@akasecurity/ai-tc-claude-code 0.9.3 → 0.9.4

package/scripts/filescan.js

@@ -493,10 +493,10 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/config.ts
 import { existsSync as existsSync4 } from "fs";
-import { join as join6 } from "path";
+import { join as join7 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/persistence/src/database.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID8 } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID9 } from "crypto";
 import { existsSync, renameSync as renameSync2, rmSync as rmSync2 } from "fs";
 import { join, sep } from "path";
 import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
@@ -562,6 +562,22 @@ var SQLITE_MIGRATIONS = [
   {
     tag: "0014_drop_legacy_events_findings",
     sql: "-- Custom migration: drops the frozen legacy `events`/`findings` tables\n-- (superseded by audit_events/inspection_definitions/inspection_findings) and\n-- replaces them with read-only views of the same name.\n--\n-- persistence's migrations.ts applies this migration ONLY once the batched\n-- history backfill (see runLegacyHistoryBackfill) has fully drained both\n-- tables, and only after copying the live file aside \u2014 see\n-- backupBeforeLegacyDrop in packages/persistence/src/migrations.ts. A store\n-- still mid-copy keeps its real tables and this migration stays pending.\n--\n-- The views exist for skew: the `aka` CLI and the Claude Code plugin update\n-- independently against one shared store, so an older, already-installed\n-- binary can open a store a newer binary already dropped these tables on.\n-- Every already-shipped repository constructor prepares its SQL eagerly at\n-- open time, so a bare \"table not found\" would fail the WHOLE open, not just\n-- a findings-specific read \u2014 these views keep `prepare()` succeeding so an\n-- old binary's unrelated features keep working; its own reads stay truthful,\n-- and its rare (already fail-open) writes fail at run time instead.\n--\n-- The 0009/0010 expression indexes existed only over the legacy `events`\n-- table; DROP TABLE below would remove them implicitly, but they are\n-- dropped explicitly first so the intent reads clearly. IF EXISTS so a store\n-- that reached here with an index missing out of band (an adopted-tag store\n-- whose physical index was never built) does not throw a deterministic \"no\n-- such index\" out of the fail-open drop path.\nDROP INDEX IF EXISTS `idx_events_code_change_path`;\n--> statement-breakpoint\nDROP INDEX IF EXISTS `idx_events_session_id`;\n--> statement-breakpoint\n-- `findings.event_id` references `events.id` \u2014 drop the child first.\nDROP TABLE `findings`;\n--> statement-breakpoint\nDROP TABLE `events`;\n--> statement-breakpoint\n-- Legacy `events` shape, projected from audit_events: `kind`/`occurred_at`/\n-- `source_tool` become real columns again (source_tool round-trips through\n-- the attributes bag, the only place a capture-typed audit row keeps it);\n-- `metadata` is reconstructed as the old camelCase JSON object from the new\n-- snake_case attributes bag, with `root_session_id` folded back in as\n-- `sessionId` (the one legacy metadata key that became a column, never an\n-- attribute, on the new table). Constrained to the four capture kinds so\n-- structural rows (session/run/tool_call/llm_call/source_lookup/config_scan)\n-- never leak into a legacy reader's result set \u2014 the old `events` table\n-- never held them either.\nCREATE VIEW `events` AS\nSELECT\n  id,\n  json_extract(attributes, '$.source_tool') AS source_tool,\n  event_type AS kind,\n  started_at AS occurred_at,\n  content_hash,\n  content,\n  -- Plugin-local bookkeeping column that `ensureSyncedAtColumn` adds to the\n  -- real `events` table at open time. A pre-cutover binary runs that probe on\n  -- EVERY open; without this projection its `columnNames('events')` check\n  -- misses `synced_at` and issues `ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN` against this\n  -- view, which SQLite rejects (\"Cannot add a column to a view\") \u2014 a hard,\n  -- non-fail-open crash of the whole open, the exact skew failure these views\n  -- exist to prevent. Projecting it (always NULL; no reader consumes it)\n  -- short-circuits that ALTER.\n  NULL AS synced_at,\n  json_object(\n    'sessionId', root_session_id,\n    'repo', json_extract(attributes, '$.repo'),\n    'filePath', json_extract(attributes, '$.file_path'),\n    'toolName', json_extract(attributes, '$.tool_name'),\n    'gitignored', json_extract(attributes, '$.gitignored'),\n    'wholeFile', json_extract(attributes, '$.whole_file'),\n    'model', json_extract(attributes, '$.model'),\n    'turnIndex', json_extract(attributes, '$.turn_index'),\n    'correlationId', json_extract(attributes, '$.correlation_id'),\n    'traceId', json_extract(attributes, '$.trace_id'),\n    'exceptionIds', json_extract(attributes, '$.exception_ids')\n  ) AS metadata\nFROM audit_events\nWHERE event_type IN ('prompt', 'response', 'code_change', 'tool_use');\n--> statement-breakpoint\n-- A plain single-row INSERT (the old writer's shape \u2014 no ON CONFLICT) is\n-- accepted by prepare() against a view once an INSTEAD OF INSERT trigger\n-- exists, so it fails at run time instead of at open \u2014 landing in the same\n-- fail-open path the caller already wraps its write in.\nCREATE TRIGGER `trg_events_ro`\nINSTEAD OF INSERT ON `events`\nBEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'events is read-only; write to audit_events instead'); END;\n--> statement-breakpoint\n-- Legacy `findings` shape: rule_id/category/severity come from the joined\n-- inspection_definitions row (the legacy table inlined them per-row; the\n-- generalized schema normalizes them out into the shared definition). A view\n-- has no rowid of its own, so the underlying table's rowid is re-exposed\n-- explicitly under that name \u2014 a legacy reader ordering by `f.rowid` would\n-- otherwise fail to resolve the column at all. Joined to audit_events for the\n-- same four-capture-kind constraint as the events view above (a finding\n-- attached to a tool_call/config_scan row never existed in the legacy table\n-- either \u2014 see the persistence findings repository's identical predicate).\nCREATE VIEW `findings` AS\nSELECT\n  f.id AS id,\n  f.rowid AS rowid,\n  f.audit_event_id AS event_id,\n  d.rule_id AS rule_id,\n  d.category AS category,\n  d.severity AS severity,\n  f.span_start AS span_start,\n  f.span_end AS span_end,\n  f.masked_match AS masked_match,\n  f.action_taken AS action_taken,\n  f.confidence AS confidence,\n  f.finding_key AS finding_key,\n  f.first_detected_at AS first_detected_at\nFROM inspection_findings f\nJOIN audit_events e ON e.id = f.audit_event_id\nJOIN inspection_definitions d ON d.id = f.inspection_definition_id\nWHERE e.event_type IN ('prompt', 'response', 'code_change', 'tool_use');\n--> statement-breakpoint\n-- Defense in depth only: SQLite refuses to plan ANY upsert against a view\n-- (\"cannot UPSERT a view\") no matter what trigger exists, so this can never\n-- rescue the real legacy writer, which always used\n-- `ON CONFLICT (finding_key) DO UPDATE` \u2014 that statement still fails at\n-- prepare() on an old binary, same as it would with no trigger at all. This\n-- only covers a plain-INSERT shape, should one ever exist.\nCREATE TRIGGER `trg_findings_ro`\nINSTEAD OF INSERT ON `findings`\nBEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'findings is read-only; write to inspection_findings instead'); END;\n"
+  },
+  {
+    tag: "0015_busy_vengeance",
+    sql: "CREATE TABLE `secret_vault` (\n	`pointer_id` text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,\n	`value_fingerprint` text NOT NULL,\n	`fingerprint_key_version` integer NOT NULL,\n	`key_version` integer NOT NULL,\n	`category` text NOT NULL,\n	`rule_id` text NOT NULL,\n	`masked_match` text NOT NULL,\n	`provider` text,\n	`ciphertext` text NOT NULL,\n	`nonce` text NOT NULL,\n	`auth_tag` text NOT NULL,\n	`occurrence_count` integer DEFAULT 1 NOT NULL,\n	`first_seen` integer NOT NULL,\n	`last_seen` integer NOT NULL\n);\n--> statement-breakpoint\nCREATE UNIQUE INDEX `uq_secret_vault_value` ON `secret_vault` (`value_fingerprint`);--> statement-breakpoint\nCREATE TABLE `secret_vault_deref` (\n	`id` text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,\n	`pointer_id` text NOT NULL,\n	`at` integer NOT NULL,\n	`target` text NOT NULL,\n	`reason` text NOT NULL,\n	`outcome` text NOT NULL,\n	`grant_id` text,\n	`pointer_count` integer DEFAULT 1 NOT NULL\n);\n--> statement-breakpoint\nCREATE INDEX `idx_secret_vault_deref_pointer` ON `secret_vault_deref` (`pointer_id`);--> statement-breakpoint\nCREATE INDEX `idx_secret_vault_deref_reason_at` ON `secret_vault_deref` (`reason`,`at`);"
+  },
+  {
+    tag: "0016_breezy_zodiak",
+    sql: "ALTER TABLE `exceptions` ADD `capability` text DEFAULT 'suppress' NOT NULL;"
+  },
+  {
+    tag: "0017_rainy_kat_farrell",
+    sql: "CREATE TABLE `secret_vault_sighting` (\n	`id` text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,\n	`pointer_id` text NOT NULL,\n	`location` text NOT NULL,\n	`kind` text NOT NULL,\n	`first_seen` integer NOT NULL,\n	`last_seen` integer NOT NULL\n);\n--> statement-breakpoint\nCREATE UNIQUE INDEX `uq_secret_vault_sighting` ON `secret_vault_sighting` (`pointer_id`,`location`);"
+  },
+  {
+    tag: "0018_serious_tana_nile",
+    sql: "ALTER TABLE `secret_vault` ADD `format_version` integer DEFAULT 2 NOT NULL;"
   }
 ];
 
@@ -16218,6 +16234,7 @@ var ExceptionConditions = external_exports.object({
   sourceTool: external_exports.string().optional(),
   provider: external_exports.string().optional()
 }).strict();
+var ExceptionCapability = external_exports.enum(["suppress", "reveal_to_model"]);
 var DetectionException = external_exports.object({
   id: external_exports.guid(),
   ruleId: external_exports.string(),
@@ -16234,6 +16251,7 @@ var DetectionException = external_exports.object({
   keyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
   // maskMatch() preview of the approved value — never the raw value.
   maskedValue: external_exports.string(),
+  capability: ExceptionCapability.default("suppress"),
   scope: ExceptionScope,
   expiresAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().nullable(),
   maxUses: external_exports.number().int().positive().nullable(),
@@ -16257,6 +16275,7 @@ var ExceptionBundleEntry = DetectionException.pick({
   ruleId: true,
   valueFingerprint: true,
   keyVersion: true,
+  capability: true,
   expiresAt: true,
   maxUses: true,
   useCount: true,
@@ -17361,8 +17380,120 @@ var PatchInstalledPackRequest = external_exports.object({
   message: "At least one field must be provided"
 }).meta({ id: "PatchInstalledPackRequest" });
 
+// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/vault.ts
+var POINTER_FORMAT_VERSION = 2;
+var CATEGORY_ALTERNATION = DetectionCategory.options.join("|");
+var POINTER_TOKEN_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  `\\[\\[aka:(?:${CATEGORY_ALTERNATION}):[A-Z2-7]{2,7}\\.[A-Z2-7]{26}\\.[A-Z2-7]{16}\\]\\]`
+);
+var POINTER_TOKEN_ANCHORED = new RegExp(`^${POINTER_TOKEN_PATTERN.source}$`);
+function pointerTokenScanner() {
+  return new RegExp(POINTER_TOKEN_PATTERN.source, "g");
+}
+var PointerToken = external_exports.string().regex(POINTER_TOKEN_ANCHORED);
+var ParsedPointer = external_exports.object({
+  category: DetectionCategory,
+  keyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
+  pointerId: external_exports.string(),
+  tag: external_exports.string()
+});
+var VaultEntry = external_exports.object({
+  pointerId: external_exports.string(),
+  // The keyed HMAC of the raw value under `exception.key`, and the epoch it was
+  // derived under. This is what a reveal-to-model grant matches on, and it rotates
+  // independently of the vault encryption key below.
+  valueFingerprint: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/),
+  fingerprintKeyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
+  // The vault-key epoch this row's ciphertext was sealed under.
+  keyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
+  // Fixed at first mint and never updated: the same value detected later under a
+  // different rule's category keeps the category it was minted with, so one
+  // value always produces exactly one wire token.
+  category: DetectionCategory,
+  ruleId: external_exports.string(),
+  // Partial-reveal preview for badges and listings. Never the raw value.
+  maskedMatch: external_exports.string(),
+  provider: external_exports.string().optional(),
+  ciphertext: external_exports.string(),
+  nonce: external_exports.string(),
+  authTag: external_exports.string(),
+  // How many times this value has been detected on this machine — the reuse
+  // signal the vault dashboard reads. Distinct from VaultDeref.pointerCount.
+  occurrenceCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  firstSeen: external_exports.string(),
+  lastSeen: external_exports.string()
+});
+var PointerDescriptor = external_exports.object({
+  category: DetectionCategory,
+  provider: external_exports.string().optional(),
+  maskedMatch: external_exports.string(),
+  occurrences: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  firstSeen: external_exports.string(),
+  lastSeen: external_exports.string()
+});
+var PointerIdentity = external_exports.object({
+  ruleId: external_exports.string(),
+  valueFingerprint: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/),
+  fingerprintKeyVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive()
+});
+var DetokenizeTarget = external_exports.enum(["human", "model"]);
+var VaultDerefReason = external_exports.enum([
+  "display",
+  "explicit-reveal",
+  "view-render",
+  "model-input",
+  "remediation",
+  "purge"
+]);
+var VaultDerefOutcome = external_exports.enum(["revealed", "refused", "unavailable"]);
+var VaultDeref = external_exports.object({
+  id: external_exports.guid(),
+  pointerId: external_exports.string(),
+  at: external_exports.string(),
+  target: DetokenizeTarget,
+  reason: VaultDerefReason,
+  outcome: VaultDerefOutcome,
+  // Present only on a model-target crossing that a reveal grant authorized.
+  grantId: external_exports.string().optional(),
+  // How many pointers ONE batched render resolved. 1 for unbatched rows. Named
+  // apart from VaultEntry.occurrenceCount, which counts detections of a value.
+  pointerCount: external_exports.number().int().positive().default(1)
+});
+var VaultSightingKind = external_exports.enum([
+  "prompt",
+  "tool-input",
+  "tool-output",
+  "file",
+  "transcript"
+]);
+var VaultSighting = external_exports.object({
+  location: external_exports.string(),
+  kind: VaultSightingKind,
+  firstSeen: external_exports.string(),
+  lastSeen: external_exports.string()
+});
+var VaultInventoryEntry = external_exports.object({
+  pointerId: external_exports.string(),
+  category: DetectionCategory,
+  provider: external_exports.string().optional(),
+  maskedMatch: external_exports.string(),
+  occurrences: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  firstSeen: external_exports.string(),
+  lastSeen: external_exports.string(),
+  // The active reveal-to-model grant covering this value, when one exists —
+  // the inventory badges it, the row links to revocation.
+  revealGrantId: external_exports.string().nullable(),
+  sightings: external_exports.array(VaultSighting)
+});
+var VaultKeyCustody = external_exports.string();
+var VaultInlineReveal = external_exports.enum(["masked", "full", "off"]);
+var VaultConsent = external_exports.object({
+  acknowledgedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
+  version: external_exports.number().int().positive()
+});
+
 // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/local.ts
-var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 4;
+var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 5;
 var RunMode = external_exports.enum(["standalone"]);
 var SimpleDetectionPolicy = external_exports.enum(["redact", "warn"]);
 var HistoricalAccess = external_exports.enum(["full", "session-only"]);
@@ -17384,6 +17515,16 @@ var WorkspaceSettings = external_exports.object({
   // In-place egress extraction on the scan paths; disable to stop all Data
   // Shares writes.
   dataSharesInPlace: external_exports.boolean().default(true),
+  // Consent to keep a RECOVERABLE encrypted copy of detected values in the local
+  // vault, instead of destroying them. Absent by default: this is a custody
+  // change from one-way redaction, so it is never an assumed grant on upgrade.
+  // Revoking stops future vaulting; it does not erase what is already stored —
+  // purging the vault is the eraser.
+  vaultConsent: VaultConsent.optional(),
+  // Where the vault master key lives.
+  vaultKeyCustody: VaultKeyCustody.default("file"),
+  // How a pointer renders in assistant prose on screen (see VaultInlineReveal).
+  vaultInlineReveal: VaultInlineReveal.default("masked"),
   // Absent until /aka:setup completes; its presence is what "onboarded" means.
   onboardedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional(),
   // Records that the user consented to sending findings to the model API for
@@ -19798,6 +19939,9 @@ var AmbiguousExceptionIdError = class extends Error {
 var ACTIVE_PREDICATE = `revoked_at IS NULL
      AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > :now)
      AND (max_uses IS NULL OR use_count < max_uses)`;
+var ACTIVE_REVEAL_GRANT_PREDICATE = `capability = 'reveal_to_model'
+     AND conditions IS NULL
+     AND ${ACTIVE_PREDICATE}`;
 var SqliteExceptionsRepository = class {
   constructor(db) {
     this.db = db;
@@ -19889,11 +20033,11 @@ var SqliteExceptionsRepository = class {
     this.db.prepare(
       `INSERT INTO exceptions (
              id, rule_id, category, value_fingerprint, key_version, masked_value,
-             scope, expires_at, max_uses, use_count, last_used_at, justification,
-             conditions, created_by, created_via, created_at, updated_at
+             capability, scope, expires_at, max_uses, use_count, last_used_at,
+             justification, conditions, created_by, created_via, created_at, updated_at
            ) VALUES (
              :id, :ruleId, :category, :valueFingerprint, :keyVersion, :maskedValue,
-             :scope, :expiresAt, :maxUses, 0, NULL, :justification,
+             :capability, :scope, :expiresAt, :maxUses, 0, NULL, :justification,
              :conditions, :createdBy, :createdVia, :now, :now
            )`
     ).run({
@@ -19903,6 +20047,7 @@ var SqliteExceptionsRepository = class {
       valueFingerprint: input.valueFingerprint,
       keyVersion: input.keyVersion,
       maskedValue: input.maskedValue,
+      capability: input.capability ?? "suppress",
       scope: input.scope,
       expiresAt: input.expiresAt === null ? null : isoToEpochMillis(input.expiresAt),
       maxUses: input.maxUses,
@@ -19996,6 +20141,7 @@ var SqliteExceptionsRepository = class {
         ruleId: row.rule_id,
         valueFingerprint: row.value_fingerprint,
         keyVersion: row.key_version,
+        capability: row.capability,
         expiresAt: row.expires_at === null ? null : epochMillisToIso(row.expires_at),
         maxUses: row.max_uses,
         useCount: row.use_count,
@@ -20050,6 +20196,35 @@ var SqliteExceptionsRepository = class {
       }))
     );
   }
+  /**
+   * The active reveal-to-model grant for a vaulted value's identity, or null.
+   * Matching is exact on (ruleId, valueFingerprint, keyVersion) — the same key
+   * suppression uses — plus the capability: a suppression grant must never
+   * authorize a reveal. Read-only: the caller does NOT consume here, because a
+   * revealed value re-enters the detection scan immediately afterward and the
+   * suppression match there claims the use — one crossing, one use.
+   *
+   * A grant with `conditions` NEVER matches here: the reveal path does not yet
+   * evaluate conditions, and a narrowing clause that is ignored would WIDEN the
+   * grant instead. Fail closed until reveal-side condition evaluation exists.
+   */
+  activeRevealGrant(ruleId, valueFingerprint, keyVersion, now = Date.now()) {
+    try {
+      const row = getRow(
+        this.db.prepare(
+          `SELECT id FROM exceptions
+            WHERE rule_id = :ruleId AND value_fingerprint = :valueFingerprint
+              AND key_version = :keyVersion
+              AND ${ACTIVE_REVEAL_GRANT_PREDICATE}
+            LIMIT 1`
+        ),
+        { ruleId, valueFingerprint, keyVersion, now }
+      );
+      return Promise.resolve(row ?? null);
+    } catch (err) {
+      return Promise.reject(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
+    }
+  }
   /**
    * Retention sweep: delete TERMINAL rows (revoked, expired, or use-budget
    * exhausted) whose last transition is older than the retention window.
@@ -20077,6 +20252,7 @@ function parseExceptionRow(row) {
     valueFingerprint: row.value_fingerprint,
     keyVersion: row.key_version,
     maskedValue: row.masked_value,
+    capability: row.capability,
     scope: row.scope,
     expiresAt: row.expires_at === null ? null : epochMillisToIso(row.expires_at),
     maxUses: row.max_uses,
@@ -22242,6 +22418,287 @@ var SqliteScanLedgerRepository = class {
   }
 };
 
+// ../../packages/persistence/src/repositories/secret-vault.ts
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID7 } from "crypto";
+var SELECT_COLUMNS = `
+  pointer_id AS pointerId,
+  value_fingerprint AS valueFingerprint,
+  fingerprint_key_version AS fingerprintKeyVersion,
+  key_version AS keyVersion,
+  format_version AS formatVersion,
+  category,
+  rule_id AS ruleId,
+  masked_match AS maskedMatch,
+  provider,
+  ciphertext,
+  nonce,
+  auth_tag AS authTag,
+  occurrence_count AS occurrenceCount,
+  first_seen AS firstSeen,
+  last_seen AS lastSeen`;
+function toRow(raw) {
+  const { provider, ...rest } = raw;
+  return provider === null ? rest : { ...rest, provider };
+}
+var SqliteSecretVaultRepository = class {
+  constructor(db) {
+    this.db = db;
+    this.insertStmt = db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO secret_vault (
+         pointer_id, value_fingerprint, fingerprint_key_version, key_version,
+         format_version, category, rule_id, masked_match, provider,
+         ciphertext, nonce, auth_tag,
+         occurrence_count, first_seen, last_seen
+       ) VALUES (
+         :pointerId, :valueFingerprint, :fingerprintKeyVersion, :keyVersion,
+         :formatVersion, :category, :ruleId, :maskedMatch, :provider,
+         :ciphertext, :nonce, :authTag,
+         1, :now, :now
+       )`
+    );
+    this.bumpStmt = db.prepare(
+      `UPDATE secret_vault
+       SET occurrence_count = occurrence_count + 1, last_seen = :now
+       WHERE value_fingerprint = :valueFingerprint`
+    );
+    this.byPointerStmt = db.prepare(
+      `SELECT ${SELECT_COLUMNS} FROM secret_vault WHERE pointer_id = :pointerId`
+    );
+    this.byFingerprintStmt = db.prepare(
+      `SELECT ${SELECT_COLUMNS} FROM secret_vault WHERE value_fingerprint = :valueFingerprint`
+    );
+    this.listStmt = db.prepare(`SELECT ${SELECT_COLUMNS} FROM secret_vault ORDER BY first_seen`);
+    this.replaceCiphertextStmt = db.prepare(
+      `UPDATE secret_vault
+       SET key_version = :keyVersion, ciphertext = :ciphertext, nonce = :nonce, auth_tag = :authTag
+       WHERE pointer_id = :pointerId`
+    );
+    this.refreshFingerprintStmt = db.prepare(
+      `UPDATE secret_vault
+       SET value_fingerprint = :valueFingerprint, fingerprint_key_version = :fingerprintKeyVersion
+       WHERE pointer_id = :pointerId`
+    );
+    this.derefStmt = db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO secret_vault_deref (id, pointer_id, at, target, reason, outcome, grant_id, pointer_count)
+       VALUES (:id, :pointerId, :at, :target, :reason, :outcome, :grantId, :pointerCount)`
+    );
+  }
+  db;
+  insertStmt;
+  bumpStmt;
+  byPointerStmt;
+  byFingerprintStmt;
+  listStmt;
+  replaceCiphertextStmt;
+  refreshFingerprintStmt;
+  derefStmt;
+  /**
+   * Vault a value, or record another sighting of one already vaulted. Keyed on
+   * `valueFingerprint`, never on the caller's pointer id: a value seen again
+   * bumps `occurrence_count` and `last_seen` and comes back with its ORIGINAL
+   * pointer, category and ciphertext, so the same secret always resolves to one
+   * wire token. `minted` is true only when this call created the row.
+   *
+   * The read-then-write runs in one IMMEDIATE transaction so two concurrent
+   * writers cannot both decide they are minting.
+   */
+  upsert(input, now) {
+    let minted = false;
+    withTransaction(
+      this.db,
+      () => {
+        const existing = getRow(this.byFingerprintStmt, {
+          valueFingerprint: input.valueFingerprint
+        });
+        if (existing === void 0) {
+          this.insertStmt.run(
+            bindParams({
+              pointerId: input.pointerId,
+              valueFingerprint: input.valueFingerprint,
+              fingerprintKeyVersion: input.fingerprintKeyVersion,
+              keyVersion: input.keyVersion,
+              formatVersion: input.formatVersion ?? POINTER_FORMAT_VERSION,
+              category: input.category,
+              ruleId: input.ruleId,
+              maskedMatch: input.maskedMatch,
+              provider: input.provider,
+              ciphertext: input.ciphertext,
+              nonce: input.nonce,
+              authTag: input.authTag,
+              now
+            })
+          );
+          minted = true;
+          return;
+        }
+        this.bumpStmt.run({ valueFingerprint: input.valueFingerprint, now });
+      },
+      "IMMEDIATE"
+    );
+    const row = getRow(this.byFingerprintStmt, {
+      valueFingerprint: input.valueFingerprint
+    });
+    if (row === void 0) throw new Error("vault: row vanished immediately after write");
+    return { row: toRow(row), minted };
+  }
+  byPointerId(pointerId) {
+    const raw = getRow(this.byPointerStmt, { pointerId });
+    return raw === void 0 ? null : toRow(raw);
+  }
+  byValueFingerprint(fingerprint) {
+    const raw = getRow(this.byFingerprintStmt, { valueFingerprint: fingerprint });
+    return raw === void 0 ? null : toRow(raw);
+  }
+  /** Append one audit row. Carries no raw value and no ciphertext, by shape. */
+  recordDeref(entry) {
+    this.derefStmt.run(
+      bindParams({
+        id: entry.id,
+        pointerId: entry.pointerId,
+        at: entry.at,
+        target: entry.target,
+        reason: entry.reason,
+        outcome: entry.outcome,
+        grantId: entry.grantId,
+        pointerCount: entry.pointerCount ?? 1
+      })
+    );
+  }
+  listAll() {
+    return allRows(this.listStmt).map(toRow);
+  }
+  /** Re-seal an entry under a new key epoch, leaving its identity untouched. */
+  replaceCiphertext(pointerId, next) {
+    this.replaceCiphertextStmt.run({ pointerId, ...next });
+  }
+  /** Re-derive an entry's fingerprint under a new fingerprint-key epoch. */
+  refreshFingerprint(pointerId, next) {
+    this.refreshFingerprintStmt.run({ pointerId, ...next });
+  }
+  /**
+   * Destroy every vaulted value and report how many were destroyed. The deref
+   * audit is left alone on purpose — see the table note above.
+   */
+  purgeAll() {
+    let destroyed = 0;
+    withTransaction(
+      this.db,
+      () => {
+        destroyed = this.countEntries();
+        this.db.exec("DELETE FROM secret_vault");
+      },
+      "IMMEDIATE"
+    );
+    return destroyed;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Record (or re-stamp) one place a pointer has been written. One row per
+   * (pointer, location); a re-sighting bumps last_seen. Best-effort bookkeeping
+   * on hook paths — a failure must never affect the rewrite that triggered it,
+   * so callers wrap this, not the other way around.
+   */
+  recordSighting(entry, now) {
+    this.db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO secret_vault_sighting (id, pointer_id, location, kind, first_seen, last_seen)
+         VALUES (:id, :pointerId, :location, :kind, :now, :now)
+         ON CONFLICT (pointer_id, location) DO UPDATE SET last_seen = :now`
+    ).run({
+      id: randomUUID7(),
+      pointerId: entry.pointerId,
+      location: entry.location,
+      kind: entry.kind,
+      now
+    });
+  }
+  listSightings(pointerId) {
+    const rows = allRows(
+      this.db.prepare(
+        `SELECT location, kind, first_seen, last_seen FROM secret_vault_sighting
+          WHERE pointer_id = :pointerId ORDER BY last_seen DESC`
+      ),
+      { pointerId }
+    );
+    return rows.map((r) => ({
+      location: r.location,
+      kind: r.kind,
+      firstSeen: new Date(r.first_seen).toISOString(),
+      lastSeen: new Date(r.last_seen).toISOString()
+    }));
+  }
+  /**
+   * The dashboard inventory: every vaulted value's descriptor data joined with
+   * its sightings and the active reveal-to-model grant when one exists.
+   * Raw-free by construction — neither the fingerprint nor the ciphertext
+   * columns are selected.
+   */
+  listInventory(now = Date.now()) {
+    const rows = allRows(
+      this.db.prepare(
+        `SELECT v.pointer_id, v.category, v.rule_id, v.masked_match, v.provider,
+                v.occurrence_count, v.first_seen, v.last_seen,
+                (SELECT e.id FROM exceptions e
+                  WHERE e.rule_id = v.rule_id
+                    AND e.value_fingerprint = v.value_fingerprint
+                    AND e.key_version = v.fingerprint_key_version
+                    AND ${ACTIVE_REVEAL_GRANT_PREDICATE}
+                  LIMIT 1) AS grant_id
+           FROM secret_vault v
+          ORDER BY v.last_seen DESC`
+      ),
+      { now }
+    );
+    return rows.map((r) => ({
+      pointerId: r.pointer_id,
+      category: r.category,
+      ...r.provider === null ? {} : { provider: r.provider },
+      maskedMatch: r.masked_match,
+      occurrences: r.occurrence_count,
+      firstSeen: new Date(r.first_seen).toISOString(),
+      lastSeen: new Date(r.last_seen).toISOString(),
+      revealGrantId: r.grant_id,
+      sightings: this.listSightings(r.pointer_id)
+    }));
+  }
+  /**
+   * The de-reference trail, newest first. By default the batched, high-volume
+   * reasons (display, view-render) are hidden and counted instead — the rows
+   * that matter as a signal are the model crossings, and burying them under
+   * render noise would defeat the audit's purpose.
+   */
+  listDerefs(opts) {
+    const limit = opts?.limit ?? 200;
+    const where = opts?.includeBatched === true ? "" : `WHERE reason NOT IN ('display', 'view-render')`;
+    const rows = allRows(
+      this.db.prepare(
+        `SELECT id, pointer_id, at, target, reason, outcome, grant_id, pointer_count
+           FROM secret_vault_deref ${where}
+          ORDER BY at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT :limit`
+      ),
+      { limit }
+    );
+    const hiddenBatched = opts?.includeBatched === true ? 0 : countScalar(
+      this.db,
+      `SELECT count(*) AS n FROM secret_vault_deref WHERE reason IN ('display', 'view-render')`
+    );
+    return {
+      rows: rows.map((r) => ({
+        id: r.id,
+        pointerId: r.pointer_id,
+        at: new Date(r.at).toISOString(),
+        target: r.target,
+        reason: r.reason,
+        outcome: r.outcome,
+        ...r.grant_id === null ? {} : { grantId: r.grant_id },
+        pointerCount: r.pointer_count
+      })),
+      hiddenBatched
+    };
+  }
+  countEntries() {
+    return countScalar(this.db, "SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM secret_vault");
+  }
+};
+
 // ../../packages/persistence/src/repositories/security.ts
 var DAY_MS4 = 864e5;
 var SEVERITIES = ["critical", "high", "medium", "low"];
@@ -22587,7 +23044,7 @@ var SqliteSecurityRepository = class {
 };
 
 // ../../packages/persistence/src/repositories/shares.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID7 } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID8 } from "crypto";
 var MAX_EGRESS_CALL_SITES_PER_PROJECT = 5e3;
 var IN_CHUNK = 500;
 var KIND_ORDER = ["provider", "internal", "external", "ip"];
@@ -22843,7 +23300,7 @@ var SqliteSharesRepository = class {
                (id, destination_id, host, decision, created_at, updated_at)
              VALUES (:id, :destinationId, :host, :decision, :now, :now)`
         ).run({
-          id: randomUUID7(),
+          id: randomUUID8(),
           destinationId,
           host: dest.host,
           decision,
@@ -22992,7 +23449,7 @@ var SqliteSharesRepository = class {
       let destinationId = destIds.get(hit.host);
       if (destinationId === void 0) {
         destStmt.run({
-          id: randomUUID7(),
+          id: randomUUID8(),
           kind: hit.kind,
           name: hit.name,
           host: hit.host,
@@ -23008,7 +23465,7 @@ var SqliteSharesRepository = class {
       let endpointId = endpointIds.get(endpointKey);
       if (endpointId === void 0) {
         endpointStmt.run({
-          id: randomUUID7(),
+          id: randomUUID8(),
           destinationId,
           method: hit.method,
           transport: hit.transport,
@@ -23021,7 +23478,7 @@ var SqliteSharesRepository = class {
         endpointIds.set(endpointKey, endpointId);
       }
       siteStmt.run({
-        id: randomUUID7(),
+        id: randomUUID8(),
         endpointId,
         project: input.project,
         projectKey: input.projectKey,
@@ -23437,6 +23894,7 @@ function openAndInitialize(file2) {
       policies,
       installedPacks,
       scanLedger: new SqliteScanLedgerRepository(db),
+      secretVault: new SqliteSecretVaultRepository(db),
       exceptions: new SqliteExceptionsRepository(db),
       resolutions: new SqliteResolutionsRepository(db),
       ruleProbeCache: new SqliteRuleProbeCacheRepository(db),
@@ -23472,6 +23930,7 @@ function openLocalDatabase(dir) {
     policies,
     installedPacks,
     scanLedger,
+    secretVault,
     exceptions,
     resolutions,
     ruleProbeCache,
@@ -23580,7 +24039,7 @@ function openLocalDatabase(dir) {
         const definitionId = definitionIds.get(`${finding.ruleId}@${finding.version}`);
         if (!definitionId) continue;
         inspectionFindings.insertFinding({
-          id: randomUUID8(),
+          id: randomUUID9(),
           auditEventId: record2.scanEvent.id,
           inspectionDefinitionId: definitionId,
           span: finding.span,
@@ -23657,6 +24116,7 @@ function openLocalDatabase(dir) {
     policies,
     installedPacks,
     scanLedger,
+    secretVault,
     exceptions,
     resolutions,
     ruleProbeCache,
@@ -23727,7 +24187,11 @@ function parseKeyFile(raw) {
   }
   return { version: version2, material: bytes };
 }
-var KEY_VERSION_TABLES = ["exceptions", "blocked_detections"];
+var KEY_VERSION_COLUMNS = {
+  exceptions: "key_version",
+  blocked_detections: "key_version",
+  secret_vault: "fingerprint_key_version"
+};
 var SQLITE_ERROR = 1;
 var FLOOR_BUSY_TIMEOUT_MS = 250;
 var FloorUnreadableError = class extends Error {
@@ -23748,10 +24212,10 @@ function storedKeyVersionFloor(dataDir2) {
     db = new DatabaseSync2(file2, { readOnly: true });
     db.exec(`PRAGMA busy_timeout = ${String(FLOOR_BUSY_TIMEOUT_MS)}`);
     let floor = 0;
-    for (const table2 of KEY_VERSION_TABLES) {
+    for (const [table2, column] of Object.entries(KEY_VERSION_COLUMNS)) {
       try {
         const row = getRow(
-          db.prepare(`SELECT MAX(key_version) AS v FROM ${table2}`)
+          db.prepare(`SELECT MAX(${column}) AS v FROM ${table2}`)
         );
         floor = Math.max(floor, row?.v ?? 0);
       } catch (err) {
@@ -23858,16 +24322,42 @@ function readJson(file2) {
   return parseJsonObject(text) ?? null;
 }
 
-// ../../packages/persistence/src/warn-era-cap.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync3, writeFileSync as writeFileSync2 } from "fs";
+// ../../packages/persistence/src/vault/crypto.ts
+import {
+  createCipheriv,
+  createDecipheriv,
+  createHmac as createHmac2,
+  hkdfSync,
+  timingSafeEqual
+} from "crypto";
+
+// ../../packages/persistence/src/vault/key-provider.ts
+import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes2 } from "crypto";
+import {
+  chmodSync as chmodSync2,
+  mkdirSync as mkdirSync2,
+  readFileSync as readFileSync3,
+  renameSync as renameSync4,
+  rmSync as rmSync3,
+  statSync,
+  writeFileSync as writeFileSync2
+} from "fs";
 import { join as join5 } from "path";
+
+// ../../packages/persistence/src/vault/vault.ts
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes3, randomUUID as randomUUID10 } from "crypto";
+
+// ../../packages/persistence/src/warn-era-cap.ts
+import { existsSync as existsSync3, writeFileSync as writeFileSync3 } from "fs";
+import { join as join6 } from "path";
 var MARKER = "warn-era-capped";
 function capWarnEraEnforcementOnce(db, policyMode, dataDir2) {
   if (policyMode !== "warn") return { capped: 0, skipped: "not-warn" };
-  const marker = join5(dataDir2, MARKER);
+  const marker = join6(dataDir2, MARKER);
   if (existsSync3(marker)) return { capped: 0, skipped: "already-run" };
   const capped = db.policies.capCategoryActions();
-  writeFileSync2(marker, `${new Date(Date.now()).toISOString()}
+  writeFileSync3(marker, `${new Date(Date.now()).toISOString()}
 `, { mode: DATA_FILE_MODE });
   return { capped };
 }
@@ -23924,7 +24414,7 @@ function resolveProvider() {
 function loadConfig(base = defaultDataDir()) {
   try {
     ensureLayoutDirSync(base);
-    const settingsFile = join6(settingsDir(base), "settings.json");
+    const settingsFile = join7(settingsDir(base), "settings.json");
     if (existsSync4(settingsFile)) tightenFile(settingsFile);
   } catch {
   }
@@ -23948,9 +24438,9 @@ function resolveProviderSafe() {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/config-inventory.ts
-import { readdirSync, readFileSync as readFileSync4, realpathSync, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs";
+import { readdirSync, readFileSync as readFileSync5, realpathSync, statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";
 import { homedir as homedir2 } from "os";
-import { basename as basename2, join as join8 } from "path";
+import { basename as basename2, join as join9 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/detections/src/egress/registry.ts
 var EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "1";
@@ -25053,9 +25543,9 @@ function extractGoMod(text) {
   let blockKeyword = null;
   eachLine(text, (rawLine, lineNumber) => {
     if (blockKeyword === null) {
-      const open = GO_BLOCK_OPEN.exec(rawLine)?.[1];
-      if (open !== void 0) {
-        blockKeyword = open;
+      const open2 = GO_BLOCK_OPEN.exec(rawLine)?.[1];
+      if (open2 !== void 0) {
+        blockKeyword = open2;
         return;
       }
       const path = GO_REQUIRE_SINGLE_LINE.exec(rawLine)?.[1];
@@ -25573,12 +26063,12 @@ function redact(text, findings) {
   const regions = [];
   for (const f of sorted) {
     const rank = SEVERITY_RANK2[f.severity];
-    const open = regions[regions.length - 1];
-    if (open && f.span.start < open.end) {
-      open.end = Math.max(open.end, f.span.end);
-      if (rank > open.rank) {
-        open.rank = rank;
-        open.category = f.category;
+    const open2 = regions[regions.length - 1];
+    if (open2 && f.span.start < open2.end) {
+      open2.end = Math.max(open2.end, f.span.end);
+      if (rank > open2.rank) {
+        open2.rank = rank;
+        open2.category = f.category;
       }
     } else {
       regions.push({ start: f.span.start, end: f.span.end, category: f.category, rank });
@@ -25607,6 +26097,24 @@ function maskMatch(raw) {
   return `${raw.charAt(0)}${"*".repeat(6)}${raw.charAt(raw.length - 1)}`;
 }
 
+// ../../packages/detections/src/pointer-shield.ts
+function shieldPointers(text) {
+  const spans = [];
+  let out = null;
+  for (const match of text.matchAll(pointerTokenScanner())) {
+    spans.push({ start: match.index, end: match.index + match[0].length });
+    out ??= text;
+    out = out.slice(0, match.index) + " ".repeat(match[0].length) + out.slice(match.index + match[0].length);
+  }
+  return { text: out ?? text, spans };
+}
+function dropShieldedFindings(findings, spans) {
+  if (spans.length === 0) return findings;
+  return findings.filter(
+    (finding) => !spans.some((s) => finding.span.start < s.end && finding.span.end > s.start)
+  );
+}
+
 // ../../packages/detections/src/posture/config-posture.ts
 var RULE_VERSION = "1";
 var KNOWN_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
@@ -27803,8 +28311,8 @@ function bundledDetections() {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/repo.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync } from "fs";
-import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join as join7, sep as sep2 } from "path";
+import { existsSync as existsSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync4, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs";
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join as join8, sep as sep2 } from "path";
 function resolveRepoIdentity(cwd) {
   try {
     const root = findGitRoot(cwd);
@@ -27833,36 +28341,36 @@ function resolveWorktreeRoot(cwd) {
 function findGitRoot(start) {
   let dir = start;
   for (; ; ) {
-    if (existsSync5(join7(dir, ".git"))) return dir;
+    if (existsSync5(join8(dir, ".git"))) return dir;
     const parent = dirname(dir);
     if (parent === dir) return void 0;
     dir = parent;
   }
 }
 function resolveGitContext(root) {
-  const dotGit = join7(root, ".git");
+  const dotGit = join8(root, ".git");
   try {
-    if (statSync(dotGit).isDirectory()) {
-      return { configPath: join7(dotGit, "config"), headRoot: root };
+    if (statSync2(dotGit).isDirectory()) {
+      return { configPath: join8(dotGit, "config"), headRoot: root };
     }
   } catch {
     return void 0;
   }
   const target = /^gitdir:\s*(.+?)\s*$/m.exec(safeRead(dotGit) ?? "")?.[1];
   if (!target) return void 0;
-  const gitdir = isAbsolute(target) ? target : join7(root, target);
-  if (existsSync5(join7(gitdir, "config"))) {
-    return { configPath: join7(gitdir, "config"), headRoot: root };
+  const gitdir = isAbsolute(target) ? target : join8(root, target);
+  if (existsSync5(join8(gitdir, "config"))) {
+    return { configPath: join8(gitdir, "config"), headRoot: root };
   }
-  const commonRaw = safeRead(join7(gitdir, "commondir"))?.trim();
+  const commonRaw = safeRead(join8(gitdir, "commondir"))?.trim();
   if (!commonRaw) return void 0;
-  const commonGitDir = isAbsolute(commonRaw) ? commonRaw : join7(gitdir, commonRaw);
+  const commonGitDir = isAbsolute(commonRaw) ? commonRaw : join8(gitdir, commonRaw);
   const headRoot = basename(commonGitDir) === ".git" ? dirname(commonGitDir) : root;
-  return { configPath: join7(commonGitDir, "config"), headRoot };
+  return { configPath: join8(commonGitDir, "config"), headRoot };
 }
 function safeRead(path) {
   try {
-    return readFileSync3(path, "utf8");
+    return readFileSync4(path, "utf8");
   } catch {
     return void 0;
   }
@@ -27900,13 +28408,13 @@ function slugFromUrl(url2) {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/events.ts
-import { createHash as createHash4, randomUUID as randomUUID9 } from "crypto";
+import { createHash as createHash4, randomUUID as randomUUID11 } from "crypto";
 function contentHashOf(text) {
   return createHash4("sha256").update(text).digest("hex");
 }
 function buildIngestEvent(input) {
   return {
-    id: randomUUID9(),
+    id: randomUUID11(),
     sourceTool: input.sourceTool,
     kind: input.kind,
     occurredAt: input.occurredAt ?? (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
@@ -27917,7 +28425,7 @@ function buildIngestEvent(input) {
     // SDK boot in the fail-open hook path). Preserve any id the caller already set.
     metadata: {
       ...input.metadata,
-      correlationId: input.metadata?.correlationId ?? randomUUID9()
+      correlationId: input.metadata?.correlationId ?? randomUUID11()
     }
   };
 }
@@ -27926,8 +28434,8 @@ function buildIngestEvent(input) {
 import { arch, hostname as hostname3, platform, release } from "os";
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/nudge.ts
-import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync5, writeFileSync as writeFileSync3 } from "fs";
-import { join as join9 } from "path";
+import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync3, readFileSync as readFileSync6, writeFileSync as writeFileSync4 } from "fs";
+import { join as join10 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/paths.ts
 import { readdirSync as readdirSync2, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
@@ -27965,8 +28473,8 @@ function resolveNonGitProject(startDir, recognizeMarker) {
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/project-files.ts
 var import_ignore = __toESM(require_ignore(), 1);
-import { existsSync as existsSync6, readdirSync as readdirSync3, readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "fs";
-import { basename as basename4, join as join10, relative, sep as sep4 } from "path";
+import { existsSync as existsSync6, readdirSync as readdirSync3, readFileSync as readFileSync7 } from "fs";
+import { basename as basename4, join as join11, relative, sep as sep4 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/rule-quarantine.ts
 var PASS_BUDGET_MS = 2e3;
@@ -28022,7 +28530,7 @@ async function filterUnsafeRules(rules, gateway, opts) {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/runtime.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID10 } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID12 } from "crypto";
 var ENFORCEMENT_CEILING_ENABLED = false;
 var ACTION_PRIORITY = ["block", "redact", "warn", "log", "allow"];
 function entryIsActive(entry, now) {
@@ -28125,7 +28633,12 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
     if (worst === "block") return { action: "block", text: null, findings };
     if (worst === "redact") {
       const redactFindings = findings.filter((f) => actionFor(f) === "redact");
-      return { action: "redact", text: redact(text, redactFindings), findings };
+      return {
+        action: "redact",
+        text: redact(text, redactFindings),
+        findings,
+        enforcedFindings: redactFindings
+      };
     }
     return { action: worst, text, findings };
   }
@@ -28166,9 +28679,17 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
         else groups.set(pair, [finding]);
       }
       const now = Date.now();
+      const preAuthorized = new Set(ctx.preAuthorizedGrantIds ?? []);
       for (const [pair, group] of groups) {
         const entry = entries.get(pair);
-        if (!entry || !entryIsActive(entry, now) || !conditionsMatch(entry.conditions, ctx)) {
+        if (!entry) continue;
+        if (preAuthorized.has(entry.id)) {
+          if (!conditionsMatch(entry.conditions, ctx)) continue;
+          for (const finding of group) excepted.add(finding);
+          exceptionIds.push(entry.id);
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (!entryIsActive(entry, now) || !conditionsMatch(entry.conditions, ctx)) {
           continue;
         }
         let consumed = false;
@@ -28200,7 +28721,7 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
         const pair = `${finding.ruleId}:${fp}`;
         if (seen.has(pair)) continue;
         seen.add(pair);
-        const reference = randomUUID10().replaceAll("-", "").slice(0, 6);
+        const reference = randomUUID12().replaceAll("-", "").slice(0, 6);
         const maskedValue = maskMatch(finding.rawMatch);
         try {
           await gateway.recordBlockedDetection({
@@ -28224,7 +28745,8 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
   async function evaluate2(text, context, ctx) {
     try {
       await ensureInitialized();
-      const findings = scan(text, rules, context);
+      const shielded = shieldPointers(text);
+      const findings = dropShieldedFindings(scan(shielded.text, rules, context), shielded.spans);
       const fpCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
       const { excepted, exceptionIds } = await applyExceptions(findings, ctx, fpCache);
       const decision = decide(findings, text, excepted);
@@ -28247,7 +28769,11 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
     const { decision, excepted, exceptionIds } = await evaluate2(
       input.text,
       filePath ? { filePath } : void 0,
-      { sourceTool: input.sourceTool, metadata: input.metadata }
+      {
+        sourceTool: input.sourceTool,
+        metadata: input.metadata,
+        preAuthorizedGrantIds: opts2.preAuthorizedGrantIds
+      }
     );
     if (opts2.persist === "with-findings" && decision.findings.length === 0) return decision;
     try {
@@ -28277,7 +28803,7 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
           valueFingerprint: findingKeyFingerprintKey ? fingerprintOf(findingKeyFingerprintKey, match, findingKeyFpCache) : maskedMatch
         }) : void 0;
         return {
-          id: randomUUID10(),
+          id: randomUUID12(),
           eventId: event.id,
           ruleId: match.ruleId,
           category: match.category,
@@ -28303,7 +28829,7 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
       const sorted = [...rules].sort((a, b) => a.id.localeCompare(b.id));
       return contentHashOf(JSON.stringify(sorted));
     } catch {
-      return `unresolved-${randomUUID10()}`;
+      return `unresolved-${randomUUID12()}`;
     }
   }
   async function close() {
@@ -28316,12 +28842,12 @@ function createPluginRuntime(gateway, settings, opts) {
 var THIRTY_DAYS_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/throttle.ts
-import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync3, statSync as statSync3, writeFileSync as writeFileSync4 } from "fs";
-import { join as join11 } from "path";
+import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync4, statSync as statSync4, writeFileSync as writeFileSync5 } from "fs";
+import { join as join12 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/scanner/src/discover.ts
 import { readdirSync as readdirSync4 } from "fs";
-import { join as join12 } from "path";
+import { join as join13 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/scanner/src/constants.ts
 var COMMON_SKIP_DIRS = ["node_modules", "__pycache__", ".venv", "venv", ".cache"];
@@ -28366,7 +28892,7 @@ function discoverGitRepos(opts) {
       if (!entry.isDirectory()) continue;
       if (DISCOVER_SKIP.has(entry.name)) continue;
       if (entry.name.startsWith(".")) continue;
-      visit(join12(dir, entry.name), depth + 1);
+      visit(join13(dir, entry.name), depth + 1);
     }
   }
   for (const root of searchRoots) {
@@ -28469,11 +28995,11 @@ function renderMultiRepoSummary(summary, opts = {}) {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/scanner/src/scan.ts
-import { existsSync as existsSync7, readFileSync as readFileSync8 } from "fs";
+import { existsSync as existsSync7, readFileSync as readFileSync9 } from "fs";
 import { extname as extname2, isAbsolute as isAbsolute2, relative as relative4 } from "path";
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-runtime/src/standalone-gateway.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID11 } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID13 } from "crypto";
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-runtime/src/recorder.ts
 var PLUGIN_RECORDER_BINARY = "plugin";
@@ -28635,7 +29161,7 @@ var StandaloneDataGateway = class {
     const customKeywords = [...new Set(policies.flatMap((p) => p.customKeywords ?? []))];
     const installed = this.installedScanRules();
     const rulePolicies = installed ? [...installed.ruleActions].map(([ruleId, action]) => ({
-      id: randomUUID11(),
+      id: randomUUID13(),
       scope: "global",
       target: { ruleId },
       action,
@@ -28788,16 +29314,16 @@ function resolveDataGateway(config2, meta3, gatewayFactory = standaloneGatewayFa
 }
 
 // ../../packages/plugin-runtime/src/handle-session-start.ts
-import { randomUUID as randomUUID12 } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID as randomUUID14 } from "crypto";
 var EXCEPTION_RETENTION_MS = 90 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
 
 // ../../packages/scanner/src/manifests.ts
-import { statSync as statSync5 } from "fs";
+import { statSync as statSync6 } from "fs";
 
 // ../../packages/scanner/src/walk.ts
 var import_ignore2 = __toESM(require_ignore(), 1);
-import { readdirSync as readdirSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync7, statSync as statSync4 } from "fs";
-import { extname, join as join13, relative as relative3, sep as sep5 } from "path";
+import { readdirSync as readdirSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync8, statSync as statSync5 } from "fs";
+import { extname, join as join14, relative as relative3, sep as sep5 } from "path";
 var SOURCE_EXTENSIONS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   ".ts",
   ".tsx",
@@ -28829,7 +29355,7 @@ var SKIP_DIRS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
 var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024;
 function readIgnoreLayer(dir, filename) {
   try {
-    const content = readFileSync7(join13(dir, filename), "utf8");
+    const content = readFileSync8(join14(dir, filename), "utf8");
     return { base: dir, matcher: (0, import_ignore2.default)().add(content) };
   } catch {
     return void 0;
@@ -28861,7 +29387,7 @@ function* walkTree(rootDir, opts = {}) {
     const dirSkipLayers = skipLayer ? [...skipLayers, skipLayer] : skipLayers;
     for (const entry of dirents) {
       const name = entry.name;
-      const fullPath = join13(dir, name);
+      const fullPath = join14(dir, name);
       if (entry.isDirectory()) {
         const skipState = evaluate(dirSkipLayers, fullPath, true);
         if (skipState !== "unignored" && (SKIP_DIRS.has(name) || skipState === "ignored")) {
@@ -28895,7 +29421,7 @@ function* walkSourceFiles(opts = {}) {
     let size;
     let mtime;
     try {
-      const st = statSync4(file2.path);
+      const st = statSync5(file2.path);
       size = st.size;
       mtime = st.mtime;
     } catch {
@@ -28915,7 +29441,7 @@ function* walkSourceFiles(opts = {}) {
     if (opts.shouldRead && !opts.shouldRead(meta3)) continue;
     let content;
     try {
-      content = readFileSync7(file2.path, "utf8");
+      content = readFileSync8(file2.path, "utf8");
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
@@ -28937,7 +29463,7 @@ function collectManifests(rootDir, maxFileSizeBytes = MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES) {
     const kind = manifestKindOf(file2.name);
     if (kind === null) continue;
     try {
-      const st = statSync5(file2.path);
+      const st = statSync6(file2.path);
       if (st.size > maxFileSizeBytes) continue;
       found.push({ path: file2.path, kind, mtime: st.mtime.toISOString(), size: st.size });
     } catch {
@@ -29139,7 +29665,7 @@ function scanManifests(egress, ledger, updates, rootDir) {
     if (prev?.mtime === manifest.mtime) continue;
     let content;
     try {
-      content = readFileSync8(manifest.path, "utf8");
+      content = readFileSync9(manifest.path, "utf8");
     } catch {
       continue;
     }