@akasecurity/ai-tc-codex 0.9.15 → 0.9.17-beta.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/hooks/hooks.json +1 -1
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/scripts/apply-suppressions.js +2046 -1541
- package/scripts/backfill.js +2724 -1573
- package/scripts/content-retention.js +1506 -2220
- package/scripts/filescan.js +2927 -756
- package/scripts/firstrun.js +2566 -1936
- package/scripts/history-sync.js +1510 -2253
- package/scripts/intro.js +493 -2401
- package/scripts/onboard.js +3505 -1331
- package/scripts/post-tool-use.js +3213 -1990
- package/scripts/pre-tool-use.js +2650 -1516
- package/scripts/query.js +2566 -1936
- package/scripts/reconcile.js +2581 -1479
- package/scripts/remediate.js +2638 -1547
- package/scripts/scan-worker.js +377 -161
- package/scripts/session-start.js +3538 -1045
- package/scripts/start-light.js +381 -1456
- package/scripts/stop.js +626 -1311
- package/scripts/sync.js +3475 -1284
- package/scripts/user-prompt-submit.js +2766 -1595
- package/skills/setup/SKILL.md +27 -12
package/scripts/scan-worker.js
CHANGED
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@@ -881,10 +881,10 @@ function isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text, normalization) {
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}
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return false;
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}
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-
function buildCandidates(matchText, ruleset2, extension) {
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function buildCandidates(matchText, ruleset2, extension, eventKind) {
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const candidates = [];
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for (const rule of ruleset2) {
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if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension)) continue;
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+
if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind)) continue;
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const spans = MATCHERS[rule.matcher.type](matchText, rule);
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for (const span of spans) {
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const rawMatch = matchText.slice(span.start, span.end);
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@@ -994,22 +994,30 @@ function extensionOf(filePath) {
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const dot = base.lastIndexOf(".");
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return dot > 0 ? base.slice(dot).toLowerCase() : void 0;
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}
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function ruleApplies(rule, extension) {
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-
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function ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind) {
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const scope = rule.appliesTo;
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if (!scope) return true;
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if (scope.eventKinds && (eventKind === void 0 || !scope.eventKinds.some((k) => k === eventKind))) {
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return false;
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}
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if (!scope.extensions || extension === void 0) return true;
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return scope.extensions.some((e) => e.toLowerCase() === extension);
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}
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function scan(text, rules, context) {
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const ruleset2 = rules ?? getLoadedRules();
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const extension = context?.filePath ? extensionOf(context.filePath) : void 0;
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const normalization = normalizeFormatChars(text);
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-
const originalCandidates = buildCandidates(text, ruleset2, extension);
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const originalCandidates = buildCandidates(text, ruleset2, extension, context?.eventKind);
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if (!normalization) return gate(originalCandidates, text, void 0);
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const pooledOriginal = originalCandidates.map(
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(candidate) => withNormalizedSpan(candidate, normalization)
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);
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const normalizedCandidates = buildCandidates(
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-
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-
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const normalizedCandidates = buildCandidates(
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normalization.normalized,
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ruleset2,
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extension,
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context?.eventKind
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).map((candidate) => mapCandidateToOriginal(candidate, normalization, text));
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const findings = gate([...pooledOriginal, ...normalizedCandidates], text, normalization);
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return mergeOverlappingSameRule(findings, text);
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}
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@@ -21038,7 +21046,7 @@ anthropic.model("claude-haiku-4-5", {
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name: "Claude Haiku 4.5",
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ctx: 2e5,
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maxOut: 64e3,
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// Reviewed: fast/cheap tier,
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// Reviewed: fast/cheap general-purpose tier, not a reasoning or code model.
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capability: null,
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price: anthropicPrice(1, 5, 0.1),
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// The vendor documents `claude-haiku-4-5-20251001` as the versioned id and
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@@ -21169,6 +21177,11 @@ openai.model("gpt-4o", {
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price: tokenPrice(2.5, 10, { cacheRead: 1.25 }),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("gpt-4o-2024-05-13", {
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name: "GPT-4o (2024-05-13)",
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price: tokenPrice(5, 15),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("gpt-4o-mini", {
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name: "GPT-4o mini",
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price: tokenPrice(0.15, 0.6, { cacheRead: 0.075 }),
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price: tokenPrice(2, 8, { cacheRead: 0.5 }),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("text-embedding-3-small", {
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name: "text-embedding-3-small",
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capability: "embedding",
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price: tokenPrice(0.02, 0),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("text-embedding-3-large", {
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name: "text-embedding-3-large",
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capability: "embedding",
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price: tokenPrice(0.13, 0),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("text-embedding-ada-002", {
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name: "text-embedding-ada-002",
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capability: "embedding",
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price: tokenPrice(0.1, 0),
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on: [...OPENAI_RESELLERS]
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});
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openai.model("gpt-oss-120b", {
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name: "GPT-OSS 120B",
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openWeights: true,
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@@ -21474,10 +21505,21 @@ var MODEL_ENTRIES = Object.freeze([
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...alibaba.models(),
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...amazon.models()
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]);
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var LONG_CONTEXT_THRESHOLDS = Object.freeze(
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[
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...new Set(
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MODEL_ENTRIES.flatMap(
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(entry) => [...entry.platforms.values()].flatMap(
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(offering) => offering.price?.longContext ? [offering.price.longContext.thresholdInputTokens] : []
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)
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)
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)
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].sort((a, b) => a - b)
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);
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var MODEL_INDEX = buildModelIndex(MODEL_ENTRIES);
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// ../../packages/schema/src/model/governance.ts
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var ModelCapability = external_exports.enum(["reasoning", "code"]);
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var ModelCapability = external_exports.enum(["reasoning", "code", "embedding"]);
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var DataRetention = external_exports.enum([
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"zero_retention",
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"no_storage",
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"false-positive",
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"redetected"
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]).meta({ id: "ResolutionMethod" });
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var FindingContextBasis = external_exports.enum(["file", "excerpt"]).meta({ id: "FindingContextBasis" });
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var FindingContext = external_exports.object({
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basis: FindingContextBasis,
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// 1-based line number of `lines[0]`.
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firstLine: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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lines: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).min(1).max(5),
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match: external_exports.object({
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// 1-based line number, within [firstLine, firstLine + lines.length).
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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// Offsets into that entry of `lines`, end exclusive.
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start: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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end: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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}).nullable()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingContext" });
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var FindingLocation = external_exports.object({
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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context: FindingContext.nullable()
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});
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var FindingMatch = external_exports.object({
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// Masked preview of the matched value. Never raw content.
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maskedValue: external_exports.string(),
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//
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contextPrefix: external_exports.string()
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// Deprecated: always empty. Superseded by `context`.
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contextPrefix: external_exports.string(),
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// The masked lines around the match. Absent when the finding predates
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// context capture or none could be built safely.
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context: FindingContext.optional()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingMatch" });
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var FindingDetectionRef = external_exports.object({
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id: external_exports.string(),
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@@ -21693,6 +21757,11 @@ var FindingInstance = external_exports.object({
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provider: FindingProvider,
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repo: external_exports.string(),
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file: external_exports.string(),
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// 1-based line and column of the match start in the scanned text (the
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// column in UTF-16 code units). Absent for findings that predate location
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// capture or have no source text.
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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// Who the capturing event is attributed to. Optional: a single-user store
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// has no one to attribute a finding to and never sets it.
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user: FindingUser.optional(),
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@@ -21754,6 +21823,13 @@ var FindingStats = external_exports.object({
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low: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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})
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}).meta({ id: "FindingStats" });
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var FindingsOverview = external_exports.object({
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findings: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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open: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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handled: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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resolved: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingsOverview" });
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var FindingFacetItem = external_exports.object({
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value: external_exports.string(),
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count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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@@ -21871,6 +21947,7 @@ var FindingInstanceDetail = FindingInstance.extend({
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policy: FindingPolicyRef
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}).meta({ id: "FindingInstanceDetail" });
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var MAX_FLAT_FINDINGS_LIMIT = 200;
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var FindingContextQuery = external_exports.object({ id: external_exports.string().min(1).max(256) });
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var ListFindingInstancesQuery = external_exports.object({
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severity: external_exports.array(Severity).optional(),
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// Rule ids, the same vocabulary the types list's `subtype` carries. Pinning
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@@ -22202,7 +22279,23 @@ var CaptureAttributes = external_exports.object({
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// capture denied by another finding's own Block policy carries `block`
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// here too. The full statement is on EventMetadata.redactDegradedTo; it is
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// repeated rather than referenced because a store reader opens this file.
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redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional()
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redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional(),
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// The scope key this capture was stamped with: the canonical repository
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// (`host/owner/repo`) of the path the capture names (a relative path is read
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// against its working directory), else of its own working directory, or a
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// chat account's identity. The store's local `scope_key` column reads it, so
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// a scoped attachment has a per-row key to work from. Absent when no key
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// could be derived.
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//
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// LOCAL ONLY. That is the contract for every path that sends a row. Producers
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// stamp it in every attachment mode, and the two structural choke points strip
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// it: the attached gateway's `reKeyForForward` on the live path, and the
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// history drain's `rebuildAuditEvent`, which drops it through `withoutScopeKey`.
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// A capture row's bag reaches the wire through `rebuildCapture`, which builds
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// the metadata from named keys and never names this one; `toCaptureAttributes`,
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// which builds the bag from a wire event, never emits it. What a scoped
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// attachment does with the key is not part of this shape's contract.
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scope_key: external_exports.string().optional()
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}).catchall(external_exports.unknown());
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var CaptureStatusAttributes = external_exports.object({
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source_tool: external_exports.string().optional(),
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@@ -22232,6 +22325,12 @@ var ToolCallInspection = external_exports.object({
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actionTaken: ActionTaken,
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confidence: external_exports.number().min(0).max(1)
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});
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var findingLocationFields = {
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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context: FindingContext.nullable().optional()
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};
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var ToolCallInspectionInput = ToolCallInspection.extend(findingLocationFields);
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var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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sessionId: external_exports.string().min(1),
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toolUseId: external_exports.string().min(1),
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@@ -22241,7 +22340,7 @@ var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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attributes: ToolCallAttributes,
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// Secrets detected in the tool's (masked) target — written as linked
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// `inspection_findings`. Empty for a clean tool call.
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inspections: external_exports.array(
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inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspectionInput).default([])
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});
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var InventoryInput = external_exports.object({
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objectType: InventoryObjectType,
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@@ -22315,7 +22414,8 @@ var InspectionFindingInput = external_exports.object({
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// same findingKey — mirrors the legacy `findings.first_detected_at`.
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// Optional: when omitted, the writer derives it from the referenced audit
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// event's startedAt on first insert (see SqliteInspectionFindingsRepository).
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firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
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firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional(),
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...findingLocationFields
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});
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var InventoryContext = external_exports.object({
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host: InventoryInput.optional(),
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@@ -22357,8 +22457,9 @@ var SessionTokenReport = external_exports.object({
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totalTokens: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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// Σ of the PRICED rollups only; null when no rollup had a known price.
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estimatedCostUsd: external_exports.number().nullable(),
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-
// True whenever any
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-
//
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// True whenever any call priced to null (an unknown provider/model, or a call
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// over a long-context threshold whose rate is unpublished), so the total
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// understates real spend — the UI renders `≥ $X` instead of a falsely
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// precise figure rather than silently dropping the unpriced calls.
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costIsPartial: external_exports.boolean()
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});
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@@ -23090,6 +23191,17 @@ var AttachedCredential = external_exports.object({
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23090
23191
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keyPrefix: external_exports.string().min(1).max(16).optional(),
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23091
23192
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mintedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
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23092
23193
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});
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23194
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+
var AttachmentMode = external_exports.enum(["machine", "scoped"]);
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23195
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+
var ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION = 2;
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23196
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+
var AttachedCredentialV1 = AttachedCredential;
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23197
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+
var AttachedCredentialV2 = AttachedCredential.extend({
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23198
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+
specVersion: external_exports.literal(ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION),
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23199
|
+
mode: external_exports.literal("scoped")
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+
});
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23201
|
+
var AttachedCredentialAny = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("specVersion", [
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23202
|
+
AttachedCredentialV1,
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23203
|
+
AttachedCredentialV2
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23204
|
+
]);
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23093
23205
|
var MAX_DATE_MS = 253402300799999;
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var MAX_INT4 = 2147483647;
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23207
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var StorePosturePack = external_exports.object({
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@@ -23193,7 +23305,15 @@ var StorePostureSnapshot = external_exports.object({
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23193
23305
|
policyCounts: StorePosturePolicyCounts,
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23194
23306
|
// OPTIONAL, not nullable: a reporter that predates this member keeps
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23195
23307
|
// getting its 200 without a payload change.
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23196
|
-
plugin: StorePosturePlugin.optional()
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23308
|
+
plugin: StorePosturePlugin.optional(),
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23309
|
+
// OPTIONAL, and sent only by a scoped attachment, always as `scoped`. A
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23310
|
+
// machine attachment omits it, so its body is byte for byte the one it
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23311
|
+
// sent before this member existed. Absent therefore means machine-wide OR
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23312
|
+
// a reporter older than this member, never "scoped". Both values parse, so
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23313
|
+
// a sender that one day spells `machine` breaks no receiver; any other
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23314
|
+
// value fails the whole snapshot, which is why the reporter sends a
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23315
|
+
// constant and never the raw mode.
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|
+
attachmentMode: AttachmentMode.optional()
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}).meta({ id: "StorePostureSnapshot" });
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var CAPTURE_VERSION_PREFIX = "capture/";
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23199
23319
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var RecordAuditEventRequest = AuditEventInput.extend({
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@@ -23371,6 +23491,130 @@ var PackId = external_exports.string().regex(/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$/);
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23371
23491
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var SemVer = external_exports.string().regex(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z-.]+)?$/);
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23492
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var PublisherKind = external_exports.enum(["labs", "user", "org"]);
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23373
23493
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23494
|
+
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/builtin-policy-id.ts
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23495
|
+
var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
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+
var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
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23497
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+
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23498
|
+
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
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|
+
var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
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23500
|
+
var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
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23501
|
+
var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
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23502
|
+
sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
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23503
|
+
repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
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23504
|
+
filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
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23505
|
+
// The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
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23506
|
+
// set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
|
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23507
|
+
// arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
|
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23508
|
+
// (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
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23509
|
+
// display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
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23510
|
+
toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
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23511
|
+
// Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
|
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23512
|
+
// repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
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23513
|
+
// generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
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23514
|
+
// policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
|
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23515
|
+
// blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
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23516
|
+
gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
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23517
|
+
// Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
|
|
23518
|
+
// capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
|
|
23519
|
+
// (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
|
|
23520
|
+
// this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
|
|
23521
|
+
// diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
|
|
23522
|
+
// open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
|
|
23523
|
+
// may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
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|
23524
|
+
// non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
|
|
23525
|
+
// non-authoritative path.
|
|
23526
|
+
wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
|
|
23527
|
+
model: external_exports.string().optional(),
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|
23528
|
+
turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
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|
23529
|
+
// Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
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|
23530
|
+
// to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
|
|
23531
|
+
// the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
|
|
23532
|
+
// originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
|
|
23533
|
+
// compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
|
|
23534
|
+
correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
|
|
23535
|
+
traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
|
|
23536
|
+
// Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
|
|
23537
|
+
// to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
|
|
23538
|
+
// authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
|
|
23539
|
+
exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
|
|
23540
|
+
// The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
|
|
23541
|
+
// in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
|
|
23542
|
+
// row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
|
|
23543
|
+
// on every other capture path, which has no such id.
|
|
23544
|
+
//
|
|
23545
|
+
// Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
|
|
23546
|
+
// a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
|
|
23547
|
+
// places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
|
|
23548
|
+
// nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
|
|
23549
|
+
messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
|
|
23550
|
+
conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23551
|
+
// How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
|
|
23552
|
+
// milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
|
|
23553
|
+
// front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
|
|
23554
|
+
// detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
|
|
23555
|
+
//
|
|
23556
|
+
// Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
|
|
23557
|
+
// `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
|
|
23558
|
+
// scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
|
|
23559
|
+
// so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
|
|
23560
|
+
// Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
|
|
23561
|
+
// clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
|
|
23562
|
+
// and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
|
|
23563
|
+
inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23564
|
+
// What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
|
|
23565
|
+
// workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
|
|
23566
|
+
// masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
|
|
23567
|
+
// hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
|
|
23568
|
+
//
|
|
23569
|
+
// It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
|
|
23570
|
+
// `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
|
|
23571
|
+
// assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
|
|
23572
|
+
// different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
|
|
23573
|
+
// the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
|
|
23574
|
+
// degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
|
|
23575
|
+
//
|
|
23576
|
+
// TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
|
|
23577
|
+
// is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
|
|
23578
|
+
//
|
|
23579
|
+
// - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
|
|
23580
|
+
// `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
|
|
23581
|
+
// identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
|
|
23582
|
+
// describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
|
|
23583
|
+
// - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
|
|
23584
|
+
// became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
|
|
23585
|
+
// by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
|
|
23586
|
+
// and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
|
|
23587
|
+
// Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
|
|
23588
|
+
// field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
|
|
23589
|
+
//
|
|
23590
|
+
// Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
|
|
23591
|
+
// Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
|
|
23592
|
+
// already carries its own action.
|
|
23593
|
+
redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
|
|
23594
|
+
}).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
|
|
23595
|
+
var Event = external_exports.object({
|
|
23596
|
+
id: external_exports.guid(),
|
|
23597
|
+
sourceTool: SourceTool,
|
|
23598
|
+
kind: EventKind,
|
|
23599
|
+
occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
23600
|
+
contentHash: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23601
|
+
content: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23602
|
+
metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
|
|
23603
|
+
}).meta({ id: "Event" });
|
|
23604
|
+
var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
|
|
23605
|
+
var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
|
|
23606
|
+
var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
|
|
23607
|
+
events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
|
|
23608
|
+
// Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
|
|
23609
|
+
// additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
|
|
23610
|
+
// recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
|
|
23611
|
+
// backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
|
|
23612
|
+
// would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
|
|
23613
|
+
// two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
|
|
23614
|
+
// the timeline.
|
|
23615
|
+
dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
|
|
23616
|
+
}).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
|
|
23617
|
+
|
|
23374
23618
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/rule.ts
|
|
23375
23619
|
var MatcherType = external_exports.enum(["keyword", "regex"]).meta({ id: "MatcherType" });
|
|
23376
23620
|
var RuleProbeVerdict = external_exports.enum(["safe", "quarantined"]).meta({ id: "RuleProbeVerdict" });
|
|
@@ -23439,7 +23683,10 @@ var Matcher = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [KeywordMatcher2, Rege
|
|
|
23439
23683
|
var MATCHER_TYPES = MatcherType.options;
|
|
23440
23684
|
var AppliesTo = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
23441
23685
|
// Dot-prefixed, e.g. ".py" — matches the scanner's SOURCE_EXTENSIONS shape.
|
|
23442
|
-
extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1)
|
|
23686
|
+
extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1).optional(),
|
|
23687
|
+
eventKinds: external_exports.array(EventKind).min(1).optional()
|
|
23688
|
+
}).refine((v) => v.extensions !== void 0 || v.eventKinds !== void 0, {
|
|
23689
|
+
message: "appliesTo needs extensions, eventKinds, or both"
|
|
23443
23690
|
}).meta({ id: "AppliesTo" });
|
|
23444
23691
|
var PostValidatorName = external_exports.enum(["entropy", "luhn"]).meta({ id: "PostValidatorName" });
|
|
23445
23692
|
var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
|
|
@@ -23462,6 +23709,7 @@ var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
|
|
|
23462
23709
|
)}) or { "name": ..., "config": { ... } }. An unrecognized name would be a false-positive guard that never runs.`
|
|
23463
23710
|
}
|
|
23464
23711
|
).meta({ id: "PostValidatorRef" });
|
|
23712
|
+
var RuleEvidence = external_exports.enum(["code", "value"]).meta({ id: "RuleEvidence" });
|
|
23465
23713
|
var RequiresNearby = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
23466
23714
|
// Each array, when present, must be non-empty and contain non-empty strings —
|
|
23467
23715
|
// an empty/blank criterion would either never fire or (for labels) match
|
|
@@ -23484,6 +23732,8 @@ var RuleFixture = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
|
23484
23732
|
// Simulated file context for the scan, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo`
|
|
23485
23733
|
// gating (e.g. a Python-only pattern must NOT fire in a .ts file).
|
|
23486
23734
|
filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23735
|
+
// Simulated capture kind, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo.eventKinds`.
|
|
23736
|
+
eventKind: EventKind.optional(),
|
|
23487
23737
|
expectedSpans: external_exports.array(external_exports.strictObject({ start: external_exports.number(), end: external_exports.number() })).optional()
|
|
23488
23738
|
}).meta({ id: "RuleFixture" });
|
|
23489
23739
|
var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
@@ -23509,7 +23759,9 @@ var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
|
23509
23759
|
appliesTo: AppliesTo.optional(),
|
|
23510
23760
|
postValidators: external_exports.array(PostValidatorRef).optional(),
|
|
23511
23761
|
requiresNearby: RequiresNearby.optional(),
|
|
23512
|
-
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional()
|
|
23762
|
+
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional(),
|
|
23763
|
+
// Whether the matched text is itself sensitive (see RuleEvidence).
|
|
23764
|
+
evidence: RuleEvidence.optional()
|
|
23513
23765
|
}).meta({ id: "Rule" });
|
|
23514
23766
|
var Author = external_exports.object({
|
|
23515
23767
|
name: external_exports.string(),
|
|
@@ -23526,7 +23778,11 @@ var PackManifest = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23526
23778
|
description: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23527
23779
|
author: Author.optional(),
|
|
23528
23780
|
license: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23529
|
-
sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional()
|
|
23781
|
+
sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional(),
|
|
23782
|
+
// The built-in policy a FIRST install of this pack assigns
|
|
23783
|
+
// (installed_packs.policy_id). Absent leaves the pack unassigned, so its
|
|
23784
|
+
// rules follow the category policies. An existing install never takes it.
|
|
23785
|
+
defaultPolicy: BuiltinPolicyId.optional()
|
|
23530
23786
|
}).meta({ id: "PackManifest" });
|
|
23531
23787
|
|
|
23532
23788
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/detection.ts
|
|
@@ -23554,10 +23810,12 @@ var DetectionListItem = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23554
23810
|
// Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
|
|
23555
23811
|
// (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
|
|
23556
23812
|
// detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
|
|
23557
|
-
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor
|
|
23558
|
-
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID)
|
|
23559
|
-
//
|
|
23560
|
-
//
|
|
23813
|
+
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
|
|
23814
|
+
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
|
|
23815
|
+
// (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
|
|
23816
|
+
// expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
|
|
23817
|
+
// z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
|
|
23818
|
+
// future custom id.
|
|
23561
23819
|
policyId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23562
23820
|
// Set ONLY when a newer snapshot is available for this pack (OSS: the
|
|
23563
23821
|
// bundled inventory recorded in available_packs differs from the installed
|
|
@@ -23594,7 +23852,13 @@ var DetectionRule = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23594
23852
|
// Representative matching strings the rule author shipped with the rule. The
|
|
23595
23853
|
// cheapest honest answer to "show me what this rule catches" — every bundled
|
|
23596
23854
|
// rule has them, and they are already in the stored snapshot.
|
|
23597
|
-
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional()
|
|
23855
|
+
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional(),
|
|
23856
|
+
// The rule's DECLARED evidence, as stored. Absent defers to the engine's
|
|
23857
|
+
// classification (ruleEvidence in @akasecurity/detections): a bundled
|
|
23858
|
+
// code-flaw rule reads as 'code' and anything else as 'value', and a rule
|
|
23859
|
+
// in a value category (secret/pii/financial/phi) is always 'value',
|
|
23860
|
+
// whatever it declares.
|
|
23861
|
+
evidence: RuleEvidence.optional()
|
|
23598
23862
|
}).meta({ id: "DetectionRule" });
|
|
23599
23863
|
var DetectionUpdate = external_exports.object({
|
|
23600
23864
|
available: external_exports.boolean(),
|
|
@@ -23626,10 +23890,12 @@ var DetectionDetail = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23626
23890
|
// Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
|
|
23627
23891
|
// (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
|
|
23628
23892
|
// detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
|
|
23629
|
-
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor
|
|
23630
|
-
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID)
|
|
23631
|
-
//
|
|
23632
|
-
//
|
|
23893
|
+
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
|
|
23894
|
+
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
|
|
23895
|
+
// (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
|
|
23896
|
+
// expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
|
|
23897
|
+
// z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
|
|
23898
|
+
// future custom id.
|
|
23633
23899
|
policyId: external_exports.string().optional()
|
|
23634
23900
|
}).meta({ id: "DetectionDetail" });
|
|
23635
23901
|
var LibraryItem = external_exports.object({
|
|
@@ -23659,126 +23925,6 @@ var ImportDetectionRequest = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23659
23925
|
})
|
|
23660
23926
|
}).meta({ id: "ImportDetectionRequest" });
|
|
23661
23927
|
|
|
23662
|
-
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
|
|
23663
|
-
var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
|
|
23664
|
-
var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
|
|
23665
|
-
var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
|
|
23666
|
-
sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23667
|
-
repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23668
|
-
filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23669
|
-
// The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
|
|
23670
|
-
// set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
|
|
23671
|
-
// arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
|
|
23672
|
-
// (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
|
|
23673
|
-
// display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
|
|
23674
|
-
toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23675
|
-
// Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
|
|
23676
|
-
// repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
|
|
23677
|
-
// generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
|
|
23678
|
-
// policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
|
|
23679
|
-
// blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
|
|
23680
|
-
gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
|
|
23681
|
-
// Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
|
|
23682
|
-
// capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
|
|
23683
|
-
// (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
|
|
23684
|
-
// this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
|
|
23685
|
-
// diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
|
|
23686
|
-
// open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
|
|
23687
|
-
// may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
|
|
23688
|
-
// non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
|
|
23689
|
-
// non-authoritative path.
|
|
23690
|
-
wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
|
|
23691
|
-
model: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23692
|
-
turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23693
|
-
// Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
|
|
23694
|
-
// to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
|
|
23695
|
-
// the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
|
|
23696
|
-
// originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
|
|
23697
|
-
// compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
|
|
23698
|
-
correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
|
|
23699
|
-
traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
|
|
23700
|
-
// Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
|
|
23701
|
-
// to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
|
|
23702
|
-
// authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
|
|
23703
|
-
exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
|
|
23704
|
-
// The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
|
|
23705
|
-
// in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
|
|
23706
|
-
// row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
|
|
23707
|
-
// on every other capture path, which has no such id.
|
|
23708
|
-
//
|
|
23709
|
-
// Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
|
|
23710
|
-
// a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
|
|
23711
|
-
// places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
|
|
23712
|
-
// nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
|
|
23713
|
-
messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
|
|
23714
|
-
conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23715
|
-
// How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
|
|
23716
|
-
// milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
|
|
23717
|
-
// front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
|
|
23718
|
-
// detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
|
|
23719
|
-
//
|
|
23720
|
-
// Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
|
|
23721
|
-
// `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
|
|
23722
|
-
// scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
|
|
23723
|
-
// so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
|
|
23724
|
-
// Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
|
|
23725
|
-
// clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
|
|
23726
|
-
// and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
|
|
23727
|
-
inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23728
|
-
// What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
|
|
23729
|
-
// workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
|
|
23730
|
-
// masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
|
|
23731
|
-
// hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
|
|
23732
|
-
//
|
|
23733
|
-
// It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
|
|
23734
|
-
// `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
|
|
23735
|
-
// assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
|
|
23736
|
-
// different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
|
|
23737
|
-
// the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
|
|
23738
|
-
// degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
|
|
23739
|
-
//
|
|
23740
|
-
// TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
|
|
23741
|
-
// is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
|
|
23742
|
-
//
|
|
23743
|
-
// - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
|
|
23744
|
-
// `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
|
|
23745
|
-
// identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
|
|
23746
|
-
// describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
|
|
23747
|
-
// - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
|
|
23748
|
-
// became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
|
|
23749
|
-
// by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
|
|
23750
|
-
// and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
|
|
23751
|
-
// Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
|
|
23752
|
-
// field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
|
|
23753
|
-
//
|
|
23754
|
-
// Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
|
|
23755
|
-
// Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
|
|
23756
|
-
// already carries its own action.
|
|
23757
|
-
redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
|
|
23758
|
-
}).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
|
|
23759
|
-
var Event = external_exports.object({
|
|
23760
|
-
id: external_exports.guid(),
|
|
23761
|
-
sourceTool: SourceTool,
|
|
23762
|
-
kind: EventKind,
|
|
23763
|
-
occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
23764
|
-
contentHash: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23765
|
-
content: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23766
|
-
metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
|
|
23767
|
-
}).meta({ id: "Event" });
|
|
23768
|
-
var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
|
|
23769
|
-
var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
|
|
23770
|
-
var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
|
|
23771
|
-
events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
|
|
23772
|
-
// Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
|
|
23773
|
-
// additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
|
|
23774
|
-
// recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
|
|
23775
|
-
// backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
|
|
23776
|
-
// would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
|
|
23777
|
-
// two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
|
|
23778
|
-
// the timeline.
|
|
23779
|
-
dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
|
|
23780
|
-
}).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
|
|
23781
|
-
|
|
23782
23928
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/exception.ts
|
|
23783
23929
|
var ExceptionScope = external_exports.enum(["once", "temporary", "permanent"]);
|
|
23784
23930
|
var ExceptionConditions = external_exports.object({
|
|
@@ -23939,8 +24085,6 @@ var Policy = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23939
24085
|
// test `prohibitedModels` passes and `reversibleRuleIds` fails.
|
|
23940
24086
|
provenance: PolicyProvenance.optional()
|
|
23941
24087
|
}).meta({ id: "Policy" });
|
|
23942
|
-
var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
|
|
23943
|
-
var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
|
|
23944
24088
|
var RedactFallback = BuiltinPolicyId.extract(["monitor", "warn", "block"]).meta({
|
|
23945
24089
|
id: "RedactFallback"
|
|
23946
24090
|
});
|
|
@@ -23980,11 +24124,14 @@ var PolicyBundle = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23980
24124
|
ruleVersions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), external_exports.string()).optional(),
|
|
23981
24125
|
// Model ids (the raw `model` string a harness reports, e.g.
|
|
23982
24126
|
// `claude-opus-4-1`) the tenant has PROHIBITED. The plugin refuses to switch
|
|
23983
|
-
// a session onto one (PreModelSwitch)
|
|
23984
|
-
//
|
|
23985
|
-
//
|
|
23986
|
-
//
|
|
23987
|
-
//
|
|
24127
|
+
// a session onto one (PreModelSwitch), refuses a turn that would run on one
|
|
24128
|
+
// (UserPromptSubmit) and refuses a subagent spawn onto one (PreToolUse),
|
|
24129
|
+
// wherever the organization governs the event: everywhere on a
|
|
24130
|
+
// machine-wide attachment, and only in enrolled repositories on a scoped
|
|
24131
|
+
// one (the plugin runtime's `governanceApplies`).
|
|
24132
|
+
// Optional so an older backend — and an older on-disk cache — still
|
|
24133
|
+
// parses; consumers read `?? []`, which is the unenforced behaviour that
|
|
24134
|
+
// predates this field and the safe direction to default.
|
|
23988
24135
|
//
|
|
23989
24136
|
// Ids, not display names: the governance decision is keyed on the exact
|
|
23990
24137
|
// string the harness reports (`model_status_override.versionId` in the
|
|
@@ -24296,7 +24443,7 @@ var VaultConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24296
24443
|
});
|
|
24297
24444
|
|
|
24298
24445
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/local.ts
|
|
24299
|
-
var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION =
|
|
24446
|
+
var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 9;
|
|
24300
24447
|
var RunMode = external_exports.enum(["standalone", "attached"]);
|
|
24301
24448
|
var ControlPlaneConnection = external_exports.object({
|
|
24302
24449
|
endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
|
|
@@ -24315,6 +24462,20 @@ var HistorySyncConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24315
24462
|
payloadVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
|
|
24316
24463
|
endpoint: external_exports.string()
|
|
24317
24464
|
});
|
|
24465
|
+
var ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
|
|
24466
|
+
var AttachmentScopeEntry = external_exports.object({
|
|
24467
|
+
kind: external_exports.enum(["repo", "account"]),
|
|
24468
|
+
identity: printable(ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH).min(1),
|
|
24469
|
+
label: printable(80).optional(),
|
|
24470
|
+
enrolledAt: external_exports.iso.datetime()
|
|
24471
|
+
});
|
|
24472
|
+
var AttachmentScope = external_exports.object({
|
|
24473
|
+
endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
|
|
24474
|
+
tenantName: PluginWhoami.shape.tenantName.optional(),
|
|
24475
|
+
userEmail: PluginWhoami.shape.userEmail.optional(),
|
|
24476
|
+
entries: external_exports.array(AttachmentScopeEntry)
|
|
24477
|
+
});
|
|
24478
|
+
var AttachmentScopeEnvelope = AttachmentScope.extend({ entries: external_exports.array(external_exports.unknown()) });
|
|
24318
24479
|
var WebChatCaptureConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
24319
24480
|
acknowledgedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
24320
24481
|
version: external_exports.number().int().positive()
|
|
@@ -24385,6 +24546,23 @@ var WorkspaceSettings = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24385
24546
|
// both widenings. Absent until granted, and a grant for a different endpoint
|
|
24386
24547
|
// or an older payload no longer counts.
|
|
24387
24548
|
historySyncConsent: HistorySyncConsent.optional(),
|
|
24549
|
+
// The identities a SCOPED attachment forwards and the deployment they were
|
|
24550
|
+
// enrolled for (see AttachmentScope). Absent until something is enrolled.
|
|
24551
|
+
//
|
|
24552
|
+
// `z.unknown()`, NOT `AttachmentScope`, and the difference is this field's
|
|
24553
|
+
// whole failure mode. A settings.json that fails this schema reads as the
|
|
24554
|
+
// unonboarded defaults (readUserSettings in @akasecurity/persistence), and the
|
|
24555
|
+
// next save writes those defaults back over it. Typed, one entry with an
|
|
24556
|
+
// unknown `kind`, a control character or a bad timestamp would cost the
|
|
24557
|
+
// attachment, every consent and onboardedAt, permanently. Untyped, the value
|
|
24558
|
+
// is kept exactly as found and validated where it is used: parseAttachmentScope
|
|
24559
|
+
// drops a bad entry by itself, and on a scoped attachment resolveScope reads a
|
|
24560
|
+
// bad envelope as no entries, which keeps every event local.
|
|
24561
|
+
//
|
|
24562
|
+
// No default: absent must stay absent, so defaultWorkspaceSettings() and a
|
|
24563
|
+
// fresh settings.json do not change. No `.meta({ id })`, like every field
|
|
24564
|
+
// here. Not a ManagedSettingKey.
|
|
24565
|
+
attachmentScope: external_exports.unknown().optional(),
|
|
24388
24566
|
// What the browser extension may record from a web chat, and the grant that
|
|
24389
24567
|
// authorizes it. Absent until the user answers: recording something that was
|
|
24390
24568
|
// never recorded before is never an assumed grant on upgrade, so the whole
|
|
@@ -24503,6 +24681,27 @@ var ManagedSettings = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24503
24681
|
};
|
|
24504
24682
|
}).meta({ id: "ManagedSettings" });
|
|
24505
24683
|
|
|
24684
|
+
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/mod-policy-snapshot.ts
|
|
24685
|
+
var MOD_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_VERSION = 1;
|
|
24686
|
+
var MOD_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
|
|
24687
|
+
var ModPolicySnapshot = external_exports.object({
|
|
24688
|
+
version: external_exports.literal(MOD_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_VERSION),
|
|
24689
|
+
generatedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
24690
|
+
// The complete effective ruleset, as the hook's runtime scans with it: the
|
|
24691
|
+
// user's enabled installed packs (user-modified and custom packs included).
|
|
24692
|
+
// Absent means the store holds no authoritative snapshot, and the reader
|
|
24693
|
+
// scans with the packs it ships — the hook's own fallback.
|
|
24694
|
+
rules: external_exports.array(Rule).optional(),
|
|
24695
|
+
// Rule-targeted actions (first enabled policy per rule wins).
|
|
24696
|
+
ruleActions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), ActionTaken),
|
|
24697
|
+
// The resolved action per detection category.
|
|
24698
|
+
categoryActions: external_exports.record(external_exports.string(), ActionTaken),
|
|
24699
|
+
// Rules with an active exception grant. Honouring a grant means matching a
|
|
24700
|
+
// keyed fingerprint of the value and consuming a use, which only the hook can
|
|
24701
|
+
// do, so the mod leaves a finding of one of these rules for the hook to decide.
|
|
24702
|
+
exceptionRuleIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.string())
|
|
24703
|
+
}).meta({ id: "ModPolicySnapshot" });
|
|
24704
|
+
|
|
24506
24705
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/project-files.ts
|
|
24507
24706
|
var ProjectFileInput = external_exports.object({
|
|
24508
24707
|
path: external_exports.string().min(1),
|
|
@@ -24817,7 +25016,16 @@ var AttachInput = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24817
25016
|
// 200 matches the tenantName bound beside it in control-plane.ts; nothing
|
|
24818
25017
|
// renders a longer one usefully.
|
|
24819
25018
|
label: printable(200).optional(),
|
|
24820
|
-
accessKey: external_exports.string()
|
|
25019
|
+
accessKey: external_exports.string(),
|
|
25020
|
+
// How much of this machine the attachment is for: everything, or only the
|
|
25021
|
+
// repositories its user enrolls. Optional, so an input without it still
|
|
25022
|
+
// parses; what an absent mode means is for whatever reads it to decide, not
|
|
25023
|
+
// this shape. This member validates the VALUE rather than leaving that to the
|
|
25024
|
+
// call site, a deliberate exception to this module's shape-only rule: a shape
|
|
25025
|
+
// rejection names the field, so a value that is not a mode is refused as a bad
|
|
25026
|
+
// `mode` rather than stripped or passed on. The dashboard's attach action reads
|
|
25027
|
+
// it as the mode to attach in.
|
|
25028
|
+
mode: AttachmentMode.optional()
|
|
24821
25029
|
});
|
|
24822
25030
|
|
|
24823
25031
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/triage.ts
|
|
@@ -25273,7 +25481,15 @@ port.on("message", (job) => {
|
|
|
25273
25481
|
post({ kind: "probed", id: job.id, verdict, worstMs, corroboratedMs });
|
|
25274
25482
|
return;
|
|
25275
25483
|
}
|
|
25276
|
-
|
|
25484
|
+
if (job.eventKind !== void 0 && !EventKind.safeParse(job.eventKind).success) {
|
|
25485
|
+
post({
|
|
25486
|
+
kind: "failed",
|
|
25487
|
+
id: job.id,
|
|
25488
|
+
message: `unknown event kind ${JSON.stringify(job.eventKind)}`
|
|
25489
|
+
});
|
|
25490
|
+
return;
|
|
25491
|
+
}
|
|
25492
|
+
const context = job.filePath === void 0 && job.eventKind === void 0 ? void 0 : { filePath: job.filePath, eventKind: job.eventKind };
|
|
25277
25493
|
if (job.attribute) {
|
|
25278
25494
|
for (const [index, rule] of unverified.entries()) {
|
|
25279
25495
|
post({ kind: "progress", index });
|