@alfe.ai/mcp-server 0.2.3 → 0.2.5

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -5,40 +5,111 @@ import { ChangelogEntry, EncryptedEnvelopeV1, FieldEnvelope, FieldFormat, FieldS
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=tool-error-capture.d.ts.map
 //#endregion
-//#region src/index.d.ts
+//#region src/transport.d.ts
+/**
+ * Shared HTTP transport for the Agent API client — request core, retry
+ * policy, error formatting, and the `ApiBase` class the domain method
+ * groups under `./domains/` build on.
+ */
 interface AgentApiClientConfig {
   apiKey: string;
   apiUrl: string;
 }
 /**
- * The broad-news providers behind the metered `services/news` Lambda. The
- * server validates this with a zod enum; a value outside the union is an
- * unpriceable product, so keep the literal union in lockstep with the service.
+ * Encode each path segment but keep the `/` separators — `encodeURIComponent`
+ * would escape the slashes too, breaking greedy proxy routes.
  */
-type NewsProvider = "apitube" | "newsdata";
-/** One normalized article. `sentiment` is provider-shaped (APITube supplies it). */
-interface NewsArticle {
-  title: string;
-  url: string;
-  source: string;
-  publishedAt: string;
-  snippet: string;
-  sentiment?: unknown;
+
+declare class AgentApiTransport {
+  private readonly apiKey;
+  private readonly apiUrl;
+  constructor(config: AgentApiClientConfig);
+  /**
+   * Binary sibling of `request<T>()`. `request()` forces
+   * `Content-Type: application/json` and parses a `{ data: T }` envelope,
+   * neither of which fits a raw-audio flow (voice TTS/STT), so those go
+   * through this instead. Auth (Bearer), the request budget, and the single
+   * retry on transient 5xx / network errors are kept in sync with
+   * `request()`. Retries fire only on statuses produced BEFORE the route
+   * handler runs (authorizer-timeout 500 + LB 502/503/504), so re-issuing a
+   * POST does not risk a duplicate side effect.
+   */
+  rawRequest(path: string, init: {
+    method: string;
+    headers: Headers;
+    body?: BodyInit | Uint8Array;
+  }): Promise<Response>;
+  /**
+   * @param extra.timeoutMs Per-request abort timeout (default REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS).
+   *   Long endpoints (image generation) pass a larger value so the gateway's
+   *   own timeout wins with a readable status instead of a client-side abort.
+   * @param extra.retry Whether to retry once on transient failures (default
+   *   true). Expensive/non-idempotent endpoints pass false.
+   */
+  request<T>(path: string, options?: RequestInit, extra?: {
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    retry?: boolean;
+  }): Promise<T>;
 }
-/** Provider-agnostic result — the server normalizes every adapter to this. */
-interface NewsResult {
-  articles: NewsArticle[];
-  provider: string;
+/**
+ * Base class for the domain method groups. Holds the shared transport;
+ * `AgentApiClient` assembles the groups onto one class via `applyMixins`
+ * (prototype copy), so methods keep their original `this`-on-the-client
+ * call shape.
+ */
+declare class ApiBase {
+  protected readonly transport: AgentApiTransport;
+  constructor(transport: AgentApiTransport);
 }
-interface RemoteSessionInfo {
-  sessionId: string;
-  agentId: string;
-  surface: "browser" | "terminal";
-  status: "agent_driving" | "awaiting_human" | "human_in_control" | "resuming" | "completed" | "expired" | "failed";
-  url?: string;
-  instructions?: string;
-  requestedAt?: string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=transport.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/workspace.d.ts
+/** Response of GET /agents/me/workspace (services/agents). */
+interface AgentWorkspaceInfo {
+  templateKey?: string;
+  defaultModel?: string;
+  installedFrom?: {
+    templateKey: string;
+    authorTenantId: string;
+    version: number;
+  };
+  runtime?: string;
+  teams?: {
+    teamId: string;
+    name: string;
+    description?: string;
+    parentTeamId?: string;
+  }[];
+  projects?: {
+    projectId: string;
+    name: string;
+    description?: string;
+    status: string;
+    parentProjectId?: string;
+  }[];
+  teamIds?: string[];
+  projectIds?: string[];
+}
+declare class WorkspaceApi extends ApiBase {
+  /**
+   * GET /agents/me/workspace — workspace config for the authenticated agent
+   * (template assignment, default model, org roster).
+   */
+  getWorkspace(): Promise<AgentWorkspaceInfo>;
+  /**
+   * GET /templates/{key}/files — persona/workspace file contents for a
+   * template the agent has access to. Pass `version` to pin to the version
+   * the agent was installed from (omit → the endpoint resolves `latest`).
+   */
+  getTemplateFiles(templateKey: string, opts?: {
+    version?: number;
+  }): Promise<{
+    files: Record<string, string>;
+  }>;
 }
+//# sourceMappingURL=workspace.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/sync.d.ts
 interface SyncAgentInfo {
   agentId: string;
   tenantId: string;
@@ -123,6 +194,63 @@ interface SharedFileEntry {
   size: number;
   contentType?: string;
 }
+declare class SyncApi extends ApiBase {
+  syncRegister(args?: {
+    displayName?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    agent: SyncAgentInfo;
+  }>;
+  syncGetManifest(): Promise<SyncManifest>;
+  syncPresign(args: {
+    files: {
+      path: string;
+      operation: "put" | "get";
+      contentType?: string;
+    }[];
+  }): Promise<{
+    urls: SyncPresignedUrl[];
+  }>;
+  syncConfirmUpload(args: {
+    filePath: string;
+    hash: string;
+    size: number;
+    storageClass?: "STANDARD" | "GLACIER_IR";
+  }): Promise<SyncConfirmedUpload>;
+  syncReconstruct(args: {
+    mode: "full" | "active" | "memory";
+  }): Promise<SyncReconstructBundle>;
+  syncGetStats(): Promise<SyncAgentStats>;
+  syncListFiles(args?: {
+    prefix?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    files: SyncFileEntry[];
+  }>;
+  syncListSessions(): Promise<{
+    sessions: SyncSessionEntry[];
+  }>;
+  syncGetSession(sessionId: string): Promise<SyncSessionContent>;
+  syncDeleteFile(filePath: string): Promise<{
+    removed: boolean;
+  }>;
+  sharedListFiles(args: {
+    scope: "org" | "team" | "project";
+    scopeId: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    files: SharedFileEntry[];
+    nextCursor: string | null;
+  }>;
+  sharedDownloadUrl(args: {
+    scope: "org" | "team" | "project";
+    scopeId: string;
+    filePath: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    downloadUrl: string;
+    expiresIn: number;
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sync.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/knowledge.d.ts
 type KnowledgeScopeType = "org" | "team" | "project";
 interface KnowledgeScope {
   scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType;
@@ -165,15 +293,6 @@ interface KnowledgeProfile {
   updatedAt: string | null;
   updatedBy: string | null;
 }
-interface KnowledgeDoc {
-  filePath: string;
-  fileName: string;
-  contentType?: string;
-  size: number;
-  uploadedBy?: string;
-  createdAt: string;
-  updatedAt: string;
-}
 type ChangeRequestResourceType = "doc" | "profile";
 type ChangeRequestOperation = "create" | "update" | "delete";
 type ChangeRequestStatus = "open" | "approved" | "rejected" | "withdrawn" | "superseded";
@@ -215,6 +334,202 @@ interface ProposeScopeChangeInput {
   /** profile: the proposed value ({ about, description, links }). */
   proposedValue?: unknown;
 }
+interface KnowledgeDoc {
+  filePath: string;
+  fileName: string;
+  contentType?: string;
+  size: number;
+  uploadedBy?: string;
+  createdAt: string;
+  updatedAt: string;
+}
+declare class KnowledgeApi extends ApiBase {
+  /**
+   * Semantic search across the agent's member scopes. Fan-out is gated
+   * server-side by `listScopes` set-inclusion (fail-closed). Pass
+   * `scopeType` + `scopeId` to narrow to one scope; a non-member scope
+   * yields empty results (never a cross-scope leak).
+   */
+  knowledgeSearch(query: string, opts?: {
+    limit?: number;
+    scopeType?: KnowledgeScopeType;
+    scopeId?: string;
+  }): Promise<KnowledgeSearchResult>;
+  /** Enumerate the scopes (org + teams + projects) this agent belongs to. */
+  listScopes(): Promise<{
+    scopes: KnowledgeScope[];
+  }>;
+  /** Read a scope's structured knowledge profile (after membership check). */
+  getScopeProfile(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string): Promise<KnowledgeProfile>;
+  /**
+   * Open a change request against a scope's knowledge resource. For a doc
+   * create/update, `services/org` returns a presigned staging PUT; this method
+   * uploads the proposed `content` to it (echoing the same Content-Type that
+   * was signed), mirroring `writeScopeDoc`. The staged body is applied to the
+   * canonical doc — attributed to this agent — only when a reviewer approves.
+   */
+  proposeScopeChange(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, input: ProposeScopeChangeInput): Promise<KnowledgeChangeRequest>;
+  /**
+   * List the agent's OWN change requests in a scope (filtered server-side to
+   * this agent as proposer). Pass `status` to narrow to open / approved / etc.
+   */
+  listScopeChangeRequests(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, opts?: {
+    status?: ChangeRequestStatus;
+    limit?: number;
+    cursor?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    changeRequests: KnowledgeChangeRequest[];
+    nextCursor: string | null;
+  }>;
+  /** List a scope's docs (the org-files corpus; mirrored to shared/<scope>/). */
+  listScopeDocs(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, opts?: {
+    limit?: number;
+    cursor?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    files: KnowledgeDoc[];
+    nextCursor: string | null;
+  }>;
+  /**
+   * Read the full text of a scope doc. Resolves a presigned download URL
+   * from `services/org`, then fetches the bytes directly from S3 (the one
+   * legitimate raw fetch in a plugin — same pattern as sync).
+   */
+  readScopeDoc(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, filePath: string): Promise<{
+    filePath: string;
+    text: string;
+  }>;
+  /**
+   * Write (create or overwrite) a scope doc. Two-step presigned upload:
+   * `services/org` returns a signed URL plus `requiredHeaders` (author /
+   * authorKind / message as `x-amz-meta-*`) that MUST be sent verbatim on
+   * the PUT, alongside the same `Content-Type` that was signed. Author and
+   * authorKind are server-set from the agent token — never trusted here.
+   */
+  writeScopeDoc(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, filePath: string, content: string, opts?: {
+    contentType?: string;
+    message?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    filePath: string;
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=knowledge.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/mobile.d.ts
+/** Response of GET /mobile/numbers for an agent (services/mobile). */
+interface MobileNumberInfo {
+  phoneNumber: string;
+  countryCode: string;
+  monthlyPrice?: number;
+  status: string;
+  errorMessage?: string;
+}
+/** One purchasable number from GET /mobile/numbers/search. */
+interface MobileAvailableNumber {
+  number: string;
+  friendlyName: string;
+  locality: string;
+  region: string;
+  country: string;
+}
+/** Approved WhatsApp content template from GET /mobile/whatsapp/templates. */
+interface WhatsAppTemplate {
+  sid: string;
+  friendlyName: string;
+  language: string;
+  body: string;
+  variables: Record<string, string>;
+  dateCreated: string;
+  dateUpdated: string;
+  approvalStatus?: string;
+  rejectionReason?: string;
+  category?: string;
+}
+declare class MobileApi extends ApiBase {
+  getMobileNumber(): Promise<MobileNumberInfo>;
+  searchMobileNumbers(args?: {
+    country?: string;
+    query?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    numbers: MobileAvailableNumber[];
+    monthlyPrice: number;
+  }>;
+  assignMobileNumber(args: {
+    phoneNumber: string;
+    countryCode: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    phoneNumber: string;
+    countryCode: string;
+    status: "pending";
+  }>;
+  releaseMobileNumber(): Promise<{
+    released: true;
+  }>;
+  sendSms(args: {
+    to: string;
+    body: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    sent: true;
+    sid: string;
+  }>;
+  startOutboundCall(args: {
+    to: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    callSid: string;
+    status: string;
+  }>;
+  getWhatsAppSession(to: string): Promise<{
+    active: boolean;
+    expiresAt?: string;
+  }>;
+  sendWhatsAppMessage(args: {
+    to: string;
+    body: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    sent: true;
+    sid: string;
+  }>;
+  sendWhatsAppTemplate(args: {
+    to: string;
+    contentSid: string;
+    contentVariables: Record<string, string>;
+    bodyPreview?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    sent: true;
+    sid: string;
+  }>;
+  listWhatsAppTemplates(): Promise<{
+    templates: WhatsAppTemplate[];
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=mobile.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/remote.d.ts
+interface RemoteSessionInfo {
+  sessionId: string;
+  agentId: string;
+  surface: "browser" | "terminal";
+  status: "agent_driving" | "awaiting_human" | "human_in_control" | "resuming" | "completed" | "expired" | "failed";
+  url?: string;
+  instructions?: string;
+  requestedAt?: string;
+}
+declare class RemoteApi extends ApiBase {
+  requestBrowserTakeover(args: {
+    instructions: string;
+    url?: string;
+    conversationId?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    sessionId: string;
+    status: string;
+  }>;
+  getRemoteSession(sessionId: string): Promise<RemoteSessionInfo>;
+  completeRemoteSession(sessionId: string): Promise<{
+    ok: boolean;
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=remote.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/self.d.ts
 /** Voice settings — core agent config. Mirrors `VoiceConfig` in `@alfe/types`. */
 interface AgentVoiceConfig {
   /** ElevenLabs voice ID; platform default when unset. */
@@ -256,15 +571,54 @@ interface AgentVoice {
   labels: Record<string, string>;
   category: string;
 }
-/** The ElevenLabs models with a pricing row — the TTS endpoint rejects any other value. */
-type VoiceTtsModel = "eleven_turbo_v2_5" | "eleven_multilingual_v2";
-interface VoiceTtsArgs {
-  /** Text to synthesize (1–5000 chars — the endpoint enforces this). */
-  text: string;
-  /** ElevenLabs voice id; platform default when unset. */
-  voiceId?: string;
-  /** TTS model; `eleven_turbo_v2_5` (lower latency) when unset. */
-  model?: VoiceTtsModel;
+declare class SelfApi extends ApiBase {
+  /** Update the agent's own name and/or voice config. Returns the updated agent. */
+  updateSelf(update: {
+    name?: string;
+    voiceConfig?: AgentVoiceConfig;
+  }): Promise<AgentSelf>;
+  /**
+   * Generate the agent's own avatar from a text prompt. The image is generated,
+   * stored, and set on the agent server-side; returns the updated agent.
+   *
+   * ASYNC (same reason as `generateImage`): avatar gen runs `gpt-image-1`
+   * (30–60s) which exceeds the API Gateway 30s ceiling, so this enqueues a job
+   * (`POST /agent/avatar/generate` → `jobId`) then polls (`GET /agent/avatar/{jobId}`)
+   * until the avatar is set. Signature unchanged — the plugin is unaffected.
+   */
+  generateAvatar(args: {
+    prompt: string;
+  }): Promise<AgentSelf>;
+  /**
+   * Get a presigned PUT URL to upload a new avatar image. Upload the bytes to
+   * `uploadUrl`, then call `finalizeAvatar(s3Key)` to set it on the agent.
+   */
+  presignAvatar(args: {
+    mimeType: string;
+    size: number;
+  }): Promise<AgentAvatarPresign>;
+  /**
+   * Finalize an avatar upload — validates ownership + size, then sets the
+   * agent's `avatarUrl` server-side. Returns the updated agent.
+   */
+  finalizeAvatar(s3Key: string): Promise<AgentSelf>;
+  /** List the platform voice catalogue (ElevenLabs) so the agent can pick its own voice. */
+  listVoices(): Promise<{
+    voices: AgentVoice[];
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=self.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/voice.d.ts
+/** The ElevenLabs models with a pricing row — the TTS endpoint rejects any other value. */
+type VoiceTtsModel = "eleven_turbo_v2_5" | "eleven_multilingual_v2";
+interface VoiceTtsArgs {
+  /** Text to synthesize (1–5000 chars — the endpoint enforces this). */
+  text: string;
+  /** ElevenLabs voice id; platform default when unset. */
+  voiceId?: string;
+  /** TTS model; `eleven_turbo_v2_5` (lower latency) when unset. */
+  model?: VoiceTtsModel;
 }
 /** Raw synthesized audio plus its PCM framing (from the response headers). */
 interface VoiceTtsResult {
@@ -288,84 +642,112 @@ interface VoiceSttResult {
   /** Deepgram confidence in (0,1]. */
   confidence: number;
 }
-declare class AgentApiClient {
-  private readonly apiKey;
-  private readonly apiUrl;
-  constructor(config: AgentApiClientConfig);
-  private request;
-  syncRegister(args?: {
-    displayName?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    agent: SyncAgentInfo;
-  }>;
-  syncGetManifest(): Promise<SyncManifest>;
-  syncPresign(args: {
-    files: {
-      path: string;
-      operation: "put" | "get";
-      contentType?: string;
-    }[];
-  }): Promise<{
-    urls: SyncPresignedUrl[];
-  }>;
-  syncConfirmUpload(args: {
-    filePath: string;
-    hash: string;
+declare class VoiceApi extends ApiBase {
+  /**
+   * Text-to-speech. Returns raw PCM audio bytes plus their framing — the
+   * voice service defaults to 24 kHz / mono / 16-bit. Wrap in a WAV container
+   * to produce a playable file. Metered per character against the tenant
+   * credit pool server-side; TTS completes regardless of metering outcome.
+   */
+  tts(args: VoiceTtsArgs): Promise<VoiceTtsResult>;
+  /**
+   * Speech-to-text. Accepts raw linear16 (16-bit LE) mono PCM — NOT a WAV or
+   * other container (the endpoint transcribes with a fixed linear16 encoding,
+   * so a container header would be transcribed as noise). Strip any WAV header
+   * and pass `sampleRate` from it before calling. Metered by transcribed
+   * duration against the tenant credit pool server-side.
+   */
+  stt(args: VoiceSttArgs): Promise<VoiceSttResult>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=voice.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/search.d.ts
+/**
+ * The broad-news providers behind the metered `services/news` Lambda. The
+ * server validates this with a zod enum; a value outside the union is an
+ * unpriceable product, so keep the literal union in lockstep with the service.
+ */
+type NewsProvider = "apitube" | "newsdata";
+/** One normalized article. `sentiment` is provider-shaped (APITube supplies it). */
+interface NewsArticle {
+  title: string;
+  url: string;
+  source: string;
+  publishedAt: string;
+  snippet: string;
+  sentiment?: unknown;
+}
+/** Provider-agnostic result — the server normalizes every adapter to this. */
+interface NewsResult {
+  articles: NewsArticle[];
+  provider: string;
+}
+declare class SearchApi extends ApiBase {
+  searchWeb(params: {
+    query: string;
+    count?: number;
+    offset?: number;
+    country?: string;
+    freshness?: string;
+  }): Promise<unknown>;
+  searchImages(params: {
+    query: string;
+    count?: number;
+  }): Promise<unknown>;
+  searchNews(params: {
+    query: string;
+    count?: number;
+    freshness?: string;
+  }): Promise<unknown>;
+  /** Search news across the selected provider's corpus. → POST /agent/news/search */
+  newsSearch(params: {
+    query: string;
+    provider?: NewsProvider;
+    source?: string;
+    from?: string;
+    to?: string;
+    language?: string;
+    category?: string;
+    limit?: number;
+  }): Promise<NewsResult>;
+  /** Top headlines for the selected provider. → POST /agent/news/headlines */
+  newsHeadlines(params?: {
+    provider?: NewsProvider;
+    category?: string;
+    source?: string;
+    language?: string;
+    limit?: number;
+  }): Promise<NewsResult>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=search.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/chat.d.ts
+declare class ChatApi extends ApiBase {
+  presignAttachments(files: {
+    filename: string;
+    mimeType: string;
     size: number;
-    storageClass?: "STANDARD" | "GLACIER_IR";
-  }): Promise<SyncConfirmedUpload>;
-  syncReconstruct(args: {
-    mode: "full" | "active" | "memory";
-  }): Promise<SyncReconstructBundle>;
-  syncGetStats(): Promise<SyncAgentStats>;
-  syncListFiles(args?: {
-    prefix?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    files: SyncFileEntry[];
-  }>;
-  syncListSessions(): Promise<{
-    sessions: SyncSessionEntry[];
-  }>;
-  syncGetSession(sessionId: string): Promise<SyncSessionContent>;
-  syncDeleteFile(filePath: string): Promise<{
-    removed: boolean;
-  }>;
-  sharedListFiles(args: {
-    scope: "org" | "team" | "project";
-    scopeId: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    files: SharedFileEntry[];
-    nextCursor: string | null;
+  }[]): Promise<{
+    attachments: {
+      id: string;
+      uploadUrl: string;
+      downloadUrl: string;
+      s3Key: string;
+      expiresAt: string;
+    }[];
   }>;
-  sharedDownloadUrl(args: {
-    scope: "org" | "team" | "project";
-    scopeId: string;
-    filePath: string;
+  recordActivity(data: {
+    userId?: string;
+    channel: string;
+    role: "user" | "assistant";
   }): Promise<{
-    downloadUrl: string;
-    expiresIn: number;
-  }>;
-  listIntegrations(): Promise<IntegrationInstall[]>;
-  getIntegrationConfig(integrationId: string): Promise<IntegrationConfigResult>;
-  updateIntegrationConfig(integrationId: string, config: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void>;
-  installIntegration(integrationId: string, options?: {
-    version?: string;
-    config?: Record<string, unknown>;
-  }): Promise<IntegrationInstall>;
-  removeIntegration(integrationId: string): Promise<IntegrationInstall>;
-  getOAuthUrl(provider: string, scopes?: string[]): Promise<{
-    url: string;
-    provider: string;
-    expiresIn: number;
-  }>;
-  getOAuthStatus(provider: string): Promise<{
-    provider: string;
-    connected: boolean;
-    config?: Record<string, string>;
-  }>;
-  getRegistry(): Promise<{
-    integrations: RegistryEntry[];
+    recorded: boolean;
   }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=chat.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/connect-credentials.d.ts
+declare class ConnectCredentialsApi extends ApiBase {
   /**
    * Returns every connected Google account for the agent. Multi-account by
    * design — the openclaw-google plugin requires the LLM to pass `email`
@@ -422,90 +804,27 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     [key: string]: unknown;
   }>;
   /**
-   * Resolve the primary cTrader Connection's credentials for the calling
-   * agent. Unlike most providers, the cTrader Open API needs app-level auth
-   * (`clientId` + `clientSecret`) AND account auth (`accessToken` +
-   * `accountId`) on the socket, so `@alfe.ai/ctrader-mcp` self-fetches the
-   * full set here at startup (the atlassian/google pattern). `clientId` /
-   * `clientSecret` are the SST-sourced global app credentials the connect
-   * endpoint injects — they are never persisted on the connection. `host` is
-   * the resolved TLS endpoint (`live.ctraderapi.com` / `demo.ctraderapi.com`)
-   * derived from the selected account's live/demo flag.
+   * @deprecated Returns a single primary credential blob (legacy "pick-the-
+   * default-connection" shape). Use `getGithubAccounts()` for the multi-
+   * account shape required by Pattern A — explicit selector args on every
+   * tool. Retained because the `@alfe.ai/github-mcp` proxy is the
+   * only consumer that knows about Pattern A; legacy env-interpolation
+   * callers will keep hitting `/credentials` until they move to the proxy.
    */
-  getCTraderCredentials(): Promise<{
+  getGithubCredentials(): Promise<{
+    login: string;
     accessToken: string;
-    refreshToken: string;
-    accountId: string;
-    host: string;
-    clientId: string;
-    clientSecret: string;
   }>;
   /**
-   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for cTrader.
+   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for GitHub.
    *
-   * Unlike atlassian/salesforce (one Connection row per account/site), a
-   * cTrader is MULTI-grant per agent: an agent may connect several distinct
-   * cTrader logins, each its own Connection row keyed on `accountIdentifier =
-   * ctid:<userId>` (Phase 1). This aggregates the *trading accounts* across
-   * ALL of those Connection rows — each row contributes its `availableAccounts`
-   * flattened, and every account carries ITS OWN grant's `accessToken` (the
-   * token that authenticates that account against the cTrader Open API). One
-   * OAuth grant still covers all accounts under that single login on one shared
-   * token; only the `ctidTraderAccountId` and the protobuf socket `host` (live
-   * vs demo) differ within a grant. Across grants the tokens differ, so the
-   * token is now PER-ACCOUNT rather than hoisted to the top level.
+   * Returns every agent-scoped GitHub connection. The caller is expected
+   * to require a `login` selector on every credential-touching tool and
+   * look up the matching account at dispatch time.
    *
-   * `host` per account is derived from the account's `isLive` flag
-   * (`live.ctraderapi.com` / `demo.ctraderapi.com`) — the same mapping the
-   * connect provider applies server-side when an account is auto-selected.
-   *
-   * `clientId` / `clientSecret` are the SST-sourced GLOBAL app credentials the
-   * connect endpoint injects — identical across every Connection row (one
-   * cTrader app), never persisted on a connection. We take them from the first
-   * row that carries them.
-   *
-   * Accounts are deduped on `ctidTraderAccountId` first-wins: Spotware ids are
-   * globally unique across logins, so a duplicate can only appear if the same
-   * account somehow surfaced under two grants — first-wins keeps it
-   * deterministic.
-   *
-   * `accounts` may be empty (no cTrader Connection at all), in which case we
-   * return empty creds rather than throwing.
-   */
-  getCTraderAccounts(): Promise<{
-    accounts: {
-      ctidTraderAccountId: string;
-      host: string;
-      isLive: boolean;
-      brokerName?: string;
-      accountNumber?: string;
-      accessToken: string;
-    }[];
-    clientId: string;
-    clientSecret: string;
-  }>;
-  /**
-   * @deprecated Returns a single primary credential blob (legacy "pick-the-
-   * default-connection" shape). Use `getGithubAccounts()` for the multi-
-   * account shape required by Pattern A — explicit selector args on every
-   * tool. Retained because the `@alfe.ai/github-mcp` proxy is the
-   * only consumer that knows about Pattern A; legacy env-interpolation
-   * callers will keep hitting `/credentials` until they move to the proxy.
-   */
-  getGithubCredentials(): Promise<{
-    login: string;
-    accessToken: string;
-  }>;
-  /**
-   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for GitHub.
-   *
-   * Returns every agent-scoped GitHub connection. The caller is expected
-   * to require a `login` selector on every credential-touching tool and
-   * look up the matching account at dispatch time.
-   *
-   * GitHub OAuth tokens have no expiry (`tokenLifecycle: "no_expiry"`),
-   * so there is intentionally no `refreshGithubAccountToken` method — if
-   * a token is revoked the user must re-run the OAuth flow.
+   * GitHub OAuth tokens have no expiry (`tokenLifecycle: "no_expiry"`),
+   * so there is intentionally no `refreshGithubAccountToken` method — if
+   * a token is revoked the user must re-run the OAuth flow.
    *
    * Returned `accounts[i].login` is the GitHub username — the stable
    * cross-session identifier the LLM should pass.
@@ -521,67 +840,6 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
       scopes: string;
     }[];
   }>;
-  /**
-   * Pattern A: provider-parameterized multi-account credential fetch for the
-   * social connectors (Bluesky, and the approval-gated backlog: X, Meta,
-   * Threads, LinkedIn, Pinterest, TikTok, Reddit, YouTube).
-   *
-   * Unlike the bespoke `getGithubAccounts()` / `getXeroAccounts()` shapes,
-   * this returns a UNIFORM normalized account shape so `@alfe.ai/social-mcp`'s
-   * shared driver can require a single `account` selector on every
-   * credential-touching tool regardless of platform. The backend
-   * `api-agents/{provider}/accounts` route is already provider-generic; this
-   * is the client-side normalization the plan (`do-we-need-any-moonlit-toucan`
-   * Phase 0, step 5) calls for.
-   *
-   * `accountIdentifier` is the stable per-account selector the LLM should
-   * pass back (for Bluesky: the account DID). `accessToken` carries whatever
-   * the provider's `buildCredentialsResponse` bundles (for Bluesky: the JSON
-   * session bundle — the driver parses the `accessJwt` out of it, or reads the
-   * top-level `accessJwt` from `providerMetadata`-adjacent fields). Everything
-   * else the driver needs for routing (handle, pdsHost, did, …) is on
-   * `providerMetadata`.
-   *
-   * Token refresh is delegated to connect (never done in-plugin) via the
-   * per-account route `POST /agent/connect/{provider}/accounts/{accountIdentifier}/refresh`
-   * — call `refreshSocialAccount(provider, accountIdentifier)`. (The non-account
-   * `POST /agent/connect/{provider}/refresh` route refreshes the provider's
-   * PRIMARY connection, which is wrong under multi-account Pattern A.)
-   */
-  getSocialAccounts(provider: string): Promise<{
-    provider: string;
-    accounts: {
-      connectionId: string;
-      accountIdentifier: string;
-      displayName: string | null;
-      accessToken: string;
-      providerMetadata: Record<string, unknown>;
-      connectedAt: string;
-    }[];
-  }>;
-  /**
-   * Pattern A: refresh a specific social Connection by its stable
-   * `accountIdentifier` (for Bluesky: the account DID) via the
-   * provider-generic per-account refresh route. The counterpart to
-   * `getSocialAccounts(provider)`; `@alfe.ai/social-mcp` calls this on a
-   * 401/ExpiredToken from the platform PDS/API, then re-fetches accounts to
-   * pick up the rotated bundle.
-   *
-   * Refresh itself is ALWAYS delegated to connect — the plugin never calls
-   * the platform's own refresh XRPC (e.g. `com.atproto.server.refreshSession`)
-   * because connect owns the encrypted refresh token + rotation persistence
-   * (Bluesky rotates the refreshJwt; a missed rotation kills the connection
-   * after one refresh). The returned `accessToken` is whatever the provider's
-   * `refreshToken` hook re-bundled (for Bluesky: the JSON session bundle with
-   * the fresh `accessJwt`) — callers typically ignore it and re-fetch via
-   * `getSocialAccounts` for a consistent shape.
-   */
-  refreshSocialAccount(provider: string, accountIdentifier: string): Promise<{
-    accountIdentifier: string;
-    accessToken: string;
-    accessTokenExpiresAt: string;
-    expiresAt: string;
-  }>;
   /**
    * @deprecated Returns a single primary credential blob (legacy "pick-the-
    * default-connection" shape). Use `getXeroAccounts()` for the multi-
@@ -817,67 +1075,6 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     accessTokenExpiresAt: string;
     expiresAt: string;
   }>;
-  /**
-   * @deprecated Returns a single primary credential blob. Use
-   * `getShopifyAccounts()` for the multi-account shape required by Pattern A
-   * (`@alfe.ai/shopify-mcp` keys per-shop on the myshopify domain).
-   */
-  getShopifyCredentials(): Promise<{
-    accessToken: string;
-    shopDomain: string;
-    shopGid: string;
-    shopName: string;
-    apiVersion: string;
-  }>;
-  /**
-   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for Shopify. Returns every
-   * agent-scoped Shopify Connection. One OAuth grant maps to one store, so the
-   * stable per-call selector is the store's myshopify domain (`shopDomain`),
-   * NOT `accountIdentifier` — the connect provider keys `accountIdentifier` on
-   * the immutable shop GID (falling back to the domain), so `shopDomain` is the
-   * value the LLM passes and the plugin routes on.
-   *
-   * Each entry is shaped by the connect provider's `buildCredentialsResponse`:
-   * `{ accessToken, shopDomain, shopGid, shopName, apiVersion }` — offline
-   * Shopify tokens never expire, so there is NO token / expiry field and no
-   * refresh method (unlike Salesforce). The GraphQL Admin API authenticates
-   * purely on `X-Shopify-Access-Token`; no client credentials are on the wire.
-   */
-  getShopifyAccounts(): Promise<{
-    accounts: {
-      connectionId: string;
-      accountIdentifier: string;
-      displayName: string | null;
-      connectedAt: string;
-      accessToken: string;
-      shopDomain: string;
-      shopGid: string;
-      shopName: string;
-      apiVersion: string;
-    }[];
-  }>;
-  /**
-   * Disconnects one connected Microsoft 365 account for the agent, by its
-   * `accountIdentifier`. Hits the generic per-account disconnect route
-   * (`DELETE /agent/connect/microsoft/accounts/{accountIdentifier}`), which
-   * resolves across the agent's full effective scope chain and deletes the
-   * matching Connection row. Returns the remaining accounts.
-   *
-   * IMPORTANT: pass the `accountIdentifier` from `getMicrosoftAccounts()`, NOT
-   * a synthesised email. For Microsoft, `accountIdentifier` is the user's email
-   * only when the Graph profile fetch succeeded at connect time; it falls back
-   * to the Azure tenant id (`tid` claim) otherwise. The backend matches on
-   * `accountIdentifier` exactly, so passing an email would 404 on those
-   * fallback-identifier accounts. (This is why the param is not named `email`,
-   * unlike `disconnectGoogleAccount` where the identifier is always the email.)
-   */
-  disconnectMicrosoftAccount(accountIdentifier: string): Promise<{
-    accounts: {
-      accountIdentifier: string;
-      displayName?: string;
-      connectedAt?: string;
-    }[];
-  }>;
   /**
    * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for Microsoft 365.
    *
@@ -928,242 +1125,213 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     accessTokenExpiresAt: string;
     expiresAt: string;
   }>;
-  getTeamsCredentials(): Promise<{
-    agentId: string;
-    tenantId: string;
-    azureAppId: string;
-    azureBotId: string;
-    azureClientSecret: string;
-    botDisplayName?: string;
-    teamsTenantId?: string;
-    serviceUrl?: string;
-  }>;
-  sendTeamsMessage(data: {
-    conversationId: string;
-    text?: string;
-    adaptiveCard?: Record<string, unknown>;
-  }): Promise<{
-    ok: boolean;
-    activityId: string;
-  }>;
-  listTeamsChannels(): Promise<{
-    channels: {
-      id: string;
-      name: string;
-      description?: string;
-    }[];
-  }>;
-  presignAttachments(files: {
-    filename: string;
-    mimeType: string;
-    size: number;
-  }[]): Promise<{
-    attachments: {
-      id: string;
-      uploadUrl: string;
-      downloadUrl: string;
-      s3Key: string;
-      expiresAt: string;
-    }[];
-  }>;
   /**
-   * Generate an image from a text prompt and get back a STABLE, public URL
-   * (served from the agent-assets CDN — it does not expire). Embed the returned
-   * `imageUrl` in a reply as markdown to show it to the user.
+   * Disconnects one connected Microsoft 365 account for the agent, by its
+   * `accountIdentifier`. Hits the generic per-account disconnect route
+   * (`DELETE /agent/connect/microsoft/accounts/{accountIdentifier}`), which
+   * resolves across the agent's full effective scope chain and deletes the
+   * matching Connection row. Returns the remaining accounts.
    *
-   * ASYNC: `gpt-image-1` routinely runs 30–60s, which exceeds the API Gateway
-   * 30s ceiling, so this enqueues a job (`POST /agent/images/generate` →
-   * `jobId`) then polls (`GET /agent/images/{jobId}`) until it completes. The
-   * worker's real failure message (e.g. an unsupported `size`) surfaces via the
-   * job's `error` field.
+   * IMPORTANT: pass the `accountIdentifier` from `getMicrosoftAccounts()`, NOT
+   * a synthesised email. For Microsoft, `accountIdentifier` is the user's email
+   * only when the Graph profile fetch succeeded at connect time; it falls back
+   * to the Azure tenant id (`tid` claim) otherwise. The backend matches on
+   * `accountIdentifier` exactly, so passing an email would 404 on those
+   * fallback-identifier accounts. (This is why the param is not named `email`,
+   * unlike `disconnectGoogleAccount` where the identifier is always the email.)
    */
-  generateImage(args: {
-    prompt: string;
-    model?: string;
-    size?: string;
-    quality?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    imageUrl: string;
-    model: string;
-  }>;
-  recordActivity(data: {
-    userId?: string;
-    channel: string;
-    role: "user" | "assistant";
-  }): Promise<{
-    recorded: boolean;
+  disconnectMicrosoftAccount(accountIdentifier: string): Promise<{
+    accounts: {
+      accountIdentifier: string;
+      displayName?: string;
+      connectedAt?: string;
+    }[];
   }>;
-  /** Update the agent's own name and/or voice config. Returns the updated agent. */
-  updateSelf(update: {
-    name?: string;
-    voiceConfig?: AgentVoiceConfig;
-  }): Promise<AgentSelf>;
   /**
-   * Generate the agent's own avatar from a text prompt. The image is generated,
-   * stored, and set on the agent server-side; returns the updated agent.
-   *
-   * ASYNC (same reason as `generateImage`): avatar gen runs `gpt-image-1`
-   * (30–60s) which exceeds the API Gateway 30s ceiling, so this enqueues a job
-   * (`POST /agent/avatar/generate` → `jobId`) then polls (`GET /agent/avatar/{jobId}`)
-   * until the avatar is set. Signature unchanged — the plugin is unaffected.
-   */
-  generateAvatar(args: {
-    prompt: string;
-  }): Promise<AgentSelf>;
-  /**
-   * Get a presigned PUT URL to upload a new avatar image. Upload the bytes to
-   * `uploadUrl`, then call `finalizeAvatar(s3Key)` to set it on the agent.
+   * Resolve the primary cTrader Connection's credentials for the calling
+   * agent. Unlike most providers, the cTrader Open API needs app-level auth
+   * (`clientId` + `clientSecret`) AND account auth (`accessToken` +
+   * `accountId`) on the socket, so `@alfe.ai/ctrader-mcp` self-fetches the
+   * full set here at startup (the atlassian/google pattern). `clientId` /
+   * `clientSecret` are the SST-sourced global app credentials the connect
+   * endpoint injects — they are never persisted on the connection. `host` is
+   * the resolved TLS endpoint (`live.ctraderapi.com` / `demo.ctraderapi.com`)
+   * derived from the selected account's live/demo flag.
    */
-  presignAvatar(args: {
-    mimeType: string;
-    size: number;
-  }): Promise<AgentAvatarPresign>;
+  getCTraderCredentials(): Promise<{
+    accessToken: string;
+    refreshToken: string;
+    accountId: string;
+    host: string;
+    clientId: string;
+    clientSecret: string;
+  }>;
   /**
-   * Finalize an avatar upload — validates ownership + size, then sets the
-   * agent's `avatarUrl` server-side. Returns the updated agent.
+   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for cTrader.
+   *
+   * Unlike atlassian/salesforce (one Connection row per account/site), a
+   * cTrader is MULTI-grant per agent: an agent may connect several distinct
+   * cTrader logins, each its own Connection row keyed on `accountIdentifier =
+   * ctid:<userId>` (Phase 1). This aggregates the *trading accounts* across
+   * ALL of those Connection rows — each row contributes its `availableAccounts`
+   * flattened, and every account carries ITS OWN grant's `accessToken` (the
+   * token that authenticates that account against the cTrader Open API). One
+   * OAuth grant still covers all accounts under that single login on one shared
+   * token; only the `ctidTraderAccountId` and the protobuf socket `host` (live
+   * vs demo) differ within a grant. Across grants the tokens differ, so the
+   * token is now PER-ACCOUNT rather than hoisted to the top level.
+   *
+   * `host` per account is derived from the account's `isLive` flag
+   * (`live.ctraderapi.com` / `demo.ctraderapi.com`) — the same mapping the
+   * connect provider applies server-side when an account is auto-selected.
+   *
+   * `clientId` / `clientSecret` are the SST-sourced GLOBAL app credentials the
+   * connect endpoint injects — identical across every Connection row (one
+   * cTrader app), never persisted on a connection. We take them from the first
+   * row that carries them.
+   *
+   * Accounts are deduped on `ctidTraderAccountId` first-wins: Spotware ids are
+   * globally unique across logins, so a duplicate can only appear if the same
+   * account somehow surfaced under two grants — first-wins keeps it
+   * deterministic.
+   *
+   * `accounts` may be empty (no cTrader Connection at all), in which case we
+   * return empty creds rather than throwing.
    */
-  finalizeAvatar(s3Key: string): Promise<AgentSelf>;
-  /** List the platform voice catalogue (ElevenLabs) so the agent can pick its own voice. */
-  listVoices(): Promise<{
-    voices: AgentVoice[];
+  getCTraderAccounts(): Promise<{
+    accounts: {
+      ctidTraderAccountId: string;
+      host: string;
+      isLive: boolean;
+      brokerName?: string;
+      accountNumber?: string;
+      accessToken: string;
+    }[];
+    clientId: string;
+    clientSecret: string;
   }>;
   /**
-   * Mint a fresh AES-256 data key for a specific (secret, field) pair. The
-   * encryption context is rebuilt server-side from `auth.tenantId` + the body
-   * fields including `fieldKey`; the agent cannot forge context for a scope
-   * or field it doesn't own. Legacy single-envelope secrets are migrated to
-   * `field#value` rows by the data migration, so call with `fieldKey: "value"`
-   * to reach them.
+   * @deprecated Returns a single primary credential blob. Use
+   * `getShopifyAccounts()` for the multi-account shape required by Pattern A
+   * (`@alfe.ai/shopify-mcp` keys per-shop on the myshopify domain).
    */
-  generateSecretDataKey(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    fieldKey: string;
-  }): Promise<GeneratedDataKey>;
+  getShopifyCredentials(): Promise<{
+    accessToken: string;
+    shopDomain: string;
+    shopGid: string;
+    shopName: string;
+    apiVersion: string;
+  }>;
   /**
-   * Unwrap a wrapped data key so the agent can decrypt the envelope locally.
-   * `fieldKey` MUST match the value supplied when the data key was generated
-   * (it's bound into KMS encryption context); mismatch fails with
-   * `InvalidCiphertextException`.
+   * Pattern A: multi-account credential fetch for Shopify. Returns every
+   * agent-scoped Shopify Connection. One OAuth grant maps to one store, so the
+   * stable per-call selector is the store's myshopify domain (`shopDomain`),
+   * NOT `accountIdentifier` — the connect provider keys `accountIdentifier` on
+   * the immutable shop GID (falling back to the domain), so `shopDomain` is the
+   * value the LLM passes and the plugin routes on.
+   *
+   * Each entry is shaped by the connect provider's `buildCredentialsResponse`:
+   * `{ accessToken, shopDomain, shopGid, shopName, apiVersion }` — offline
+   * Shopify tokens never expire, so there is NO token / expiry field and no
+   * refresh method (unlike Salesforce). The GraphQL Admin API authenticates
+   * purely on `X-Shopify-Access-Token`; no client credentials are on the wire.
    */
-  decryptSecretDataKey(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    fieldKey: string;
-    dataKeyCiphertext: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    plaintextKey: string;
+  getShopifyAccounts(): Promise<{
+    accounts: {
+      connectionId: string;
+      accountIdentifier: string;
+      displayName: string | null;
+      connectedAt: string;
+      accessToken: string;
+      shopDomain: string;
+      shopGid: string;
+      shopName: string;
+      apiVersion: string;
+    }[];
   }>;
   /**
-   * Create a new secret with one or more fields. Encrypted fields must arrive
-   * pre-sealed (the agent has already obtained per-field data keys via
-   * `generateSecretDataKey({ ..., fieldKey })` and AES-encrypted locally).
-   * Plaintext fields ship the value inline.
+   * Pattern A: provider-parameterized multi-account credential fetch for the
+   * social connectors (Bluesky, and the approval-gated backlog: X, Meta,
+   * Threads, LinkedIn, Pinterest, TikTok, Reddit, YouTube).
+   *
+   * Unlike the bespoke `getGithubAccounts()` / `getXeroAccounts()` shapes,
+   * this returns a UNIFORM normalized account shape so `@alfe.ai/social-mcp`'s
+   * shared driver can require a single `account` selector on every
+   * credential-touching tool regardless of platform. The backend
+   * `api-agents/{provider}/accounts` route is already provider-generic; this
+   * is the client-side normalization the plan (`do-we-need-any-moonlit-toucan`
+   * Phase 0, step 5) calls for.
+   *
+   * `accountIdentifier` is the stable per-account selector the LLM should
+   * pass back (for Bluesky: the account DID). `accessToken` carries whatever
+   * the provider's `buildCredentialsResponse` bundles (for Bluesky: the JSON
+   * session bundle — the driver parses the `accessJwt` out of it, or reads the
+   * top-level `accessJwt` from `providerMetadata`-adjacent fields). Everything
+   * else the driver needs for routing (handle, pdsHost, did, …) is on
+   * `providerMetadata`.
+   *
+   * Token refresh is delegated to connect (never done in-plugin) via the
+   * per-account route `POST /agent/connect/{provider}/accounts/{accountIdentifier}/refresh`
+   * — call `refreshSocialAccount(provider, accountIdentifier)`. (The non-account
+   * `POST /agent/connect/{provider}/refresh` route refreshes the provider's
+   * PRIMARY connection, which is wrong under multi-account Pattern A.)
    */
-  createSecret(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    secretName: string;
-    category?: SecretCategory;
-    description?: string;
-    tags?: string[];
-    fields: {
-      key: string;
-      format?: FieldFormat;
-      sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
-      value?: string;
-      envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
+  getSocialAccounts(provider: string): Promise<{
+    provider: string;
+    accounts: {
+      connectionId: string;
+      accountIdentifier: string;
+      displayName: string | null;
+      accessToken: string;
+      providerMetadata: Record<string, unknown>;
+      connectedAt: string;
     }[];
-    reason?: string;
-  }): Promise<SecretAggregate>;
-  /** Fetch the secret aggregate plus per-field encrypted envelopes. */
-  getSecret(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    aggregate: SecretAggregate;
-    envelopes: FieldEnvelope[];
   }>;
-  /** Fetch one field. Plaintext: value inline. Encrypted: envelope. */
-  getSecretField(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    fieldKey: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    key: string;
-    sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
-    format?: FieldFormat;
-    value?: string;
-    envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
-    rotatedAt?: string;
-    createdAt: string;
-    updatedAt: string;
-  }>;
-  /** Add OR rotate one field. */
-  setSecretField(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    fieldKey: string;
-    sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
-    format?: FieldFormat;
-    value?: string;
-    envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
-    reason?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    fieldKey: string;
-    rotated: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Pattern A: refresh a specific social Connection by its stable
+   * `accountIdentifier` (for Bluesky: the account DID) via the
+   * provider-generic per-account refresh route. The counterpart to
+   * `getSocialAccounts(provider)`; `@alfe.ai/social-mcp` calls this on a
+   * 401/ExpiredToken from the platform PDS/API, then re-fetches accounts to
+   * pick up the rotated bundle.
+   *
+   * Refresh itself is ALWAYS delegated to connect — the plugin never calls
+   * the platform's own refresh XRPC (e.g. `com.atproto.server.refreshSession`)
+   * because connect owns the encrypted refresh token + rotation persistence
+   * (Bluesky rotates the refreshJwt; a missed rotation kills the connection
+   * after one refresh). The returned `accessToken` is whatever the provider's
+   * `refreshToken` hook re-bundled (for Bluesky: the JSON session bundle with
+   * the fresh `accessJwt`) — callers typically ignore it and re-fetch via
+   * `getSocialAccounts` for a consistent shape.
+   */
+  refreshSocialAccount(provider: string, accountIdentifier: string): Promise<{
+    accountIdentifier: string;
+    accessToken: string;
+    accessTokenExpiresAt: string;
+    expiresAt: string;
   }>;
-  /** Remove one field. */
-  removeSecretField(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    fieldKey: string;
-  }): Promise<void>;
-  /** Update secret-level metadata (name/description/tags/category). */
-  updateSecretMetadata(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    secretName?: string;
-    description?: string;
-    tags?: string[];
-    category?: SecretCategory;
-    reason?: string;
-  }): Promise<SecretAggregate>;
-  /** List metadata for secrets in a scope. Optional filters route through the byFacet GSI. */
-  listSecrets(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    category?: SecretCategory;
-    tag?: string;
-    fieldKey?: string;
-  }): Promise<SecretMetadata[]>;
-  /** Bounded changelog read — metadata-only audit entries. */
-  getSecretHistory(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
-    limit?: number;
-    cursor?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    entries: ChangelogEntry[];
-    nextCursor?: string;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=connect-credentials.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/database.d.ts
+declare class DatabaseApi extends ApiBase {
+  registerDatabaseCredentials(): Promise<{
+    connectionString: string;
+    username: string;
+    password: string;
+    databases: string[];
   }>;
-  /** Delete a secret (and all its field rows + tag rows + changelog rows). */
-  deleteSecret(args: {
-    scope: SecretScope;
-    scopeId: string;
-    secretId: string;
+  reportDatabaseAudit(entry: {
+    database: string;
+    collection: string;
+    operation: string;
+    summary?: string;
   }): Promise<void>;
-  /** Enumerate scopes (org/team/project/agent) this agent can access. */
-  listSecretScopes(): Promise<ScopeInfo[]>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=database.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/identity.d.ts
+declare class IdentityApi extends ApiBase {
   /**
    * Returns the calling agent's own identity context — `{ agentId, tenantId }`
    * decoded server-side from the agent API token. Used by the
@@ -1326,6 +1494,62 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     identityId: string | null;
     status: string;
   }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=identity.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/images.d.ts
+declare class ImagesApi extends ApiBase {
+  /**
+   * Generate an image from a text prompt and get back a STABLE, public URL
+   * (served from the agent-assets CDN — it does not expire). Embed the returned
+   * `imageUrl` in a reply as markdown to show it to the user.
+   *
+   * ASYNC: `gpt-image-1` routinely runs 30–60s, which exceeds the API Gateway
+   * 30s ceiling, so this enqueues a job (`POST /agent/images/generate` →
+   * `jobId`) then polls (`GET /agent/images/{jobId}`) until it completes. The
+   * worker's real failure message (e.g. an unsupported `size`) surfaces via the
+   * job's `error` field.
+   */
+  generateImage(args: {
+    prompt: string;
+    model?: string;
+    size?: string;
+    quality?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    imageUrl: string;
+    model: string;
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=images.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/integrations.d.ts
+declare class IntegrationsApi extends ApiBase {
+  listIntegrations(): Promise<IntegrationInstall[]>;
+  getIntegrationConfig(integrationId: string): Promise<IntegrationConfigResult>;
+  updateIntegrationConfig(integrationId: string, config: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void>;
+  installIntegration(integrationId: string, options?: {
+    version?: string;
+    config?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  }): Promise<IntegrationInstall>;
+  removeIntegration(integrationId: string): Promise<IntegrationInstall>;
+  getOAuthUrl(provider: string, scopes?: string[]): Promise<{
+    url: string;
+    provider: string;
+    expiresIn: number;
+  }>;
+  getOAuthStatus(provider: string): Promise<{
+    provider: string;
+    connected: boolean;
+    config?: Record<string, string>;
+  }>;
+  getRegistry(): Promise<{
+    integrations: RegistryEntry[];
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=integrations.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/memory.d.ts
+declare class MemoryApi extends ApiBase {
   memorySearch(query: string, opts?: {
     limit?: number;
     topic?: string;
@@ -1368,7 +1592,7 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     channelId?: string;
     userId?: string;
     userName?: string;
-  }): Promise<{
+  }, ingestEpoch?: number): Promise<{
     queued: boolean;
     messageCount: number;
   }>;
@@ -1402,196 +1626,216 @@ declare class AgentApiClient {
     vectorCount: number;
     tripleCount: number;
     storageEstimateBytes: number;
-    lastIngestionAt?: string;
-  }>;
-  memoryLearn(args: {
-    text: string;
-    source?: string;
-    sourceType?: "file" | "url" | "inline";
-    metadata?: {
-      sessionId?: string;
-      channelId?: string;
-      userName?: string;
-    };
-  }): Promise<{
-    memoriesStored: number;
-    triplesStored: number;
-    chunks: number;
-    source?: string;
-  }>;
-  memoryBootstrapStatus(): Promise<{
-    synced: boolean;
-    syncedAt?: string;
-    sessionsBackfillSynced?: boolean;
-    sessionsBackfillSyncedAt?: string;
-  }>;
-  memoryBootstrapStatusMark(scope?: "files" | "sessions"): Promise<{
-    synced: true;
-    syncedAt: string;
-  }>;
-  sendSms(args: {
-    to: string;
-    body: string;
-  }): Promise<{
-    sent: boolean;
-    sid: string;
-  }>;
-  searchWeb(params: {
-    query: string;
-    count?: number;
-    offset?: number;
-    country?: string;
-    freshness?: string;
-  }): Promise<unknown>;
-  searchImages(params: {
-    query: string;
-    count?: number;
-  }): Promise<unknown>;
-  searchNews(params: {
-    query: string;
-    count?: number;
-    freshness?: string;
-  }): Promise<unknown>;
-  /** Search news across the selected provider's corpus. → POST /agent/news/search */
-  newsSearch(params: {
-    query: string;
-    provider?: NewsProvider;
-    source?: string;
-    from?: string;
-    to?: string;
-    language?: string;
-    category?: string;
-    limit?: number;
-  }): Promise<NewsResult>;
-  /** Top headlines for the selected provider. → POST /agent/news/headlines */
-  newsHeadlines(params?: {
-    provider?: NewsProvider;
-    category?: string;
-    source?: string;
-    language?: string;
-    limit?: number;
-  }): Promise<NewsResult>;
-  /**
-   * Semantic search across the agent's member scopes. Fan-out is gated
-   * server-side by `listScopes` set-inclusion (fail-closed). Pass
-   * `scopeType` + `scopeId` to narrow to one scope; a non-member scope
-   * yields empty results (never a cross-scope leak).
-   */
-  knowledgeSearch(query: string, opts?: {
-    limit?: number;
-    scopeType?: KnowledgeScopeType;
-    scopeId?: string;
-  }): Promise<KnowledgeSearchResult>;
-  /** Enumerate the scopes (org + teams + projects) this agent belongs to. */
-  listScopes(): Promise<{
-    scopes: KnowledgeScope[];
+    lastIngestionAt?: string;
   }>;
-  /** Read a scope's structured knowledge profile (after membership check). */
-  getScopeProfile(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string): Promise<KnowledgeProfile>;
-  /** List a scope's docs (the org-files corpus; mirrored to shared/<scope>/). */
-  listScopeDocs(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, opts?: {
-    limit?: number;
-    cursor?: string;
+  memoryLearn(args: {
+    text: string;
+    source?: string;
+    sourceType?: "file" | "url" | "inline";
+    metadata?: {
+      sessionId?: string;
+      channelId?: string;
+      userName?: string;
+    };
   }): Promise<{
-    files: KnowledgeDoc[];
-    nextCursor: string | null;
+    memoriesStored: number;
+    triplesStored: number;
+    chunks: number;
+    source?: string;
+  }>;
+  memoryBootstrapStatus(): Promise<{
+    synced: boolean;
+    syncedAt?: string;
+    sessionsBackfillSynced?: boolean;
+    sessionsBackfillSyncedAt?: string;
+  }>;
+  memoryBootstrapStatusMark(scope?: "files" | "sessions"): Promise<{
+    synced: true;
+    syncedAt: string;
   }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=memory.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/secrets.d.ts
+declare class SecretsApi extends ApiBase {
   /**
-   * Read the full text of a scope doc. Resolves a presigned download URL
-   * from `services/org`, then fetches the bytes directly from S3 (the one
-   * legitimate raw fetch in a plugin — same pattern as sync).
+   * Mint a fresh AES-256 data key for a specific (secret, field) pair. The
+   * encryption context is rebuilt server-side from `auth.tenantId` + the body
+   * fields including `fieldKey`; the agent cannot forge context for a scope
+   * or field it doesn't own. Legacy single-envelope secrets are migrated to
+   * `field#value` rows by the data migration, so call with `fieldKey: "value"`
+   * to reach them.
    */
-  readScopeDoc(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, filePath: string): Promise<{
-    filePath: string;
-    text: string;
-  }>;
+  generateSecretDataKey(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    fieldKey: string;
+  }): Promise<GeneratedDataKey>;
   /**
-   * Write (create or overwrite) a scope doc. Two-step presigned upload:
-   * `services/org` returns a signed URL plus `requiredHeaders` (author /
-   * authorKind / message as `x-amz-meta-*`) that MUST be sent verbatim on
-   * the PUT, alongside the same `Content-Type` that was signed. Author and
-   * authorKind are server-set from the agent token — never trusted here.
+   * Unwrap a wrapped data key so the agent can decrypt the envelope locally.
+   * `fieldKey` MUST match the value supplied when the data key was generated
+   * (it's bound into KMS encryption context); mismatch fails with
+   * `InvalidCiphertextException`.
    */
-  writeScopeDoc(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, filePath: string, content: string, opts?: {
-    contentType?: string;
-    message?: string;
+  decryptSecretDataKey(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    fieldKey: string;
+    dataKeyCiphertext: string;
   }): Promise<{
-    filePath: string;
+    plaintextKey: string;
   }>;
   /**
-   * Open a change request against a scope's knowledge resource. For a doc
-   * create/update, `services/org` returns a presigned staging PUT; this method
-   * uploads the proposed `content` to it (echoing the same Content-Type that
-   * was signed), mirroring `writeScopeDoc`. The staged body is applied to the
-   * canonical doc — attributed to this agent — only when a reviewer approves.
-   */
-  proposeScopeChange(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, input: ProposeScopeChangeInput): Promise<KnowledgeChangeRequest>;
-  /**
-   * List the agent's OWN change requests in a scope (filtered server-side to
-   * this agent as proposer). Pass `status` to narrow to open / approved / etc.
+   * Create a new secret with one or more fields. Encrypted fields must arrive
+   * pre-sealed (the agent has already obtained per-field data keys via
+   * `generateSecretDataKey({ ..., fieldKey })` and AES-encrypted locally).
+   * Plaintext fields ship the value inline.
    */
-  listScopeChangeRequests(scopeType: KnowledgeScopeType, scopeId: string, opts?: {
-    status?: ChangeRequestStatus;
-    limit?: number;
-    cursor?: string;
+  createSecret(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    secretName: string;
+    category?: SecretCategory;
+    description?: string;
+    tags?: string[];
+    fields: {
+      key: string;
+      format?: FieldFormat;
+      sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
+      value?: string;
+      envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
+    }[];
+    reason?: string;
+  }): Promise<SecretAggregate>;
+  /** Fetch the secret aggregate plus per-field encrypted envelopes. */
+  getSecret(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
   }): Promise<{
-    changeRequests: KnowledgeChangeRequest[];
-    nextCursor: string | null;
+    aggregate: SecretAggregate;
+    envelopes: FieldEnvelope[];
   }>;
-  registerDatabaseCredentials(): Promise<{
-    connectionString: string;
-    username: string;
-    password: string;
-    databases: string[];
+  /** Fetch one field. Plaintext: value inline. Encrypted: envelope. */
+  getSecretField(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    fieldKey: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    key: string;
+    sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
+    format?: FieldFormat;
+    value?: string;
+    envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
+    rotatedAt?: string;
+    createdAt: string;
+    updatedAt: string;
   }>;
-  reportDatabaseAudit(entry: {
-    database: string;
-    collection: string;
-    operation: string;
-    summary?: string;
+  /** Add OR rotate one field. */
+  setSecretField(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    fieldKey: string;
+    sensitivity: FieldSensitivity;
+    format?: FieldFormat;
+    value?: string;
+    envelope?: EncryptedEnvelopeV1;
+    reason?: string;
+  }): Promise<{
+    fieldKey: string;
+    rotated: boolean;
+  }>;
+  /** Remove one field. */
+  removeSecretField(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    fieldKey: string;
   }): Promise<void>;
-  requestBrowserTakeover(args: {
-    instructions: string;
-    url?: string;
-    conversationId?: string;
+  /** Update secret-level metadata (name/description/tags/category). */
+  updateSecretMetadata(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    secretName?: string;
+    description?: string;
+    tags?: string[];
+    category?: SecretCategory;
+    reason?: string;
+  }): Promise<SecretAggregate>;
+  /** List metadata for secrets in a scope. Optional filters route through the byFacet GSI. */
+  listSecrets(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    category?: SecretCategory;
+    tag?: string;
+    fieldKey?: string;
+  }): Promise<SecretMetadata[]>;
+  /** Bounded changelog read — metadata-only audit entries. */
+  getSecretHistory(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+    limit?: number;
+    cursor?: string;
   }): Promise<{
-    sessionId: string;
-    status: string;
+    entries: ChangelogEntry[];
+    nextCursor?: string;
   }>;
-  getRemoteSession(sessionId: string): Promise<RemoteSessionInfo>;
-  completeRemoteSession(sessionId: string): Promise<{
+  /** Delete a secret (and all its field rows + tag rows + changelog rows). */
+  deleteSecret(args: {
+    scope: SecretScope;
+    scopeId: string;
+    secretId: string;
+  }): Promise<void>;
+  /** Enumerate scopes (org/team/project/agent) this agent can access. */
+  listSecretScopes(): Promise<ScopeInfo[]>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=secrets.d.ts.map
+//#endregion
+//#region src/domains/teams.d.ts
+declare class TeamsApi extends ApiBase {
+  getTeamsCredentials(): Promise<{
+    agentId: string;
+    tenantId: string;
+    azureAppId: string;
+    azureBotId: string;
+    azureClientSecret: string;
+    botDisplayName?: string;
+    teamsTenantId?: string;
+    serviceUrl?: string;
+  }>;
+  sendTeamsMessage(data: {
+    conversationId: string;
+    text?: string;
+    adaptiveCard?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  }): Promise<{
     ok: boolean;
+    activityId: string;
   }>;
-  /**
-   * Issue a request that returns the raw `Response` (no JSON parsing, no
-   * forced Content-Type). The caller sets `Content-Type`/`Accept` on `headers`
-   * and reads the body itself (`arrayBuffer()` / `json()`).
-   *
-   * A single retry fires only on the same transient statuses `request()`
-   * retries (authorizer-timeout 500 + LB 502/503/504) and transient network
-   * errors — before the route handler runs — so re-issuing a POST does not
-   * risk a duplicate side effect. Voice TTS/STT are effectively idempotent
-   * (re-synthesize / re-transcribe) and meter server-side keyed on the
-   * gateway requestId, so a retried transcription doesn't double-bill.
-   */
-  private rawFetch;
-  /**
-   * Text-to-speech. Returns raw PCM audio bytes plus their framing — the
-   * voice service defaults to 24 kHz / mono / 16-bit. Wrap in a WAV container
-   * to produce a playable file. Metered per character against the tenant
-   * credit pool server-side; TTS completes regardless of metering outcome.
-   */
-  tts(args: VoiceTtsArgs): Promise<VoiceTtsResult>;
-  /**
-   * Speech-to-text. Accepts raw linear16 (16-bit LE) mono PCM — NOT a WAV or
-   * other container (the endpoint transcribes with a fixed linear16 encoding,
-   * so a container header would be transcribed as noise). Strip any WAV header
-   * and pass `sampleRate` from it before calling. Metered by transcribed
-   * duration against the tenant credit pool server-side.
-   */
-  stt(args: VoiceSttArgs): Promise<VoiceSttResult>;
+  listTeamsChannels(): Promise<{
+    channels: {
+      id: string;
+      name: string;
+      description?: string;
+    }[];
+  }>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=teams.d.ts.map
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/index.d.ts
+interface AgentApiClient extends SyncApi, IntegrationsApi, WorkspaceApi, ConnectCredentialsApi, TeamsApi, ChatApi, SecretsApi, IdentityApi, MemoryApi, SearchApi, KnowledgeApi, DatabaseApi, MobileApi, RemoteApi, SelfApi, VoiceApi, ImagesApi {}
+declare class AgentApiClient extends ApiBase {
+  constructor(config: AgentApiClientConfig);
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
+
 //#endregion
 //#endregion
 //#region src/index.d.ts