@ait-co/devtools 0.1.132 → 0.1.133

package/dist/test-runner/config.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { i as createRelayPool, n as RelayConnectionFactory, t as RELAY_POOL_NAME } from "../pool-BtLh7U1y.js";
+import { i as createRelayPool, n as RelayConnectionFactory, t as RELAY_POOL_NAME } from "../pool-x28Wv1ty.js";
 
 //#region src/test-runner/relay-factory.d.ts
 /** Options for {@link createRelayConnectionFactory}. */

package/dist/test-runner/config.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { RELAY_POOL_NAME, createRelayPool } from "./pool.js";
-import { t as createRelayConnectionFactory } from "../relay-factory-cNgPfrWg.js";
+import { t as createRelayConnectionFactory } from "../relay-factory-BQfmK7RP.js";
 //#region src/test-runner/config.ts
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
 	include: ["**/*.ait.test.ts"],

package/dist/test-runner/pool.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { i as createRelayPool, n as RelayConnectionFactory, r as RelayPoolOptions, t as RELAY_POOL_NAME } from "../pool-BtLh7U1y.js";
+import { i as createRelayPool, n as RelayConnectionFactory, r as RelayPoolOptions, t as RELAY_POOL_NAME } from "../pool-x28Wv1ty.js";
 export { RELAY_POOL_NAME, RelayConnectionFactory, RelayPoolOptions, createRelayPool };

package/dist/test-runner/pool.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { i as runTestFilesOverRelay } from "../relay-worker-l34xNuci.js";
+import { i as runTestFilesOverRelay } from "../relay-worker-MZq4fLv8.js";
 import { synthesizeFileTask, toTaskEventPacks, toTaskResultPacks } from "./task-graph.js";
 //#region src/test-runner/pool.ts
 /** The pool name Vitest matches against `getFilePoolName(project)`. */

package/dist/test-runner/relay-factory.js

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
 	return {
 		async open() {
 			const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait, mintAttachUrl } = await import("../attach-orchestrator-Cjdhir2U.js");
-			const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import("../cell-Cw4fVOl2.js");
+			const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import("../cell-D1y4shoV.js");
 			const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import("../relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js");
-			const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import("../debug-server-Ch5p0ryv.js");
+			const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import("../debug-server-CS1BS2BX.js");
 			await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });
 			let resolveTunnelUp;
 			const tunnelReady = new Promise((resolve) => {
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
 				qrServer?.notifyStateChange();
 			}
 			try {
-				const { injectDebugIndicator } = await import("../cell-Cw4fVOl2.js");
+				const { injectDebugIndicator } = await import("../cell-D1y4shoV.js");
 				await injectDebugIndicator(connection, { state: "disconnected" });
 			} catch {}
 			family?.stop();

package/dist/test-runner/relay-worker.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { a as RelayRunReport, i as RelayRunOptions, n as FileResult, o as flattenResults, r as MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, s as runTestFilesOverRelay, t as EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER } from "../relay-worker-BMSnlyls.js";
+import { a as RelayRunReport, i as RelayRunOptions, n as FileResult, o as flattenResults, r as MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, s as runTestFilesOverRelay, t as EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER } from "../relay-worker-DtX_eszH.js";
 export { EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER, FileResult, MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, RelayRunOptions, RelayRunReport, flattenResults, runTestFilesOverRelay };

package/dist/test-runner/relay-worker.js

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { i as runTestFilesOverRelay, n as MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, r as flattenResults, t as EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER } from "../relay-worker-l34xNuci.js";
+import { i as runTestFilesOverRelay, n as MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, r as flattenResults, t as EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER } from "../relay-worker-MZq4fLv8.js";
 export { EVALUATE_TIMEOUT_MARKER, MANUAL_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, flattenResults, runTestFilesOverRelay };

package/dist/test-runner/report.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { t as AitCaptureLine } from "../capture-ltuV0gZa.js";
 import { n as TestResult } from "../runtime-9xhN9pr8.js";
-import { a as RelayRunReport } from "../relay-worker-BMSnlyls.js";
+import { a as RelayRunReport } from "../relay-worker-DtX_eszH.js";
 
 //#region src/test-runner/report.d.ts
 /** The cell axes a report is stamped with — the test-matrix coordinates. */
@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ interface RunnerAgnosticReport {
   totals: RelayRunReport['totals'];
   /** Per-file results with projectRoot-relative paths. */
   files: RunnerAgnosticFileReport[];
+  /**
+   * Permission-state preflight result (devtools#739), mirrored verbatim from
+   * `RelayRunReport.preflight` — see that field's docblock. Absent when the
+   * preflight did not complete (non-fatal; the run still succeeds). No
+   * secrets — permission-state strings only.
+   */
+  preflight?: {
+    permissions: Record<string, string>;
+  };
 }
 /**
  * Serialises a {@link RelayRunReport} into the runner-agnostic, secret-free

package/dist/test-runner/report.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"report.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/test-runner/report.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;UA+BiB,cAAA;EAqCX;EAnCJ,OAAA;EA2CmC;EAzCnC,QAAA;EAiDQ;;;;;EA3CR,WAAA;AAAA;;UAIe,wBAAA;EAqCf;;;;;EA/BA,IAAA;EA0Cc;EAxCd,KAAA;EAwCiC;EAtCjC,QAAA;EACA,MAAA;EACA,MAAA;EACA,OAAA;EAgEQ;EA9DR,KAAA,GAAQ,UAAA;EAgEP;;;;;;;EAxDD,IAAA;AAAA;;AAkHF;;;;UA1GiB,oBAAA;EA8Gd;EA5GD,IAAA;IAAQ,OAAA;IAAiB,QAAA;EAAA;EA0GzB;EAxGA,SAAA;EAyGA;EAvGA,QAAA;EAwGQ;EAtGR,MAAA,EAAQ,cAAA;EA2JY;EAzJpB,KAAA,EAAO,wBAAA;;;;;;;EAOP,SAAA;IAAc,WAAA,EAAa,MAAA;EAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;iBA4Bb,oBAAA,CACd,MAAA,EAAQ,cAAA,EACR,IAAA,EAAM,cAAA,GACL,oBAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBA0DmB,mBAAA,CACpB,MAAA,EAAQ,cAAA,EACR,GAAA,UACA,IAAA,EAAM,cAAA,GACL,OAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAqDmB,qBAAA,CACpB,QAAA,EAAU,aAAA,CAAc,cAAA,GACxB,GAAA,UACA,IAAA;EAAQ,OAAA;EAAiB,QAAA;AAAA,IACxB,OAAA"}

package/dist/test-runner/report.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ function serializeRelayReport(report, meta) {
 		startedAt: report.startedAt,
 		duration: report.duration,
 		totals: report.totals,
+		...report.preflight ? { preflight: report.preflight } : {},
 		files: report.files.map((f) => {
 			const file = relativise(meta.projectRoot, f.file);
 			const modeField = f.mode === "manual" ? { mode: "manual" } : {};

package/dist/test-runner/report.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"report.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/test-runner/report.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runner-agnostic report serialisation for env3 test runs (devtools#696).\n *\n * Both env3 execution paths — the Vitest custom pool (`pool.ts`) and the\n * standalone `devtools-test` CLI (`cli.ts`) — call the same core\n * `runTestFilesOverRelay` and so produce the same {@link RelayRunReport}. This\n * module is the single, runner-neutral place that turns that in-memory report\n * into a stable on-disk artifact so a 2.x run and a 3.0 run can be diffed\n * cell-by-cell after the fact.\n *\n * The serialised schema is deliberately MINIMAL and secret-free:\n *\n *   - file paths are stored RELATIVE to `projectRoot` (no absolute `/Users/...`\n *     leakage — see {@link RunnerAgnosticReport.files});\n *   - the cell metadata (sdkLine/platform) is baked INTO the body, not only the\n *     filename, so a moved artifact never loses its provenance;\n *   - NO relay wss / scheme / TOTP / relayUrl fields exist in the schema at all\n *     (enforced by the type + this comment) — error strings are the matcher\n *     message only, inherited from rpc.ts which already strips expression/value.\n *\n * react-free — depends only on the type-level `RelayRunReport` and `node:fs` /\n * `node:path`. Safe to bundle without pulling the chii/cloudflared graph.\n */\n\nimport { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport path from 'node:path';\nimport type { AitCaptureLine } from './capture.js';\nimport type { RelayRunReport } from './relay-worker.js';\nimport type { TestResult } from './runtime.js';\n\n/** The cell axes a report is stamped with — the test-matrix coordinates. */\nexport interface ReportCellMeta {\n  /** SDK line under test (e.g. `'2.x'` / `'3.x'`). */\n  sdkLine: string;\n  /** Platform under test (e.g. `'ios'` / `'android'` / `'mock'`). */\n  platform: string;\n  /**\n   * Project root the run was launched from. Used ONLY to relativise file paths\n   * out of the serialised report — never stored in the output. SECRET-HANDLING:\n   * absolute project paths must not leak into artifacts.\n   */\n  projectRoot: string;\n}\n\n/** Per-file slice of a {@link RunnerAgnosticReport}. */\nexport interface RunnerAgnosticFileReport {\n  /**\n   * Test file path, RELATIVE to `projectRoot`. Never absolute — `path.relative`\n   * strips the machine-specific prefix so the artifact is portable and leaks no\n   * local filesystem layout.\n   */\n  file: string;\n  /** Whole-file bundle/inject error (matcher message only), when the file failed. */\n  error?: string;\n  /** In-page run duration (ms) for this file, when it ran. */\n  duration?: number;\n  passed?: number;\n  failed?: number;\n  skipped?: number;\n  /** Per-test results, when the file ran. Error strings are matcher messages only. */\n  tests?: TestResult[];\n  /**\n   * Present + `'manual'` only when this file ran under `--manual-blocking`\n   * (devtools#741) — human-attended, real native envelopes. Absent (never\n   * `false`) for unattended files: absence-means-unattended is the contract,\n   * mirroring `FileResult.mode` in relay-worker.ts. A manual-stamped record\n   * must never be diffed against an unattended one as if equivalent.\n   */\n  mode?: 'manual';\n}\n\n/**\n * The runner-neutral, secret-free report written to disk. There are\n * intentionally NO wss/scheme/TOTP/relayUrl fields on this type — the absence is\n * load-bearing (SECRET-HANDLING) and must not be \"completed\" by a future edit.\n */\nexport interface RunnerAgnosticReport {\n  /** Cell axes this run belongs to — baked into the body for portability. */\n  cell: { sdkLine: string; platform: string };\n  /** ISO timestamp of when the run started (from the core report). */\n  startedAt: string;\n  /** Total wall-clock ms (bundling + sequential injection). */\n  duration: number;\n  /** Flattened totals across all files. */\n  totals: RelayRunReport['totals'];\n  /** Per-file results with projectRoot-relative paths. */\n  files: RunnerAgnosticFileReport[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts an absolute (or already-relative) file path to a projectRoot-relative\n * one. `path.relative` returns `''` when the paths are equal — guard that to the\n * basename so the field is never empty.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this is the single choke point that strips absolute project\n * paths from the artifact.\n */\nfunction relativise(projectRoot: string, file: string): string {\n  const rel = path.relative(projectRoot, file);\n  if (rel === '' || rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) {\n    // Outside the project root (or equal) — fall back to the basename rather\n    // than emitting an absolute or `../../..` traversal path.\n    return path.basename(file);\n  }\n  return rel;\n}\n\n/**\n * Serialises a {@link RelayRunReport} into the runner-agnostic, secret-free\n * on-disk shape. Pure — no IO; testable with a plain report + meta.\n *\n * @param report - The core relay run report.\n * @param meta   - Cell axes + projectRoot (projectRoot is consumed, not stored).\n */\nexport function serializeRelayReport(\n  report: RelayRunReport,\n  meta: ReportCellMeta,\n): RunnerAgnosticReport {\n  return {\n    cell: { sdkLine: meta.sdkLine, platform: meta.platform },\n    startedAt: report.startedAt,\n    duration: report.duration,\n    totals: report.totals,\n    files: report.files.map((f): RunnerAgnosticFileReport => {\n      const file = relativise(meta.projectRoot, f.file);\n      const modeField = f.mode === 'manual' ? ({ mode: 'manual' } as const) : {};\n      if ('error' in f.result) {\n        // Matcher/inject error message only — rpc.ts already stripped the\n        // expression/value upstream.\n        return { file, error: f.result.error, ...modeField };\n      }\n      return {\n        file,\n        duration: f.result.duration,\n        passed: f.result.passed,\n        failed: f.result.failed,\n        skipped: f.result.skipped,\n        tests: f.result.tests,\n        ...modeField,\n      };\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes the serialised report to `<dir>/<sdkLine>.<platform>.json`, creating\n * `dir` if needed. Returns the absolute path(s) written.\n *\n * The cell-suffixed filename keeps 2.x and 3.0 (and per-platform) runs as\n * distinct artifacts in the same directory; the same cell metadata is also baked\n * into the body so a renamed/moved file still carries its provenance.\n *\n * Manual-run provenance (devtools#741): when `report.files` contains ANY\n * `mode: 'manual'` entry (i.e. this run included `--manual-blocking` files),\n * the manual-tagged files are written to a SEPARATE\n * `<dir>/<sdkLine>.<platform>.manual.json` artifact instead of the standard\n * one — the standard `<sdkLine>.<platform>.json` filename is reserved for the\n * regular (unattended) files only, so a manual run's presence never mutates\n * what the unattended-baseline filename means. If ALL files in the run are\n * regular, only the standard artifact is written (today's behavior,\n * unchanged). If a run mixes both (regular files + `--manual-blocking`\n * scheduled last), BOTH artifacts are written — the manual one ALONGSIDE, not\n * replacing, the standard one.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the written body contains no relay/secret fields (the schema\n * has none). `dir`/`projectRoot` are local filesystem paths, never logged here.\n *\n * @param report - The core relay run report.\n * @param dir    - Output directory (created recursively if missing).\n * @param meta   - Cell axes + projectRoot.\n * @returns The absolute path(s) written, in order: standard first (if any\n *   regular files ran), then manual (if any manual files ran). At least one\n *   path is always returned when `report.files` is non-empty.\n */\nexport async function writeReportArtifact(\n  report: RelayRunReport,\n  dir: string,\n  meta: ReportCellMeta,\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  const serialised = serializeRelayReport(report, meta);\n  await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });\n\n  const regularFiles = serialised.files.filter((f) => f.mode !== 'manual');\n  const manualFiles = serialised.files.filter((f) => f.mode === 'manual');\n\n  const written: string[] = [];\n\n  // Standard artifact: written whenever there are regular files, OR when the\n  // whole run is empty (preserves the pre-#741 \"always write one file\"\n  // behavior for a run with zero files, e.g. an empty glob match).\n  if (regularFiles.length > 0 || serialised.files.length === 0) {\n    const outFile = path.join(dir, `${meta.sdkLine}.${meta.platform}.json`);\n    await writeFile(\n      outFile,\n      `${JSON.stringify({ ...serialised, files: regularFiles }, null, 2)}\\n`,\n      'utf8',\n    );\n    written.push(outFile);\n  }\n\n  if (manualFiles.length > 0) {\n    const manualOutFile = path.join(dir, `${meta.sdkLine}.${meta.platform}.manual.json`);\n    await writeFile(\n      manualOutFile,\n      `${JSON.stringify({ ...serialised, files: manualFiles }, null, 2)}\\n`,\n      'utf8',\n    );\n    written.push(manualOutFile);\n  }\n\n  return written;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes harvested `__AIT_CAPTURE__` lines to per-category files under `dir`,\n * named `<category>.<sdkLine>.<platform>.json` — the SAME convention\n * sdk-example's env1 `flushCapture` uses on the filesystem, so env1 and env3\n * capture artifacts line up for diffing.\n *\n * Each line's `json` payload is an opaque JSON array of capture records. Lines\n * sharing a category are concatenated into one array, in harvest order.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: only allowlist-prefixed capture lines reach here (the parser\n * dropped wss/scheme noise); the `json` payload is written verbatim but is a\n * capture record array, not a relay/secret.\n *\n * @param captures - Parsed capture lines (from `RelayRunReport.captures`).\n * @param dir      - Output directory (created recursively if missing).\n * @param cell     - Cell axes for the filename suffix.\n * @returns The absolute paths written (one per category), in category order.\n */\nexport async function writeCaptureArtifacts(\n  captures: ReadonlyArray<AitCaptureLine>,\n  dir: string,\n  cell: { sdkLine: string; platform: string },\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  if (captures.length === 0) return [];\n\n  // Group payloads by category, preserving harvest order. 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+{"version":3,"file":"report.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/test-runner/report.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runner-agnostic report serialisation for env3 test runs (devtools#696).\n *\n * Both env3 execution paths — the Vitest custom pool (`pool.ts`) and the\n * standalone `devtools-test` CLI (`cli.ts`) — call the same core\n * `runTestFilesOverRelay` and so produce the same {@link RelayRunReport}. This\n * module is the single, runner-neutral place that turns that in-memory report\n * into a stable on-disk artifact so a 2.x run and a 3.0 run can be diffed\n * cell-by-cell after the fact.\n *\n * The serialised schema is deliberately MINIMAL and secret-free:\n *\n *   - file paths are stored RELATIVE to `projectRoot` (no absolute `/Users/...`\n *     leakage — see {@link RunnerAgnosticReport.files});\n *   - the cell metadata (sdkLine/platform) is baked INTO the body, not only the\n *     filename, so a moved artifact never loses its provenance;\n *   - NO relay wss / scheme / TOTP / relayUrl fields exist in the schema at all\n *     (enforced by the type + this comment) — error strings are the matcher\n *     message only, inherited from rpc.ts which already strips expression/value.\n *\n * react-free — depends only on the type-level `RelayRunReport` and `node:fs` /\n * `node:path`. Safe to bundle without pulling the chii/cloudflared graph.\n */\n\nimport { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';\nimport path from 'node:path';\nimport type { AitCaptureLine } from './capture.js';\nimport type { RelayRunReport } from './relay-worker.js';\nimport type { TestResult } from './runtime.js';\n\n/** The cell axes a report is stamped with — the test-matrix coordinates. */\nexport interface ReportCellMeta {\n  /** SDK line under test (e.g. `'2.x'` / `'3.x'`). */\n  sdkLine: string;\n  /** Platform under test (e.g. `'ios'` / `'android'` / `'mock'`). */\n  platform: string;\n  /**\n   * Project root the run was launched from. Used ONLY to relativise file paths\n   * out of the serialised report — never stored in the output. SECRET-HANDLING:\n   * absolute project paths must not leak into artifacts.\n   */\n  projectRoot: string;\n}\n\n/** Per-file slice of a {@link RunnerAgnosticReport}. */\nexport interface RunnerAgnosticFileReport {\n  /**\n   * Test file path, RELATIVE to `projectRoot`. Never absolute — `path.relative`\n   * strips the machine-specific prefix so the artifact is portable and leaks no\n   * local filesystem layout.\n   */\n  file: string;\n  /** Whole-file bundle/inject error (matcher message only), when the file failed. */\n  error?: string;\n  /** In-page run duration (ms) for this file, when it ran. */\n  duration?: number;\n  passed?: number;\n  failed?: number;\n  skipped?: number;\n  /** Per-test results, when the file ran. Error strings are matcher messages only. */\n  tests?: TestResult[];\n  /**\n   * Present + `'manual'` only when this file ran under `--manual-blocking`\n   * (devtools#741) — human-attended, real native envelopes. Absent (never\n   * `false`) for unattended files: absence-means-unattended is the contract,\n   * mirroring `FileResult.mode` in relay-worker.ts. A manual-stamped record\n   * must never be diffed against an unattended one as if equivalent.\n   */\n  mode?: 'manual';\n}\n\n/**\n * The runner-neutral, secret-free report written to disk. There are\n * intentionally NO wss/scheme/TOTP/relayUrl fields on this type — the absence is\n * load-bearing (SECRET-HANDLING) and must not be \"completed\" by a future edit.\n */\nexport interface RunnerAgnosticReport {\n  /** Cell axes this run belongs to — baked into the body for portability. */\n  cell: { sdkLine: string; platform: string };\n  /** ISO timestamp of when the run started (from the core report). */\n  startedAt: string;\n  /** Total wall-clock ms (bundling + sequential injection). */\n  duration: number;\n  /** Flattened totals across all files. */\n  totals: RelayRunReport['totals'];\n  /** Per-file results with projectRoot-relative paths. */\n  files: RunnerAgnosticFileReport[];\n  /**\n   * Permission-state preflight result (devtools#739), mirrored verbatim from\n   * `RelayRunReport.preflight` — see that field's docblock. Absent when the\n   * preflight did not complete (non-fatal; the run still succeeds). No\n   * secrets — permission-state strings only.\n   */\n  preflight?: { permissions: Record<string, string> };\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts an absolute (or already-relative) file path to a projectRoot-relative\n * one. `path.relative` returns `''` when the paths are equal — guard that to the\n * basename so the field is never empty.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this is the single choke point that strips absolute project\n * paths from the artifact.\n */\nfunction relativise(projectRoot: string, file: string): string {\n  const rel = path.relative(projectRoot, file);\n  if (rel === '' || rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) {\n    // Outside the project root (or equal) — fall back to the basename rather\n    // than emitting an absolute or `../../..` traversal path.\n    return path.basename(file);\n  }\n  return rel;\n}\n\n/**\n * Serialises a {@link RelayRunReport} into the runner-agnostic, secret-free\n * on-disk shape. Pure — no IO; testable with a plain report + meta.\n *\n * @param report - The core relay run report.\n * @param meta   - Cell axes + projectRoot (projectRoot is consumed, not stored).\n */\nexport function serializeRelayReport(\n  report: RelayRunReport,\n  meta: ReportCellMeta,\n): RunnerAgnosticReport {\n  return {\n    cell: { sdkLine: meta.sdkLine, platform: meta.platform },\n    startedAt: report.startedAt,\n    duration: report.duration,\n    totals: report.totals,\n    ...(report.preflight ? { preflight: report.preflight } : {}),\n    files: report.files.map((f): RunnerAgnosticFileReport => {\n      const file = relativise(meta.projectRoot, f.file);\n      const modeField = f.mode === 'manual' ? ({ mode: 'manual' } as const) : {};\n      if ('error' in f.result) {\n        // Matcher/inject error message only — rpc.ts already stripped the\n        // expression/value upstream.\n        return { file, error: f.result.error, ...modeField };\n      }\n      return {\n        file,\n        duration: f.result.duration,\n        passed: f.result.passed,\n        failed: f.result.failed,\n        skipped: f.result.skipped,\n        tests: f.result.tests,\n        ...modeField,\n      };\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes the serialised report to `<dir>/<sdkLine>.<platform>.json`, creating\n * `dir` if needed. Returns the absolute path(s) written.\n *\n * The cell-suffixed filename keeps 2.x and 3.0 (and per-platform) runs as\n * distinct artifacts in the same directory; the same cell metadata is also baked\n * into the body so a renamed/moved file still carries its provenance.\n *\n * Manual-run provenance (devtools#741): when `report.files` contains ANY\n * `mode: 'manual'` entry (i.e. this run included `--manual-blocking` files),\n * the manual-tagged files are written to a SEPARATE\n * `<dir>/<sdkLine>.<platform>.manual.json` artifact instead of the standard\n * one — the standard `<sdkLine>.<platform>.json` filename is reserved for the\n * regular (unattended) files only, so a manual run's presence never mutates\n * what the unattended-baseline filename means. If ALL files in the run are\n * regular, only the standard artifact is written (today's behavior,\n * unchanged). If a run mixes both (regular files + `--manual-blocking`\n * scheduled last), BOTH artifacts are written — the manual one ALONGSIDE, not\n * replacing, the standard one.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the written body contains no relay/secret fields (the schema\n * has none). `dir`/`projectRoot` are local filesystem paths, never logged here.\n *\n * @param report - The core relay run report.\n * @param dir    - Output directory (created recursively if missing).\n * @param meta   - Cell axes + projectRoot.\n * @returns The absolute path(s) written, in order: standard first (if any\n *   regular files ran), then manual (if any manual files ran). At least one\n *   path is always returned when `report.files` is non-empty.\n */\nexport async function writeReportArtifact(\n  report: RelayRunReport,\n  dir: string,\n  meta: ReportCellMeta,\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  const serialised = serializeRelayReport(report, meta);\n  await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });\n\n  const regularFiles = serialised.files.filter((f) => f.mode !== 'manual');\n  const manualFiles = serialised.files.filter((f) => f.mode === 'manual');\n\n  const written: string[] = [];\n\n  // Standard artifact: written whenever there are regular files, OR when the\n  // whole run is empty (preserves the pre-#741 \"always write one file\"\n  // behavior for a run with zero files, e.g. an empty glob match).\n  if (regularFiles.length > 0 || serialised.files.length === 0) {\n    const outFile = path.join(dir, `${meta.sdkLine}.${meta.platform}.json`);\n    await writeFile(\n      outFile,\n      `${JSON.stringify({ ...serialised, files: regularFiles }, null, 2)}\\n`,\n      'utf8',\n    );\n    written.push(outFile);\n  }\n\n  if (manualFiles.length > 0) {\n    const manualOutFile = path.join(dir, `${meta.sdkLine}.${meta.platform}.manual.json`);\n    await writeFile(\n      manualOutFile,\n      `${JSON.stringify({ ...serialised, files: manualFiles }, null, 2)}\\n`,\n      'utf8',\n    );\n    written.push(manualOutFile);\n  }\n\n  return written;\n}\n\n/**\n * Writes harvested `__AIT_CAPTURE__` lines to per-category files under `dir`,\n * named `<category>.<sdkLine>.<platform>.json` — the SAME convention\n * sdk-example's env1 `flushCapture` uses on the filesystem, so env1 and env3\n * capture artifacts line up for diffing.\n *\n * Each line's `json` payload is an opaque JSON array of capture records. Lines\n * sharing a category are concatenated into one array, in harvest order.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: only allowlist-prefixed capture lines reach here (the parser\n * dropped wss/scheme noise); the `json` payload is written verbatim but is a\n * capture record array, not a relay/secret.\n *\n * @param captures - Parsed capture lines (from `RelayRunReport.captures`).\n * @param dir      - Output directory (created recursively if missing).\n * @param cell     - Cell axes for the filename suffix.\n * @returns The absolute paths written (one per category), in category order.\n */\nexport async function writeCaptureArtifacts(\n  captures: ReadonlyArray<AitCaptureLine>,\n  dir: string,\n  cell: { sdkLine: string; platform: string },\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  if (captures.length === 0) return [];\n\n  // Group payloads by category, preserving harvest order. 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package/dist/{totp-DvOYkYim.js → totp-CZLLKfOC.js}

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-import "node:module";
+import { t as __exportAll } from "./rolldown-runtime-DGkTqVfb.js";
 import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
-//#region \0rolldown/runtime.js
-var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
-var __exportAll = (all, no_symbols) => {
-	let target = {};
-	for (var name in all) __defProp(target, name, {
-		get: all[name],
-		enumerable: true
-	});
-	if (!no_symbols) __defProp(target, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
-	return target;
-};
-//#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/totp.ts
 /**
 * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).
@@ -209,4 +197,4 @@ function buildRelayVerifyAuth(env = process.env) {
 //#endregion
 export { totp_exports as i, buildRelayVerifyAuth as n, generateTotp as r, assertRelayAuthConfigured as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=totp-DvOYkYim.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=totp-CZLLKfOC.js.map

package/dist/{totp-DvOYkYim.js.map → totp-CZLLKfOC.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"totp-DvOYkYim.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? 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+{"version":3,"file":"totp-CZLLKfOC.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? '';\n\n    // Do NOT log `code`, `secret`, or any derived value here.\n    // Use RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS (±6) for a ~3-minute acceptance window (#490).\n    // verifyTotp's own default (skew=1) is unchanged — only this call site is widened.\n    return verifyTotp(secret, code, undefined, RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS);\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA8BA,MAAM,YAAY;;AAGlB,MAAM,SAAS;;;;;;;;;;AAWf,SAAgB,aAAa,QAAgB,OAAe,KAAK,KAAK,EAAU;CAC9E,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;CAGtC,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,MAAO,UAAU,CAAC;CAGhE,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;CAGlC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,WAAY;CAC5C,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY;AACvB,YAAW,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;AAC/B,YAAW,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;CAE/B,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ;CAG/D,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM;AAQzB,WANI,IAAI,UAAU,QAAS,MACvB,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,QAAS,MAC3B,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,QAAS,IAC5B,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,OAEC,MAAM,QACjB,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiB7C,SAAgB,WACd,QACA,MACA,OAAe,KAAK,KAAK,EACzB,OAAe,GACN;CACT,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AACrD,KAAI,WAAW,WAAW,UAAU,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,WAAW,CAC7D,QAAO;CAGT,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO;AAEpD,MAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS;EAE9C,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa,QADb,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,IACG;AAE/C,MAAI,gBADgB,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO,EAChB,aAAa,CAC5C,QAAO;;AAIX,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;AAWT,MAAM,uBAAuB;;AAG7B,MAAM,SAAS;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcf,MAAa,oCAAoC;CAC/C;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACD,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcZ,SAAgB,uBAAuB,QAA8C;AACnF,KAAI,WAAW,KAAA,KAAa,WAAW,GAAI,QAAO;AAClD,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,qBAAsB,QAAO;AACjD,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACpC,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA0B5B,SAAgB,0BAA0B,MAAyB,QAAQ,KAAW;AACpF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,CACpD,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kCAAkC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDtD,SAAgB,qBACd,MAAyB,QAAQ,KACoC;CACrE,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACnB,KAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO,KAAA;AAEpB,SAAQ,QAAQ;EAGd,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO;EAC1B,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI;EAClC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,EAAE;AAO9D,SAAO,WAAW,QANH,IAAI,gBAAgB,SAAS,CACxB,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAKD,KAAA,GAAA,EAAmC"}

package/dist/totp-DAxys-r0.js

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+import { t as __exportAll } from "./rolldown-runtime-DUslC3ob.js";
+import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+//#region src/mcp/totp.ts
+/**
+* RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).
+*
+* External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used
+* to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and
+* covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.
+*
+* Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):
+*   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter
+*   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)
+*   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)
+*   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f
+*   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits
+*
+* Security note (keep this comment accurate):
+*   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a
+*   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from
+*   "anyone with the URL" to "URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation".
+*   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are
+*   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in
+*   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any
+* log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean
+* pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.
+*/
+var totp_exports = /* @__PURE__ */ __exportAll({
+	RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE: () => RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE,
+	RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS: () => 6,
+	assertRelayAuthConfigured: () => assertRelayAuthConfigured,
+	buildRelayVerifyAuth: () => buildRelayVerifyAuth,
+	generateTotp: () => generateTotp,
+	isValidRelayAuthSecret: () => isValidRelayAuthSecret,
+	verifyTotp: () => verifyTotp
+});
+/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */
+const TIME_STEP = 30;
+/** Number of digits in the generated code. */
+const DIGITS = 6;
+/**
+* Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-
+* clock time.
+*
+* @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32
+*   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.
+* @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.
+* @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `"042193"`.
+*/
+function generateTotp(secret, when = Date.now()) {
+	const key = Buffer.from(secret, "hex");
+	const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1e3 / TIME_STEP));
+	const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);
+	const hi = Math.floor(counter / 4294967296);
+	const lo = counter >>> 0;
+	counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);
+	counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);
+	const mac = createHmac("sha1", key).update(counterBuf).digest();
+	const offset = mac[19] & 15;
+	return (((mac[offset] & 127) << 24 | (mac[offset + 1] & 255) << 16 | (mac[offset + 2] & 255) << 8 | mac[offset + 3] & 255) % 10 ** DIGITS).toString().padStart(DIGITS, "0");
+}
+/**
+* Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to
+* tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.
+*
+* Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing
+* side-channel attacks.
+*
+* @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.
+* @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).
+* @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.
+* @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1
+*   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).
+* @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.
+*/
+function verifyTotp(secret, code, when = Date.now(), skew = 1) {
+	const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, "0");
+	if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) return false;
+	const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, "utf8");
+	for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {
+		const expected = generateTotp(secret, when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1e3);
+		if (timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected, "utf8"), candidateBuf)) return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+/**
+* Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.
+*
+* The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,
+* 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key
+* we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits
+* 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.
+*/
+const MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;
+/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */
+const HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;
+/**
+* Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and
+* how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any
+* fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.
+*
+* Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`
+* decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be
+* silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting
+* command emits hex.
+*/
+const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [
+	"[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.",
+	"발급: openssl rand -hex 32",
+	"데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.",
+	"프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.",
+	"자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp"
+].join("\n");
+/**
+* Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at
+* least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd
+* length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,
+* 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).
+*
+* Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the
+* fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,
+* logged, or echoed.
+*/
+function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret) {
+	if (secret === void 0 || secret === "") return false;
+	if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;
+	if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;
+	return HEX_RE.test(secret);
+}
+/**
+* Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before
+* a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).
+*
+* Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes
+* the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third
+* party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay
+* comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —
+* `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),
+* both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach
+* this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.
+*
+* Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.
+* The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)
+* — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean
+* predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never
+* the value, its length, or any derived fragment.
+*
+* @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable
+*   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.
+*/
+function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env = process.env) {
+	if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);
+}
+/**
+* Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a
+* `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.
+*
+* The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and
+* adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using
+* {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3
+* minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even
+* when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).
+*
+* Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as
+* "auth disabled" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since
+* issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by
+* {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production
+* this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the
+* `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.
+*
+* Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the
+* same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported
+* from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and
+* is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.
+*/
+function buildRelayVerifyAuth(env = process.env) {
+	const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;
+	if (!secret) return void 0;
+	return (req) => {
+		const rawUrl = req.url ?? "";
+		const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf("?");
+		const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? "" : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);
+		return verifyTotp(secret, new URLSearchParams(queryStr).get("at") ?? "", void 0, 6);
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { totp_exports as i, buildRelayVerifyAuth as n, generateTotp as r, assertRelayAuthConfigured as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=totp-DAxys-r0.js.map

package/dist/totp-DAxys-r0.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"totp-DAxys-r0.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ait-co/devtools",
-  "version": "0.1.132",
+  "version": "0.1.133",
   "description": "Development tools for Apps in Toss mini-apps — mock SDK, floating devtools panel, and universal bundler plugin",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {