@ait-co/devtools 0.1.69 → 0.1.70

package/dist/in-app/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runtime activation gate for the in-app debug surface.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"3-layer activation gate\". This is the pure gate decision; the Chii client,\n * WebSocket transport, MCP server, and CLI that consume it live in src/mcp/.\n *\n * This function evaluates the two RUNTIME layers, B and C. Layer A — the\n * build-time gate — is NOT evaluated here, and deliberately so: it is enforced\n * entirely by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }` guard around the\n * import site (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`). `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant; a release consumer build folds it to `false`\n * and dead-code-eliminates the whole import of `@ait-co/devtools/in-app`, so\n * this code is simply absent from release bundles. A pre-built npm package\n * cannot re-check that flag — it was already baked at devtools' own publish\n * time — so any `isDebugBuild` check inside this function would be permanently\n * `false` and could never pass. Layer A is the consumer guard; B and C are\n * here.\n *\n * Layer B has two parts:\n *   B1 — host allowlist: `hostname` must be a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`\n *        subdomain (Toss dogfood entry) OR a `*.trycloudflare.com` host (env 2\n *        PWA dev tunnel). The Toss app serves dogfood / private mini-apps from\n *        a separate `private-apps` host; a production (`intoss://`) entry is\n *        served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` WITHOUT the `private-apps` segment.\n *        This is the security gate against a dogfood build that somehow lands\n *        on a production entry — see the comment on {@link isPrivateAppsHost}.\n *        The env 2 tunnel host is allowed because it has no production runtime\n *        (mock SDK, the developer's own dev server) — see {@link\n *        isTrycloudflareHost}.\n *   B2 — entry query: `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. Applies to\n *        the Toss path only; the env 2 tunnel has no deployed bundle, so B2 is\n *        skipped for `*.trycloudflare.com` hosts.\n *\n * Layer C — opt-in + relay + optional TOTP auth:\n *   C1 — opt-in:       `debug=1` must be present.\n *   C2 — relay URL:    `relay=<wss-url>` must be a valid `wss:` URL.\n *   C3 — TOTP auth:    When `verifyTotpCode` is provided (consumer injected the\n *                      baked secret at build time via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__`),\n *                      `at=<code>` is checked. Invalid or absent code → BLOCKED.\n *                      When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), `at` is\n *                      ignored (backward compatible).\n *\n * Security note on baked secrets:\n *   The TOTP secret baked in via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__` is present in the\n *   dogfood bundle and is extractable by a determined reverse engineer.\n *   The practical bar raised is: \"URL leak\" (Slack paste, QR screenshot) →\n *   blocked; \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP code\" → not blocked.\n *   This is the intended threat model. Do not overpromise on this guarantee.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `verifyTotpCode` is a black-box predicate. This module\n *   does NOT log the secret, any code value, or pass/fail details beyond the\n *   `'auth'` reason enum.\n *\n * Decision matrix (gate only runs in a debug build — Layer A already passed):\n *\n *   host        | _deploymentId | debug=1 | relay ok | TOTP ok* | result\n *   neither     | (any)         | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (host)\n *   private-apps| absent        | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (entry)\n *   private-apps| present       | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH\n *\n *   * \"TOTP ok\" column only applies when `verifyTotpCode` is provided.\n *     When no verifier is injected, TOTP check is skipped entirely.\n *   For trycloudflare (env 2 tunnel) hosts B1 is bypassed and B2 is skipped;\n *   C1/C2/C3 still apply identically. The ATTACH result carries\n *   `deploymentId: ''` for tunnel hosts.\n */\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate allows attachment. */\nexport interface GateResultAttach {\n  readonly attach: true;\n  /** The validated `wss:` relay URL from the `relay` query param. */\n  readonly relayUrl: string;\n  /** The deployment ID extracted from the `_deploymentId` query param. */\n  readonly deploymentId: string;\n}\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate blocks attachment, with a reason code. */\nexport interface GateResultBlocked {\n  readonly attach: false;\n  /**\n   * - `'host'`          Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.\n   * - `'entry'`         Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.\n   * - `'opt-in'`        Layer C1: `debug=1` param is absent.\n   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C2: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.\n   * - `'auth'`          Layer C3: TOTP `at=` code is absent, invalid, or expired\n   *                     (only when a `verifyTotpCode` predicate is injected).\n   *\n   * There is no `'build'` reason: Layer A is enforced by the consumer's\n   * `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard, not by this function.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: `'auth'` is the only value surfaced for auth failures —\n   * no code value, expected value, or secret fragment is ever exposed.\n   */\n  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay' | 'auth';\n}\n\nexport type GateResult = GateResultAttach | GateResultBlocked;\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link evaluateDebugGate}.\n *\n * All fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without\n * touching `window`.\n */\nexport interface GateInput {\n  /**\n   * The host the page is served from — `window.location.hostname`.\n   *\n   * This is the Layer B1 security signal. Why hostname and not the entry\n   * scheme: the Toss SDK normalises `intoss-private://` to `intoss://` in\n   * `getSchemeUri()`, and `getOperationalEnvironment()` / `getWebViewType()`\n   * return the same value (`\"toss\"` / `\"partner\"`) for both dogfood and\n   * production entries — none of them distinguish a dogfood entry. The host\n   * does: a dogfood / private-apps entry is served from\n   * `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`, a production entry is not. This was\n   * confirmed live over CDP against mini-app 31146 (see spec open question 2).\n   */\n  readonly hostname: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The URL search params to inspect for gate signals (Layers B2 and C).\n   *\n   * Prefer `URLSearchParams` so callers can pass `new URLSearchParams(location.search)`\n   * without coupling the pure function to `window`.\n   */\n  readonly searchParams: URLSearchParams;\n\n  /**\n   * Optional TOTP code verifier for Layer C3 auth gate.\n   *\n   * When provided, `evaluateDebugGate` reads the `at` query param and passes\n   * it to this predicate. Return `true` to allow, `false` to block with\n   * `reason: 'auth'`.\n   *\n   * Inject via the consumer's build define, e.g.:\n   * ```ts\n   * // dogfood build entry — consumer's build injects __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__\n   * declare const __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__: string | undefined;\n   * const verifyTotpCode = typeof __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__ !== 'undefined'\n   *   ? (code: string) => verifyTotp(__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__, code)\n   *   : undefined;\n   * maybeAttach(evaluateDebugGate({ ...params, verifyTotpCode }));\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Security note: this predicate is a black-box from the gate's perspective.\n   * The gate only surfaces pass/fail and the `'auth'` reason code — no code\n   * value or secret fragment is ever logged or returned.\n   *\n   * When `undefined` (TOTP disabled), `at=` is silently ignored and the gate\n   * proceeds to ATTACH if all other layers pass.\n   */\n  readonly verifyTotpCode?: (code: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix the Toss app uses to serve dogfood / private mini-apps.\n *\n * A `intoss-private://` (dogfood) entry maps to a host such as\n * `aitc-sdk-example.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n * entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` — the `.private-apps.` segment\n * is absent. Confirmed live over CDP for mini-app 31146; the exact production\n * host is to be re-confirmed once 31146 passes review (spec open question 2).\n */\nconst PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX = '.private-apps.tossmini.com';\n\n/**\n * The host suffix Cloudflare quick-tunnels serve from — the env 2 (PWA) entry.\n * See {@link isTrycloudflareHost} for why this host kind bypasses Layer B1.\n */\nconst TRYCLOUDFLARE_HOST_SUFFIX = '.trycloudflare.com';\n\n/**\n * Returns whether `hostname` is a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` subdomain —\n * the host the Toss app reserves for dogfood / private mini-app entries.\n *\n * The match is an exact suffix check, not a substring `.includes()`: a\n * substring test would also accept an attacker-controlled host like\n * `private-apps.tossmini.com.evil.example`, which ends in `.example`, not in\n * `.tossmini.com`. Requiring the string to END with the suffix closes that.\n * The leading `.` in the suffix also forces a real subdomain label, so a\n * bare `private-apps.tossmini.com` (no mini-app subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isPrivateAppsHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix Cloudflare quick-tunnels use — the env 2 (PWA) entry.\n *\n * Env 2 serves the local Vite dev server through a `*.trycloudflare.com` quick\n * tunnel (`src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`). It has no Toss app, no `intoss-private://`\n * scheme, and — critically — no production runtime: the SDK is the devtools\n * mock, and the page is the developer's own dev build. The Layer B1 safety net\n * (which stops a dogfood build that lands on a Toss *production* host from\n * attaching) has nothing to protect against here, because env 2 has no\n * production host. So a trycloudflare host is allowed past B1 — but ONLY past\n * B1: the remaining layers (C1 opt-in, C2 relay, C3 TOTP) still apply, so a\n * leaked tunnel URL is still blocked by TOTP exactly as on the Toss path.\n *\n * The match is the same exact-suffix `endsWith` check as\n * {@link isPrivateAppsHost} — never a substring `.includes()`, which would\n * accept an attacker-controlled `evil.trycloudflare.com.example.com`. The\n * leading `.` forces a real subdomain label, so a bare `trycloudflare.com`\n * (no tunnel subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isTrycloudflareHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(TRYCLOUDFLARE_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure function that evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C).\n *\n * Has no side effects. The input is explicit. Returns a discriminated union\n * so callers can pattern-match on `result.attach`.\n *\n * Layer A (build-time) is intentionally not evaluated here — see the file-level\n * comment. By the time this function runs, the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)`\n * guard has already passed; this function only decides B and C.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const result = evaluateDebugGate({\n *   hostname: window.location.hostname,\n *   searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n * });\n * if (result.attach) {\n *   // Proceed to load Chii client\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function evaluateDebugGate(input: GateInput): GateResult {\n  // Layer B1 — host allowlist (the security gate).\n  // Two host kinds are allowed past B1:\n  //   - Toss dogfood: `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n  //     entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` and is rejected here. This\n  //     is what stops a dogfood build that somehow reaches a production entry\n  //     from attaching: Layer A keeps debug code out of release bundles, and\n  //     this layer keeps a dogfood bundle that lands on a production host from\n  //     attaching even though its code is present.\n  //   - Env 2 PWA tunnel: `*.trycloudflare.com`. This is the developer's own\n  //     local dev server (mock SDK, no production runtime), so the\n  //     production-entry hazard B1 guards against cannot occur. It bypasses B1\n  //     but NOT the remaining layers — C1/C2/C3 (incl. TOTP) still apply, so a\n  //     leaked tunnel URL is blocked exactly as on the Toss path. See\n  //     {@link isTrycloudflareHost}.\n  const isTunnel = isTrycloudflareHost(input.hostname);\n  if (!isPrivateAppsHost(input.hostname) && !isTunnel) {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'host' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer B2 — runtime entry query gate (Toss path only).\n  // `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. The `intoss-private://`\n  // scheme used for dogfood entries includes this param; general user entry\n  // paths do not. The env 2 tunnel has no deployed bundle and therefore no\n  // `_deploymentId` — B2 is skipped for it, and `deploymentId` is reported as\n  // the empty string on a tunnel attach (no consumer reads it; see attach.ts).\n  let deploymentId = '';\n  if (!isTunnel) {\n    deploymentId = input.searchParams.get('_deploymentId') ?? '';\n    if (deploymentId === '') {\n      return { attach: false, reason: 'entry' };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Layer C — explicit opt-in gate.\n  // Require `debug=1` so that an operator who opens a dogfood URL by accident\n  // does not inadvertently trigger the debug surface.\n  const debugParam = input.searchParams.get('debug');\n  if (debugParam !== '1') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'opt-in' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C continued — relay URL validation.\n  // `relay=<wss-url>` must be present and must use the `wss:` scheme.\n  // Plain `ws:` is rejected (no TLS). `http:`/`https:` are rejected.\n  const relayRaw = input.searchParams.get('relay') ?? '';\n  if (relayRaw === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  let relayUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    relayUrl = new URL(relayRaw);\n  } catch {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  if (relayUrl.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C3 — TOTP auth gate (fail-fast, only when a verifier is injected).\n  // The `at` query param carries the current TOTP code. Absent or invalid code\n  // → BLOCKED. When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), this check is\n  // skipped entirely for backward compatibility.\n  //\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: we do NOT log `code`, the verifier's result, or anything\n  // derived from the secret. Only the `'auth'` enum is surfaced on failure.\n  if (input.verifyTotpCode !== undefined) {\n    const code = input.searchParams.get('at') ?? '';\n    if (!input.verifyTotpCode(code)) {\n      return { attach: false, reason: 'auth' };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { attach: true, relayUrl: relayUrl.href, deploymentId };\n}\n","/**\n * In-app Chii target injection for the debug attach flow.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"MCP attach\" topology section — Phase 1 browser-side implementation.\n *\n * This module bridges the 3-layer gate result to a Chii `target.js` script\n * injection. The Chii npm package is the relay SERVER — the in-app side is\n * a plain `<script src=\"…/target.js\">` pointing at the relay host. No chii\n * npm dependency is needed here.\n */\n\nimport { setScreenAwakeMode } from '@apps-in-toss/web-framework';\nimport { checkDebugGate, type GateResult } from './index.js';\n\n/**\n * Converts a validated `wss:` relay URL into the Chii `target.js` script URL.\n *\n * Scheme is mapped `wss:` → `https:`. Host and port are preserved.\n * Pathname is set to `/target.js` (or `/at/<code>/target.js` when a TOTP code\n * is given) regardless of the relay path. Query params and hash from the\n * relay URL are dropped — the target script URL is a static asset path on the\n * same host.\n *\n * TOTP path-prefix transport (issue #466): chii's stock `target.js` derives\n * its WS endpoint from the script `src` (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js',\n * '')`), so embedding the current TOTP code in the script URL *path* is the\n * only way the phone-side WS upgrade can carry it — both the script fetch and\n * the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` dial inherit the prefix,\n * and the relay verifies + strips it before chii parses the URL. The\n * `window.ChiiServerUrl` + query alternative does NOT work: chii appends\n * `target/<id>` to the serverUrl string, which would land after a `?`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `atCode` rides only inside the returned URL (the intended\n * transport — same exposure grade as the daemon client's `at=` query). It is\n * never logged here.\n *\n * @example\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://abc.trycloudflare.com/relay')\n * // → 'https://abc.trycloudflare.com/target.js'\n *\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://h.example.com:9100/', '123456')\n * // → 'https://h.example.com:9100/at/123456/target.js'\n *\n * @param relayUrl - Validated `wss:` relay URL from the gate result.\n * @param atCode - Current TOTP code from the page URL's `at` query param, or\n *   `null`/`undefined`/`''` to keep the legacy un-prefixed URL.\n */\nexport function deriveTargetScriptUrl(relayUrl: string, atCode?: string | null): string {\n  const u = new URL(relayUrl);\n  u.protocol = 'https:';\n  u.pathname =\n    atCode !== undefined && atCode !== null && atCode !== ''\n      ? `/at/${encodeURIComponent(atCode)}/target.js`\n      : '/target.js';\n  u.search = '';\n  u.hash = '';\n  return u.toString();\n}\n\n/** Module-level guard against double-injection within a page lifecycle. */\nlet attached = false;\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the 3-layer debug gate and, if the gate passes, injects the Chii\n * `target.js` script into `document.head`.\n *\n * Idempotent — calling more than once is safe. The second call is a no-op if\n * a script with the same `src` is already present in the document, and the\n * module-level `attached` flag prevents redundant DOM queries after the first\n * successful injection.\n *\n * Safe to call even if `document` is somehow unavailable (defensive boundary\n * guard — in practice this always runs in a real WebView).\n *\n * **keepAwake side effect**: on a successful attach, `setScreenAwakeMode({\n * enabled: true })` is called so the phone screen stays awake during the debug\n * session. A `beforeunload` handler restores normal sleep on page unload.\n * Opt out by adding `noKeepAwake=1` to the page URL query string — the check\n * reads `window.location.search` directly, consistent with other guards in\n * this file.\n *\n * @param gateResult - Optional pre-evaluated gate result for testability.\n *   Defaults to `checkDebugGate()` which reads the current page URL. Passing a\n *   custom value avoids the need to manipulate `window.location` in tests.\n */\nexport function maybeAttach(gateResult: GateResult = checkDebugGate()): void {\n  if (!gateResult.attach) {\n    console.debug(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] debug attach skipped — gate blocked (reason: ${gateResult.reason})`,\n    );\n    // Defect 2: a wrong/expired TOTP code is the ONLY block reason that is a\n    // user-actionable failure inside a deliberate debug session — the operator\n    // scanned a QR expecting an attach. Surface it to the parent launcher shell\n    // so it can show a \"rescan the QR\" banner. Every other reason\n    // ('host'/'entry'/'opt-in'/'invalid-relay') fires on ordinary non-debug page\n    // loads and must stay silent to avoid a banner on every plain pageview.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the message carries ONLY the 'auth' reason enum — never\n    // the code, secret, host, or relay URL.\n    if (gateResult.reason === 'auth' && typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.parent !== window) {\n      window.parent.postMessage({ type: 'ait:debug-attach-blocked', reason: 'auth' }, '*');\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Guard against double-injection across repeated calls.\n  if (attached) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Defensive: if document is not available (unusual, but possible in some\n  // SSR-adjacent edge cases), bail silently rather than throwing.\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // TOTP path-prefix transport (issue #466): forward the page URL's `at` code\n  // (delivered by the dashboard QR → launcher deep-link) into the target\n  // script URL so the WS upgrade derived from it passes the relay's TOTP\n  // gate. Absent `at` → legacy un-prefixed URL (relay without TOTP, tests).\n  // Read window.location.search directly, consistent with other guards in\n  // this file. SECRET-HANDLING: the code is never logged; it rides only in\n  // the script src (the intended transport).\n  //\n  // TTL note: the code is verified within the relay's ±1-step window (90 s),\n  // so the initial attach always fits. A much-later automatic reconnect by\n  // target.js reuses the stale prefix and is rejected (401) — by design under\n  // the URL-leak threat model; recover by rescanning the QR (the relay-side\n  // auth-reject counter from issue #467 makes this visible).\n  const atCode =\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' ? new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('at') : null;\n\n  const src = deriveTargetScriptUrl(gateResult.relayUrl, atCode);\n\n  // Also guard against a script with the same src already in the DOM\n  // (e.g. injected by a different code path or a page reload within SPA).\n  const existing = document.querySelector<HTMLScriptElement>(`script[src=\"${src}\"]`);\n  if (existing !== null) {\n    attached = true;\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const script = document.createElement('script');\n  script.src = src;\n  script.async = true;\n  (document.head ?? document.documentElement).appendChild(script);\n\n  attached = true;\n\n  // keepAwake — keep phone screen on during the debug session.\n  // Opt out via noKeepAwake=1 in the URL (consistent with direct window reads\n  // used throughout this file).\n  if (\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n    new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('noKeepAwake') === '1'\n  ) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  setScreenAwakeMode({ enabled: true })\n    .then(() => {\n      // Restore normal sleep on page unload — only if the enable call succeeded\n      // (nothing to restore if it failed).\n      window.addEventListener(\n        'beforeunload',\n        () => {\n          setScreenAwakeMode({ enabled: false }).catch(() => {});\n        },\n        { once: true },\n      );\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      // Swallow rejection so attach never breaks — some platforms/mock reject.\n      console.debug('[@ait-co/devtools] setScreenAwakeMode failed:', err);\n    });\n}\n","/**\n * @ait-co/devtools/in-app entry point.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n *\n * Phase 1 — gate + browser-side Chii target injection.\n * WebSocket relay, QR/paste UI, and AI-host MCP bin are later phases that\n * require real-device validation and are not included here.\n *\n * This thin entry reads `window.location` and calls the pure\n * {@link evaluateDebugGate} function. All testable logic lives in `./gate.ts`\n * and `./attach.ts`, not here.\n *\n * Layer A of the activation gate (build-time) is NOT enforced in this module.\n * It is the consumer's responsibility: the consumer wraps its\n * `import('@ait-co/devtools/in-app')` call site in `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }`\n * (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`), where `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant. A release consumer build folds that constant\n * to `false` and dead-code-eliminates this whole module. This package is\n * pre-built and ships with `__DEBUG_BUILD__` already resolved at devtools'\n * publish time, so it could never re-evaluate the consumer's build channel —\n * which is exactly why Layer A lives at the consumer guard, not here.\n */\n\nimport { evaluateDebugGate, type GateResult } from './gate.js';\n\nexport { deriveTargetScriptUrl, maybeAttach } from './attach.js';\nexport type { GateInput, GateResult, GateResultAttach, GateResultBlocked } from './gate.js';\nexport { evaluateDebugGate, isPrivateAppsHost, isTrycloudflareHost } from './gate.js';\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C) against the current\n * page URL.\n *\n * Returns the gate result. Callers can check `result.attach` to decide whether\n * to proceed with debug surface attachment.\n *\n * This function reads `window.location` only — both the hostname (Layer B1\n * host allowlist) and the search params (Layers B2 and C). Layer A\n * (build-time) is enforced by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard\n * around the import site, not here — see the file-level comment. 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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runtime activation gate for the in-app debug surface.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"3-layer activation gate\". This is the pure gate decision; the Chii client,\n * WebSocket transport, MCP server, and CLI that consume it live in src/mcp/.\n *\n * This function evaluates the two RUNTIME layers, B and C. Layer A — the\n * build-time gate — is NOT evaluated here, and deliberately so: it is enforced\n * entirely by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }` guard around the\n * import site (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`). `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant; a release consumer build folds it to `false`\n * and dead-code-eliminates the whole import of `@ait-co/devtools/in-app`, so\n * this code is simply absent from release bundles. A pre-built npm package\n * cannot re-check that flag — it was already baked at devtools' own publish\n * time — so any `isDebugBuild` check inside this function would be permanently\n * `false` and could never pass. Layer A is the consumer guard; B and C are\n * here.\n *\n * Layer B has two parts:\n *   B1 — host allowlist: `hostname` must be a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`\n *        subdomain (Toss dogfood entry) OR a `*.trycloudflare.com` host (env 2\n *        PWA dev tunnel). The Toss app serves dogfood / private mini-apps from\n *        a separate `private-apps` host; a production (`intoss://`) entry is\n *        served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` WITHOUT the `private-apps` segment.\n *        This is the security gate against a dogfood build that somehow lands\n *        on a production entry — see the comment on {@link isPrivateAppsHost}.\n *        The env 2 tunnel host is allowed because it has no production runtime\n *        (mock SDK, the developer's own dev server) — see {@link\n *        isTrycloudflareHost}.\n *   B2 — entry query: `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. Applies to\n *        the Toss path only; the env 2 tunnel has no deployed bundle, so B2 is\n *        skipped for `*.trycloudflare.com` hosts.\n *\n * Layer C — opt-in + relay + optional TOTP auth:\n *   C1 — opt-in:       `debug=1` must be present.\n *   C2 — relay URL:    `relay=<wss-url>` must be a valid `wss:` URL.\n *   C3 — TOTP auth:    When `verifyTotpCode` is provided (consumer injected the\n *                      baked secret at build time via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__`),\n *                      `at=<code>` is checked. Invalid or absent code → BLOCKED.\n *                      When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), `at` is\n *                      ignored (backward compatible).\n *\n * Security note on baked secrets:\n *   The TOTP secret baked in via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__` is present in the\n *   dogfood bundle and is extractable by a determined reverse engineer.\n *   The practical bar raised is: \"URL leak\" (Slack paste, QR screenshot) →\n *   blocked; \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP code\" → not blocked.\n *   This is the intended threat model. Do not overpromise on this guarantee.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `verifyTotpCode` is a black-box predicate. This module\n *   does NOT log the secret, any code value, or pass/fail details beyond the\n *   `'auth'` reason enum.\n *\n * Decision matrix (gate only runs in a debug build — Layer A already passed):\n *\n *   host        | _deploymentId | debug=1 | relay ok | TOTP ok* | result\n *   neither     | (any)         | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (host)\n *   private-apps| absent        | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (entry)\n *   private-apps| present       | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)\n *   private-apps| present       | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)\n *   trycloudflare| (skipped)    | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH\n *\n *   * \"TOTP ok\" column only applies when `verifyTotpCode` is provided.\n *     When no verifier is injected, TOTP check is skipped entirely.\n *   For trycloudflare (env 2 tunnel) hosts B1 is bypassed and B2 is skipped;\n *   C1/C2/C3 still apply identically. The ATTACH result carries\n *   `deploymentId: ''` for tunnel hosts.\n */\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate allows attachment. */\nexport interface GateResultAttach {\n  readonly attach: true;\n  /** The validated `wss:` relay URL from the `relay` query param. */\n  readonly relayUrl: string;\n  /** The deployment ID extracted from the `_deploymentId` query param. */\n  readonly deploymentId: string;\n}\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate blocks attachment, with a reason code. */\nexport interface GateResultBlocked {\n  readonly attach: false;\n  /**\n   * - `'host'`          Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.\n   * - `'entry'`         Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.\n   * - `'opt-in'`        Layer C1: `debug=1` param is absent.\n   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C2: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.\n   * - `'auth'`          Layer C3: TOTP `at=` code is absent, invalid, or expired\n   *                     (only when a `verifyTotpCode` predicate is injected).\n   *\n   * There is no `'build'` reason: Layer A is enforced by the consumer's\n   * `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard, not by this function.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: `'auth'` is the only value surfaced for auth failures —\n   * no code value, expected value, or secret fragment is ever exposed.\n   */\n  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay' | 'auth';\n}\n\nexport type GateResult = GateResultAttach | GateResultBlocked;\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link evaluateDebugGate}.\n *\n * All fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without\n * touching `window`.\n */\nexport interface GateInput {\n  /**\n   * The host the page is served from — `window.location.hostname`.\n   *\n   * This is the Layer B1 security signal. Why hostname and not the entry\n   * scheme: the Toss SDK normalises `intoss-private://` to `intoss://` in\n   * `getSchemeUri()`, and `getOperationalEnvironment()` / `getWebViewType()`\n   * return the same value (`\"toss\"` / `\"partner\"`) for both dogfood and\n   * production entries — none of them distinguish a dogfood entry. The host\n   * does: a dogfood / private-apps entry is served from\n   * `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`, a production entry is not. This was\n   * confirmed live over CDP against mini-app 31146 (see spec open question 2).\n   */\n  readonly hostname: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The URL search params to inspect for gate signals (Layers B2 and C).\n   *\n   * Prefer `URLSearchParams` so callers can pass `new URLSearchParams(location.search)`\n   * without coupling the pure function to `window`.\n   */\n  readonly searchParams: URLSearchParams;\n\n  /**\n   * Optional TOTP code verifier for Layer C3 auth gate.\n   *\n   * When provided, `evaluateDebugGate` reads the `at` query param and passes\n   * it to this predicate. Return `true` to allow, `false` to block with\n   * `reason: 'auth'`.\n   *\n   * Inject via the consumer's build define, e.g.:\n   * ```ts\n   * // dogfood build entry — consumer's build injects __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__\n   * declare const __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__: string | undefined;\n   * const verifyTotpCode = typeof __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__ !== 'undefined'\n   *   ? (code: string) => verifyTotp(__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__, code)\n   *   : undefined;\n   * maybeAttach(evaluateDebugGate({ ...params, verifyTotpCode }));\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Security note: this predicate is a black-box from the gate's perspective.\n   * The gate only surfaces pass/fail and the `'auth'` reason code — no code\n   * value or secret fragment is ever logged or returned.\n   *\n   * When `undefined` (TOTP disabled), `at=` is silently ignored and the gate\n   * proceeds to ATTACH if all other layers pass.\n   */\n  readonly verifyTotpCode?: (code: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix the Toss app uses to serve dogfood / private mini-apps.\n *\n * A `intoss-private://` (dogfood) entry maps to a host such as\n * `aitc-sdk-example.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n * entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` — the `.private-apps.` segment\n * is absent. Confirmed live over CDP for mini-app 31146; the exact production\n * host is to be re-confirmed once 31146 passes review (spec open question 2).\n */\nconst PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX = '.private-apps.tossmini.com';\n\n/**\n * The host suffix Cloudflare quick-tunnels serve from — the env 2 (PWA) entry.\n * See {@link isTrycloudflareHost} for why this host kind bypasses Layer B1.\n */\nconst TRYCLOUDFLARE_HOST_SUFFIX = '.trycloudflare.com';\n\n/**\n * Returns whether `hostname` is a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` subdomain —\n * the host the Toss app reserves for dogfood / private mini-app entries.\n *\n * The match is an exact suffix check, not a substring `.includes()`: a\n * substring test would also accept an attacker-controlled host like\n * `private-apps.tossmini.com.evil.example`, which ends in `.example`, not in\n * `.tossmini.com`. Requiring the string to END with the suffix closes that.\n * The leading `.` in the suffix also forces a real subdomain label, so a\n * bare `private-apps.tossmini.com` (no mini-app subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isPrivateAppsHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix Cloudflare quick-tunnels use — the env 2 (PWA) entry.\n *\n * Env 2 serves the local Vite dev server through a `*.trycloudflare.com` quick\n * tunnel (`src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`). It has no Toss app, no `intoss-private://`\n * scheme, and — critically — no production runtime: the SDK is the devtools\n * mock, and the page is the developer's own dev build. The Layer B1 safety net\n * (which stops a dogfood build that lands on a Toss *production* host from\n * attaching) has nothing to protect against here, because env 2 has no\n * production host. So a trycloudflare host is allowed past B1 — but ONLY past\n * B1: the remaining layers (C1 opt-in, C2 relay, C3 TOTP) still apply, so a\n * leaked tunnel URL is still blocked by TOTP exactly as on the Toss path.\n *\n * The match is the same exact-suffix `endsWith` check as\n * {@link isPrivateAppsHost} — never a substring `.includes()`, which would\n * accept an attacker-controlled `evil.trycloudflare.com.example.com`. The\n * leading `.` forces a real subdomain label, so a bare `trycloudflare.com`\n * (no tunnel subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isTrycloudflareHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(TRYCLOUDFLARE_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure function that evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C).\n *\n * Has no side effects. The input is explicit. Returns a discriminated union\n * so callers can pattern-match on `result.attach`.\n *\n * Layer A (build-time) is intentionally not evaluated here — see the file-level\n * comment. By the time this function runs, the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)`\n * guard has already passed; this function only decides B and C.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const result = evaluateDebugGate({\n *   hostname: window.location.hostname,\n *   searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n * });\n * if (result.attach) {\n *   // Proceed to load Chii client\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function evaluateDebugGate(input: GateInput): GateResult {\n  // Layer B1 — host allowlist (the security gate).\n  // Two host kinds are allowed past B1:\n  //   - Toss dogfood: `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n  //     entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` and is rejected here. This\n  //     is what stops a dogfood build that somehow reaches a production entry\n  //     from attaching: Layer A keeps debug code out of release bundles, and\n  //     this layer keeps a dogfood bundle that lands on a production host from\n  //     attaching even though its code is present.\n  //   - Env 2 PWA tunnel: `*.trycloudflare.com`. This is the developer's own\n  //     local dev server (mock SDK, no production runtime), so the\n  //     production-entry hazard B1 guards against cannot occur. It bypasses B1\n  //     but NOT the remaining layers — C1/C2/C3 (incl. TOTP) still apply, so a\n  //     leaked tunnel URL is blocked exactly as on the Toss path. See\n  //     {@link isTrycloudflareHost}.\n  const isTunnel = isTrycloudflareHost(input.hostname);\n  if (!isPrivateAppsHost(input.hostname) && !isTunnel) {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'host' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer B2 — runtime entry query gate (Toss path only).\n  // `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. The `intoss-private://`\n  // scheme used for dogfood entries includes this param; general user entry\n  // paths do not. The env 2 tunnel has no deployed bundle and therefore no\n  // `_deploymentId` — B2 is skipped for it, and `deploymentId` is reported as\n  // the empty string on a tunnel attach (no consumer reads it; see attach.ts).\n  let deploymentId = '';\n  if (!isTunnel) {\n    deploymentId = input.searchParams.get('_deploymentId') ?? '';\n    if (deploymentId === '') {\n      return { attach: false, reason: 'entry' };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Layer C — explicit opt-in gate.\n  // Require `debug=1` so that an operator who opens a dogfood URL by accident\n  // does not inadvertently trigger the debug surface.\n  const debugParam = input.searchParams.get('debug');\n  if (debugParam !== '1') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'opt-in' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C continued — relay URL validation.\n  // `relay=<wss-url>` must be present and must use the `wss:` scheme.\n  // Plain `ws:` is rejected (no TLS). `http:`/`https:` are rejected.\n  const relayRaw = input.searchParams.get('relay') ?? '';\n  if (relayRaw === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  let relayUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    relayUrl = new URL(relayRaw);\n  } catch {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  if (relayUrl.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C3 — TOTP auth gate (fail-fast, only when a verifier is injected).\n  // The `at` query param carries the current TOTP code. Absent or invalid code\n  // → BLOCKED. When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), this check is\n  // skipped entirely for backward compatibility.\n  //\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: we do NOT log `code`, the verifier's result, or anything\n  // derived from the secret. Only the `'auth'` enum is surfaced on failure.\n  if (input.verifyTotpCode !== undefined) {\n    const code = input.searchParams.get('at') ?? '';\n    if (!input.verifyTotpCode(code)) {\n      return { attach: false, reason: 'auth' };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { attach: true, relayUrl: relayUrl.href, deploymentId };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * In-app Chii target injection for the debug attach flow.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"MCP attach\" topology section — Phase 1 browser-side implementation.\n *\n * This module bridges the 3-layer gate result to a Chii `target.js` script\n * injection. The Chii npm package is the relay SERVER — the in-app side is\n * a plain `<script src=\"…/target.js\">` pointing at the relay host. No chii\n * npm dependency is needed here.\n */\n\nimport { setScreenAwakeMode } from '@apps-in-toss/web-framework';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\nimport { checkDebugGate, type GateResult } from './index.js';\n\n/**\n * Converts a validated `wss:` relay URL into the Chii `target.js` script URL.\n *\n * Scheme is mapped `wss:` → `https:`. Host and port are preserved.\n * Pathname is set to `/target.js` (or `/at/<code>/target.js` when a TOTP code\n * is given) regardless of the relay path. Query params and hash from the\n * relay URL are dropped — the target script URL is a static asset path on the\n * same host.\n *\n * TOTP path-prefix transport (issue #466): chii's stock `target.js` derives\n * its WS endpoint from the script `src` (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js',\n * '')`), so embedding the current TOTP code in the script URL *path* is the\n * only way the phone-side WS upgrade can carry it — both the script fetch and\n * the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` dial inherit the prefix,\n * and the relay verifies + strips it before chii parses the URL. The\n * `window.ChiiServerUrl` + query alternative does NOT work: chii appends\n * `target/<id>` to the serverUrl string, which would land after a `?`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `atCode` rides only inside the returned URL (the intended\n * transport — same exposure grade as the daemon client's `at=` query). It is\n * never logged here.\n *\n * @example\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://abc.trycloudflare.com/relay')\n * // → 'https://abc.trycloudflare.com/target.js'\n *\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://h.example.com:9100/', '123456')\n * // → 'https://h.example.com:9100/at/123456/target.js'\n *\n * @param relayUrl - Validated `wss:` relay URL from the gate result.\n * @param atCode - Current TOTP code from the page URL's `at` query param, or\n *   `null`/`undefined`/`''` to keep the legacy un-prefixed URL.\n */\nexport function deriveTargetScriptUrl(relayUrl: string, atCode?: string | null): string {\n  const u = new URL(relayUrl);\n  u.protocol = 'https:';\n  u.pathname =\n    atCode !== undefined && atCode !== null && atCode !== ''\n      ? `/at/${encodeURIComponent(atCode)}/target.js`\n      : '/target.js';\n  u.search = '';\n  u.hash = '';\n  return u.toString();\n}\n\n/** Module-level guard against double-injection within a page lifecycle. */\nlet attached = false;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Relay-origin WebSocket observer (issue #478)\n//\n// After a successful attach, chii's target.js owns its own reconnect loop —\n// `maybeAttach()` never re-runs, so a much-later reconnect carrying the stale\n// `/at/<code>/` prefix is rejected by the relay with NO in-page signal. The\n// relay now names that rejection (accept-then-close, code 4401), and this\n// observer is the in-page half: it watches relay-bound WebSockets for the\n// 4401 close and tells the parent launcher shell once, then fail-fasts any\n// further relay dials so the retry loop stops generating network traffic.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** One-shot guard for the parent notification (both observer + onerror probe). */\nlet authExpiredNotified = false;\n\n/** Set once a relay-bound socket closed with 4401 — flips dials to fail-fast. */\nlet relayAuthExpired = false;\n\n/** Guard against stacking multiple observer wrappers on window.WebSocket. */\nlet wsObserverInstalled = false;\n\n/**\n * Posts the `auth-expired` block signal to the parent launcher shell, once.\n *\n * Mirrors the existing `reason: 'auth'` postMessage in {@link maybeAttach}.\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the payload carries ONLY the reason enum — never the code,\n * secret, host, or relay URL.\n */\nfunction notifyAuthExpired(): void {\n  if (authExpiredNotified) return;\n  if (typeof window === 'undefined' || window.parent === window) return;\n  authExpiredNotified = true;\n  window.parent.postMessage({ type: 'ait:debug-attach-blocked', reason: 'auth-expired' }, '*');\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalises a URL into a comparable origin key, mapping the HTTP scheme pair\n * onto the WS pair (`https:`→`wss:`, `http:`→`ws:`) so the `wss:` relay URL\n * from the gate result matches the dials target.js derives from its\n * `https://…/target.js` script src. Returns `null` for unparsable URLs.\n */\nfunction wsOriginKey(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(rawUrl);\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const protocol =\n    parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 'wss:' : parsed.protocol === 'http:' ? 'ws:' : parsed.protocol;\n  return `${protocol}//${parsed.host}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a dummy WebSocket that never connects and closes immediately\n * (asynchronously, with the 4401 code) — returned for relay-bound dials after\n * auth expiry so chii's internal reconnect loop stops producing real network\n * traffic. We cannot stop the loop itself (it lives inside stock target.js);\n * we can only make each iteration free.\n *\n * Both `onclose`-style property handlers and `addEventListener` listeners are\n * fired — stock target.js uses property handlers, but we cannot know every\n * consumer. (A consumer wiring BOTH would see a double callback; acceptable\n * for a retry scheduler and irrelevant for chii.)\n */\nfunction createFailFastSocket(url: string): WebSocket {\n  const eventTarget = new EventTarget();\n  const sock = {\n    url,\n    readyState: 3, // CLOSED\n    bufferedAmount: 0,\n    extensions: '',\n    protocol: '',\n    binaryType: 'blob' as BinaryType,\n    onopen: null as ((ev: Event) => unknown) | null,\n    onmessage: null as ((ev: Event) => unknown) | null,\n    onerror: null as ((ev: Event) => unknown) | null,\n    onclose: null as ((ev: Event) => unknown) | null,\n    close(): void {},\n    send(): void {},\n    addEventListener: eventTarget.addEventListener.bind(eventTarget),\n    removeEventListener: eventTarget.removeEventListener.bind(eventTarget),\n    dispatchEvent: eventTarget.dispatchEvent.bind(eventTarget),\n    CONNECTING: 0,\n    OPEN: 1,\n    CLOSING: 2,\n    CLOSED: 3,\n  };\n  setTimeout(() => {\n    const errorEvent = new Event('error');\n    sock.onerror?.(errorEvent);\n    eventTarget.dispatchEvent(errorEvent);\n    // CloseEvent exists in every real WebView; the Object.assign fallback\n    // keeps the dummy environment-proof (consumers only read `.code`).\n    let closeEvent: Event;\n    try {\n      closeEvent = new CloseEvent('close', {\n        code: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n        reason: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n        wasClean: false,\n      });\n    } catch {\n      closeEvent = Object.assign(new Event('close'), {\n        code: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n        reason: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n        wasClean: false,\n      });\n    }\n    sock.onclose?.(closeEvent);\n    eventTarget.dispatchEvent(closeEvent);\n  }, 0);\n  return sock as unknown as WebSocket;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps `window.WebSocket` with a relay-origin-scoped observer (issue #478).\n *\n * - Connections whose URL origin does NOT match the relay origin pass through\n *   to the native constructor untouched — app traffic is never observed.\n * - Relay-origin connections get a `close` listener: code 4401 (the relay's\n *   named TOTP rejection) flips the module into the expired state and posts\n *   `reason: 'auth-expired'` to the parent launcher shell (once).\n * - After 4401, further relay-origin dials return a fail-fast dummy socket so\n *   target.js's autonomous reconnect loop stops hitting the network.\n *\n * Installed by {@link maybeAttach} BEFORE target.js is injected so the very\n * first dial is already observed. Idempotent per page lifecycle. Exported for\n * unit tests.\n */\nexport function installRelayWsObserver(relayUrl: string): void {\n  if (wsObserverInstalled) return;\n  if (typeof window === 'undefined' || typeof window.WebSocket !== 'function') return;\n  const relayKey = wsOriginKey(relayUrl);\n  if (relayKey === null) return;\n  wsObserverInstalled = true;\n\n  const NativeWebSocket = window.WebSocket;\n  const observed = new Proxy(NativeWebSocket, {\n    construct(target, args: unknown[]): object {\n      const url = String(args[0]);\n      if (wsOriginKey(url) !== relayKey) {\n        // Not relay traffic — construct natively, no observation.\n        return Reflect.construct(target, args);\n      }\n      if (relayAuthExpired) {\n        // Retry-storm cutoff: the relay already named this session expired.\n        return createFailFastSocket(url);\n      }\n      const ws = Reflect.construct(target, args) as WebSocket;\n      ws.addEventListener('close', (event) => {\n        if ((event as CloseEvent).code === RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE) {\n          relayAuthExpired = true;\n          notifyAuthExpired();\n        }\n      });\n      return ws;\n    },\n  });\n  window.WebSocket = observed as typeof WebSocket;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the 3-layer debug gate and, if the gate passes, injects the Chii\n * `target.js` script into `document.head`.\n *\n * Idempotent — calling more than once is safe. The second call is a no-op if\n * a script with the same `src` is already present in the document, and the\n * module-level `attached` flag prevents redundant DOM queries after the first\n * successful injection.\n *\n * Safe to call even if `document` is somehow unavailable (defensive boundary\n * guard — in practice this always runs in a real WebView).\n *\n * **keepAwake side effect**: on a successful attach, `setScreenAwakeMode({\n * enabled: true })` is called so the phone screen stays awake during the debug\n * session. A `beforeunload` handler restores normal sleep on page unload.\n * Opt out by adding `noKeepAwake=1` to the page URL query string — the check\n * reads `window.location.search` directly, consistent with other guards in\n * this file.\n *\n * @param gateResult - Optional pre-evaluated gate result for testability.\n *   Defaults to `checkDebugGate()` which reads the current page URL. Passing a\n *   custom value avoids the need to manipulate `window.location` in tests.\n */\nexport function maybeAttach(gateResult: GateResult = checkDebugGate()): void {\n  if (!gateResult.attach) {\n    console.debug(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] debug attach skipped — gate blocked (reason: ${gateResult.reason})`,\n    );\n    // Defect 2: a wrong/expired TOTP code is the ONLY block reason that is a\n    // user-actionable failure inside a deliberate debug session — the operator\n    // scanned a QR expecting an attach. Surface it to the parent launcher shell\n    // so it can show a \"rescan the QR\" banner. Every other reason\n    // ('host'/'entry'/'opt-in'/'invalid-relay') fires on ordinary non-debug page\n    // loads and must stay silent to avoid a banner on every plain pageview.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the message carries ONLY the 'auth' reason enum — never\n    // the code, secret, host, or relay URL.\n    if (gateResult.reason === 'auth' && typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.parent !== window) {\n      window.parent.postMessage({ type: 'ait:debug-attach-blocked', reason: 'auth' }, '*');\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Guard against double-injection across repeated calls.\n  if (attached) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Defensive: if document is not available (unusual, but possible in some\n  // SSR-adjacent edge cases), bail silently rather than throwing.\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // TOTP path-prefix transport (issue #466): forward the page URL's `at` code\n  // (delivered by the dashboard QR → launcher deep-link) into the target\n  // script URL so the WS upgrade derived from it passes the relay's TOTP\n  // gate. Absent `at` → legacy un-prefixed URL (relay without TOTP, tests).\n  // Read window.location.search directly, consistent with other guards in\n  // this file. SECRET-HANDLING: the code is never logged; it rides only in\n  // the script src (the intended transport).\n  //\n  // TTL note: the code is verified within the relay's ±1-step window (90 s),\n  // so the initial attach always fits. A much-later automatic reconnect by\n  // target.js reuses the stale prefix and is rejected (401) — by design under\n  // the URL-leak threat model; recover by rescanning the QR (the relay-side\n  // auth-reject counter from issue #467 makes this visible).\n  const atCode =\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' ? new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('at') : null;\n\n  const src = deriveTargetScriptUrl(gateResult.relayUrl, atCode);\n\n  // Issue #478: observe relay-bound WebSockets BEFORE target.js is injected so\n  // even its very first dial — and every autonomous reconnect after a session\n  // drop — is covered. The relay names a TOTP rejection with close code 4401;\n  // the observer relays it to the launcher banner and cuts the retry storm.\n  installRelayWsObserver(gateResult.relayUrl);\n\n  // Also guard against a script with the same src already in the DOM\n  // (e.g. injected by a different code path or a page reload within SPA).\n  const existing = document.querySelector<HTMLScriptElement>(`script[src=\"${src}\"]`);\n  if (existing !== null) {\n    attached = true;\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const script = document.createElement('script');\n  script.src = src;\n  script.async = true;\n  // Issue #478: a first-load stale code (QR scanned after expiry) fails the\n  // target.js GET itself — no WebSocket is ever dialled, so the observer\n  // above can't see it. Probe the same URL once with fetch(): the relay's\n  // 401 now carries CORS headers, so the status is readable cross-origin.\n  // 401 → surface auth-expired; anything else (tunnel down, transient\n  // network) stays silent — same behaviour as before #478.\n  script.onerror = () => {\n    void fetch(src)\n      .then((res) => {\n        if (res.status === 401) notifyAuthExpired();\n      })\n      .catch(() => {\n        // Network-level failure — not an auth signal; stay silent.\n      });\n  };\n  (document.head ?? document.documentElement).appendChild(script);\n\n  attached = true;\n\n  // keepAwake — keep phone screen on during the debug session.\n  // Opt out via noKeepAwake=1 in the URL (consistent with direct window reads\n  // used throughout this file).\n  if (\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n    new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('noKeepAwake') === '1'\n  ) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  setScreenAwakeMode({ enabled: true })\n    .then(() => {\n      // Restore normal sleep on page unload — only if the enable call succeeded\n      // (nothing to restore if it failed).\n      window.addEventListener(\n        'beforeunload',\n        () => {\n          setScreenAwakeMode({ enabled: false }).catch(() => {});\n        },\n        { once: true },\n      );\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      // Swallow rejection so attach never breaks — some platforms/mock reject.\n      console.debug('[@ait-co/devtools] setScreenAwakeMode failed:', err);\n    });\n}\n","/**\n * @ait-co/devtools/in-app entry point.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n *\n * Phase 1 — gate + browser-side Chii target injection.\n * WebSocket relay, QR/paste UI, and AI-host MCP bin are later phases that\n * require real-device validation and are not included here.\n *\n * This thin entry reads `window.location` and calls the pure\n * {@link evaluateDebugGate} function. All testable logic lives in `./gate.ts`\n * and `./attach.ts`, not here.\n *\n * Layer A of the activation gate (build-time) is NOT enforced in this module.\n * It is the consumer's responsibility: the consumer wraps its\n * `import('@ait-co/devtools/in-app')` call site in `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }`\n * (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`), where `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant. A release consumer build folds that constant\n * to `false` and dead-code-eliminates this whole module. This package is\n * pre-built and ships with `__DEBUG_BUILD__` already resolved at devtools'\n * publish time, so it could never re-evaluate the consumer's build channel —\n * which is exactly why Layer A lives at the consumer guard, not here.\n */\n\nimport { evaluateDebugGate, type GateResult } from './gate.js';\n\nexport { deriveTargetScriptUrl, maybeAttach } from './attach.js';\nexport type { GateInput, GateResult, GateResultAttach, GateResultBlocked } from './gate.js';\nexport { evaluateDebugGate, isPrivateAppsHost, isTrycloudflareHost } from './gate.js';\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C) against the current\n * page URL.\n *\n * Returns the gate result. Callers can check `result.attach` to decide whether\n * to proceed with debug surface attachment.\n *\n * This function reads `window.location` only — both the hostname (Layer B1\n * host allowlist) and the search params (Layers B2 and C). Layer A\n * (build-time) is enforced by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard\n * around the import site, not here — see the file-level comment. 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package/dist/mcp/cli.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
 import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
 import { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
 import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
-import { WebSocket } from "ws";
+import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from "ws";
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { createServer } from "node:http";
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
@@ -120,6 +120,47 @@ var ChiiAitSource = class {
 	}
 };
 //#endregion
+//#region src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts
+/**
+* Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).
+*
+* Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a
+* raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is
+* indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the
+* WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)
+* could not tell "stale TOTP code" apart from "tunnel down" and stayed
+* silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close
+* with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.
+*
+* Three parties share this contract:
+*   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;
+*   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and
+*     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;
+*   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code
+*     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh
+*     code mint means it should not normally hit this).
+*
+* This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is
+* safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon
+* bundle.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body
+* must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.
+*/
+/**
+* WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.
+*
+* 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors
+* HTTP 401 so it reads as "unauthorized" at a glance.
+*/
+const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;
+/**
+* Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and
+* the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —
+* never interpolated with request data.
+*/
+const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = "totp-rejected";
+//#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/log.ts
 /**
 * Allowed field keys that may pass through to a log line.
@@ -467,12 +508,15 @@ var ChiiCdpConnection = class {
 		await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
 			ws.once("open", () => resolve());
 			ws.once("error", (err) => reject(err));
+			ws.once("close", (code) => {
+				if (code === 4401) reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("relay 인증(TOTP)이 거부됐습니다 (close 4401). 코드가 만료됐을 수 있습니다 — 재연결 시 새 코드가 발급됩니다."));
+			});
 		});
 		this.lastCrashDetectedAt = null;
 		this.targetLastSeenAt.clear();
 		this.connectionState = "connected";
 		ws.on("message", (data) => this.handleMessage(data.toString()));
-		ws.on("close", () => this.handleDisconnect("relay WebSocket 연결이 끊겼습니다"));
+		ws.on("close", (code) => this.handleDisconnect(code === 4401 ? "relay 인증(TOTP)이 거부돼 연결이 종료됐습니다 (close 4401)" : "relay WebSocket 연결이 끊겼습니다"));
 		ws.on("error", (err) => this.handleDisconnect(`relay WebSocket 오류: ${err.message}`));
 		this.sendFireAndForget("Runtime.enable");
 		this.sendFireAndForget("Network.enable");
@@ -721,12 +765,27 @@ var ChiiCdpConnection = class {
 * entries.
 *
 * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):
-*   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module registers HTTP 'upgrade' and
-*   'request' listeners on the server BEFORE calling `chii.start({server})`.
-*   Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first to
-*   call `socket.destroy()` (upgrade) or `res.end()` (request) wins. Invalid
-*   auth → 401 + destroy (chii never sees the connection). Valid auth →
-*   return without side-effect (chii handles it).
+*   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:
+*
+*   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.
+*     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first
+*     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny
+*     JSON body (`{"error":"totp-rejected"}`) so a cross-origin script
+*     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return
+*     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).
+*
+*   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade
+*     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,
+*     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the
+*     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close
+*     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +
+*     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the
+*     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the
+*     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)
+*     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close
+*     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let
+*     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket
+*     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.
 *
 * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:
 *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection
@@ -812,33 +871,40 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 			onAuthReject({ kind });
 		} catch {}
 	};
+	if (verifyAuth) httpServer.on("request", (req, res) => {
+		const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
+		if (rewritten === null) return;
+		req.url = rewritten;
+		if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+			res.statusCode = 401;
+			res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+			res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+			res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+			notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+		}
+	});
+	await loadChiiServer().start({
+		server: httpServer,
+		domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`,
+		port: requestedPort
+	});
 	if (verifyAuth) {
-		httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket) => {
+		const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners("upgrade");
+		httpServer.removeAllListeners("upgrade");
+		const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });
+		httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
 			const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
 			if (rewritten !== null) req.url = rewritten;
 			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
-				socket.write("HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n");
-				socket.destroy();
+				rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {
+					ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);
+				});
 				notifyAuthReject("ws-upgrade");
 				return;
 			}
-		});
-		httpServer.on("request", (req, res) => {
-			const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
-			if (rewritten === null) return;
-			req.url = rewritten;
-			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
-				res.statusCode = 401;
-				res.end();
-				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
-			}
+			for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) listener(req, socket, head);
 		});
 	}
-	await loadChiiServer().start({
-		server: httpServer,
-		domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`,
-		port: requestedPort
-	});
 	const actualPort = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
 		httpServer.once("error", reject);
 		httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {
@@ -1934,6 +2000,7 @@ const en = {
 	"launcher.invalidUrl": "Enter a valid http(s):// URL.",
 	"launcher.debugAuthFailed": "Debug connection authentication failed",
 	"launcher.debugAuthFailedHint": "The QR code may have expired. Scan a fresh QR code.",
+	"launcher.debugAuthExpiredHint": "The debug session has expired. Scan a fresh QR from the attach page on your Mac.",
 	"launcher.debugAuthRescanCta": "Scan a new QR",
 	"launcher.diagFab": "Diag",
 	"launcher.diagTitle": "Viewport diagnostics",
@@ -2177,6 +2244,7 @@ const tables = {
 		"launcher.invalidUrl": "올바른 http(s):// URL을 입력하세요.",
 		"launcher.debugAuthFailed": "디버그 연결 인증 실패",
 		"launcher.debugAuthFailedHint": "QR 코드가 만료되었을 수 있어요. 새 QR을 다시 스캔하세요.",
+		"launcher.debugAuthExpiredHint": "디버그 세션이 만료됐어요. Mac의 attach 페이지에서 새 QR을 스캔하세요.",
 		"launcher.debugAuthRescanCta": "새 QR 스캔하기",
 		"launcher.diagFab": "진단",
 		"launcher.diagTitle": "뷰포트 진단",
@@ -4381,7 +4449,7 @@ async function readMcpSdkVersion() {
 * some test environments that skip the build step).
 */
 function readDevtoolsVersion() {
-	return "0.1.69";
+	return "0.1.70";
 }
 /**
 * Derives the next recommended action from a completed diagnostics snapshot.
@@ -4885,7 +4953,7 @@ function createDebugServer(deps) {
 	const collector = collectorDep ?? new InMemoryDiagnosticsCollector();
 	const server = new Server({
 		name: "ait-debug",
-		version: "0.1.69"
+		version: "0.1.70"
 	}, { capabilities: { tools: { listChanged: true } } });
 	server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, () => {
 		const conn = router.active;
@@ -6761,7 +6829,7 @@ function createDevServer(deps = {}) {
 	const aitSource = deps.aitSource ?? new HttpAitSource({ stateEndpoint });
 	const server = new Server({
 		name: "ait-devtools",
-		version: "0.1.69"
+		version: "0.1.70"
 	}, { capabilities: { tools: {} } });
 	server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, () => ({ tools: DEV_TOOL_DEFINITIONS.map((tool) => ({ ...tool })) }));
 	server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {