@ait-co/devtools 0.1.117 → 0.1.119

package/dist/relay-factory-DVI7TrX4.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+//#region src/test-runner/relay-factory.ts
+/**
+* Builds a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that opens a standalone env3 relay
+* connection.
+*
+* `open()` performs the full attach lifecycle and BLOCKS for tens of seconds (up
+* to `timeoutMs`) while a human scans the rendered QR with their phone — there
+* is no way around the manual scan for env3. It resolves with the live
+* `CdpConnection` once a matching page attaches; `close()` tears the relay
+* family down.
+*
+* The factory holds the booted relay family in a closure so `close()` can stop
+* it. A second `open()` on the same factory boots a fresh family (the previous
+* one should have been `close()`d first).
+*/
+function createRelayConnectionFactory(opts) {
+	const projectRoot = opts.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();
+	const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 6e5;
+	const headless = opts.headless === true;
+	let family;
+	return {
+		async open() {
+			const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait } = await import("./attach-orchestrator-CFotueL3.js");
+			const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import("./cell-nrWFeqvG.js");
+			const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import("./relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js");
+			const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import("./debug-server-BhHVy3XT.js");
+			await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });
+			const booted = await bootRelayFamily({ verifyAuth: buildRelayVerifyAuth() });
+			family = booted;
+			const attachDeps = {
+				getTunnelStatus: booted.getTunnelStatus ?? (() => ({
+					up: false,
+					wssUrl: null
+				})),
+				getTotpSecret: () => process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,
+				qrHttpServer: void 0,
+				onAttachUrlBuilt: void 0,
+				canOpenBrowser: () => !headless
+			};
+			const prep = await prepareAttach(attachDeps, "relay-dev", { scheme_url: opts.schemeUrl }, booted.connection);
+			if (!prep.ok) {
+				booted.stop();
+				family = void 0;
+				throw new Error("createRelayConnectionFactory: attach preparation failed — check the scheme_url and that the relay tunnel is up");
+			}
+			const waitResult = await renderAndMaybeWait(attachDeps, prep, true, timeoutMs, booted.connection);
+			if (waitResult.isError) {
+				booted.stop();
+				family = void 0;
+				const timeoutSec = Math.round(timeoutMs / 1e3);
+				throw new Error(`createRelayConnectionFactory: attach timed out after ${timeoutSec}s — phone did not scan the QR within the timeout`);
+			}
+			const qrChunks = waitResult.content.filter((c) => c.type === "text").map((c) => c.text);
+			opts.onQrContent(qrChunks);
+			await injectDebugIndicator(booted.connection);
+			if (opts.cell !== void 0) await injectGlobals(booted.connection, { __AIT_CELL__: opts.cell });
+			await booted.connection.enableDomains();
+			return booted.connection;
+		},
+		async close(_connection) {
+			family?.stop();
+			family = void 0;
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { createRelayConnectionFactory as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-factory-DVI7TrX4.js.map

package/dist/relay-factory-DVI7TrX4.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"relay-factory-DVI7TrX4.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/test-runner/relay-factory.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Relay connection factory for the Vitest custom pool (devtools#696).\n *\n * The Vitest pool (`pool.ts`) takes a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that knows\n * how to `open()` a live CDP relay connection (boot relay → QR → phone scan →\n * cell inject → enableDomains) and `close()` it. Before this module that exact\n * assembly lived only inside the `devtools-test` CLI's `main()`; the standalone\n * CLI and the Vitest pool would otherwise each hand-roll it and drift.\n *\n * This is the single source of that assembly. `cli.ts` is refactored to call\n * `createRelayConnectionFactory(...).open()`, and `definePhoneVitestConfig`\n * (config.ts) exposes it so a downstream `vitest.config.ts` can wire the pool:\n *\n *   import { createRelayConnectionFactory } from '@ait-co/devtools/test-runner';\n *   const connection = createRelayConnectionFactory({\n *     schemeUrl,\n *     cell,\n *     // REQUIRED — own the stdout decision (the chunks carry the relay wss +\n *     // TOTP code). Suppress on non-interactive stdout; print otherwise.\n *     onQrContent: (chunks) => {\n *       if (!process.stdout.isTTY) return;\n *       for (const c of chunks) process.stdout.write(`${c}\\n`);\n *     },\n *   });\n *   export default defineConfig({ test: definePhoneVitestConfig({ connection }) });\n *\n * The heavy boot graph (chii relay, cloudflared, ws, debug-server) is pulled via\n * DYNAMIC import inside `open()` — so merely importing this module (or the\n * `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel) does NOT statically drag that graph in.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: relay wss URLs, scheme URLs, and the TOTP secret/code are\n * never logged. `open()` reads the project-local `.ait_relay` secret read-only\n * (never mints) and the minted TOTP code rides only inside the QR `at=` param.\n *\n * Node-only. react-free (CdpConnection + lazily-imported MCP boot helpers only).\n */\n\nimport type { AttachDeps } from '../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js';\nimport type { CdpConnection } from '../mcp/cdp-connection.js';\nimport type { RelayConnectionFactory } from './pool.js';\n\n// NOTE: every value import below is a DYNAMIC import inside `open()`. This module\n// keeps ONLY type-level static imports so that re-exporting it from the\n// `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel (config.ts) does NOT statically drag the\n// heavy MCP graph (cell.ts → attach-orchestrator.ts → tools.ts → server-lock,\n// plus chii/cloudflared via debug-server) onto that Node-config entry.\n\n/** Options for {@link createRelayConnectionFactory}. */\nexport interface RelayConnectionFactoryOptions {\n  /**\n   * intoss-private:// scheme URL from `ait deploy --scheme-only` (env3). The\n   * phone cold-loads the candidate bundle this URL points at. SECRET-HANDLING:\n   * never logged.\n   */\n  schemeUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Project root for the `.ait_relay` secret lookup (read-only). Defaults to\n   * `process.cwd()`.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /**\n   * Attach wait timeout in ms — how long `open()` waits for the phone to scan\n   * the QR and attach. Defaults to 600 000 (10 min) to give time for a manual\n   * scan. (The per-file evaluate timeout is separate, passed via the pool's\n   * `run` options.)\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Disable browser auto-open of the QR dashboard (text QR only). */\n  headless?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Cell axes injected as `__AIT_CELL__` before the first test bundle runs, so\n   * sdk-example's capture picks up the correct sdkLine/platform. Optional — when\n   * omitted no cell is injected. The values are not secrets.\n   */\n  cell?: { sdkLine: string; platform: string };\n  /**\n   * Receives the QR/attach render content (text chunks) from\n   * `renderAndMaybeWait`, so the caller decides whether to print them — e.g.\n   * suppress on non-interactive stdout.\n   *\n   * REQUIRED (not optional) on purpose: these chunks contain the QR payload\n   * (which encodes the relay wss + TOTP `at=` code) and the attach JSON block.\n   * Making the hook mandatory means the factory never falls back to printing\n   * them itself — a downstream `vitest.config.ts` consumer that wires this via\n   * the `@ait-co/devtools/test-runner` barrel is forced to make an explicit\n   * stdout decision rather than silently leaking the secret-bearing block.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: when a non-interactive caller is detected the hook MUST\n   * suppress the WHOLE chunk (not just `attachUrl`), since `relayUrl` rides in\n   * the same block.\n   */\n  onQrContent: (textChunks: string[]) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a {@link RelayConnectionFactory} that opens a standalone env3 relay\n * connection.\n *\n * `open()` performs the full attach lifecycle and BLOCKS for tens of seconds (up\n * to `timeoutMs`) while a human scans the rendered QR with their phone — there\n * is no way around the manual scan for env3. It resolves with the live\n * `CdpConnection` once a matching page attaches; `close()` tears the relay\n * family down.\n *\n * The factory holds the booted relay family in a closure so `close()` can stop\n * it. A second `open()` on the same factory boots a fresh family (the previous\n * one should have been `close()`d first).\n */\nexport function createRelayConnectionFactory(\n  opts: RelayConnectionFactoryOptions,\n): RelayConnectionFactory {\n  const projectRoot = opts.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();\n  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 600_000;\n  const headless = opts.headless === true;\n\n  // Captured so close() can stop the family that open() booted.\n  let family: { connection: CdpConnection; stop(): void } | undefined;\n\n  return {\n    async open(): Promise<CdpConnection> {\n      // Dynamic imports: keep the chii/cloudflared/debug-server graph OFF the\n      // static import graph of this module (and the test-runner config barrel).\n      const { prepareAttach, renderAndMaybeWait } = await import('../mcp/attach-orchestrator.js');\n      const { injectDebugIndicator, injectGlobals } = await import('./cell.js');\n      const { loadRelaySecretReadOnly } = await import('../mcp/relay-secret-store.js');\n      const { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth } = await import('../mcp/debug-server.js');\n\n      // Load the project-local .ait_relay secret into AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET\n      // BEFORE booting the relay so assertRelayAuthConfigured()/buildRelayVerifyAuth()\n      // at the boot site see it. Read-only — never mints. SECRET-HANDLING: the\n      // value is never logged here.\n      await loadRelaySecretReadOnly({ projectRoot });\n\n      const booted = await bootRelayFamily({ verifyAuth: buildRelayVerifyAuth() });\n      family = booted;\n\n      // Assemble AttachDeps with no dashboard/SSE (CLI/pool is not the daemon).\n      const attachDeps: AttachDeps = {\n        getTunnelStatus: booted.getTunnelStatus ?? (() => ({ up: false, wssUrl: null })),\n        getTotpSecret: () => process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        qrHttpServer: undefined,\n        onAttachUrlBuilt: undefined,\n        canOpenBrowser: () => !headless,\n      };\n\n      const prep = await prepareAttach(\n        attachDeps,\n        'relay-dev',\n        { scheme_url: opts.schemeUrl },\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (!prep.ok) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING: do NOT surface `prep.error.content` in the thrown\n        // message. Some prep error paths build their text from attach\n        // components, and the CLI catch writes `e.message` to stderr — embedding\n        // that text risks leaking the scheme/relay wss URL. The detailed\n        // diagnostic is the daemon/dashboard's job; the factory throws a\n        // secret-free message only.\n        throw new Error(\n          'createRelayConnectionFactory: attach preparation failed — check the scheme_url and that the relay tunnel is up',\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Render the QR + wait for the phone to attach. SECRET-HANDLING: this\n      // function never logs scheme/wss/TOTP values.\n      const waitResult = await renderAndMaybeWait(\n        attachDeps,\n        prep,\n        true,\n        timeoutMs,\n        booted.connection,\n      );\n      if (waitResult.isError) {\n        booted.stop();\n        family = undefined;\n        // SECRET-HANDLING (BLOCKER fix): `waitResult.content` is the timeout\n        // result built from `buildTimeoutError(baseText, ...)`, and `baseText`\n        // is `JSON.stringify({ attachUrl, relayUrl, ... })` — `attachUrl` carries\n        // the TOTP `at=` code and `relayUrl` is the relay `wss://` URL. The CLI\n        // catch writes `e.message` to stderr, so extracting that text here would\n        // leak the relay wss + TOTP code on every timeout. Throw a secret-free\n        // message with only the timeout duration.\n        const timeoutSec = Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000);\n        throw new Error(\n          `createRelayConnectionFactory: attach timed out after ${timeoutSec}s — phone did not scan the QR within the timeout`,\n        );\n      }\n\n      // Surface the QR/attach render content to the caller, which owns the\n      // stdout decision (suppress on non-interactive stdout). There is no\n      // fallback that prints here itself: `onQrContent` is a required option so\n      // the secret-bearing block (attachUrl TOTP + relayUrl wss) can never be\n      // emitted without an explicit caller decision. SECRET-HANDLING.\n      const qrChunks = waitResult.content\n        .filter((c): c is { type: 'text'; text: string } => c.type === 'text')\n        .map((c) => c.text);\n      opts.onQrContent(qrChunks);\n\n      // Debugger attached — show the on-phone \"Debugger Connected\" badge.\n      await injectDebugIndicator(booted.connection);\n\n      // Inject the cell globals before any test bundle runs (session-global).\n      if (opts.cell !== undefined) {\n        await injectGlobals(booted.connection, { __AIT_CELL__: opts.cell });\n      }\n\n      // Open the CDP client websocket + enable domains so the first run's\n      // Runtime.evaluate and console stream are live. enableDomains is\n      // idempotent; runTestFilesOverRelay also calls it defensively.\n      await booted.connection.enableDomains();\n\n      return booted.connection;\n    },\n\n    async close(_connection: CdpConnection): Promise<void> {\n      // family.stop() is synchronous best-effort: closes the CDP connection and\n      // shuts down the relay + cloudflared child.\n      family?.stop();\n      family = undefined;\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4GA,SAAgB,6BACd,MACwB;CACxB,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;CACrD,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa;CACpC,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,aAAa;CAGnC,IAAI;AAEJ,QAAO;EACL,MAAM,OAA+B;GAGnC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,uBAAuB,MAAM,OAAO;GAC3D,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO;GAC7D,MAAM,EAAE,4BAA4B,MAAM,OAAO;GACjD,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,yBAAyB,MAAM,OAAO;AAM/D,SAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;GAE9C,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;AAC5E,YAAS;GAGT,MAAM,aAAyB;IAC7B,iBAAiB,OAAO,2BAA2B;KAAE,IAAI;KAAO,QAAQ;KAAM;IAC9E,qBAAqB,QAAQ,IAAI;IACjC,cAAc,KAAA;IACd,kBAAkB,KAAA;IAClB,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACxB;GAED,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,cACjB,YACA,aACA,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW,EAC9B,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;AACZ,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;AAOT,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,iHACD;;GAKH,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,mBACvB,YACA,MACA,MACA,WACA,OAAO,WACR;AACD,OAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,aAAS,KAAA;IAQT,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,IAAK;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,MACR,wDAAwD,WAAW,kDACpE;;GAQH,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,QACzB,QAAQ,MAA2C,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,CACrE,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AACrB,QAAK,YAAY,SAAS;AAG1B,SAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,WAAW;AAG7C,OAAI,KAAK,SAAS,KAAA,EAChB,OAAM,cAAc,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAMrE,SAAM,OAAO,WAAW,eAAe;AAEvC,UAAO,OAAO;;EAGhB,MAAM,MAAM,aAA2C;AAGrD,WAAQ,MAAM;AACd,YAAS,KAAA;;EAEZ"}

package/dist/relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+//#region src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts
+/**
+* Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to
+* a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).
+*
+* Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:
+*
+*   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin
+*     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to
+*     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.
+*
+*   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP
+*     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or
+*     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects
+*     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast
+*     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked
+*     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.
+*
+* Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot
+* trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is
+* frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace
+* root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied
+* per-debug-session through `start_debug`.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and
+* its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or
+* assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the
+* discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode
+* 0600.
+*/
+/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */
+const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = ".ait_relay";
+/**
+* Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a
+* `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write
+* still lands somewhere deterministic).
+*
+* The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret
+* minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep
+* `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so
+* `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is
+* the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the
+* per-session projectRoot.
+*
+* @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.
+* @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).
+*/
+function nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn) {
+	let dir = start;
+	while (true) {
+		if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, "package.json"))) return dir;
+		const parent = dirname(dir);
+		if (parent === dir) return start;
+		dir = parent;
+	}
+}
+/**
+* Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start
+* directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).
+*
+* Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the
+* resolution logic.
+*/
+function relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn) {
+	return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);
+}
+/**
+* Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a
+* valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.
+*
+* Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,
+* chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is
+* the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast
+* (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is
+* found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the
+* downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.
+*
+* Resolution order:
+*   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).
+*   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject
+*      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.
+*   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before
+* assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.
+*
+* @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.
+*/
+async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps) {
+	const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};
+	const logFn = log ?? ((msg) => process.stderr.write(msg));
+	const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import("./totp-DfekTBk3.js").then((n) => n.i);
+	if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {
+		if (projectRoot !== void 0) {
+			const fsEarly = fsDep ?? await import("node:fs");
+			const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync);
+			warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, secretPathEarly, fsEarly, isValidRelayAuthSecret, logFn);
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+	if (projectRoot === void 0) return;
+	const fs = fsDep ?? await import("node:fs");
+	const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync);
+	if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) return;
+	let stored;
+	try {
+		stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, "utf8").trim();
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) return;
+	env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;
+}
+/**
+* Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file
+* exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`
+* when they differ.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):
+*   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of
+*     it, or the resolved file path.
+*   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data
+*     enters the log message.
+*   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the
+*     function returns silently — no spurious noise.
+*
+* This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)
+* so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without
+* introducing additional async hops.
+*
+* @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is
+*   valid before calling).
+* @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.
+* @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).
+* @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.
+* @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.
+*/
+function warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(envSecret, secretPath, fsDep, isValidRelayAuthSecret, logFn) {
+	if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) return;
+	let stored;
+	try {
+		stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, "utf8").trim();
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) return;
+	if (envSecret !== stored) logFn("[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; the relay will verify against the environment value. Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\n");
+}
+//#endregion
+export { loadRelaySecretReadOnly, nearestPackageJsonDir };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js.map

package/dist/relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"relay-secret-store-BcVrWwTq.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to\n * a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to\n *     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.\n *\n *   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP\n *     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or\n *     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects\n *     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n *     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked\n *     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.\n *\n * Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot\n * trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is\n * frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace\n * root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied\n * per-debug-session through `start_debug`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and\n * its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or\n * assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the\n * discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = '.ait_relay';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surface\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link ensureRelaySecret} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelaySecretFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n  chmodSync(path: string, mode: number): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  appendFileSync(path: string, data: string): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal fs subset needed by {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — strictly the two\n * read-only operations. Deliberately omits writeFileSync/mkdirSync/chmodSync so\n * the daemon path cannot mutate the filesystem even by accident (the type\n * forbids it).\n */\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). The `.ait_relay` file is\n   * resolved against the nearest `package.json` directory at or above this path.\n   * When omitted, the current working directory is used as the start point —\n   * retained for back-compat/tests; the unplugin always passes it.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. Defaults to node:crypto randomBytes. */\n  randomBytes?: (n: number) => Buffer;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelaySecretFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Current working directory resolver (used only when `projectRoot` is omitted). */\n  cwd?: () => string;\n  /** Log function for first-mint announcement. Defaults to process.stderr.write. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root supplied per-debug-session via `start_debug`. The daemon reads\n   * `<nearest package.json dir from projectRoot>/.ait_relay`. When omitted, the\n   * loader is a no-op (the daemon has no anchor to read from).\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Optional log sink — never receives the secret value, length, or file path. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a\n * `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write\n * still lands somewhere deterministic).\n *\n * The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret\n * minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep\n * `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so\n * `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is\n * the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the\n * per-session projectRoot.\n *\n * @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.\n * @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).\n */\nexport function nearestPackageJsonDir(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  let dir = start;\n  // Stop at the filesystem root (dirname of root === root).\n  while (true) {\n    if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, 'package.json'))) {\n      return dir;\n    }\n    const parent = dirname(dir);\n    if (parent === dir) {\n      // Reached the filesystem root without finding a package.json — fall back\n      // to the original start directory.\n      return start;\n    }\n    dir = parent;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function relaySecretFilePath(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — mint + persist\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Ensures `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` is set to a valid relay TOTP secret,\n * persisting a freshly-minted one to `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600) on first\n * run and loading it silently on subsequent runs.\n *\n * Writes a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — it never\n * creates a directory (so no `mkdirSync`/dir `chmod`). The file is created with\n * `O_EXCL` (`flag: 'wx'`) so a concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on the\n * EEXIST race the winner's value is read instead.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 relay boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} (read-only) — it must never mint.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function ensureRelaySecret(deps?: RelaySecretDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    projectRoot,\n    env = process.env,\n    randomBytes: randomBytesFn,\n    fs: fsDep,\n    existsSync: existsSyncDep,\n    cwd: cwdFn,\n    log,\n  } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  // Lazily import isValidRelayAuthSecret to avoid pulling in node:crypto at\n  // module-load time (keeps the import side-effect free).\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or earlier run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    // We need fs to compare — resolve deps early just for the divergence check.\n    // This mirrors the lazy-resolve block below but is hoisted here so we can\n    // still early-return after the (possibly-emitted) warning.\n    const fsEarly: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n    const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n    const startEarly = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n    const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(startEarly, existsSyncEarly);\n    warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n      secretPathEarly,\n      fsEarly,\n      isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n      logFn,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve injected or real dependencies lazily to keep the import graph clean.\n  const rb: (n: number) => Buffer = randomBytesFn ?? (await import('node:crypto')).randomBytes;\n  const fs: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const start = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // 2. Persist file exists — read and inject (silent reload).\n  if (fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return readAndInject(secretPath, fs, env, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, rb);\n  }\n\n  // 3. Mint a fresh secret.\n  return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never mints, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a\n * valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is\n * the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n * (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is\n * found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the\n * downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n *   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).\n *   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject\n *      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.\n *   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before\n * assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps?: RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or unplugin run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    if (projectRoot !== undefined) {\n      const fsEarly: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n      const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n      const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncEarly);\n      warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n        env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        secretPathEarly,\n        fsEarly,\n        isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n        logFn,\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // 2. No anchor → nothing to read.\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n  if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error) — stay silent and let\n    // the downstream assert be the single fail-fast. SECRET-HANDLING: the error\n    // and path are not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the value flows only through the boolean predicate.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers (not exported — single-use extracted for readability)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file\n * exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`\n * when they differ.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):\n *   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of\n *     it, or the resolved file path.\n *   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data\n *     enters the log message.\n *   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the\n *     function returns silently — no spurious noise.\n *\n * This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)\n * so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without\n * introducing additional async hops.\n *\n * @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is\n *   valid before calling).\n * @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.\n * @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).\n * @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.\n * @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.\n */\nfunction warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n  envSecret: string,\n  secretPath: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): void {\n  // File absent → nothing to compare.\n  if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable — skip silently. SECRET-HANDLING: error and path not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Invalid stored contents → skip silently (no spurious noise).\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Compare by equality only. Neither value nor path enters the log message.\n  if (envSecret !== stored) {\n    logFn(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; ` +\n        `the relay will verify against the environment value. ` +\n        `Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, ` +\n        `so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\\n`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link ensureGitignoreEntries} call.\n *\n * - `injected`: one or more missing lines were appended to `.gitignore`.\n * - `failed`:   append was attempted but threw (unwritable FS) — secret generation\n *   is never aborted on failure.\n * - Neither flag set: all lines were already present — pure no-op.\n */\ninterface GitignoreResult {\n  injected: boolean;\n  failed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently appends `.ait_relay` and `.ait_urls` ignore entries to\n * `<secretDir>/.gitignore`.\n *\n * Covers the commit-safety net for the auto-generated relay secrets (#669).\n * Both files live in `secretDir` (the nearest package.json directory), so\n * anchoring the `.gitignore` there ensures the ignore entry and the files it\n * guards always co-locate.\n *\n * Idempotency: reads the existing `.gitignore` (if any), splits into lines,\n * appends only names not already present (exact-match, trimmed). A project\n * that already has both entries (the sdk-example case) is a pure no-op — no\n * write, no log noise.\n *\n * On write failure (unwritable FS, read-only mount) the function returns\n * `{ injected: false, failed: true }` — it NEVER aborts secret generation.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this function only manipulates ignore-pattern strings and\n * the `.gitignore` path. It never reads, logs, or echoes any secret value.\n *\n * @param secretDir - dirname of the `.ait_relay` file (= nearest package.json dir).\n * @param fsDep     - Injectable fs subset (same object passed to the write path).\n * @param logFn     - Injectable log sink (used by callers for fold-in messages).\n */\nfunction ensureGitignoreEntries(\n  secretDir: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretFs,\n  _logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): GitignoreResult {\n  const gi = join(secretDir, '.gitignore');\n\n  // '.ait_urls' mirrors URLS_FILE_NAME from relay-url-store.ts. The constant is\n  // inlined here (rather than imported) to avoid a circular module dependency:\n  // relay-url-store.ts already imports nearestPackageJsonDir from this module,\n  // so a reverse import would create a 2-way cycle.\n  const names = [RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME, '.ait_urls'];\n\n  let existing = '';\n  if (fsDep.existsSync(gi)) {\n    try {\n      existing = fsDep.readFileSync(gi, 'utf8');\n    } catch {\n      // Unreadable .gitignore — degrade gracefully; secret generation is unaffected.\n      return { injected: false, failed: true };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const presentLines = new Set(existing.split(/\\r?\\n/).map((l) => l.trim()));\n  const missing = names.filter((n) => !presentLines.has(n));\n\n  if (missing.length === 0) {\n    // Pure no-op: all entries already present (sdk-example case).\n    return { injected: false, failed: false };\n  }\n\n  // Ensure we start on a fresh line when the existing content has no trailing newline.\n  const prefix = existing === '' || existing.endsWith('\\n') ? '' : '\\n';\n  try {\n    fsDep.appendFileSync(gi, `${prefix}${missing.join('\\n')}\\n`);\n    return { injected: true, failed: false };\n  } catch {\n    // Write failed (unwritable FS, read-only mount, etc.) — degrade gracefully.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are swallowed, not surfaced.\n    return { injected: false, failed: true };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readAndInject(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n): Promise<void> {\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch (err) {\n    const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패: ${msg}`);\n  }\n\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    // Stored value is corrupt — re-mint over the same path.\n    logFn('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일의 값이 유효하지 않습니다. 재생성합니다.\\n');\n    return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, true);\n  }\n\n  // Inject into env — silent path (no log on successful reload).\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n\n  // Ensure .gitignore covers both secret files even on the reload path (the\n  // secret already exists so mintAndPersist will not run, but .ait_urls is\n  // written unconditionally by the unplugin on every boot and must be ignored).\n  // This is idempotent — if the entries are already present it is a pure no-op.\n  ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n}\n\nasync function mintAndPersist(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  /** When re-minting over a corrupt file, the existing file must be overwritten. */\n  overwrite = false,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the raw bytes are never written to any log or string other\n  // than the persist file and the env variable.\n  const secret = rb(32).toString('hex'); // 64 hex chars = 256 bits\n\n  // Self-consistency guard: our own minted secret must pass validation.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[@ait-co/devtools] 내부 오류: mint된 시크릿이 유효성 검사를 통과하지 못했습니다.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Write a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — no\n  // directory is created. `O_EXCL` (flag 'wx') makes the create exclusive so a\n  // concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on EEXIST we read the winner's value.\n  // (When re-minting over a corrupt file we must overwrite, so use 'w'.)\n  const flag = overwrite ? 'w' : 'wx';\n  try {\n    fs.writeFileSync(secretPath, secret, { mode: 0o600, flag });\n    // Belt-and-suspenders: apply chmod after write in case umask relaxed the mode.\n    fs.chmodSync(secretPath, 0o600);\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') {\n      // Race: another process already wrote the file — read their value.\n      let stored: string;\n      try {\n        stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n      } catch (readErr) {\n        const msg = readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : String(readErr);\n        throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패(경합): ${msg}`);\n      }\n      if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n        throw new Error('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일이 경합 후에도 유효하지 않습니다.');\n      }\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n      return;\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Inject into the current process env so the immediately following\n  // assertRelayAuthConfigured() / buildRelayVerifyAuth() calls see the value.\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = secret;\n\n  // Idempotently inject .gitignore entries for the two secret files (#669).\n  // Fold the result into the single first-mint announcement below so\n  // logs.length === 1 is preserved (SECRET-HANDLING: no path/value surfaced).\n  const giResult = ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n\n  // First-mint announcement (value never included — SECRET-HANDLING). The file\n  // name is fixed (`.ait_relay`); we do not echo the resolved directory either.\n  // The gitignore result is folded in here to keep the single-log invariant.\n  const giLine = giResult.injected\n    ? `프로젝트의 .gitignore에 .ait_relay / .ait_urls 무시 규칙을 추가했습니다.\\n`\n    : giResult.failed\n      ? `.gitignore 자동 갱신에 실패했습니다 — .ait_relay / .ait_urls 를 직접 추가하거나 비공개 repo를 권장합니다.\\n`\n      : '';\n\n  logFn(\n    `[@ait-co/devtools] relay 인증 시크릿을 생성해 프로젝트의 ${RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME} 파일에 저장했습니다 (권한 0600).\\n` +\n      `다음 실행부터 자동으로 사용됩니다. 직접 export할 필요 없습니다.\\n` +\n      `팀이 같은 relay를 공유하려면 이 파일을 repo에 커밋하세요(비공개 repo 권장).\\n` +\n      (giLine ? giLine : '') +\n      `자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp\\n`,\n  );\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,MAAa,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoFtC,SAAgB,sBACd,OACA,cACQ;CACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAEV,QAAO,MAAM;AACX,MAAI,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,CACzC,QAAO;EAET,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,WAAW,IAGb,QAAO;AAET,QAAM;;;;;;;;;;AAWV,SAAgB,oBACd,OACA,cACQ;AACR,QAAO,KAAK,sBAAsB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwGjF,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAA+C;CAC3F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;CAEhG,MAAM,QAA+B,SAAS,QAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAA,MAAA,MAAA,EAAA,EAAA;AAMhD,KAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE;AACrD,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,GAAW;GAC7B,MAAM,UAAiC,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;GAE9D,MAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,aADO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WACH;AACzE,4BACE,IAAI,uBACJ,iBACA,SACA,wBACA,MACD;;AAEH;;AAIF,KAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAClB;CAGF,MAAM,KAA4B,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;CAGzD,MAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,aAFS,iBAAiB,GAAG,WAEH;AACjE,KAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW,CAC5B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,GAAG,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAC7C;AAIN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAGF,KAAI,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+B9B,SAAS,yBACP,WACA,YACA,OACA,wBACA,OACM;AAEN,KAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,CAC/B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAChD;AAEN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAIF,KAAI,cAAc,OAChB,OACE,iRAID"}

package/dist/{relay-secret-store-BHcOmaNK.js → relay-secret-store-BlFEhqwb.js}

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-import { n as loadRelaySecretReadOnly } from "./relay-secret-store-CkA7KNUb.js";
+import { n as loadRelaySecretReadOnly } from "./relay-secret-store-CmDDfZMh.js";
 export { loadRelaySecretReadOnly };

package/dist/{relay-secret-store-CmqchhR5.js → relay-secret-store-CFc9n0OA.js}

@@ -151,4 +151,4 @@ function warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(envSecret, secretPath, fsDep, isValidRelayAuth
 //#endregion
 export { loadRelaySecretReadOnly, nearestPackageJsonDir };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=relay-secret-store-CmqchhR5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-secret-store-CFc9n0OA.js.map

package/dist/{relay-secret-store-CmqchhR5.js.map → relay-secret-store-CFc9n0OA.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"relay-secret-store-CmqchhR5.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to\n * a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to\n *     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.\n *\n *   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP\n *     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or\n *     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects\n *     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n *     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked\n *     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.\n *\n * Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot\n * trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is\n * frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace\n * root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied\n * per-debug-session through `start_debug`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and\n * its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or\n * assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the\n * discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = '.ait_relay';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surface\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link ensureRelaySecret} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelaySecretFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n  chmodSync(path: string, mode: number): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  appendFileSync(path: string, data: string): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal fs subset needed by {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — strictly the two\n * read-only operations. Deliberately omits writeFileSync/mkdirSync/chmodSync so\n * the daemon path cannot mutate the filesystem even by accident (the type\n * forbids it).\n */\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). The `.ait_relay` file is\n   * resolved against the nearest `package.json` directory at or above this path.\n   * When omitted, the current working directory is used as the start point —\n   * retained for back-compat/tests; the unplugin always passes it.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. Defaults to node:crypto randomBytes. */\n  randomBytes?: (n: number) => Buffer;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelaySecretFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Current working directory resolver (used only when `projectRoot` is omitted). */\n  cwd?: () => string;\n  /** Log function for first-mint announcement. Defaults to process.stderr.write. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root supplied per-debug-session via `start_debug`. The daemon reads\n   * `<nearest package.json dir from projectRoot>/.ait_relay`. When omitted, the\n   * loader is a no-op (the daemon has no anchor to read from).\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Optional log sink — never receives the secret value, length, or file path. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a\n * `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write\n * still lands somewhere deterministic).\n *\n * The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret\n * minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep\n * `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so\n * `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is\n * the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the\n * per-session projectRoot.\n *\n * @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.\n * @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).\n */\nexport function nearestPackageJsonDir(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  let dir = start;\n  // Stop at the filesystem root (dirname of root === root).\n  while (true) {\n    if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, 'package.json'))) {\n      return dir;\n    }\n    const parent = dirname(dir);\n    if (parent === dir) {\n      // Reached the filesystem root without finding a package.json — fall back\n      // to the original start directory.\n      return start;\n    }\n    dir = parent;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function relaySecretFilePath(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — mint + persist\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Ensures `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` is set to a valid relay TOTP secret,\n * persisting a freshly-minted one to `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600) on first\n * run and loading it silently on subsequent runs.\n *\n * Writes a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — it never\n * creates a directory (so no `mkdirSync`/dir `chmod`). The file is created with\n * `O_EXCL` (`flag: 'wx'`) so a concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on the\n * EEXIST race the winner's value is read instead.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 relay boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} (read-only) — it must never mint.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function ensureRelaySecret(deps?: RelaySecretDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    projectRoot,\n    env = process.env,\n    randomBytes: randomBytesFn,\n    fs: fsDep,\n    existsSync: existsSyncDep,\n    cwd: cwdFn,\n    log,\n  } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  // Lazily import isValidRelayAuthSecret to avoid pulling in node:crypto at\n  // module-load time (keeps the import side-effect free).\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or earlier run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    // We need fs to compare — resolve deps early just for the divergence check.\n    // This mirrors the lazy-resolve block below but is hoisted here so we can\n    // still early-return after the (possibly-emitted) warning.\n    const fsEarly: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n    const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n    const startEarly = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n    const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(startEarly, existsSyncEarly);\n    warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n      secretPathEarly,\n      fsEarly,\n      isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n      logFn,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve injected or real dependencies lazily to keep the import graph clean.\n  const rb: (n: number) => Buffer = randomBytesFn ?? (await import('node:crypto')).randomBytes;\n  const fs: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const start = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // 2. Persist file exists — read and inject (silent reload).\n  if (fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return readAndInject(secretPath, fs, env, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, rb);\n  }\n\n  // 3. Mint a fresh secret.\n  return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never mints, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a\n * valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is\n * the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n * (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is\n * found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the\n * downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n *   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).\n *   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject\n *      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.\n *   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before\n * assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps?: RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or unplugin run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    if (projectRoot !== undefined) {\n      const fsEarly: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n      const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n      const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncEarly);\n      warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n        env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        secretPathEarly,\n        fsEarly,\n        isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n        logFn,\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // 2. No anchor → nothing to read.\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n  if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error) — stay silent and let\n    // the downstream assert be the single fail-fast. SECRET-HANDLING: the error\n    // and path are not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the value flows only through the boolean predicate.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers (not exported — single-use extracted for readability)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file\n * exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`\n * when they differ.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):\n *   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of\n *     it, or the resolved file path.\n *   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data\n *     enters the log message.\n *   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the\n *     function returns silently — no spurious noise.\n *\n * This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)\n * so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without\n * introducing additional async hops.\n *\n * @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is\n *   valid before calling).\n * @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.\n * @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).\n * @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.\n * @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.\n */\nfunction warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n  envSecret: string,\n  secretPath: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): void {\n  // File absent → nothing to compare.\n  if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable — skip silently. SECRET-HANDLING: error and path not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Invalid stored contents → skip silently (no spurious noise).\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Compare by equality only. Neither value nor path enters the log message.\n  if (envSecret !== stored) {\n    logFn(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; ` +\n        `the relay will verify against the environment value. ` +\n        `Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, ` +\n        `so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\\n`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link ensureGitignoreEntries} call.\n *\n * - `injected`: one or more missing lines were appended to `.gitignore`.\n * - `failed`:   append was attempted but threw (unwritable FS) — secret generation\n *   is never aborted on failure.\n * - Neither flag set: all lines were already present — pure no-op.\n */\ninterface GitignoreResult {\n  injected: boolean;\n  failed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently appends `.ait_relay` and `.ait_urls` ignore entries to\n * `<secretDir>/.gitignore`.\n *\n * Covers the commit-safety net for the auto-generated relay secrets (#669).\n * Both files live in `secretDir` (the nearest package.json directory), so\n * anchoring the `.gitignore` there ensures the ignore entry and the files it\n * guards always co-locate.\n *\n * Idempotency: reads the existing `.gitignore` (if any), splits into lines,\n * appends only names not already present (exact-match, trimmed). A project\n * that already has both entries (the sdk-example case) is a pure no-op — no\n * write, no log noise.\n *\n * On write failure (unwritable FS, read-only mount) the function returns\n * `{ injected: false, failed: true }` — it NEVER aborts secret generation.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this function only manipulates ignore-pattern strings and\n * the `.gitignore` path. It never reads, logs, or echoes any secret value.\n *\n * @param secretDir - dirname of the `.ait_relay` file (= nearest package.json dir).\n * @param fsDep     - Injectable fs subset (same object passed to the write path).\n * @param logFn     - Injectable log sink (used by callers for fold-in messages).\n */\nfunction ensureGitignoreEntries(\n  secretDir: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretFs,\n  _logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): GitignoreResult {\n  const gi = join(secretDir, '.gitignore');\n\n  // '.ait_urls' mirrors URLS_FILE_NAME from relay-url-store.ts. The constant is\n  // inlined here (rather than imported) to avoid a circular module dependency:\n  // relay-url-store.ts already imports nearestPackageJsonDir from this module,\n  // so a reverse import would create a 2-way cycle.\n  const names = [RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME, '.ait_urls'];\n\n  let existing = '';\n  if (fsDep.existsSync(gi)) {\n    try {\n      existing = fsDep.readFileSync(gi, 'utf8');\n    } catch {\n      // Unreadable .gitignore — degrade gracefully; secret generation is unaffected.\n      return { injected: false, failed: true };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const presentLines = new Set(existing.split(/\\r?\\n/).map((l) => l.trim()));\n  const missing = names.filter((n) => !presentLines.has(n));\n\n  if (missing.length === 0) {\n    // Pure no-op: all entries already present (sdk-example case).\n    return { injected: false, failed: false };\n  }\n\n  // Ensure we start on a fresh line when the existing content has no trailing newline.\n  const prefix = existing === '' || existing.endsWith('\\n') ? '' : '\\n';\n  try {\n    fsDep.appendFileSync(gi, `${prefix}${missing.join('\\n')}\\n`);\n    return { injected: true, failed: false };\n  } catch {\n    // Write failed (unwritable FS, read-only mount, etc.) — degrade gracefully.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are swallowed, not surfaced.\n    return { injected: false, failed: true };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readAndInject(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n): Promise<void> {\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch (err) {\n    const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패: ${msg}`);\n  }\n\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    // Stored value is corrupt — re-mint over the same path.\n    logFn('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일의 값이 유효하지 않습니다. 재생성합니다.\\n');\n    return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, true);\n  }\n\n  // Inject into env — silent path (no log on successful reload).\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n\n  // Ensure .gitignore covers both secret files even on the reload path (the\n  // secret already exists so mintAndPersist will not run, but .ait_urls is\n  // written unconditionally by the unplugin on every boot and must be ignored).\n  // This is idempotent — if the entries are already present it is a pure no-op.\n  ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n}\n\nasync function mintAndPersist(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  /** When re-minting over a corrupt file, the existing file must be overwritten. */\n  overwrite = false,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the raw bytes are never written to any log or string other\n  // than the persist file and the env variable.\n  const secret = rb(32).toString('hex'); // 64 hex chars = 256 bits\n\n  // Self-consistency guard: our own minted secret must pass validation.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[@ait-co/devtools] 내부 오류: mint된 시크릿이 유효성 검사를 통과하지 못했습니다.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Write a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — no\n  // directory is created. `O_EXCL` (flag 'wx') makes the create exclusive so a\n  // concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on EEXIST we read the winner's value.\n  // (When re-minting over a corrupt file we must overwrite, so use 'w'.)\n  const flag = overwrite ? 'w' : 'wx';\n  try {\n    fs.writeFileSync(secretPath, secret, { mode: 0o600, flag });\n    // Belt-and-suspenders: apply chmod after write in case umask relaxed the mode.\n    fs.chmodSync(secretPath, 0o600);\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') {\n      // Race: another process already wrote the file — read their value.\n      let stored: string;\n      try {\n        stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n      } catch (readErr) {\n        const msg = readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : String(readErr);\n        throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패(경합): ${msg}`);\n      }\n      if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n        throw new Error('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일이 경합 후에도 유효하지 않습니다.');\n      }\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n      return;\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Inject into the current process env so the immediately following\n  // assertRelayAuthConfigured() / buildRelayVerifyAuth() calls see the value.\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = secret;\n\n  // Idempotently inject .gitignore entries for the two secret files (#669).\n  // Fold the result into the single first-mint announcement below so\n  // logs.length === 1 is preserved (SECRET-HANDLING: no path/value surfaced).\n  const giResult = ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n\n  // First-mint announcement (value never included — SECRET-HANDLING). The file\n  // name is fixed (`.ait_relay`); we do not echo the resolved directory either.\n  // The gitignore result is folded in here to keep the single-log invariant.\n  const giLine = giResult.injected\n    ? `프로젝트의 .gitignore에 .ait_relay / .ait_urls 무시 규칙을 추가했습니다.\\n`\n    : giResult.failed\n      ? `.gitignore 자동 갱신에 실패했습니다 — .ait_relay / .ait_urls 를 직접 추가하거나 비공개 repo를 권장합니다.\\n`\n      : '';\n\n  logFn(\n    `[@ait-co/devtools] relay 인증 시크릿을 생성해 프로젝트의 ${RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME} 파일에 저장했습니다 (권한 0600).\\n` +\n      `다음 실행부터 자동으로 사용됩니다. 직접 export할 필요 없습니다.\\n` +\n      `팀이 같은 relay를 공유하려면 이 파일을 repo에 커밋하세요(비공개 repo 권장).\\n` +\n      (giLine ? giLine : '') +\n      `자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp\\n`,\n  );\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,MAAa,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoFtC,SAAgB,sBACd,OACA,cACQ;CACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAEV,QAAO,MAAM;AACX,MAAI,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,CACzC,QAAO;EAET,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,WAAW,IAGb,QAAO;AAET,QAAM;;;;;;;;;;AAWV,SAAgB,oBACd,OACA,cACQ;AACR,QAAO,KAAK,sBAAsB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwGjF,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAA+C;CAC3F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;CAEhG,MAAM,QAA+B,SAAS,QAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAA,MAAA,MAAA,EAAA,EAAA;AAMhD,KAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE;AACrD,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,GAAW;GAC7B,MAAM,UAAiC,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;GAE9D,MAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,aADO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WACH;AACzE,4BACE,IAAI,uBACJ,iBACA,SACA,wBACA,MACD;;AAEH;;AAIF,KAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAClB;CAGF,MAAM,KAA4B,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;CAGzD,MAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,aAFS,iBAAiB,GAAG,WAEH;AACjE,KAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW,CAC5B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,GAAG,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAC7C;AAIN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAGF,KAAI,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+B9B,SAAS,yBACP,WACA,YACA,OACA,wBACA,OACM;AAEN,KAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,CAC/B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAChD;AAEN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAIF,KAAI,cAAc,OAChB,OACE,iRAID"}
+{"version":3,"file":"relay-secret-store-CFc9n0OA.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to\n * a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to\n *     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.\n *\n *   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP\n *     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or\n *     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects\n *     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n *     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked\n *     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.\n *\n * Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot\n * trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is\n * frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace\n * root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied\n * per-debug-session through `start_debug`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and\n * its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or\n * assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the\n * discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = '.ait_relay';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surface\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link ensureRelaySecret} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelaySecretFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n  chmodSync(path: string, mode: number): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  appendFileSync(path: string, data: string): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal fs subset needed by {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — strictly the two\n * read-only operations. Deliberately omits writeFileSync/mkdirSync/chmodSync so\n * the daemon path cannot mutate the filesystem even by accident (the type\n * forbids it).\n */\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). The `.ait_relay` file is\n   * resolved against the nearest `package.json` directory at or above this path.\n   * When omitted, the current working directory is used as the start point —\n   * retained for back-compat/tests; the unplugin always passes it.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. Defaults to node:crypto randomBytes. */\n  randomBytes?: (n: number) => Buffer;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelaySecretFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Current working directory resolver (used only when `projectRoot` is omitted). */\n  cwd?: () => string;\n  /** Log function for first-mint announcement. Defaults to process.stderr.write. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root supplied per-debug-session via `start_debug`. The daemon reads\n   * `<nearest package.json dir from projectRoot>/.ait_relay`. When omitted, the\n   * loader is a no-op (the daemon has no anchor to read from).\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Optional log sink — never receives the secret value, length, or file path. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a\n * `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write\n * still lands somewhere deterministic).\n *\n * The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret\n * minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep\n * `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so\n * `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is\n * the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the\n * per-session projectRoot.\n *\n * @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.\n * @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).\n */\nexport function nearestPackageJsonDir(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  let dir = start;\n  // Stop at the filesystem root (dirname of root === root).\n  while (true) {\n    if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, 'package.json'))) {\n      return dir;\n    }\n    const parent = dirname(dir);\n    if (parent === dir) {\n      // Reached the filesystem root without finding a package.json — fall back\n      // to the original start directory.\n      return start;\n    }\n    dir = parent;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function relaySecretFilePath(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — mint + persist\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Ensures `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` is set to a valid relay TOTP secret,\n * persisting a freshly-minted one to `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600) on first\n * run and loading it silently on subsequent runs.\n *\n * Writes a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — it never\n * creates a directory (so no `mkdirSync`/dir `chmod`). The file is created with\n * `O_EXCL` (`flag: 'wx'`) so a concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on the\n * EEXIST race the winner's value is read instead.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 relay boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} (read-only) — it must never mint.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function ensureRelaySecret(deps?: RelaySecretDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    projectRoot,\n    env = process.env,\n    randomBytes: randomBytesFn,\n    fs: fsDep,\n    existsSync: existsSyncDep,\n    cwd: cwdFn,\n    log,\n  } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  // Lazily import isValidRelayAuthSecret to avoid pulling in node:crypto at\n  // module-load time (keeps the import side-effect free).\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or earlier run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    // We need fs to compare — resolve deps early just for the divergence check.\n    // This mirrors the lazy-resolve block below but is hoisted here so we can\n    // still early-return after the (possibly-emitted) warning.\n    const fsEarly: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n    const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n    const startEarly = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n    const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(startEarly, existsSyncEarly);\n    warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n      secretPathEarly,\n      fsEarly,\n      isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n      logFn,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve injected or real dependencies lazily to keep the import graph clean.\n  const rb: (n: number) => Buffer = randomBytesFn ?? (await import('node:crypto')).randomBytes;\n  const fs: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const start = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // 2. Persist file exists — read and inject (silent reload).\n  if (fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return readAndInject(secretPath, fs, env, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, rb);\n  }\n\n  // 3. Mint a fresh secret.\n  return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never mints, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a\n * valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is\n * the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n * (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is\n * found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the\n * downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n *   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).\n *   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject\n *      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.\n *   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before\n * assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps?: RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or unplugin run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    if (projectRoot !== undefined) {\n      const fsEarly: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n      const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n      const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncEarly);\n      warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n        env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        secretPathEarly,\n        fsEarly,\n        isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n        logFn,\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // 2. No anchor → nothing to read.\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n  if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error) — stay silent and let\n    // the downstream assert be the single fail-fast. SECRET-HANDLING: the error\n    // and path are not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the value flows only through the boolean predicate.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers (not exported — single-use extracted for readability)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file\n * exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`\n * when they differ.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):\n *   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of\n *     it, or the resolved file path.\n *   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data\n *     enters the log message.\n *   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the\n *     function returns silently — no spurious noise.\n *\n * This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)\n * so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without\n * introducing additional async hops.\n *\n * @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is\n *   valid before calling).\n * @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.\n * @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).\n * @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.\n * @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.\n */\nfunction warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n  envSecret: string,\n  secretPath: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): void {\n  // File absent → nothing to compare.\n  if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable — skip silently. SECRET-HANDLING: error and path not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Invalid stored contents → skip silently (no spurious noise).\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Compare by equality only. Neither value nor path enters the log message.\n  if (envSecret !== stored) {\n    logFn(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; ` +\n        `the relay will verify against the environment value. ` +\n        `Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, ` +\n        `so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\\n`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link ensureGitignoreEntries} call.\n *\n * - `injected`: one or more missing lines were appended to `.gitignore`.\n * - `failed`:   append was attempted but threw (unwritable FS) — secret generation\n *   is never aborted on failure.\n * - Neither flag set: all lines were already present — pure no-op.\n */\ninterface GitignoreResult {\n  injected: boolean;\n  failed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently appends `.ait_relay` and `.ait_urls` ignore entries to\n * `<secretDir>/.gitignore`.\n *\n * Covers the commit-safety net for the auto-generated relay secrets (#669).\n * Both files live in `secretDir` (the nearest package.json directory), so\n * anchoring the `.gitignore` there ensures the ignore entry and the files it\n * guards always co-locate.\n *\n * Idempotency: reads the existing `.gitignore` (if any), splits into lines,\n * appends only names not already present (exact-match, trimmed). A project\n * that already has both entries (the sdk-example case) is a pure no-op — no\n * write, no log noise.\n *\n * On write failure (unwritable FS, read-only mount) the function returns\n * `{ injected: false, failed: true }` — it NEVER aborts secret generation.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this function only manipulates ignore-pattern strings and\n * the `.gitignore` path. It never reads, logs, or echoes any secret value.\n *\n * @param secretDir - dirname of the `.ait_relay` file (= nearest package.json dir).\n * @param fsDep     - Injectable fs subset (same object passed to the write path).\n * @param logFn     - Injectable log sink (used by callers for fold-in messages).\n */\nfunction ensureGitignoreEntries(\n  secretDir: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretFs,\n  _logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): GitignoreResult {\n  const gi = join(secretDir, '.gitignore');\n\n  // '.ait_urls' mirrors URLS_FILE_NAME from relay-url-store.ts. The constant is\n  // inlined here (rather than imported) to avoid a circular module dependency:\n  // relay-url-store.ts already imports nearestPackageJsonDir from this module,\n  // so a reverse import would create a 2-way cycle.\n  const names = [RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME, '.ait_urls'];\n\n  let existing = '';\n  if (fsDep.existsSync(gi)) {\n    try {\n      existing = fsDep.readFileSync(gi, 'utf8');\n    } catch {\n      // Unreadable .gitignore — degrade gracefully; secret generation is unaffected.\n      return { injected: false, failed: true };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const presentLines = new Set(existing.split(/\\r?\\n/).map((l) => l.trim()));\n  const missing = names.filter((n) => !presentLines.has(n));\n\n  if (missing.length === 0) {\n    // Pure no-op: all entries already present (sdk-example case).\n    return { injected: false, failed: false };\n  }\n\n  // Ensure we start on a fresh line when the existing content has no trailing newline.\n  const prefix = existing === '' || existing.endsWith('\\n') ? '' : '\\n';\n  try {\n    fsDep.appendFileSync(gi, `${prefix}${missing.join('\\n')}\\n`);\n    return { injected: true, failed: false };\n  } catch {\n    // Write failed (unwritable FS, read-only mount, etc.) — degrade gracefully.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are swallowed, not surfaced.\n    return { injected: false, failed: true };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readAndInject(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n): Promise<void> {\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch (err) {\n    const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패: ${msg}`);\n  }\n\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    // Stored value is corrupt — re-mint over the same path.\n    logFn('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일의 값이 유효하지 않습니다. 재생성합니다.\\n');\n    return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, true);\n  }\n\n  // Inject into env — silent path (no log on successful reload).\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n\n  // Ensure .gitignore covers both secret files even on the reload path (the\n  // secret already exists so mintAndPersist will not run, but .ait_urls is\n  // written unconditionally by the unplugin on every boot and must be ignored).\n  // This is idempotent — if the entries are already present it is a pure no-op.\n  ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n}\n\nasync function mintAndPersist(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  /** When re-minting over a corrupt file, the existing file must be overwritten. */\n  overwrite = false,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the raw bytes are never written to any log or string other\n  // than the persist file and the env variable.\n  const secret = rb(32).toString('hex'); // 64 hex chars = 256 bits\n\n  // Self-consistency guard: our own minted secret must pass validation.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[@ait-co/devtools] 내부 오류: mint된 시크릿이 유효성 검사를 통과하지 못했습니다.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Write a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — no\n  // directory is created. `O_EXCL` (flag 'wx') makes the create exclusive so a\n  // concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on EEXIST we read the winner's value.\n  // (When re-minting over a corrupt file we must overwrite, so use 'w'.)\n  const flag = overwrite ? 'w' : 'wx';\n  try {\n    fs.writeFileSync(secretPath, secret, { mode: 0o600, flag });\n    // Belt-and-suspenders: apply chmod after write in case umask relaxed the mode.\n    fs.chmodSync(secretPath, 0o600);\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') {\n      // Race: another process already wrote the file — read their value.\n      let stored: string;\n      try {\n        stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n      } catch (readErr) {\n        const msg = readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : String(readErr);\n        throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패(경합): ${msg}`);\n      }\n      if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n        throw new Error('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일이 경합 후에도 유효하지 않습니다.');\n      }\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n      return;\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Inject into the current process env so the immediately following\n  // assertRelayAuthConfigured() / buildRelayVerifyAuth() calls see the value.\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = secret;\n\n  // Idempotently inject .gitignore entries for the two secret files (#669).\n  // Fold the result into the single first-mint announcement below so\n  // logs.length === 1 is preserved (SECRET-HANDLING: no path/value surfaced).\n  const giResult = ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n\n  // First-mint announcement (value never included — SECRET-HANDLING). The file\n  // name is fixed (`.ait_relay`); we do not echo the resolved directory either.\n  // The gitignore result is folded in here to keep the single-log invariant.\n  const giLine = giResult.injected\n    ? `프로젝트의 .gitignore에 .ait_relay / .ait_urls 무시 규칙을 추가했습니다.\\n`\n    : giResult.failed\n      ? `.gitignore 자동 갱신에 실패했습니다 — .ait_relay / .ait_urls 를 직접 추가하거나 비공개 repo를 권장합니다.\\n`\n      : '';\n\n  logFn(\n    `[@ait-co/devtools] relay 인증 시크릿을 생성해 프로젝트의 ${RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME} 파일에 저장했습니다 (권한 0600).\\n` +\n      `다음 실행부터 자동으로 사용됩니다. 직접 export할 필요 없습니다.\\n` +\n      `팀이 같은 relay를 공유하려면 이 파일을 repo에 커밋하세요(비공개 repo 권장).\\n` +\n      (giLine ? giLine : '') +\n      `자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp\\n`,\n  );\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,MAAa,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoFtC,SAAgB,sBACd,OACA,cACQ;CACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAEV,QAAO,MAAM;AACX,MAAI,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,CACzC,QAAO;EAET,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,WAAW,IAGb,QAAO;AAET,QAAM;;;;;;;;;;AAWV,SAAgB,oBACd,OACA,cACQ;AACR,QAAO,KAAK,sBAAsB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwGjF,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAA+C;CAC3F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;CAEhG,MAAM,QAA+B,SAAS,QAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAA,MAAA,MAAA,EAAA,EAAA;AAMhD,KAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE;AACrD,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,GAAW;GAC7B,MAAM,UAAiC,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;GAE9D,MAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,aADO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WACH;AACzE,4BACE,IAAI,uBACJ,iBACA,SACA,wBACA,MACD;;AAEH;;AAIF,KAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAClB;CAGF,MAAM,KAA4B,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;CAGzD,MAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,aAFS,iBAAiB,GAAG,WAEH;AACjE,KAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW,CAC5B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,GAAG,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAC7C;AAIN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAGF,KAAI,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+B9B,SAAS,yBACP,WACA,YACA,OACA,wBACA,OACM;AAEN,KAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,CAC/B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAChD;AAEN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAIF,KAAI,cAAc,OAChB,OACE,iRAID"}

package/dist/{relay-secret-store-CkA7KNUb.js → relay-secret-store-CmDDfZMh.js}

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ function relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn) {
 async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps) {
 	const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};
 	const logFn = log ?? ((msg) => process.stderr.write(msg));
-	const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import("./totp-D104cJQN.js");
+	const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import("./totp-zGIlDsZS.js");
 	if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {
 		if (projectRoot !== void 0) {
 			const fsEarly = fsDep ?? await import("node:fs");
@@ -151,4 +151,4 @@ function warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(envSecret, secretPath, fsDep, isValidRelayAuth
 //#endregion
 export { relaySecretFilePath as i, loadRelaySecretReadOnly as n, nearestPackageJsonDir as r, RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=relay-secret-store-CkA7KNUb.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=relay-secret-store-CmDDfZMh.js.map

package/dist/{relay-secret-store-CkA7KNUb.js.map → relay-secret-store-CmDDfZMh.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"relay-secret-store-CkA7KNUb.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to\n * a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to\n *     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.\n *\n *   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP\n *     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or\n *     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects\n *     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n *     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked\n *     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.\n *\n * Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot\n * trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is\n * frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace\n * root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied\n * per-debug-session through `start_debug`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and\n * its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or\n * assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the\n * discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = '.ait_relay';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surface\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link ensureRelaySecret} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelaySecretFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n  chmodSync(path: string, mode: number): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  appendFileSync(path: string, data: string): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal fs subset needed by {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — strictly the two\n * read-only operations. Deliberately omits writeFileSync/mkdirSync/chmodSync so\n * the daemon path cannot mutate the filesystem even by accident (the type\n * forbids it).\n */\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). The `.ait_relay` file is\n   * resolved against the nearest `package.json` directory at or above this path.\n   * When omitted, the current working directory is used as the start point —\n   * retained for back-compat/tests; the unplugin always passes it.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. Defaults to node:crypto randomBytes. */\n  randomBytes?: (n: number) => Buffer;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelaySecretFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Current working directory resolver (used only when `projectRoot` is omitted). */\n  cwd?: () => string;\n  /** Log function for first-mint announcement. Defaults to process.stderr.write. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root supplied per-debug-session via `start_debug`. The daemon reads\n   * `<nearest package.json dir from projectRoot>/.ait_relay`. When omitted, the\n   * loader is a no-op (the daemon has no anchor to read from).\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Optional log sink — never receives the secret value, length, or file path. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a\n * `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write\n * still lands somewhere deterministic).\n *\n * The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret\n * minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep\n * `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so\n * `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is\n * the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the\n * per-session projectRoot.\n *\n * @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.\n * @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).\n */\nexport function nearestPackageJsonDir(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  let dir = start;\n  // Stop at the filesystem root (dirname of root === root).\n  while (true) {\n    if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, 'package.json'))) {\n      return dir;\n    }\n    const parent = dirname(dir);\n    if (parent === dir) {\n      // Reached the filesystem root without finding a package.json — fall back\n      // to the original start directory.\n      return start;\n    }\n    dir = parent;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function relaySecretFilePath(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — mint + persist\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Ensures `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` is set to a valid relay TOTP secret,\n * persisting a freshly-minted one to `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600) on first\n * run and loading it silently on subsequent runs.\n *\n * Writes a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — it never\n * creates a directory (so no `mkdirSync`/dir `chmod`). The file is created with\n * `O_EXCL` (`flag: 'wx'`) so a concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on the\n * EEXIST race the winner's value is read instead.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 relay boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} (read-only) — it must never mint.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function ensureRelaySecret(deps?: RelaySecretDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    projectRoot,\n    env = process.env,\n    randomBytes: randomBytesFn,\n    fs: fsDep,\n    existsSync: existsSyncDep,\n    cwd: cwdFn,\n    log,\n  } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  // Lazily import isValidRelayAuthSecret to avoid pulling in node:crypto at\n  // module-load time (keeps the import side-effect free).\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or earlier run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    // We need fs to compare — resolve deps early just for the divergence check.\n    // This mirrors the lazy-resolve block below but is hoisted here so we can\n    // still early-return after the (possibly-emitted) warning.\n    const fsEarly: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n    const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n    const startEarly = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n    const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(startEarly, existsSyncEarly);\n    warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n      secretPathEarly,\n      fsEarly,\n      isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n      logFn,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve injected or real dependencies lazily to keep the import graph clean.\n  const rb: (n: number) => Buffer = randomBytesFn ?? (await import('node:crypto')).randomBytes;\n  const fs: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const start = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // 2. Persist file exists — read and inject (silent reload).\n  if (fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return readAndInject(secretPath, fs, env, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, rb);\n  }\n\n  // 3. Mint a fresh secret.\n  return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never mints, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a\n * valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is\n * the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n * (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is\n * found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the\n * downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n *   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).\n *   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject\n *      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.\n *   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before\n * assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps?: RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or unplugin run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    if (projectRoot !== undefined) {\n      const fsEarly: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n      const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n      const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncEarly);\n      warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n        env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        secretPathEarly,\n        fsEarly,\n        isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n        logFn,\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // 2. No anchor → nothing to read.\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n  if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error) — stay silent and let\n    // the downstream assert be the single fail-fast. SECRET-HANDLING: the error\n    // and path are not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the value flows only through the boolean predicate.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers (not exported — single-use extracted for readability)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file\n * exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`\n * when they differ.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):\n *   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of\n *     it, or the resolved file path.\n *   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data\n *     enters the log message.\n *   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the\n *     function returns silently — no spurious noise.\n *\n * This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)\n * so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without\n * introducing additional async hops.\n *\n * @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is\n *   valid before calling).\n * @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.\n * @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).\n * @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.\n * @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.\n */\nfunction warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n  envSecret: string,\n  secretPath: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): void {\n  // File absent → nothing to compare.\n  if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable — skip silently. SECRET-HANDLING: error and path not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Invalid stored contents → skip silently (no spurious noise).\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Compare by equality only. Neither value nor path enters the log message.\n  if (envSecret !== stored) {\n    logFn(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; ` +\n        `the relay will verify against the environment value. ` +\n        `Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, ` +\n        `so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\\n`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link ensureGitignoreEntries} call.\n *\n * - `injected`: one or more missing lines were appended to `.gitignore`.\n * - `failed`:   append was attempted but threw (unwritable FS) — secret generation\n *   is never aborted on failure.\n * - Neither flag set: all lines were already present — pure no-op.\n */\ninterface GitignoreResult {\n  injected: boolean;\n  failed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently appends `.ait_relay` and `.ait_urls` ignore entries to\n * `<secretDir>/.gitignore`.\n *\n * Covers the commit-safety net for the auto-generated relay secrets (#669).\n * Both files live in `secretDir` (the nearest package.json directory), so\n * anchoring the `.gitignore` there ensures the ignore entry and the files it\n * guards always co-locate.\n *\n * Idempotency: reads the existing `.gitignore` (if any), splits into lines,\n * appends only names not already present (exact-match, trimmed). A project\n * that already has both entries (the sdk-example case) is a pure no-op — no\n * write, no log noise.\n *\n * On write failure (unwritable FS, read-only mount) the function returns\n * `{ injected: false, failed: true }` — it NEVER aborts secret generation.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this function only manipulates ignore-pattern strings and\n * the `.gitignore` path. It never reads, logs, or echoes any secret value.\n *\n * @param secretDir - dirname of the `.ait_relay` file (= nearest package.json dir).\n * @param fsDep     - Injectable fs subset (same object passed to the write path).\n * @param logFn     - Injectable log sink (used by callers for fold-in messages).\n */\nfunction ensureGitignoreEntries(\n  secretDir: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretFs,\n  _logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): GitignoreResult {\n  const gi = join(secretDir, '.gitignore');\n\n  // '.ait_urls' mirrors URLS_FILE_NAME from relay-url-store.ts. The constant is\n  // inlined here (rather than imported) to avoid a circular module dependency:\n  // relay-url-store.ts already imports nearestPackageJsonDir from this module,\n  // so a reverse import would create a 2-way cycle.\n  const names = [RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME, '.ait_urls'];\n\n  let existing = '';\n  if (fsDep.existsSync(gi)) {\n    try {\n      existing = fsDep.readFileSync(gi, 'utf8');\n    } catch {\n      // Unreadable .gitignore — degrade gracefully; secret generation is unaffected.\n      return { injected: false, failed: true };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const presentLines = new Set(existing.split(/\\r?\\n/).map((l) => l.trim()));\n  const missing = names.filter((n) => !presentLines.has(n));\n\n  if (missing.length === 0) {\n    // Pure no-op: all entries already present (sdk-example case).\n    return { injected: false, failed: false };\n  }\n\n  // Ensure we start on a fresh line when the existing content has no trailing newline.\n  const prefix = existing === '' || existing.endsWith('\\n') ? '' : '\\n';\n  try {\n    fsDep.appendFileSync(gi, `${prefix}${missing.join('\\n')}\\n`);\n    return { injected: true, failed: false };\n  } catch {\n    // Write failed (unwritable FS, read-only mount, etc.) — degrade gracefully.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are swallowed, not surfaced.\n    return { injected: false, failed: true };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readAndInject(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n): Promise<void> {\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch (err) {\n    const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패: ${msg}`);\n  }\n\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    // Stored value is corrupt — re-mint over the same path.\n    logFn('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일의 값이 유효하지 않습니다. 재생성합니다.\\n');\n    return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, true);\n  }\n\n  // Inject into env — silent path (no log on successful reload).\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n\n  // Ensure .gitignore covers both secret files even on the reload path (the\n  // secret already exists so mintAndPersist will not run, but .ait_urls is\n  // written unconditionally by the unplugin on every boot and must be ignored).\n  // This is idempotent — if the entries are already present it is a pure no-op.\n  ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n}\n\nasync function mintAndPersist(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  /** When re-minting over a corrupt file, the existing file must be overwritten. */\n  overwrite = false,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the raw bytes are never written to any log or string other\n  // than the persist file and the env variable.\n  const secret = rb(32).toString('hex'); // 64 hex chars = 256 bits\n\n  // Self-consistency guard: our own minted secret must pass validation.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[@ait-co/devtools] 내부 오류: mint된 시크릿이 유효성 검사를 통과하지 못했습니다.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Write a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — no\n  // directory is created. `O_EXCL` (flag 'wx') makes the create exclusive so a\n  // concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on EEXIST we read the winner's value.\n  // (When re-minting over a corrupt file we must overwrite, so use 'w'.)\n  const flag = overwrite ? 'w' : 'wx';\n  try {\n    fs.writeFileSync(secretPath, secret, { mode: 0o600, flag });\n    // Belt-and-suspenders: apply chmod after write in case umask relaxed the mode.\n    fs.chmodSync(secretPath, 0o600);\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') {\n      // Race: another process already wrote the file — read their value.\n      let stored: string;\n      try {\n        stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n      } catch (readErr) {\n        const msg = readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : String(readErr);\n        throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패(경합): ${msg}`);\n      }\n      if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n        throw new Error('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일이 경합 후에도 유효하지 않습니다.');\n      }\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n      return;\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Inject into the current process env so the immediately following\n  // assertRelayAuthConfigured() / buildRelayVerifyAuth() calls see the value.\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = secret;\n\n  // Idempotently inject .gitignore entries for the two secret files (#669).\n  // Fold the result into the single first-mint announcement below so\n  // logs.length === 1 is preserved (SECRET-HANDLING: no path/value surfaced).\n  const giResult = ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n\n  // First-mint announcement (value never included — SECRET-HANDLING). The file\n  // name is fixed (`.ait_relay`); we do not echo the resolved directory either.\n  // The gitignore result is folded in here to keep the single-log invariant.\n  const giLine = giResult.injected\n    ? `프로젝트의 .gitignore에 .ait_relay / .ait_urls 무시 규칙을 추가했습니다.\\n`\n    : giResult.failed\n      ? `.gitignore 자동 갱신에 실패했습니다 — .ait_relay / .ait_urls 를 직접 추가하거나 비공개 repo를 권장합니다.\\n`\n      : '';\n\n  logFn(\n    `[@ait-co/devtools] relay 인증 시크릿을 생성해 프로젝트의 ${RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME} 파일에 저장했습니다 (권한 0600).\\n` +\n      `다음 실행부터 자동으로 사용됩니다. 직접 export할 필요 없습니다.\\n` +\n      `팀이 같은 relay를 공유하려면 이 파일을 repo에 커밋하세요(비공개 repo 권장).\\n` +\n      (giLine ? giLine : '') +\n      `자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp\\n`,\n  );\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,MAAa,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoFtC,SAAgB,sBACd,OACA,cACQ;CACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAEV,QAAO,MAAM;AACX,MAAI,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,CACzC,QAAO;EAET,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,WAAW,IAGb,QAAO;AAET,QAAM;;;;;;;;;;AAWV,SAAgB,oBACd,OACA,cACQ;AACR,QAAO,KAAK,sBAAsB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwGjF,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAA+C;CAC3F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;CAEhG,MAAM,QAA+B,SAAS,QAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,MAAM,OAAO;AAMhD,KAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE;AACrD,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,GAAW;GAC7B,MAAM,UAAiC,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;GAE9D,MAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,aADO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WACH;AACzE,4BACE,IAAI,uBACJ,iBACA,SACA,wBACA,MACD;;AAEH;;AAIF,KAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAClB;CAGF,MAAM,KAA4B,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;CAGzD,MAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,aAFS,iBAAiB,GAAG,WAEH;AACjE,KAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW,CAC5B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,GAAG,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAC7C;AAIN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAGF,KAAI,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+B9B,SAAS,yBACP,WACA,YACA,OACA,wBACA,OACM;AAEN,KAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,CAC/B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAChD;AAEN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAIF,KAAI,cAAc,OAChB,OACE,iRAID"}
+{"version":3,"file":"relay-secret-store-CmDDfZMh.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/relay-secret-store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Project-local relay TOTP secret store (#394 first-run auto-mint, #396 moved to\n * a project-local single file `.ait_relay`).\n *\n * Two surfaces, intentionally split by who is allowed to write:\n *\n *   - {@link ensureRelaySecret} — WRITE path, called ONLY from the unplugin\n *     (env-2 relay boot). Mints a fresh secret on first run and persists it to\n *     `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600). A single file — no directory is created.\n *\n *   - {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — READ-ONLY path, called from the MCP\n *     daemon when switching into a relay environment. It NEVER mints, chmods, or\n *     creates anything: it only reads an already-existing `.ait_relay` and injects\n *     its value into `env`. A daemon that minted would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n *     (the daemon is the verifier side — a self-minted secret would let a leaked\n *     tunnel URL attach unauthenticated), so the daemon stays read-only.\n *\n * Why a per-session `projectRoot` instead of `process.cwd()`: the daemon cannot\n * trust its own cwd — agent-plugin spawns it via `npx` without `cwd`, so cwd is\n * frozen at Claude Code launch and a cwd-walk stops at the monorepo workspace\n * root (which always has a package.json). So the project root is supplied\n * per-debug-session through `start_debug`.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this module handles AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET — the raw value and\n * its length MUST NOT appear in any log, error message, stdout, stderr, or\n * assertion output. Only boolean pass/fail signals are safe to surface, and the\n * discovered file path is never logged either. The persist file is written mode\n * 0600.\n */\n\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Project-local secret file name (single file, not a directory). */\nexport const RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME = '.ait_relay';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Dependency injection surface\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Minimal fs subset needed by {@link ensureRelaySecret} — injectable for tests. */\nexport interface RelaySecretFs {\n  writeFileSync(path: string, data: string, options: { mode: number; flag: string }): void;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n  chmodSync(path: string, mode: number): void;\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  appendFileSync(path: string, data: string): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal fs subset needed by {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} — strictly the two\n * read-only operations. Deliberately omits writeFileSync/mkdirSync/chmodSync so\n * the daemon path cannot mutate the filesystem even by accident (the type\n * forbids it).\n */\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyFs {\n  existsSync(path: string): boolean;\n  readFileSync(path: string, encoding: BufferEncoding): string;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root (typically Vite `server.config.root`). The `.ait_relay` file is\n   * resolved against the nearest `package.json` directory at or above this path.\n   * When omitted, the current working directory is used as the start point —\n   * retained for back-compat/tests; the unplugin always passes it.\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. Defaults to node:crypto randomBytes. */\n  randomBytes?: (n: number) => Buffer;\n  /** Filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs synchronous functions. */\n  fs?: RelaySecretFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Current working directory resolver (used only when `projectRoot` is omitted). */\n  cwd?: () => string;\n  /** Log function for first-mint announcement. Defaults to process.stderr.write. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\nexport interface RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps {\n  /**\n   * Project root supplied per-debug-session via `start_debug`. The daemon reads\n   * `<nearest package.json dir from projectRoot>/.ait_relay`. When omitted, the\n   * loader is a no-op (the daemon has no anchor to read from).\n   */\n  projectRoot?: string;\n  /** Process environment to read from and inject into. Defaults to process.env. */\n  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /** Read-only filesystem operations. Defaults to node:fs (existsSync + readFileSync). */\n  fs?: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs;\n  /** existsSync used to resolve the nearest package.json directory. Defaults to node:fs. */\n  existsSync?: (path: string) => boolean;\n  /** Optional log sink — never receives the secret value, length, or file path. */\n  log?: (msg: string) => void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Path helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Walks upward from `start` and returns the nearest directory that contains a\n * `package.json`. Falls back to `start` itself when none is found (so a write\n * still lands somewhere deterministic).\n *\n * The write (unplugin) and read (daemon) sides use the SAME anchor so a secret\n * minted by `pnpm dev` is found by the daemon: real mini-apps keep\n * `vite.config.ts` and `package.json` in the same directory, so\n * `server.config.root === package.json-dir`. In a monorepo subdir the anchor is\n * the package's own directory — the one the daemon can also reach via the\n * per-session projectRoot.\n *\n * @param start - Directory to start the upward walk from.\n * @param existsSyncFn - Injectable existence check (defaults to node:fs).\n */\nexport function nearestPackageJsonDir(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  let dir = start;\n  // Stop at the filesystem root (dirname of root === root).\n  while (true) {\n    if (existsSyncFn(join(dir, 'package.json'))) {\n      return dir;\n    }\n    const parent = dirname(dir);\n    if (parent === dir) {\n      // Reached the filesystem root without finding a package.json — fall back\n      // to the original start directory.\n      return start;\n    }\n    dir = parent;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Absolute path to the project-local `.ait_relay` file for a given start\n * directory (resolved against the nearest package.json directory).\n *\n * Exported so tests can compute the expected path without duplicating the\n * resolution logic.\n */\nexport function relaySecretFilePath(\n  start: string,\n  existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean,\n): string {\n  return join(nearestPackageJsonDir(start, existsSyncFn), RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// WRITE path (unplugin only) — mint + persist\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Ensures `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` is set to a valid relay TOTP secret,\n * persisting a freshly-minted one to `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` (0600) on first\n * run and loading it silently on subsequent runs.\n *\n * Writes a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — it never\n * creates a directory (so no `mkdirSync`/dir `chmod`). The file is created with\n * `O_EXCL` (`flag: 'wx'`) so a concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on the\n * EEXIST race the winner's value is read instead.\n *\n * Called ONLY from the unplugin (env-2 relay boot). The MCP daemon uses\n * {@link loadRelaySecretReadOnly} (read-only) — it must never mint.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function ensureRelaySecret(deps?: RelaySecretDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    projectRoot,\n    env = process.env,\n    randomBytes: randomBytesFn,\n    fs: fsDep,\n    existsSync: existsSyncDep,\n    cwd: cwdFn,\n    log,\n  } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  // Lazily import isValidRelayAuthSecret to avoid pulling in node:crypto at\n  // module-load time (keeps the import side-effect free).\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or earlier run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    // We need fs to compare — resolve deps early just for the divergence check.\n    // This mirrors the lazy-resolve block below but is hoisted here so we can\n    // still early-return after the (possibly-emitted) warning.\n    const fsEarly: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n    const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n    const startEarly = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n    const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(startEarly, existsSyncEarly);\n    warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n      secretPathEarly,\n      fsEarly,\n      isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n      logFn,\n    );\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Resolve injected or real dependencies lazily to keep the import graph clean.\n  const rb: (n: number) => Buffer = randomBytesFn ?? (await import('node:crypto')).randomBytes;\n  const fs: RelaySecretFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const start = projectRoot ?? (cwdFn ?? (() => process.cwd()))();\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(start, existsSyncFn);\n\n  // 2. Persist file exists — read and inject (silent reload).\n  if (fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return readAndInject(secretPath, fs, env, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, rb);\n  }\n\n  // 3. Mint a fresh secret.\n  return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// READ-ONLY path (daemon only) — never mints, chmods, or creates anything\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Reads an already-existing `<projectRoot>/.ait_relay` and, if its contents are a\n * valid relay TOTP secret, injects them into `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET`.\n *\n * Strictly READ-ONLY: it uses only `existsSync` + `readFileSync` and NEVER mints,\n * chmods, or creates files/directories. The daemon must not mint because it is\n * the relay verifier side — a self-minted secret would defeat the #250 fail-fast\n * (a leaked tunnel URL could then attach unauthenticated). If no valid secret is\n * found the function leaves `env` untouched and returns without throwing, so the\n * downstream `assertRelayAuthConfigured()` stays the single fail-fast.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n *   1. `env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET` already valid → no-op (operator export wins).\n *   2. `projectRoot` given → read `<nearest package.json dir>/.ait_relay`; inject\n *      iff the contents pass {@link isValidRelayAuthSecret}.\n *   3. Otherwise (no projectRoot, file absent, or invalid) → silent no-op.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: the read value is passed ONLY to the boolean predicate before\n * assignment; its value, length, and the discovered file path are never logged.\n *\n * @param deps - Optional dependency overrides for testing.\n */\nexport async function loadRelaySecretReadOnly(deps?: RelaySecretReadOnlyDeps): Promise<void> {\n  const { projectRoot, env = process.env, fs: fsDep, existsSync: existsSyncDep, log } = deps ?? {};\n\n  const logFn: (msg: string) => void = log ?? ((msg: string) => process.stderr.write(msg));\n\n  const { isValidRelayAuthSecret } = await import('./totp.js');\n\n  // 1. Already configured — no-op (operator export or unplugin run wins).\n  //    But first check for a divergence between the env value and .ait_relay —\n  //    if they differ the relay will verify against the env value while QR/\n  //    deep-links carry codes derived from the file, causing silent 401s (#620).\n  if (isValidRelayAuthSecret(env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET)) {\n    if (projectRoot !== undefined) {\n      const fsEarly: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n      const existsSyncEarly: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fsEarly.existsSync;\n      const secretPathEarly = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncEarly);\n      warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n        env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET,\n        secretPathEarly,\n        fsEarly,\n        isValidRelayAuthSecret,\n        logFn,\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // 2. No anchor → nothing to read.\n  if (projectRoot === undefined) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const fs: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs = fsDep ?? (await import('node:fs'));\n  const existsSyncFn: (path: string) => boolean = existsSyncDep ?? fs.existsSync;\n\n  const secretPath = relaySecretFilePath(projectRoot, existsSyncFn);\n  if (!fs.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable file (permissions, transient FS error) — stay silent and let\n    // the downstream assert be the single fail-fast. SECRET-HANDLING: the error\n    // and path are not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the value flows only through the boolean predicate.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal helpers (not exported — single-use extracted for readability)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Compares `envSecret` against the contents of `secretPath` (if the file\n * exists and contains a valid secret) and emits a single warning via `logFn`\n * when they differ.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING (hard rules — do NOT relax):\n *   - The warning MUST NOT include either secret value, its length, a hash of\n *     it, or the resolved file path.\n *   - Only an inequality boolean drives the warning; no secret-derived data\n *     enters the log message.\n *   - If the file is absent, unreadable, or its contents are invalid the\n *     function returns silently — no spurious noise.\n *\n * This helper is intentionally synchronous-like (reads via the injected fs)\n * so it can be called from within the async early-return guards without\n * introducing additional async hops.\n *\n * @param envSecret - The validated env value (caller must have confirmed it is\n *   valid before calling).\n * @param secretPath - Absolute path to `.ait_relay` to read for comparison.\n * @param fsDep - Injectable fs subset (at minimum `existsSync` + `readFileSync`).\n * @param isValidRelayAuthSecret - Injectable predicate from totp.ts.\n * @param logFn - Injectable log sink; never receives a secret value.\n */\nfunction warnIfEnvDiffersFromFile(\n  envSecret: string,\n  secretPath: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretReadOnlyFs,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): void {\n  // File absent → nothing to compare.\n  if (!fsDep.existsSync(secretPath)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fsDep.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch {\n    // Unreadable — skip silently. SECRET-HANDLING: error and path not surfaced.\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Invalid stored contents → skip silently (no spurious noise).\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Compare by equality only. Neither value nor path enters the log message.\n  if (envSecret !== stored) {\n    logFn(\n      `[@ait-co/devtools] AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET (from environment) differs from the project-local relay secret; ` +\n        `the relay will verify against the environment value. ` +\n        `Remove .env/.env.local/exported AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET, or sync the file, ` +\n        `so QR/deep-links and the relay agree.\\n`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link ensureGitignoreEntries} call.\n *\n * - `injected`: one or more missing lines were appended to `.gitignore`.\n * - `failed`:   append was attempted but threw (unwritable FS) — secret generation\n *   is never aborted on failure.\n * - Neither flag set: all lines were already present — pure no-op.\n */\ninterface GitignoreResult {\n  injected: boolean;\n  failed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently appends `.ait_relay` and `.ait_urls` ignore entries to\n * `<secretDir>/.gitignore`.\n *\n * Covers the commit-safety net for the auto-generated relay secrets (#669).\n * Both files live in `secretDir` (the nearest package.json directory), so\n * anchoring the `.gitignore` there ensures the ignore entry and the files it\n * guards always co-locate.\n *\n * Idempotency: reads the existing `.gitignore` (if any), splits into lines,\n * appends only names not already present (exact-match, trimmed). A project\n * that already has both entries (the sdk-example case) is a pure no-op — no\n * write, no log noise.\n *\n * On write failure (unwritable FS, read-only mount) the function returns\n * `{ injected: false, failed: true }` — it NEVER aborts secret generation.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this function only manipulates ignore-pattern strings and\n * the `.gitignore` path. It never reads, logs, or echoes any secret value.\n *\n * @param secretDir - dirname of the `.ait_relay` file (= nearest package.json dir).\n * @param fsDep     - Injectable fs subset (same object passed to the write path).\n * @param logFn     - Injectable log sink (used by callers for fold-in messages).\n */\nfunction ensureGitignoreEntries(\n  secretDir: string,\n  fsDep: RelaySecretFs,\n  _logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n): GitignoreResult {\n  const gi = join(secretDir, '.gitignore');\n\n  // '.ait_urls' mirrors URLS_FILE_NAME from relay-url-store.ts. The constant is\n  // inlined here (rather than imported) to avoid a circular module dependency:\n  // relay-url-store.ts already imports nearestPackageJsonDir from this module,\n  // so a reverse import would create a 2-way cycle.\n  const names = [RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME, '.ait_urls'];\n\n  let existing = '';\n  if (fsDep.existsSync(gi)) {\n    try {\n      existing = fsDep.readFileSync(gi, 'utf8');\n    } catch {\n      // Unreadable .gitignore — degrade gracefully; secret generation is unaffected.\n      return { injected: false, failed: true };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const presentLines = new Set(existing.split(/\\r?\\n/).map((l) => l.trim()));\n  const missing = names.filter((n) => !presentLines.has(n));\n\n  if (missing.length === 0) {\n    // Pure no-op: all entries already present (sdk-example case).\n    return { injected: false, failed: false };\n  }\n\n  // Ensure we start on a fresh line when the existing content has no trailing newline.\n  const prefix = existing === '' || existing.endsWith('\\n') ? '' : '\\n';\n  try {\n    fsDep.appendFileSync(gi, `${prefix}${missing.join('\\n')}\\n`);\n    return { injected: true, failed: false };\n  } catch {\n    // Write failed (unwritable FS, read-only mount, etc.) — degrade gracefully.\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: the error and path are swallowed, not surfaced.\n    return { injected: false, failed: true };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readAndInject(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n): Promise<void> {\n  let stored: string;\n  try {\n    stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n  } catch (err) {\n    const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패: ${msg}`);\n  }\n\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n    // Stored value is corrupt — re-mint over the same path.\n    logFn('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일의 값이 유효하지 않습니다. 재생성합니다.\\n');\n    return mintAndPersist(secretPath, fs, env, rb, logFn, isValidRelayAuthSecret, true);\n  }\n\n  // Inject into env — silent path (no log on successful reload).\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n\n  // Ensure .gitignore covers both secret files even on the reload path (the\n  // secret already exists so mintAndPersist will not run, but .ait_urls is\n  // written unconditionally by the unplugin on every boot and must be ignored).\n  // This is idempotent — if the entries are already present it is a pure no-op.\n  ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n}\n\nasync function mintAndPersist(\n  secretPath: string,\n  fs: RelaySecretFs,\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  rb: (n: number) => Buffer,\n  logFn: (msg: string) => void,\n  isValidRelayAuthSecret: (s: string | undefined) => s is string,\n  /** When re-minting over a corrupt file, the existing file must be overwritten. */\n  overwrite = false,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // SECRET-HANDLING: the raw bytes are never written to any log or string other\n  // than the persist file and the env variable.\n  const secret = rb(32).toString('hex'); // 64 hex chars = 256 bits\n\n  // Self-consistency guard: our own minted secret must pass validation.\n  if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(secret)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      '[@ait-co/devtools] 내부 오류: mint된 시크릿이 유효성 검사를 통과하지 못했습니다.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Write a SINGLE file into the already-existing project directory — no\n  // directory is created. `O_EXCL` (flag 'wx') makes the create exclusive so a\n  // concurrent process cannot be clobbered; on EEXIST we read the winner's value.\n  // (When re-minting over a corrupt file we must overwrite, so use 'w'.)\n  const flag = overwrite ? 'w' : 'wx';\n  try {\n    fs.writeFileSync(secretPath, secret, { mode: 0o600, flag });\n    // Belt-and-suspenders: apply chmod after write in case umask relaxed the mode.\n    fs.chmodSync(secretPath, 0o600);\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'EEXIST') {\n      // Race: another process already wrote the file — read their value.\n      let stored: string;\n      try {\n        stored = fs.readFileSync(secretPath, 'utf8').trim();\n      } catch (readErr) {\n        const msg = readErr instanceof Error ? readErr.message : String(readErr);\n        throw new Error(`[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일 읽기 실패(경합): ${msg}`);\n      }\n      if (!isValidRelayAuthSecret(stored)) {\n        throw new Error('[@ait-co/devtools] relay 시크릿 파일이 경합 후에도 유효하지 않습니다.');\n      }\n      env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = stored;\n      return;\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Inject into the current process env so the immediately following\n  // assertRelayAuthConfigured() / buildRelayVerifyAuth() calls see the value.\n  env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET = secret;\n\n  // Idempotently inject .gitignore entries for the two secret files (#669).\n  // Fold the result into the single first-mint announcement below so\n  // logs.length === 1 is preserved (SECRET-HANDLING: no path/value surfaced).\n  const giResult = ensureGitignoreEntries(dirname(secretPath), fs, logFn);\n\n  // First-mint announcement (value never included — SECRET-HANDLING). The file\n  // name is fixed (`.ait_relay`); we do not echo the resolved directory either.\n  // The gitignore result is folded in here to keep the single-log invariant.\n  const giLine = giResult.injected\n    ? `프로젝트의 .gitignore에 .ait_relay / .ait_urls 무시 규칙을 추가했습니다.\\n`\n    : giResult.failed\n      ? `.gitignore 자동 갱신에 실패했습니다 — .ait_relay / .ait_urls 를 직접 추가하거나 비공개 repo를 권장합니다.\\n`\n      : '';\n\n  logFn(\n    `[@ait-co/devtools] relay 인증 시크릿을 생성해 프로젝트의 ${RELAY_SECRET_FILE_NAME} 파일에 저장했습니다 (권한 0600).\\n` +\n      `다음 실행부터 자동으로 사용됩니다. 직접 export할 필요 없습니다.\\n` +\n      `팀이 같은 relay를 공유하려면 이 파일을 repo에 커밋하세요(비공개 repo 권장).\\n` +\n      (giLine ? giLine : '') +\n      `자세히: https://docs.aitc.dev/guides/relay-auth-totp\\n`,\n  );\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,MAAa,yBAAyB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoFtC,SAAgB,sBACd,OACA,cACQ;CACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAEV,QAAO,MAAM;AACX,MAAI,aAAa,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC,CACzC,QAAO;EAET,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,WAAW,IAGb,QAAO;AAET,QAAM;;;;;;;;;;AAWV,SAAgB,oBACd,OACA,cACQ;AACR,QAAO,KAAK,sBAAsB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwGjF,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAA+C;CAC3F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;CAEhG,MAAM,QAA+B,SAAS,QAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,MAAM,OAAO;AAMhD,KAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE;AACrD,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,GAAW;GAC7B,MAAM,UAAiC,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;GAE9D,MAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAoB,aADO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WACH;AACzE,4BACE,IAAI,uBACJ,iBACA,SACA,wBACA,MACD;;AAEH;;AAIF,KAAI,gBAAgB,KAAA,EAClB;CAGF,MAAM,KAA4B,SAAU,MAAM,OAAO;CAGzD,MAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,aAFS,iBAAiB,GAAG,WAEH;AACjE,KAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW,CAC5B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,GAAG,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAC7C;AAIN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAGF,KAAI,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+B9B,SAAS,yBACP,WACA,YACA,OACA,wBACA,OACM;AAEN,KAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,CAC/B;CAGF,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACF,WAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;SAChD;AAEN;;AAIF,KAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,OAAO,CACjC;AAIF,KAAI,cAAc,OAChB,OACE,iRAID"}