@ait-co/devtools 0.1.143 → 0.1.144

package/dist/{relay-url-store-1FGuSYAn.cjs → relay-url-store-C1as_m5G.cjs}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-const require_relay_secret_store = require("./relay-secret-store-DWKdV-eY.cjs");
+const require_relay_secret_store = require("./relay-secret-store-BR0YIkNv.cjs");
 let node_path = require("node:path");
 //#region src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts
 /**
@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ async function deleteRelayUrls(deps) {
 exports.deleteRelayUrls = deleteRelayUrls;
 exports.writeRelayUrls = writeRelayUrls;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=relay-url-store-1FGuSYAn.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-url-store-C1as_m5G.cjs.map

package/dist/{relay-url-store-1FGuSYAn.cjs.map → relay-url-store-C1as_m5G.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"relay-url-store-1FGuSYAn.cjs","names":["nearestPackageJsonDir"],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local ephemeral URL store (#424).\n *\n * Environment-2 (\"AITC Sandbox PWA\") cold-start requires two ephemeral URLs:\n *   - `relayBaseUrl` — the CDP relay's https base (was `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`)\n *   - `tunnelBaseUrl` — the app's https tunnel base (was `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`)\n *\n * Quick-tunnel URLs change every run. Previously the user had to copy-paste them\n * into env vars on every cold-start — a single typo silently broke attach. This\n * module replaces that manual hand-off with a file-based discovery pattern that\n * exactly mirrors the `.ait_relay` TOTP-secret store (relay-secret-store.ts).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link writeRelayUrls} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 tunnel boot). Writes JSON to `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (0600) on\n *     every boot (`flag: 'w'` — overwrite). A single file — no directory is\n *     created.\n *\n *   - {@link readRelayUrls} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP daemon as a\n *     fallback when `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`/`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL` are not set. It\n *     NEVER writes, chmods, or creates anything: it only reads an existing\n *     `.ait_urls`. On any failure (missing file / bad JSON / wrong shape) it\n *     returns `null` silently, letting the downstream assertion be the single\n *     fail-fast.\n *\n *   - {@link deleteRelayUrls} — called from the unplugin `cleanup()` on\n *     teardown (via `void deleteRelayUrls(...)`). A stale `.ait_urls` pointing\n *     at a dead tunnel would cause the MCP daemon to attempt a doomed attach on\n *     the next cold-start — deletion is non-negotiable. Silently swallows all\n *     errors.\n *\n * Design note: the env vars (`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`, `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`) are\n * PRESERVED as operator overrides. The file is the fallback — env wins.\n *\n * Why `nearestPackageJsonDir` instead of `process.cwd()`: see relay-secret-store.ts.\n * The unplugin (writer) and the MCP daemon (reader) both anchor to the nearest\n * package.json from their respective `projectRoot` inputs, ensuring both sides\n * find the same file.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `relayBaseUrl` and `tunnelBaseUrl` carry the relay/tunnel host\n * — same sensitivity class as `.ait_relay`. The raw URL values, partial values,\n * and the resolved file path MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout,\n * stderr, or assertion output anywhere in this module or at its call sites.\n * Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface. The file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { nearestPackageJsonDir } from './relay-secret-store.js';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local ephemeral URL file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const URLS_FILE_NAME = '.ait_urls';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surfaces\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link writeRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlWriteFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link readRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlReadFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link deleteRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlDeleteFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  unlinkSync(path: string): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helper\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_urls` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function urlsFilePath(start: string, existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), URLS_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — overwrite on every boot\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface WriteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's https base URL (same value as `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when the relay was not started (e.g. `cdp:false`).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's LOCAL http base URL (`http://127.0.0.1:<relay-port>`).\n   * Set when `cdp: true` and the local relay port is known. Used by the MCP\n   * daemon's `bootExternalRelayFamily` to build the Chii inspector URL against\n   * the local relay rather than the cloudflare tunnel, so front_end page load\n   * and the client WS leg do not traverse the tunnel (issue #530).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: local loopback URL — no tunnel host, safe to surface.\n   */\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The app tunnel's https base URL (same value as `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when no tunnel URL is available.\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelayUrlWriteFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes `{ relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl }` (omitting absent keys) to\n * `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (mode 0600). Uses `flag: 'w'` (overwrite) because\n * URLs are ephemeral — a fresh URL replaces the previous one on every boot.\n *\n * Unlike the `.ait_relay` secret store this does NOT use `O_EXCL` (`'wx'`):\n * there is no race concern here (only the unplugin writes this file) and the\n * URL must be fresh on every cold-start.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 tunnel boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link readRelayUrls} (read-only) — it must never write.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values are never logged.\n */\nexport async function writeRelayUrls(deps: WriteRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps;\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlWriteFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // Build the payload — omit keys whose values are absent.\n  const payload: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n  if (typeof relayBaseUrl === 'string' && relayBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayBaseUrl = relayBaseUrl;\n  }\n  const { relayLocalUrl } = deps;\n  if (typeof relayLocalUrl === 'string' && relayLocalUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayLocalUrl = relayLocalUrl;\n  }\n  if (typeof tunnelBaseUrl === 'string' && tunnelBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.tunnelBaseUrl = tunnelBaseUrl;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: JSON content (which includes URL values) is written to\n  // the file only — never to any log, stdout, or stderr.\n  const data = JSON.stringify(payload);\n\n  // Overwrite on every boot (`flag: 'w'`) — URLs are ephemeral.\n  fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'w' });\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never writes, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ReadRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root supplied per-debug-session. When omitted, returns `null`. */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelayUrlReadFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` and returns the stored URLs, or `null` on\n * any failure.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: only `existsSync` + `readFileSync`. Never writes,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories.\n *\n * Returns `null` (silently, no throw, no log) on:\n *   - missing `projectRoot`\n *   - missing `.ait_urls` file\n *   - unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error)\n *   - invalid JSON\n *   - wrong shape (non-object, non-string values)\n *\n * Trims string values before returning. Ignores non-string fields.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values and the file path are never logged.\n */\nexport async function readRelayUrls(deps?: ReadRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<{\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n} | null> {\n  const { projectRoot, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps ?? {};\n\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlReadFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let raw: string;\n  try {\n    raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file — silent no-op, let the downstream assert be the fail-fast.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are not surfaced.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // Invalid JSON — silent no-op.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const result: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n\n  const relay = obj.relayBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof relay === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relay.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const relayLocal = obj.relayLocalUrl;\n  if (typeof relayLocal === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relayLocal.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayLocalUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const tunnel = obj.tunnelBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof tunnel === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = tunnel.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.tunnelBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DELETE path (unplugin cleanup only)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface DeleteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root. */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. 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+{"version":3,"file":"relay-url-store-C1as_m5G.cjs","names":["nearestPackageJsonDir"],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local ephemeral URL store (#424).\n *\n * Environment-2 (\"AITC Sandbox PWA\") cold-start requires two ephemeral URLs:\n *   - `relayBaseUrl` — the CDP relay's https base (was `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`)\n *   - `tunnelBaseUrl` — the app's https tunnel base (was `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`)\n *\n * Quick-tunnel URLs change every run. Previously the user had to copy-paste them\n * into env vars on every cold-start — a single typo silently broke attach. This\n * module replaces that manual hand-off with a file-based discovery pattern that\n * exactly mirrors the `.ait_relay` TOTP-secret store (relay-secret-store.ts).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link writeRelayUrls} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 tunnel boot). Writes JSON to `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (0600) on\n *     every boot (`flag: 'w'` — overwrite). A single file — no directory is\n *     created.\n *\n *   - {@link readRelayUrls} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP daemon as a\n *     fallback when `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`/`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL` are not set. It\n *     NEVER writes, chmods, or creates anything: it only reads an existing\n *     `.ait_urls`. On any failure (missing file / bad JSON / wrong shape) it\n *     returns `null` silently, letting the downstream assertion be the single\n *     fail-fast.\n *\n *   - {@link deleteRelayUrls} — called from the unplugin `cleanup()` on\n *     teardown (via `void deleteRelayUrls(...)`). A stale `.ait_urls` pointing\n *     at a dead tunnel would cause the MCP daemon to attempt a doomed attach on\n *     the next cold-start — deletion is non-negotiable. Silently swallows all\n *     errors.\n *\n * Design note: the env vars (`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`, `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`) are\n * PRESERVED as operator overrides. The file is the fallback — env wins.\n *\n * Why `nearestPackageJsonDir` instead of `process.cwd()`: see relay-secret-store.ts.\n * The unplugin (writer) and the MCP daemon (reader) both anchor to the nearest\n * package.json from their respective `projectRoot` inputs, ensuring both sides\n * find the same file.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `relayBaseUrl` and `tunnelBaseUrl` carry the relay/tunnel host\n * — same sensitivity class as `.ait_relay`. The raw URL values, partial values,\n * and the resolved file path MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout,\n * stderr, or assertion output anywhere in this module or at its call sites.\n * Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface. The file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { nearestPackageJsonDir } from './relay-secret-store.js';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local ephemeral URL file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const URLS_FILE_NAME = '.ait_urls';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surfaces\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link writeRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlWriteFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link readRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlReadFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link deleteRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlDeleteFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  unlinkSync(path: string): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helper\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_urls` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function urlsFilePath(start: string, existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), URLS_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — overwrite on every boot\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface WriteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's https base URL (same value as `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when the relay was not started (e.g. `cdp:false`).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's LOCAL http base URL (`http://127.0.0.1:<relay-port>`).\n   * Set when `cdp: true` and the local relay port is known. Used by the MCP\n   * daemon's `bootExternalRelayFamily` to build the Chii inspector URL against\n   * the local relay rather than the cloudflare tunnel, so front_end page load\n   * and the client WS leg do not traverse the tunnel (issue #530).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: local loopback URL — no tunnel host, safe to surface.\n   */\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The app tunnel's https base URL (same value as `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when no tunnel URL is available.\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelayUrlWriteFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes `{ relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl }` (omitting absent keys) to\n * `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (mode 0600). Uses `flag: 'w'` (overwrite) because\n * URLs are ephemeral — a fresh URL replaces the previous one on every boot.\n *\n * Unlike the `.ait_relay` secret store this does NOT use `O_EXCL` (`'wx'`):\n * there is no race concern here (only the unplugin writes this file) and the\n * URL must be fresh on every cold-start.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 tunnel boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link readRelayUrls} (read-only) — it must never write.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values are never logged.\n */\nexport async function writeRelayUrls(deps: WriteRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps;\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlWriteFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // Build the payload — omit keys whose values are absent.\n  const payload: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n  if (typeof relayBaseUrl === 'string' && relayBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayBaseUrl = relayBaseUrl;\n  }\n  const { relayLocalUrl } = deps;\n  if (typeof relayLocalUrl === 'string' && relayLocalUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayLocalUrl = relayLocalUrl;\n  }\n  if (typeof tunnelBaseUrl === 'string' && tunnelBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.tunnelBaseUrl = tunnelBaseUrl;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: JSON content (which includes URL values) is written to\n  // the file only — never to any log, stdout, or stderr.\n  const data = JSON.stringify(payload);\n\n  // Overwrite on every boot (`flag: 'w'`) — URLs are ephemeral.\n  fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'w' });\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never writes, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ReadRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root supplied per-debug-session. When omitted, returns `null`. */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelayUrlReadFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` and returns the stored URLs, or `null` on\n * any failure.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: only `existsSync` + `readFileSync`. Never writes,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories.\n *\n * Returns `null` (silently, no throw, no log) on:\n *   - missing `projectRoot`\n *   - missing `.ait_urls` file\n *   - unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error)\n *   - invalid JSON\n *   - wrong shape (non-object, non-string values)\n *\n * Trims string values before returning. Ignores non-string fields.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values and the file path are never logged.\n */\nexport async function readRelayUrls(deps?: ReadRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<{\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n} | null> {\n  const { projectRoot, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps ?? {};\n\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlReadFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let raw: string;\n  try {\n    raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file — silent no-op, let the downstream assert be the fail-fast.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are not surfaced.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // Invalid JSON — silent no-op.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const result: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n\n  const relay = obj.relayBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof relay === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relay.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const relayLocal = obj.relayLocalUrl;\n  if (typeof relayLocal === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relayLocal.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayLocalUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const tunnel = obj.tunnelBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof tunnel === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = tunnel.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.tunnelBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DELETE path (unplugin cleanup only)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface DeleteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root. */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + unlinkSync). */\n  fs?: RelayUrlDeleteFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Removes `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` if present. Silently swallows ENOENT and\n * any other error so cleanup always succeeds.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin's `cleanup()` on `httpServer 'close'` + signals\n * (via `void deleteRelayUrls(...)`). A stale `.ait_urls` pointing at a dead\n * tunnel would cause the MCP daemon to attempt a doomed attach on the next\n * cold-start — deletion is non-negotiable.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the file path is never logged.\n */\nexport async function deleteRelayUrls(deps: DeleteRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps;\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlDeleteFs = fsDep ?? 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package/dist/{relay-url-store-Bskcyeg8.js → relay-url-store-CzFo_84F.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { nearestPackageJsonDir } from "./relay-secret-store-BPhN1upr.js";
+import { nearestPackageJsonDir } from "./relay-secret-store-CYM8CBIF.js";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 //#region src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts
 /**
@@ -111,4 +111,4 @@ async function deleteRelayUrls(deps) {
 //#endregion
 export { deleteRelayUrls, writeRelayUrls };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=relay-url-store-Bskcyeg8.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-url-store-CzFo_84F.js.map

package/dist/{relay-url-store-Bskcyeg8.js.map → relay-url-store-CzFo_84F.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"relay-url-store-Bskcyeg8.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local ephemeral URL store (#424).\n *\n * Environment-2 (\"AITC Sandbox PWA\") cold-start requires two ephemeral URLs:\n *   - `relayBaseUrl` — the CDP relay's https base (was `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`)\n *   - `tunnelBaseUrl` — the app's https tunnel base (was `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`)\n *\n * Quick-tunnel URLs change every run. Previously the user had to copy-paste them\n * into env vars on every cold-start — a single typo silently broke attach. This\n * module replaces that manual hand-off with a file-based discovery pattern that\n * exactly mirrors the `.ait_relay` TOTP-secret store (relay-secret-store.ts).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link writeRelayUrls} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 tunnel boot). Writes JSON to `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (0600) on\n *     every boot (`flag: 'w'` — overwrite). A single file — no directory is\n *     created.\n *\n *   - {@link readRelayUrls} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP daemon as a\n *     fallback when `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`/`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL` are not set. It\n *     NEVER writes, chmods, or creates anything: it only reads an existing\n *     `.ait_urls`. On any failure (missing file / bad JSON / wrong shape) it\n *     returns `null` silently, letting the downstream assertion be the single\n *     fail-fast.\n *\n *   - {@link deleteRelayUrls} — called from the unplugin `cleanup()` on\n *     teardown (via `void deleteRelayUrls(...)`). A stale `.ait_urls` pointing\n *     at a dead tunnel would cause the MCP daemon to attempt a doomed attach on\n *     the next cold-start — deletion is non-negotiable. Silently swallows all\n *     errors.\n *\n * Design note: the env vars (`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`, `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`) are\n * PRESERVED as operator overrides. The file is the fallback — env wins.\n *\n * Why `nearestPackageJsonDir` instead of `process.cwd()`: see relay-secret-store.ts.\n * The unplugin (writer) and the MCP daemon (reader) both anchor to the nearest\n * package.json from their respective `projectRoot` inputs, ensuring both sides\n * find the same file.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `relayBaseUrl` and `tunnelBaseUrl` carry the relay/tunnel host\n * — same sensitivity class as `.ait_relay`. The raw URL values, partial values,\n * and the resolved file path MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout,\n * stderr, or assertion output anywhere in this module or at its call sites.\n * Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface. The file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { nearestPackageJsonDir } from './relay-secret-store.js';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local ephemeral URL file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const URLS_FILE_NAME = '.ait_urls';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surfaces\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link writeRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlWriteFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link readRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlReadFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link deleteRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlDeleteFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  unlinkSync(path: string): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helper\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_urls` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function urlsFilePath(start: string, existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), URLS_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — overwrite on every boot\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface WriteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's https base URL (same value as `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when the relay was not started (e.g. `cdp:false`).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's LOCAL http base URL (`http://127.0.0.1:<relay-port>`).\n   * Set when `cdp: true` and the local relay port is known. Used by the MCP\n   * daemon's `bootExternalRelayFamily` to build the Chii inspector URL against\n   * the local relay rather than the cloudflare tunnel, so front_end page load\n   * and the client WS leg do not traverse the tunnel (issue #530).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: local loopback URL — no tunnel host, safe to surface.\n   */\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The app tunnel's https base URL (same value as `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when no tunnel URL is available.\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelayUrlWriteFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes `{ relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl }` (omitting absent keys) to\n * `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (mode 0600). Uses `flag: 'w'` (overwrite) because\n * URLs are ephemeral — a fresh URL replaces the previous one on every boot.\n *\n * Unlike the `.ait_relay` secret store this does NOT use `O_EXCL` (`'wx'`):\n * there is no race concern here (only the unplugin writes this file) and the\n * URL must be fresh on every cold-start.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 tunnel boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link readRelayUrls} (read-only) — it must never write.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values are never logged.\n */\nexport async function writeRelayUrls(deps: WriteRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps;\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlWriteFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // Build the payload — omit keys whose values are absent.\n  const payload: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n  if (typeof relayBaseUrl === 'string' && relayBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayBaseUrl = relayBaseUrl;\n  }\n  const { relayLocalUrl } = deps;\n  if (typeof relayLocalUrl === 'string' && relayLocalUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayLocalUrl = relayLocalUrl;\n  }\n  if (typeof tunnelBaseUrl === 'string' && tunnelBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.tunnelBaseUrl = tunnelBaseUrl;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: JSON content (which includes URL values) is written to\n  // the file only — never to any log, stdout, or stderr.\n  const data = JSON.stringify(payload);\n\n  // Overwrite on every boot (`flag: 'w'`) — URLs are ephemeral.\n  fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'w' });\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never writes, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ReadRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root supplied per-debug-session. When omitted, returns `null`. */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelayUrlReadFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` and returns the stored URLs, or `null` on\n * any failure.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: only `existsSync` + `readFileSync`. Never writes,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories.\n *\n * Returns `null` (silently, no throw, no log) on:\n *   - missing `projectRoot`\n *   - missing `.ait_urls` file\n *   - unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error)\n *   - invalid JSON\n *   - wrong shape (non-object, non-string values)\n *\n * Trims string values before returning. Ignores non-string fields.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values and the file path are never logged.\n */\nexport async function readRelayUrls(deps?: ReadRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<{\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n} | null> {\n  const { projectRoot, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps ?? {};\n\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlReadFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let raw: string;\n  try {\n    raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file — silent no-op, let the downstream assert be the fail-fast.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are not surfaced.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // Invalid JSON — silent no-op.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const result: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n\n  const relay = obj.relayBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof relay === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relay.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const relayLocal = obj.relayLocalUrl;\n  if (typeof relayLocal === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relayLocal.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayLocalUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const tunnel = obj.tunnelBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof tunnel === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = tunnel.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.tunnelBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DELETE path (unplugin cleanup only)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface DeleteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root. */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. 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+{"version":3,"file":"relay-url-store-CzFo_84F.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-url-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local ephemeral URL store (#424).\n *\n * Environment-2 (\"AITC Sandbox PWA\") cold-start requires two ephemeral URLs:\n *   - `relayBaseUrl` — the CDP relay's https base (was `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`)\n *   - `tunnelBaseUrl` — the app's https tunnel base (was `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`)\n *\n * Quick-tunnel URLs change every run. Previously the user had to copy-paste them\n * into env vars on every cold-start — a single typo silently broke attach. This\n * module replaces that manual hand-off with a file-based discovery pattern that\n * exactly mirrors the `.ait_relay` TOTP-secret store (relay-secret-store.ts).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link writeRelayUrls} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 tunnel boot). Writes JSON to `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (0600) on\n *     every boot (`flag: 'w'` — overwrite). A single file — no directory is\n *     created.\n *\n *   - {@link readRelayUrls} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP daemon as a\n *     fallback when `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`/`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL` are not set. It\n *     NEVER writes, chmods, or creates anything: it only reads an existing\n *     `.ait_urls`. On any failure (missing file / bad JSON / wrong shape) it\n *     returns `null` silently, letting the downstream assertion be the single\n *     fail-fast.\n *\n *   - {@link deleteRelayUrls} — called from the unplugin `cleanup()` on\n *     teardown (via `void deleteRelayUrls(...)`). A stale `.ait_urls` pointing\n *     at a dead tunnel would cause the MCP daemon to attempt a doomed attach on\n *     the next cold-start — deletion is non-negotiable. Silently swallows all\n *     errors.\n *\n * Design note: the env vars (`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`, `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`) are\n * PRESERVED as operator overrides. The file is the fallback — env wins.\n *\n * Why `nearestPackageJsonDir` instead of `process.cwd()`: see relay-secret-store.ts.\n * The unplugin (writer) and the MCP daemon (reader) both anchor to the nearest\n * package.json from their respective `projectRoot` inputs, ensuring both sides\n * find the same file.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `relayBaseUrl` and `tunnelBaseUrl` carry the relay/tunnel host\n * — same sensitivity class as `.ait_relay`. The raw URL values, partial values,\n * and the resolved file path MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout,\n * stderr, or assertion output anywhere in this module or at its call sites.\n * Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface. The file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { nearestPackageJsonDir } from './relay-secret-store.js';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local ephemeral URL file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const URLS_FILE_NAME = '.ait_urls';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surfaces\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link writeRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlWriteFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link readRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlReadFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link deleteRelayUrls} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelayUrlDeleteFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  unlinkSync(path: string): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helper\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_urls` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function urlsFilePath(start: string, existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), URLS_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — overwrite on every boot\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface WriteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's https base URL (same value as `AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when the relay was not started (e.g. `cdp:false`).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The CDP relay's LOCAL http base URL (`http://127.0.0.1:<relay-port>`).\n   * Set when `cdp: true` and the local relay port is known. Used by the MCP\n   * daemon's `bootExternalRelayFamily` to build the Chii inspector URL against\n   * the local relay rather than the cloudflare tunnel, so front_end page load\n   * and the client WS leg do not traverse the tunnel (issue #530).\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: local loopback URL — no tunnel host, safe to surface.\n   */\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * The app tunnel's https base URL (same value as `AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`).\n   * Omit when no tunnel URL is available.\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: never log this value.\n   */\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelayUrlWriteFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes `{ relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl }` (omitting absent keys) to\n * `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` (mode 0600). Uses `flag: 'w'` (overwrite) because\n * URLs are ephemeral — a fresh URL replaces the previous one on every boot.\n *\n * Unlike the `.ait_relay` secret store this does NOT use `O_EXCL` (`'wx'`):\n * there is no race concern here (only the unplugin writes this file) and the\n * URL must be fresh on every cold-start.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 tunnel boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link readRelayUrls} (read-only) — it must never write.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values are never logged.\n */\nexport async function writeRelayUrls(deps: WriteRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, relayBaseUrl, tunnelBaseUrl, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps;\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlWriteFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // Build the payload — omit keys whose values are absent.\n  const payload: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n  if (typeof relayBaseUrl === 'string' && relayBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayBaseUrl = relayBaseUrl;\n  }\n  const { relayLocalUrl } = deps;\n  if (typeof relayLocalUrl === 'string' && relayLocalUrl !== '') {\n    payload.relayLocalUrl = relayLocalUrl;\n  }\n  if (typeof tunnelBaseUrl === 'string' && tunnelBaseUrl !== '') {\n    payload.tunnelBaseUrl = tunnelBaseUrl;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: JSON content (which includes URL values) is written to\n  // the file only — never to any log, stdout, or stderr.\n  const data = JSON.stringify(payload);\n\n  // Overwrite on every boot (`flag: 'w'`) — URLs are ephemeral.\n  fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'w' });\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never writes, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface ReadRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root supplied per-debug-session. When omitted, returns `null`. */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelayUrlReadFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads `<projectRoot>/.ait_urls` and returns the stored URLs, or `null` on\n * any failure.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: only `existsSync` + `readFileSync`. Never writes,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories.\n *\n * Returns `null` (silently, no throw, no log) on:\n *   - missing `projectRoot`\n *   - missing `.ait_urls` file\n *   - unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error)\n *   - invalid JSON\n *   - wrong shape (non-object, non-string values)\n *\n * Trims string values before returning. Ignores non-string fields.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: URL values and the file path are never logged.\n */\nexport async function readRelayUrls(deps?: ReadRelayUrlsDeps): Promise<{\n  relayBaseUrl?: string;\n  relayLocalUrl?: string;\n  tunnelBaseUrl?: string;\n} | null> {\n  const { projectRoot, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep } = deps ?? {};\n\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelayUrlReadFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const filePath = urlsFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n\n  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let raw: string;\n  try {\n    raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file — silent no-op, let the downstream assert be the fail-fast.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are not surfaced.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // Invalid JSON — silent no-op.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const result: { relayBaseUrl?: string; relayLocalUrl?: string; tunnelBaseUrl?: string } = {};\n\n  const relay = obj.relayBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof relay === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relay.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const relayLocal = obj.relayLocalUrl;\n  if (typeof relayLocal === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = relayLocal.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.relayLocalUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  const tunnel = obj.tunnelBaseUrl;\n  if (typeof tunnel === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = tunnel.trim();\n    if (trimmed !== '') result.tunnelBaseUrl = trimmed;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DELETE path (unplugin cleanup only)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface DeleteRelayUrlsDeps {\n  /** Project root. */\n  projectRoot: string;\n  /** Filesystem operations. 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package/dist/{totp-DIbrZtI7.js → totp-BqmCLSNA.js}

@@ -184,6 +184,6 @@ function buildRelayVerifyAuth(env = process.env) {
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
-export { assertRelayAuthConfigured, buildRelayVerifyAuth, generateTotp, isValidRelayAuthSecret };
+export { assertRelayAuthConfigured, buildRelayVerifyAuth, isValidRelayAuthSecret };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=totp-DIbrZtI7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=totp-BqmCLSNA.js.map

package/dist/{totp-DIbrZtI7.js.map → totp-BqmCLSNA.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"totp-DIbrZtI7.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? 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+{"version":3,"file":"totp-BqmCLSNA.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. 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package/dist/{totp-Df252ZdA.cjs → totp-CMHR5lsW.cjs}

@@ -186,7 +186,6 @@ function buildRelayVerifyAuth(env = process.env) {
 //#endregion
 exports.assertRelayAuthConfigured = assertRelayAuthConfigured;
 exports.buildRelayVerifyAuth = buildRelayVerifyAuth;
-exports.generateTotp = generateTotp;
 exports.isValidRelayAuthSecret = isValidRelayAuthSecret;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=totp-Df252ZdA.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=totp-CMHR5lsW.cjs.map

package/dist/{totp-Df252ZdA.cjs.map → totp-CMHR5lsW.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? 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+{"version":3,"file":"totp-CMHR5lsW.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? '';\n\n    // Do NOT log `code`, `secret`, or any derived value here.\n    // Use RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS (±6) for a ~3-minute acceptance window (#490).\n    // verifyTotp's own default (skew=1) is unchanged — only this call site is widened.\n    return verifyTotp(secret, code, undefined, RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS);\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA8BA,MAAM,YAAY;;AAGlB,MAAM,SAAS;;;;;;;;;;AAWf,SAAgB,aAAa,QAAgB,OAAe,KAAK,KAAK,EAAU;CAC9E,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;CAGtC,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,MAAO,UAAU,CAAC;CAGhE,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;CAGlC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,WAAY;CAC5C,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY;AACvB,YAAW,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/B,YAAW,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;CAE/B,MAAM,OAAA,GAAA,YAAA,YAAiB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ;CAG/D,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM;AAQzB,WANI,IAAI,UAAU,QAAS,MACvB,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,QAAS,MAC3B,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,QAAS,IAC5B,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,OAEC,MAAM,QACjB,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiB7C,SAAgB,WACd,QACA,MACA,OAAe,KAAK,KAAK,EACzB,OAAe,GACN;CACT,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AACrD,KAAI,WAAW,WAAW,UAAU,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,WAAW,CAC7D,QAAO;CAGT,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO;AAEpD,MAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS;EAE9C,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa,QADb,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,IACG;AAE/C,OAAA,GAAA,YAAA,iBADoB,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO,EAChB,aAAa,CAC5C,QAAO;;AAIX,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;AAWT,MAAM,uBAAuB;;AAG7B,MAAM,SAAS;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcf,MAAa,oCAAoC;CAC/C;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACD,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcZ,SAAgB,uBAAuB,QAA8C;AACnF,KAAI,WAAW,KAAA,KAAa,WAAW,GAAI,QAAO;AAClD,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,qBAAsB,QAAO;AACjD,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACpC,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA0B5B,SAAgB,0BAA0B,MAAyB,QAAQ,KAAW;AACpF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,CACpD,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kCAAkC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDtD,SAAgB,qBACd,MAAyB,QAAQ,KACoC;CACrE,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACnB,KAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO,KAAA;AAEpB,SAAQ,QAAQ;EAGd,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO;EAC1B,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI;EAClC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,EAAE;AAO9D,SAAO,WAAW,QANH,IAAI,gBAAgB,SAAS,CACxB,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAKD,KAAA,GAAA,EAAmC"}

package/dist/{tunnel-BVSMXctM.cjs → tunnel-BGT9Curk.cjs}

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+const require_optional_peers = require("./optional-peers-CDEFhlhJ.cjs");
 let node_path = require("node:path");
 let node_fs = require("node:fs");
 let node_fs_promises = require("node:fs/promises");
@@ -105,97 +106,48 @@ async function printTunnelBanner(url, opts = {}) {
 	}
 }
 /**
-* Heuristic: can this process open a GUI browser? Mirrors `canOpenBrowser` in
-* `src/mcp/tools.ts` but is re-declared here (not imported) so the tunnel path
-* does not statically pull the heavy MCP `tools.ts` module graph into the lazy
-* `import('./tunnel.js')` chunk. Kept in sync with the MCP copy.
-*
-*   - macOS / Windows → assume yes (env-2 dev normally runs on the user's Mac).
-*   - Linux → require `DISPLAY` or `WAYLAND_DISPLAY`.
-*   - CI (`CI=true`/`CI=1`) → no.
-*/
-function canOpenBrowser() {
-	if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") return false;
-	const platform = process.platform;
-	if (platform === "darwin" || platform === "win32") return true;
-	if (platform === "linux") return Boolean(process.env.DISPLAY ?? process.env.WAYLAND_DISPLAY);
-	return false;
-}
-/**
-* Env-2 UX parity with env 3/4 (issue #408): when CDP wiring is on and a GUI is
+* Env-2 UX parity with env 3 (issue #408): when CDP wiring is on and a GUI is
 * available, start the SAME `127.0.0.1` HTML dashboard (QR image + connect steps
-* + FAQ) that the MCP `start_attach` path serves, and auto-open it in the
+* + FAQ) the debug daemon's `start_attach` path serves, and auto-open it in the
 * browser. headless / opt-out falls back to the terminal ASCII QR (printed
 * separately by {@link printTunnelBanner}).
 *
-* Every part the install-graph invariant depends on (`qrcode`, the MCP HTTP
-* server, the opener) is reached only through dynamic `import()` here, inside
-* the already-lazy `tunnel.js` chunk — nothing is added to the common build
-* graph or the MCP-only install graph.
+* DELEGATED (issue #817): the implementation now lives in `@ait-co/debugger`'s
+* `/dev-bridge` subpath — the one cross-repo code delegation of the package
+* split. The dashboard needs the daemon's QR HTTP server, deep-link builder and
+* TOTP minting, all of which moved into that package; keeping a second copy here
+* would fork them. `@ait-co/debugger` is an OPTIONAL peer, so a consumer who
+* never asks for env-2 CDP installs nothing extra.
+*
+* Why this is not a separate plugin: the relay `wss://` URL must exist BEFORE
+* the QR banner is printed (the launcher QR carries `&relay=`), so the relay and
+* the dashboard are order-dependent and stay one composed call in the dev loop.
 *
-* TOTP encapsulation: the dashboard's `getDashboardState` closure mints a FRESH
-* TOTP `at=` code on every call via `generateTotp(secret, Date.now())` and folds
-* it into a fresh `buildLauncherAttachUrl(...)`. Because the QR is re-rendered on
-* each SSE push / page reload from this closure, the code a phone scans is always
-* within its 30 s window — no stale code is baked into static HTML.
+* Degradation: when `@ait-co/debugger` is not installed the import fails and we
+* return `undefined` — exactly the same "no dashboard" outcome as a closed GUI
+* gate, with the terminal ASCII QR standing alone. We do NOT fall back to a
+* local copy of the daemon code. The caller (`./index.ts`) prints the install
+* hint once when CDP was requested without the package.
 *
 * SECRET-HANDLING: the tunnel host, relay wssUrl, TOTP code, and `.ait_relay`
-* value/path are NEVER written to stdout/stderr/logs here. They live only inside
-* the attach URL (HTML body + `/qr.png` query, per qr-http-server's invariant).
-* The only thing opened/logged is `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` (local, safe).
+* value/path are NEVER written to stdout/stderr/logs — neither here nor in the
+* delegate. The only thing opened/logged is `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` (local).
 *
 * @returns the dashboard handle when it started (caller wires `close()` into the
-*   tunnel cleanup), or `undefined` when skipped (no relay, `qr:false`, headless,
-*   opt-out, or a start failure) — in which case ASCII QR fallback stands alone.
+*   tunnel cleanup), or `undefined` when skipped (package absent, no relay,
+*   `qr:false`, headless, opt-out, or a start failure) — in which case the ASCII
+*   QR fallback stands alone.
 */
 async function startTunnelDashboard(opts) {
-	const log = opts.log ?? ((m) => console.log(m));
 	if (!opts.relayWssUrl) return void 0;
 	if (opts.qr === false) return void 0;
-	const { isAutoDevtoolsDisabled } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./devtools-opener-iv1OwfJN.cjs"));
-	if (!(opts.shouldOpen ?? (() => !isAutoDevtoolsDisabled() && canOpenBrowser()))()) return void 0;
-	const { startQrHttpServer } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./qr-http-server--gl2-WKc.cjs"));
-	const { buildLauncherAttachUrl } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./deeplink-BzdbA1gV.cjs"));
-	const { generateTotp } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./totp-Df252ZdA.cjs"));
-	const getDashboardState = () => {
-		const secret = process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;
-		const totpCode = secret ? generateTotp(secret, Date.now()) : void 0;
-		const attachUrl = buildLauncherAttachUrl(opts.tunnelUrl, opts.relayWssUrl, totpCode, { name: opts.name });
-		return {
-			tunnel: {
-				up: true,
-				wssUrl: opts.relayWssUrl
-			},
-			pages: null,
-			attachUrl,
-			inspectorUrl: null,
-			mode: "relay-mobile",
-			phase: "active"
-		};
-	};
-	let server;
+	let devBridge;
 	try {
-		server = await startQrHttpServer(getDashboardState);
+		devBridge = await import(require_optional_peers.DEBUGGER_DEV_BRIDGE_ID);
 	} catch {
 		return;
 	}
-	let totpRefreshHandle = setInterval(() => {
-		server.notifyStateChange();
-	}, 2e4);
-	totpRefreshHandle.unref();
-	const dashboardUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.port}`;
-	const { openUrlInBrowser } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./devtools-opener-iv1OwfJN.cjs"));
-	log(openUrlInBrowser(dashboardUrl) ? `  │  Opened a QR dashboard in your browser: ${dashboardUrl}` : `  │  Open this QR dashboard in your browser: ${dashboardUrl}`);
-	return {
-		url: dashboardUrl,
-		close: () => {
-			if (totpRefreshHandle) {
-				clearInterval(totpRefreshHandle);
-				totpRefreshHandle = null;
-			}
-			return server.close();
-		}
-	};
+	return devBridge.startTunnelDashboard(opts);
 }
 /**
 * Sanitize cloudflared stderr output for error diagnostics (#421).
@@ -291,4 +243,4 @@ exports.printTunnelBanner = printTunnelBanner;
 exports.startQuickTunnel = startQuickTunnel;
 exports.startTunnelDashboard = startTunnelDashboard;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=tunnel-BVSMXctM.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=tunnel-BGT9Curk.cjs.map

package/dist/tunnel-BGT9Curk.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"tunnel-BGT9Curk.cjs","names":["DEBUGGER_DEV_BRIDGE_ID"],"sources":["../src/unplugin/tunnel.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cloudflare quick-tunnel helper for the devtools unplugin.\n *\n * Loaded lazily (`await import('./tunnel.js')`) only when the `tunnel` option is\n * on, so `cloudflared` / `qrcode-terminal` are never pulled in for the common\n * case. This is the one place in `@ait-co/devtools` that depends on Node-only\n * APIs (`child_process` via the `cloudflared` wrapper) — keep it thin and out of\n * jsdom unit tests; the spawn path is verified by hand / e2e (same spirit as the\n * \"web 모드는 e2e\" rule in CLAUDE.md). The pure helpers below\n * (`parseTrycloudflareUrl`, `printTunnelBanner`) are unit-tested.\n */\n\nimport { existsSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport { mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport { dirname } from 'node:path';\nimport { DEBUGGER_DEV_BRIDGE_ID } from './optional-peers.js';\n\n/** Matches the public URL cloudflared prints for an unauthenticated quick tunnel. */\nconst TRYCLOUDFLARE_RE = /https:\\/\\/[a-z0-9-]+\\.trycloudflare\\.com/i;\n\n/**\n * Extract the `https://<sub>.trycloudflare.com` URL from a line of cloudflared\n * output, or `null` if the line doesn't contain one. Pulled out as a pure\n * function so it can be unit-tested without spawning anything.\n */\nexport function parseTrycloudflareUrl(line: string): string | null {\n  const m = line.match(TRYCLOUDFLARE_RE);\n  return m ? m[0] : null;\n}\n\nexport interface PrintTunnelBannerOptions {\n  /** Print an ASCII QR encoding the tunnel URL (default: true). */\n  qr?: boolean;\n  /** Sink for the banner text (default: `console.log`). Injected for testing. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n  /**\n   * The `wss://` relay URL of the env-2 CDP tunnel, if `tunnel.cdp` is on. When\n   * present the QR deep-link additionally carries `&debug=1&relay=<wss>` so the\n   * framed PWA passes the in-app debug gate and attaches a Chii target — the\n   * same single scan opens screen preview *and* CDP debugging.\n   */\n  relayWssUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name to embed as `name=` in the launcher deep-link (#498).\n   * When provided (non-blank), the launcher partner bar shows this name instead of\n   * the generic default.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * The miniapp's webViewType. When `'game'`, the deep-link carries `&navBarType=game`\n   * so the launcher enters game nav chrome automatically on scan (#584).\n   * `'partner'` (the default) is the launcher's implicit default — not added to\n   * keep the URL clean.\n   */\n  webViewType?: 'partner' | 'game';\n  /**\n   * Whether the miniapp's navigationBar has `transparentBackground: true`\n   * (granite.config `navigationBar.transparentBackground`, SDK 2.8.0, #587).\n   * When `true`, the deep-link carries `&navBarTransparent=1` so the launcher\n   * partner bar renders with a transparent background (content shows through).\n   * `false` / omitted → not added (URL clean, back-compat).\n   */\n  navBarTransparent?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * The miniapp's navigationBar theme (`granite.config `navigationBar.theme`,\n   * SDK 2.8.0, #587). When `'light'` or `'dark'`, the deep-link carries\n   * `&navBarTheme=<v>` so the launcher partner bar uses the matching foreground\n   * colour. Omitted / other values → not added (URL clean, back-compat).\n   */\n  navBarTheme?: 'light' | 'dark';\n}\n\nconst LAUNCHER_URL = 'https://devtools.aitc.dev/launcher/';\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link buildLauncherDeepLink}.\n */\nexport interface BuildLauncherDeepLinkOptions {\n  /**\n   * `wss://` relay URL for env-2 CDP wiring. When present the deep-link carries\n   * `&debug=1&relay=<wss>`.\n   */\n  relayWssUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name shown in the partner nav bar (`name=` param, #498).\n   * Blank / whitespace-only values are not added.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * The miniapp's webViewType. When `'game'`, adds `&navBarType=game` to the\n   * deep-link so the launcher enters game nav chrome automatically on scan (#584).\n   * `'partner'` (the launcher's implicit default) is not added to keep the URL\n   * clean.\n   */\n  webViewType?: 'partner' | 'game';\n  /**\n   * Whether the miniapp's navigationBar has `transparentBackground: true`\n   * (granite.config `navigationBar.transparentBackground`, SDK 2.8.0, #587).\n   * When `true`, adds `&navBarTransparent=1` to the deep-link so the launcher\n   * partner bar renders with a transparent background. Omitted when `false` /\n   * undefined to keep the URL clean (back-compat).\n   */\n  navBarTransparent?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * The miniapp's navigationBar theme (granite.config `navigationBar.theme`,\n   * SDK 2.8.0, #587). When `'light'` or `'dark'`, adds `&navBarTheme=<v>` to\n   * the deep-link so the launcher partner bar uses the matching foreground colour.\n   * Omitted when undefined / other values to keep the URL clean (back-compat).\n   */\n  navBarTheme?: 'light' | 'dark';\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the deep-link URL that QR codes encode: when the launcher PWA is\n * already on the phone's home screen, scanning this opens it directly into the\n * live view for `tunnelUrl` (the launcher consumes `?url=` and clears it).\n * Plain-text raw URL is no longer enough — the launcher gates its setup UI to\n * the installed PWA, so a raw tunnel URL opened in a normal browser tab would\n * land on a \"please install\" screen.\n *\n * When `opts.relayWssUrl` is given (env-2 CDP wiring), the deep-link also carries\n * `&debug=1&relay=<wss>`; the launcher folds those onto the framed tunnel URL so\n * the in-app debug gate's Layer C (`debug=1` opt-in + `relay=<wss>`) is met and\n * a Chii target.js is injected into the live view.\n *\n * When `opts.name` is given (non-blank), it is added as `&name=` so the launcher\n * partner bar shows the app name instead of the generic default (#498).\n *\n * When `opts.webViewType` is `'game'`, `&navBarType=game` is appended so the\n * launcher enters game nav chrome (floating capsule, no full bar) automatically\n * on scan. `'partner'` is the launcher's implicit default and is not added to\n * keep the URL clean (#584).\n *\n * When `opts.navBarTransparent` is `true`, `&navBarTransparent=1` is appended\n * so the launcher partner bar renders with a transparent background (#587).\n *\n * When `opts.navBarTheme` is `'light'` or `'dark'`, `&navBarTheme=<v>` is\n * appended so the launcher partner bar uses the matching foreground colour (#587).\n *\n * Back-compat: the second argument may also be a plain string (`relayWssUrl`)\n * for callers that haven't migrated to the options object yet.\n */\nexport function buildLauncherDeepLink(\n  tunnelUrl: string,\n  optsOrRelay?: string | BuildLauncherDeepLinkOptions,\n): string {\n  // Normalise the overloaded second argument.\n  const opts: BuildLauncherDeepLinkOptions =\n    typeof optsOrRelay === 'string' ? { relayWssUrl: optsOrRelay } : (optsOrRelay ?? {});\n\n  const base = `${LAUNCHER_URL}?url=${encodeURIComponent(tunnelUrl)}`;\n  let url = base;\n  if (opts.relayWssUrl) {\n    url += `&debug=1&relay=${encodeURIComponent(opts.relayWssUrl)}`;\n  }\n  if (opts.name !== undefined && opts.name.trim() !== '') {\n    url += `&name=${encodeURIComponent(opts.name.trim())}`;\n  }\n  if (opts.webViewType === 'game') {\n    url += '&navBarType=game';\n  }\n  if (opts.navBarTransparent === true) {\n    url += '&navBarTransparent=1';\n  }\n  if (opts.navBarTheme === 'light' || opts.navBarTheme === 'dark') {\n    url += `&navBarTheme=${opts.navBarTheme}`;\n  }\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Print the terminal banner announcing the live tunnel: the public URL, an ASCII\n * QR encoding a launcher deep-link, and a one-line note that quick tunnels are\n * ephemeral, unauthenticated and not for production. Pure w.r.t. side effects\n * other than the injected `log` sink and `qrcode-terminal` — unit-tested.\n */\nexport async function printTunnelBanner(\n  url: string,\n  opts: PrintTunnelBannerOptions = {},\n): Promise<void> {\n  const log = opts.log ?? ((m: string) => console.log(m));\n  const deepLink = buildLauncherDeepLink(url, {\n    relayWssUrl: opts.relayWssUrl,\n    name: opts.name,\n    webViewType: opts.webViewType,\n    navBarTransparent: opts.navBarTransparent,\n    navBarTheme: opts.navBarTheme,\n  });\n  const lines: string[] = [\n    '',\n    '  ┌─ @ait-co/devtools · live tunnel ────────────────────────────',\n    `  │  ${url}`,\n    '  │',\n    `  │  Install the launcher PWA once:  ${LAUNCHER_URL}`,\n    '  │  Then scan the QR below — it opens the launcher directly',\n    '  │  into this tunnel URL (no manual paste needed).',\n    ...(opts.relayWssUrl\n      ? [\n          '  │  The same scan also attaches CDP — connect your AI host',\n          '  │  to the relay and debug the live view on-device.',\n        ]\n      : []),\n    '  │  Quick tunnels are unauthenticated, change every run, and are',\n    '  │  not for production use.',\n    '  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────',\n    '',\n  ];\n  log(lines.join('\\n'));\n\n  if (opts.qr !== false) {\n    // qrcode-terminal is only pulled in on this code path (ambient types live\n    // in src/qrcode-terminal.d.ts).\n    const qrcode = (await import('qrcode-terminal')).default;\n    await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n      qrcode.generate(deepLink, { small: true }, (out) => {\n        log(out);\n        resolve();\n      });\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Handle returned by {@link startTunnelDashboard}. */\nexport interface TunnelDashboard {\n  /** `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` — the local dashboard URL opened in the browser. */\n  url: string;\n  /** Tear down the local HTTP server. Idempotent via the underlying server. */\n  close: () => Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface StartTunnelDashboardOptions {\n  /** The public `https://*.trycloudflare.com` app tunnel URL the launcher frames. */\n  tunnelUrl: string;\n  /** The `wss://` relay URL of the env-2 CDP tunnel. REQUIRED — the dashboard is a CDP-only UX. */\n  relayWssUrl: string;\n  /** Mirror of `tunnel.qr` — when `false` the dashboard is skipped (no browser open). */\n  qr?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Override the GUI/opt-out gate (testing only). When omitted the real\n   * `canOpenBrowser()` + `AIT_AUTO_DEVTOOLS` checks decide.\n   */\n  shouldOpen?: () => boolean;\n  /** Sink for the one-line \"opened in browser\" note (default: `console.log`). Injected for testing. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name to embed as `name=` in the launcher deep-link (#498).\n   * When provided (non-blank), the launcher partner bar shows this name instead of\n   * the generic default.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Env-2 UX parity with env 3 (issue #408): when CDP wiring is on and a GUI is\n * available, start the SAME `127.0.0.1` HTML dashboard (QR image + connect steps\n * + FAQ) the debug daemon's `start_attach` path serves, and auto-open it in the\n * browser. headless / opt-out falls back to the terminal ASCII QR (printed\n * separately by {@link printTunnelBanner}).\n *\n * DELEGATED (issue #817): the implementation now lives in `@ait-co/debugger`'s\n * `/dev-bridge` subpath — the one cross-repo code delegation of the package\n * split. The dashboard needs the daemon's QR HTTP server, deep-link builder and\n * TOTP minting, all of which moved into that package; keeping a second copy here\n * would fork them. `@ait-co/debugger` is an OPTIONAL peer, so a consumer who\n * never asks for env-2 CDP installs nothing extra.\n *\n * Why this is not a separate plugin: the relay `wss://` URL must exist BEFORE\n * the QR banner is printed (the launcher QR carries `&relay=`), so the relay and\n * the dashboard are order-dependent and stay one composed call in the dev loop.\n *\n * Degradation: when `@ait-co/debugger` is not installed the import fails and we\n * return `undefined` — exactly the same \"no dashboard\" outcome as a closed GUI\n * gate, with the terminal ASCII QR standing alone. We do NOT fall back to a\n * local copy of the daemon code. The caller (`./index.ts`) prints the install\n * hint once when CDP was requested without the package.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the tunnel host, relay wssUrl, TOTP code, and `.ait_relay`\n * value/path are NEVER written to stdout/stderr/logs — neither here nor in the\n * delegate. The only thing opened/logged is `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` (local).\n *\n * @returns the dashboard handle when it started (caller wires `close()` into the\n *   tunnel cleanup), or `undefined` when skipped (package absent, no relay,\n *   `qr:false`, headless, opt-out, or a start failure) — in which case the ASCII\n *   QR fallback stands alone.\n */\nexport async function startTunnelDashboard(\n  opts: StartTunnelDashboardOptions,\n): Promise<TunnelDashboard | undefined> {\n  // Gate: dashboard is a CDP-only UX (needs a relay to attach to). Checked here\n  // as well as in the delegate so an absent relay never even probes the package.\n  if (!opts.relayWssUrl) return undefined;\n  // Opt-out via `tunnel.qr:false` (same toggle that suppresses the ASCII QR).\n  if (opts.qr === false) return undefined;\n\n  let devBridge: { startTunnelDashboard: typeof startTunnelDashboard };\n  try {\n    devBridge = (await import(DEBUGGER_DEV_BRIDGE_ID)) as {\n      startTunnelDashboard: typeof startTunnelDashboard;\n    };\n  } catch {\n    // Not installed (or an unexpected load failure) — degrade to ASCII QR only.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error is not surfaced (it can embed local paths).\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return devBridge.startTunnelDashboard(opts);\n}\n\nexport interface QuickTunnel {\n  /** The public `https://*.trycloudflare.com` URL. */\n  url: string;\n  /** Stop the underlying `cloudflared` process. Idempotent. */\n  stop: () => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize cloudflared stderr output for error diagnostics (#421).\n *\n * Masks `*.trycloudflare.com` hostnames and full `https://` / `wss://` URLs\n * that carry those hostnames so tunnel host values never appear in error\n * messages. Diagnostic content (error codes, reasons, JSON blobs) is preserved.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: tunnel host is SECRET-class per harness policy — only\n * placeholder text is emitted.\n */\nexport function sanitizeCloudflaredOutput(line: string): string {\n  // Full URL forms: https://xxx.trycloudflare.com/… and wss://xxx.trycloudflare.com/…\n  let s = line.replace(/(?:https?|wss?):\\/\\/[a-z0-9-]+\\.trycloudflare\\.com(?:\\/[^\\s]*)*/gi, (m) =>\n    m.replace(/[a-z0-9-]+\\.trycloudflare\\.com/i, '<HOST>.trycloudflare.com'),\n  );\n  // Bare hostname without scheme (e.g. printed in cloudflared JSON logs)\n  s = s.replace(/[a-z0-9-]+\\.trycloudflare\\.com/gi, '<HOST>.trycloudflare.com');\n  return s;\n}\n\nconst URL_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;\n\n/**\n * Start an unauthenticated Cloudflare quick tunnel to `http://localhost:<port>`\n * and resolve once the public URL is known. Downloads the `cloudflared` binary\n * on first use if it is not already installed. Rejects with a friendly error if\n * no URL appears within {@link URL_TIMEOUT_MS}.\n */\nexport async function startQuickTunnel(port: number): Promise<QuickTunnel> {\n  const cloudflared = await import('cloudflared');\n  const { bin, install, Tunnel } = cloudflared;\n\n  if (!existsSync(bin)) {\n    await mkdir(dirname(bin), { recursive: true });\n    await install(bin);\n  }\n\n  const tunnel = Tunnel.quick(`http://localhost:${port}`);\n  let stopped = false;\n  const stop = () => {\n    if (stopped) return;\n    stopped = true;\n    try {\n      tunnel.stop();\n    } catch {\n      // process may already be gone\n    }\n  };\n\n  return new Promise<QuickTunnel>((resolve, reject) => {\n    // #421: accumulate stderr to attach as diagnostics on failure.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: lines are sanitized before inclusion in error messages.\n    const stderrLines: string[] = [];\n\n    /**\n     * Format the last `n` sanitized stderr lines as a diagnostic appendix.\n     * Returns an empty string when no lines have been collected.\n     */\n    const stderrTail = (n = 15): string => {\n      if (stderrLines.length === 0) return '';\n      const tail = stderrLines.slice(-n).map(sanitizeCloudflaredOutput).join('');\n      return `\\ncloudflared 출력 (마지막 ${Math.min(n, stderrLines.length)}줄):\\n${tail}`;\n    };\n\n    const timer = setTimeout(() => {\n      cleanup();\n      stop();\n      reject(\n        new Error(\n          `[@ait-co/devtools] cloudflared did not report a tunnel URL within ${\n            URL_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000\n          }s. Check your network connection, or run \\`cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:${port}\\` manually.${stderrTail()}`,\n        ),\n      );\n    }, URL_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\n    const onUrl = (line: string) => {\n      const found = parseTrycloudflareUrl(line);\n      if (!found) return;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      // Stop scanning further output once we have the URL.\n      cleanup();\n      resolve({ url: found, stop });\n    };\n\n    // Accumulate stderr lines for diagnostics (#421). Named so it can be\n    // removed from the listener list when cleanup() runs.\n    const pushStderr = (line: string) => {\n      stderrLines.push(line);\n    };\n\n    const cleanup = () => {\n      tunnel.off('stdout', onUrl);\n      tunnel.off('stderr', onUrl);\n      tunnel.off('stderr', pushStderr);\n    };\n\n    // The library emits a parsed `url` event; we also scan raw stdout/stderr in\n    // case the output format shifts.\n    tunnel.once('url', onUrl);\n    tunnel.on('stdout', onUrl);\n    tunnel.on('stderr', onUrl);\n    // Second stderr listener: accumulate all lines for error diagnostics.\n    tunnel.on('stderr', pushStderr);\n    tunnel.once('error', (err: Error) => {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      cleanup();\n      stop();\n      reject(err);\n    });\n    tunnel.once('exit', (code: number | null) => {\n      if (stopped) return;\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      cleanup();\n      reject(\n        new Error(\n          `[@ait-co/devtools] cloudflared exited (code ${code ?? 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