@aiwg/cli 2026.11.4 → 2026.11.6
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/agentic/code/providers/capability-matrix.yaml +75 -5
- package/agentic/code/providers/model-capabilities.v1.json +44 -36
- package/bin/aiwg.mjs +6 -4
- package/dist/src/activity-log/cli.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/agents/agent-deployer.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/audit/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/discover-facets.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/enrichment/prompt.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/enrichment/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/index-builder.js +4 -2
- package/dist/src/artifacts/query-engine-rules.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/artifacts/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/views/definition.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/artifacts/views/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/catalog/cli.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/catalog/cli.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/catalog/loader.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/catalog/loader.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/catalog/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/cli-extension-loader.js +19 -5
- package/dist/src/cli/cli-extension-paths.js +65 -0
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/best-practices-audit.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/help.js +3 -4
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/marketplace-plugin-search.js +37 -0
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/marketplace.js +3 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/models.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/ralph-launcher.js +8 -2
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/ralph.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/runtime-info.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/scaffolding.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/script-runner.js +8 -5
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/sdlc-accelerate.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/steward-format.js +12 -0
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/subcommands-bundles.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/subcommands-list-format.js +19 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/use.js +15 -6
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/utilities.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/utility-doctor.js +4 -0
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/version.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/handlers/workspace.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/help-generator.js +9 -11
- package/dist/src/cli/hooks/builtin/activity-log-hook.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/router.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/cli/workflow-orchestrator.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/config/worker-context.js +37 -7
- package/dist/src/config/worker-parallelism.js +11 -0
- package/dist/src/contributors/detect.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/contributors/discover.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/contributors/heuristic.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/contributors/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/contributors/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/contributors/validation.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/effects/worker-delivery.js +83 -0
- package/dist/src/extensions/capability-index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/commands/definitions.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/extensions/deployment-registration.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/loader.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/manifest.js +10 -2
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-activity.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-discovery.js +23 -3
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-doctor.js +7 -3
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-promote.js +3 -3
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-remove.js +3 -3
- package/dist/src/extensions/project-local-scaffold.js +20 -8
- package/dist/src/extensions/registry.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/shadow-resolver.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/upstream-registry.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/extensions/validation.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/intake/git-history-analyzer.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/kb/cli.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/marketplace/plugin-directory.js +36 -0
- package/dist/src/marketplace/plugin-search.js +180 -0
- package/dist/src/mcp/cli.mjs +2 -2
- package/dist/src/mcp/helpers.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/http-tools.mjs +8 -6
- package/dist/src/mcp/http-transport.mjs +3 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/server.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/command-run.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/discovery.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/subsystems.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-invoke.mjs +68 -22
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-local-only-preflight.mjs +79 -0
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-recorded-launch.mjs +26 -0
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-stdin-runtime.mjs +33 -6
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-verify-deliver-schema.mjs +33 -0
- package/dist/src/mcp/tools/worker-verify-deliver.mjs +27 -0
- package/dist/src/models/catalog-policy.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/models/conductor-data-policy.mjs +83 -14
- package/dist/src/models/config-loader.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/models/factory-models.js +144 -0
- package/dist/src/models/index.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/models/local-endpoint-models.js +155 -0
- package/dist/src/models/model-capabilities.v1.json +44 -36
- package/dist/src/models/model-discovery.js +16 -8
- package/dist/src/models/opencode-worker-model.mjs +16 -0
- package/dist/src/models/resolver.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/models/worker-installation.d.mts +2 -0
- package/dist/src/models/worker-installation.mjs +16 -5
- package/dist/src/models/worker-invocation-policy.js +25 -1
- package/dist/src/models/worker-plan.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/models/wrapper-enforcement.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/plugin/plugin-installer.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/plugin/registry-validator.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/plugin/skill-command-translator.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/policy/repo-access.js +3 -1
- package/dist/src/providers/capability-matrix.yaml +75 -5
- package/dist/src/providers/deployment-ownership.mjs +8 -1
- package/dist/src/providers/deployment-preservation.mjs +44 -3
- package/dist/src/providers/grok-build-acp.js +13 -5
- package/dist/src/providers/grok-build-dispatch.js +35 -2
- package/dist/src/providers/grok-build-headless.js +2 -1
- package/dist/src/rlm/cache/hash.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/rlm/cache/store.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/rlm/cache/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/serve/worker-invocation-preparation.js +13 -0
- package/dist/src/serve/worker-invocation.js +21 -6
- package/dist/src/serve/worker-stdin-frame.mjs +1 -1
- package/dist/src/sessions/adapters/grok-build-native-records.js +77 -7
- package/dist/src/sessions/adapters/grok-build-native.js +148 -1
- package/dist/src/sessions/adapters/grok-build.js +36 -14
- package/dist/src/sessions/normalization.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/skills/run.js +0 -11
- package/dist/src/smiths/agentsmith/generator.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/context-pipeline/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/context-pipeline/provider-policy.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/context-pipeline/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/context-pipeline/workspace-doctor.js +4 -0
- package/dist/src/smiths/hook-bridge/factory-trust.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/hook-bridge/hermes-prompt-discovery.js +10 -7
- package/dist/src/smiths/hook-bridge/hermes-trust.js +65 -0
- package/dist/src/smiths/mcpsmith/analyzers/cli-analyzer.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/mcpsmith/generator.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/mcpsmith/index.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/mcpsmith/types.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/skillsmith/collision-detector.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/skillsmith/namespace-adapter.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/smiths/toolsmith/runtime-discovery.mjs +2 -2
- package/dist/src/smiths/toolsmith/types.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/storage/backends/fortemi.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/backends/fs.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/backends/logseq.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/backends/obsidian.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/cli.js +2 -2
- package/dist/src/storage/config.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/subsystem-cli.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/storage/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/testing/generators/test-case-generator.js +1 -1
- package/dist/src/writing/validation-engine.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +11 -1
- package/schemas/models/model-catalog.v1.schema.json +6 -3
- package/tools/agents/deploy-agents.mjs +4 -2
- package/tools/agents/deploy-options.mjs +2 -0
- package/tools/agents/providers/base-inventory.mjs +3 -1
- package/tools/agents/providers/base-kernel-skills.mjs +11 -5
- package/tools/agents/providers/conductor-data-guard.mjs +1 -1
- package/tools/agents/providers/grok-build.mjs +31 -40
- package/tools/agents/providers/model-wrapper.mjs +2 -5
- package/tools/agents/providers/rule-deployment-commit.mjs +3 -0
- package/tools/agents/providers/rule-deployment-prepare.mjs +2 -2
- package/tools/agents/providers/rule-projection.mjs +39 -4
- package/tools/agents/providers/skill-copy-prune.mjs +12 -0
- package/tools/agents/providers/stale-artifact-prune.mjs +24 -10
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/claude-adapter.mjs +2 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/factory-adapter.mjs +6 -2
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/mcp-worker-launch.mjs +67 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/opencode-adapter.mjs +9 -7
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/trusted-verification.mjs +1021 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/typed-stop-delivery.mjs +46 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/verification-isolation.mjs +509 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-context.mjs +3 -3
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-delivery-guards.mjs +95 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-delivery-record.mjs +15 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-final.mjs +4 -1
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-inputs.mjs +20 -1
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-isolation-status.mjs +3 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-isolation.mjs +1 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-launch-cli.mjs +8 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-local-only-paths.mjs +45 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-prompt.mjs +4 -1
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-retry-evidence.mjs +2 -1
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-run-directory.mjs +45 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-termination.mjs +21 -12
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-unit-cleanup.mjs +10 -2
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worker-verification-cli.mjs +164 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/lib/worktree-preparation.mjs +417 -0
- package/tools/ralph-external/session-launcher.mjs +30 -32
- package/vscode-extension/schemas/aiwg.config.v1.json +27 -0
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// Publish a validated zero-launch stop through the existing signed delivery route.
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import { lstatSync, mkdtempSync, realpathSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { importImpl } from '../../_resolve-impl.mjs';
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import { prepareDeliveryRecord } from './worker-delivery-record.mjs';
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function destinationFor(deliverablePath, writableRoots) {
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const destination = join(realpathSync(dirname(deliverablePath)), basename(deliverablePath));
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for (const tree of writableRoots) {
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const rel = relative(realpathSync(tree), destination);
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if (rel === '' || rel !== '..' && !rel.startsWith('..' + sep) && !isAbsolute(rel)) {
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throw new Error('--deliverable must be outside worker-writable roots');
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}
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}
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let existing;
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try { existing = lstatSync(destination); } catch (error) { if (error.code !== 'ENOENT') throw error; }
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if (existing && (!existing.isFile() || existing.nlink !== 1)) throw new Error('--deliverable must be a regular non-linked file or an absent path');
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return destination;
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}
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export async function deliverTypedStop(input, { prepareRecord = prepareDeliveryRecord } = {}) {
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const { projectDir = process.cwd(), ...request } = input;
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const { typedStopDeliverySchema, invalidTypedStop } = await importImpl(import.meta.url, 'mcp/tools/worker-verify-deliver-schema.mjs');
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const parsed = typedStopDeliverySchema.safeParse(request);
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if (!parsed.success) throw invalidTypedStop(parsed.error.message);
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const { deliverablePath, typedStop } = parsed.data;
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const { loadWorkerInputs } = await importImpl(import.meta.url, 'cli/handlers/models.js');
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const inputs = await loadWorkerInputs({ cwd: projectDir, args: [], rawArgs: [],
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frameworkRoot: fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url)) });
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const writableRoots = Object.values(inputs.drivers).flatMap(driver => driver.qualification.installation?.workerWritableRoots ?? []);
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const destination = destinationFor(deliverablePath, writableRoots);
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const bytes = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(typedStop).sort(([a], [b]) => a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0))) + '\n');
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const artifactDigest = `sha256:${createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex')}`;
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const complete = await prepareRecord(projectDir, { kind: 'typed-stop', verifierId: 'typed-stop@1', artifactDigest, deliverablePath: destination });
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// Recheck after signing, before the same-directory atomic rename.
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destinationFor(destination, writableRoots);
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const staging = mkdtempSync(join(dirname(destination), '.aiwg-deliver-'));
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try {
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const staged = join(staging, 'typed-stop');
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renameSync(staged, destination);
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} finally { rmSync(staging, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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return { status: 'accepted', kind: 'typed-stop', verifierId: 'typed-stop@1', artifactDigest, deliveryRecord: await complete() };
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}
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/**
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* Confinement for Tier 0 trusted verification checks (#2889 B1,
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* FR-OG-039/042/068). Extends the #2954/#2888 worker-isolation path
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* (`worker-isolation.mjs`) with the extra `systemd-run --user` properties a
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* *verification* check needs: checks execute worker-controlled code (the
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* worker's own tests, `vitest`/`tsconfig` configs, Makefiles, cwd-relative
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* runners) so they must never run with the conductor's full filesystem and
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* network access or an exposed `HOME`.
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*
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* This host (and, empirically, any Ubuntu host with
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* `dmesg`/`audit` showing `apparmor="DENIED" ... capability=21 sys_admin
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* profile=unprivileged_userns` on every `systemd-run --user` invocation)
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* namespace-creating confinement (`ProtectHome=`, `PrivateTmp=`,
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* `PrivateNetwork=`, `InaccessiblePaths=`, `TemporaryFileSystem=`): all five
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* silently no-op (`ProtectHome`/`PrivateTmp`/`InaccessiblePaths`) or log a
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* single degrade line and continue unconfined (`PrivateNetwork`) rather than
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* failing the unit. Only confinement implemented as a *remount* of an
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* already-mounted filesystem — `ReadOnlyPaths=`/`ReadWritePaths=`,
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* `NoNewPrivileges=`, and `PrivateUsers=`'s self-only uid map — is enforced
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* here without that extra privilege. `probeVerificationIsolationCapabilities`
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* never trusts that distinction from memory: it live-probes every property
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* on first use so a different host or a kernel/policy change is reflected
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* automatically instead of silently assumed.
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*
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* Round-2 fail-closed hardening (#2889 B1 CRITICAL): the probe is
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* fail-closed end to end. A probe spawn error, non-zero exit, timeout, or
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* ANY missing/ambiguous output field means the WHOLE probe is treated as
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* failed — every capability is reported `degraded`, nothing is cached, and
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* `runConfinedCheck` refuses to launch unless the caller explicitly opts
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* into degraded isolation. Every capability this module claims `enforced`
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* is positively demonstrated from OUTSIDE the probe unit, after it has
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* exited, never from the unit's own self-reported exit code alone: a write
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* sentinel outside the allowed paths must be observably ABSENT on the real
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* host filesystem after the unit ends (not merely "the shell said the write
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* failed"), and network isolation additionally requires the probe to have
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* positively confirmed it ran to completion (the `DONE` marker below) before
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* its reported network namespace id is trusted at all. The capability cache
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* has a short TTL (re-measured well within a single conductor run, but
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* never cached across a changing kernel/policy for the life of a long
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* process) and is invalidated immediately on any probe failure, never
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* reused stale. It is additionally keyed to the exact set of systemd
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* properties this probe exercises (`PROBE_PROFILE_KEY`), so a future change
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* to that set can never silently reuse an now-unrelated cached result.
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*
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* Given that split, this module's `runConfinedCheck` enforces EVERY
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* required capability (write confinement, home-read protection, and network
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* isolation — not write confinement alone) and reports every capability it
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* could not additionally enforce — most importantly, that readable paths
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* outside the worktree and home/tmp trees remain visible — as an
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* explicit, structured `degraded` list on every result. A launch requests
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* EXACTLY the systemd properties this host's live probe just proved
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* (`buildVerificationExtraProperties`): `ProtectHome=`, `PrivateTmp=`, and
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* `PrivateNetwork=` are each included only when their own probed capability
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* came back `enforced`, never requested unconditionally and never silently
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* omitted when they ARE available. Nothing is ever silently claimed
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* "isolated" when it is not: callers decide whether a degraded run is
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* acceptable (`allowDegradedIsolation: true`, a strict boolean — a string
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* `"false"` or any other truthy-but-not-`true` value is treated as `false`
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* and still refuses); the default is to refuse to run the check at all when
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* the per-host probe shows a required capability is unavailable.
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*
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* One more host-specific gap the live probe measures separately
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* (`tmpWriteConfinement`, never folded into `writeConfinement` and never
|
|
66
|
+
* part of the REQUIRED set `runConfinedCheck` refuses on): on this host,
|
|
67
|
+
* `systemd-run --user` leaves `/tmp` and `/var/tmp` writable EVERYWHERE,
|
|
68
|
+
* not just inside the worktree/output-directory allow-list, regardless of
|
|
69
|
+
* an explicit `ReadOnlyPaths=/tmp`/`ReadOnlyPaths=/var/tmp`.
|
|
70
|
+
* `systemd.exec(5)` ties that specific lock-down to `PrivateTmp=` actually
|
|
71
|
+
* engaging (which, per the same AppArmor restriction, it does not here);
|
|
72
|
+
* every other path on the same filesystem (confirmed with `/opt`, `/srv`,
|
|
73
|
+
* `/home`, `/var` directly) IS correctly confined. A worktree created
|
|
74
|
+
* under a real repository checkout (the normal case — see
|
|
75
|
+
* `worktree-preparation.mjs`) is unaffected; only a worktree or output
|
|
76
|
+
* directory placed under `/tmp`/`/var/tmp` inherits this specific gap, and
|
|
77
|
+
* it is reported, never assumed away.
|
|
78
|
+
*/
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
|
|
81
|
+
import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
|
|
82
|
+
import { homedir, tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
|
83
|
+
import path from 'node:path';
|
|
84
|
+
import {
|
|
85
|
+
buildWorkerIsolationArgs,
|
|
86
|
+
detectWorkerIsolation,
|
|
87
|
+
resolveManagerEnvNames,
|
|
88
|
+
} from './worker-isolation.mjs';
|
|
89
|
+
import { buildSystemdClientEnv, resolveSystemdRun } from './systemd-client.mjs';
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
let cachedCapabilities;
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
/** Reset the process-lifetime capability cache. Test-only. */
|
|
94
|
+
export function resetVerificationIsolationCapabilityCache() {
|
|
95
|
+
cachedCapabilities = undefined;
|
|
96
|
+
}
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
// Short TTL: long enough that a normal conductor run (many checks across one
|
|
99
|
+
// or a few verification passes) does not re-probe every call, short enough
|
|
100
|
+
// that a long-running process never trusts a kernel/AppArmor-policy change
|
|
101
|
+
// (or a one-off probe flake) for more than a few minutes.
|
|
102
|
+
const CAPABILITY_CACHE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
// The exact systemd properties this probe exercises, used only to key the
|
|
105
|
+
// cache (see module doc comment): if a future change to this list is made
|
|
106
|
+
// without also bumping this key, the stale cache is used instead of being
|
|
107
|
+
// silently (and wrongly) treated as still valid for a DIFFERENT probe.
|
|
108
|
+
const PROBE_PROFILE_KEY = [
|
|
109
|
+
'NoNewPrivileges=yes', 'ProtectHome=tmpfs', 'PrivateTmp=yes',
|
|
110
|
+
'PrivateUsers=yes', 'PrivateNetwork=yes', 'ReadOnlyPaths=/', 'ReadWritePaths=<scratch>',
|
|
111
|
+
].join('|');
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
// Every capability a launch REQUIRES before it will proceed without an
|
|
114
|
+
// explicit `allowDegradedIsolation` opt-in (B1: "the refusal covers EVERY
|
|
115
|
+
// required capability ... not just write"). `tmpIsolation`/
|
|
116
|
+
// `tmpWriteConfinement`/`noNewPrivileges`/`arbitraryPathReadIsolation` are
|
|
117
|
+
// real, separately reported findings but are NOT required for launch —
|
|
118
|
+
// they are documented, known-degraded gaps on this host class (see module
|
|
119
|
+
// doc comment) that a caller may still accept as part of the overall
|
|
120
|
+
// degraded picture without blocking every launch outright.
|
|
121
|
+
export const REQUIRED_VERIFICATION_CAPABILITIES = ['writeConfinement', 'homeReadIsolation', 'networkIsolation'];
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
/** Which of `REQUIRED_VERIFICATION_CAPABILITIES` are NOT `'enforced'` on `capabilities`. */
|
|
124
|
+
export function missingRequiredCapabilities(capabilities) {
|
|
125
|
+
if (!capabilities || capabilities.mode !== 'systemd-unit') return [...REQUIRED_VERIFICATION_CAPABILITIES];
|
|
126
|
+
return REQUIRED_VERIFICATION_CAPABILITIES.filter(name => capabilities[name] !== 'enforced');
|
|
127
|
+
}
|
|
128
|
+
|
|
129
|
+
function runProbeUnit({ spawn, argv }) {
|
|
130
|
+
return spawn(resolveSystemdRun(), argv.slice(1), { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 20000, env: buildSystemdClientEnv({ envNames: [] }) });
|
|
131
|
+
}
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
function fullyDegradedResult(reason) {
|
|
134
|
+
return {
|
|
135
|
+
mode: 'systemd-unit',
|
|
136
|
+
reason,
|
|
137
|
+
writeConfinement: 'degraded',
|
|
138
|
+
tmpWriteConfinement: 'degraded',
|
|
139
|
+
noNewPrivileges: 'degraded',
|
|
140
|
+
homeReadIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
141
|
+
tmpIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
142
|
+
networkIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
143
|
+
arbitraryPathReadIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
144
|
+
degraded: [{ capability: 'probe', reason }],
|
|
145
|
+
};
|
|
146
|
+
}
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
const PROBE_REQUIRED_FIELDS = [
|
|
149
|
+
'NONEWPRIVS', 'NETNS', 'HOMECOUNT', 'TMPMARK',
|
|
150
|
+
'SCRATCHWRITE', 'TMPWRITE', 'VARTMPWRITE', 'HOMEWRITE', 'DONE',
|
|
151
|
+
];
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
/**
|
|
154
|
+
* Live-probe which confinement properties this host's `systemd-run --user`
|
|
155
|
+
* actually enforces, rather than assuming from a fixed list. Runs ONE
|
|
156
|
+
* combined throwaway unit (bounded, single call — `tool-quota`) that
|
|
157
|
+
* exercises each property against disposable fixtures it creates and tears
|
|
158
|
+
* down itself; nothing it touches is a real secret or a real worktree.
|
|
159
|
+
*
|
|
160
|
+
* Fail-closed (B1): a probe spawn error, non-zero exit, or any missing
|
|
161
|
+
* expected output field means the probe is treated as having failed
|
|
162
|
+
* entirely — every capability comes back `degraded` with a `probe`-level
|
|
163
|
+
* reason, and the result is NOT cached (so the very next call re-probes
|
|
164
|
+
* rather than wedging on a transient failure). A successful probe is
|
|
165
|
+
* cached for `CAPABILITY_CACHE_TTL_MS` and keyed to `PROBE_PROFILE_KEY`;
|
|
166
|
+
* pass `force: true` to bypass the cache outright (tests only).
|
|
167
|
+
*/
|
|
168
|
+
export function probeVerificationIsolationCapabilities({ spawn = spawnSync, force = false } = {}) {
|
|
169
|
+
if (cachedCapabilities && !force) {
|
|
170
|
+
const fresh = Date.now() - cachedCapabilities._probedAt < CAPABILITY_CACHE_TTL_MS;
|
|
171
|
+
const sameProfile = cachedCapabilities._profileKey === PROBE_PROFILE_KEY;
|
|
172
|
+
if (fresh && sameProfile) return cachedCapabilities;
|
|
173
|
+
cachedCapabilities = undefined;
|
|
174
|
+
}
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
const detected = detectWorkerIsolation({ spawn });
|
|
177
|
+
if (detected.mode !== 'systemd-unit') {
|
|
178
|
+
const result = {
|
|
179
|
+
mode: 'degraded',
|
|
180
|
+
reason: detected.reason,
|
|
181
|
+
writeConfinement: 'degraded',
|
|
182
|
+
tmpWriteConfinement: 'degraded',
|
|
183
|
+
noNewPrivileges: 'degraded',
|
|
184
|
+
homeReadIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
185
|
+
tmpIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
186
|
+
networkIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
187
|
+
arbitraryPathReadIsolation: 'degraded',
|
|
188
|
+
degraded: [{ capability: 'systemd-unit', reason: detected.reason }],
|
|
189
|
+
};
|
|
190
|
+
// This is a durable, legitimate finding (no systemd user manager at
|
|
191
|
+
// all), not a probe failure -- caching it avoids re-shelling out to
|
|
192
|
+
// `systemd-run --version`/`systemctl --user show` on every call.
|
|
193
|
+
cachedCapabilities = { ...result, _probedAt: Date.now(), _profileKey: PROBE_PROFILE_KEY };
|
|
194
|
+
return cachedCapabilities;
|
|
195
|
+
}
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
// B1: a failed/ambiguous host-netns lookup must never be read as "the
|
|
198
|
+
// probe's reported namespace differs, so isolation is enforced" -- fail
|
|
199
|
+
// the WHOLE probe closed rather than comparing against an empty/unknown
|
|
200
|
+
// baseline.
|
|
201
|
+
let hostNetNs;
|
|
202
|
+
try {
|
|
203
|
+
hostNetNs = spawn('readlink', ['/proc/self/ns/net'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5000 });
|
|
204
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
205
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult(`could not determine this host's own network namespace: ${error.message}`);
|
|
206
|
+
}
|
|
207
|
+
if (hostNetNs.error || hostNetNs.status !== 0) {
|
|
208
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult(`could not determine this host's own network namespace: ${hostNetNs.error?.message ?? `readlink exited ${hostNetNs.status}`}`);
|
|
209
|
+
}
|
|
210
|
+
const hostNetNsId = String(hostNetNs.stdout ?? '').trim();
|
|
211
|
+
if (!hostNetNsId) {
|
|
212
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult('host network namespace lookup returned no output');
|
|
213
|
+
}
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
// A disposable scratch directory stands in for a real worktree/output
|
|
216
|
+
// directory, exercising the exact same `ReadOnlyPaths=/`+`ReadWritePaths=`
|
|
217
|
+
// pair `buildVerificationExtraProperties` builds for a real check — so
|
|
218
|
+
// this probe measures the real mechanism, not a simplified stand-in.
|
|
219
|
+
//
|
|
220
|
+
// Uniqueness note: `process.pid` is identical across Vitest worker
|
|
221
|
+
// THREADS (they share one OS process), so two test files running
|
|
222
|
+
// concurrent live probes with `${process.pid}`-only escape-sentinel
|
|
223
|
+
// names raced each other's writes/cleanup of the SAME host path — one
|
|
224
|
+
// probe's cleanup could delete another concurrent probe's still-pending
|
|
225
|
+
// sentinel, producing a flaky "enforced" reading for `writeConfinement`/
|
|
226
|
+
// `tmpWriteConfinement` that depends on nothing but scheduling luck.
|
|
227
|
+
// `mkdtempSync` already gives the scratch directory a unique name; the
|
|
228
|
+
// escape-sentinel filenames and the systemd unit name get an explicit
|
|
229
|
+
// random suffix for the same reason a `systemd-run --unit=` name must
|
|
230
|
+
// also never collide across concurrent probes.
|
|
231
|
+
const probeNonce = `${process.pid}-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
|
|
232
|
+
const scratchDir = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), 'aiwg-verify-probe-scratch-'));
|
|
233
|
+
const escapeOutsideScratchButInTmp = path.join(tmpdir(), `aiwg-verify-probe-tmp-escape-${probeNonce}`);
|
|
234
|
+
const escapeInVarTmp = path.join('/var/tmp', `aiwg-verify-probe-vartmp-escape-${probeNonce}`);
|
|
235
|
+
const escapeInHome = path.join(homedir(), `.aiwg-verify-probe-home-escape-${probeNonce}`);
|
|
236
|
+
rmSync(escapeOutsideScratchButInTmp, { force: true });
|
|
237
|
+
rmSync(escapeInVarTmp, { force: true });
|
|
238
|
+
rmSync(escapeInHome, { force: true });
|
|
239
|
+
|
|
240
|
+
const cleanupScratchFixtures = () => {
|
|
241
|
+
try { rmSync(scratchDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
|
|
242
|
+
try { rmSync(escapeOutsideScratchButInTmp, { force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
|
|
243
|
+
try { rmSync(escapeInVarTmp, { force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
|
|
244
|
+
try { rmSync(escapeInHome, { force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
|
|
245
|
+
};
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
const unit = `aiwg-verify-isolation-probe-${probeNonce}`;
|
|
248
|
+
// B1: the probe no longer deletes its own /tmp marker from INSIDE the
|
|
249
|
+
// unit (`rm -f "$MARK"` used to run before the conductor ever looked at
|
|
250
|
+
// it, which meant the marker was always gone by the time the degraded
|
|
251
|
+
// check below ran — a host where PrivateTmp is degraded and the write
|
|
252
|
+
// landed on the REAL /tmp would still read back "enforced" because the
|
|
253
|
+
// unit had already erased the only evidence of its own failure). Cleanup
|
|
254
|
+
// of any marker that DID leak onto the real host /tmp now happens only
|
|
255
|
+
// from OUTSIDE, after the unit has exited, by this function itself.
|
|
256
|
+
const argv = ['systemd-run', '--user', '--pipe', '--wait', '--quiet', `--unit=${unit}`,
|
|
257
|
+
'-p', 'NoNewPrivileges=yes', '-p', 'ProtectHome=tmpfs', '-p', 'PrivateTmp=yes',
|
|
258
|
+
'-p', 'PrivateUsers=yes', '-p', 'PrivateNetwork=yes',
|
|
259
|
+
// BindPaths= keeps the granted directory visible through ProtectHome=tmpfs/PrivateTmp=yes;
|
|
260
|
+
// without it an enforcing host fails the unit with 226/NAMESPACE (noodle, #4128).
|
|
261
|
+
'-p', 'ReadOnlyPaths=/', '-p', `BindPaths=${scratchDir}`, '-p', `ReadWritePaths=${scratchDir}`,
|
|
262
|
+
'--', '/bin/sh', '-c',
|
|
263
|
+
'echo NONEWPRIVS:$(grep -c "NoNewPrivs:\\s1" /proc/self/status);' +
|
|
264
|
+
'echo NETNS:$(readlink /proc/self/ns/net);' +
|
|
265
|
+
'echo HOMECOUNT:$(ls -A "$HOME" 2>/dev/null | wc -l);' +
|
|
266
|
+
'MARK=/tmp/aiwg-verify-probe-$$; echo x > "$MARK" 2>/dev/null; echo TMPMARK:$MARK;' +
|
|
267
|
+
`(echo x > '${scratchDir}/ok') 2>/dev/null; echo SCRATCHWRITE:$?;` +
|
|
268
|
+
`(echo x > '${escapeOutsideScratchButInTmp}') 2>/dev/null; echo TMPWRITE:$?;` +
|
|
269
|
+
`(echo x > '${escapeInVarTmp}') 2>/dev/null; echo VARTMPWRITE:$?;` +
|
|
270
|
+
`(echo x > '${escapeInHome}') 2>/dev/null; echo HOMEWRITE:$?;` +
|
|
271
|
+
'echo DONE:1'];
|
|
272
|
+
|
|
273
|
+
let result;
|
|
274
|
+
try {
|
|
275
|
+
result = runProbeUnit({ spawn, argv });
|
|
276
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
277
|
+
cleanupScratchFixtures();
|
|
278
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult(`probe unit could not be spawned: ${error.message}`);
|
|
279
|
+
}
|
|
280
|
+
// B1: a spawn-level error, timeout (ETIMEDOUT leaves `status: null`), or
|
|
281
|
+
// non-zero exit means we got nothing trustworthy -- never parse partial
|
|
282
|
+
// stdout from a probe that did not cleanly finish.
|
|
283
|
+
if (result.error || result.status !== 0) {
|
|
284
|
+
cleanupScratchFixtures();
|
|
285
|
+
const reason = result.error
|
|
286
|
+
? `probe unit failed to run: ${result.error.code ?? result.error.message}`
|
|
287
|
+
: `probe unit exited ${result.status}`;
|
|
288
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult(reason);
|
|
289
|
+
}
|
|
290
|
+
|
|
291
|
+
const stdout = String(result.stdout ?? '');
|
|
292
|
+
const fields = {};
|
|
293
|
+
for (const line of stdout.split('\n')) {
|
|
294
|
+
const index = line.indexOf(':');
|
|
295
|
+
if (index === -1) continue;
|
|
296
|
+
fields[line.slice(0, index)] = line.slice(index + 1);
|
|
297
|
+
}
|
|
298
|
+
|
|
299
|
+
// B1: a timed-out or otherwise truncated probe can still exit 0 with
|
|
300
|
+
// partial output (e.g. the pipe closed mid-write); require every expected
|
|
301
|
+
// field to be present before trusting ANY of them, rather than letting
|
|
302
|
+
// missing fields silently default into "enforced" one at a time.
|
|
303
|
+
const missingFields = PROBE_REQUIRED_FIELDS.filter(name => fields[name] === undefined);
|
|
304
|
+
if (missingFields.length > 0) {
|
|
305
|
+
cleanupScratchFixtures();
|
|
306
|
+
return fullyDegradedResult(`probe output incomplete (missing: ${missingFields.join(', ')}); refusing to trust a partial probe`);
|
|
307
|
+
}
|
|
308
|
+
|
|
309
|
+
const degraded = [];
|
|
310
|
+
const noNewPrivileges = fields.NONEWPRIVS === '1' ? 'enforced' : 'degraded';
|
|
311
|
+
if (noNewPrivileges === 'degraded') degraded.push({ capability: 'noNewPrivileges', reason: 'NoNewPrivs was not set to 1 inside the probe unit' });
|
|
312
|
+
|
|
313
|
+
// B1: network isolation is positively shown by (a) the probe having
|
|
314
|
+
// positively confirmed it ran to completion (the DONE marker, checked
|
|
315
|
+
// above as part of "every field present") and (b) the probe's own
|
|
316
|
+
// reported namespace id actually differing from the HOST's own id, which
|
|
317
|
+
// was independently resolved (and error-checked) above.
|
|
318
|
+
const networkIsolation = fields.NETNS !== hostNetNsId ? 'enforced' : 'degraded';
|
|
319
|
+
if (networkIsolation === 'degraded') degraded.push({ capability: 'networkIsolation', reason: `PrivateNetwork=yes did not change the net namespace (host: ${hostNetNsId}, probe: ${fields.NETNS}); this host's AppArmor policy denies the CAP_SYS_ADMIN unprivileged-userns needs to create one` });
|
|
320
|
+
|
|
321
|
+
// A real $HOME is never empty on a developer/CI host; ProtectHome=tmpfs
|
|
322
|
+
// enforced would make it 0 (a fresh empty tmpfs). Any positive count means
|
|
323
|
+
// the real HOME directory is still visible.
|
|
324
|
+
const homeCount = Number(fields.HOMECOUNT);
|
|
325
|
+
const homeReadIsolation = Number.isFinite(homeCount) && homeCount === 0 ? 'enforced' : 'degraded';
|
|
326
|
+
if (homeReadIsolation === 'degraded') degraded.push({ capability: 'homeReadIsolation', reason: `ProtectHome=tmpfs did not hide $HOME (still ${fields.HOMECOUNT ?? 'unknown'} entries visible); same AppArmor unprivileged-userns restriction` });
|
|
327
|
+
|
|
328
|
+
// B1: PrivateTmp enforced is now positively demonstrated from OUTSIDE,
|
|
329
|
+
// after the unit has exited: the marker the probe wrote under its own
|
|
330
|
+
// /tmp must be ABSENT from the real host /tmp. The unit no longer deletes
|
|
331
|
+
// it itself (see argv comment above), so this is the first and only
|
|
332
|
+
// place it is removed.
|
|
333
|
+
const tmpMarkerPath = fields.TMPMARK;
|
|
334
|
+
const tmpMarkerLeaked = existsSync(tmpMarkerPath);
|
|
335
|
+
const tmpIsolation = tmpMarkerLeaked ? 'degraded' : 'enforced';
|
|
336
|
+
if (tmpMarkerLeaked) {
|
|
337
|
+
degraded.push({ capability: 'tmpIsolation', reason: 'PrivateTmp=yes did not isolate /tmp: the probe\'s own tmp marker was visible on the real host /tmp after the unit exited' });
|
|
338
|
+
try { rmSync(tmpMarkerPath, { force: true }); } catch { /* best effort cleanup of the leaked marker */ }
|
|
339
|
+
}
|
|
340
|
+
|
|
341
|
+
// ProtectHome/PrivateTmp hide their trees; ReadOnlyPaths=/ leaves other reads visible.
|
|
342
|
+
const arbitraryPathReadIsolation = 'degraded';
|
|
343
|
+
degraded.push({ capability: 'arbitraryPathReadIsolation', reason: 'the verification profile does not confine reads to the worktree and output directory: ProtectHome/PrivateTmp hide only home and temporary paths, and ReadOnlyPaths=/ prevents writes but leaves other readable host paths accessible' });
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
345
|
+
// B1: writeConfinement is positively demonstrated from OUTSIDE, after
|
|
346
|
+
// the unit exits, on BOTH sides: the allow-listed scratch write must be
|
|
347
|
+
// observably present (the mechanism actually works, not merely "the
|
|
348
|
+
// shell said exit 0"), and the disallowed $HOME write must be observably
|
|
349
|
+
// ABSENT (not merely "the shell said it failed"). A missing/ambiguous
|
|
350
|
+
// self-reported exit code (`fields.SCRATCHWRITE`/`HOMEWRITE`) is already
|
|
351
|
+
// ruled out above (every field is required to be present), so these are
|
|
352
|
+
// now a secondary corroborating signal, never the sole evidence.
|
|
353
|
+
const scratchWriteLanded = existsSync(path.join(scratchDir, 'ok'));
|
|
354
|
+
const homeWriteLeaked = existsSync(escapeInHome);
|
|
355
|
+
const writeConfinement = (scratchWriteLanded && !homeWriteLeaked) ? 'enforced' : 'degraded';
|
|
356
|
+
if (!scratchWriteLanded) degraded.push({ capability: 'writeConfinement', reason: 'the ReadWritePaths= allow-list itself did not work: the write inside the granted scratch directory was not observed to land (checked from outside the unit)' });
|
|
357
|
+
if (homeWriteLeaked) degraded.push({ capability: 'writeConfinement', reason: 'ReadOnlyPaths=/ did not block a write to an ordinary path outside the allow-list ($HOME): the sentinel was observed to exist after the unit exited' });
|
|
358
|
+
|
|
359
|
+
const tmpWriteLeaked = existsSync(escapeOutsideScratchButInTmp);
|
|
360
|
+
const varTmpWriteLeaked = existsSync(escapeInVarTmp);
|
|
361
|
+
const tmpWriteConfinement = (!tmpWriteLeaked && !varTmpWriteLeaked) ? 'enforced' : 'degraded';
|
|
362
|
+
if (tmpWriteLeaked) degraded.push({ capability: 'tmpWriteConfinement', reason: '/tmp is writable outside the designated worktree/output-directory allow-list regardless of ReadOnlyPaths=/ (systemd exempts /tmp from path-based confinement unless PrivateTmp= is actually functioning, which it is not on this host)' });
|
|
363
|
+
if (varTmpWriteLeaked) degraded.push({ capability: 'tmpWriteConfinement', reason: '/var/tmp is writable outside the designated worktree/output-directory allow-list, for the same reason as /tmp' });
|
|
364
|
+
|
|
365
|
+
cleanupScratchFixtures();
|
|
366
|
+
|
|
367
|
+
cachedCapabilities = {
|
|
368
|
+
mode: 'systemd-unit',
|
|
369
|
+
reason: detected.reason,
|
|
370
|
+
writeConfinement,
|
|
371
|
+
tmpWriteConfinement,
|
|
372
|
+
noNewPrivileges,
|
|
373
|
+
homeReadIsolation,
|
|
374
|
+
tmpIsolation,
|
|
375
|
+
networkIsolation,
|
|
376
|
+
arbitraryPathReadIsolation,
|
|
377
|
+
degraded,
|
|
378
|
+
_probedAt: Date.now(),
|
|
379
|
+
_profileKey: PROBE_PROFILE_KEY,
|
|
380
|
+
};
|
|
381
|
+
return cachedCapabilities;
|
|
382
|
+
}
|
|
383
|
+
|
|
384
|
+
/**
|
|
385
|
+
* Build the extra confinement properties `runConfinedCheck` always requests.
|
|
386
|
+
* B1: a launch requests EXACTLY the property set the live probe just
|
|
387
|
+
* proved — never a fixed list assumed from memory. `NoNewPrivileges=`/
|
|
388
|
+
* `PrivateUsers=` are requested unconditionally because they are pure
|
|
389
|
+
* remounts/uid-map restrictions that can only narrow privilege (never grant
|
|
390
|
+
* it) and are the two properties this host's AppArmor policy does NOT deny
|
|
391
|
+
* (see module doc comment); `ReadOnlyPaths=`/`ReadWritePaths=`,
|
|
392
|
+
* `ProtectHome=tmpfs`, `PrivateTmp=yes`, and `PrivateNetwork=yes` are each
|
|
393
|
+
* included only when `capabilities` shows the matching capability
|
|
394
|
+
* `'enforced'` on THIS host, so a degraded property is never requested as
|
|
395
|
+
* if it worked.
|
|
396
|
+
*/
|
|
397
|
+
export function buildVerificationExtraProperties({ worktreeRootReal, outputDirReal, readWritePaths = [], capabilities } = {}) {
|
|
398
|
+
if (typeof worktreeRootReal !== 'string' || worktreeRootReal.length === 0) {
|
|
399
|
+
throw new Error('buildVerificationExtraProperties requires worktreeRootReal');
|
|
400
|
+
}
|
|
401
|
+
if (!capabilities || typeof capabilities !== 'object') {
|
|
402
|
+
throw new Error('buildVerificationExtraProperties requires the live-probed capabilities, so a launch only requests what this host actually proved');
|
|
403
|
+
}
|
|
404
|
+
const properties = ['NoNewPrivileges=yes', 'PrivateUsers=yes'];
|
|
405
|
+
if (capabilities.writeConfinement === 'enforced') {
|
|
406
|
+
// Bind each granted path into the unit's namespace so it survives ProtectHome=tmpfs and
|
|
407
|
+
// PrivateTmp=yes (worktrees usually live under /home); ReadWritePaths= alone fails there (#4128).
|
|
408
|
+
properties.push('ReadOnlyPaths=/');
|
|
409
|
+
for (const granted of [worktreeRootReal, outputDirReal, ...readWritePaths].filter(Boolean)) {
|
|
410
|
+
properties.push(`BindPaths=${granted}`, `ReadWritePaths=${granted}`);
|
|
411
|
+
}
|
|
412
|
+
}
|
|
413
|
+
if (capabilities.homeReadIsolation === 'enforced') properties.push('ProtectHome=tmpfs');
|
|
414
|
+
if (capabilities.tmpIsolation === 'enforced') properties.push('PrivateTmp=yes');
|
|
415
|
+
if (capabilities.networkIsolation === 'enforced') properties.push('PrivateNetwork=yes');
|
|
416
|
+
return properties;
|
|
417
|
+
}
|
|
418
|
+
|
|
419
|
+
/**
|
|
420
|
+
* Run one check confined through `systemd-run --user` with the properties
|
|
421
|
+
* this host actually enforces, `--pipe --wait` so stdout/stderr/exit code
|
|
422
|
+
* return synchronously exactly like a plain `spawnSync` result.
|
|
423
|
+
*
|
|
424
|
+
* Returns `{ status, stdout, stderr, error, isolation }`. `isolation`
|
|
425
|
+
* carries the mode and the full degraded-capability list from
|
|
426
|
+
* `probeVerificationIsolationCapabilities` on every call — including
|
|
427
|
+
* accepted/passed ones — so a caller can never mistake "the check passed"
|
|
428
|
+
* for "the check was fully isolated."
|
|
429
|
+
*
|
|
430
|
+
* B1: the refusal-by-default gate now covers EVERY capability in
|
|
431
|
+
* `REQUIRED_VERIFICATION_CAPABILITIES` (write confinement, home-read
|
|
432
|
+
* protection, network isolation) — not write confinement alone. When this
|
|
433
|
+
* host cannot even reach a systemd user manager, OR any required
|
|
434
|
+
* capability is not `'enforced'`, the check is refused (`{ status: null,
|
|
435
|
+
* error: {code: 'ISOLATION_UNAVAILABLE'}, isolation }`) unless
|
|
436
|
+
* `allowDegradedIsolation` is the strict boolean `true` — a string
|
|
437
|
+
* `"false"`, `1`, or any other truthy-but-not-literally-`true` value is
|
|
438
|
+
* treated as `false` and still refuses, closing the JS-truthiness gap where
|
|
439
|
+
* `!allowDegradedIsolation` would have let a stray `"false"` string through
|
|
440
|
+
* as if it were an explicit opt-in. Refusing by default here — rather than
|
|
441
|
+
* launching through `systemd-run` anyway and trusting its properties
|
|
442
|
+
* silently no-op into a pass-through — is deliberate: a caller must
|
|
443
|
+
* explicitly accept running genuinely unconfined, never discover it only
|
|
444
|
+
* after reading `isolation.degraded`.
|
|
445
|
+
*/
|
|
446
|
+
export function runConfinedCheck({
|
|
447
|
+
command,
|
|
448
|
+
args = [],
|
|
449
|
+
cwd,
|
|
450
|
+
worktreeRootReal,
|
|
451
|
+
outputDirReal,
|
|
452
|
+
envNames = ['PATH', 'HOME'],
|
|
453
|
+
env = process.env,
|
|
454
|
+
timeoutMs = 60000,
|
|
455
|
+
spawn = spawnSync,
|
|
456
|
+
allowDegradedIsolation = false,
|
|
457
|
+
} = {}) {
|
|
458
|
+
const capabilities = probeVerificationIsolationCapabilities({ spawn });
|
|
459
|
+
const isolation = { mode: capabilities.mode, degraded: capabilities.degraded };
|
|
460
|
+
const missingRequired = missingRequiredCapabilities(capabilities);
|
|
461
|
+
const confinementUnavailable = capabilities.mode !== 'systemd-unit' || missingRequired.length > 0;
|
|
462
|
+
const degradedOptIn = allowDegradedIsolation === true;
|
|
463
|
+
|
|
464
|
+
if (confinementUnavailable) {
|
|
465
|
+
if (!degradedOptIn) {
|
|
466
|
+
const reason = capabilities.mode !== 'systemd-unit'
|
|
467
|
+
? capabilities.reason
|
|
468
|
+
: `required confinement capabilities are not enforced on this host for systemd --user units: ${missingRequired.join(', ')}`;
|
|
469
|
+
return { status: null, stdout: '', stderr: '', error: { code: 'ISOLATION_UNAVAILABLE', message: reason }, isolation };
|
|
470
|
+
}
|
|
471
|
+
// HIGH m2 regression (round 2): a degraded launch has no systemd unit
|
|
472
|
+
// to isolate the environment, so it MUST build its own allowlisted
|
|
473
|
+
// environment and pass it as the child's *entire* environment (the
|
|
474
|
+
// `env` option REPLACES, never merges with, the current process
|
|
475
|
+
// environment — the functional equivalent of `env -i NAME=value ...`,
|
|
476
|
+
// matching `worker-isolation.mjs`'s `launchIsolatedWorker` degraded
|
|
477
|
+
// path). The previous version forwarded `env` (defaulting to
|
|
478
|
+
// `process.env`, the conductor's FULL environment, secrets included)
|
|
479
|
+
// straight into worker-controlled check code — confirmed by an
|
|
480
|
+
// unlisted synthetic secret surviving into the degraded child's
|
|
481
|
+
// environment. Only names present in `envNames` ever cross this
|
|
482
|
+
// boundary now, exactly like the confined (`systemd-unit`) path's own
|
|
483
|
+
// `--setenv=` allowlist.
|
|
484
|
+
const allowedEnv = {};
|
|
485
|
+
for (const name of envNames) {
|
|
486
|
+
const value = env?.[name];
|
|
487
|
+
if (value !== undefined) allowedEnv[name] = value;
|
|
488
|
+
}
|
|
489
|
+
const result = spawn(command, args, { cwd, env: allowedEnv, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: timeoutMs });
|
|
490
|
+
return { ...result, isolation };
|
|
491
|
+
}
|
|
492
|
+
|
|
493
|
+
let managerEnvNames, systemdRun;
|
|
494
|
+
try {
|
|
495
|
+
managerEnvNames = resolveManagerEnvNames({ spawn });
|
|
496
|
+
systemdRun = resolveSystemdRun();
|
|
497
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
498
|
+
return { status: null, stdout: '', stderr: '', error: { code: 'ISOLATION_UNAVAILABLE', message: `unable to resolve the user manager's environment or trusted systemd-run client: ${error.message}` }, isolation };
|
|
499
|
+
}
|
|
500
|
+
|
|
501
|
+
const unit = `aiwg-verify-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
|
|
502
|
+
const extraProperties = buildVerificationExtraProperties({ worktreeRootReal, outputDirReal, capabilities });
|
|
503
|
+
const argv = buildWorkerIsolationArgs({
|
|
504
|
+
unit, memoryMax: '2G', command, args, cwd, env, envNames, managerEnvNames,
|
|
505
|
+
kind: 'unit', extraProperties, pipe: true, wait: true,
|
|
506
|
+
});
|
|
507
|
+
const result = spawn(systemdRun, argv.slice(1), { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: timeoutMs, env: buildSystemdClientEnv({ env, envNames }) });
|
|
508
|
+
return { ...result, isolation };
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export async function resolveWorkerContextProviders({ repoRoot, providers = null
|
|
|
68
68
|
* Ensure a worker workdir carries its CLI's AIWG bootstrap before launch.
|
|
69
69
|
* Resolves the worker CLI to its provider (from the project config, so
|
|
70
70
|
* orchestration CLIs map through the registry), checks presence, and
|
|
71
|
-
* deploys
|
|
71
|
+
* deploys only that provider with project scope when missing. The deploy
|
|
72
72
|
* target is always exactly `workdir` — never anywhere else.
|
|
73
73
|
*
|
|
74
74
|
* Injectable for synthetic tests: `ensureFn` stubs the whole ensure,
|
|
@@ -116,13 +116,13 @@ export async function ensureWorkerContextForLaunch({
|
|
|
116
116
|
);
|
|
117
117
|
}
|
|
118
118
|
const provider = mapped.provider;
|
|
119
|
-
const deployProviders =
|
|
119
|
+
const deployProviders = [provider];
|
|
120
120
|
const ensure = ensureFn ?? (async (opts) => {
|
|
121
121
|
const { ensureWorkerContextBootstrap } = await importImpl(import.meta.url, 'config/worker-context.js');
|
|
122
122
|
return ensureWorkerContextBootstrap(opts);
|
|
123
123
|
});
|
|
124
124
|
const outcome = await ensure({
|
|
125
|
-
workdir, provider, providers: deployProviders, aiwgBin,
|
|
125
|
+
workdir, provider, providers: deployProviders, projectLocal: true, aiwgBin,
|
|
126
126
|
...(statusFn ? { statusFn } : {}),
|
|
127
127
|
...(deployFn ? { deployFn } : {}),
|
|
128
128
|
...(skipWorktreeFn ? { skipWorktreeFn } : {}),
|