the caller.
+   * Answers 0 or the alert.
+   */
+  drain(): i32 {
+    while (this.state !== TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH && this.inputLength >= 4) {
+      const length: i32 = (toI32(this.input[1]) << 16) | (toI32(this.input[2]) << 8) | toI32(this.input[3])
+      if (length > TLS_MAX_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
+        return TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR
+      }
+      const whole: i32 = 4 + length
+      if (this.inputLength < whole) {
+        return 0
+      }
+      const type: i32 = toI32(this.input[0])
+      const alert: i32 = this.handleMessage(type, length)
+      if (alert !== 0) {
+        return alert
+      }
+      this.consume(whole)
+      const endsFlight: boolean = type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO || type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED
+      if (endsFlight && this.inputLength > 0) {
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      }
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** Drops the first `count` bytes of `input`, moving the rest to its front. */
+  consume(count: i32): void {
+    const rest: i32 = this.inputLength - count
+    for (let k: i32 = 0; k < rest && count + k < toI32(this.input.length); k++) {
+      this.input[k] = this.input[count + k]
+    }
+    this.inputLength = rest
+  }
+
+  /** Dispatches one whole message, `input[0 .. 4 + length)`, of type `type`, by state. */
+  handleMessage(type: i32, length: i32): i32 {
+    switch (this.state) {
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_SERVER_HELLO:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO
+          ? this.handleServerHello(length)
+          : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+          ? this.handleEncryptedExtensions(length)
+          : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE
+          ? this.handleCertificate(length)
+          : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+          ? this.handleCertificateVerify(length)
+          : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_FINISHED:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED ? this.handleFinished(length) : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      case TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED:
+        return type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+          ? this.handleTicket(length)
+          : TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      default:
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The checks a ServerHello and a HelloRetryRequest share, in the order
+   * that names a TLS 1.2 server for its version: the structure, then
+   * `supported_versions` and the downgrade sentinel (§4.1.3), then the
+   * extensions, the echoed session id, null compression and an offered
+   * suite. Answers 0 or the alert.
+   */
+  checkHello(view: TlsServerFlightView): i32 {
+    if (view.alert !== 0) {
+      return view.alert
+    }
+    if (!view.hasSupportedVersions) {
+      return !view.isRetry && tlsServerHelloDowngrade(view)
+        ? TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+        : TLS_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+    }
+    if (view.selectedVersion !== TLS_VERSION_13 || view.legacyVersion !== TLS_LEGACY_VERSION) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    if (view.extensionAlert !== 0) {
+      return view.extensionAlert
+    }
+    if (
+      view.sessionIdLength !== TLS_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+      !timingSafeEqualAt(
+        view.data,
+        view.sessionIdAt,
+        this.sessionId,
+        TLS_CLIENT_FROM,
+        TLS_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_SIZE
+      ) ||
+      view.compression !== 0
+    ) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    if (this.config.suites.indexOf(view.suite) < 0) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    // §4.1.4: the ServerHello after a HelloRetryRequest keeps its suite.
+    if (this.retried && view.suite !== this.suite) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** A ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest, `input[0 .. 4 + length)`. */
+  handleServerHello(length: i32): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    tlsReadServerHello(view, this.input, 4, length)
+    if (view.isRetry && this.retried) {
+      // §4.1.4: a second HelloRetryRequest.
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+    const checked: i32 = this.checkHello(view)
+    if (checked !== 0) {
+      return checked
+    }
+    if (view.isRetry) {
+      return this.handleRetry(length)
+    }
+    if (!view.hasKeyShare) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_MISSING_EXTENSION
+    }
+    if (view.shareGroup !== this.shareGroup) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    const shareSize: i32 = this.shareGroup === TLS_GROUP_X25519 ? TLS_X25519_SHARE_SIZE : TLS_P256_SHARE_SIZE
+    if (view.shareLength !== shareSize) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    if (!this.retried) {
+      this.startTranscript(view.suite)
+    }
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    const alert: i32 = this.exchangeKeys()
+    if (alert !== 0) {
+      return alert
+    }
+    const pool: TlsSecretPool = this.secrets()
+    const h: i32 = this.hashLength
+    this.transcript.hashInto(this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM)
+    tlsDeriveSecretHeld(h, pool.handshake, "c hs traffic", this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, pool.clientHandshake)
+    tlsDeriveSecretHeld(h, pool.handshake, "s hs traffic", this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, pool.serverHandshake)
+    this.held =
+      this.held |
+      (1 << TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE) |
+      (1 << TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE) |
+      (1 << TLS_SECRET_SERVER_HANDSHAKE)
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** Starts the transcript over `suite`'s hash, from the first ClientHello. */
+  startTranscript(suite: i32): void {
+    this.suite = suite
+    this.hashLength = tlsSuiteHashLength(suite)
+    this.transcript.reset(this.hashLength)
+    this.transcript.update(this.firstHello, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, toI32(this.firstHello.length))
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A HelloRetryRequest (§4.1.4), checked by `checkHello` already: it must
+   * name a group the client offered and did not send a share for, or carry
+   * a cookie, and changes the hello. The transcript restarts from
+   * `message_hash` (§4.4.1), and the second ClientHello carries a share of
+   * the new group and echoes the cookie. The key of the group not picked is
+   * wiped now.
+   */
+  handleRetry(length: i32): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    if (!view.hasKeyShare && !view.hasCookie) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    if (
+      view.hasKeyShare &&
+      (this.config.groups.indexOf(view.shareGroup) < 0 || view.shareGroup === this.shareGroup)
+    ) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    this.retried = true
+    this.startTranscript(view.suite)
+    this.transcript.restartWithMessageHash()
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    if (view.hasCookie) {
+      this.cookie = tlsCopyWindow(view.data, view.cookieAt, view.cookieLength)
+    }
+    if (view.hasKeyShare) {
+      this.shareGroup = view.shareGroup
+    }
+    this.wipeUnpicked()
+    // The first hello is not needed again; the second goes out after it.
+    this.firstHello = []
+    if (this.writeHello() < 0) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** Zeroes both private keys, once the exchange is done or cannot be. */
+  wipeKeys(): void {
+    exposeWith(this.x25519Key, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    exposeWith(this.p256Key, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+  }
+
+  /** Zeroes the private key of the group the client's share is not of. */
+  wipeUnpicked(): void {
+    if (this.shareGroup === TLS_GROUP_X25519) {
+      exposeWith(this.p256Key, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    } else {
+      exposeWith(this.x25519Key, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The ECDHE exchange with the server's share, `input[view.shareAt ..)`, and
+   * the handshake secret from it. Both private keys are wiped on every path,
+   * and the shared and early secrets before it returns. An all-zero x25519
+   * secret is `illegal_parameter` (RFC 7748 §6.1, RFC 8446 §7.4.2), and so is
+   * a secp256r1 share that is not an uncompressed point on the curve
+   * (§4.2.8.2); its shared secret is the product's x, which may be zero.
+   */
+  exchangeKeys(): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    const peer: u8[] = tlsCopyWindow(view.data, view.shareAt, view.shareLength)
+    const isX25519: boolean = this.shareGroup === TLS_GROUP_X25519
+    const shared: Secret<u8[]> | null = isX25519 ? x25519(this.x25519Key, peer) : p256Ecdh(this.p256Key, peer)
+    this.wipeKeys()
+    if (shared === null) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    if (isX25519 && expose(shared, tlsIsZeroSecret)) {
+      wipe(shared)
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    const h: i32 = this.hashLength
+    const early: Secret<u8[]> = tlsEarlySecret(h)
+    tlsHandshakeSecretHeld(h, early, shared, this.secrets().handshake)
+    wipe(early)
+    wipe(shared)
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** EncryptedExtensions (§4.3.1): ALPN, if any, must be one the client offered, and `server_name` acknowledged only if sent. */
+  handleEncryptedExtensions(length: i32): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    tlsReadEncryptedExtensions(view, this.input, 4, length)
+    if (view.alert !== 0) {
+      return view.alert
+    }
+    if (view.extensionAlert !== 0) {
+      return view.extensionAlert
+    }
+    if (view.serverNameAcknowledged && !this.sentServerName) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+    }
+    if (view.hasAlpn) {
+      const chosen: string = tlsWindowString(view.data, view.alpnAt, view.alpnLength)
+      if (toI32(this.config.alpn.length) === 0) {
+        // An extension the client never sent (§4.2).
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+      }
+      if (this.config.alpn.indexOf(chosen) < 0) {
+        // RFC 7301 §3.2 leaves the alert open; a protocol never offered is
+        // a value the client cannot accept.
+        return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+      }
+      this.alpnChosen = chosen
+    }
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** The server's Certificate (§4.4.2): its request context must be empty. The chain is copied out, and what CertificateVerify signs computed. */
+  handleCertificate(length: i32): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    tlsReadCertificate(view, this.input, 4, length)
+    if (view.alert !== 0) {
+      return view.alert
+    }
+    if (view.extensionAlert !== 0) {
+      return view.extensionAlert
+    }
+    if (view.contextLength !== 0) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    this.certificates = tlsCopyCertificates(view)
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    this.content = tlsCertificateVerifyContent(this.transcript.hash())
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** CertificateVerify (§4.4.3): a scheme the client offered. The signature is kept, unchecked, for the caller; the client then waits on it. */
+  handleCertificateVerify(length: i32): i32 {
+    const view: TlsServerFlightView = this.view
+    tlsReadCertificateVerify(view, this.input, 4, length)
+    if (view.alert !== 0) {
+      return view.alert
+    }
+    if (!tlsClientOffersScheme(view.scheme)) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+    }
+    this.scheme = view.scheme
+    this.signature = tlsCopyWindow(view.data, view.signatureAt, view.signatureLength)
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The server's Finished (§4.4.4), checked with `timingSafeEqualAt` against the one
+   * its handshake secret gives (`decrypt_error` if it differs). Then the
+   * master secret, the application and exporter secrets, and the client's
+   * Finished at the Handshake level; the handshake secret is wiped.
+   */
+  handleFinished(length: i32): i32 {
+    const h: i32 = this.hashLength
+    if (length !== h) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR
+    }
+    const pool: TlsSecretPool = this.secrets()
+    this.transcript.hashInto(this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM)
+    const expected: u8[] = tlsFinishedVerifyDataHeld(h, pool.serverHandshake, this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM)
+    const matches: boolean = timingSafeEqualAt(this.input, 4, expected, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, h)
+    secureZero(expected)
+    if (!matches) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR
+    }
+    this.transcript.update(this.input, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, 4 + length)
+    this.transcript.hashInto(this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM)
+    // The master secret is derived over the handshake secret, which has no
+    // other use left.
+    tlsMasterSecretHeld(h, pool.handshake, pool.handshake)
+    tlsDeriveSecretHeld(
+      h,
+      pool.handshake,
+      "c ap traffic",
+      this.hashes,
+      TLS_CLIENT_FROM,
+      pool.clientApplication
+    )
+    tlsDeriveSecretHeld(
+      h,
+      pool.handshake,
+      "s ap traffic",
+      this.hashes,
+      TLS_CLIENT_FROM,
+      pool.serverApplication
+    )
+    tlsDeriveSecretHeld(h, pool.handshake, "exp master", this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, pool.exporter)
+    pool.zero(TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE)
+    const verifyData: u8[] = tlsFinishedVerifyDataHeld(h, pool.clientHandshake, this.hashes, TLS_CLIENT_FROM)
+    const at: i32 = this.outputHandshakeLength
+    const end: i32 = tlsWriteFinished(this.outputHandshake, at, verifyData, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, h)
+    secureZero(verifyData)
+    this.sent(TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE, at, end)
+    this.held =
+      (this.held |
+        (1 << TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION) |
+        (1 << TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION) |
+        (1 << TLS_SECRET_EXPORTER)) &
+      ~(1 << TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE)
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /** A NewSessionTicket (§4.6.1) once connected: checked for its structure and dropped, since this client does not resume. */
+  handleTicket(length: i32): i32 {
+    tlsReadNewSessionTicket(this.view, this.input, 4, length)
+    return this.view.alert
+  }
+
+  /** The server's DER certificates, leaf first; empty before its Certificate is read. */
+  peerCertificates(): u8[][] {
+    return this.certificates
+  }
+
+  /** The CertificateVerify scheme (`TLS_SIGNATURE_*`); 0 before it is read. */
+  verifyScheme(): i32 {
+    return this.scheme
+  }
+
+  /** What the CertificateVerify signature is over (§4.4.3): 64 spaces, the server's context string, a zero byte and the transcript hash. */
+  verifyContent(): u8[] {
+    return this.content
+  }
+
+  /** The CertificateVerify signature as sent: DER for ECDSA, raw for RSA-PSS. */
+  verifySignature(): u8[] {
+    return this.signature
+  }
+
+  /** The ALPN protocol the server chose, or empty when it chose none. */
+  alpn(): string {
+    return this.alpnChosen
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The caller's verdict on the server's chain and signature, at
+   * `TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH`: `true` goes on to the server's Finished,
+   * reading what was held meanwhile; `false` is `reject(bad_certificate)`.
+   * Answers 0 or the alert; in any other state the client fails with
+   * `internal_error`.
+   */
+  authenticate(ok: boolean): i32 {
+    if (!ok) {
+      return this.reject(TLS_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE)
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return this.alert
+    }
+    if (this.state !== TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+    this.state = TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_FINISHED
+    const alert: i32 = this.drain()
+    if (alert !== 0) {
+      return this.fail(alert)
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Refuses the server at `TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH` with `alert`, the
+   * caller's reason (`bad_certificate`, `certificate_expired`,
+   * `unknown_ca`, `decrypt_error`…): the client fails with it and answers it.
+   * An alert outside 1 to 255 is taken as `bad_certificate`. In any other
+   * state the client fails with `internal_error`.
+   */
+  reject(alert: i32): i32 {
+    if (this.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return this.alert
+    }
+    if (this.state !== TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH) {
+      return this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    }
+    return this.fail(alert >= 1 && alert <= 255 ? alert : TLS_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE)
+  }
+
+  /** A message the client wrote at `level`, `output[at .. end)`, goes into the transcript once its hash is known and stays on the output. */
+  sent(level: i32, at: i32, end: i32): void {
+    if (level === TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL) {
+      if (this.hashLength !== 0) {
+        this.transcript.update(this.outputInitial, at, end - at)
+      }
+      this.outputInitialLength = end
+    } else {
+      this.transcript.update(this.outputHandshake, at, end - at)
+      this.outputHandshakeLength = end
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** The handshake bytes written at `level` since the last call, in a fresh array, and forgets them. */
+  takeOutput(level: i32): u8[] {
+    const none: u8[] = []
+    switch (level) {
+      case TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL: {
+        const out: u8[] = tlsCopyWindow(this.outputInitial, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, this.outputInitialLength)
+        this.outputInitialLength = 0
+        return out
+      }
+      case TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE: {
+        const out: u8[] = tlsCopyWindow(this.outputHandshake, TLS_CLIENT_FROM, this.outputHandshakeLength)
+        this.outputHandshakeLength = 0
+        return out
+      }
+      default:
+        return none
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Forgets the handshake bytes written at `level`, which a carrier has read out of the buffer itself. */
+  clearOutput(level: i32): void {
+    if (level === TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL) {
+      this.outputInitialLength = 0
+    } else if (level === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE) {
+      this.outputHandshakeLength = 0
+    }
+  }
+}