@aldegad/safedeps 2.5.0 → 2.6.0

package/README.ko.md

@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
-# Safedeps
+# safedeps
 
-> **모든 install 을 미확정 블록으로 본다 — `safedeps` 는 안전한 것만 승인하고, 그렇지 않으면 reorg 한다.**
+> **AI 코딩 에이전트가 취약하거나 미승인된 의존성을 설치하지 못하게 막고, 빠져나간 건 롤백한다.**
 >
-> OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory 로 의존성 spec 을 사전 승인하고, Claude Code 와 Codex CLI 의 hook 에서 실제 설치 closure 를 강제하며, 승인과 어긋난 install 은 자동으로 마지막 안전 snapshot 으로 롤백한다.
+> `safedeps` 는 Claude Code·Codex CLI 에이전트가 실행하는 모든 의존성 install 을 게이트한다. 패키지를 OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory 로 사전 승인하고, 실제로 lockfile 에 깔린 closure 를 다시 검증하며, 어긋난 건 자동으로 롤백한다. 전부 로컬에서 돌고 런타임 의존성은 0.
 
-*Detailed reference → [README.md](./README.md) (영문, SSoT)*
+- **사전 승인** — 모든 `pkg@version` 과 (npm 은) 그 전체 transitive closure 를 설치 *전에* OSV(정본)·CISA KEV·GitHub Advisory 로 검사한다.
+- **실제 effect 강제** — 설치 후 실제 `package-lock.json` closure 를 다시 확인하므로, 래핑·난독화된 명령도 게이트를 못 빠져나간다.
+- **롤백** — 미승인·신규 취약 패키지는 마지막 확정 안전 snapshot 으로 되돌린다. Claude Code 에서는 install 이 inert(`--ignore-scripts`)로 돌아 거부된 패키지의 lifecycle script 가 아예 실행되지 않는다.
 
----
+## Quickstart
 
-## "reorg" 는 뭐고 왜 그 비유인가
+```bash
+# 1. CLI 설치 — npm 패키지는 scoped, @aldegad/ 접두사 주의
+npm install -g @aldegad/safedeps
 
-블록체인에서 **reorg (재편성)** 은 미확정 블록 시퀀스를 무효화하고 마지막 확정된 안전 상태로 체인을 되돌린다. `safedeps` 는 같은 원리를 `node_modules` 에 적용한다 — 모든 install 은 일련의 공급망 보안 검사를 통과하기 전까지는 **미확정 블록 후보** 로 취급된다. 의심스러우면 도구가 **reorg** 를 수행한다 — lock 파일, `package.json`, `node_modules` 를 마지막 확정된 안전 snapshot 으로 되돌린다.
+# 2. Claude Code / Codex 에 hook 연결 (idempotent)
+cd "$(npm root -g)/@aldegad/safedeps" && node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs
 
-빠른 advisory 피드백, 관측 가능한 rollback, silent fallback 없음. command guard 는 best-effort UX 이고, 설치 결과 effect 가 backstop 이다.
+# 3. 끝 — 이제 에이전트가 실행하는 모든 의존성 install 이 자동으로 게이트된다.
+```
+
+> `safedeps` 는 CLI 명령어이고, npm 패키지는 **`@aldegad/safedeps`** 다 — npm 의 unscoped `safedeps` 는 무관한 남의 패키지. 전체 skill 소스 트리를 원하면 [설치](#설치) 참고.
+
+![safedeps 가 취약한 install 을 보류하고, 패치 버전은 통과시킨다](assets/demo.gif)
+
+*Detailed reference → [README.md](./README.md) (영문, SSoT)*
 
 ---
 
@@ -193,6 +205,14 @@ node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs install --hour 9 --minut
 
 ---
 
+## "reorg" 는 뭐고 왜 그 비유인가
+
+블록체인에서 **reorg (재편성)** 은 미확정 블록 시퀀스를 무효화하고 마지막 확정된 안전 상태로 체인을 되돌린다. `safedeps` 는 모든 install 을 똑같이 본다 — 일련의 공급망 보안 검사를 통과하기 전까지는 미확정 블록 후보다. 설치된 effect 가 어긋나면 도구가 **reorg** 를 수행한다 — lock 파일, `package.json`, `node_modules` 를 마지막 확정된 안전 snapshot 으로 되돌린다.
+
+하지만 reorg 는 **최전선이 아니라 backstop 이다.** 나쁜 install 의 대부분은 여기까지 오지도 않는다 — 사전 승인 게이트가 미승인·플래그된 패키지를 실행 전에 *거부* 하고, Claude Code 에서는 install 이 **inert (`--ignore-scripts`)** 로 돌아 closure 가 깨끗하다고 검증되기 전까지 lifecycle script 가 실행되지 않는다. reorg 가 발동하는 건 잔여 케이스뿐이다 — 승인된 직접 패키지가 미승인·취약 transitive 를 끌어오거나, 래핑된 명령이 advisory 계층을 빠져나간 경우 — 그리고 그때조차 실행되지도 못한 파일을 되돌린다.
+
+빠른 advisory 피드백, 관측 가능한 rollback, silent fallback 없음. command guard 는 best-effort UX 이고, 설치 결과 effect 가 backstop 이다.
+
 ## 다른 도구와 뭐가 다른가
 
 `safedeps` 는 **AI 에이전트가 코딩 중 install 명령을 작성하는 순간**에 끼어드는 도구다. CI 스캔, PR 권장, runtime sandbox 처럼 다른 시점에서 동작하는 도구들과 핵심 차별점이 여기 있다.

package/README.md

@@ -1,14 +1,28 @@
-# Safedeps
+# safedeps
 
-> **Treat every install as an unconfirmed block — `safedeps` approves the safe ones, reorgs the rest.**
+> **Stop your AI coding agent from installing vulnerable or unapproved dependencies — and roll back the ones that slip through.**
 >
-> Pre-approve dependency installs against OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory, enforce the installed closure from Claude Code and Codex CLI hooks, and auto-rollback any install that diverges from the approved closure. *(한국어 README → [README.ko.md](./README.ko.md))*
+> `safedeps` gates every dependency install your Claude Code or Codex CLI agent runs. It pre-approves packages against OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory, re-verifies the closure that actually lands in your lockfile, and auto-rolls-back anything that diverges. Local-only, with zero runtime dependencies. *(한국어 README → [README.ko.md](./README.ko.md))*
 
-## Why "reorg"?
+- **Pre-approve** — every `pkg@version`, plus its full transitive closure for npm, is cleared against OSV (canonical), CISA KEV, and GitHub Advisory *before* it installs.
+- **Enforce the real effect** — after the install, the actual `package-lock.json` closure is re-checked, so a wrapped or obfuscated command can't sneak a package past the gate.
+- **Roll back** — anything unapproved or newly-vulnerable is reverted to the last confirmed safe snapshot. On Claude Code the install runs inert (`--ignore-scripts`), so a rejected package's lifecycle scripts never run.
 
-In blockchain networks, a **reorganization (reorg)** invalidates a sequence of blocks and reverts the chain to a previously confirmed safe state. `safedeps` applies the same principle to your `node_modules`: every install is treated as an unconfirmed block candidate until it passes a battery of supply-chain security checks. If anything looks wrong, the tool performs a **reorg** -- rolling back lock files, `package.json`, and `node_modules` to the last confirmed safe snapshot.
+## Quickstart
 
-Fast advisory feedback, observable rollback, and no hidden fallback. The command guard is best-effort UX; the installed effect is the backstop.
+```bash
+# 1. Install the CLI — the npm package is scoped, note the @aldegad/ prefix
+npm install -g @aldegad/safedeps
+
+# 2. Wire the hooks into Claude Code / Codex (idempotent)
+cd "$(npm root -g)/@aldegad/safedeps" && node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs
+
+# 3. Done — every dependency install your agent runs is now gated.
+```
+
+> `safedeps` is the CLI command; the npm package is **`@aldegad/safedeps`** — the unscoped `safedeps` on npm is an unrelated package. Prefer the full skill source tree? See [Installation](#installation).
+
+![safedeps withholds a vulnerable install, then clears the patched version](assets/demo.gif)
 
 ## Distribution Model
 
@@ -115,6 +129,14 @@ After the install command completes, the verify hook analyzes what changed. For
   4. The event is logged to `~/.safedeps/reorg.log`.
   5. Claude Code receives a system message detailing the detected threats and rollback actions.
 
+## Why "reorg"?
+
+The name borrows from blockchain, where a **reorganization (reorg)** invalidates a sequence of unconfirmed blocks and reverts the chain to its last confirmed safe state. `safedeps` treats every install the same way: an unconfirmed block candidate until it passes a battery of supply-chain checks. If the installed effect diverges, the tool performs a **reorg** -- rolling the lock file, `package.json`, and `node_modules` back to the last confirmed safe snapshot.
+
+But the reorg is the **backstop, not the front line.** Most bad installs never reach it: the pre-approval gate *denies* an unapproved or flagged package before it runs, and on Claude Code the install runs **inert** (`--ignore-scripts`) so lifecycle scripts do not execute until the closure verifies clean. The reorg fires for the residual case -- an approved direct package that pulls in an unapproved or vulnerable transitive, or a wrapped command that slips past the advisory layer -- and even then it rolls back files that never got to run.
+
+Fast advisory feedback, observable rollback, and no hidden fallback. The command guard is best-effort UX; the installed effect is the backstop.
+
 ## The Blockchain Analogy
 
 | Blockchain Concept | Safedeps Equivalent |

package/bin/safedeps

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
-SAFEDEPS_VERSION="2.5.0"
+SAFEDEPS_VERSION="2.6.0"
 
 # ---- repo / lib bootstrap ----------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
   evidence_file=$(sf_mktemp_evidence)
   transitive_file=$(sf_closure_temp_file)
 
-  sf_spinner_start "npm closure 해석 중 (${pkg}@${version})"
+  sf_spinner_start "resolving npm closure (${pkg}@${version})"
   if ! sf_npm_closure_for_spec "${pkg}" "${version}" "${closure_file}"; then
     sf_spinner_stop
     rm -f "${closure_file}" "${batch_file}" "${evidence_file}" "${transitive_file}"
@@ -352,10 +352,10 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
   fi
   sf_spinner_stop
 
-  sf_spinner_start "closure 취약점 batch 조회 중 (OSV / KEV)"
+  sf_spinner_start "batch-checking closure for advisories (OSV / KEV)"
   if ! sf_npm_batch_check_closure "${closure_file}" "${batch_file}"; then
     sf_spinner_stop
-    sf_err "OSV batch 응답 없음 — fail-closed (closure cache miss + 라이브 실패)"
+    sf_err "no OSV batch response — fail-closed (closure cache miss + live query failed)"
     sf_advisory_log "check fail-closed npm-closure package=${pkg} version=${version}"
     rm -f "${closure_file}" "${batch_file}" "${evidence_file}" "${transitive_file}"
     if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
   if [[ "${kev_count}" -gt 0 ]]; then
     local kev_summary
     kev_summary=$(jq -r '[.[] | select(.status == "hard_block") | "\(.package)@\(.version)" + (if .direct then " (direct)" else " (transitive)" end)] | join(", ")' "${batch_file}")
-    sf_err "KEV 매칭 closure 감지 — 설치 차단: ${kev_summary}"
+    sf_err "KEV-matched package in closure — install blocked: ${kev_summary}"
     sf_advisory_log "check block(KEV closure) package=${pkg} version=${version} affected=${kev_summary}"
     if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
       sf_npm_emit_closure_block_json "kev_hard_block" "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${range}" "${version}" "${batch_file}"
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
       fi
 
       for patched_version in "${patched_versions[@]+${patched_versions[@]}}"; do
-        sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} direct 취약 — 후보 ${patched_version} closure 재조회 중."
+        sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} direct vulnerable — re-checking closure for candidate ${patched_version}."
         if ! sf_npm_closure_for_spec "${pkg}" "${patched_version}" "${closure_file}"; then
           continue
         fi
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
         local hash; hash=$(jq -r '.hash' <<< "${spec_json}")
         local expires_at; expires_at=$(jq -r '.expires_at' <<< "${spec_json}")
         local transitive_count; transitive_count=$(jq 'length' "${transitive_file}")
-        sf_ok "${pkg}@${patched_version} full closure 승인 (transitive ${transitive_count}, until ${expires_at})"
+        sf_ok "${pkg}@${patched_version} full closure cleared (transitive ${transitive_count}, until ${expires_at})"
         sf_info "ledger: ${hash}"
         sf_advisory_log "check approve(patched closure) package=${pkg} version=${patched_version} hash=${hash} transitive=${transitive_count} prev_version=${version}"
         rm -f "${direct_evidence}" "${closure_file}" "${batch_file}" "${evidence_file}" "${transitive_file}"
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
 
     local affected_summary
     affected_summary=$(jq -r '[.[] | select(.status == "vulnerable") | "\(.package)@\(.version)" + (if .direct then " (direct)" else " (transitive)" end)] | join(", ")' "${batch_file}")
-    sf_warn "closure 에 취약 패키지 감지 — 승인 보류: ${affected_summary}"
+    sf_warn "vulnerable package in closure — approval withheld: ${affected_summary}"
     sf_advisory_log "check block(vulnerable closure) package=${pkg} version=${version} affected=${affected_summary}"
     if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
       sf_npm_emit_closure_block_json "${block_result}" "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${range}" "${version}" "${batch_file}"
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ sf_cmd_check_npm_full_closure() {
   local hash; hash=$(jq -r '.hash' <<< "${spec_json}")
   local expires_at; expires_at=$(jq -r '.expires_at' <<< "${spec_json}")
   local transitive_count; transitive_count=$(jq 'length' "${transitive_file}")
-  sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} full closure 승인 (transitive ${transitive_count}, until ${expires_at})"
+  sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} full closure cleared (transitive ${transitive_count}, until ${expires_at})"
   sf_info "ledger: ${hash}"
   sf_advisory_log "check approve(clean closure) package=${pkg} version=${version} hash=${hash} transitive=${transitive_count}"
   rm -f "${closure_file}" "${batch_file}" "${evidence_file}" "${transitive_file}"
@@ -506,10 +506,10 @@ cmd_check() {
   range=$(sf_parse_pkg_spec "${pkg_spec}" | sed -n '2p')
 
   local version
-  sf_spinner_start "버전 해석 중 (${pkg}@${range})"
+  sf_spinner_start "resolving version (${pkg}@${range})"
   if ! version=$(sf_resolve_version "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${range}"); then
     sf_spinner_stop
-    sf_err "버전 해석 실패: ${pkg}@${range}"
+    sf_err "version resolution failed: ${pkg}@${range}"
     if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
       jq -nc --arg ecosystem "${ecosystem}" --arg package "${pkg}" --arg range "${range}" \
         '{command:"check", ecosystem:$ecosystem, package:$package, input_range:$range, result:"error", error:"version_resolution_failed"}'
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ cmd_check() {
       hash=$(jq -r '.hash' <<< "${ledger_check}")
       approved_at=$(jq -r '.spec.approved_at // "n/a"' <<< "${ledger_check}")
       expires_at=$(jq -r '.spec.expires_at // "n/a"' <<< "${ledger_check}")
-      sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} 이미 승인됨 (until ${expires_at})"
+      sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} already approved (until ${expires_at})"
       sf_info "ledger: ${hash}"
       if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
         jq -nc \
@@ -551,10 +551,10 @@ cmd_check() {
 
   # Provider query (canonical truth = OSV; KEV overlay; GHSA enrichment)
   local provider_json
-  sf_spinner_start "취약점 조회 중 (OSV / KEV / GHSA)"
+  sf_spinner_start "checking advisories (OSV / KEV / GHSA)"
   if ! provider_json=$(safedeps_providers_query "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${version}"); then
     sf_spinner_stop
-    sf_err "OSV primary 응답 없음 — fail-closed (cache miss + 라이브 실패)"
+    sf_err "no OSV primary response — fail-closed (cache miss + live query failed)"
     sf_advisory_log "check fail-closed ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version}"
     if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
       jq -nc \
@@ -577,11 +577,11 @@ cmd_check() {
 
   case "${status}" in
     hard_block)
-      sf_err "KEV 매칭 — ${pkg}@${version} 은 실제 야생에서 exploit 확인됨. 설치 차단."
+      sf_err "KEV match — ${pkg}@${version} is exploited in the wild. install blocked."
       local kev_cves
       kev_cves=$(jq -r '[.kev.matches[]?.cveID] | unique | join(", ")' <<< "${provider_json}")
-      [[ -n "${kev_cves}" ]] && sf_info "관련 CVE: ${kev_cves}"
-      sf_warn "대체 모듈을 검토하세요. 이 spec 은 ledger 에 승인되지 않습니다."
+      [[ -n "${kev_cves}" ]] && sf_info "related CVEs: ${kev_cves}"
+      sf_warn "consider an alternative package; this spec is not approved in the ledger."
       sf_advisory_log "check block(KEV) ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version} cves=${kev_cves}"
       if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
         jq -c \
@@ -610,11 +610,11 @@ cmd_check() {
 
         for patched_version in "${patched_versions[@]}"; do
           last_patched="${patched_version}"
-          sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} 에 ${vuln_count} 개 CVE — 후보 ${patched_version} 재조회 중."
-          sf_spinner_start "${patched_version} 재조회 중"
+          sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} has ${vuln_count} CVE(s) — re-checking candidate ${patched_version}."
+          sf_spinner_start "re-checking ${patched_version}"
           if ! narrow_json=$(safedeps_providers_query "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${patched_version}"); then
             sf_spinner_stop
-            sf_err "${pkg}@${patched_version} 재조회 실패 — fail-closed"
+            sf_err "${pkg}@${patched_version} re-check failed — fail-closed"
             rm -f "${tmp_evidence}"
             if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
               jq -nc \
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ cmd_check() {
           narrow_status=$(jq -r '.status' <<< "${narrow_json}")
           last_status="${narrow_status}"
           if [[ "${narrow_status}" != "clean" ]]; then
-            sf_warn "패치 후보 ${patched_version} 도 깨끗하지 않음 (status=${narrow_status}); 다음 후보를 확인합니다."
+            sf_warn "patch candidate ${patched_version} is not clean either (status=${narrow_status}); trying the next candidate."
             continue
           fi
 
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ cmd_check() {
           rm -f "${narrow_evidence}" "${tmp_evidence}"
           local hash; hash=$(jq -r '.hash' <<< "${spec_json}")
           local expires_at; expires_at=$(jq -r '.expires_at' <<< "${spec_json}")
-          sf_ok "${pkg}@${patched_version} 승인 (until ${expires_at})"
+          sf_ok "${pkg}@${patched_version} approved (until ${expires_at})"
           sf_info "ledger: ${hash}"
           sf_advisory_log "check approve(patched) ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${patched_version} hash=${hash} prev_version=${version}"
           if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ cmd_check() {
           return 0
         done
 
-        sf_err "패치 후보를 모두 재조회했지만 clean 후보가 없음 (last=${last_patched}, status=${last_status})"
+        sf_err "re-checked all patch candidates but none are clean (last=${last_patched}, status=${last_status})"
         rm -f "${tmp_evidence}"
         if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
           jq -nc \
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ cmd_check() {
         fi
         return 2
       else
-        sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} 에 ${vuln_count} 개 CVE — 사용 가능한 patch 없음. 승인 보류."
+        sf_warn "${pkg}@${version} has ${vuln_count} CVE(s) — no patch available. approval withheld."
         sf_advisory_log "check warn(no-patch) ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version} vulns=${vuln_count}"
         rm -f "${tmp_evidence}"
         if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ cmd_check() {
       rm -f "${tmp_evidence}"
       local hash; hash=$(jq -r '.hash' <<< "${spec_json}")
       local expires_at; expires_at=$(jq -r '.expires_at' <<< "${spec_json}")
-      sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} 승인 (until ${expires_at})"
+      sf_ok "${pkg}@${version} approved (until ${expires_at})"
       sf_info "ledger: ${hash}"
       sf_advisory_log "check approve(clean) ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version} hash=${hash}"
       if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ cmd_check() {
       ;;
 
     *)
-      sf_err "예상치 못한 provider status: ${status}"
+      sf_err "unexpected provider status: ${status}"
       rm -f "${tmp_evidence}"
       return 4
       ;;
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ cmd_ledger() {
   fi
 
   if [[ ${#entries[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
-    sf_info "approved-specs 비어있음 (${SAFEDEPS_LEDGER_DIR})"
+    sf_info "approved-specs is empty (${SAFEDEPS_LEDGER_DIR})"
     return 0
   fi
 
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ cmd_revoke() {
   local target_file=""
   if [[ "${arg1}" == sha256:* ]]; then
     target_file=$(safedeps_ledger_path_for_hash "${arg1}")
-    [[ -f "${target_file}" ]] || { sf_err "ledger entry 없음: ${arg1}"; return 1; }
+    [[ -f "${target_file}" ]] || { sf_err "no ledger entry: ${arg1}"; return 1; }
   else
     # one or two args. Two = ecosystem + pkg@version. One = pkg@version (scan).
     if [[ -n "${arg2}" ]]; then
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ cmd_revoke() {
       version=$(sf_parse_pkg_spec "${arg2}" | sed -n '2p')
       [[ -n "${version}" ]] || { sf_eprintf "safedeps: revoke needs pkg@version, got '${arg2}'"; return 4; }
       target_file=$(safedeps_ledger_path "${arg1}" "${pkg}" "${version}")
-      [[ -f "${target_file}" ]] || { sf_err "ledger entry 없음: ${arg1} ${pkg}@${version}"; return 1; }
+      [[ -f "${target_file}" ]] || { sf_err "no ledger entry: ${arg1} ${pkg}@${version}"; return 1; }
     else
       local pkg version
       pkg=$(sf_parse_pkg_spec "${arg1}" | sed -n '1p')
@@ -855,9 +855,9 @@ cmd_revoke() {
         fi
       done < <(find "${SAFEDEPS_LEDGER_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.json' -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
       case "${#matches[@]}" in
-        0) sf_err "ledger entry 없음: ${pkg}@${version}"; return 1 ;;
+        0) sf_err "no ledger entry: ${pkg}@${version}"; return 1 ;;
         1) target_file="${matches[0]}" ;;
-        *) sf_err "${pkg}@${version} 가 여러 ecosystem 에서 매칭됨 — ecosystem 을 명시하세요"; return 4 ;;
+        *) sf_err "${pkg}@${version} matched in multiple ecosystems — specify the ecosystem"; return 4 ;;
       esac
     fi
   fi
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ cmd_revoke() {
   local revoked_json
   revoked_json=$(safedeps_ledger_revoke "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${version}" "${reason}")
   sf_advisory_log "revoke ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version} reason=${reason}"
-  sf_ok "취소: ${ecosystem} ${pkg}@${version}"
+  sf_ok "revoked: ${ecosystem} ${pkg}@${version}"
   sf_info "reason: ${reason}"
 
   if [[ "${SAFEDEPS_JSON_MODE}" -eq 1 ]]; then
@@ -909,17 +909,17 @@ cmd_recheck() {
     hash=$(jq -r '.hash // ""' "${f}")
     [[ -n "${revoked_at}" ]] && continue
     if [[ -f "${SAFEDEPS_ADVISORY_LOG}" ]] && ! sf_ledger_has_approval_provenance "${hash}" "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${version}"; then
-      sf_warn "  provenance 없음 — 위조 의심 flag (revoke 안 함)"
+      sf_warn "  no provenance — flagged as suspected forgery (not revoked)"
       suspected_forgery_arr=$(jq -c \
         --arg ecosystem "${ecosystem}" --arg package "${pkg}" --arg version "${version}" --arg hash "${hash}" \
         '. + [{ecosystem:$ecosystem, package:$package, version:$version, hash:$hash, reason:"missing_advisory_log_approval"}]' <<< "${suspected_forgery_arr}")
     fi
     checked=$(( checked + 1 ))
 
-    sf_info "재검증 ${ecosystem} ${pkg}@${version}"
+    sf_info "re-checking ${ecosystem} ${pkg}@${version}"
     local pj
     if ! pj=$(safedeps_providers_query "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${version}" 2>/dev/null); then
-      sf_warn "  provider 응답 없음 — skip"
+      sf_warn "  no provider response — skipped"
       continue
     fi
     local s; s=$(jq -r '.status' <<< "${pj}")
@@ -932,12 +932,12 @@ cmd_recheck() {
         safedeps_ledger_revoke "${ecosystem}" "${pkg}" "${version}" "${reason}" >/dev/null
         sf_advisory_log "re-check revoke ecosystem=${ecosystem} package=${pkg} version=${version} status=${s}"
         if [[ "${s}" == "hard_block" ]]; then
-          sf_err "  KEV 매칭 → revoke"
+          sf_err "  KEV match -> revoked"
           kev_hit_arr=$(jq -c \
             --arg ecosystem "${ecosystem}" --arg package "${pkg}" --arg version "${version}" \
             '. + [{ecosystem:$ecosystem, package:$package, version:$version, status:"hard_block"}]' <<< "${kev_hit_arr}")
         else
-          sf_warn "  새 CVE 매치 → revoke"
+          sf_warn "  new CVE match -> revoked"
           newly_vuln_arr=$(jq -c \
             --arg ecosystem "${ecosystem}" --arg package "${pkg}" --arg version "${version}" \
             '. + [{ecosystem:$ecosystem, package:$package, version:$version, status:"vulnerable"}]' <<< "${newly_vuln_arr}")
@@ -961,15 +961,15 @@ cmd_recheck() {
     return 0
   fi
 
-  sf_info "검증 완료: ${checked} 개 중 ${still_clean} 개 clean"
+  sf_info "re-check complete: ${still_clean}/${checked} still clean"
   local nv kv
   nv=$(jq -r 'length' <<< "${newly_vuln_arr}")
   kv=$(jq -r 'length' <<< "${kev_hit_arr}")
   local fg
   fg=$(jq -r 'length' <<< "${suspected_forgery_arr}")
-  [[ "${nv}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_warn "새 CVE 매치로 ${nv} 개 revoke"
-  [[ "${kv}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_err  "KEV 매치로 ${kv} 개 revoke"
-  [[ "${fg}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_warn "approval provenance 없는 ledger entry ${fg} 개 flag"
+  [[ "${nv}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_warn "revoked ${nv} for new CVE match"
+  [[ "${kv}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_err  "revoked ${kv} for KEV match"
+  [[ "${fg}" -gt 0 ]] && sf_warn "flagged ${fg} ledger entries with no approval provenance"
 }
 
 # ---- migrate -----------------------------------------------------------------

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@aldegad/safedeps",
-  "version": "2.5.0",
+  "version": "2.6.0",
   "description": "Dependency install safety gate with OSV-backed advisory checks, approved-spec ledger enforcement, and reorg rollback hooks",
   "main": "bin/safedeps",
   "bin": {

package/scripts/safedeps-post-verify.sh

@@ -781,12 +781,12 @@ LOG_EOF
     --arg log_path "${GUARD_DIR}/reorg.log" \
     '{
       systemMessage: (
-        "safedeps: 의심스러운 패키지 변경 감지, 마지막으로 confirmed 된 안전 스냅샷으로 롤백했습니다.\n\n" +
-        "감지된 문제:\n" + $reasons + "\n\n" +
-        "롤백 기준 스냅샷: " + $rollback_snapshot + "\n" +
-        "롤백된 파일: " + $rolled_back +
-        (if $warnings == "" then "" else "\n\n추가 경고:\n" + $warnings end) +
-        "\n\n상세 로그: " + $log_path
+        "safedeps: suspicious dependency change detected — rolled back to the last confirmed safe snapshot.\n\n" +
+        "Detected problems:\n" + $reasons + "\n\n" +
+        "Rollback snapshot: " + $rollback_snapshot + "\n" +
+        "Rolled-back files: " + $rolled_back +
+        (if $warnings == "" then "" else "\n\nAdditional warnings:\n" + $warnings end) +
+        "\n\nDetails log: " + $log_path
       )
     }'
   exit 0

package/scripts/test/e2e.sh

@@ -190,6 +190,50 @@ EOF
 grep -qx 'rebuild' "${tmp_root}/npm-calls.log" || fail "post hook runs npm rebuild after verified injected install"
 pass "post hook rebuilds after verified inert install"
 
+# Reorg must actually revert the on-disk lockfile, not just print the message. The
+# missing-transitive test below proves the systemMessage; this proves the stronger
+# claim — a tampered lockfile is restored byte-for-byte to the last confirmed safe
+# snapshot on disk. Regression guard so a future change cannot break the rollback
+# while keeping the message green. Stub npm keeps `npm ci` from rewriting the file.
+revert_project="${tmp_root}/revert-project"
+mkdir -p "${revert_project}"
+printf '{"dependencies":{"fixture-parent":"1.0.0"}}\n' > "${revert_project}/package.json"
+cat > "${revert_project}/package-lock.json" <<'EOF'
+{
+  "name": "revert-project",
+  "lockfileVersion": 3,
+  "packages": {
+    "": {"dependencies": {"fixture-parent": "1.0.0"}},
+    "node_modules/fixture-parent": {"version": "1.0.0", "dependencies": {"fixture-child": "1.0.0"}},
+    "node_modules/fixture-child": {"version": "1.0.0"}
+  }
+}
+EOF
+cp "${revert_project}/package-lock.json" "${tmp_root}/revert-safe-lock.json"
+scripts/safedeps-pre-guard.sh > /dev/null <<EOF
+{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"npm install fixture-parent@1.0.0"},"cwd":"${revert_project}"}
+EOF
+cat > "${revert_project}/package-lock.json" <<'EOF'
+{
+  "name": "revert-project",
+  "lockfileVersion": 3,
+  "packages": {
+    "": {"dependencies": {"fixture-parent": "1.0.0"}},
+    "node_modules/fixture-parent": {"version": "1.0.0", "dependencies": {"fixture-child": "1.0.0"}},
+    "node_modules/fixture-child": {"version": "1.0.0"},
+    "node_modules/fixture-evil": {"version": "6.6.6", "resolved": "git://evil.example.com/fixture-evil.git"}
+  }
+}
+EOF
+revert_post=$(
+  PATH="${stub_bin}:${PATH}" scripts/safedeps-post-verify.sh <<EOF
+{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"npm install fixture-parent@1.0.0"},"cwd":"${revert_project}"}
+EOF
+)
+grep -q 'suspicious dependency change detected' <<< "${revert_post}" || fail "reorg fires on a tampered lockfile"
+cmp -s "${revert_project}/package-lock.json" "${tmp_root}/revert-safe-lock.json" || fail "reorg restores the exact safe lockfile content on disk"
+pass "reorg reverts a tampered lockfile to safe content on disk"
+
 export SAFEDEPS_HOME="${tmp_root}/safe-missing-transitive"
 export SAFEDEPS_OSV_API_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${port}/osv/v1/query"
 export SAFEDEPS_OSV_BATCH_API_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${port}/osv/v1/querybatch"
@@ -223,9 +267,15 @@ missing_post=$(
 {"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"npm install fixture-parent@1.0.0"},"cwd":"${missing_project}"}
 EOF
 )
-grep -q '의심스러운 패키지 변경 감지' <<< "${missing_post}" || fail "post hook reorgs unapproved transitive package"
+grep -q 'suspicious dependency change detected' <<< "${missing_post}" || fail "post hook reorgs unapproved transitive package"
 grep -q 'fixture-child@1.0.0' <<< "${missing_post}" || fail "post hook names unapproved transitive package"
-pass "post hook reorgs unapproved transitive package"
+# Not just the message — the unapproved transitive must be gone from the on-disk
+# lockfile. (Reorg removes the tampered lockfile; a no-network reinstall may recreate
+# an empty one, so assert fixture-child is absent rather than the file itself.)
+if grep -q 'fixture-child' "${missing_project}/package-lock.json" 2>/dev/null; then
+  fail "post hook reorg leaves the unapproved transitive in the on-disk lockfile"
+fi
+pass "post hook reorgs unapproved transitive package (verified on disk)"
 
 export SAFEDEPS_HOME="${tmp_root}/safe"
 export SAFEDEPS_OSV_API_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${port}/osv/v1/query"

package/scripts/test/smoke.sh

@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ tamper_post=$(
   jq -nc --arg cwd "${project_dir}" '{tool_name:"Bash",tool_input:{command:"npm install ledger-tamper@1.0.0"},cwd:$cwd}' |
     HOME="${tamper_home}" SAFEDEPS_HOME="${tamper_safe}" scripts/safedeps-post-verify.sh
 )
-grep -q '의심스러운 패키지 변경 감지' <<< "${tamper_post}" || fail "post hook reorgs safedeps ledger tamper script"
+grep -q 'suspicious dependency change detected' <<< "${tamper_post}" || fail "post hook reorgs safedeps ledger tamper script"
 pass "post hook reorgs safedeps ledger tamper script"
 
 fixture_json="${tmp_root}/recheck-fixture.json"