@ait-co/devtools 0.1.121 → 0.1.123

package/dist/test-runner/relay-factory.js

@@ -18,15 +18,17 @@ function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
 	const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 6e5;
 	const headless = opts.headless === true;
 	let family;
+	let qrServer;
 	return {
 		async open() {
-			const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait } = await import("../attach-orchestrator-DEJfLm7V.js");
-			const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import("../cell-Cv3e_qwn.js");
-			const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import("../relay-secret-store-DNPJKHNs.js");
-			const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import("../debug-server-Buc8yoa7.js");
+			const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait, mintAttachUrl } = await import("../attach-orchestrator-RhOdO3DS.js");
+			const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import("../cell-Ba9lCI3B.js");
+			const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import("../relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js");
+			const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import("../debug-server-Bup2AJ5H.js");
 			await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });
 			const booted = await bootRelayFamily({ verifyAuth: buildRelayVerifyAuth() });
 			family = booted;
+			let lastAttachParts;
 			const attachDeps = {
 				getTunnelStatus: booted.getTunnelStatus ?? (() => ({
 					up: false,
@@ -37,6 +39,22 @@ function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
 				onAttachUrlBuilt: void 0,
 				canOpenBrowser: () => !headless
 			};
+			try {
+				const { startQrHttpServer } = await import("../qr-http-server-BsWlOA85.js");
+				const getDashboardState = () => ({
+					tunnel: attachDeps.getTunnelStatus(),
+					pages: null,
+					attachUrl: lastAttachParts ? mintAttachUrl(attachDeps, lastAttachParts) : null,
+					mode: "relay-dev"
+				});
+				qrServer = await startQrHttpServer(getDashboardState);
+				attachDeps.qrHttpServer = qrServer;
+				attachDeps.onAttachUrlBuilt = (parts) => {
+					lastAttachParts = parts;
+					qrServer?.notifyStateChange();
+				};
+				process.stderr.write(`devtools-test: QR dashboard: http://127.0.0.1:${qrServer.port}/\n`);
+			} catch {}
 			const prep = await prepareAttach(attachDeps, "relay-dev", { scheme_url: opts.schemeUrl }, booted.connection);
 			if (!prep.ok) {
 				booted.stop();
@@ -60,6 +78,8 @@ function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
 		async close(_connection) {
 			family?.stop();
 			family = void 0;
+			await qrServer?.close();
+			qrServer = void 0;
 		}
 	};
 }

package/dist/test-runner/relay-factory.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"relay-factory.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/test-runner/relay-factory.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Relay connection factory for the Vitest custom pool (devtools#696).\n *\n * The Vitest pool (`pool.ts`) takes a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that knows\n * how to `open()` a live CDP relay connection (boot relay → QR → phone scan →\n * cell inject → enableDomains) and `close()` it. Before this module that exact\n * assembly lived only inside the `devtools-test` CLI's `main()`; the standalone\n * CLI and the Vitest pool would otherwise each hand-roll it and drift.\n *\n * This is the single source of that assembly. `cli.ts` is refactored to call\n * `createRelayConnectionFactory(...).open()`, and `definePhoneVitestConfig`\n * (config.ts) exposes it so a downstream `vitest.config.ts` can wire the pool:\n *\n *   import { createRelayConnectionFactory } from '@ait-co/devtools/test-runner';\n *   const connection = createRelayConnectionFactory({\n *     schemeUrl,\n *     cell,\n *     // REQUIRED — own the stdout decision (the chunks carry the relay wss +\n *     // TOTP code). Suppress on non-interactive stdout; print otherwise.\n *     onQrContent: (chunks) => {\n *       if (!process.stdout.isTTY) return;\n *       for (const c of chunks) process.stdout.write(`${c}\\n`);\n *     },\n *   });\n *   export default defineConfig({ test: definePhoneVitestConfig({ connection }) });\n *\n * The heavy boot graph (chii relay, cloudflared, ws, debug-server) is pulled via\n * DYNAMIC import inside `open()` — so merely importing this module (or the\n * `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel) does NOT statically drag that graph in.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: relay wss URLs, scheme URLs, and the TOTP secret/code are\n * never logged. `open()` reads the project-local `.ait_relay` secret read-only\n * (never mints) and the minted TOTP code rides only inside the QR `at=` param.\n *\n * Node-only. react-free (CdpConnection + lazily-imported MCP boot helpers only).\n */\n\nimport type { AttachDeps } from '../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js';\nimport type { CdpConnection } from '../mcp/cdp-connection.js';\nimport type { RelayConnectionFactory } from './pool.js';\n\n// NOTE: every value import below is a DYNAMIC import inside `open()`. This module\n// keeps ONLY type-level static imports so that re-exporting it from the\n// `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel (config.ts) does NOT statically drag the\n// heavy MCP graph (cell.ts → attach-orchestrator.ts → tools.ts → server-lock,\n// plus chii/cloudflared via debug-server) onto that Node-config entry.\n\n/** Options for {@link createRelayConnectionFactory}. */\nexport interface RelayConnectionFactoryOptions {\n  /**\n   * intoss-private:// scheme URL from `ait deploy --scheme-only` (env3). The\n   * phone cold-loads the candidate bundle this URL points at. SECRET-HANDLING:\n   * never logged.\n   */\n  schemeUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Project root for the `.ait_relay` secret lookup (read-only). Defaults to\n   * `process.cwd()`.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /**\n   * Attach wait timeout in ms — how long `open()` waits for the phone to scan\n   * the QR and attach. Defaults to 600 000 (10 min) to give time for a manual\n   * scan. (The per-file evaluate timeout is separate, passed via the pool's\n   * `run` options.)\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Disable browser auto-open of the QR dashboard (text QR only). */\n  headless?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Cell axes injected as `__AIT_CELL__` before the first test bundle runs, so\n   * sdk-example's capture picks up the correct sdkLine/platform. Optional — when\n   * omitted no cell is injected. The values are not secrets.\n   */\n  cell?: { sdkLine: string; platform: string };\n  /**\n   * Receives the QR/attach render content (text chunks) from\n   * `renderAndMaybeWait`, so the caller decides whether to print them — e.g.\n   * suppress on non-interactive stdout.\n   *\n   * REQUIRED (not optional) on purpose: these chunks contain the QR payload\n   * (which encodes the relay wss + TOTP `at=` code) and the attach JSON block.\n   * Making the hook mandatory means the factory never falls back to printing\n   * them itself — a downstream `vitest.config.ts` consumer that wires this via\n   * the `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel is forced to make an explicit\n   * stdout decision rather than silently leaking the secret-bearing block.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: when a non-interactive caller is detected the hook MUST\n   * suppress the WHOLE chunk (not just `attachUrl`), since `relayUrl` rides in\n   * the same block.\n   */\n  onQrContent: (textChunks: string[]) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that opens a standalone env3 relay\n * connection.\n *\n * `open()` performs the full attach lifecycle and BLOCKS for tens of seconds (up\n * to `timeoutMs`) while a human scans the rendered QR with their phone — there\n * is no way around the manual scan for env3. It resolves with the live\n * `CdpConnection` once a matching page attaches; `close()` tears the relay\n * family down.\n *\n * The factory holds the booted relay family in a closure so `close()` can stop\n * it. A second `open()` on the same factory boots a fresh family (the previous\n * one should have been `close()`d first).\n */\nexport function createRelayConnectionFactory(\n  opts: RelayConnectionFactoryOptions,\n): RelayConnectionFactory {\n  const projectRoot = opts.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();\n  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 600_000;\n  const headless = opts.headless === true;\n\n  // Captured so close() can stop the family that open() booted.\n  let family: { connection: CdpConnection; stop(): void } | undefined;\n\n  return {\n    async open(): Promise<CdpConnection> {\n      // Dynamic imports: keep the chii/cloudflared/debug-server graph OFF the\n      // static import graph of this module (and the test-runner config barrel).\n      const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait } = await import('../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js');\n      const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import('./cell.js');\n      const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import('../mcp/relay-secret-store.js');\n      const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import('../mcp/debug-server.js');\n\n      // Load the project-local .ait_relay secret into AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET\n      // BEFORE booting the relay so assertRelayAuthConfigured()/buildRelayVerifyAuth()\n      // at the boot site see it. Read-only — never mints. SECRET-HANDLING: the\n      // value is never logged here.\n      await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });\n\n      const booted = await bootRelayFamily({ verifyAuth: buildRelayVerifyAuth() });\n      family = booted;\n\n      // Assemble AttachDeps with no dashboard/SSE (CLI/pool is not the daemon).\n      const attachDeps: AttachDeps = {\n        getTunnelStatus: booted.getTunnelStatus ?? (() => ({ up: false, wssUrl: null })),\n        getTotpSecret: () => process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        qrHttpServer: undefined,\n        onAttachUrlBuilt: undefined,\n        canOpenBrowser: () => !headless,\n      };\n\n      const prep = await prepareAttach(\n        attachDeps,\n        'relay-dev',\n        { scheme_url: opts.schemeUrl },\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (!prep.ok) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING: do NOT surface `prep.error.content` in the thrown\n        // message. Some prep error paths build their text from attach\n        // components, and the CLI catch writes `e.message` to stderr — embedding\n        // that text risks leaking the scheme/relay wss URL. The detailed\n        // diagnostic is the daemon/dashboard's job; the factory throws a\n        // secret-free message only.\n        throw new Error(\n          'createRelayConnectionFactory: attach preparation failed — check the scheme_url and that the relay tunnel is up',\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Render the QR + wait for the phone to attach. SECRET-HANDLING: this\n      // function never logs scheme/wss/TOTP values.\n      const waitResult = await renderAndMaybeWait(\n        attachDeps,\n        prep,\n        true,\n        timeoutMs,\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (waitResult.isError) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING (BLOCKER fix): `waitResult.content` is the timeout\n        // result built from `buildTimeoutError(baseText, ...)`, and `baseText`\n        // is `JSON.stringify({ attachUrl, relayUrl, ... })` — `attachUrl` carries\n        // the TOTP `at=` code and `relayUrl` is the relay `wss://` URL. The CLI\n        // catch writes `e.message` to stderr, so extracting that text here would\n        // leak the relay wss + TOTP code on every timeout. Throw a secret-free\n        // message with only the timeout duration.\n        const timeoutSec = Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000);\n        throw new Error(\n          `createRelayConnectionFactory: attach timed out after ${timeoutSec}s — phone did not scan the QR within the timeout`,\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Surface the QR/attach render content to the caller, which owns the\n      // stdout decision (suppress on non-interactive stdout). There is no\n      // fallback that prints here itself: `onQrContent` is a required option so\n      // the secret-bearing block (attachUrl TOTP + relayUrl wss) can never be\n      // emitted without an explicit caller decision. SECRET-HANDLING.\n      const qrChunks = waitResult.content\n        .filter((c): c is { type: 'text'; text: string } => c.type === 'text')\n        .map((c) => c.text);\n      opts.onQrContent(qrChunks);\n\n      // Debugger attached — show the on-phone \"Debugger Connected\" badge.\n      await injectDebugIndicator(booted.connection);\n\n      // Inject the cell globals before any test bundle runs (session-global).\n      if (opts.cell !== undefined) {\n        await injectGlobals(booted.connection, { __AIT_CELL__: opts.cell });\n      }\n\n      // Open the CDP client websocket + enable domains so the first run's\n      // Runtime.evaluate and console stream are live. enableDomains is\n      // idempotent; runTestFilesOverRelay also calls it defensively.\n      await booted.connection.enableDomains();\n\n      return booted.connection;\n    },\n\n    async close(_connection: CdpConnection): Promise<void> {\n      // family.stop() is synchronous best-effort: closes the CDP connection and\n      // shuts down the relay + cloudflared child.\n      family?.stop();\n      family = undefined;\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4GA,SAAgB,6BACd,MACwB;CACxB,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;CACrD,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;CACpC,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,aAAa;CAGnC,IAAI;AAEJ,QAAO;EACL,MAAM,OAA+B;GAGnC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,uBAAuB,MAAM,OAAO;GAC3D,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO;GAC7D,MAAM,EAAE,4BAA4B,MAAM,OAAO;GACjD,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,yBAAyB,MAAM,OAAO;AAM/D,SAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;GAE9C,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC5E,YAAS;GAGT,MAAM,aAAyB;IAC7B,iBAAiB,OAAO,2BAA2B;KAAE,IAAI;KAAO,QAAQ;KAAM;IAC9E,qBAAqB,QAAQ,IAAI;IACjC,cAAc,KAAA;IACd,kBAAkB,KAAA;IAClB,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACxB;GAED,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,cACjB,YACA,aACA,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW,EAC9B,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;AACZ,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;AAOT,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,iHACD;;GAKH,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,mBACvB,YACA,MACA,MACA,WACA,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;IAQT,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,IAAK;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,wDAAwD,WAAW,kDACpE;;GAQH,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,QACzB,QAAQ,MAA2C,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,CACrE,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AACrB,QAAK,YAAY,SAAS;AAG1B,SAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,WAAW;AAG7C,OAAI,KAAK,SAAS,KAAA,EAChB,OAAM,cAAc,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAMrE,SAAM,OAAO,WAAW,eAAe;AAEvC,UAAO,OAAO;;EAGhB,MAAM,MAAM,aAA2C;AAGrD,WAAQ,MAAM;AACd,YAAS,KAAA;;EAEZ"}
+{"version":3,"file":"relay-factory.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/test-runner/relay-factory.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Relay connection factory for the Vitest custom pool (devtools#696).\n *\n * The Vitest pool (`pool.ts`) takes a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that knows\n * how to `open()` a live CDP relay connection (boot relay → QR → phone scan →\n * cell inject → enableDomains) and `close()` it. Before this module that exact\n * assembly lived only inside the `devtools-test` CLI's `main()`; the standalone\n * CLI and the Vitest pool would otherwise each hand-roll it and drift.\n *\n * This is the single source of that assembly. `cli.ts` is refactored to call\n * `createRelayConnectionFactory(...).open()`, and `definePhoneVitestConfig`\n * (config.ts) exposes it so a downstream `vitest.config.ts` can wire the pool:\n *\n *   import { createRelayConnectionFactory } from '@ait-co/devtools/test-runner';\n *   const connection = createRelayConnectionFactory({\n *     schemeUrl,\n *     cell,\n *     // REQUIRED — own the stdout decision (the chunks carry the relay wss +\n *     // TOTP code). Suppress on non-interactive stdout; print otherwise.\n *     onQrContent: (chunks) => {\n *       if (!process.stdout.isTTY) return;\n *       for (const c of chunks) process.stdout.write(`${c}\\n`);\n *     },\n *   });\n *   export default defineConfig({ test: definePhoneVitestConfig({ connection }) });\n *\n * The heavy boot graph (chii relay, cloudflared, ws, debug-server) is pulled via\n * DYNAMIC import inside `open()` — so merely importing this module (or the\n * `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel) does NOT statically drag that graph in.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: relay wss URLs, scheme URLs, and the TOTP secret/code are\n * never logged. `open()` reads the project-local `.ait_relay` secret read-only\n * (never mints) and the minted TOTP code rides only inside the QR `at=` param.\n *\n * Node-only. react-free (CdpConnection + lazily-imported MCP boot helpers only).\n */\n\nimport type { AttachDeps, AttachUrlParts } from '../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js';\nimport type { CdpConnection } from '../mcp/cdp-connection.js';\nimport type { QrHttpServer } from '../mcp/qr-http-server.js';\nimport type { RelayConnectionFactory } from './pool.js';\n\n// NOTE: every value import below is a DYNAMIC import inside `open()`. This module\n// keeps ONLY type-level static imports so that re-exporting it from the\n// `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel (config.ts) does NOT statically drag the\n// heavy MCP graph (cell.ts → attach-orchestrator.ts → tools.ts → server-lock,\n// plus chii/cloudflared via debug-server) onto that Node-config entry.\n\n/** Options for {@link createRelayConnectionFactory}. */\nexport interface RelayConnectionFactoryOptions {\n  /**\n   * intoss-private:// scheme URL from `ait deploy --scheme-only` (env3). The\n   * phone cold-loads the candidate bundle this URL points at. SECRET-HANDLING:\n   * never logged.\n   */\n  schemeUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Project root for the `.ait_relay` secret lookup (read-only). Defaults to\n   * `process.cwd()`.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /**\n   * Attach wait timeout in ms — how long `open()` waits for the phone to scan\n   * the QR and attach. Defaults to 600 000 (10 min) to give time for a manual\n   * scan. (The per-file evaluate timeout is separate, passed via the pool's\n   * `run` options.)\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Disable browser auto-open of the QR dashboard (text QR only). */\n  headless?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Cell axes injected as `__AIT_CELL__` before the first test bundle runs, so\n   * sdk-example's capture picks up the correct sdkLine/platform. Optional — when\n   * omitted no cell is injected. The values are not secrets.\n   */\n  cell?: { sdkLine: string; platform: string };\n  /**\n   * Receives the QR/attach render content (text chunks) from\n   * `renderAndMaybeWait`, so the caller decides whether to print them — e.g.\n   * suppress on non-interactive stdout.\n   *\n   * REQUIRED (not optional) on purpose: these chunks contain the QR payload\n   * (which encodes the relay wss + TOTP `at=` code) and the attach JSON block.\n   * Making the hook mandatory means the factory never falls back to printing\n   * them itself — a downstream `vitest.config.ts` consumer that wires this via\n   * the `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel is forced to make an explicit\n   * stdout decision rather than silently leaking the secret-bearing block.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: when a non-interactive caller is detected the hook MUST\n   * suppress the WHOLE chunk (not just `attachUrl`), since `relayUrl` rides in\n   * the same block.\n   */\n  onQrContent: (textChunks: string[]) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that opens a standalone env3 relay\n * connection.\n *\n * `open()` performs the full attach lifecycle and BLOCKS for tens of seconds (up\n * to `timeoutMs`) while a human scans the rendered QR with their phone — there\n * is no way around the manual scan for env3. It resolves with the live\n * `CdpConnection` once a matching page attaches; `close()` tears the relay\n * family down.\n *\n * The factory holds the booted relay family in a closure so `close()` can stop\n * it. A second `open()` on the same factory boots a fresh family (the previous\n * one should have been `close()`d first).\n */\nexport function createRelayConnectionFactory(\n  opts: RelayConnectionFactoryOptions,\n): RelayConnectionFactory {\n  const projectRoot = opts.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();\n  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 600_000;\n  const headless = opts.headless === true;\n\n  // Captured so close() can stop the family that open() booted.\n  let family: { connection: CdpConnection; stop(): void } | undefined;\n  // QR HTTP server — started during open() when not headless, closed in close().\n  let qrServer: QrHttpServer | undefined;\n\n  return {\n    async open(): Promise<CdpConnection> {\n      // Dynamic imports: keep the chii/cloudflared/debug-server graph OFF the\n      // static import graph of this module (and the test-runner config barrel).\n      const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait, mintAttachUrl } = await import(\n        '../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js'\n      );\n      const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import('./cell.js');\n      const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import('../mcp/relay-secret-store.js');\n      const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import('../mcp/debug-server.js');\n\n      // Load the project-local .ait_relay secret into AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET\n      // BEFORE booting the relay so assertRelayAuthConfigured()/buildRelayVerifyAuth()\n      // at the boot site see it. Read-only — never mints. SECRET-HANDLING: the\n      // value is never logged here.\n      await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });\n\n      const booted = await bootRelayFamily({ verifyAuth: buildRelayVerifyAuth() });\n      family = booted;\n\n      // Track the last-captured attach parts so getDashboardState can mint a\n      // fresh attach URL on every dashboard request/SSE push (fresh TOTP at=).\n      // SECRET-HANDLING: parts contain the relay wss + scheme URL — never logged.\n      let lastAttachParts: AttachUrlParts | undefined;\n\n      // Assemble AttachDeps. We set qrHttpServer and onAttachUrlBuilt below\n      // (before prepareAttach) after optionally starting the web-QR server.\n      const attachDeps: AttachDeps = {\n        getTunnelStatus: booted.getTunnelStatus ?? (() => ({ up: false, wssUrl: null })),\n        getTotpSecret: () => process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        qrHttpServer: undefined, // filled in below if web-QR server started\n        onAttachUrlBuilt: undefined, // filled in below\n        canOpenBrowser: () => !headless,\n      };\n\n      // Web-QR server: reuse the same loopback HTTP dashboard that the MCP\n      // start_attach path uses (src/mcp/qr-http-server.ts). This makes the QR\n      // scannable even when stdout is non-interactive (Claude Code `!` / CI),\n      // because the browser is opened by URL — not via captured stdout.\n      //\n      // Headless decision: we start the server even in --headless mode so the\n      // printed stderr URL can be opened manually. The existing\n      // canOpenBrowser: () => !headless gate inside renderAndMaybeWait prevents\n      // the auto-open; headless users see only the stderr URL.\n      //\n      // On failure we fall back gracefully to the text-QR path — do NOT crash.\n      // SECRET-HANDLING: only http://127.0.0.1:<port>/ (no secrets) goes to stderr.\n      try {\n        const { startQrHttpServer } = await import('../mcp/qr-http-server.js');\n\n        const getDashboardState = () => ({\n          tunnel: attachDeps.getTunnelStatus(),\n          pages: null, // CLI/pool: no page-list introspection needed\n          attachUrl: lastAttachParts ? mintAttachUrl(attachDeps, lastAttachParts) : null,\n          mode: 'relay-dev' as const,\n        });\n\n        qrServer = await startQrHttpServer(getDashboardState);\n\n        // Wire the QR server into attachDeps BEFORE prepareAttach is called so\n        // renderAndMaybeWait sees it and takes Path 2/3 (web-QR) instead of Path 4.\n        attachDeps.qrHttpServer = qrServer;\n\n        // Capture attach parts via onAttachUrlBuilt so getDashboardState can\n        // mint a fresh URL (fresh TOTP at= code) on every dashboard render.\n        attachDeps.onAttachUrlBuilt = (parts: AttachUrlParts) => {\n          lastAttachParts = parts;\n          qrServer?.notifyStateChange();\n        };\n\n        // Print the loopback dashboard URL to stderr — it carries no secrets\n        // (TOTP codes and relay wss live only in the in-memory HTTP response).\n        process.stderr.write(`devtools-test: QR dashboard: http://127.0.0.1:${qrServer.port}/\\n`);\n      } catch {\n        // startQrHttpServer failed (e.g. port conflict, import error). Fall back\n        // to the existing text-QR path by leaving qrHttpServer: undefined.\n        // qrServer remains undefined; close() handles that with optional chaining.\n      }\n\n      const prep = await prepareAttach(\n        attachDeps,\n        'relay-dev',\n        { scheme_url: opts.schemeUrl },\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (!prep.ok) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING: do NOT surface `prep.error.content` in the thrown\n        // message. Some prep error paths build their text from attach\n        // components, and the CLI catch writes `e.message` to stderr — embedding\n        // that text risks leaking the scheme/relay wss URL. The detailed\n        // diagnostic is the daemon/dashboard's job; the factory throws a\n        // secret-free message only.\n        throw new Error(\n          'createRelayConnectionFactory: attach preparation failed — check the scheme_url and that the relay tunnel is up',\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Render the QR + wait for the phone to attach. SECRET-HANDLING: this\n      // function never logs scheme/wss/TOTP values.\n      const waitResult = await renderAndMaybeWait(\n        attachDeps,\n        prep,\n        true,\n        timeoutMs,\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (waitResult.isError) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING (BLOCKER fix): `waitResult.content` is the timeout\n        // result built from `buildTimeoutError(baseText, ...)`, and `baseText`\n        // is `JSON.stringify({ attachUrl, relayUrl, ... })` — `attachUrl` carries\n        // the TOTP `at=` code and `relayUrl` is the relay `wss://` URL. The CLI\n        // catch writes `e.message` to stderr, so extracting that text here would\n        // leak the relay wss + TOTP code on every timeout. Throw a secret-free\n        // message with only the timeout duration.\n        const timeoutSec = Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000);\n        throw new Error(\n          `createRelayConnectionFactory: attach timed out after ${timeoutSec}s — phone did not scan the QR within the timeout`,\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Surface the QR/attach render content to the caller, which owns the\n      // stdout decision (suppress on non-interactive stdout). There is no\n      // fallback that prints here itself: `onQrContent` is a required option so\n      // the secret-bearing block (attachUrl TOTP + relayUrl wss) can never be\n      // emitted without an explicit caller decision. SECRET-HANDLING.\n      const qrChunks = waitResult.content\n        .filter((c): c is { type: 'text'; text: string } => c.type === 'text')\n        .map((c) => c.text);\n      opts.onQrContent(qrChunks);\n\n      // Debugger attached — show the on-phone \"Debugger Connected\" badge.\n      await injectDebugIndicator(booted.connection);\n\n      // Inject the cell globals before any test bundle runs (session-global).\n      if (opts.cell !== undefined) {\n        await injectGlobals(booted.connection, { __AIT_CELL__: opts.cell });\n      }\n\n      // Open the CDP client websocket + enable domains so the first run's\n      // Runtime.evaluate and console stream are live. enableDomains is\n      // idempotent; runTestFilesOverRelay also calls it defensively.\n      await booted.connection.enableDomains();\n\n      return booted.connection;\n    },\n\n    async close(_connection: CdpConnection): Promise<void> {\n      // family.stop() is synchronous best-effort: closes the CDP connection and\n      // shuts down the relay + cloudflared child.\n      family?.stop();\n      family = undefined;\n      // Close the web-QR HTTP server if one was started during open().\n      // close() is idempotent via optional chaining + reassignment to undefined.\n      await qrServer?.close();\n      qrServer = undefined;\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA6GA,SAAgB,6BACd,MACwB;CACxB,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;CACrD,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;CACpC,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,aAAa;CAGnC,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI;AAEJ,QAAO;EACL,MAAM,OAA+B;GAGnC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,oBAAoB,kBAAkB,MAAM,OACjE;GAEF,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO;GAC7D,MAAM,EAAE,4BAA4B,MAAM,OAAO;GACjD,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,yBAAyB,MAAM,OAAO;AAM/D,SAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;GAE9C,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC5E,YAAS;GAKT,IAAI;GAIJ,MAAM,aAAyB;IAC7B,iBAAiB,OAAO,2BAA2B;KAAE,IAAI;KAAO,QAAQ;KAAM;IAC9E,qBAAqB,QAAQ,IAAI;IACjC,cAAc,KAAA;IACd,kBAAkB,KAAA;IAClB,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACxB;AAcD,OAAI;IACF,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,OAAO;IAE3C,MAAM,2BAA2B;KAC/B,QAAQ,WAAW,iBAAiB;KACpC,OAAO;KACP,WAAW,kBAAkB,cAAc,YAAY,gBAAgB,GAAG;KAC1E,MAAM;KACP;AAED,eAAW,MAAM,kBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAIrD,eAAW,eAAe;AAI1B,eAAW,oBAAoB,UAA0B;AACvD,uBAAkB;AAClB,eAAU,mBAAmB;;AAK/B,YAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,iDAAiD,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK;WACnF;GAMR,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,cACjB,YACA,aACA,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW,EAC9B,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;AACZ,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;AAOT,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,iHACD;;GAKH,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,mBACvB,YACA,MACA,MACA,WACA,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;IAQT,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,IAAK;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,wDAAwD,WAAW,kDACpE;;GAQH,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,QACzB,QAAQ,MAA2C,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,CACrE,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AACrB,QAAK,YAAY,SAAS;AAG1B,SAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,WAAW;AAG7C,OAAI,KAAK,SAAS,KAAA,EAChB,OAAM,cAAc,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAMrE,SAAM,OAAO,WAAW,eAAe;AAEvC,UAAO,OAAO;;EAGhB,MAAM,MAAM,aAA2C;AAGrD,WAAQ,MAAM;AACd,YAAS,KAAA;AAGT,SAAM,UAAU,OAAO;AACvB,cAAW,KAAA;;EAEd"}

package/dist/test-runner/relay-worker.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { a as runTestFilesOverRelay, i as flattenResults, n as RelayRunOptions, r as RelayRunReport, t as FileResult } from "../relay-worker-BBu1oEqC.js";
+import { a as runTestFilesOverRelay, i as flattenResults, n as RelayRunOptions, r as RelayRunReport, t as FileResult } from "../relay-worker-7biDlEjo.js";
 export { FileResult, RelayRunOptions, RelayRunReport, flattenResults, runTestFilesOverRelay };

package/dist/test-runner/report.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { t as AitCaptureLine } from "../capture-BmK_cBqQ.js";
-import { n as TestResult } from "../runtime-Bm_sT1C9.js";
-import { r as RelayRunReport } from "../relay-worker-BBu1oEqC.js";
+import { t as AitCaptureLine } from "../capture-B1zfGyTo.js";
+import { n as TestResult } from "../runtime-ozyPnRbU.js";
+import { r as RelayRunReport } from "../relay-worker-7biDlEjo.js";
 
 //#region src/test-runner/report.d.ts
 /** The cell axes a report is stamped with — the test-matrix coordinates. */

package/dist/test-runner/rpc.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { t as CdpConnection } from "../cdp-connection-DB2zgthr.js";
-import { t as RunReport } from "../runtime-Bm_sT1C9.js";
+import { t as CdpConnection } from "../cdp-connection-Dxw_EY8s.js";
+import { t as RunReport } from "../runtime-ozyPnRbU.js";
 
 //#region src/test-runner/rpc.d.ts
 /**

package/dist/test-runner/runtime.d.ts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { i as runtimeGlobals, n as TestResult, r as runTestModule, t as RunReport } from "../runtime-Bm_sT1C9.js";
+import { i as runtimeGlobals, n as TestResult, r as runTestModule, t as RunReport } from "../runtime-ozyPnRbU.js";
 export { RunReport, TestResult, runTestModule, runtimeGlobals };

package/dist/test-runner/task-graph.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { t as RunReport } from "../runtime-Bm_sT1C9.js";
+import { t as RunReport } from "../runtime-ozyPnRbU.js";
 import { File, TaskEventPack, TaskResultPack } from "@vitest/runner";
 
 //#region src/test-runner/task-graph.d.ts

package/dist/totp-D1pulXLa.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+import { a as isValidRelayAuthSecret } from "./totp-WY6l0ysP.js";
+export { isValidRelayAuthSecret };

package/dist/{totp-0bvlo9Yb.js → totp-WY6l0ysP.js}

@@ -187,4 +187,4 @@ function buildRelayVerifyAuth(env = process.env) {
 //#endregion
 export { isValidRelayAuthSecret as a, generateTotp as i, assertRelayAuthConfigured as n, verifyTotp as o, buildRelayVerifyAuth as r, RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=totp-0bvlo9Yb.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=totp-WY6l0ysP.js.map

package/dist/{totp-0bvlo9Yb.js.map → totp-WY6l0ysP.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"totp-0bvlo9Yb.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. Re-exported\n * from `debug-server.ts` for back-compat.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value read from env is captured in a closure and\n * is NEVER written to any log, error message, or process output.\n */\nexport function buildRelayVerifyAuth(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n): ((req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage) => boolean) | undefined {\n  const secret = env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET;\n  if (!secret) return undefined;\n\n  return (req) => {\n    // Parse the `at` query param from the upgrade request URL.\n    // req.url is the raw request path + query, e.g. `/client/id?target=…&at=123456`\n    const rawUrl = req.url ?? '';\n    const qIndex = rawUrl.indexOf('?');\n    const queryStr = qIndex === -1 ? '' : rawUrl.slice(qIndex + 1);\n    const params = new URLSearchParams(queryStr);\n    const code = params.get('at') ?? 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+{"version":3,"file":"totp-WY6l0ysP.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/totp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6238 TOTP implementation (Node.js, node:crypto only).\n *\n * External TOTP libraries (otplib, speakeasy, …) are intentionally NOT used\n * to keep the dependency surface minimal. This hand-roll is ~30 lines and\n * covers exactly what relay-side auth needs.\n *\n * Algorithm summary (RFC 6238 + RFC 4226):\n *   T  = floor(now / 30)          — 30-second time step counter\n *   K  = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex') — shared secret (raw bytes, hex-encoded)\n *   MAC = HMAC-SHA1(K, T as 8-byte big-endian uint64)\n *   offset = MAC[19] & 0x0f\n *   code = (MAC[offset..offset+4] & 0x7fffffff) % 10^6  — 6 digits\n *\n * Security note (keep this comment accurate):\n *   The baked-in secret in a dog-food build is extractable from the bundle by a\n *   determined reverse engineer. This mechanism raises the bar from\n *   \"anyone with the URL\" to \"URL + bundle extraction + live TOTP calculation\".\n *   Casual URL leaks (Slack paste, QR screenshot, shoulder-surfing) are\n *   blocked; deliberate reverse engineering is not. See threat model in\n *   src/mcp/chii-relay.ts and umbrella CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: secret values and computed codes MUST NOT appear in any\n * log, error message, or string visible outside this module. Only boolean\n * pass/fail and reason enum values are safe to surface.\n */\n\nimport { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** Time step window in seconds (RFC 6238 default). */\nconst TIME_STEP = 30;\n\n/** Number of digits in the generated code. */\nconst DIGITS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Derives a 6-digit TOTP code from a hex-encoded secret at the given wall-\n * clock time.\n *\n * @param secret - The shared secret as a hex string (e.g. 64 hex chars = 32\n *   bytes). Must be the output of `generateAttachToken()` or compatible.\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @returns A zero-padded 6-digit decimal string, e.g. `\"042193\"`.\n */\nexport function generateTotp(secret: string, when: number = Date.now()): string {\n  const key = Buffer.from(secret, 'hex');\n  // Clamp to 0 so negative timestamps (e.g. in ±skew checks near epoch) do not\n  // produce a negative counter, which would cause writeUInt32BE to throw.\n  const counter = Math.max(0, Math.floor(when / 1000 / TIME_STEP));\n\n  // Encode counter as 8-byte big-endian unsigned integer.\n  const counterBuf = Buffer.alloc(8);\n  // JavaScript numbers are safe integers up to 2^53; counter is ~7.5×10^10 at\n  // year 9999 — well within safe range so standard bitwise ops are fine.\n  const hi = Math.floor(counter / 0x100000000);\n  const lo = counter >>> 0;\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(hi, 0);\n  counterBuf.writeUInt32BE(lo, 4);\n\n  const mac = createHmac('sha1', key).update(counterBuf).digest();\n\n  // Dynamic truncation (RFC 4226 §5.4).\n  const offset = mac[19] & 0x0f;\n  const binCode =\n    ((mac[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((mac[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((mac[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (mac[offset + 3] & 0xff);\n\n  const otp = binCode % 10 ** DIGITS;\n  return otp.toString().padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a TOTP code against the secret, accepting ±`skew` time steps to\n * tolerate clock drift between the relay host and the client device.\n *\n * Uses `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time comparison to prevent timing\n * side-channel attacks.\n *\n * @param secret - Hex-encoded shared secret.\n * @param code - The 6-digit code to verify (string or numeric).\n * @param when - Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Defaults to `Date.now()`.\n * @param skew - Number of adjacent steps to accept on either side. Default 1\n *   (accepts T-1, T, T+1 — a 90-second acceptance window).\n * @returns `true` if the code matches any accepted step, `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyTotp(\n  secret: string,\n  code: string,\n  when: number = Date.now(),\n  skew: number = 1,\n): boolean {\n  const normalised = String(code).padStart(DIGITS, '0');\n  if (normalised.length !== DIGITS || !/^\\d{6}$/.test(normalised)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  const candidateBuf = Buffer.from(normalised, 'utf8');\n\n  for (let delta = -skew; delta <= skew; delta++) {\n    const stepWhen = when + delta * TIME_STEP * 1000;\n    const expected = generateTotp(secret, stepWhen);\n    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');\n    if (timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, candidateBuf)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimum length (in hex characters) accepted for `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * The secret is hex-encoded (see {@link generateTotp} — `Buffer.from(secret,\n * 'hex')`). 32 hex chars = 16 bytes = 128 bits, the floor for an HMAC-SHA1 key\n * we are willing to gate a public relay behind. `generateAttachToken()` emits\n * 64 hex chars (32 bytes), comfortably above this bar.\n */\nconst MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS = 32;\n\n/** Hex string: one or more hex digits, case-insensitive (RFC 4648 base16). */\nconst HEX_RE = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Human-facing guidance printed when {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} fails.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this message states only the REQUIREMENT (≥32 hex chars) and\n * how to mint one. It NEVER echoes the configured value, its length, or any\n * fragment derived from it — see {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * Note on encoding: the secret is hex (base16), not base32 — `generateTotp`\n * decodes it with `Buffer.from(secret, 'hex')`. A base32 string would be\n * silently mis-decoded and every TOTP code would fail to match, so the minting\n * command emits hex.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE = [\n  '[ait-debug] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET이 필수입니다. 32자 이상 16진수(hex) 문자열을 설정하세요.',\n  '발급: openssl rand -hex 32',\n  '데몬은 start_debug의 projectRoot 인자로 받은 디렉토리에서 .ait_relay 파일을 읽어 이 시크릿을 채웁니다.',\n  '프로젝트에서 pnpm dev:phone:cdp를 한 번 띄우면 unplugin이 .ait_relay를 자동 생성하니(tunnel.cdp 옵션 필요), projectRoot를 전달하세요.',\n  '자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp',\n].join('\\n');\n\n/**\n * Whether `secret` is a well-formed relay-auth TOTP secret: a hex string of at\n * least {@link MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS} characters with an even length (an odd\n * length would have its trailing nibble silently dropped by `Buffer.from(...,\n * 'hex')`, weakening the key without warning).\n *\n * Pure predicate so callers can test the validation independently of the\n * fail-fast side effect in {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured}.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: returns only a boolean — the input value is never returned,\n * logged, or echoed.\n */\nexport function isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret: string | undefined): secret is string {\n  if (secret === undefined || secret === '') return false;\n  if (secret.length < MIN_SECRET_HEX_CHARS) return false;\n  if (secret.length % 2 !== 0) return false;\n  return HEX_RE.test(secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-fast guard enforcing that a relay-auth TOTP secret is configured before\n * a public-internet-exposed relay is booted (issue #250).\n *\n * Relay-auth (the §4 Layer C TOTP gate) is the only fail-fast layer that closes\n * the real gap: a leaked `wss://…trycloudflare.com` URL otherwise lets a third\n * party attach a debugger to a dog-food/live mini-app. Without a secret the relay\n * comes up unauthenticated, so this guard is called at every relay-boot site —\n * `bootRelayFamily` (intoss env 3/4) and `bootExternalRelayFamily` (env-2 PWA),\n * both eager and lazy. Local-only sessions never boot a relay and so never reach\n * this guard, matching the issue's exemption for non-relay debugging.\n *\n * Throws when the secret is unset, empty, too short, or not a valid hex string.\n * The thrown message is the bin entry's fatal stderr (see `cli.ts` `main().catch`)\n * — the same fatal model as the missing-`AIT_RELAY_BASE_URL` path.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the env value is read once, passed ONLY to the boolean\n * predicate, and never logged. The thrown message names the requirement, never\n * the value, its length, or any derived fragment.\n *\n * @param env - Environment to read from. Defaults to `process.env`; injectable\n *   for tests so they never mutate the real process environment.\n */\nexport function assertRelayAuthConfigured(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    throw new Error(RELAY_AUTH_SECRET_MISSING_MESSAGE);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate-specific skew for the relay WebSocket upgrade TOTP check.\n *\n * Rationale (why 6, not the RFC default of 1):\n *   - Each step is 30 s, so ±6 steps = past 6 steps accepted = 180–210 s of\n *     backwards acceptance. This means a code generated at issuance time is\n *     guaranteed valid for at least 3 minutes (180 s) after it was minted.\n *   - The real-world attach flow (QR issued on desktop → developer picks up\n *     phone → camera scan → launcher PWA loads → attach) routinely exceeds\n *     the 90 s window of the RFC default (skew=1), especially when the launcher\n *     PWA needs to reinstall or when the phone is not immediately at hand.\n *   - Expanding to ~3.5 min reachability is acceptable under the §4 threat\n *     model: the adversary we guard against is \"someone who got the URL but\n *     does NOT have the secret\". Without the secret they cannot compute a TOTP\n *     code regardless of the window size — security theater is explicitly\n *     forbidden by the project principle. An attacker WITH the secret (bundle\n *     extractor) is out of scope per CLAUDE.md §4.\n *\n * `verifyTotp`'s own default (skew=1) is deliberately left unchanged — it is\n * the RFC primitive. Only this relay-gate call site is widened.\n */\nexport const RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS = 6;\n\n/**\n * Reads `AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` from `process.env` at runtime and builds a\n * `verifyAuth` predicate for the Chii relay's WebSocket upgrade gate.\n *\n * The predicate checks the `at` query parameter against the current and\n * adjacent TOTP time steps (±{@link RELAY_VERIFY_SKEW_STEPS} skew) using\n * {@link verifyTotp}. This gives the issued code a minimum validity of ~3\n * minutes, which is enough to cover the QR-scan → launcher-attach flow even\n * when the launcher PWA needs to load or reinstall (#490).\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the env var is not set — callers treat that as\n * \"auth disabled\" (no predicate registered on the relay). Note that since\n * issue #250 the secret is MANDATORY at every relay-boot site (enforced by\n * {@link assertRelayAuthConfigured} BEFORE the relay starts), so in production\n * this never returns `undefined` for a relay that actually boots; the\n * `undefined` branch only matters for the no-relay local path and tests.\n *\n * Lives here (not in the MCP server) so the unplugin's env-2 relay can wire the\n * same gate without importing the heavy MCP server module graph. 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ait-co/devtools",
-  "version": "0.1.121",
+  "version": "0.1.123",
   "description": "Development tools for Apps in Toss mini-apps — mock SDK, floating devtools panel, and universal bundler plugin",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
   },
   "bin": {
     "devtools-mcp": "./dist/mcp/cli.js",
-    "devtools-test": "./dist/test-runner/cli.js"
+    "devtools-test": "./dist/test-runner/bin.js"
   },
   "files": [
     "dist"

package/dist/attach-orchestrator-BTsEHXfq.js

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
-import { l as prepareAttach, u as renderAndMaybeWait } from "./attach-orchestrator-DPMBN06p.js";
-export { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait };