@ait-co/devtools 0.1.32 → 0.1.34

package/dist/in-app/index.d.ts

@@ -27,14 +27,38 @@
  *        on a production entry — see the comment on {@link isPrivateAppsHost}.
  *   B2 — entry query: `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty.
  *
- * Decision matrix (the gate only ever runs in a debug build — Layer A already
- * passed by the time this code is reachable):
- *
- *   private-apps host | _deploymentId | debug=1 | result
- *   no                | (any)         | (any)   | BLOCKED  (Layer B1 — host)
- *   yes               | absent        | (any)   | BLOCKED  (Layer B2 — entry)
- *   yes               | present       | absent  | BLOCKED  (Layer C  — opt-in)
- *   yes               | present       | present | ATTACH
+ * Layer C — opt-in + relay + optional TOTP auth:
+ *   C1 — opt-in:       `debug=1` must be present.
+ *   C2 — relay URL:    `relay=<wss-url>` must be a valid `wss:` URL.
+ *   C3 — TOTP auth:    When `verifyTotpCode` is provided (consumer injected the
+ *                      baked secret at build time via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__`),
+ *                      `at=<code>` is checked. Invalid or absent code → BLOCKED.
+ *                      When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), `at` is
+ *                      ignored (backward compatible).
+ *
+ * Security note on baked secrets:
+ *   The TOTP secret baked in via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__` is present in the
+ *   dogfood bundle and is extractable by a determined reverse engineer.
+ *   The practical bar raised is: "URL leak" (Slack paste, QR screenshot) →
+ *   blocked; "URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP code" → not blocked.
+ *   This is the intended threat model. Do not overpromise on this guarantee.
+ *
+ * SECRET-HANDLING: `verifyTotpCode` is a black-box predicate. This module
+ *   does NOT log the secret, any code value, or pass/fail details beyond the
+ *   `'auth'` reason enum.
+ *
+ * Decision matrix (gate only runs in a debug build — Layer A already passed):
+ *
+ *   host ok | _deploymentId | debug=1 | relay ok | TOTP ok* | result
+ *   no      | (any)         | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (host)
+ *   yes     | absent        | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (entry)
+ *   yes     | present       | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)
+ *   yes     | present       | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)
+ *   yes     | present       | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)
+ *   yes     | present       | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH
+ *
+ *   * "TOTP ok" column only applies when `verifyTotpCode` is provided.
+ *     When no verifier is injected, TOTP check is skipped entirely.
  */
 /** Shape returned when the gate allows attachment. */
 interface GateResultAttach {
@@ -48,21 +72,26 @@ interface GateResultAttach {
 interface GateResultBlocked {
   readonly attach: false;
   /**
-   * - `'host'`         Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.
-   * - `'entry'`        Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.
-   * - `'opt-in'`       Layer C: `debug=1` param is absent.
-   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.
+   * - `'host'`          Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.
+   * - `'entry'`         Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.
+   * - `'opt-in'`        Layer C1: `debug=1` param is absent.
+   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C2: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.
+   * - `'auth'`          Layer C3: TOTP `at=` code is absent, invalid, or expired
+   *                     (only when a `verifyTotpCode` predicate is injected).
    *
    * There is no `'build'` reason: Layer A is enforced by the consumer's
    * `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard, not by this function.
+   *
+   * SECRET-HANDLING: `'auth'` is the only value surfaced for auth failures —
+   * no code value, expected value, or secret fragment is ever exposed.
    */
-  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay';
+  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay' | 'auth';
 }
 type GateResult = GateResultAttach | GateResultBlocked;
 /**
  * Input for {@link evaluateDebugGate}.
  *
- * Both fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without
+ * All fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without
  * touching `window`.
  */
 interface GateInput {
@@ -86,6 +115,31 @@ interface GateInput {
    * without coupling the pure function to `window`.
    */
   readonly searchParams: URLSearchParams;
+  /**
+   * Optional TOTP code verifier for Layer C3 auth gate.
+   *
+   * When provided, `evaluateDebugGate` reads the `at` query param and passes
+   * it to this predicate. Return `true` to allow, `false` to block with
+   * `reason: 'auth'`.
+   *
+   * Inject via the consumer's build define, e.g.:
+   * ```ts
+   * // dogfood build entry — consumer's build injects __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__
+   * declare const __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__: string | undefined;
+   * const verifyTotpCode = typeof __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__ !== 'undefined'
+   *   ? (code: string) => verifyTotp(__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__, code)
+   *   : undefined;
+   * maybeAttach(evaluateDebugGate({ ...params, verifyTotpCode }));
+   * ```
+   *
+   * Security note: this predicate is a black-box from the gate's perspective.
+   * The gate only surfaces pass/fail and the `'auth'` reason code — no code
+   * value or secret fragment is ever logged or returned.
+   *
+   * When `undefined` (TOTP disabled), `at=` is silently ignored and the gate
+   * proceeds to ATTACH if all other layers pass.
+   */
+  readonly verifyTotpCode?: (code: string) => boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Returns whether `hostname` is a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` subdomain —

package/dist/in-app/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"mappings":";;AAuCA;;;;;;;;;AASA;;;;;AAcA;;;;;AAQA;;;;;;;;;AA8CA;;;;;AAyBA;;;;UAtGiB,gBAAA;EAAA,SACN,MAAA;EAqG0C;EAAA,SAnG1C,QAAA;EAmGoD;EAAA,SAjGpD,YAAA;AAAA;;UAIM,iBAAA;EAAA,SACN,MAAA;;;;ACQX;;;;;;WDEW,MAAA;AAAA;AAAA,KAGC,UAAA,GAAa,gBAAA,GAAmB,iBAAA;;;;;;;UAQ3B,SAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaN,QAAA;;;;;;;WAQA,YAAA,EAAc,eAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAyBT,iBAAA,CAAkB,QAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAyBlB,iBAAA,CAAkB,KAAA,EAAO,SAAA,GAAY,UAAA;;;;;;AA/ErD;;;;;AAQA;;;;;;;iBCzCgB,qBAAA,CAAsB,QAAA;;ADuFtC;;;;;AAyBA;;;;;;;;;;iBCpFgB,WAAA,CAAY,UAAA,GAAY,UAAA;;;;;AD2DxC;;;;;AAyBA;;;;;;;iBEjGgB,cAAA,CAAA,GAAkB,UAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"mappings":";;AA+DA;;;;;;;;;AASA;;;;;AAmBA;;;;;AAQA;;;;;;;;;;;AAwEA;;;;;AAyBA;;;;;;;;;;;;ACvKA;;;;;AA4BA;;;;;;;;ACbA;AAAA,UFmBiB,gBAAA;EAAA,SACN,MAAA;EEpBuB;EAAA,SFsBvB,QAAA;;WAEA,YAAA;AAAA;;UAIM,iBAAA;EAAA,SACN,MAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAeA,MAAA;AAAA;AAAA,KAGC,UAAA,GAAa,gBAAA,GAAmB,iBAAA;;;;;;;UAQ3B,SAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaN,QAAA;;;;;;;WAQA,YAAA,EAAc,eAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA0Bd,cAAA,IAAkB,IAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAyBb,iBAAA,CAAkB,QAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAyBlB,iBAAA,CAAkB,KAAA,EAAO,SAAA,GAAY,UAAA;;;;;;AAzGrD;;;;;AAQA;;;;;;;iBCtEgB,qBAAA,CAAsB,QAAA;;;;AD8ItC;;;;;AAyBA;;;;;;;;iBC3IgB,WAAA,CAAY,UAAA,GAAY,UAAA;;;;;;;ADkHxC;;;;;AAyBA;;;;;iBExJgB,cAAA,CAAA,GAAkB,UAAA"}

package/dist/in-app/index.js

@@ -76,6 +76,13 @@ function evaluateDebugGate(input) {
 		attach: false,
 		reason: "invalid-relay"
 	};
+	if (input.verifyTotpCode !== void 0) {
+		const code = input.searchParams.get("at") ?? "";
+		if (!input.verifyTotpCode(code)) return {
+			attach: false,
+			reason: "auth"
+		};
+	}
 	return {
 		attach: true,
 		relayUrl: relayUrl.href,

package/dist/in-app/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runtime activation gate for the in-app debug surface.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"3-layer activation gate\". This is the pure gate decision; the Chii client,\n * WebSocket transport, MCP server, and CLI that consume it live in src/mcp/.\n *\n * This function evaluates the two RUNTIME layers, B and C. Layer A — the\n * build-time gate — is NOT evaluated here, and deliberately so: it is enforced\n * entirely by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }` guard around the\n * import site (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`). `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant; a release consumer build folds it to `false`\n * and dead-code-eliminates the whole import of `@ait-co/devtools/in-app`, so\n * this code is simply absent from release bundles. A pre-built npm package\n * cannot re-check that flag — it was already baked at devtools' own publish\n * time — so any `isDebugBuild` check inside this function would be permanently\n * `false` and could never pass. Layer A is the consumer guard; B and C are\n * here.\n *\n * Layer B has two parts. Both must pass:\n *   B1 — host allowlist: `hostname` must be a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`\n *        subdomain. The Toss app serves dogfood / private mini-apps from a\n *        separate `private-apps` host; a production (`intoss://`) entry is\n *        served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` WITHOUT the `private-apps` segment.\n *        This is the security gate against a dogfood build that somehow lands\n *        on a production entry — see the comment on {@link isPrivateAppsHost}.\n *   B2 — entry query: `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty.\n *\n * Decision matrix (the gate only ever runs in a debug build — Layer A already\n * passed by the time this code is reachable):\n *\n *   private-apps host | _deploymentId | debug=1 | result\n *   no                | (any)         | (any)   | BLOCKED  (Layer B1 — host)\n *   yes               | absent        | (any)   | BLOCKED  (Layer B2 — entry)\n *   yes               | present       | absent  | BLOCKED  (Layer C  — opt-in)\n *   yes               | present       | present | ATTACH\n */\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate allows attachment. */\nexport interface GateResultAttach {\n  readonly attach: true;\n  /** The validated `wss:` relay URL from the `relay` query param. */\n  readonly relayUrl: string;\n  /** The deployment ID extracted from the `_deploymentId` query param. */\n  readonly deploymentId: string;\n}\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate blocks attachment, with a reason code. */\nexport interface GateResultBlocked {\n  readonly attach: false;\n  /**\n   * - `'host'`         Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.\n   * - `'entry'`        Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.\n   * - `'opt-in'`       Layer C: `debug=1` param is absent.\n   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.\n   *\n   * There is no `'build'` reason: Layer A is enforced by the consumer's\n   * `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard, not by this function.\n   */\n  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay';\n}\n\nexport type GateResult = GateResultAttach | GateResultBlocked;\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link evaluateDebugGate}.\n *\n * Both fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without\n * touching `window`.\n */\nexport interface GateInput {\n  /**\n   * The host the page is served from — `window.location.hostname`.\n   *\n   * This is the Layer B1 security signal. Why hostname and not the entry\n   * scheme: the Toss SDK normalises `intoss-private://` to `intoss://` in\n   * `getSchemeUri()`, and `getOperationalEnvironment()` / `getWebViewType()`\n   * return the same value (`\"toss\"` / `\"partner\"`) for both dogfood and\n   * production entries — none of them distinguish a dogfood entry. The host\n   * does: a dogfood / private-apps entry is served from\n   * `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`, a production entry is not. This was\n   * confirmed live over CDP against mini-app 31146 (see spec open question 2).\n   */\n  readonly hostname: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The URL search params to inspect for gate signals (Layers B2 and C).\n   *\n   * Prefer `URLSearchParams` so callers can pass `new URLSearchParams(location.search)`\n   * without coupling the pure function to `window`.\n   */\n  readonly searchParams: URLSearchParams;\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix the Toss app uses to serve dogfood / private mini-apps.\n *\n * A `intoss-private://` (dogfood) entry maps to a host such as\n * `aitc-sdk-example.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n * entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` — the `.private-apps.` segment\n * is absent. Confirmed live over CDP for mini-app 31146; the exact production\n * host is to be re-confirmed once 31146 passes review (spec open question 2).\n */\nconst PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX = '.private-apps.tossmini.com';\n\n/**\n * Returns whether `hostname` is a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` subdomain —\n * the host the Toss app reserves for dogfood / private mini-app entries.\n *\n * The match is an exact suffix check, not a substring `.includes()`: a\n * substring test would also accept an attacker-controlled host like\n * `private-apps.tossmini.com.evil.example`, which ends in `.example`, not in\n * `.tossmini.com`. Requiring the string to END with the suffix closes that.\n * The leading `.` in the suffix also forces a real subdomain label, so a\n * bare `private-apps.tossmini.com` (no mini-app subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isPrivateAppsHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure function that evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C).\n *\n * Has no side effects. The input is explicit. Returns a discriminated union\n * so callers can pattern-match on `result.attach`.\n *\n * Layer A (build-time) is intentionally not evaluated here — see the file-level\n * comment. By the time this function runs, the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)`\n * guard has already passed; this function only decides B and C.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const result = evaluateDebugGate({\n *   hostname: window.location.hostname,\n *   searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n * });\n * if (result.attach) {\n *   // Proceed to load Chii client\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function evaluateDebugGate(input: GateInput): GateResult {\n  // Layer B1 — host allowlist (the security gate).\n  // The page must be served from a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host. A\n  // production `intoss://` entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` and is\n  // rejected here. This is what stops a dogfood build that somehow reaches a\n  // production entry from attaching: Layer A keeps debug code out of release\n  // bundles, and this layer keeps a dogfood bundle that lands on a production\n  // host from attaching even though its code is present.\n  if (!isPrivateAppsHost(input.hostname)) {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'host' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer B2 — runtime entry query gate.\n  // `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. The `intoss-private://`\n  // scheme used for dogfood entries includes this param; general user entry\n  // paths do not.\n  const deploymentId = input.searchParams.get('_deploymentId') ?? '';\n  if (deploymentId === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'entry' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C — explicit opt-in gate.\n  // Require `debug=1` so that an operator who opens a dogfood URL by accident\n  // does not inadvertently trigger the debug surface.\n  const debugParam = input.searchParams.get('debug');\n  if (debugParam !== '1') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'opt-in' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C continued — relay URL validation.\n  // `relay=<wss-url>` must be present and must use the `wss:` scheme.\n  // Plain `ws:` is rejected (no TLS). `http:`/`https:` are rejected.\n  const relayRaw = input.searchParams.get('relay') ?? '';\n  if (relayRaw === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  let relayUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    relayUrl = new URL(relayRaw);\n  } catch {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  if (relayUrl.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  return { attach: true, relayUrl: relayUrl.href, deploymentId };\n}\n","/**\n * In-app Chii target injection for the debug attach flow.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"MCP attach\" topology section — Phase 1 browser-side implementation.\n *\n * This module bridges the 3-layer gate result to a Chii `target.js` script\n * injection. The Chii npm package is the relay SERVER — the in-app side is\n * a plain `<script src=\"…/target.js\">` pointing at the relay host. No chii\n * npm dependency is needed here.\n */\n\nimport { checkDebugGate, type GateResult } from './index.js';\n\n/**\n * Converts a validated `wss:` relay URL into the Chii `target.js` script URL.\n *\n * Scheme is mapped `wss:` → `https:`. Host and port are preserved.\n * Pathname is set to `/target.js` regardless of the relay path.\n * Query params and hash from the relay URL are dropped — the target script\n * URL is a static asset path on the same host.\n *\n * @example\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://abc.trycloudflare.com/relay')\n * // → 'https://abc.trycloudflare.com/target.js'\n *\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://h.example.com:9100/')\n * // → 'https://h.example.com:9100/target.js'\n */\nexport function deriveTargetScriptUrl(relayUrl: string): string {\n  const u = new URL(relayUrl);\n  u.protocol = 'https:';\n  u.pathname = '/target.js';\n  u.search = '';\n  u.hash = '';\n  return u.toString();\n}\n\n/** Module-level guard against double-injection within a page lifecycle. */\nlet attached = false;\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the 3-layer debug gate and, if the gate passes, injects the Chii\n * `target.js` script into `document.head`.\n *\n * Idempotent — calling more than once is safe. The second call is a no-op if\n * a script with the same `src` is already present in the document, and the\n * module-level `attached` flag prevents redundant DOM queries after the first\n * successful injection.\n *\n * Safe to call even if `document` is somehow unavailable (defensive boundary\n * guard — in practice this always runs in a real WebView).\n *\n * @param gateResult - Optional pre-evaluated gate result for testability.\n *   Defaults to `checkDebugGate()` which reads the current page URL. Passing a\n *   custom value avoids the need to manipulate `window.location` in tests.\n */\nexport function maybeAttach(gateResult: GateResult = checkDebugGate()): void {\n  if (!gateResult.attach) {\n    console.debug(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] debug attach skipped — gate blocked (reason: ${gateResult.reason})`,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Guard against double-injection across repeated calls.\n  if (attached) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Defensive: if document is not available (unusual, but possible in some\n  // SSR-adjacent edge cases), bail silently rather than throwing.\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const src = deriveTargetScriptUrl(gateResult.relayUrl);\n\n  // Also guard against a script with the same src already in the DOM\n  // (e.g. injected by a different code path or a page reload within SPA).\n  const existing = document.querySelector<HTMLScriptElement>(`script[src=\"${src}\"]`);\n  if (existing !== null) {\n    attached = true;\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const script = document.createElement('script');\n  script.src = src;\n  script.async = true;\n  (document.head ?? document.documentElement).appendChild(script);\n\n  attached = true;\n}\n","/**\n * @ait-co/devtools/in-app entry point.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n *\n * Phase 1 — gate + browser-side Chii target injection.\n * WebSocket relay, QR/paste UI, and AI-host MCP bin are later phases that\n * require real-device validation and are not included here.\n *\n * This thin entry reads `window.location` and calls the pure\n * {@link evaluateDebugGate} function. All testable logic lives in `./gate.ts`\n * and `./attach.ts`, not here.\n *\n * Layer A of the activation gate (build-time) is NOT enforced in this module.\n * It is the consumer's responsibility: the consumer wraps its\n * `import('@ait-co/devtools/in-app')` call site in `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }`\n * (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`), where `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant. A release consumer build folds that constant\n * to `false` and dead-code-eliminates this whole module. This package is\n * pre-built and ships with `__DEBUG_BUILD__` already resolved at devtools'\n * publish time, so it could never re-evaluate the consumer's build channel —\n * which is exactly why Layer A lives at the consumer guard, not here.\n */\n\nimport { evaluateDebugGate, type GateResult } from './gate.js';\n\nexport { deriveTargetScriptUrl, maybeAttach } from './attach.js';\nexport type { GateInput, GateResult, GateResultAttach, GateResultBlocked } from './gate.js';\nexport { evaluateDebugGate, isPrivateAppsHost } from './gate.js';\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C) against the current\n * page URL.\n *\n * Returns the gate result. Callers can check `result.attach` to decide whether\n * to proceed with debug surface attachment.\n *\n * This function reads `window.location` only — both the hostname (Layer B1\n * host allowlist) and the search params (Layers B2 and C). Layer A\n * (build-time) is enforced by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard\n * around the import site, not here — see the file-level comment. Consumers\n * call this with no arguments, so the Layer B1 host check is picked up with\n * no change at the call site.\n */\nexport function checkDebugGate(): GateResult {\n  return evaluateDebugGate({\n    hostname: window.location.hostname,\n    searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n  });\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AAuGA,MAAM,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;AAajC,SAAgB,kBAAkB,UAA2B;AAC3D,QAAO,SAAS,SAAS,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBpD,SAAgB,kBAAkB,OAA8B;AAQ9D,KAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,MAAM,SAAS,CACpC,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAQ;CAO1C,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAChE,KAAI,iBAAiB,GACnB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAS;AAO3C,KADmB,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,KAC/B,IACjB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAU;CAM5C,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AACpD,KAAI,aAAa,GACf,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;CAGnD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,aAAW,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;SACtB;AACN,SAAO;GAAE,QAAQ;GAAO,QAAQ;GAAiB;;AAGnD,KAAI,SAAS,aAAa,OACxB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;AAGnD,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAM,UAAU,SAAS;EAAM;EAAc;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AChKhE,SAAgB,sBAAsB,UAA0B;CAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC3B,GAAE,WAAW;AACb,GAAE,WAAW;AACb,GAAE,SAAS;AACX,GAAE,OAAO;AACT,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU;;;AAIrB,IAAI,WAAW;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBf,SAAgB,YAAY,aAAyB,gBAAgB,EAAQ;AAC3E,KAAI,CAAC,WAAW,QAAQ;AACtB,UAAQ,MACN,mEAAmE,WAAW,OAAO,GACtF;AACD;;AAIF,KAAI,SACF;AAKF,KAAI,OAAO,aAAa,YACtB;CAGF,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,WAAW,SAAS;AAKtD,KADiB,SAAS,cAAiC,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,KACjE,MAAM;AACrB,aAAW;AACX;;CAGF,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,SAAS;AAC/C,QAAO,MAAM;AACb,QAAO,QAAQ;AACf,EAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB,YAAY,OAAO;AAE/D,YAAW;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AC/Cb,SAAgB,iBAA6B;AAC3C,QAAO,kBAAkB;EACvB,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS;EAC1B,cAAc,IAAI,gBAAgB,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;EAC1D,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/in-app/gate.ts","../../src/in-app/attach.ts","../../src/in-app/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runtime activation gate for the in-app debug surface.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"3-layer activation gate\". This is the pure gate decision; the Chii client,\n * WebSocket transport, MCP server, and CLI that consume it live in src/mcp/.\n *\n * This function evaluates the two RUNTIME layers, B and C. Layer A — the\n * build-time gate — is NOT evaluated here, and deliberately so: it is enforced\n * entirely by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }` guard around the\n * import site (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`). `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant; a release consumer build folds it to `false`\n * and dead-code-eliminates the whole import of `@ait-co/devtools/in-app`, so\n * this code is simply absent from release bundles. A pre-built npm package\n * cannot re-check that flag — it was already baked at devtools' own publish\n * time — so any `isDebugBuild` check inside this function would be permanently\n * `false` and could never pass. Layer A is the consumer guard; B and C are\n * here.\n *\n * Layer B has two parts. Both must pass:\n *   B1 — host allowlist: `hostname` must be a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`\n *        subdomain. The Toss app serves dogfood / private mini-apps from a\n *        separate `private-apps` host; a production (`intoss://`) entry is\n *        served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` WITHOUT the `private-apps` segment.\n *        This is the security gate against a dogfood build that somehow lands\n *        on a production entry — see the comment on {@link isPrivateAppsHost}.\n *   B2 — entry query: `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty.\n *\n * Layer C — opt-in + relay + optional TOTP auth:\n *   C1 — opt-in:       `debug=1` must be present.\n *   C2 — relay URL:    `relay=<wss-url>` must be a valid `wss:` URL.\n *   C3 — TOTP auth:    When `verifyTotpCode` is provided (consumer injected the\n *                      baked secret at build time via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__`),\n *                      `at=<code>` is checked. Invalid or absent code → BLOCKED.\n *                      When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), `at` is\n *                      ignored (backward compatible).\n *\n * Security note on baked secrets:\n *   The TOTP secret baked in via `__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__` is present in the\n *   dogfood bundle and is extractable by a determined reverse engineer.\n *   The practical bar raised is: \"URL leak\" (Slack paste, QR screenshot) →\n *   blocked; \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP code\" → not blocked.\n *   This is the intended threat model. Do not overpromise on this guarantee.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `verifyTotpCode` is a black-box predicate. This module\n *   does NOT log the secret, any code value, or pass/fail details beyond the\n *   `'auth'` reason enum.\n *\n * Decision matrix (gate only runs in a debug build — Layer A already passed):\n *\n *   host ok | _deploymentId | debug=1 | relay ok | TOTP ok* | result\n *   no      | (any)         | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (host)\n *   yes     | absent        | (any)   | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (entry)\n *   yes     | present       | absent  | (any)    | (any)    | BLOCKED (opt-in)\n *   yes     | present       | present | invalid  | (any)    | BLOCKED (invalid-relay)\n *   yes     | present       | present | valid    | fail*    | BLOCKED (auth)\n *   yes     | present       | present | valid    | pass/n/a | ATTACH\n *\n *   * \"TOTP ok\" column only applies when `verifyTotpCode` is provided.\n *     When no verifier is injected, TOTP check is skipped entirely.\n */\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate allows attachment. */\nexport interface GateResultAttach {\n  readonly attach: true;\n  /** The validated `wss:` relay URL from the `relay` query param. */\n  readonly relayUrl: string;\n  /** The deployment ID extracted from the `_deploymentId` query param. */\n  readonly deploymentId: string;\n}\n\n/** Shape returned when the gate blocks attachment, with a reason code. */\nexport interface GateResultBlocked {\n  readonly attach: false;\n  /**\n   * - `'host'`          Layer B1: `hostname` is not a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host.\n   * - `'entry'`         Layer B2: `_deploymentId` param is absent or empty.\n   * - `'opt-in'`        Layer C1: `debug=1` param is absent.\n   * - `'invalid-relay'` Layer C2: `relay` param is absent, empty, or not a `wss:` URL.\n   * - `'auth'`          Layer C3: TOTP `at=` code is absent, invalid, or expired\n   *                     (only when a `verifyTotpCode` predicate is injected).\n   *\n   * There is no `'build'` reason: Layer A is enforced by the consumer's\n   * `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard, not by this function.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: `'auth'` is the only value surfaced for auth failures —\n   * no code value, expected value, or secret fragment is ever exposed.\n   */\n  readonly reason: 'host' | 'entry' | 'opt-in' | 'invalid-relay' | 'auth';\n}\n\nexport type GateResult = GateResultAttach | GateResultBlocked;\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link evaluateDebugGate}.\n *\n * All fields are explicit so the function is trivially testable without\n * touching `window`.\n */\nexport interface GateInput {\n  /**\n   * The host the page is served from — `window.location.hostname`.\n   *\n   * This is the Layer B1 security signal. Why hostname and not the entry\n   * scheme: the Toss SDK normalises `intoss-private://` to `intoss://` in\n   * `getSchemeUri()`, and `getOperationalEnvironment()` / `getWebViewType()`\n   * return the same value (`\"toss\"` / `\"partner\"`) for both dogfood and\n   * production entries — none of them distinguish a dogfood entry. The host\n   * does: a dogfood / private-apps entry is served from\n   * `*.private-apps.tossmini.com`, a production entry is not. This was\n   * confirmed live over CDP against mini-app 31146 (see spec open question 2).\n   */\n  readonly hostname: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The URL search params to inspect for gate signals (Layers B2 and C).\n   *\n   * Prefer `URLSearchParams` so callers can pass `new URLSearchParams(location.search)`\n   * without coupling the pure function to `window`.\n   */\n  readonly searchParams: URLSearchParams;\n\n  /**\n   * Optional TOTP code verifier for Layer C3 auth gate.\n   *\n   * When provided, `evaluateDebugGate` reads the `at` query param and passes\n   * it to this predicate. Return `true` to allow, `false` to block with\n   * `reason: 'auth'`.\n   *\n   * Inject via the consumer's build define, e.g.:\n   * ```ts\n   * // dogfood build entry — consumer's build injects __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__\n   * declare const __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__: string | undefined;\n   * const verifyTotpCode = typeof __DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__ !== 'undefined'\n   *   ? (code: string) => verifyTotp(__DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET__, code)\n   *   : undefined;\n   * maybeAttach(evaluateDebugGate({ ...params, verifyTotpCode }));\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Security note: this predicate is a black-box from the gate's perspective.\n   * The gate only surfaces pass/fail and the `'auth'` reason code — no code\n   * value or secret fragment is ever logged or returned.\n   *\n   * When `undefined` (TOTP disabled), `at=` is silently ignored and the gate\n   * proceeds to ATTACH if all other layers pass.\n   */\n  readonly verifyTotpCode?: (code: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * The host suffix the Toss app uses to serve dogfood / private mini-apps.\n *\n * A `intoss-private://` (dogfood) entry maps to a host such as\n * `aitc-sdk-example.private-apps.tossmini.com`. A production `intoss://`\n * entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` — the `.private-apps.` segment\n * is absent. Confirmed live over CDP for mini-app 31146; the exact production\n * host is to be re-confirmed once 31146 passes review (spec open question 2).\n */\nconst PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX = '.private-apps.tossmini.com';\n\n/**\n * Returns whether `hostname` is a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` subdomain —\n * the host the Toss app reserves for dogfood / private mini-app entries.\n *\n * The match is an exact suffix check, not a substring `.includes()`: a\n * substring test would also accept an attacker-controlled host like\n * `private-apps.tossmini.com.evil.example`, which ends in `.example`, not in\n * `.tossmini.com`. Requiring the string to END with the suffix closes that.\n * The leading `.` in the suffix also forces a real subdomain label, so a\n * bare `private-apps.tossmini.com` (no mini-app subdomain) does not match.\n */\nexport function isPrivateAppsHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  return hostname.endsWith(PRIVATE_APPS_HOST_SUFFIX);\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure function that evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C).\n *\n * Has no side effects. The input is explicit. Returns a discriminated union\n * so callers can pattern-match on `result.attach`.\n *\n * Layer A (build-time) is intentionally not evaluated here — see the file-level\n * comment. By the time this function runs, the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)`\n * guard has already passed; this function only decides B and C.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const result = evaluateDebugGate({\n *   hostname: window.location.hostname,\n *   searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n * });\n * if (result.attach) {\n *   // Proceed to load Chii client\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function evaluateDebugGate(input: GateInput): GateResult {\n  // Layer B1 — host allowlist (the security gate).\n  // The page must be served from a `*.private-apps.tossmini.com` host. A\n  // production `intoss://` entry is served from `*.apps.tossmini.com` and is\n  // rejected here. This is what stops a dogfood build that somehow reaches a\n  // production entry from attaching: Layer A keeps debug code out of release\n  // bundles, and this layer keeps a dogfood bundle that lands on a production\n  // host from attaching even though its code is present.\n  if (!isPrivateAppsHost(input.hostname)) {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'host' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer B2 — runtime entry query gate.\n  // `_deploymentId` must be present and non-empty. The `intoss-private://`\n  // scheme used for dogfood entries includes this param; general user entry\n  // paths do not.\n  const deploymentId = input.searchParams.get('_deploymentId') ?? '';\n  if (deploymentId === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'entry' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C — explicit opt-in gate.\n  // Require `debug=1` so that an operator who opens a dogfood URL by accident\n  // does not inadvertently trigger the debug surface.\n  const debugParam = input.searchParams.get('debug');\n  if (debugParam !== '1') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'opt-in' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C continued — relay URL validation.\n  // `relay=<wss-url>` must be present and must use the `wss:` scheme.\n  // Plain `ws:` is rejected (no TLS). `http:`/`https:` are rejected.\n  const relayRaw = input.searchParams.get('relay') ?? '';\n  if (relayRaw === '') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  let relayUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    relayUrl = new URL(relayRaw);\n  } catch {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  if (relayUrl.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    return { attach: false, reason: 'invalid-relay' };\n  }\n\n  // Layer C3 — TOTP auth gate (fail-fast, only when a verifier is injected).\n  // The `at` query param carries the current TOTP code. Absent or invalid code\n  // → BLOCKED. When no verifier is provided (TOTP disabled), this check is\n  // skipped entirely for backward compatibility.\n  //\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: we do NOT log `code`, the verifier's result, or anything\n  // derived from the secret. Only the `'auth'` enum is surfaced on failure.\n  if (input.verifyTotpCode !== undefined) {\n    const code = input.searchParams.get('at') ?? '';\n    if (!input.verifyTotpCode(code)) {\n      return { attach: false, reason: 'auth' };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { attach: true, relayUrl: relayUrl.href, deploymentId };\n}\n","/**\n * In-app Chii target injection for the debug attach flow.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n * \"MCP attach\" topology section — Phase 1 browser-side implementation.\n *\n * This module bridges the 3-layer gate result to a Chii `target.js` script\n * injection. The Chii npm package is the relay SERVER — the in-app side is\n * a plain `<script src=\"…/target.js\">` pointing at the relay host. No chii\n * npm dependency is needed here.\n */\n\nimport { checkDebugGate, type GateResult } from './index.js';\n\n/**\n * Converts a validated `wss:` relay URL into the Chii `target.js` script URL.\n *\n * Scheme is mapped `wss:` → `https:`. Host and port are preserved.\n * Pathname is set to `/target.js` regardless of the relay path.\n * Query params and hash from the relay URL are dropped — the target script\n * URL is a static asset path on the same host.\n *\n * @example\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://abc.trycloudflare.com/relay')\n * // → 'https://abc.trycloudflare.com/target.js'\n *\n * deriveTargetScriptUrl('wss://h.example.com:9100/')\n * // → 'https://h.example.com:9100/target.js'\n */\nexport function deriveTargetScriptUrl(relayUrl: string): string {\n  const u = new URL(relayUrl);\n  u.protocol = 'https:';\n  u.pathname = '/target.js';\n  u.search = '';\n  u.hash = '';\n  return u.toString();\n}\n\n/** Module-level guard against double-injection within a page lifecycle. */\nlet attached = false;\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the 3-layer debug gate and, if the gate passes, injects the Chii\n * `target.js` script into `document.head`.\n *\n * Idempotent — calling more than once is safe. The second call is a no-op if\n * a script with the same `src` is already present in the document, and the\n * module-level `attached` flag prevents redundant DOM queries after the first\n * successful injection.\n *\n * Safe to call even if `document` is somehow unavailable (defensive boundary\n * guard — in practice this always runs in a real WebView).\n *\n * @param gateResult - Optional pre-evaluated gate result for testability.\n *   Defaults to `checkDebugGate()` which reads the current page URL. Passing a\n *   custom value avoids the need to manipulate `window.location` in tests.\n */\nexport function maybeAttach(gateResult: GateResult = checkDebugGate()): void {\n  if (!gateResult.attach) {\n    console.debug(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] debug attach skipped — gate blocked (reason: ${gateResult.reason})`,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Guard against double-injection across repeated calls.\n  if (attached) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Defensive: if document is not available (unusual, but possible in some\n  // SSR-adjacent edge cases), bail silently rather than throwing.\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const src = deriveTargetScriptUrl(gateResult.relayUrl);\n\n  // Also guard against a script with the same src already in the DOM\n  // (e.g. injected by a different code path or a page reload within SPA).\n  const existing = document.querySelector<HTMLScriptElement>(`script[src=\"${src}\"]`);\n  if (existing !== null) {\n    attached = true;\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const script = document.createElement('script');\n  script.src = src;\n  script.async = true;\n  (document.head ?? document.documentElement).appendChild(script);\n\n  attached = true;\n}\n","/**\n * @ait-co/devtools/in-app entry point.\n *\n * Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-in-app-debug-mcp.md\n *\n * Phase 1 — gate + browser-side Chii target injection.\n * WebSocket relay, QR/paste UI, and AI-host MCP bin are later phases that\n * require real-device validation and are not included here.\n *\n * This thin entry reads `window.location` and calls the pure\n * {@link evaluateDebugGate} function. All testable logic lives in `./gate.ts`\n * and `./attach.ts`, not here.\n *\n * Layer A of the activation gate (build-time) is NOT enforced in this module.\n * It is the consumer's responsibility: the consumer wraps its\n * `import('@ait-co/devtools/in-app')` call site in `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__) { … }`\n * (see sdk-example `src/main.tsx`), where `__DEBUG_BUILD__` is a\n * consumer-build-time constant. A release consumer build folds that constant\n * to `false` and dead-code-eliminates this whole module. This package is\n * pre-built and ships with `__DEBUG_BUILD__` already resolved at devtools'\n * publish time, so it could never re-evaluate the consumer's build channel —\n * which is exactly why Layer A lives at the consumer guard, not here.\n */\n\nimport { evaluateDebugGate, type GateResult } from './gate.js';\n\nexport { deriveTargetScriptUrl, maybeAttach } from './attach.js';\nexport type { GateInput, GateResult, GateResultAttach, GateResultBlocked } from './gate.js';\nexport { evaluateDebugGate, isPrivateAppsHost } from './gate.js';\n\n/**\n * Evaluates the runtime debug activation layers (B and C) against the current\n * page URL.\n *\n * Returns the gate result. Callers can check `result.attach` to decide whether\n * to proceed with debug surface attachment.\n *\n * This function reads `window.location` only — both the hostname (Layer B1\n * host allowlist) and the search params (Layers B2 and C). Layer A\n * (build-time) is enforced by the consumer's `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` guard\n * around the import site, not here — see the file-level comment. Consumers\n * call this with no arguments, so the Layer B1 host check is picked up with\n * no change at the call site.\n */\nexport function checkDebugGate(): GateResult {\n  return evaluateDebugGate({\n    hostname: window.location.hostname,\n    searchParams: new URLSearchParams(window.location.search),\n  });\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AA8JA,MAAM,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;AAajC,SAAgB,kBAAkB,UAA2B;AAC3D,QAAO,SAAS,SAAS,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBpD,SAAgB,kBAAkB,OAA8B;AAQ9D,KAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,MAAM,SAAS,CACpC,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAQ;CAO1C,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAChE,KAAI,iBAAiB,GACnB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAS;AAO3C,KADmB,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,KAC/B,IACjB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAU;CAM5C,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AACpD,KAAI,aAAa,GACf,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;CAGnD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,aAAW,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;SACtB;AACN,SAAO;GAAE,QAAQ;GAAO,QAAQ;GAAiB;;AAGnD,KAAI,SAAS,aAAa,OACxB,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;AAUnD,KAAI,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAA,GAAW;EACtC,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AAC7C,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,CAC7B,QAAO;GAAE,QAAQ;GAAO,QAAQ;GAAQ;;AAI5C,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAM,UAAU,SAAS;EAAM;EAAc;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACrOhE,SAAgB,sBAAsB,UAA0B;CAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC3B,GAAE,WAAW;AACb,GAAE,WAAW;AACb,GAAE,SAAS;AACX,GAAE,OAAO;AACT,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU;;;AAIrB,IAAI,WAAW;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBf,SAAgB,YAAY,aAAyB,gBAAgB,EAAQ;AAC3E,KAAI,CAAC,WAAW,QAAQ;AACtB,UAAQ,MACN,mEAAmE,WAAW,OAAO,GACtF;AACD;;AAIF,KAAI,SACF;AAKF,KAAI,OAAO,aAAa,YACtB;CAGF,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,WAAW,SAAS;AAKtD,KADiB,SAAS,cAAiC,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,KACjE,MAAM;AACrB,aAAW;AACX;;CAGF,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,SAAS;AAC/C,QAAO,MAAM;AACb,QAAO,QAAQ;AACf,EAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB,YAAY,OAAO;AAE/D,YAAW;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AC/Cb,SAAgB,iBAA6B;AAC3C,QAAO,kBAAkB;EACvB,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS;EAC1B,cAAc,IAAI,gBAAgB,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;EAC1D,CAAC"}