@alfe.ai/gateway 0.9.10 → 0.9.11

package/dist/health.js

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ var AlfeApiClient = class {
 	* would never reach the network — the `getToken: () => null` path would
 	* synthesize a 401 and fire onAuthFailure, breaking the entire flow.
 	*/
-	async _fetch(path, options, skipAuth = false) {
+	async _fetchResponse(path, options, skipAuth = false) {
 		try {
 			const url = `${this.apiBaseUrl}${path}`;
 			const headers = new Headers(options?.headers);
@@ -348,14 +348,14 @@ var AlfeApiClient = class {
 					}
 				};
 			}
-			const text = res.status === 204 ? "" : await res.text();
-			let body;
-			if (text) try {
-				body = JSON.parse(text);
-			} catch {
-				body = text;
-			}
 			if (!res.ok) {
+				const text = res.status === 204 ? "" : await res.text();
+				let body;
+				if (text) try {
+					body = JSON.parse(text);
+				} catch {
+					body = text;
+				}
 				const errBody = body;
 				return {
 					ok: false,
@@ -368,8 +368,7 @@ var AlfeApiClient = class {
 			}
 			return {
 				ok: true,
-				res,
-				body
+				res
 			};
 		} catch (err) {
 			return {
@@ -381,6 +380,22 @@ var AlfeApiClient = class {
 			};
 		}
 	}
+	async _fetch(path, options, skipAuth = false) {
+		const response = await this._fetchResponse(path, options, skipAuth);
+		if (!response.ok) return response;
+		const text = response.res.status === 204 ? "" : await response.res.text();
+		let body;
+		if (text) try {
+			body = JSON.parse(text);
+		} catch {
+			body = text;
+		}
+		return {
+			ok: true,
+			res: response.res,
+			body
+		};
+	}
 	/**
 	* Make an authenticated request to an Alfe API endpoint.
 	* Unwraps the @auriclabs/api-core `{ data, timestamp, requestId }` envelope.
@@ -427,6 +442,30 @@ var AlfeApiClient = class {
 			data: result.body
 		};
 	}
+	/**
+	* Make an authenticated request without attempting text/JSON decoding.
+	* Use for downloads such as a Teams app ZIP where UTF-8 conversion would
+	* corrupt the payload.
+	*/
+	async binaryRequest(path, options) {
+		const result = await this._fetchResponse(path, options);
+		if (!result.ok) return result.result;
+		try {
+			return {
+				ok: true,
+				data: {
+					body: await result.res.arrayBuffer(),
+					contentType: result.res.headers.get("Content-Type") ?? void 0,
+					contentDisposition: result.res.headers.get("Content-Disposition") ?? void 0
+				}
+			};
+		} catch (err) {
+			return {
+				ok: false,
+				error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Failed to read binary response"
+			};
+		}
+	}
 	getApiBaseUrl() {
 		return this.apiBaseUrl;
 	}
@@ -4227,6 +4266,176 @@ object({
 	ttsModel: _enum(TTS_MODELS).optional(),
 	enabled: boolean().optional()
 });
+//#endregion
+//#region ../../packages-internal/types/dist/access.js
+/**
+* Runtime catalog of declared permission subjects + allowed actions.
+*
+* Mirrors the compile-time `PermissionDefinitions` augmentation in
+* `@alfe/api-core/auriclabs-roles.ts`. Kept here so browser code
+* (dashboard) can consume it without pulling in server-only deps
+* (`@middy/core`, `aws-lambda`, etc.).
+*/
+const PERMISSION_CATALOG = {
+	all: ["manage"],
+	user: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	agent: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"exec",
+		"chat",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	chat: [
+		"read",
+		"write",
+		"upload",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	sync: [
+		"read",
+		"write",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	integration: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	gateway: ["connect", "manage"],
+	voice: ["read", "manage"],
+	identity: ["read", "manage"],
+	token: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	billing: ["read", "manage"],
+	template: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	team: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	project: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	org_file: ["read", "write"],
+	org_knowledge: ["read", "write"],
+	model_policy: ["read", "manage"],
+	secret: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	database: [
+		"read",
+		"write",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	role_management: ["read", "manage"],
+	org: ["read", "manage"],
+	connection: [
+		"create",
+		"read",
+		"update",
+		"delete",
+		"manage"
+	],
+	remote: ["control", "terminal"],
+	subscription: ["read", "manage"],
+	referral: ["manage"],
+	promo_code: ["manage"],
+	pricing: ["manage"],
+	access_gate: ["manage"],
+	dlq: ["read", "manage"],
+	support: ["read"],
+	discounts: ["manage"],
+	stats: ["read"],
+	mobile: ["read", "manage"],
+	impersonation: ["manage"]
+};
+/**
+* Subjects a tenant may grant via a custom role.
+*
+* Excludes `all` (platform-admin escape hatch) and every platform-only
+* permission subject listed after it in the catalog.
+*/
+const TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS = [
+	"agent",
+	"chat",
+	"sync",
+	"integration",
+	"secret",
+	"database",
+	"template",
+	"org_file",
+	"org_knowledge",
+	"team",
+	"project",
+	"model_policy",
+	"role_management",
+	"billing",
+	"identity",
+	"token",
+	"user",
+	"gateway",
+	"voice",
+	"org",
+	"connection",
+	"remote",
+	"subscription"
+];
+/**
+* Subjects a PLATFORM ADMIN may grant via a custom **admin** role (authored at
+* the flat `admin:` scope, stored under the `"system"` tenant). Two groups:
+*
+*   1. Platform-only subjects — every catalog subject that is NOT in
+*      `TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS` (and never `all`). Derived from
+*      `PERMISSION_CATALOG` so a newly-declared admin-only subject becomes
+*      grantable in custom admin roles automatically.
+*   2. Dual-surface subjects an admin also curates platform-wide: `user`
+*      (platform user management), `role_management` (admin role authoring),
+*      and `subscription` (reviewing every tenant's plan/startup application).
+*
+* `all` is deliberately excluded — it is reserved for the built-in
+* `sys:admin:admin` super-admin role and must never be grantable through a
+* custom admin role. The complement of `TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS` keeps the
+* tenant vocabulary and the admin vocabulary from drifting into each other.
+*/
+const ADMIN_DUAL_SURFACE_SUBJECTS = [
+	"user",
+	"role_management",
+	"subscription"
+];
+const TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECT_LOOKUP = new Set(TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS);
+[...Object.keys(PERMISSION_CATALOG).filter((subject) => subject !== "all" && !TENANT_ALLOWED_SUBJECT_LOOKUP.has(subject)), ...ADMIN_DUAL_SURFACE_SUBJECTS];
 enumValues({
 	Org: "org",
 	Team: "team",
@@ -4592,7 +4801,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	}
 	prefix = "/auth";
 	validate(token) {
-		return this.client.request(`${this.prefix}/validate`, {
+		return this.client.publicRequest(`${this.prefix}/validate`, {
 			method: "POST",
 			body: JSON.stringify({ token })
 		});
@@ -4967,6 +5176,12 @@ var IntegrationsService = class {
 	listSlackChannels(agentId) {
 		return this.client.request(`/slack/agents/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}/channels`);
 	}
+	createSlackApp(agentId) {
+		return this.client.request("/slack/apps/create", {
+			method: "POST",
+			body: JSON.stringify({ agentId })
+		});
+	}
 	sendSlackMessage(agentId, channel, text) {
 		return this.client.request(`/slack/agents/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}/send`, {
 			method: "POST",
@@ -6416,25 +6631,44 @@ var ConfigReconciler = class {
 			status: "applied"
 		};
 		const failures = [];
+		const inconclusiveKeys = [];
 		for (const [key, want] of entries) try {
 			if (getConfigRaw) {
-				if (await getConfigRaw(key) === want) {
+				let current;
+				try {
+					current = await getConfigRaw(key);
+				} catch (err) {
+					log$4.warn({
+						key,
+						err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+					}, "Config diff read failed — attempting the write");
+				}
+				if (current === want) {
 					log$4.debug({ key }, "Config already at desired value — no-op");
 					continue;
 				}
 			}
 			await setConfigRaw(key, want);
 			if (getConfigRaw) {
-				if (!await this.verify(getConfigRaw, key, want)) failures.push(`${key}: verify failed (read-back did not match)`);
+				const outcome = await this.verify(getConfigRaw, key, want);
+				if (outcome === "mismatched") failures.push(`${key}: verify failed (read-back did not match)`);
+				else if (outcome === "inconclusive") inconclusiveKeys.push(key);
 			}
 		} catch (err) {
 			const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-			if (getConfigRaw && await this.verify(getConfigRaw, key, want)) {
-				log$4.warn({
-					key,
-					err: msg
-				}, "config set errored but value landed — treating as applied");
-				continue;
+			if (getConfigRaw) {
+				const outcome = await this.verify(getConfigRaw, key, want);
+				if (outcome === "matched") {
+					log$4.warn({
+						key,
+						err: msg
+					}, "config set errored but value landed — treating as applied");
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (outcome === "inconclusive") {
+					inconclusiveKeys.push(key);
+					continue;
+				}
 			}
 			failures.push(`${key}: ${msg}`);
 		}
@@ -6451,6 +6685,13 @@ var ConfigReconciler = class {
 				reason
 			};
 		}
+		if (inconclusiveKeys.length > 0) {
+			log$4.warn({
+				version: desired.version,
+				keys: inconclusiveKeys
+			}, "Config reconcile verification was inconclusive — leaving version pending");
+			return null;
+		}
 		log$4.info({
 			version: desired.version,
 			keys: entries.length
@@ -6461,11 +6702,21 @@ var ConfigReconciler = class {
 		};
 	}
 	async verify(getConfigRaw, key, want) {
+		let observedValue = false;
 		for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= this.verifyRetries; attempt++) {
-			if (await getConfigRaw(key) === want) return true;
+			try {
+				const current = await getConfigRaw(key);
+				if (current === want) return "matched";
+				if (current !== void 0) observedValue = true;
+			} catch (err) {
+				log$4.debug({
+					key,
+					err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+				}, "Config verify read failed");
+			}
 			if (attempt < this.verifyRetries && this.verifyRetryDelayMs > 0) await delay(this.verifyRetryDelayMs * 2 ** attempt);
 		}
-		return false;
+		return observedValue ? "mismatched" : "inconclusive";
 	}
 };
 //#endregion
@@ -7735,7 +7986,7 @@ function warnFailedMcpServers(bundler, log, reason) {
 * List every server entry in the alfe bundler store. Lets agents inspect
 * what they've already registered before adding a new one.
 */
-function handleMcpListServers(manager) {
+function handleMcpListServers(manager, liveStatusAvailable = manager?.serverStatuses !== void 0) {
 	if (!manager) return {
 		ok: false,
 		error: {
@@ -7743,21 +7994,24 @@ function handleMcpListServers(manager) {
 			message: "MCP manager not initialized"
 		}
 	};
-	const statuses = manager.serverStatuses ? manager.serverStatuses() : [];
+	const statuses = liveStatusAvailable && manager.serverStatuses ? manager.serverStatuses() : [];
 	const byName = new Map(statuses.map((s) => [s.name, s]));
 	return {
 		ok: true,
-		payload: { servers: manager.listServers().map(({ id, entry }) => ({
-			id,
-			entry: toPublicServerEntry(entry),
-			fingerprint: serverLaunchFingerprint(entry),
-			status: byName.get(id) ?? {
-				name: id,
-				connected: false,
-				toolCount: 0,
-				consecutiveFailures: 0
-			}
-		})) }
+		payload: { servers: manager.listServers().map(({ id, entry }) => {
+			const status = byName.get(id);
+			return {
+				id,
+				entry: toPublicServerEntry(entry),
+				fingerprint: serverLaunchFingerprint(entry),
+				...liveStatusAvailable ? { status: status ?? {
+					name: id,
+					connected: false,
+					toolCount: 0,
+					consecutiveFailures: 0
+				} } : {}
+			};
+		}) }
 	};
 }
 function toPublicServerEntry(entry) {
@@ -7786,10 +8040,12 @@ const MCP_ADD_WARM_TIMEOUT_MS = 12e3;
 * server actually works. Owned as `'manual'` so the agent can later remove it
 * without an expectedOwner conflict — matches what `alfe mcp add` does from the
 * CLI. Registration is durable regardless of the probe outcome: a probe
-* failure (or a runtime with no daemon bundler, e.g. hermes) still returns
-* `ok` with `connected: false`; the store watcher / runtime picks the entry up.
+* failure still returns `ok`; the store watcher / runtime picks the entry up.
+* A runtime that mirrors the store but owns its MCP children (Hermes and
+* Claude Code) has no daemon-side status authority, so it omits connected/tool
+* fields instead of presenting unknown as a definite disconnection.
 */
-async function handleMcpAddServer(params, manager) {
+async function handleMcpAddServer(params, manager, liveStatusAvailable = manager?.warmServer !== void 0) {
 	if (!manager) return {
 		ok: false,
 		error: {
@@ -7833,7 +8089,7 @@ async function handleMcpAddServer(params, manager) {
 		};
 	}
 	let status = null;
-	if (manager.warmServer) try {
+	if (liveStatusAvailable && manager.warmServer) try {
 		status = await manager.warmServer(p.id, MCP_ADD_WARM_TIMEOUT_MS);
 	} catch (err) {
 		logger$1.warn({
@@ -7845,9 +8101,11 @@ async function handleMcpAddServer(params, manager) {
 		ok: true,
 		payload: {
 			id: p.id,
-			connected: status?.connected ?? false,
-			toolCount: status?.toolCount ?? 0,
-			...status?.lastError !== void 0 ? { error: status.lastError } : {}
+			...status ? {
+				connected: status.connected,
+				toolCount: status.toolCount,
+				...status.lastError !== void 0 ? { error: status.lastError } : {}
+			} : {}
 		}
 	};
 }
@@ -25076,8 +25334,8 @@ function handlePluginRequest(method, params, pluginId) {
 		case "integration.report": return Promise.resolve(handleIntegrationReport(params, pluginId));
 		case "mcp.list_tools": return Promise.resolve(handleMcpListTools(mcpBundler));
 		case "mcp.call_tool": return handleMcpCallTool(mcpBundler, params);
-		case "mcp.list_servers": return Promise.resolve(handleMcpListServers(mcpManagerRef));
-		case "mcp.add_server": return handleMcpAddServer(params, mcpManagerRef);
+		case "mcp.list_servers": return Promise.resolve(handleMcpListServers(mcpManagerRef, mcpBundler !== null));
+		case "mcp.add_server": return handleMcpAddServer(params, mcpManagerRef, mcpBundler !== null);
 		case "mcp.remove_server": return handleMcpRemoveServer(params, mcpManagerRef);
 		default: return Promise.resolve({
 			ok: false,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@alfe.ai/gateway",
-  "version": "0.9.10",
+  "version": "0.9.11",
   "description": "Alfe local gateway daemon — persistent control plane for agent integrations",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
     "pino-roll": "^1.2.0",
     "smol-toml": ">=1.6.1",
     "ws": "^8.18.0",
-    "@alfe.ai/agent-api-client": "^0.16.0",
+    "@alfe.ai/agent-api-client": "^0.16.1",
     "@alfe.ai/ai-proxy-local": "^0.0.16",
     "@alfe.ai/config": "^0.4.1",
     "@alfe.ai/integration-manifest": "^0.3.6",