@akasecurity/ai-tc-codex 0.9.14 → 0.9.16

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -603,6 +603,82 @@ function escapeRegExp2(value) {
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  return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
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  }
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+ // ../../packages/detections/src/format-chars.ts
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+ var HAS_FORMAT_CHAR = new RegExp("\\p{Cf}", "u");
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+ var FORMAT_CHAR_GLOBAL = new RegExp("\\p{Cf}", "gu");
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+ function normalizeFormatChars(text) {
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+ if (!HAS_FORMAT_CHAR.test(text)) return void 0;
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+ const normalizedParts = [];
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+ const segments = [];
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+ let cursor = 0;
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+ let normLength = 0;
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+ for (const match of text.matchAll(FORMAT_CHAR_GLOBAL)) {
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+ const matchStart = match.index;
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+ if (matchStart > cursor) {
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+ const length = matchStart - cursor;
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+ normalizedParts.push(text.slice(cursor, matchStart));
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+ segments.push({ normStart: normLength, origStart: cursor, length });
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+ normLength += length;
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+ }
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+ cursor = matchStart + match[0].length;
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+ }
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+ if (cursor < text.length) {
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+ const length = text.length - cursor;
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+ normalizedParts.push(text.slice(cursor));
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+ segments.push({ normStart: normLength, origStart: cursor, length });
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+ }
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+ return { normalized: normalizedParts.join(""), segments };
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+ }
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+ function segmentAt(segments, normPos) {
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+ let lo = 0;
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+ let hi = segments.length - 1;
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+ while (lo < hi) {
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+ const mid = lo + hi >> 1;
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+ const segment = segments[mid];
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+ if (segment !== void 0 && normPos >= segment.normStart + segment.length) {
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+ lo = mid + 1;
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+ } else {
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+ hi = mid;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const found = segments[lo];
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+ if (found === void 0) {
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+ throw new Error(`normPos ${String(normPos)} has no covering segment`);
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+ }
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+ return found;
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+ }
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+ function mapSpanToOriginal(span, normalization) {
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+ const { segments } = normalization;
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+ const startSegment = segmentAt(segments, span.start);
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+ const start = startSegment.origStart + (span.start - startSegment.normStart);
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+ const endSegment = segmentAt(segments, span.end - 1);
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+ const end = endSegment.origStart + (span.end - 1 - endSegment.normStart) + 1;
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+ return { start, end };
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+ }
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+ function normalizedOffset(origPos, segments) {
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+ let lo = 0;
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+ let hi = segments.length;
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+ while (lo < hi) {
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+ const mid = lo + hi >> 1;
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+ const segment = segments[mid];
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+ if (segment !== void 0 && segment.origStart + segment.length <= origPos) {
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+ lo = mid + 1;
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+ } else {
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+ hi = mid;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const found = segments[Math.min(lo, segments.length - 1)];
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+ if (found === void 0) return 0;
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+ return found.normStart + Math.min(Math.max(0, origPos - found.origStart), found.length);
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+ }
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+ function mapSpanToNormalized(span, normalization) {
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+ const { segments } = normalization;
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+ return {
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+ start: normalizedOffset(span.start, segments),
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+ end: normalizedOffset(span.end, segments)
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+ };
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+ }
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+
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  // ../../packages/detections/src/regex-cache.ts
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  var singles = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
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  var keywordLists = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
@@ -761,29 +837,35 @@ function passesPostValidators(rule, value) {
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  function getLoadedRules() {
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  return [...packs.values()].flatMap((p) => p.rules);
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  }
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- function isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text) {
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+ function spansOverlap(a, b) {
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+ return a.start < b.end && a.end > b.start;
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+ }
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+ function isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text, normalization) {
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  const req = candidate.rule.requiresNearby;
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  if (!req) return true;
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  const halfWindow = req.windowChars;
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- const { start, end } = candidate.match.span;
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- const winStart = start - halfWindow;
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- const winEnd = end + halfWindow;
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+ const ns = candidate.normSpan;
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+ const winStart = ns.start - halfWindow;
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+ const winEnd = ns.end + halfWindow;
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  const categories = req.categories;
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  const ruleIds = req.ruleIds;
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  if (categories?.length || ruleIds?.length) {
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  for (const other of candidates) {
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  if (other === candidate) continue;
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- const os = other.match.span;
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- if (os.end < winStart || os.start > winEnd) continue;
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- if (other.match.ruleId !== candidate.match.ruleId && categories?.includes(other.match.category)) {
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- return true;
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+ if (other.normSpan.end < winStart || other.normSpan.start > winEnd) continue;
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+ const relevant = other.match.ruleId !== candidate.match.ruleId && categories?.includes(other.match.category) === true || ruleIds?.includes(other.match.ruleId) === true;
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+ if (!relevant) continue;
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+ if (other.match.ruleId === candidate.match.ruleId && spansOverlap(other.match.span, candidate.match.span)) {
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+ continue;
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  }
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- if (ruleIds?.includes(other.match.ruleId)) return true;
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+ return true;
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  }
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  }
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  const labels = req.labels;
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  if (labels && labels.length > 0) {
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- const haystack = text.slice(Math.max(0, winStart), winEnd);
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+ const { start, end } = candidate.match.span;
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+ const haystack = text.slice(Math.max(0, start - halfWindow), end + halfWindow);
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+ const normalizedHaystack = normalization === void 0 ? void 0 : normalization.normalized.slice(Math.max(0, winStart), winEnd);
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  for (const re of memoizedRegExpList(
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  "label",
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  req,
@@ -792,29 +874,20 @@ function isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text) {
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  return trimmed.length === 0 ? void 0 : new RegExp(`(?<![A-Za-z0-9])${escapeRegExp2(trimmed)}(?![A-Za-z0-9])`, "i");
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  })
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  )) {
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- if (re?.test(haystack)) return true;
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+ if (!re) continue;
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+ if (re.test(haystack)) return true;
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+ if (normalizedHaystack !== void 0 && re.test(normalizedHaystack)) return true;
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  }
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  }
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  return false;
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  }
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- function extensionOf(filePath) {
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- const base = filePath.slice(Math.max(filePath.lastIndexOf("/"), filePath.lastIndexOf("\\")) + 1);
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- const dot = base.lastIndexOf(".");
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- return dot > 0 ? base.slice(dot).toLowerCase() : void 0;
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- }
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- function ruleApplies(rule, extension) {
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- if (!rule.appliesTo || extension === void 0) return true;
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- return rule.appliesTo.extensions.some((e) => e.toLowerCase() === extension);
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- }
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- function scan(text, rules, context) {
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- const ruleset2 = rules ?? getLoadedRules();
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- const extension = context?.filePath ? extensionOf(context.filePath) : void 0;
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+ function buildCandidates(matchText, ruleset2, extension, eventKind) {
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  const candidates = [];
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  for (const rule of ruleset2) {
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- if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension)) continue;
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- const spans = MATCHERS[rule.matcher.type](text, rule);
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+ if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind)) continue;
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+ const spans = MATCHERS[rule.matcher.type](matchText, rule);
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  for (const span of spans) {
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- const rawMatch = text.slice(span.start, span.end);
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+ const rawMatch = matchText.slice(span.start, span.end);
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  if (!passesPostValidators(rule, rawMatch)) continue;
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  candidates.push({
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  rule,
@@ -825,10 +898,31 @@ function scan(text, rules, context) {
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  span,
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  rawMatch,
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  confidence: 0.9
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- }
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+ },
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+ // In `matchText`'s own coordinates, which is the normalized text for
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+ // a normalized-pass candidate and so already right; an original-pass
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+ // candidate on the slow path is re-derived by withNormalizedSpan.
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+ normSpan: span
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  });
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  }
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  }
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+ return candidates;
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+ }
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+ function mapCandidateToOriginal(candidate, normalization, text) {
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+ const span = mapSpanToOriginal(candidate.match.span, normalization);
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+ return {
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+ rule: candidate.rule,
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+ match: { ...candidate.match, span, rawMatch: text.slice(span.start, span.end) },
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+ // Deliberately NOT remapped: `normSpan` is the span the primitive match
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+ // was found at in the normalized text, which is exactly the coordinate
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+ // space windows are measured in. See the `Candidate` comment.
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+ normSpan: candidate.normSpan
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+ };
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+ }
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+ function withNormalizedSpan(candidate, normalization) {
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+ return { ...candidate, normSpan: mapSpanToNormalized(candidate.match.span, normalization) };
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+ }
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+ function gate(candidates, text, normalization) {
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  const findings = [];
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  for (const candidate of candidates) {
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  const req = candidate.rule.requiresNearby;
@@ -836,7 +930,7 @@ function scan(text, rules, context) {
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  findings.push(candidate.match);
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  continue;
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  }
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- if (!isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text)) continue;
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+ if (!isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text, normalization)) continue;
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  const boost = req.confidenceBoost;
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  findings.push(
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  boost ? { ...candidate.match, confidence: Math.min(0.99, candidate.match.confidence + boost) } : candidate.match
@@ -844,6 +938,89 @@ function scan(text, rules, context) {
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  }
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  return findings;
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  }
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+ function closeRegion(open2, text) {
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+ const span = { start: open2.start, end: open2.end };
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+ return {
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+ ruleId: open2.ruleId,
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+ category: open2.category,
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+ severity: open2.severity,
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+ span,
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+ rawMatch: text.slice(span.start, span.end),
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+ confidence: open2.confidence
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+ };
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+ }
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+ function mergeOverlappingSameRule(findings, text) {
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+ if (findings.length === 0) return findings;
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+ const groups = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ const ruleOrder = [];
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+ for (const finding of findings) {
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+ const group = groups.get(finding.ruleId);
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+ if (group) {
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+ group.push(finding);
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+ } else {
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+ groups.set(finding.ruleId, [finding]);
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+ ruleOrder.push(finding.ruleId);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const merged = [];
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+ for (const ruleId of ruleOrder) {
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+ const group = groups.get(ruleId) ?? [];
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+ const sorted = [...group].sort(
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+ (a, b) => a.span.start - b.span.start || a.span.end - b.span.end
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+ );
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+ let open2;
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+ for (const finding of sorted) {
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+ if (open2 && finding.span.start < open2.end) {
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+ open2.end = Math.max(open2.end, finding.span.end);
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+ open2.confidence = Math.max(open2.confidence, finding.confidence);
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ if (open2) merged.push(closeRegion(open2, text));
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+ open2 = {
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+ start: finding.span.start,
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+ end: finding.span.end,
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+ confidence: finding.confidence,
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+ ruleId: finding.ruleId,
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+ category: finding.category,
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+ severity: finding.severity
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+ };
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+ }
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+ if (open2) merged.push(closeRegion(open2, text));
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+ }
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+ return merged;
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+ }
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+ function extensionOf(filePath) {
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+ const base = filePath.slice(Math.max(filePath.lastIndexOf("/"), filePath.lastIndexOf("\\")) + 1);
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+ const dot = base.lastIndexOf(".");
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+ return dot > 0 ? base.slice(dot).toLowerCase() : void 0;
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+ }
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+ function ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind) {
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+ const scope = rule.appliesTo;
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+ if (!scope) return true;
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+ if (scope.eventKinds && (eventKind === void 0 || !scope.eventKinds.some((k) => k === eventKind))) {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ if (!scope.extensions || extension === void 0) return true;
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+ return scope.extensions.some((e) => e.toLowerCase() === extension);
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+ }
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+ function scan(text, rules, context) {
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+ const ruleset2 = rules ?? getLoadedRules();
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+ const extension = context?.filePath ? extensionOf(context.filePath) : void 0;
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+ const normalization = normalizeFormatChars(text);
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+ const originalCandidates = buildCandidates(text, ruleset2, extension, context?.eventKind);
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+ if (!normalization) return gate(originalCandidates, text, void 0);
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+ const pooledOriginal = originalCandidates.map(
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+ (candidate) => withNormalizedSpan(candidate, normalization)
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+ );
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+ const normalizedCandidates = buildCandidates(
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+ normalization.normalized,
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+ ruleset2,
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+ extension,
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+ context?.eventKind
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+ ).map((candidate) => mapCandidateToOriginal(candidate, normalization, text));
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+ const findings = gate([...pooledOriginal, ...normalizedCandidates], text, normalization);
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+ return mergeOverlappingSameRule(findings, text);
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+ }
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  // ../../packages/schema/src/exception-scope.ts
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  var MINUTE_MS = 6e4;
@@ -21500,11 +21677,33 @@ var ResolutionMethod = external_exports.enum([
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  "false-positive",
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  "redetected"
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  ]).meta({ id: "ResolutionMethod" });
21680
+ var FindingContextBasis = external_exports.enum(["file", "excerpt"]).meta({ id: "FindingContextBasis" });
21681
+ var FindingContext = external_exports.object({
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+ basis: FindingContextBasis,
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+ // 1-based line number of `lines[0]`.
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+ firstLine: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ lines: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).min(1).max(5),
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+ match: external_exports.object({
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+ // 1-based line number, within [firstLine, firstLine + lines.length).
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ // Offsets into that entry of `lines`, end exclusive.
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+ start: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ end: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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+ }).nullable()
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+ }).meta({ id: "FindingContext" });
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+ var FindingLocation = external_exports.object({
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ context: FindingContext.nullable()
21698
+ });
21503
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  var FindingMatch = external_exports.object({
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  // Masked preview of the matched value. Never raw content.
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  maskedValue: external_exports.string(),
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- // Redacted source-line prefix. Currently empty (pending privacy review).
21507
- contextPrefix: external_exports.string()
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+ // Deprecated: always empty. Superseded by `context`.
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+ contextPrefix: external_exports.string(),
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+ // The masked lines around the match. Absent when the finding predates
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+ // context capture or none could be built safely.
21706
+ context: FindingContext.optional()
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  }).meta({ id: "FindingMatch" });
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21708
  var FindingDetectionRef = external_exports.object({
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  id: external_exports.string(),
@@ -21524,6 +21723,11 @@ var FindingInstance = external_exports.object({
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  provider: FindingProvider,
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  repo: external_exports.string(),
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  file: external_exports.string(),
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+ // 1-based line and column of the match start in the scanned text (the
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+ // column in UTF-16 code units). Absent for findings that predate location
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+ // capture or have no source text.
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
21730
+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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  // Who the capturing event is attributed to. Optional: a single-user store
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  // has no one to attribute a finding to and never sets it.
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  user: FindingUser.optional(),
@@ -21585,6 +21789,13 @@ var FindingStats = external_exports.object({
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  low: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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  })
21587
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  }).meta({ id: "FindingStats" });
21792
+ var FindingsOverview = external_exports.object({
21793
+ findings: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ open: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ handled: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ resolved: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
21797
+ dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
21798
+ }).meta({ id: "FindingsOverview" });
21588
21799
  var FindingFacetItem = external_exports.object({
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21800
  value: external_exports.string(),
21590
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  count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
@@ -21702,6 +21913,7 @@ var FindingInstanceDetail = FindingInstance.extend({
21702
21913
  policy: FindingPolicyRef
21703
21914
  }).meta({ id: "FindingInstanceDetail" });
21704
21915
  var MAX_FLAT_FINDINGS_LIMIT = 200;
21916
+ var FindingContextQuery = external_exports.object({ id: external_exports.string().min(1).max(256) });
21705
21917
  var ListFindingInstancesQuery = external_exports.object({
21706
21918
  severity: external_exports.array(Severity).optional(),
21707
21919
  // Rule ids, the same vocabulary the types list's `subtype` carries. Pinning
@@ -22033,7 +22245,23 @@ var CaptureAttributes = external_exports.object({
22033
22245
  // capture denied by another finding's own Block policy carries `block`
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22246
  // here too. The full statement is on EventMetadata.redactDegradedTo; it is
22035
22247
  // repeated rather than referenced because a store reader opens this file.
22036
- redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional()
22248
+ redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional(),
22249
+ // The scope key this capture was stamped with: the canonical repository
22250
+ // (`host/owner/repo`) of the path the capture names (a relative path is read
22251
+ // against its working directory), else of its own working directory, or a
22252
+ // chat account's identity. The store's local `scope_key` column reads it, so
22253
+ // a scoped attachment has a per-row key to work from. Absent when no key
22254
+ // could be derived.
22255
+ //
22256
+ // LOCAL ONLY. That is the contract for every path that sends a row. Producers
22257
+ // stamp it in every attachment mode, and the two structural choke points strip
22258
+ // it: the attached gateway's `reKeyForForward` on the live path, and the
22259
+ // history drain's `rebuildAuditEvent`, which drops it through `withoutScopeKey`.
22260
+ // A capture row's bag reaches the wire through `rebuildCapture`, which builds
22261
+ // the metadata from named keys and never names this one; `toCaptureAttributes`,
22262
+ // which builds the bag from a wire event, never emits it. What a scoped
22263
+ // attachment does with the key is not part of this shape's contract.
22264
+ scope_key: external_exports.string().optional()
22037
22265
  }).catchall(external_exports.unknown());
22038
22266
  var CaptureStatusAttributes = external_exports.object({
22039
22267
  source_tool: external_exports.string().optional(),
@@ -22063,6 +22291,12 @@ var ToolCallInspection = external_exports.object({
22063
22291
  actionTaken: ActionTaken,
22064
22292
  confidence: external_exports.number().min(0).max(1)
22065
22293
  });
22294
+ var findingLocationFields = {
22295
+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
22296
+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
22297
+ context: FindingContext.nullable().optional()
22298
+ };
22299
+ var ToolCallInspectionInput = ToolCallInspection.extend(findingLocationFields);
22066
22300
  var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
22067
22301
  sessionId: external_exports.string().min(1),
22068
22302
  toolUseId: external_exports.string().min(1),
@@ -22072,7 +22306,7 @@ var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
22072
22306
  attributes: ToolCallAttributes,
22073
22307
  // Secrets detected in the tool's (masked) target — written as linked
22074
22308
  // `inspection_findings`. Empty for a clean tool call.
22075
- inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspection).default([])
22309
+ inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspectionInput).default([])
22076
22310
  });
22077
22311
  var InventoryInput = external_exports.object({
22078
22312
  objectType: InventoryObjectType,
@@ -22146,7 +22380,8 @@ var InspectionFindingInput = external_exports.object({
22146
22380
  // same findingKey — mirrors the legacy `findings.first_detected_at`.
22147
22381
  // Optional: when omitted, the writer derives it from the referenced audit
22148
22382
  // event's startedAt on first insert (see SqliteInspectionFindingsRepository).
22149
- firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
22383
+ firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional(),
22384
+ ...findingLocationFields
22150
22385
  });
22151
22386
  var InventoryContext = external_exports.object({
22152
22387
  host: InventoryInput.optional(),
@@ -22921,6 +23156,17 @@ var AttachedCredential = external_exports.object({
22921
23156
  keyPrefix: external_exports.string().min(1).max(16).optional(),
22922
23157
  mintedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
22923
23158
  });
23159
+ var AttachmentMode = external_exports.enum(["machine", "scoped"]);
23160
+ var ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION = 2;
23161
+ var AttachedCredentialV1 = AttachedCredential;
23162
+ var AttachedCredentialV2 = AttachedCredential.extend({
23163
+ specVersion: external_exports.literal(ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION),
23164
+ mode: external_exports.literal("scoped")
23165
+ });
23166
+ var AttachedCredentialAny = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("specVersion", [
23167
+ AttachedCredentialV1,
23168
+ AttachedCredentialV2
23169
+ ]);
22924
23170
  var MAX_DATE_MS = 253402300799999;
22925
23171
  var MAX_INT4 = 2147483647;
22926
23172
  var StorePosturePack = external_exports.object({
@@ -22977,7 +23223,29 @@ var StorePosturePlugin = external_exports.object({
22977
23223
  */
22978
23224
  policyBundleVersion: external_exports.string().max(200).nullable(),
22979
23225
  /** Epoch millis, on the CLIENT clock, of that fetch. */
22980
- policyFetchedAt: external_exports.number().int().min(0).max(MAX_DATE_MS).nullable()
23226
+ policyFetchedAt: external_exports.number().int().min(0).max(MAX_DATE_MS).nullable(),
23227
+ /**
23228
+ * The newest version the host's own install record holds for this plugin —
23229
+ * what is on disk. After an update it leads `version` (the running copy) by
23230
+ * one launch. Null when no usable version can be read: no install record
23231
+ * (a plugin run from a checkout), no entry with a valid version, or every
23232
+ * such entry names an `installPath` that no longer exists; OPTIONAL, not
23233
+ * required, so a build that predates the member keeps getting its 200.
23234
+ * Bounded like `version`.
23235
+ */
23236
+ installedVersion: external_exports.string().max(64).nullable().optional(),
23237
+ /**
23238
+ * The local-store schema version this running build migrates a store to:
23239
+ * the number of store migrations it carries, the count it stamps into
23240
+ * `PRAGMA user_version`. A snapshot whose `schemaVersion` is above it
23241
+ * usually describes a store a newer build migrated. It is a hint, not a
23242
+ * verdict: the stamp is write-only, so a store whose count ran past this
23243
+ * build's while this build knows every migration in its ledger reads above
23244
+ * it too, which is why describeStoreSkew decides skew on ledger tags and
23245
+ * never on the count. OPTIONAL for the same reason as `installedVersion`;
23246
+ * bounded like `schemaVersion`.
23247
+ */
23248
+ buildSchemaVersion: external_exports.number().int().min(0).max(MAX_INT4).optional()
22981
23249
  }).meta({ id: "StorePosturePlugin" });
22982
23250
  var StorePostureSnapshot = external_exports.object({
22983
23251
  deviceId: external_exports.guid(),
@@ -23180,6 +23448,130 @@ var PackId = external_exports.string().regex(/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$/);
23180
23448
  var SemVer = external_exports.string().regex(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z-.]+)?$/);
23181
23449
  var PublisherKind = external_exports.enum(["labs", "user", "org"]);
23182
23450
 
23451
+ // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/builtin-policy-id.ts
23452
+ var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
23453
+ var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
23454
+
23455
+ // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
23456
+ var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
23457
+ var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
23458
+ var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
23459
+ sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23460
+ repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
23461
+ filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23462
+ // The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
23463
+ // set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
23464
+ // arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
23465
+ // (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
23466
+ // display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
23467
+ toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
23468
+ // Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
23469
+ // repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
23470
+ // generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
23471
+ // policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
23472
+ // blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
23473
+ gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23474
+ // Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
23475
+ // capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
23476
+ // (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
23477
+ // this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
23478
+ // diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
23479
+ // open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
23480
+ // may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
23481
+ // non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
23482
+ // non-authoritative path.
23483
+ wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23484
+ model: external_exports.string().optional(),
23485
+ turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23486
+ // Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
23487
+ // to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
23488
+ // the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
23489
+ // originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
23490
+ // compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
23491
+ correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
23492
+ traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
23493
+ // Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
23494
+ // to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
23495
+ // authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
23496
+ exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
23497
+ // The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
23498
+ // in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
23499
+ // row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
23500
+ // on every other capture path, which has no such id.
23501
+ //
23502
+ // Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
23503
+ // a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
23504
+ // places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
23505
+ // nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
23506
+ messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
23507
+ conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23508
+ // How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
23509
+ // milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
23510
+ // front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
23511
+ // detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
23512
+ //
23513
+ // Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
23514
+ // `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
23515
+ // scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
23516
+ // so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
23517
+ // Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
23518
+ // clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
23519
+ // and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
23520
+ inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23521
+ // What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
23522
+ // workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
23523
+ // masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
23524
+ // hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
23525
+ //
23526
+ // It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
23527
+ // `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
23528
+ // assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
23529
+ // different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
23530
+ // the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
23531
+ // degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
23532
+ //
23533
+ // TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
23534
+ // is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
23535
+ //
23536
+ // - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
23537
+ // `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
23538
+ // identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
23539
+ // describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
23540
+ // - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
23541
+ // became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
23542
+ // by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
23543
+ // and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
23544
+ // Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
23545
+ // field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
23546
+ //
23547
+ // Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
23548
+ // Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
23549
+ // already carries its own action.
23550
+ redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
23551
+ }).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
23552
+ var Event = external_exports.object({
23553
+ id: external_exports.guid(),
23554
+ sourceTool: SourceTool,
23555
+ kind: EventKind,
23556
+ occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
23557
+ contentHash: external_exports.string(),
23558
+ content: external_exports.string(),
23559
+ metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
23560
+ }).meta({ id: "Event" });
23561
+ var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
23562
+ var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
23563
+ var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
23564
+ events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
23565
+ // Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
23566
+ // additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
23567
+ // recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
23568
+ // backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
23569
+ // would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
23570
+ // two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
23571
+ // the timeline.
23572
+ dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
23573
+ }).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
23574
+
23183
23575
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/rule.ts
23184
23576
  var MatcherType = external_exports.enum(["keyword", "regex"]).meta({ id: "MatcherType" });
23185
23577
  var RuleProbeVerdict = external_exports.enum(["safe", "quarantined"]).meta({ id: "RuleProbeVerdict" });
@@ -23248,7 +23640,10 @@ var Matcher = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [KeywordMatcher2, Rege
23248
23640
  var MATCHER_TYPES = MatcherType.options;
23249
23641
  var AppliesTo = external_exports.strictObject({
23250
23642
  // Dot-prefixed, e.g. ".py" — matches the scanner's SOURCE_EXTENSIONS shape.
23251
- extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1)
23643
+ extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1).optional(),
23644
+ eventKinds: external_exports.array(EventKind).min(1).optional()
23645
+ }).refine((v) => v.extensions !== void 0 || v.eventKinds !== void 0, {
23646
+ message: "appliesTo needs extensions, eventKinds, or both"
23252
23647
  }).meta({ id: "AppliesTo" });
23253
23648
  var PostValidatorName = external_exports.enum(["entropy", "luhn"]).meta({ id: "PostValidatorName" });
23254
23649
  var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
@@ -23271,6 +23666,7 @@ var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
23271
23666
  )}) or { "name": ..., "config": { ... } }. An unrecognized name would be a false-positive guard that never runs.`
23272
23667
  }
23273
23668
  ).meta({ id: "PostValidatorRef" });
23669
+ var RuleEvidence = external_exports.enum(["code", "value"]).meta({ id: "RuleEvidence" });
23274
23670
  var RequiresNearby = external_exports.strictObject({
23275
23671
  // Each array, when present, must be non-empty and contain non-empty strings —
23276
23672
  // an empty/blank criterion would either never fire or (for labels) match
@@ -23293,6 +23689,8 @@ var RuleFixture = external_exports.strictObject({
23293
23689
  // Simulated file context for the scan, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo`
23294
23690
  // gating (e.g. a Python-only pattern must NOT fire in a .ts file).
23295
23691
  filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23692
+ // Simulated capture kind, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo.eventKinds`.
23693
+ eventKind: EventKind.optional(),
23296
23694
  expectedSpans: external_exports.array(external_exports.strictObject({ start: external_exports.number(), end: external_exports.number() })).optional()
23297
23695
  }).meta({ id: "RuleFixture" });
23298
23696
  var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
@@ -23318,7 +23716,9 @@ var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
23318
23716
  appliesTo: AppliesTo.optional(),
23319
23717
  postValidators: external_exports.array(PostValidatorRef).optional(),
23320
23718
  requiresNearby: RequiresNearby.optional(),
23321
- examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional()
23719
+ examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional(),
23720
+ // Whether the matched text is itself sensitive. Absent means 'value'.
23721
+ evidence: RuleEvidence.optional()
23322
23722
  }).meta({ id: "Rule" });
23323
23723
  var Author = external_exports.object({
23324
23724
  name: external_exports.string(),
@@ -23335,7 +23735,11 @@ var PackManifest = external_exports.object({
23335
23735
  description: external_exports.string().optional(),
23336
23736
  author: Author.optional(),
23337
23737
  license: external_exports.string().optional(),
23338
- sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional()
23738
+ sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional(),
23739
+ // The built-in policy a FIRST install of this pack assigns
23740
+ // (installed_packs.policy_id). Absent leaves the pack unassigned, so its
23741
+ // rules follow the category policies. An existing install never takes it.
23742
+ defaultPolicy: BuiltinPolicyId.optional()
23339
23743
  }).meta({ id: "PackManifest" });
23340
23744
 
23341
23745
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/detection.ts
@@ -23363,10 +23767,12 @@ var DetectionListItem = external_exports.object({
23363
23767
  // Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
23364
23768
  // (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
23365
23769
  // detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
23366
- // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor everywhere
23367
- // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID). Every enforcement surface expands it into
23368
- // per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed z.string() (not
23369
- // the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a future custom id.
23770
+ // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
23771
+ // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
23772
+ // (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
23773
+ // expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
23774
+ // z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
23775
+ // future custom id.
23370
23776
  policyId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23371
23777
  // Set ONLY when a newer snapshot is available for this pack (OSS: the
23372
23778
  // bundled inventory recorded in available_packs differs from the installed
@@ -23435,10 +23841,12 @@ var DetectionDetail = external_exports.object({
23435
23841
  // Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
23436
23842
  // (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
23437
23843
  // detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
23438
- // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor everywhere
23439
- // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID). Every enforcement surface expands it into
23440
- // per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed z.string() (not
23441
- // the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a future custom id.
23844
+ // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
23845
+ // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
23846
+ // (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
23847
+ // expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
23848
+ // z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
23849
+ // future custom id.
23442
23850
  policyId: external_exports.string().optional()
23443
23851
  }).meta({ id: "DetectionDetail" });
23444
23852
  var LibraryItem = external_exports.object({
@@ -23468,126 +23876,6 @@ var ImportDetectionRequest = external_exports.object({
23468
23876
  })
23469
23877
  }).meta({ id: "ImportDetectionRequest" });
23470
23878
 
23471
- // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
23472
- var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
23473
- var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
23474
- var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
23475
- sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23476
- repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
23477
- filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23478
- // The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
23479
- // set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
23480
- // arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
23481
- // (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
23482
- // display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
23483
- toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
23484
- // Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
23485
- // repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
23486
- // generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
23487
- // policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
23488
- // blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
23489
- gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23490
- // Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
23491
- // capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
23492
- // (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
23493
- // this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
23494
- // diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
23495
- // open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
23496
- // may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
23497
- // non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
23498
- // non-authoritative path.
23499
- wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23500
- model: external_exports.string().optional(),
23501
- turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23502
- // Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
23503
- // to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
23504
- // the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
23505
- // originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
23506
- // compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
23507
- correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
23508
- traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
23509
- // Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
23510
- // to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
23511
- // authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
23512
- exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
23513
- // The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
23514
- // in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
23515
- // row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
23516
- // on every other capture path, which has no such id.
23517
- //
23518
- // Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
23519
- // a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
23520
- // places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
23521
- // nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
23522
- messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
23523
- conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23524
- // How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
23525
- // milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
23526
- // front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
23527
- // detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
23528
- //
23529
- // Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
23530
- // `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
23531
- // scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
23532
- // so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
23533
- // Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
23534
- // clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
23535
- // and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
23536
- inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23537
- // What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
23538
- // workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
23539
- // masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
23540
- // hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
23541
- //
23542
- // It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
23543
- // `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
23544
- // assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
23545
- // different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
23546
- // the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
23547
- // degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
23548
- //
23549
- // TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
23550
- // is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
23551
- //
23552
- // - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
23553
- // `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
23554
- // identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
23555
- // describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
23556
- // - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
23557
- // became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
23558
- // by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
23559
- // and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
23560
- // Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
23561
- // field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
23562
- //
23563
- // Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
23564
- // Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
23565
- // already carries its own action.
23566
- redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
23567
- }).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
23568
- var Event = external_exports.object({
23569
- id: external_exports.guid(),
23570
- sourceTool: SourceTool,
23571
- kind: EventKind,
23572
- occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
23573
- contentHash: external_exports.string(),
23574
- content: external_exports.string(),
23575
- metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
23576
- }).meta({ id: "Event" });
23577
- var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
23578
- var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
23579
- var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
23580
- events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
23581
- // Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
23582
- // additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
23583
- // recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
23584
- // backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
23585
- // would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
23586
- // two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
23587
- // the timeline.
23588
- dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
23589
- }).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
23590
-
23591
23879
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/exception.ts
23592
23880
  var ExceptionScope = external_exports.enum(["once", "temporary", "permanent"]);
23593
23881
  var ExceptionConditions = external_exports.object({
@@ -23748,8 +24036,6 @@ var Policy = external_exports.object({
23748
24036
  // test `prohibitedModels` passes and `reversibleRuleIds` fails.
23749
24037
  provenance: PolicyProvenance.optional()
23750
24038
  }).meta({ id: "Policy" });
23751
- var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
23752
- var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
23753
24039
  var RedactFallback = BuiltinPolicyId.extract(["monitor", "warn", "block"]).meta({
23754
24040
  id: "RedactFallback"
23755
24041
  });
@@ -23956,10 +24242,15 @@ var ParsedPointer = external_exports.object({
23956
24242
  });
23957
24243
  var VaultEntry = external_exports.object({
23958
24244
  pointerId: external_exports.string(),
23959
- // The keyed HMAC of the raw value under `exception.key`, and the epoch it was
23960
- // derived under. This is what a reveal-to-model grant matches on, and it rotates
23961
- // independently of the vault encryption key below.
24245
+ // The keyed HMAC of the EXACT raw bytes under `exception.key`, and the epoch it
24246
+ // was derived under. The vault's own dedupe key: a value and its invisibly
24247
+ // padded twin are two rows. It rotates independently of the vault encryption
24248
+ // key below. Never matched against an exception or grant.
23962
24249
  valueFingerprint: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/),
24250
+ // The same HMAC over the raw with invisible padding removed: the identity a
24251
+ // reveal-to-model grant and every exception match on. Shared by a value and
24252
+ // its padded twin.
24253
+ valueIdentityFingerprint: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/),
23963
24254
  fingerprintKeyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
23964
24255
  // The vault-key epoch this row's ciphertext was sealed under.
23965
24256
  keyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
@@ -24100,7 +24391,7 @@ var VaultConsent = external_exports.object({
24100
24391
  });
24101
24392
 
24102
24393
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/local.ts
24103
- var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 8;
24394
+ var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 9;
24104
24395
  var RunMode = external_exports.enum(["standalone", "attached"]);
24105
24396
  var ControlPlaneConnection = external_exports.object({
24106
24397
  endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
@@ -24119,6 +24410,18 @@ var HistorySyncConsent = external_exports.object({
24119
24410
  payloadVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
24120
24411
  endpoint: external_exports.string()
24121
24412
  });
24413
+ var ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
24414
+ var AttachmentScopeEntry = external_exports.object({
24415
+ kind: external_exports.enum(["repo", "account"]),
24416
+ identity: printable(ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH).min(1),
24417
+ label: printable(80).optional(),
24418
+ enrolledAt: external_exports.iso.datetime()
24419
+ });
24420
+ var AttachmentScope = external_exports.object({
24421
+ endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
24422
+ entries: external_exports.array(AttachmentScopeEntry)
24423
+ });
24424
+ var AttachmentScopeEnvelope = AttachmentScope.extend({ entries: external_exports.array(external_exports.unknown()) });
24122
24425
  var WebChatCaptureConsent = external_exports.object({
24123
24426
  acknowledgedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
24124
24427
  version: external_exports.number().int().positive()
@@ -24189,6 +24492,23 @@ var WorkspaceSettings = external_exports.object({
24189
24492
  // both widenings. Absent until granted, and a grant for a different endpoint
24190
24493
  // or an older payload no longer counts.
24191
24494
  historySyncConsent: HistorySyncConsent.optional(),
24495
+ // The identities a SCOPED attachment forwards and the deployment they were
24496
+ // enrolled for (see AttachmentScope). Absent until something is enrolled.
24497
+ //
24498
+ // `z.unknown()`, NOT `AttachmentScope`, and the difference is this field's
24499
+ // whole failure mode. A settings.json that fails this schema reads as the
24500
+ // unonboarded defaults (readUserSettings in @akasecurity/persistence), and the
24501
+ // next save writes those defaults back over it. Typed, one entry with an
24502
+ // unknown `kind`, a control character or a bad timestamp would cost the
24503
+ // attachment, every consent and onboardedAt, permanently. Untyped, the value
24504
+ // is kept exactly as found and validated where it is used: parseAttachmentScope
24505
+ // drops a bad entry by itself, and on a scoped attachment resolveScope reads a
24506
+ // bad envelope as no entries, which keeps every event local.
24507
+ //
24508
+ // No default: absent must stay absent, so defaultWorkspaceSettings() and a
24509
+ // fresh settings.json do not change. No `.meta({ id })`, like every field
24510
+ // here. Not a ManagedSettingKey.
24511
+ attachmentScope: external_exports.unknown().optional(),
24192
24512
  // What the browser extension may record from a web chat, and the grant that
24193
24513
  // authorizes it. Absent until the user answers: recording something that was
24194
24514
  // never recorded before is never an assumed grant on upgrade, so the whole
@@ -24401,10 +24721,18 @@ var SeveritySummaryItem = external_exports.object({
24401
24721
  count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
24402
24722
  // Resolution-aware breakdown (optional, additive). Populated once findings
24403
24723
  // carry lifecycle state: `caught` = handled in-flight (enforced); `openAtRest`
24404
- // = still open with no in-flight enforcement (needs remediation). Absent on the
24405
- // legacy count-only response until the resolution feature lands.
24724
+ // = still open with no in-flight enforcement (needs remediation); `dismissed`
24725
+ // = closed by a human judgement rather than a fix — visible, but not counted as
24726
+ // needing remediation. The three are disjoint. Absent on the legacy count-only
24727
+ // response until the resolution feature lands.
24406
24728
  caught: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24407
- openAtRest: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional()
24729
+ openAtRest: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24730
+ dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24731
+ // The two halves of `caught`, for a reader that wants them apart: `handled` =
24732
+ // in-flight findings an enforcement action already contained; `resolved` =
24733
+ // at-rest findings closed out by fixing them. `handled + resolved === caught`.
24734
+ handled: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24735
+ resolved: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional()
24408
24736
  }).meta({ id: "SeveritySummaryItem" });
24409
24737
  var SeveritySummaryResponse = external_exports.object({
24410
24738
  // Sum of bySeverity[].count.
@@ -24412,6 +24740,9 @@ var SeveritySummaryResponse = external_exports.object({
24412
24740
  // Findings still open at rest (sum of bySeverity[].openAtRest). Optional and
24413
24741
  // additive — absent on the legacy response until the resolution feature lands.
24414
24742
  needsRemediation: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24743
+ // Findings a user dismissed (sum of bySeverity[].dismissed). Excluded from
24744
+ // needsRemediation, and kept visible here so an accepted risk is not erased.
24745
+ dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
24415
24746
  // All four severity levels are always present (count may be 0).
24416
24747
  bySeverity: external_exports.array(SeveritySummaryItem)
24417
24748
  }).meta({ id: "SeveritySummaryResponse" });
@@ -25066,7 +25397,15 @@ port.on("message", (job) => {
25066
25397
  post({ kind: "probed", id: job.id, verdict, worstMs, corroboratedMs });
25067
25398
  return;
25068
25399
  }
25069
- const context = job.filePath === void 0 ? void 0 : { filePath: job.filePath };
25400
+ if (job.eventKind !== void 0 && !EventKind.safeParse(job.eventKind).success) {
25401
+ post({
25402
+ kind: "failed",
25403
+ id: job.id,
25404
+ message: `unknown event kind ${JSON.stringify(job.eventKind)}`
25405
+ });
25406
+ return;
25407
+ }
25408
+ const context = job.filePath === void 0 && job.eventKind === void 0 ? void 0 : { filePath: job.filePath, eventKind: job.eventKind };
25070
25409
  if (job.attribute) {
25071
25410
  for (const [index, rule] of unverified.entries()) {
25072
25411
  post({ kind: "progress", index });