@ait-co/devtools 0.1.88 → 0.1.90

package/dist/{chii-relay-BzUf0LH3.cjs → chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs}

@@ -224,14 +224,28 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 	};
 	if (verifyAuth) httpServer.on("request", (req, res) => {
 		const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
-		if (rewritten === null) return;
-		req.url = rewritten;
-		if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
-			res.statusCode = 401;
-			res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
-			res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
-			res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
-			notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+		if (rewritten !== null) {
+			req.url = rewritten;
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+			}
+			return;
+		}
+		const pathname = (req.url ?? "").split("?")[0];
+		if (pathname === "/targets" || pathname === "/targets/") {
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+				return;
+			}
+			return;
 		}
 	});
 	const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;
@@ -286,4 +300,4 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 //#endregion
 exports.startChiiRelay = startChiiRelay;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-BzUf0LH3.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs.map

package/dist/{chii-relay-BzUf0LH3.cjs.map → chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-BzUf0LH3.cjs","names":["require","WebSocketServer"],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: only the path-prefixed form is ours — the phone\n    // fetches `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue\n    // #466), which must be verified + stripped so chii's Koa static handler\n    // serves `/target.js`. Non-prefixed requests keep today's behaviour\n    // (ungated pass-through to chii).\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten === null) return;\n      req.url = rewritten;\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes.\n        // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n        // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n        // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n        // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n        // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n        res.statusCode = 401;\n        res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n        res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n        notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n      }\n      // Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa 'request' listener (registered below\n      // by chii.start) serves the rewritten URL. (Koa skips writing when an\n      // earlier listener already ended the response, so the 401 path is safe\n      // even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). 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+{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs","names":["require","WebSocketServer"],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). Only ping live sockets.\n        if (client.readyState === 1) {\n          client.ping();\n        }\n      }\n    }, keepaliveIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    port: actualPort,\n    baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,\n    close: () =>\n      new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n        if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {\n          clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);\n          keepaliveHandle = null;\n        }\n        httpServer.close(() => resolve());\n      }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiCA,MAAa,+BAA+B;;;;;;AAO5C,MAAa,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACiCxC,MAAMA,aAAAA,GAAAA,YAAAA,eAAAA,QAAAA,MAAAA,CAAAA,cAAAA,WAAAA,CAAAA,KAAwC;;;;;;;;AAS9C,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;AAsBtC,SAAS,sBAA0D;AACjE,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAeA,UAAQ,kCAAkC;AAC/D,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,WACjB,QAAO;SAEH;AAGR,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBT,eAAe,qBACb,MACA,cACA,cACiC;AACjC,KAAI,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACzB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;AAC9B,SAAO;;CAGT,IAAI,WAAmC;CACvC,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa;CAC3B,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAE5B,OAAM,QAAQ,SAAiC,QAAQ;AACrD,aAAW;AACX,SAAO,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;;AAGzC,KAAI;AACF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;WACtB;AAER,QAAM,QAAQ;;AAGhB,QAAO;;AAcT,SAAS,iBAAmC;CAE1C,MAAM,MAAeA,UAAQ,OAAO;AACpC,KACE,OAAO,QAAQ,YACf,QAAQ,QACR,WAAW,OACX,OAAQ,IAA2B,UAAU,WAE7C,QAAO;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyC9D,SAAgB,oBAAoB,QAA+B;CACjE,MAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,KAAK,OAAO;AAC9D,KAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;CAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;CACnB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,KAAa,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAE1B,QAAO,GAAG,OAAO,QADC,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IACJ,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+E1C,eAAsB,eAAe,UAAiC,EAAE,EAAsB;CAC5F,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACtC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAiB;CACrC,MAAM,sBACJ,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBACR;CAEN,MAAM,cAAA,GAAA,UAAA,eAA2B;CAIjC,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAA6C;AACrE,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAW;AAChC,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;UAChB;;AAiBV,KAAI,WAuBF,YAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;EACrC,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,MAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AAEtB,OAAI,MAAM;AACV,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAMpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;;AAIlC;;EAMF,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAI,aAAa,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAIvD,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAEpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;AAEhC;;AAOF;;GAQF;CAgBJ,MAAM,eAAe,sBAAsB,IAAI,qBAAqB,GAAG;CACvE,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,qBAC5B,gBAAgB,EAChB;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAY,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;EAAiB,MAAM;EAAe,EAC/E,aACD;AAUD,KAAI,YAAY;EACd,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU;AAG5D,aAAW,mBAAmB,UAAU;EAGxC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAIC,GAAAA,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,aAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAsB,QAAgB,SAAiB;GAK/E,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,OAAI,cAAc,KAChB,KAAI,MAAM;AAEZ,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAOpB,cAAU,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAO;AACjD,UAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,yBAAyB;MAChE;AACF,qBAAiB,aAAa;AAE9B;;AAIF,QAAK,MAAM,YAAY,qBACrB,UAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;IAE7B;;CAGJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,SAAiB,SAAS,WAAW;AAChE,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3C,cAAW,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AAG/B,WADa,WAAW,SAAS,CACpB,KAAK;IAClB;GACF;CAYF,IAAI,kBAAyD;AAC7D,KAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,oBAAoB,MAAM;EACvD,MAAM,UAAU;AAChB,oBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAClC,QAAK,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,QAEhC,KAAI,OAAO,eAAe,EACxB,QAAO,MAAM;KAGhB,oBAAoB;;AAGzB,QAAO;EACL,MAAM;EACN,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;EAC3B,aACE,IAAI,SAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,OAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,kBAAc,gBAAgB;AAC9B,sBAAkB;;AAEpB,cAAW,YAAY,SAAS,CAAC;IACjC;EACL"}

package/dist/{chii-relay-BASitNMw.js → chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js}

@@ -224,14 +224,28 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 	};
 	if (verifyAuth) httpServer.on("request", (req, res) => {
 		const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
-		if (rewritten === null) return;
-		req.url = rewritten;
-		if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
-			res.statusCode = 401;
-			res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
-			res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
-			res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
-			notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+		if (rewritten !== null) {
+			req.url = rewritten;
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+			}
+			return;
+		}
+		const pathname = (req.url ?? "").split("?")[0];
+		if (pathname === "/targets" || pathname === "/targets/") {
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+				return;
+			}
+			return;
 		}
 	});
 	const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;
@@ -286,4 +300,4 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 //#endregion
 export { startChiiRelay };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-BASitNMw.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js.map

package/dist/{chii-relay-BASitNMw.js.map → chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-BASitNMw.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: only the path-prefixed form is ours — the phone\n    // fetches `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue\n    // #466), which must be verified + stripped so chii's Koa static handler\n    // serves `/target.js`. Non-prefixed requests keep today's behaviour\n    // (ungated pass-through to chii).\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten === null) return;\n      req.url = rewritten;\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes.\n        // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n        // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n        // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n        // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n        // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n        res.statusCode = 401;\n        res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n        res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n        notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n      }\n      // Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa 'request' listener (registered below\n      // by chii.start) serves the rewritten URL. (Koa skips writing when an\n      // earlier listener already ended the response, so the 401 path is safe\n      // even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). 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+{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). Only ping live sockets.\n        if (client.readyState === 1) {\n          client.ping();\n        }\n      }\n    }, keepaliveIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    port: actualPort,\n    baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,\n    close: () =>\n      new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n        if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {\n          clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);\n          keepaliveHandle = null;\n        }\n        httpServer.close(() => resolve());\n      }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiCA,MAAa,+BAA+B;;;;;;AAO5C,MAAa,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACiCxC,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;;;;;;;;AAS9C,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;AAsBtC,SAAS,sBAA0D;AACjE,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,kCAAkC;AAC/D,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,WACjB,QAAO;SAEH;AAGR,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBT,eAAe,qBACb,MACA,cACA,cACiC;AACjC,KAAI,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACzB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;AAC9B,SAAO;;CAGT,IAAI,WAAmC;CACvC,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa;CAC3B,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAE5B,OAAM,QAAQ,SAAiC,QAAQ;AACrD,aAAW;AACX,SAAO,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;;AAGzC,KAAI;AACF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;WACtB;AAER,QAAM,QAAQ;;AAGhB,QAAO;;AAcT,SAAS,iBAAmC;CAE1C,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,OAAO;AACpC,KACE,OAAO,QAAQ,YACf,QAAQ,QACR,WAAW,OACX,OAAQ,IAA2B,UAAU,WAE7C,QAAO;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyC9D,SAAgB,oBAAoB,QAA+B;CACjE,MAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,KAAK,OAAO;AAC9D,KAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;CAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;CACnB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,KAAa,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAE1B,QAAO,GAAG,OAAO,QADC,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IACJ,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+E1C,eAAsB,eAAe,UAAiC,EAAE,EAAsB;CAC5F,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACtC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAiB;CACrC,MAAM,sBACJ,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBACR;CAEN,MAAM,aAAa,cAAc;CAIjC,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAA6C;AACrE,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAW;AAChC,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;UAChB;;AAiBV,KAAI,WAuBF,YAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;EACrC,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,MAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AAEtB,OAAI,MAAM;AACV,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAMpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;;AAIlC;;EAMF,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAI,aAAa,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAIvD,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAEpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;AAEhC;;AAOF;;GAQF;CAgBJ,MAAM,eAAe,sBAAsB,IAAI,qBAAqB,GAAG;CACvE,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,qBAC5B,gBAAgB,EAChB;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAY,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;EAAiB,MAAM;EAAe,EAC/E,aACD;AAUD,KAAI,YAAY;EACd,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU;AAG5D,aAAW,mBAAmB,UAAU;EAGxC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,aAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAsB,QAAgB,SAAiB;GAK/E,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,OAAI,cAAc,KAChB,KAAI,MAAM;AAEZ,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAOpB,cAAU,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;AACjD,QAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,yBAAyB;MAChE;AACF,qBAAiB,aAAa;AAE9B;;AAIF,QAAK,MAAM,YAAY,qBACrB,UAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;IAE7B;;CAGJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,SAAiB,SAAS,WAAW;AAChE,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3C,cAAW,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AAG/B,WADa,WAAW,SAAS,CACpB,KAAK;IAClB;GACF;CAYF,IAAI,kBAAyD;AAC7D,KAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,oBAAoB,MAAM;EACvD,MAAM,UAAU;AAChB,oBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAClC,QAAK,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,QAEhC,KAAI,OAAO,eAAe,EACxB,QAAO,MAAM;KAGhB,oBAAoB;;AAGzB,QAAO;EACL,MAAM;EACN,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;EAC3B,aACE,IAAI,SAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,OAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,kBAAc,gBAAgB;AAC9B,sBAAkB;;AAEpB,cAAW,YAAY,SAAS,CAAC;IACjC;EACL"}