@aithos/sdk 0.1.0-alpha.5 → 0.1.0-alpha.51

package/dist/src/auth.d.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,44 @@
 import { type AithosSessionStore } from "./session-store.js";
 import { type AithosKeyStore } from "./key-store.js";
 import { DelegateActor } from "./internal/delegate-state.js";
+import { type SignedEnvelope } from "./internal/envelope.js";
 import { OwnerSigners } from "./internal/owner-signers.js";
 /** Default URL of the Aithos auth backend. */
 export declare const DEFAULT_AUTH_BASE_URL = "https://auth.aithos.be";
+/** Default URL of the Aithos primitives API (publish_identity, publish_ethos_edition, etc.). */
+export declare const DEFAULT_API_BASE_URL = "https://api.aithos.be";
 export interface AithosAuthConfig {
     readonly authBaseUrl?: string;
+    /**
+     * Base URL of the Aithos primitives API (`api.aithos.be`). Used by
+     * {@link AithosAuth.signUp} to bootstrap the user's Ethos via
+     * `aithos.publish_identity` after the auth account is created. Override
+     * for staging or self-hosted deployments. Defaults to
+     * {@link DEFAULT_API_BASE_URL}.
+     */
+    readonly apiBaseUrl?: string;
     readonly fetch?: typeof fetch;
     readonly window?: Pick<Window, "location" | "history">;
     /** Pluggable JWT-session storage. Defaults to {@link defaultSessionStore}. */
     readonly sessionStore?: AithosSessionStore;
     /** Pluggable key persistence. Defaults to {@link defaultKeyStore}. */
     readonly keyStore?: AithosKeyStore;
+    /**
+     * Public client key issued by Aithos for browser callers
+     * (`pk_<env>_<…>`). When set, the custodial endpoints (`signUpCustodial`,
+     * `verifyEmail`, `resendVerificationEmail`) authenticate as this app
+     * by default — the caller no longer has to repeat the key on every
+     * call. The corresponding `allowed_origins` allowlist must include the
+     * current page's origin.
+     *
+     * Safe to ship in the browser bundle: it grants nothing beyond what
+     * a visitor of the app can already do, is gated by Origin on every
+     * call, and is rate-limited per IP by the backend.
+     *
+     * If your app authenticates with a SECRET Bearer API key from a
+     * backend instead, leave this unset and pass `apiKey` per call.
+     */
+    readonly publicKey?: string;
 }
 /**
  * Active Aithos session. Returned by JWT-backed entry points
@@ -54,7 +81,31 @@ export interface DelegateInfo {
     readonly label?: string;
 }
 export interface SignInWithGoogleOptions {
+    /**
+     * Opaque state the consumer app wants to recover after the OAuth
+     * round-trip (e.g. a deep-link to resume on). Echoed back as
+     * `?app_state=` on the final redirect.
+     */
     readonly appState?: string;
+    /**
+     * App id registered in the Aithos `aithos-auth-apps` table. When set
+     * together with {@link returnTo}, the auth backend redirects the
+     * browser to {@link returnTo} (post Google + Aithos sign-in) instead
+     * of the legacy hard-coded `app.aithos.be/auth/callback`.
+     *
+     * The pair is required together: the backend rejects half-presence
+     * with `sso_app_redirect_pair_required`. Use it for any consumer app
+     * other than the canonical `app.aithos.be` (typically your own
+     * domain in prod, `http://localhost:<port>/auth/callback` in dev).
+     */
+    readonly appId?: string;
+    /**
+     * Where the auth backend should 302 the browser back to after a
+     * successful Google sign-in. MUST be on the app's
+     * `allowed_redirect_uris` allowlist (registered with Aithos out of
+     * band; see {@link appId}). Exact-match — wildcards rejected.
+     */
+    readonly returnTo?: string;
 }
 export interface SignInInput {
     readonly email: string;
@@ -71,6 +122,28 @@ export interface SignUpResult {
     readonly recoveryFile: Blob;
     readonly recoveryFilename: string;
 }
+/**
+ * Input to {@link AithosAuth.completeSsoFirstLogin}. The handle is
+ * required (the auth backend pre-generated one from the user's email
+ * local-part, available on the session payload — we re-confirm it
+ * here so the user can edit before commit).
+ */
+export interface CompleteSsoFirstLoginInput {
+    readonly handle: string;
+    readonly displayName?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of {@link AithosAuth.completeSsoFirstLogin}. Returns a recovery
+ * file just like signUp — even though the user authenticated via Google,
+ * the freshly-generated Ed25519 seeds are the only material that can
+ * sign Aithos artifacts; without the recovery file, losing access to
+ * the Google account means losing the ethos forever.
+ */
+export interface CompleteSsoFirstLoginResult {
+    readonly session: AithosSession;
+    readonly recoveryFile: Blob;
+    readonly recoveryFilename: string;
+}
 export interface SignInWithRecoveryInput {
     /** Recovery file as a Blob (browser File input) or already-decoded JSON string. */
     readonly file: Blob | string;
@@ -79,9 +152,196 @@ export interface ImportMandateInput {
     /** Delegate bundle as a Blob or already-decoded JSON string. */
     readonly bundle: Blob | string;
 }
+/**
+ * Input to {@link AithosAuth.inviteCustodial}. Sends an invitation magic link
+ * that carries an opaque payload (typically a delegate bundle) to deliver to
+ * the invitee on accept. Mandate-agnostic: `mandateBundle` may be ANY mandate
+ * (read/write/append/ethos/compute…) — the auth backend stores it verbatim,
+ * bound to a single-use token, and never parses it.
+ *
+ * The app authenticates via `apiKey` (server-only secret) or `publicKey`
+ * (browser-safe, Origin-gated), or the constructor's default `publicKey`.
+ * No user password here — the invitee chooses it when they accept.
+ */
+export interface InviteCustodialInput {
+    readonly apiKey?: string;
+    readonly publicKey?: string;
+    /** Invitee email — receives the magic link. */
+    readonly email: string;
+    /**
+     * The mandate to deliver. Accept the SDK's `MintedMandate.bundle` (Blob),
+     * a JSON string, or a plain bundle object — all normalized to a JSON string.
+     */
+    readonly mandateBundle: Blob | string | Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Token TTL in seconds (backend clamps to its policy). */
+    readonly ttlSeconds?: number;
+    /** Optional display name pre-filled on the pending account. */
+    readonly displayName?: string;
+}
+/** Result of {@link AithosAuth.inviteCustodial}. */
+export interface InviteCustodialResult {
+    readonly status: "invited";
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly mailSent: boolean;
+    readonly mailMessageId?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Input to {@link AithosAuth.acceptInvite}. `email` and `token` come from the
+ * `?email=&token=` query string of the invitation link. `password` is set by
+ * the invitee for a NEW account, or used to authenticate an EXISTING one — so
+ * it's required whenever the user isn't already signed in.
+ */
+export interface AcceptInviteInput {
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly token: string;
+    readonly password?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of {@link AithosAuth.acceptInvite}. The token is consumed, the
+ * session is hydrated (account created or existing one signed in), and the
+ * invited mandate has been imported into the keystore — `delegate` describes
+ * it. Read `delegate.subjectDid` to identify the issuer (e.g. resolve their
+ * public Ethos via `sdk.ethos.of(delegate.subjectDid)`).
+ */
+export interface AcceptInviteResult {
+    readonly status: "signed_in";
+    readonly session: AithosSession;
+    readonly delegate: DelegateInfo;
+    /** True when a new account was provisioned; false when an existing one signed in. */
+    readonly accountCreated: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Input to {@link AithosAuth.signUpCustodial}.
+ *
+ * The caller authenticates as an app via ONE of:
+ *   - `apiKey`     : server-only secret Bearer. Pass from your backend
+ *                    only — never ship it in browser code.
+ *   - `publicKey`  : browser-safe public client key. Safe to embed in
+ *                    the bundle; the backend gates it by Origin and
+ *                    rate-limits by IP.
+ *
+ * If you set `publicKey` on the {@link AithosAuth} constructor, omit
+ * both fields here — the default credential is used.
+ *
+ * The `password` is always required and is chosen by the user (sign-up
+ * no longer auto-generates one). The created account starts as
+ * **pending** (`email_verified=false`); the user must click the
+ * confirmation link sent by SES before {@link signInCustodial} works.
+ */
+export interface CustodialSignUpInput {
+    /** Server-only Bearer secret. Mutually exclusive with `publicKey`. */
+    readonly apiKey?: string;
+    /** Browser-safe public client key. Mutually exclusive with `apiKey`.
+     *  Overrides the constructor's default `publicKey` when provided. */
+    readonly publicKey?: string;
+    /** Email address of the new user. Will receive the verification mail. */
+    readonly email: string;
+    /** Raw password the user chose. ≥ 10 chars, mix of letters with
+     *  ≥ 1 digit or symbol. Enforced server-side. */
+    readonly password: string;
+    /** Optional display name. Capped at 200 chars by the backend. */
+    readonly displayName?: string;
+    /** Optional handle hint. Backend may sanitise or replace. */
+    readonly handleHint?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of {@link AithosAuth.signUpCustodial}. Always carries
+ * `status: "pending_verification"` — the user must click the link in
+ * their inbox before sign-in works. If `mailSent` is false the row
+ * exists in DDB anyway; trigger {@link AithosAuth.resendVerificationEmail}
+ * to retry the SES send.
+ */
+export interface CustodialSignUpResult {
+    readonly status: "pending_verification";
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly mailSent: boolean;
+    readonly mailMessageId?: string;
+}
+/** Input to {@link AithosAuth.verifyEmail}. Both fields come straight
+ *  out of the `?email=&token=` query string of the confirmation URL. */
+export interface VerifyEmailInput {
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly token: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of {@link AithosAuth.verifyEmail}. Discriminated by `status`.
+ *
+ *  - `"signed_in"` (magic-link mode): the user has been authenticated
+ *    in this call. A JWT session is persisted to the session store and
+ *    the local keystore is hydrated with the unwrapped seed bundle.
+ *    The caller can navigate the user straight to a logged-in area.
+ *  - `"already_verified"`: the verification link had already been
+ *    consumed on a previous click. No session is minted (the token is
+ *    spent). The caller should route the user to the sign-in form.
+ */
+export type VerifyEmailResult = {
+    readonly status: "signed_in";
+    readonly session: AithosSession;
+    readonly passwordMustChange: false;
+} | {
+    readonly status: "already_verified";
+    readonly email: string;
+};
+/** Input to {@link AithosAuth.resendVerificationEmail}. The `email` is
+ *  required; credential overrides follow the same rules as
+ *  {@link CustodialSignUpInput}. */
+export interface ResendVerificationInput {
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly apiKey?: string;
+    readonly publicKey?: string;
+}
+export interface CustodialSignInInput {
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly password: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Active custodial session. Same JWT-backed shape as {@link AithosSession}
+ * but adds a `passwordMustChange` flag the UI can honour to nudge the
+ * user toward a `requestPasswordReset` on first login.
+ */
+export interface CustodialSignInResult {
+    readonly session: AithosSession;
+    readonly passwordMustChange: boolean;
+}
+export interface RequestPasswordResetInput {
+    readonly email: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Input to {@link AithosAuth.applyPasswordReset}. Finalises a password
+ * reset started by {@link AithosAuth.requestPasswordReset}. The `email`
+ * and `token` come straight from the magic-link URL that landed in the
+ * user's inbox (`?email=…&token=…`); the `newPassword` is what the user
+ * just typed in the reset page.
+ */
+export interface ApplyPasswordResetInput {
+    /** Email address whose password is being reset. */
+    readonly email: string;
+    /** Raw reset token extracted from the magic-link URL query string. */
+    readonly token: string;
+    /** New password — must satisfy the backend's policy (≥ 10 chars). */
+    readonly newPassword: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of {@link AithosAuth.applyPasswordReset}. Carries a fresh JWT
+ * session so the UI can either redirect to a "you're now signed in"
+ * landing or prompt the user to sign in explicitly with their new
+ * credentials — same {@link CustodialSignInResult} shape as a normal
+ * sign-in.
+ *
+ * Note: unlike {@link signInCustodial}, this DOES NOT hydrate the local
+ * keystore. The reset path on the auth Lambda re-wraps the seed bundle
+ * with KMS but doesn't return it (the user just typed a password — they
+ * still need to sign in once to materialise the seeds locally). The
+ * {@link AithosSession} returned here lets the app store the JWT and
+ * call {@link signInCustodial} to complete hydration.
+ */
+export interface ApplyPasswordResetResult {
+    readonly session: AithosSession;
+}
 export declare class AithosAuth {
     #private;
     readonly authBaseUrl: string;
+    readonly apiBaseUrl: string;
     constructor(config?: AithosAuthConfig);
     /**
      * Reload signing material and JWT session from the configured stores.
@@ -103,6 +363,70 @@ export declare class AithosAuth {
     getOwnerInfo(): OwnerInfo | null;
     getDelegates(): readonly DelegateInfo[];
     canSignAsOwner(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Sign an envelope (spec §11.2) as the active owner, to authenticate
+     * a call to a third-party Aithos-aware backend.
+     *
+     * Same primitive that SDK namespaces (`sdk.data`, `sdk.ethos`,
+     * `sdk.mandates`, ...) use internally to sign their own writes to
+     * `api.aithos.be`. Exposed here so apps can sign envelopes for their
+     * own backends — any service that verifies a `SignedEnvelope` per
+     * spec §11.2 (typically using `@aithos/protocol-core/envelope`'s
+     * `verifyEnvelope`) accepts the resulting object.
+     *
+     * The envelope binds the signature to `(iss, aud, method,
+     * params_hash, nonce, iat, exp)`, so it cannot be replayed against a
+     * different endpoint, method, or payload, and expires after
+     * `ttlSeconds` (default 60s, server-side typically caps at 300s).
+     *
+     * Usage:
+     *
+     * ```ts
+     * const envelope = await sdk.auth.signEnvelope({
+     *   aud: "https://api.example.com/v1/widgets",
+     *   method: "myapp.widgets.create",
+     *   params: { name: "Widget #1" },
+     * });
+     * await fetch("https://api.example.com/v1/widgets", {
+     *   method: "POST",
+     *   headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+     *   body: JSON.stringify({ ...payload, _envelope: envelope }),
+     * });
+     * ```
+     *
+     * @throws {AithosSDKError} `auth_not_signed_in` if no owner identity
+     *   is loaded (call `signIn` / `signUp` / `signInCustodial` first).
+     * @throws {AithosSDKError} `auth_invalid_sphere` if `sphere` is not
+     *   one of `"root" | "public" | "circle" | "self"`.
+     */
+    signEnvelope(args: {
+        /**
+         * Absolute URL of the target endpoint (scheme + host + path, no
+         * query, no fragment). The receiving server rejects the envelope if
+         * `aud` does not match the actual request URL.
+         */
+        readonly aud: string;
+        /** Fully-qualified JSON-RPC method name. */
+        readonly method: string;
+        /**
+         * Tool payload — what `params_hash` commits to. Will be
+         * JCS-canonicalized (RFC 8785 subset) before hashing, so JS object
+         * key order does not affect the result.
+         */
+        readonly params: unknown;
+        /**
+         * Which of the owner's four sphere keys signs. Default: `"public"`,
+         * which matches what SDK namespaces use for everyday writes.
+         * Choose `"root"`, `"circle"`, or `"self"` only if the receiving
+         * server specifically expects one of those (rare).
+         */
+        readonly sphere?: "root" | "public" | "circle" | "self";
+        /**
+         * Envelope lifetime in seconds. Default 60. Aithos servers cap
+         * at 300; third-party servers may apply their own cap.
+         */
+        readonly ttlSeconds?: number;
+    }): Promise<SignedEnvelope>;
     canSignAsDelegateFor(did: string): boolean;
     /**
      * Internal accessor used by sibling SDK namespaces (compute, wallet,
@@ -124,6 +448,42 @@ export declare class AithosAuth {
      * @internal
      */
     _findDelegateForSubject(did: string): DelegateActor | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Sign in with email + password, dispatching automatically between
+     * the legacy zero-knowledge flow ({@link signIn}) and the custodial
+     * flow ({@link signInCustodial}) based on which mode the account
+     * was provisioned with.
+     *
+     * Use this in apps that want a single sign-in form for users who
+     * may have been created under either mode (e.g. an app that's
+     * migrating from zk to custodial — pre-existing users stay zk
+     * forever, new ones go custodial, the SDK figures it out).
+     *
+     * Strategy: try {@link signInCustodial} first (the modern path).
+     * If the backend reports `auth_invalid_credentials` — which it
+     * uniformly returns for "wrong password", "unknown user", AND
+     * "user exists but not in custodial mode" (anti-enum) — fall
+     * back to {@link signIn} (zk).
+     *
+     * Other failure modes from the custodial path are NOT swallowed:
+     *   - `auth_email_not_verified` → propagate (user is custodial but
+     *     hasn't clicked the confirmation link yet; the app should
+     *     surface a "resend mail" CTA rather than retrying as zk,
+     *     which would also fail and mask the real cause)
+     *   - server / network errors → propagate (don't double the
+     *     incident by retrying through the other flow)
+     *
+     * Latency profile:
+     *   - Pure custodial (success or wrong pwd) : 1 round-trip
+     *   - Pure zk (any outcome)                 : 1 custodial probe + 2 zk
+     *   - Unknown email                         : same as zk worst case
+     *
+     * Anti-enum note: timing slightly leaks the mode (custodial path is
+     * faster than zk). Acceptable for V1 — rate limiting + strong
+     * passwords are the real defenses. A future strict-anti-enum mode
+     * could race both paths in parallel and accept the 2x backend load.
+     */
+    signInAuto(input: SignInInput): Promise<AithosSession>;
     signIn(input: SignInInput): Promise<AithosSession>;
     signUp(input: SignUpInput): Promise<SignUpResult>;
     /**
@@ -148,8 +508,191 @@ export declare class AithosAuth {
     importMandate(input: ImportMandateInput): Promise<DelegateInfo>;
     removeMandate(mandateId: string): Promise<void>;
     signInWithGoogle(opts?: SignInWithGoogleOptions): never;
+    /**
+     * Public entrypoint — dedupes concurrent calls (React StrictMode).
+     * The first call kicks off the actual exchange; subsequent calls
+     * before that promise resolves return the SAME promise so they all
+     * receive the same `AithosSession | null`. Otherwise StrictMode's
+     * second invocation would race against the URL clean done by the
+     * first call and resolve to `null`, robbing the AuthCallback page
+     * of the session it actually obtained.
+     */
     handleCallback(): Promise<AithosSession | null>;
     exchange(aithosCode: string): Promise<AithosSession>;
+    /**
+     * Finish the first-time Google SSO bootstrap. After
+     * `signInWithGoogle()` + `handleCallback()`, a brand-new SSO user has
+     * a session JWT and an `enc_key` released by the auth backend, but
+     * NO Aithos identity yet (no Ed25519 seeds, no published did.json,
+     * no blob in the auth vault). This method closes that gap:
+     *
+     *   1. Generates a fresh {@link BrowserIdentity} client-side (4
+     *      Ed25519 keypairs, derived DID).
+     *   2. Calls `aithos.publish_identity` on api.aithos.be so reads
+     *      and writes against the Aithos primitives have an ethos to
+     *      anchor to.
+     *   3. AES-GCM-encrypts the seeds with the session's `enc_key`,
+     *      PUTs the result to `/auth/blob`. From now on, every Google
+     *      sign-in for this user will receive the encrypted blob and
+     *      hydrate locally.
+     *   4. Hydrates `ownerSigners` + `keyStore` so `canSignAsOwner()`
+     *      flips to true.
+     *   5. Returns a recovery-file Blob — the only material that can
+     *      restore this ethos if Google access is lost.
+     *
+     * Preconditions:
+     *   - `getCurrentSession()` returns a non-null session (caller went
+     *     through `handleCallback()` already).
+     *   - The session's `blob_version` is 0 (i.e. no blob yet).
+     *   - The session's `enc_key_b64` is non-empty.
+     *
+     * Throws `AithosSDKError("auth_sso_no_pending_first_login", …)` if
+     * preconditions don't hold (e.g. blob_version > 0 means the user has
+     * already completed setup; nothing to do).
+     */
+    completeSsoFirstLogin(input: CompleteSsoFirstLoginInput): Promise<CompleteSsoFirstLoginResult>;
+    /**
+     * Provision a custodial-mode account on behalf of a registered app.
+     *
+     * Two integration patterns:
+     *   - **Frontend-only** apps : set `publicKey` on the constructor
+     *     (or on this call). Safe to ship in browser bundles — the
+     *     backend gates each request by Origin + IP rate limit.
+     *   - **Backend-fronted** apps : the backend passes `apiKey` (secret
+     *     Bearer); the browser never sees the credential.
+     *
+     * The created account is in a *pending* state — sign-in stays blocked
+     * until the user clicks the confirmation link sent to their inbox.
+     * Call {@link verifyEmail} from the page mounted on
+     * `app.verify_base_url` to consume the token; afterwards
+     * {@link signInCustodial} works.
+     *
+     * Errors map to `AithosSDKError` codes:
+     *   - `auth_missing_api_key`         (no credential provided)
+     *   - `auth_invalid_api_key`         (Bearer rejected by backend)
+     *   - `auth_invalid_public_key`      (public key rejected by backend)
+     *   - `auth_api_key_revoked` / `auth_public_key_revoked`
+     *   - `auth_origin_not_allowed`      (public key + Origin not in allowlist)
+     *   - `auth_password_too_weak`       (400 — server-side strength check)
+     *   - `auth_email_exists`            (409 — email already registered)
+     *   - `auth_email_invalid`           (400 — bad email format)
+     *   - `auth_mail_send_failed`        (502 — DDB row exists but SES failed)
+     *   - `auth_custodial_signup_failed` (catch-all)
+     */
+    signUpCustodial(input: CustodialSignUpInput): Promise<CustodialSignUpResult>;
+    /**
+     * Magic-link auto-signin: consume the verification token from the
+     * confirmation link, KMS-unwrap the seed bundle server-side, and
+     * hydrate the local session + keystore in one round-trip.
+     *
+     * Outcome depends on the link's state:
+     *   - First click on a fresh link → returns
+     *     `{ status: "signed_in", session, … }`. The session store is
+     *     populated, the owner signers are loaded — the user is signed
+     *     in. The caller should navigate them to a logged-in route.
+     *   - Click of an already-consumed link → returns
+     *     `{ status: "already_verified", email }`. No session is minted;
+     *     the user must sign in via {@link signInCustodial}.
+     *
+     * Mount this on the page declared as `verify_base_url` in your app's
+     * registration. Read `email` + `token` from `window.location.search`,
+     * call this, branch on `result.status`.
+     *
+     * Throws `auth_token_invalid_or_expired` if the token is wrong or
+     * past its 1h TTL — surface a "request a fresh link" CTA in that case.
+     */
+    verifyEmail(input: VerifyEmailInput): Promise<VerifyEmailResult>;
+    /**
+     * Send an invitation magic link carrying a mandate. The issuer (owner)
+     * mints any mandate via {@link AithosSDK.mandates} (read/write/append/…),
+     * then calls this with the bundle: the auth backend stores it bound to a
+     * single-use token and emails the magic link. The mandate (and its delegate
+     * seed) never ride the email URL. The invitee redeems it via
+     * {@link acceptInvite}.
+     *
+     * Generic — knows nothing about the mandate's scope. Authenticate with
+     * `apiKey` (server) or `publicKey` (browser, Origin-gated).
+     */
+    inviteCustodial(input: InviteCustodialInput): Promise<InviteCustodialResult>;
+    /**
+     * Redeem an invitation from the magic link: consume the token, sign in
+     * (create the account with `password`, or authenticate an existing one),
+     * and AUTO-IMPORT the mandate the inviter attached. Returns the session and
+     * the imported {@link DelegateInfo}.
+     *
+     * Mount this on the page declared as the invitation's verify/redirect URL;
+     * read `email` + `token` from `window.location.search`, collect the
+     * `password`, call this.
+     *
+     * Throws `auth_token_invalid_or_expired` (bad/consumed/expired token) or an
+     * auth error if an existing account's password is wrong / a new one is weak.
+     */
+    acceptInvite(input: AcceptInviteInput): Promise<AcceptInviteResult>;
+    /**
+     * Re-send the verification mail for a pending account. Use when the
+     * user reports never having received the welcome mail, or when their
+     * verification token expired (24h TTL).
+     *
+     * The backend is anti-enumeration (always 200) and rate-limited
+     * 1/h/account, so it's safe to call even when the state of `email`
+     * is unknown. Accepts the same credential families as
+     * {@link signUpCustodial}; falls back to the constructor's
+     * `publicKey` when neither override is set.
+     */
+    resendVerificationEmail(input: ResendVerificationInput): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Authenticate a custodial-mode user with email + password. Single
+     * round-trip: returns a fresh JWT session AND hydrates the local
+     * KeyStore with the user's 4 Ed25519 seeds (KMS-unwrapped server-side
+     * after Argon2id verify).
+     *
+     * After this returns, the SDK is ready to publish ethos editions,
+     * invoke compute, mint mandates, etc. — exactly as if the user had
+     * signed in via {@link signIn} (zk) or {@link handleCallback} (SSO).
+     *
+     * Errors map to `AithosSDKError` codes:
+     *   - `auth_invalid_input`        (your code passed empty fields)
+     *   - `auth_invalid_credentials`  (401 — wrong email / wrong password)
+     *   - `auth_wrong_auth_mode`      (403 — user exists in another flow)
+     */
+    signInCustodial(input: CustodialSignInInput): Promise<CustodialSignInResult>;
+    /**
+     * Trigger a password-reset email to the given address. Backend ALWAYS
+     * resolves silently (no enumeration) — caller cannot tell whether the
+     * email is registered or not. The mail itself, if sent, contains a
+     * magic-link URL of shape `<resetBaseUrl>?token=<raw>&email=<email>`.
+     *
+     * Per-email rate limits apply server-side (5 mails/day, 5 min cooldown
+     * between consecutive requests). Calls during cooldown silently no-op
+     * the mail send while still returning success here.
+     */
+    requestPasswordReset(input: RequestPasswordResetInput): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Finalise a password reset using the magic-link token sent to the
+     * user's inbox by {@link requestPasswordReset}.
+     *
+     * Typical use site: the page mounted on the reset URL declared in
+     * `aithos-auth-apps.reset_base_url`. The page reads `email` and
+     * `token` from `window.location.search`, prompts the user for a new
+     * password, then calls this method.
+     *
+     * On success, the returned {@link AithosSession} is persisted to the
+     * session store but the local keystore is NOT hydrated — the backend
+     * does not return the seed bundle on this endpoint. To get a fully
+     * usable session (one that can sign envelopes), follow up with
+     * {@link signInCustodial} using the email + new password. The two
+     * round-trips can be hidden inside a single UI action: reset → auto
+     * sign-in → redirect to dashboard.
+     *
+     * Errors map to `AithosSDKError` codes:
+     *   - `auth_invalid_input`              (your code passed empty fields)
+     *   - `auth_reset_token_invalid`        (400 — token forged / wrong email)
+     *   - `auth_reset_token_expired`        (410 — token TTL elapsed)
+     *   - `auth_reset_token_consumed`       (409 — already used)
+     *   - `auth_password_too_short`         (400 — < 10 chars)
+     *   - `auth_custodial_reset_failed`     (catch-all)
+     */
+    applyPasswordReset(input: ApplyPasswordResetInput): Promise<ApplyPasswordResetResult>;
     signOut(): Promise<void>;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=auth.d.ts.map