@amritk/nish-x86_64-linux 0.23.1 → 0.25.0

package/std/net/tls/record-client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1192 @@
+/**
+ * `nish/net/tls/record-client` — a TLS 1.3 client over a byte stream: the
+ * record layer of `nish/net/tls/record` wrapped around
+ * `nish/net/tls/client`'s `TlsClient`, sans-IO. Bytes the server sent go in,
+ * bytes to send come out, and once the handshake is done application data
+ * flows both ways. The mirror of `nish/net/tls/record-server`.
+ *
+ *     const conn = new TlsRecordClient(new TlsClient(config, random, x25519Key, p256Key));
+ *     // send conn.output[conn.outputStart .. conn.outputEnd), then conn.consume(sent)
+ *     conn.receive(bytes, 0, n);                 // what the socket read
+ *     if ((conn.interest() & TLS_RECORD_AUTH) !== 0) {
+ *       // check conn.tls.peerCertificates() and the CertificateVerify
+ *       conn.authenticate(verified);
+ *     }
+ *     const got: i32 = conn.read(buf, 0, buf.length);   // application data
+ *
+ * **What it adds to `TlsClient`.** Records around the handshake messages:
+ * the ClientHello in the clear, then the client's Finished under the
+ * handshake keys, and every key installed at the record boundary RFC 8446
+ * §5.1 puts it on. The middlebox-compatibility `change_cipher_spec` of §D.4,
+ * which a client that sends a session id (this one always does) owes: one,
+ * in the clear, before its second ClientHello after a HelloRetryRequest, or
+ * else before its first protected record; the server's is dropped from its
+ * first handshake record until its Finished. Alerts (§6) both ways, as the
+ * server has them: `close_notify` ends the server's stream, `user_canceled`
+ * is passed over, any other alert ends the connection, and a refusal of this
+ * module's or of `TlsClient`'s is sent as a fatal alert under whatever keys
+ * the client writes with. KeyUpdate (§4.6.3) both ways, with the server's
+ * limits: `TLS_RECORD_IDLE_LIMIT` records in a row that carry nothing, and
+ * `TLS_RECORD_MAX_KEY_UPDATES` KeyUpdates. A NewSessionTicket is handed to
+ * `TlsClient`, which checks and drops it; any other post-handshake message is
+ * `unexpected_message` (no client certificate is offered, so no
+ * CertificateRequest). A stream that ends without `close_notify` is
+ * truncation.
+ *
+ * **Authentication is the caller's.** At `TlsClient`'s `WAIT_AUTH` the
+ * records after the server's CertificateVerify stay in the reader and
+ * `interest` says `TLS_RECORD_AUTH`: nothing more is read until the caller
+ * has checked the chain and the signature and called `authenticate(true)` —
+ * or `authenticate(false)` / `reject(alert)`, which fail the connection with
+ * the alert sent. Nothing here proves who the server is.
+ *
+ * **Buffers.** One connection, one object: `output`, `plain` and `scratch`
+ * are allocated with it, and `wipe` zeroes the two that hold plaintext. The
+ * handshake's messages are sealed straight out of `TlsClient`'s own buffers.
+ *
+ * **Secrets.** As in `TlsRecordServer`: `TlsClient` holds the handshake's
+ * secrets, this object the two application traffic secrets, one readonly
+ * field per direction and hash length, with `readHash` and `writeHash` saying
+ * which of each pair is live. A secret is copied out of `TlsClient` as it is
+ * installed and the client's copy zeroed; the handshake secrets are zeroed
+ * once the Finished messages no longer need them; a KeyUpdate overwrites
+ * the live field in place. A failure of any kind wipes everything both
+ * objects hold once the last alert is sealed; the client's `close_notify`,
+ * once sealed, wipes the write direction, and the server's the read
+ * direction; `wipe` wipes the rest (TLS-1, TLS-3 and "The client" in
+ * `docs/security/tls.md`).
+ *
+ * Refusals are alerts, never panics. Written from RFC 8446 §4.6.3, §5, §6
+ * and §D.4, not ported from another implementation.
+ */
+import {
+  TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL,
+  TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION,
+  TLS_SECRET_SERVER_HANDSHAKE,
+  TlsSecretPool,
+  tlsHeldClone,
+  tlsHeldCopyIn,
+  tlsHeldCopyOver,
+  tlsZeroHeld,
+} from "nish/net/tls"
+import {
+  TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED,
+  TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED,
+  TLS_CLIENT_STATE_START,
+  TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH,
+  TlsClient,
+} from "nish/net/tls/client"
+import {
+  TLS_RECORD_AGAIN,
+  TLS_RECORD_DATA,
+  TLS_RECORD_DONE,
+  TLS_RECORD_IDLE_LIMIT,
+  TLS_RECORD_INVALID,
+  TLS_RECORD_MAX_KEY_UPDATES,
+  TLS_RECORD_PIPE,
+  TLS_RECORD_RESET,
+  TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED,
+  TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED,
+  TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN,
+  TLS_RECORD_WANT_READ,
+  TLS_RECORD_WANT_WRITE,
+} from "nish/net/tls/record-server"
+import { Secret, expose, exposeWith, secret, wipe } from "nish:secret"
+import { SHA256_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha256"
+import { SHA384_SIZE } from "nish/crypto/sha512"
+import {
+  TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR,
+  TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+  TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+  TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+} from "nish/net/tls/codec"
+import {
+  TLS_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY,
+  TLS_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+  TLS_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
+  TLS_ALERT_USER_CANCELED,
+  TLS_CONTENT_ALERT,
+  TLS_CONTENT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+  TLS_CONTENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+  TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE,
+  TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE,
+  TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT,
+  TLS_MAX_RECORD,
+  TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE,
+  TLS_RECORD_TAG_SIZE,
+  TlsRecordProtection,
+  TlsRecordReader,
+  tlsRecordWindowFits,
+} from "nish/net/tls/record"
+
+/**
+ * An `interest` bit beside `nish/net/tls/record-server`'s `TLS_RECORD_*`:
+ * the server's chain and CertificateVerify wait for the caller's verdict,
+ * `authenticate` or `reject`.
+ */
+export const TLS_RECORD_AUTH: i32 = 64
+
+/** The size of the bytes to send: two whole records, so a record fits beside one partly sent. */
+const TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_OUTPUT_SIZE: i32 = 2 * TLS_MAX_RECORD
+/** The size of the application data the caller has not read: two records' worth. */
+const TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_PLAIN_SIZE: i32 = 2 * TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT
+
+/** A KeyUpdate message: type, a 24-bit length of 1, and `request_update`. */
+const TLS_KEY_UPDATE_SIZE: i32 = 5
+/** A handshake message header: type and a 24-bit length. */
+const TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_SIZE: i32 = 4
+
+/** A typed zero for the offsets below: a bare literal is an `f64` under `--number-mode f64`. */
+const TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM: i32 = 0
+
+/**
+ * Installs `protection` under `suite` from the traffic secret `held`, from a
+ * plain copy that dies with the arena block, zeroed; false, as `install`
+ * answers, when the keys do not install. As in `nish/net/tls/record-server`.
+ */
+const tlsClientInstallHeld = (protection: TlsRecordProtection, suite: i32, held: Secret<u8[]>): boolean => {
+  using _scope = arena()
+  const plain: u8[] = expose(held, tlsHeldClone)
+  const installed: boolean = protection.install(suite, plain)
+  secureZero(plain)
+  return installed
+}
+
+/**
+ * Moves `protection` to the next traffic secret (§7.2) and writes it over
+ * `held`'s bytes in place, the KeyUpdate step; false when the keys do not
+ * install. As in `nish/net/tls/record-server`.
+ */
+const tlsClientAdvanceHeld = (protection: TlsRecordProtection, held: Secret<u8[]>): boolean => {
+  using _scope = arena()
+  const plain: u8[] = expose(held, tlsHeldClone)
+  const installed: boolean = protection.advance(plain)
+  exposeWith(held, plain, tlsHeldCopyIn)
+  secureZero(plain)
+  return installed
+}
+
+/**
+ * One TLS 1.3 client connection over a stream. Make one per connection
+ * around a fresh `TlsClient`, which it starts, and drive it with `receive`,
+ * `consume`, `read`, `write` and `authenticate` as `interest` says.
+ *
+ * The fields are readable: `state`, `alert` (the alert this client sent, or
+ * 0), `peerAlert` (the error alert the server sent, or -1), `peerClosed`
+ * (the server's `close_notify` arrived), `tls` (the handshake: suite, ALPN,
+ * the server's certificates, exporter secret), and the two protections with
+ * their sequence numbers. `padding` is how many zero bytes each protected
+ * record the client writes carries after its content type (§5.4).
+ */
+export class TlsRecordClient {
+  tls: TlsClient
+  reader: TlsRecordReader
+  readProtection: TlsRecordProtection
+  writeProtection: TlsRecordProtection
+  /** Never installed: seals the compatibility record in the clear once the write side is protected. */
+  clearProtection: TlsRecordProtection
+  /** Bytes to send are `output[outputStart .. outputEnd)`. */
+  output: u8[]
+  /** Application data the caller has not read is `plain[plainStart .. plainEnd)`. */
+  plain: u8[]
+  /** Where a record is opened to. */
+  scratch: u8[]
+  /** The server's and the client's current application traffic secrets, at both hash lengths. */
+  readonly readTraffic256: Secret<u8[]>
+  readonly readTraffic384: Secret<u8[]>
+  readonly writeTraffic256: Secret<u8[]>
+  readonly writeTraffic384: Secret<u8[]>
+  readHash: i32 = 0
+  writeHash: i32 = 0
+  /** The header of a post-handshake message the server has sent part of, and a KeyUpdate's body. */
+  postHandshake: u8[]
+  state: i32 = 0
+  alert: i32 = 0
+  peerAlert: i32 = -1
+  padding: i32 = 0
+  /** The `TLS_LEVEL_*` the server's records are read at. */
+  readLevel: i32 = 0
+  /** The `TLS_LEVEL_*` the client's records are written at. */
+  writeLevel: i32 = 0
+  outputStart: i32 = 0
+  outputEnd: i32 = 0
+  plainStart: i32 = 0
+  plainEnd: i32 = 0
+  /** How much of `TlsClient`'s Initial-level output is already in records. */
+  pendingInitialAt: i32 = 0
+  /** How much of `TlsClient`'s Handshake-level output is already in records. */
+  pendingHandshakeAt: i32 = 0
+  /** How many bytes of the current post-handshake message's header or KeyUpdate are in `postHandshake`. */
+  postHandshakeLength: i32 = 0
+  /** How many body bytes of a NewSessionTicket are still to come, handed to `TlsClient` as they arrive. */
+  ticketLeft: i32 = 0
+  idleRecords: i32 = 0
+  keyUpdates: i32 = 0
+  peerClosed: boolean = false
+  ended: boolean = false
+  /** The server's first handshake record has arrived, which opens the window its `change_cipher_spec` may come in. */
+  started: boolean = false
+  /** The client's compatibility `change_cipher_spec` is sent (§D.4). */
+  ccsSent: boolean = false
+  keyUpdateDue: boolean = false
+  closeDue: boolean = false
+
+  /**
+   * Wraps `tls`, which should be fresh, and starts it: the ClientHello is
+   * sealed into `output` at once. A `tls` that has already failed, or whose
+   * ClientHello cannot be written, fails this connection with its alert
+   * queued in the clear.
+   */
+  constructor(tls: TlsClient) {
+    this.tls = tls
+    this.reader = new TlsRecordReader()
+    this.readProtection = new TlsRecordProtection()
+    this.writeProtection = new TlsRecordProtection()
+    this.clearProtection = new TlsRecordProtection()
+    this.output = new Array<u8>(TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_OUTPUT_SIZE)
+    this.plain = new Array<u8>(TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_PLAIN_SIZE)
+    this.scratch = new Array<u8>(TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT)
+    this.readTraffic256 = secret(new Array<u8>(SHA256_SIZE))
+    this.readTraffic384 = secret(new Array<u8>(SHA384_SIZE))
+    this.writeTraffic256 = secret(new Array<u8>(SHA256_SIZE))
+    this.writeTraffic384 = secret(new Array<u8>(SHA384_SIZE))
+    this.postHandshake = new Array<u8>(TLS_KEY_UPDATE_SIZE)
+    this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE
+    let alert: i32 = tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_FAILED ? tls.alert : 0
+    if (alert === 0 && tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_START) {
+      alert = tls.start()
+    }
+    if (alert !== 0) {
+      this.fail(alert)
+      return
+    }
+    this.pump()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Wipes everything this connection holds: both traffic secrets at both
+   * hash lengths, both directions' keys, the plaintext buffers and everything
+   * `TlsClient` holds, so `read` has nothing more to give. Call it when the
+   * connection is done with.
+   */
+  wipe(): void {
+    wipe(this.readTraffic256)
+    wipe(this.readTraffic384)
+    wipe(this.writeTraffic256)
+    wipe(this.writeTraffic384)
+    this.readHash = 0
+    this.writeHash = 0
+    this.readProtection.clear()
+    this.writeProtection.clear()
+    secureZero(this.plain)
+    this.plainStart = 0
+    this.plainEnd = 0
+    secureZero(this.scratch)
+    secureZero(this.postHandshake)
+    this.tls.wipe()
+  }
+
+  /** Wipes the server's application traffic secret and the read keys. */
+  wipeRead(): void {
+    exposeWith(this.readTraffic256, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    exposeWith(this.readTraffic384, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    this.readHash = 0
+    this.readProtection.clear()
+  }
+
+  /** Wipes the client's application traffic secret and its write keys. */
+  wipeWrite(): void {
+    exposeWith(this.writeTraffic256, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    exposeWith(this.writeTraffic384, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, tlsZeroHeld)
+    this.writeHash = 0
+    this.writeProtection.clear()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Copies the server's application traffic secret out of `TlsClient` into
+   * the field of its hash's length, wipes the client's copy, and installs the
+   * read keys from it. False when the secret is not known or the keys do not
+   * install.
+   */
+  keepRead(): boolean {
+    const tls: TlsClient = this.tls
+    if (!tls.readKnown(TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    const pool: TlsSecretPool = tls.secrets()
+    this.readHash = tls.hashLength
+    let installed: boolean = false
+    if (this.readHash === SHA384_SIZE) {
+      exposeWith(pool.serverApplication, this.readTraffic384, tlsHeldCopyOver)
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION)
+      installed = tlsClientInstallHeld(this.readProtection, tls.suite, this.readTraffic384)
+    } else {
+      exposeWith(pool.serverApplication, this.readTraffic256, tlsHeldCopyOver)
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_SERVER_APPLICATION)
+      installed = tlsClientInstallHeld(this.readProtection, tls.suite, this.readTraffic256)
+    }
+    return installed
+  }
+
+  /** `keepRead` for the client's application traffic secret and the write keys. */
+  keepWrite(): boolean {
+    const tls: TlsClient = this.tls
+    if (!tls.writeKnown(TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    const pool: TlsSecretPool = tls.secrets()
+    this.writeHash = tls.hashLength
+    let installed: boolean = false
+    if (this.writeHash === SHA384_SIZE) {
+      exposeWith(pool.clientApplication, this.writeTraffic384, tlsHeldCopyOver)
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION)
+      installed = tlsClientInstallHeld(this.writeProtection, tls.suite, this.writeTraffic384)
+    } else {
+      exposeWith(pool.clientApplication, this.writeTraffic256, tlsHeldCopyOver)
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_APPLICATION)
+      installed = tlsClientInstallHeld(this.writeProtection, tls.suite, this.writeTraffic256)
+    }
+    return installed
+  }
+
+  /** How many bytes `receive` would take now: what the socket should read at most. */
+  space(): i32 {
+    return this.reader.space()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Takes bytes of the server's stream, `data[off .. off + len)`, and handles
+   * every record they complete. Answers how many it took, fewer than `len`
+   * only when its buffers are full, or `TLS_RECORD_INVALID` for a window
+   * outside `data`. Once the connection has failed, the server has sent
+   * `close_notify`, or the client closed before the handshake was done, bytes
+   * are taken and dropped (§6.1).
+   */
+  receive(data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): i32 {
+    if (!tlsRecordWindowFits(toI32(data.length), off, len)) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_INVALID
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED || this.peerClosed || this.abandoned()) {
+      return len
+    }
+    const taken: i32 = this.reader.push(data, off, len)
+    this.process()
+    return taken
+  }
+
+  /** The server's TCP stream ended: the orderly end after its `close_notify`, truncation before it. */
+  end(): void {
+    this.ended = true
+    this.process()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Once the server's stream has ended and every whole record it held is
+   * handled, an end without `close_notify` is truncation: the connection
+   * fails with nothing more sent, and every key it holds is wiped.
+   */
+  checkTruncation(): void {
+    if (this.ended && !this.peerClosed && this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED && this.reader.next() <= 0) {
+      this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED
+      this.dropPending()
+      this.wipe()
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** The socket failed under the connection: it ends with nothing more sent, and every key it holds wiped. */
+  abort(): void {
+    this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED
+    this.outputStart = 0
+    this.outputEnd = 0
+    this.dropPending()
+    this.wipe()
+  }
+
+  /** Forgets what is owed but not yet sealed: the handshake queues, a KeyUpdate and a close. */
+  dropPending(): void {
+    this.tls.clearOutput(TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL)
+    this.tls.clearOutput(TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE)
+    this.pendingInitialAt = 0
+    this.pendingHandshakeAt = 0
+    this.keyUpdateDue = false
+    this.closeDue = false
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Handles every whole record the reader holds, as far as the application
+   * data buffer has room for. While `TlsClient` waits for the caller's
+   * verdict on the server's certificate the records stay where they are, and
+   * `authenticate` comes back for them.
+   */
+  process(): void {
+    while (this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED && !this.peerClosed && !this.abandoned()) {
+      if (this.tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH) {
+        break
+      }
+      const n: i32 = this.reader.next()
+      if (n < 0) {
+        this.fail(-n)
+        return
+      }
+      if (n === 0) {
+        break
+      }
+      if (this.readLevel === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION && !this.plainHasRoom()) {
+        break
+      }
+      const alert: i32 = this.handleRecord(this.reader.buffer, this.reader.start, n)
+      this.reader.consume(n)
+      if (alert !== 0) {
+        this.fail(alert)
+        return
+      }
+    }
+    this.checkTruncation()
+    this.pump()
+  }
+
+  /** Whether a whole record's content fits beside what the caller has not read, moving that to the front when it would then fit. */
+  plainHasRoom(): boolean {
+    const capacity: i32 = TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_PLAIN_SIZE
+    if (capacity - (this.plainEnd - this.plainStart) < TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT) {
+      return false
+    }
+    if (capacity - this.plainEnd < TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT) {
+      const held: i32 = this.plainEnd - this.plainStart
+      for (let k: i32 = 0; k < held && this.plainStart + k < toI32(this.plain.length); k++) {
+        this.plain[k] = this.plain[this.plainStart + k]
+      }
+      this.plainStart = 0
+      this.plainEnd = held
+    }
+    return true
+  }
+
+  /** Counts a record that carried nothing for the caller: 0, or `unexpected_message` once there are too many in a row. */
+  idle(): i32 {
+    this.idleRecords = this.idleRecords + 1
+    return this.idleRecords > TLS_RECORD_IDLE_LIMIT ? TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE : 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * One whole record, `buf[off .. off + n)`: a `change_cipher_spec` is judged
+   * on its own; anything else is opened under the read protection into
+   * `scratch`, and its content goes to `handleApplicationRecord` once the
+   * server's Finished is read, to the handshake before. Answers 0 or the alert.
+   */
+  handleRecord(buf: u8[], off: i32, n: i32): i32 {
+    if (toI32(buf[off]) === TLS_CONTENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+      return this.handleChangeCipherSpec(buf, off, n - TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE)
+    }
+    const length: i32 = this.readProtection.open(buf, off, n, this.scratch, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM)
+    if (length < 0) {
+      return -length
+    }
+    if (this.readLevel === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION) {
+      return this.handleApplicationRecord(length)
+    }
+    switch (this.readProtection.contentType) {
+      case TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE:
+        return this.handleHandshake(length)
+      case TLS_CONTENT_ALERT:
+        // §5.1: an alert may not fall between the records of one handshake message.
+        return this.tls.inputLength > 0 ? TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE : this.handleAlert(length)
+      default:
+        // Application data before the server's Finished, a protected
+        // change_cipher_spec (§5), or a type nobody defined.
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The server's compatibility record (§5, §D.4): one byte of 1, in the
+   * clear, after its first handshake record and before its Finished, and not
+   * between the records of one handshake message. Dropped; anything else is
+   * `unexpected_message`.
+   */
+  handleChangeCipherSpec(buf: u8[], off: i32, length: i32): i32 {
+    if (length !== 1 || toI32(buf[off + TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE]) !== 1) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+    if (!this.started || this.readLevel === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION || this.tls.inputLength > 0) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+    return this.idle()
+  }
+
+  /** Handshake bytes, `scratch[0 .. length)`, for `TlsClient` at the level they were read at; an empty fragment is `unexpected_message` (§5.1). */
+  handleHandshake(length: i32): i32 {
+    if (length === 0) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+    this.started = true
+    this.idleRecords = 0
+    const alert: i32 = this.tls.receive(this.readLevel, this.scratch, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, length)
+    if (alert !== 0) {
+      return alert
+    }
+    this.advance()
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * A record under the server's application keys, its `length` bytes of
+   * content in `scratch`: application data for the caller, an alert, or
+   * post-handshake handshake bytes, which nothing else may interrupt (§5.1).
+   */
+  handleApplicationRecord(length: i32): i32 {
+    const type: i32 = this.readProtection.contentType
+    if ((this.postHandshakeLength > 0 || this.ticketLeft > 0) && type !== TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+    switch (type) {
+      case TLS_CONTENT_APPLICATION_DATA: {
+        if (length === 0) {
+          return this.idle()
+        }
+        for (let k: i32 = 0; k < length && this.plainEnd + k < toI32(this.plain.length); k++) {
+          this.plain[this.plainEnd + k] = this.scratch[k]
+        }
+        this.plainEnd = this.plainEnd + length
+        this.idleRecords = 0
+        return 0
+      }
+      case TLS_CONTENT_ALERT:
+        return this.handleAlert(length)
+      case TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE:
+        return length === 0 ? TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE : this.handlePostHandshake(length)
+      default:
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * An alert, `scratch[0 .. length)` (§6): two bytes, or `decode_error`.
+   * `close_notify` once the handshake is done ends the server's stream and
+   * wipes the read direction, `user_canceled` is passed over, and any other
+   * description — `close_notify` during the handshake among them, so a
+   * connection that never authenticated cannot end like one that did — ends
+   * the connection with nothing more sent and every key wiped.
+   */
+  handleAlert(length: i32): i32 {
+    if (length !== 2) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR
+    }
+    const description: i32 = toI32(this.scratch[1])
+    if (description === TLS_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY && this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE) {
+      this.peerClosed = true
+      this.wipeRead()
+      return 0
+    }
+    if (description === TLS_ALERT_USER_CANCELED) {
+      return this.idle()
+    }
+    this.peerAlert = description
+    this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED
+    this.outputStart = 0
+    this.outputEnd = 0
+    this.dropPending()
+    this.wipe()
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Post-handshake handshake bytes, `scratch[0 .. length)`, which may continue
+   * a message an earlier record began. A NewSessionTicket goes to `TlsClient`
+   * as it arrives, which reads and drops it. A KeyUpdate is this module's:
+   * a length other than 1 is `decode_error`, a `request_update` other than 0
+   * or 1 `illegal_parameter`, and one that does not end its record
+   * `unexpected_message`, since the keys change after it (§4.6.3, §5.1). Any
+   * other type is `unexpected_message`. Each message counts against the idle
+   * limit.
+   */
+  handlePostHandshake(length: i32): i32 {
+    let k: i32 = 0
+    while (k < length) {
+      if (this.ticketLeft > 0) {
+        const left: i32 = length - k
+        const take: i32 = left < this.ticketLeft ? left : this.ticketLeft
+        const alert: i32 = this.tls.receive(TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION, this.scratch, k, take)
+        if (alert !== 0) {
+          return alert
+        }
+        this.ticketLeft = this.ticketLeft - take
+        k = k + take
+        continue
+      }
+      if (this.postHandshakeLength === 0) {
+        const idle: i32 = this.idle()
+        if (idle !== 0) {
+          return idle
+        }
+      }
+      if (this.postHandshakeLength < toI32(this.postHandshake.length)) {
+        this.postHandshake[this.postHandshakeLength] = this.scratch[k]
+      }
+      this.postHandshakeLength = this.postHandshakeLength + 1
+      const held: i32 = this.postHandshakeLength
+      const type: i32 = toI32(this.postHandshake[0])
+      if (held === 1 && type !== TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE && type !== TLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+        return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+      }
+      if (held === TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_SIZE) {
+        const body: i32 =
+          (toI32(this.postHandshake[1]) << 16) |
+          (toI32(this.postHandshake[2]) << 8) |
+          toI32(this.postHandshake[3])
+        if (type === TLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+          // The header goes to `TlsClient` with the body, which it reads whole.
+          const alert: i32 = this.tls.receive(
+            TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+            this.postHandshake,
+            TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM,
+            TLS_MESSAGE_HEADER_SIZE
+          )
+          if (alert !== 0) {
+            return alert
+          }
+          this.postHandshakeLength = 0
+          this.ticketLeft = body
+        } else if (body !== 1) {
+          return TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR
+        }
+      }
+      if (held === TLS_KEY_UPDATE_SIZE) {
+        const request: i32 = toI32(this.postHandshake[4])
+        if (request > 1) {
+          return TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+        }
+        if (k !== length - 1) {
+          return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+        }
+        this.postHandshakeLength = 0
+        if (this.keyUpdates >= TLS_RECORD_MAX_KEY_UPDATES) {
+          return TLS_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+        }
+        this.keyUpdates = this.keyUpdates + 1
+        return this.updateReadKeys(request === 1)
+      }
+      k = k + 1
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The server's KeyUpdate: its next records are under the next secret
+   * (§7.2), the old one wiped; when it asked, the client owes one of its own,
+   * which `pump` sends. Answers 0, or `internal_error` when the keys do not
+   * install.
+   */
+  updateReadKeys(requested: boolean): i32 {
+    const advanced: boolean =
+      this.readHash === SHA384_SIZE
+        ? tlsClientAdvanceHeld(this.readProtection, this.readTraffic384)
+        : this.readHash !== 0 && tlsClientAdvanceHeld(this.readProtection, this.readTraffic256)
+    if (!advanced) {
+      return TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+    }
+    if (requested) {
+      this.keyUpdateDue = true
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Picks up what `TlsClient` did with the last bytes or the caller's
+   * verdict: the read keys of each level as they appear, and the end of the
+   * server's flight, after which its handshake secrets have done their work
+   * and are wiped in `TlsClient`.
+   */
+  advance(): void {
+    const tls: TlsClient = this.tls
+    if (this.readLevel === TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL && tls.readKnown(TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE)) {
+      if (!tlsClientInstallHeld(this.readProtection, tls.suite, tls.secrets().serverHandshake)) {
+        this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+        return
+      }
+      this.readLevel = TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
+    }
+    if (tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED && this.readLevel === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE) {
+      // The server's Finished is verified: the handshake secret and the
+      // server's handshake secret are done with.
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE)
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_SERVER_HANDSHAKE)
+      if (!this.keepRead()) {
+        this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+        return
+      }
+      this.readLevel = TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+      if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE) {
+        this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN
+      }
+    }
+    this.pump()
+  }
+
+  /** Whether `need` more bytes fit in `output`, moving what is unsent to the front first. */
+  outputHasRoom(need: i32): boolean {
+    const capacity: i32 = TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_OUTPUT_SIZE
+    if (this.outputEnd + need > capacity && this.outputStart > 0) {
+      const held: i32 = this.outputEnd - this.outputStart
+      for (let k: i32 = 0; k < held && this.outputStart + k < toI32(this.output.length); k++) {
+        this.output[k] = this.output[this.outputStart + k]
+      }
+      this.outputStart = 0
+      this.outputEnd = held
+    }
+    return this.outputEnd + need <= capacity
+  }
+
+  /** The most content one record may carry under the write protection as it stands (§5.4). */
+  maxChunk(): i32 {
+    return TLS_MAX_PLAINTEXT - this.writePadding()
+  }
+
+  /** The padding the next record carries: `padding` once records are protected, none in the clear. */
+  writePadding(): i32 {
+    return this.writeProtection.isProtected() ? this.padding : 0
+  }
+
+  /** The room a record of `len` content bytes takes in `output` under the write protection as it stands. */
+  recordRoom(len: i32): i32 {
+    if (!this.writeProtection.isProtected()) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE + len
+    }
+    return TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE + len + 1 + this.writePadding() + TLS_RECORD_TAG_SIZE
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Seals one record of `type` from `data[off .. off + len)` onto `output`
+   * under `protection`. False, writing nothing, when it does not fit; a
+   * refusal from `seal` itself fails the connection.
+   */
+  sealWith(protection: TlsRecordProtection, type: i32, data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): boolean {
+    const sealed: boolean = protection.isProtected()
+    const padding: i32 = sealed ? this.padding : 0
+    const room: i32 = sealed
+      ? TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE + len + 1 + padding + TLS_RECORD_TAG_SIZE
+      : TLS_RECORD_HEADER_SIZE + len
+    if (!this.outputHasRoom(room)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    const n: i32 = protection.seal(type, data, off, len, padding, this.output, this.outputEnd)
+    if (n < 0) {
+      this.fail(-n)
+      return false
+    }
+    this.outputEnd = this.outputEnd + n
+    return true
+  }
+
+  /** `sealWith` under the write protection. */
+  sealRecord(type: i32, data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): boolean {
+    return this.sealWith(this.writeProtection, type, data, off, len)
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The compatibility `change_cipher_spec` (§D.4), in the clear whatever the
+   * write side is under, once a connection. False when `output` has no room.
+   */
+  sealChangeCipherSpec(): boolean {
+    if (this.ccsSent) {
+      return true
+    }
+    const ccs: u8[] = [toU8(1)]
+    const one: i32 = 1
+    // `recordRoom` counts the protected size, which is more than the clear record needs.
+    if (
+      !this.sealWith(this.clearProtection, TLS_CONTENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ccs, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, one)
+    ) {
+      return false
+    }
+    this.ccsSent = true
+    return true
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Seals as much of `queue[at .. length)` as fits, in records of at most
+   * `maxChunk()` bytes, and answers where it stopped. A padding that leaves
+   * no room for content fails the connection with `internal_error`.
+   */
+  sealQueue(queue: u8[], at: i32, length: i32): i32 {
+    let next: i32 = at
+    const most: i32 = this.maxChunk()
+    if (most < 1 && next < length) {
+      this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+      return next
+    }
+    while (next < length && this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED) {
+      const left: i32 = length - next
+      const chunk: i32 = left < most ? left : most
+      if (!this.sealRecord(TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE, queue, next, chunk)) {
+        return next
+      }
+      next = next + chunk
+    }
+    return next
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Moves what is owed onto `output` as far as it fits, in the order the
+   * server must read it: the ClientHellos in the clear (the compatibility
+   * record before a second one), the compatibility record and the handshake
+   * write keys once they are known, the client's Finished under them, and
+   * then the switch to the application keys, with the client's handshake and
+   * application secrets wiped in `TlsClient` once they are installed here. A
+   * KeyUpdate owed to the server goes last.
+   */
+  pump(): void {
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED) {
+      this.sealClose()
+      return
+    }
+    const tls: TlsClient = this.tls
+    if (tls.outputInitialLength > 0) {
+      // §D.4: after a HelloRetryRequest the record goes before the second ClientHello.
+      if (tls.retried && !this.sealChangeCipherSpec()) {
+        return
+      }
+      this.pendingInitialAt = this.sealQueue(
+        tls.outputInitial,
+        this.pendingInitialAt,
+        tls.outputInitialLength
+      )
+      if (this.pendingInitialAt < tls.outputInitialLength) {
+        return
+      }
+      tls.clearOutput(TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL)
+      this.pendingInitialAt = 0
+    }
+    // Everything the client sends after its ServerHello is read is under the
+    // handshake keys, an alert included, so they go in as soon as they are
+    // known; the compatibility record, in the clear, goes first.
+    if (this.writeLevel === TLS_LEVEL_INITIAL && tls.writeKnown(TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE)) {
+      if (!this.sealChangeCipherSpec()) {
+        return
+      }
+      if (!tlsClientInstallHeld(this.writeProtection, tls.suite, tls.secrets().clientHandshake)) {
+        this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+        return
+      }
+      this.writeLevel = TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
+    }
+    if (this.writeLevel === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE && tls.outputHandshakeLength > 0) {
+      this.pendingHandshakeAt = this.sealQueue(
+        tls.outputHandshake,
+        this.pendingHandshakeAt,
+        tls.outputHandshakeLength
+      )
+      if (this.pendingHandshakeAt < tls.outputHandshakeLength) {
+        return
+      }
+      tls.clearOutput(TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE)
+      this.pendingHandshakeAt = 0
+    }
+    if (this.writeLevel === TLS_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE && tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_CONNECTED) {
+      // The client's Finished is sealed: its handshake secret is done with.
+      tls.wipeSecret(TLS_SECRET_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE)
+      if (!this.keepWrite()) {
+        this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+        return
+      }
+      this.writeLevel = TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+    }
+    if (this.keyUpdateDue && this.writeLevel === TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION && this.sendKeyUpdate(false)) {
+      this.keyUpdateDue = false
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Seals a KeyUpdate under the current write keys and moves the write side
+   * to the next secret (§4.6.3, §7.2), the old one wiped. False, sending
+   * nothing, when it does not fit in `output` yet.
+   */
+  sendKeyUpdate(request: boolean): boolean {
+    const message: u8[] = [toU8(TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE), toU8(0), toU8(0), toU8(1), toU8(request ? 1 : 0)]
+    if (!this.sealRecord(TLS_CONTENT_HANDSHAKE, message, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, TLS_KEY_UPDATE_SIZE)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    const advanced: boolean =
+      this.writeHash === SHA384_SIZE
+        ? tlsClientAdvanceHeld(this.writeProtection, this.writeTraffic384)
+        : this.writeHash !== 0 && tlsClientAdvanceHeld(this.writeProtection, this.writeTraffic256)
+    if (!advanced) {
+      this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+      return false
+    }
+    return true
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Sends a KeyUpdate now, asking the server to update too when
+   * `requestPeer` (§4.6.3). Answers 0, `TLS_RECORD_AGAIN` while the handshake
+   * is under way or `output` is full, `TLS_RECORD_PIPE` once the client has
+   * closed or the connection failed, or `TLS_RECORD_RESET` when the next keys
+   * do not install.
+   */
+  keyUpdate(requestPeer: boolean): i32 {
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED || this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_PIPE
+    }
+    this.pump()
+    if (this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN || this.writeLevel !== TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? TLS_RECORD_RESET : TLS_RECORD_AGAIN
+    }
+    if (this.keyUpdateDue || !this.sendKeyUpdate(requestPeer)) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? TLS_RECORD_RESET : TLS_RECORD_AGAIN
+    }
+    return 0
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Fails the connection with `alert`, sent as a fatal alert under whatever
+   * the client writes with now. What was still owed is dropped, and once the
+   * alert is sealed every key the connection holds is wiped.
+   */
+  fail(alert: i32): void {
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return
+    }
+    const closed: boolean = this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED
+    this.dropPending()
+    this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED
+    this.alert = alert
+    // A client that has sent its close_notify sends nothing after it (§6.1).
+    if (!closed) {
+      this.sendAlert(TLS_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert)
+    }
+    this.wipe()
+  }
+
+  /** Seals an alert record of `level` and `description`; false, sending nothing, when `output` has no room for it. */
+  sendAlert(level: i32, description: i32): boolean {
+    const body: u8[] = [toU8(level), toU8(description)]
+    const two: i32 = 2
+    return this.sealRecord(TLS_CONTENT_ALERT, body, TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM, two)
+  }
+
+  /** Lets the first `n` bytes of `output` go, once the socket has taken them, and seals what was waiting for the room. */
+  consume(n: i32): void {
+    const held: i32 = this.outputEnd - this.outputStart
+    let take: i32 = n < held ? n : held
+    if (take < 0) {
+      take = 0
+    }
+    this.outputStart = this.outputStart + take
+    if (this.outputStart === this.outputEnd) {
+      this.outputStart = 0
+      this.outputEnd = 0
+    }
+    this.pump()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Application data for the server, `data[off .. off + len)`: seals as much
+   * as fits, in records of at most 2^14 bytes, and answers how much that
+   * was. A KeyUpdate goes first when the key has protected `recordLimit`
+   * records, or the server asked for one. `TLS_RECORD_AGAIN` while the
+   * handshake is under way or nothing fits, `TLS_RECORD_PIPE` once the client
+   * has closed or the connection failed, `TLS_RECORD_INVALID` for a window
+   * outside `data`.
+   */
+  write(data: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): i32 {
+    if (!tlsRecordWindowFits(toI32(data.length), off, len)) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_INVALID
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED || this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_PIPE
+    }
+    this.pump()
+    if (
+      this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN ||
+      this.keyUpdateDue ||
+      this.writeLevel !== TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+    ) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? TLS_RECORD_RESET : TLS_RECORD_AGAIN
+    }
+    let done: i32 = 0
+    while (done < len && this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN) {
+      if (this.writeProtection.sequence >= this.writeProtection.recordLimit && !this.sendKeyUpdate(false)) {
+        break
+      }
+      const most: i32 = this.maxChunk()
+      if (most < 1) {
+        this.fail(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+        break
+      }
+      const left: i32 = len - done
+      let chunk: i32 = left < most ? left : most
+      this.outputHasRoom(this.recordRoom(chunk))
+      const room: i32 =
+        TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_OUTPUT_SIZE - this.outputEnd - this.recordRoom(TLS_RECORD_CLIENT_FROM)
+      if (room < chunk) {
+        chunk = room
+      }
+      if (chunk <= 0 || !this.sealRecord(TLS_CONTENT_APPLICATION_DATA, data, off + done, chunk)) {
+        break
+      }
+      done = done + chunk
+    }
+    if (done === 0 && len > 0) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? TLS_RECORD_RESET : TLS_RECORD_AGAIN
+    }
+    return done
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Application data from the server, into `buf[off .. off + len)`: the
+   * count; 0 at the end of its stream (its `close_notify`) or for a `len` of
+   * 0; `TLS_RECORD_AGAIN` when nothing is waiting; `TLS_RECORD_RESET` once
+   * the connection has failed; `TLS_RECORD_INVALID` for a window outside
+   * `buf`.
+   */
+  read(buf: u8[], off: i32, len: i32): i32 {
+    if (!tlsRecordWindowFits(toI32(buf.length), off, len)) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_INVALID
+    }
+    if (len === 0) {
+      return 0
+    }
+    const avail: i32 = this.plainEnd - this.plainStart
+    if (avail > 0) {
+      const n: i32 = avail < len ? avail : len
+      for (let k: i32 = 0; k < n && off + k < toI32(buf.length); k++) {
+        buf[off + k] = this.plain[this.plainStart + k]
+      }
+      this.plainStart = this.plainStart + n
+      if (this.plainStart === this.plainEnd) {
+        this.plainStart = 0
+        this.plainEnd = 0
+      }
+      this.process()
+      return n
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED) {
+      return TLS_RECORD_RESET
+    }
+    return this.peerClosed ? 0 : TLS_RECORD_AGAIN
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Closes the client's side (§6.1): a `close_notify`, after which `write`
+   * answers `TLS_RECORD_PIPE`. Application data already written stays ahead
+   * of the alert; the write keys are wiped once it is sealed. Closed before
+   * the handshake is done — before the client's Finished is sealed — the
+   * client reads nothing more, and the read keys and everything `TlsClient`
+   * holds are wiped at once. Nothing happens once
+   * the connection has failed or closed.
+   */
+  close(): void {
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED || this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED) {
+      return
+    }
+    this.dropPending()
+    // Until the client's Finished is sealed the handshake is not done, even
+    // once the server's Finished has opened the connection, and now it never
+    // will be.
+    if (this.writeLevel !== TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION) {
+      this.wipeRead()
+      this.tls.wipe()
+    }
+    this.state = TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED
+    this.closeDue = true
+    this.sealClose()
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the client closed before its Finished was sealed, so the server's records are not read. */
+  abandoned(): boolean {
+    return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED && this.writeLevel !== TLS_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+  }
+
+  /** Seals the `close_notify` `close` owes once `output` has room, then wipes the write direction. */
+  sealClose(): void {
+    if (this.closeDue && this.sendAlert(TLS_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, TLS_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) {
+      this.closeDue = false
+      this.wipeWrite()
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The caller's verdict on the server's certificate chain and
+   * CertificateVerify, while `interest` says `TLS_RECORD_AUTH`
+   * (`TlsClient.authenticate`): `true` reads on to the server's Finished and
+   * seals the client's; `false` fails the connection with `bad_certificate`
+   * sent. Answers 0, or a non-zero alert once the connection has failed
+   * (`failure`) — a verdict given before one is due answers
+   * `internal_error`.
+   */
+  authenticate(ok: boolean): i32 {
+    if (this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? this.failure() : TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+    }
+    const alert: i32 = this.tls.authenticate(ok)
+    if (alert !== 0) {
+      this.fail(alert)
+      return alert
+    }
+    this.advance()
+    this.process()
+    return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? this.failure() : 0
+  }
+
+  /** Refuses the server with the caller's `alert` (`TlsClient.reject`), sent; answers the alert. */
+  reject(alert: i32): i32 {
+    if (this.state !== TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE) {
+      return this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED ? this.failure() : TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+    }
+    const sent: i32 = this.tls.reject(alert)
+    this.fail(sent)
+    return sent
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Why a failed connection failed, never 0: the alert the client sent, else
+   * the server's error alert, else `internal_error` for a failure with no
+   * alert of its own (truncation, `abort`, `close_notify` mid-handshake).
+   */
+  failure(): i32 {
+    if (this.alert !== 0) {
+      return this.alert
+    }
+    return this.peerAlert > 0 ? this.peerAlert : TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * What the connection wants next, as `TLS_RECORD_*` bits: read the socket,
+   * write it, `read`, the caller's verdict on the server (`TLS_RECORD_AUTH`),
+   * or nothing more ever (`TLS_RECORD_DONE`).
+   */
+  interest(): i32 {
+    let bits: i32 = 0
+    const sending: boolean = this.outputEnd > this.outputStart || this.closeDue
+    if (sending) {
+      bits = bits | TLS_RECORD_WANT_WRITE
+    }
+    const failed: boolean = this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_FAILED
+    if ((failed || this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_CLOSED) && !sending) {
+      bits = bits | TLS_RECORD_DONE
+    }
+    const live: boolean = this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE || this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_OPEN
+    const blocked: boolean = this.reader.next() > 0
+    if (live && !this.peerClosed && !this.ended && !blocked && this.reader.space() > 0) {
+      bits = bits | TLS_RECORD_WANT_READ
+    }
+    if (this.plainEnd > this.plainStart || (this.peerClosed && live)) {
+      bits = bits | TLS_RECORD_DATA
+    }
+    if (this.state === TLS_RECORD_STATE_HANDSHAKE && this.tls.state === TLS_CLIENT_STATE_WAIT_AUTH) {
+      bits = bits | TLS_RECORD_AUTH
+    }
+    return bits
+  }
+}