@ait-co/devtools 0.1.113 → 0.1.116

package/dist/debug-server-DcAKrbnq.js

@@ -0,0 +1,921 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+import { n as buildRelayVerifyAuth, r as generateTotp, t as assertRelayAuthConfigured } from "./totp-DvOYkYim.js";
+import { c as generateAttachToken, d as startQuickTunnel, f as startTunnelHealthProbe, l as makeTunnelStatus, m as logInfo, p as logError, u as printAttachBanner } from "./cli-BLBo0lkP.js";
+import "./relay-secret-store-CmqchhR5.js";
+import { createRequire } from "node:module";
+import "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
+import "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
+import "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
+import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
+import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from "ws";
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+//#region src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts
+/**
+* Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).
+*
+* Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a
+* raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is
+* indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the
+* WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)
+* could not tell "stale TOTP code" apart from "tunnel down" and stayed
+* silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close
+* with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.
+*
+* Three parties share this contract:
+*   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;
+*   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and
+*     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;
+*   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code
+*     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh
+*     code mint means it should not normally hit this).
+*
+* This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is
+* safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon
+* bundle.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body
+* must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.
+*/
+/**
+* WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.
+*
+* 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors
+* HTTP 401 so it reads as "unauthorized" at a glance.
+*/
+const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;
+/**
+* Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and
+* the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —
+* never interpolated with request data.
+*/
+const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = "totp-rejected";
+//#endregion
+//#region src/mcp/chii-connection.ts
+/**
+* Production `CdpConnection` backed by the local Chii relay.
+*
+* Topology (debug mode):
+*   phone target.js  --WS-->  Chii relay :9100  <--WS--  this connection
+*
+* The phone connects to the relay as a `target`; this module connects as a
+* `client` (the role a CDP frontend would take) so CDP events the page emits
+* (`Runtime.consoleAPICalled`, `Network.*`) flow back here. We buffer recent
+* events in ring buffers the tool layer reads via `getBufferedEvents`.
+*
+* Node-only: imports `ws`. Never bundled into the browser/in-app entries.
+*
+* Attach reliability (#281):
+*   `refreshTargets()` emits an internal 'target:attached' event whenever a
+*   new target is added to the relay. `waitForFirstTarget()` awaits that event
+*   (with a polling-interval fallback) so `start_attach`'s attach wait
+*   resolves deterministically rather than racing between polling rounds.
+*/
+/** Max events retained per domain ring buffer. */
+const DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE = 500;
+function isObject(value) {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null;
+}
+function parseInbound(raw) {
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+	if (!isObject(parsed)) return null;
+	const message = {};
+	if (typeof parsed.id === "number") message.id = parsed.id;
+	if (typeof parsed.method === "string") message.method = parsed.method;
+	if ("params" in parsed) message.params = parsed.params;
+	if ("result" in parsed) message.result = parsed.result;
+	if (isObject(parsed.error) && typeof parsed.error.message === "string") message.error = { message: parsed.error.message };
+	return message;
+}
+const PHASE_1_EVENTS = [
+	"Runtime.consoleAPICalled",
+	"Network.requestWillBeSent",
+	"Network.responseReceived"
+];
+/**
+* Ring buffer size for `Runtime.exceptionThrown`.
+*
+* Exceptions are rarer than console messages but each is heavier (stack
+* trace). 50 is generous enough to cover a crash scenario while keeping
+* memory bounded.
+*
+* **Lifecycle note**: the exception buffer intentionally survives `replaced` /
+* `crashed` / `destroyed` lifecycle events — it is NOT cleared on target
+* transitions. Rationale: an exception fired just before a crash is exactly
+* the signal we want to preserve for root-cause analysis. The buffer
+* represents "exceptions seen in this MCP session", not "exceptions in the
+* current page".
+*/
+const EXCEPTION_BUFFER_SIZE = 50;
+/** Default per-command timeout if neither option nor env var is set. */
+const DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;
+/**
+* Production CDP connection. Polls the relay for the first attached target,
+* opens a client websocket to it, enables Phase 1 domains, and buffers events.
+*/
+var ChiiCdpConnection = class {
+	/** Authoritative connection kind (issue #348) — relay-backed. */
+	kind = "relay";
+	relayBaseUrl;
+	bufferSize;
+	commandTimeoutMs;
+	totpSecret;
+	emitter = new EventEmitter();
+	buffers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	targets = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	ws = null;
+	connectionState = "idle";
+	nextCommandId = 1;
+	/**
+	* The single active target id under the single-attach model.
+	* Updated by `refreshTargets()` whenever a non-null target is present.
+	* Used to detect a new (different) target attach and evict the previous one.
+	*/
+	activeTargetId = null;
+	/** In-flight enableDomains() promise — concurrent callers share it. */
+	enablingPromise = null;
+	/** Pending request→response commands keyed by CDP message id. */
+	pending = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	/**
+	* Timestamp (ms since epoch) of the most recent crash/destroy/detach event,
+	* or `null` if no crash has been detected since the last `enableDomains()`.
+	*/
+	lastCrashDetectedAt = null;
+	/**
+	* Per-target last-seen timestamp (ms since epoch). Updated on any inbound
+	* CDP message carrying data from a target. Keyed by target id.
+	*/
+	targetLastSeenAt = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	/** Active heartbeat interval handle (only when `AIT_CDP_HEARTBEAT_MS` is set). */
+	heartbeatHandle = null;
+	/** Lifecycle event listeners (crash / destroyed / detached). */
+	lifecycleListeners = [];
+	constructor(options) {
+		this.relayBaseUrl = options.relayBaseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
+		this.bufferSize = options.bufferSize ?? DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
+		this.totpSecret = options.totpSecret;
+		const envMs = process.env.AIT_CDP_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS ? Number(process.env.AIT_CDP_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS) : void 0;
+		this.commandTimeoutMs = (envMs !== void 0 && Number.isFinite(envMs) && envMs > 0 ? envMs : void 0) ?? options.commandTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS;
+		for (const event of PHASE_1_EVENTS) this.buffers.set(event, []);
+		this.buffers.set("Runtime.exceptionThrown", []);
+		this.emitter.setMaxListeners(0);
+	}
+	/** Refresh the attached-target list from the relay's `GET /targets`. */
+	async refreshTargets() {
+		let targetsUrl = `${this.relayBaseUrl}/targets`;
+		if (this.totpSecret) {
+			const code = generateTotp(this.totpSecret);
+			targetsUrl += `?at=${encodeURIComponent(code)}`;
+		}
+		const res = await fetch(targetsUrl);
+		if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Chii relay /targets returned HTTP ${res.status} ${res.statusText}`);
+		const body = await res.json();
+		const list = isObject(body) && Array.isArray(body.targets) ? body.targets : [];
+		let newestTargetId = null;
+		for (const item of list) {
+			if (!isObject(item) || typeof item.id !== "string") continue;
+			newestTargetId = item.id;
+		}
+		if (newestTargetId !== null && this.activeTargetId !== null && newestTargetId !== this.activeTargetId) {
+			const prevId = this.activeTargetId;
+			logInfo("page.detached", { prevTargetId: prevId });
+			this.evictTarget(prevId);
+		}
+		this.targets.clear();
+		for (const item of list) {
+			if (!isObject(item) || typeof item.id !== "string") continue;
+			if (item.id !== newestTargetId) continue;
+			this.targets.set(item.id, {
+				id: item.id,
+				title: typeof item.title === "string" ? item.title : "",
+				url: typeof item.url === "string" ? item.url : ""
+			});
+		}
+		if (newestTargetId !== null) this.activeTargetId = newestTargetId;
+		else this.activeTargetId = null;
+		const result = [...this.targets.values()];
+		if (newestTargetId !== null) this.emitter.emit("target:attached", result);
+		return result;
+	}
+	listTargets() {
+		return [...this.targets.values()];
+	}
+	/**
+	* Waits until at least one target matching `filterFn` is attached, then
+	* resolves with the full target list at that moment.
+	*
+	* Resolution happens on whichever comes first:
+	*   (a) a `'target:attached'` event from `refreshTargets()` (triggered by
+	*       the /targets poll finding a new target), OR
+	*   (b) a `'target:attached'` event from `handleMessage()` (triggered by
+	*       the first inbound CDP message from a target — confirms the relay
+	*       websocket has data from the phone, not just a target entry in the map).
+	*
+	* This dual-signal approach eliminates the polling race that previously
+	* caused `wait_for_attach` to resolve before the first CDP message arrived.
+	*
+	* Falls back to checking `listTargets()` every `pollIntervalMs` in case the
+	* EventEmitter is missed (defensive belt-and-suspenders).
+	*
+	* @param filterFn  - Predicate that the returned targets must satisfy.
+	* @param timeoutMs - Reject after this many ms (default 90 000).
+	* @param pollIntervalMs - Fallback poll interval (default 500ms).
+	*/
+	waitForFirstTarget(filterFn, timeoutMs = 9e4, pollIntervalMs = 500) {
+		const current = this.listTargets();
+		if (filterFn(current)) return Promise.resolve(current);
+		return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+			let settled = false;
+			let pollHandle = null;
+			const settle = (targets) => {
+				if (settled) return;
+				settled = true;
+				clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
+				if (pollHandle !== null) {
+					clearInterval(pollHandle);
+					pollHandle = null;
+				}
+				this.emitter.off("target:attached", onAttach);
+				resolve(targets);
+			};
+			const onAttach = (targets) => {
+				if (filterFn(targets)) settle(targets);
+			};
+			const timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => {
+				if (settled) return;
+				settled = true;
+				if (pollHandle !== null) {
+					clearInterval(pollHandle);
+					pollHandle = null;
+				}
+				this.emitter.off("target:attached", onAttach);
+				reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`waitForFirstTarget: 타임아웃 (${timeoutMs}ms) — 폰이 relay에 attach되지 않았습니다.`));
+			}, timeoutMs);
+			this.emitter.on("target:attached", onAttach);
+			pollHandle = setInterval(() => {
+				this.refreshTargets().then((targets) => {
+					if (filterFn(targets)) settle(targets);
+				}, () => {});
+			}, pollIntervalMs);
+		});
+	}
+	/**
+	* Timestamp (ms since epoch) of the most recent crash/destroy/detach event
+	* detected since the last `enableDomains()` call, or `null` if none.
+	*/
+	getLastCrashDetectedAt() {
+		return this.lastCrashDetectedAt;
+	}
+	/**
+	* Last-seen timestamp (ms since epoch) for a given target id, or `null` if
+	* the target is unknown / no message has been received from it yet.
+	*/
+	getTargetLastSeenAt(targetId) {
+		return this.targetLastSeenAt.get(targetId) ?? null;
+	}
+	/** Subscribe to target lifecycle events (crash / destroyed / detached). */
+	onLifecycle(listener) {
+		this.lifecycleListeners.push(listener);
+		return () => {
+			const idx = this.lifecycleListeners.indexOf(listener);
+			if (idx !== -1) this.lifecycleListeners.splice(idx, 1);
+		};
+	}
+	/**
+	* Connect a client websocket to the first attached target and enable Phase 1
+	* domains. Resolves once the socket is open and enable commands are sent.
+	*/
+	async enableDomains() {
+		if (this.ws && this.ws.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) return;
+		if (this.enablingPromise) return this.enablingPromise;
+		this.enablingPromise = this._doEnableDomains().finally(() => {
+			this.enablingPromise = null;
+		});
+		return this.enablingPromise;
+	}
+	async _doEnableDomains() {
+		const target = (await this.refreshTargets())[0];
+		if (!target) throw new Error("No mini-app page attached to the Chii relay yet.");
+		let clientUrl = `${this.relayBaseUrl.replace(/^http/, "ws")}/client/${`devtools-mcp-${Date.now()}`}?target=${encodeURIComponent(target.id)}`;
+		if (this.totpSecret) {
+			const code = generateTotp(this.totpSecret);
+			clientUrl += `&at=${encodeURIComponent(code)}`;
+		}
+		const ws = new WebSocket(clientUrl);
+		this.ws = ws;
+		await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+			ws.once("open", () => resolve());
+			ws.once("error", (err) => reject(err));
+			ws.once("close", (code) => {
+				if (code === 4401) reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("relay 인증(TOTP)이 거부됐습니다 (close 4401). 코드가 만료됐을 수 있습니다 — 재연결 시 새 코드가 발급됩니다."));
+			});
+		});
+		this.lastCrashDetectedAt = null;
+		this.targetLastSeenAt.clear();
+		this.connectionState = "connected";
+		ws.on("message", (data) => this.handleMessage(data.toString()));
+		ws.on("close", (code) => this.handleDisconnect(code === 4401 ? "relay 인증(TOTP)이 거부돼 연결이 종료됐습니다 (close 4401)" : "relay WebSocket 연결이 끊겼습니다"));
+		ws.on("error", (err) => this.handleDisconnect(`relay WebSocket 오류: ${err.message}`));
+		this.sendFireAndForget("Runtime.enable");
+		this.sendFireAndForget("Network.enable");
+		this.sendFireAndForget("DOM.enable");
+		this.sendFireAndForget("Page.enable");
+		this.sendFireAndForget("Inspector.enable");
+		this.sendFireAndForget("Target.setDiscoverTargets", { discover: true });
+		this.startHeartbeat(target.id);
+	}
+	/** Fire-and-forget CDP message (used for `*.enable`, no result awaited). */
+	sendFireAndForget(method, params = {}) {
+		if (!this.ws || this.ws.readyState !== WebSocket.OPEN) return;
+		const id = this.nextCommandId++;
+		this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+			id,
+			method,
+			params
+		}));
+	}
+	/**
+	* Issue a CDP command and resolve with its result (Phase 2). Rejects on a CDP
+	* error frame or when no websocket is open (no page attached yet).
+	*/
+	send(method, params) {
+		return this.sendCommand(method, params ?? {});
+	}
+	/**
+	* Issue an arbitrary request→response command over the relay and resolve with
+	* its raw result. Both the typed CDP {@link send} and the AIT domain (Phase 3
+	* `AIT.*` methods, forwarded over the same Chii channel) build on this.
+	*
+	* Rejects immediately if the connection is disconnected (fail-fast — no
+	* auto-reconnect). Caller should re-run `list_pages` or `enableDomains` to
+	* reattach.
+	*
+	* Times out after `commandTimeoutMs` (default 30s, env
+	* `AIT_CDP_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS`). On timeout the pending entry is cleaned up
+	* and the promise rejects with a descriptive Korean error.
+	*/
+	sendCommand(method, params = {}) {
+		if (this.connectionState === "disconnected") return Promise.reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`relay에 연결되어 있지 않습니다 (${method}). list_pages로 attach 상태를 확인하고 enableDomains()로 재연결하세요.`));
+		if (!this.ws || this.ws.readyState !== WebSocket.OPEN) return Promise.reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("No mini-app page attached to the Chii relay yet. Call enableDomains() first."));
+		const id = this.nextCommandId++;
+		const ws = this.ws;
+		const timeoutMs = this.commandTimeoutMs;
+		return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+			const handle = setTimeout(() => {
+				this.pending.delete(id);
+				reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`CDP 명령이 타임아웃됐습니다 (${method}, ${timeoutMs}ms). 폰 측 토스 앱이 백그라운드로 내려갔거나 미니앱이 unload됐을 수 있습니다. list_pages로 attach 상태를 확인하세요.`));
+			}, timeoutMs);
+			this.pending.set(id, {
+				resolve: (v) => {
+					clearTimeout(handle);
+					resolve(v);
+				},
+				reject: (e) => {
+					clearTimeout(handle);
+					reject(e);
+				}
+			});
+			ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+				id,
+				method,
+				params
+			}));
+		});
+	}
+	/**
+	* Called on WebSocket `close` or `error` after a successful connection.
+	* Rejects all pending commands and marks the connection as disconnected so
+	* subsequent `sendCommand` calls fail fast (no auto-reconnect).
+	*/
+	handleDisconnect(reason) {
+		if (this.connectionState === "disconnected") return;
+		this.connectionState = "disconnected";
+		this.ws = null;
+		this.stopHeartbeat();
+		const err = /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`${reason}. list_pages로 attach 상태를 확인하고 enableDomains()로 재연결하세요.`);
+		for (const waiter of this.pending.values()) waiter.reject(err);
+		this.pending.clear();
+	}
+	/**
+	* Evict a previously active target under the single-attach model.
+	* Rejects pending commands with a 'replaced-by-new-attach' reason and emits
+	* a 'replaced' lifecycle event. Does NOT clear all targets — only the specific
+	* targetId. The caller is responsible for rebuilding the targets map afterwards.
+	*
+	* The error message uses 'replaced-by-new-attach' so test assertions can match it.
+	*/
+	evictTarget(targetId) {
+		const detectedAt = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+		this.targets.delete(targetId);
+		this.targetLastSeenAt.delete(targetId);
+		const err = /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`[ait-debug] replaced-by-new-attach — 이전 page 세션이 새 attach로 교체됐습니다 (targetId=${targetId}). list_pages로 현재 attach 상태를 확인하세요.`);
+		for (const waiter of this.pending.values()) waiter.reject(err);
+		this.pending.clear();
+		const event = {
+			kind: "replaced",
+			targetId,
+			detectedAt
+		};
+		for (const listener of this.lifecycleListeners) try {
+			listener(event);
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	/**
+	* Handle a page-level crash or target destruction event.
+	* Removes the target from the in-memory map, rejects all pending commands,
+	* and emits a lifecycle event.
+	*
+	* @param kind - Event kind: 'crashed' | 'destroyed' | 'detached'
+	* @param targetId - The target ID from the event params (may be null for
+	*   Inspector.targetCrashed which has no targetId in the params).
+	*/
+	handleTargetGone(kind, targetId) {
+		const detectedAt = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+		this.lastCrashDetectedAt = Date.now();
+		if (targetId !== null) {
+			this.targets.delete(targetId);
+			this.targetLastSeenAt.delete(targetId);
+			if (this.activeTargetId === targetId) this.activeTargetId = null;
+		} else {
+			this.targets.clear();
+			this.targetLastSeenAt.clear();
+			this.activeTargetId = null;
+		}
+		const err = /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`[ait-debug] ${kind === "crashed" ? "page crash (Inspector.targetCrashed)" : kind === "destroyed" ? "target 종료 (Target.targetDestroyed)" : "target detach (Target.detachedFromTarget)"} 감지됨 — relay에서 제거됐습니다. 새 attach가 필요합니다 (list_pages로 확인 → enableDomains()로 재연결).`);
+		for (const waiter of this.pending.values()) waiter.reject(err);
+		this.pending.clear();
+		const event = {
+			kind,
+			targetId,
+			detectedAt
+		};
+		for (const listener of this.lifecycleListeners) try {
+			listener(event);
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	/**
+	* Start the optional CDP heartbeat loop.
+	*
+	* When `AIT_CDP_HEARTBEAT_MS` is set to a positive integer, every interval
+	* we send `Runtime.evaluate({expression: '1'})` to each active target. If
+	* the command times out (2 s hard deadline) or errors, we treat the target
+	* as dead and call `handleTargetGone`.
+	*
+	* This is a zombie-detector fallback: cloudflared keeps-alive the tunnel ws
+	* even when the phone app has crashed, so the ws-level disconnect (#252) won't
+	* fire. The heartbeat catches this gap.
+	*
+	* Default: OFF. Only activates when `AIT_CDP_HEARTBEAT_MS` is set.
+	*/
+	startHeartbeat(initialTargetId) {
+		this.stopHeartbeat();
+		const envMs = process.env.AIT_CDP_HEARTBEAT_MS ? Number(process.env.AIT_CDP_HEARTBEAT_MS) : void 0;
+		if (envMs === void 0 || !Number.isFinite(envMs) || envMs <= 0) return;
+		const PING_TIMEOUT_MS = 2e3;
+		this.heartbeatHandle = setInterval(() => {
+			const targetIds = this.targets.size > 0 ? [...this.targets.keys()] : [initialTargetId];
+			for (const targetId of targetIds) {
+				const pingPromise = this.sendCommand("Runtime.evaluate", {
+					expression: "1",
+					returnByValue: true,
+					timeout: PING_TIMEOUT_MS
+				});
+				const timeoutPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => setTimeout(() => reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("heartbeat timeout")), PING_TIMEOUT_MS + 500));
+				Promise.race([pingPromise, timeoutPromise]).catch(() => {
+					if (this.targets.has(targetId)) this.handleTargetGone("destroyed", targetId);
+				});
+			}
+		}, envMs);
+	}
+	stopHeartbeat() {
+		if (this.heartbeatHandle !== null) {
+			clearInterval(this.heartbeatHandle);
+			this.heartbeatHandle = null;
+		}
+	}
+	handleMessage(raw) {
+		const message = parseInbound(raw);
+		if (!message) return;
+		if (typeof message.id === "number" && this.pending.has(message.id)) {
+			const waiter = this.pending.get(message.id);
+			this.pending.delete(message.id);
+			if (waiter) if (message.error) waiter.reject(new Error(message.error.message));
+			else waiter.resolve(message.result);
+			return;
+		}
+		const now = Date.now();
+		let firstMessageSeen = false;
+		for (const targetId of this.targets.keys()) {
+			if (!this.targetLastSeenAt.has(targetId)) firstMessageSeen = true;
+			this.targetLastSeenAt.set(targetId, now);
+		}
+		if (firstMessageSeen && this.targets.size > 0) this.emitter.emit("target:attached", [...this.targets.values()]);
+		if (typeof message.method !== "string") return;
+		if (message.method === "Inspector.targetCrashed") {
+			this.handleTargetGone("crashed", null);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (message.method === "Target.targetDestroyed") {
+			const targetId = isObject(message.params) && typeof message.params.targetId === "string" ? message.params.targetId : null;
+			this.handleTargetGone("destroyed", targetId);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (message.method === "Target.detachedFromTarget") {
+			const targetId = isObject(message.params) && typeof message.params.targetId === "string" ? message.params.targetId : null;
+			this.handleTargetGone("detached", targetId);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (!this.buffers.has(message.method)) return;
+		const event = message.method;
+		const buffer = this.buffers.get(event);
+		if (!buffer) return;
+		buffer.push(message.params);
+		const cap = event === "Runtime.exceptionThrown" ? EXCEPTION_BUFFER_SIZE : this.bufferSize;
+		if (buffer.length > cap) buffer.shift();
+		this.emitter.emit(event, message.params);
+	}
+	getBufferedEvents(event) {
+		return this.buffers.get(event) ?? [];
+	}
+	on(event, listener) {
+		this.emitter.on(event, listener);
+		return () => this.emitter.off(event, listener);
+	}
+	/** Close the relay client websocket and reject any in-flight commands. */
+	close() {
+		const ws = this.ws;
+		this.stopHeartbeat();
+		this.handleDisconnect("Chii relay connection closed");
+		ws?.close();
+	}
+};
+//#endregion
+//#region src/mcp/chii-relay.ts
+/**
+* Boots the local Chii relay server.
+*
+* Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome
+* WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.
+* The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`
+* and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).
+*
+* Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app
+* entries.
+*
+* TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):
+*   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:
+*
+*   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.
+*     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first
+*     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny
+*     JSON body (`{"error":"totp-rejected"}`) so a cross-origin script
+*     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return
+*     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).
+*
+*   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade
+*     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,
+*     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the
+*     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close
+*     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +
+*     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the
+*     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the
+*     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)
+*     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close
+*     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let
+*     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket
+*     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.
+*
+* TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:
+*   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection
+*      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).
+*   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's
+*      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`
+*      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the
+*      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The
+*      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the
+*      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS
+*      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix
+*      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`
+*      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only
+*      ever sees the stripped URL.
+*
+* Threat model: "URL leak" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR
+*   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.
+*   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.
+*   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can
+*   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear
+*   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box
+*   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.
+*/
+const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
+/**
+* WS keepalive ping interval (ms).
+*
+* Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.
+* 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg
+* and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.
+*/
+const DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45e3;
+/**
+* Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a
+* flag indicating whether the real class was found.
+*
+* Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release
+* changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.
+*/
+function tryLoadChiiWssClass() {
+	try {
+		const mod = require("chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer");
+		if (typeof mod === "function") return mod;
+	} catch {}
+	return null;
+}
+/**
+* Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that
+* was constructed during the call.
+*
+* How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`
+* where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`
+* at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily
+* patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —
+* to record `this` before the original `start` runs.
+*
+* The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)
+* immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each
+* call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration
+* of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.
+*
+* If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),
+* `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip
+* keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.
+*/
+async function startChiiWithCapture(chii, startOptions, ChiiWssClass) {
+	if (ChiiWssClass === null) {
+		await chii.start(startOptions);
+		return null;
+	}
+	let captured = null;
+	const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype;
+	const originalStart = proto.start;
+	proto.start = function(server) {
+		captured = this;
+		return originalStart.call(this, server);
+	};
+	try {
+		await chii.start(startOptions);
+	} finally {
+		proto.start = originalStart;
+	}
+	return captured;
+}
+function loadChiiServer() {
+	const mod = require("chii");
+	if (typeof mod === "object" && mod !== null && "start" in mod && typeof mod.start === "function") return mod;
+	throw new Error("chii server module did not expose start()");
+}
+/**
+* Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent
+* query-based form, e.g.:
+*
+*   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`
+*   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`
+*   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`
+*
+* Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty
+* code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing
+* query-based auth path.
+*
+* Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code
+* validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`
+* predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended
+* verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are
+* percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is
+* needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).
+*/
+function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl) {
+	const match = /^\/at\/([^/?]+)(\/[^?]*)?(\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);
+	if (match === null) return null;
+	const code = match[1];
+	const path = match[2] === void 0 || match[2] === "" ? "/" : match[2];
+	const query = match[3] ?? "";
+	return `${path}${query}${query === "" ? "?" : "&"}at=${code}`;
+}
+/**
+* Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.
+*
+* Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral
+* port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular
+* port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`
+* always reflect the actual bound port.
+*
+* chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE
+* httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and
+* WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is
+* performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values
+* passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and
+* do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients
+* connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.
+*/
+async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
+	const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;
+	const host = options.host ?? "127.0.0.1";
+	const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;
+	const keepaliveIntervalMs = options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== void 0 ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;
+	const httpServer = createServer();
+	const notifyAuthReject = (kind) => {
+		if (onAuthReject === void 0) return;
+		try {
+			onAuthReject({ kind });
+		} catch {}
+	};
+	if (verifyAuth) httpServer.on("request", (req, res) => {
+		const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
+		if (rewritten !== null) {
+			req.url = rewritten;
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+			}
+			return;
+		}
+		const pathname = (req.url ?? "").split("?")[0];
+		if (pathname === "/targets" || pathname === "/targets/") {
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				res.statusCode = 401;
+				res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
+				res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+				res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));
+				notifyAuthReject("http-request");
+				return;
+			}
+			return;
+		}
+	});
+	const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;
+	const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(loadChiiServer(), {
+		server: httpServer,
+		domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`,
+		port: requestedPort
+	}, chiiWssClass);
+	if (verifyAuth) {
+		const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners("upgrade");
+		httpServer.removeAllListeners("upgrade");
+		const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });
+		httpServer.on("upgrade", (req, socket, head) => {
+			const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? "");
+			if (rewritten !== null) req.url = rewritten;
+			if (!verifyAuth(req)) {
+				rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {
+					ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);
+				});
+				notifyAuthReject("ws-upgrade");
+				return;
+			}
+			for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) listener(req, socket, head);
+		});
+	}
+	const actualPort = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+		httpServer.once("error", reject);
+		httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {
+			httpServer.off("error", reject);
+			resolve(httpServer.address().port);
+		});
+	});
+	let keepaliveHandle = null;
+	if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {
+		const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;
+		keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {
+			for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) if (client.readyState === 1) client.ping();
+		}, keepaliveIntervalMs);
+	}
+	return {
+		port: actualPort,
+		baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,
+		close: () => new Promise((resolve) => {
+			if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {
+				clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);
+				keepaliveHandle = null;
+			}
+			httpServer.close(() => resolve());
+		})
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/mcp/debug-server.ts
+/**
+* Factory that constructs a `ChiiCdpConnection` for the given relay base URL.
+*
+* Introduced as a named seam so PR-2 (dual-connection, #348) can defer
+* construction to first-activation time by moving or replacing this call. Since
+* #396 every family (relay included) is constructed lazily on its first
+* `start_debug`, so this is always called from the lazy boot path.
+*
+* The relay base URL is only available after `startChiiRelay()` resolves, so
+* the factory is called right after that point (same as before this refactor).
+*/
+function createRelayConnection(relayBaseUrl) {
+	return new ChiiCdpConnection({
+		relayBaseUrl,
+		totpSecret: process.env.AIT_DEBUG_TOTP_SECRET
+	});
+}
+/**
+* Boots the relay family (issues #348, #356): starts the Chii relay on an
+* OS-assigned port (with optional TOTP gate), opens a cloudflared quick tunnel
+* to the relay's confirmed port in the background, prints the attach banner,
+* and arms the tunnel health probe. Returns a {@link BootedFamily} whose
+* `getTunnelStatus()` reflects the live tunnel (it flips up once the background
+* tunnel resolves and follows reissues).
+*
+* Booted lazily via the dual router's `bootLazyFor('relay-intoss')` callback
+* (symmetry with {@link bootLocalFamily}), at most once on the first
+* `start_debug({ mode: 'relay-staging' })` (all-lazy, #396 — every relay boot now
+* flows through `switchMode` after the project-local secret load). `relay-live`
+* removed (#665).
+*
+* The relay base URL is only known after `startChiiRelay()` resolves, so the
+* `ChiiCdpConnection` (via {@link createRelayConnection}) is constructed inside
+* this function, after the relay port is confirmed.
+*
+* SECRET-HANDLING: the TOTP secret rides only inside `verifyAuth`; the wssUrl
+* (relay host) is never logged here directly.
+*/
+async function bootRelayFamily(options = {}) {
+	assertRelayAuthConfigured();
+	const relayPort = options.relayPort ?? 0;
+	const totpEnabled = options.verifyAuth !== void 0;
+	const relay = await startChiiRelay({
+		port: relayPort,
+		verifyAuth: options.verifyAuth,
+		onAuthReject: options.onAuthReject
+	});
+	logInfo("server.start", {
+		port: relay.port,
+		totpEnabled
+	});
+	let tunnel = null;
+	let tunnelStatus = makeTunnelStatus(false, null);
+	let tunnelProbe = null;
+	generateAttachToken();
+	startQuickTunnel(relay.port).then((t) => {
+		tunnel = t;
+		tunnelStatus = makeTunnelStatus(true, t.wssUrl);
+		options.onWssUrl?.(t.wssUrl);
+		if (t.childPid !== void 0) options.onTunnelChildPid?.(t.childPid);
+		logInfo("tunnel.up", { totpEnabled });
+		tunnelProbe = startTunnelHealthProbe(t, relay.port, {
+			onReissue: (newTunnel) => {
+				tunnel = newTunnel;
+				tunnelStatus = makeTunnelStatus(true, newTunnel.wssUrl, null, 0);
+				options.onWssUrl?.(newTunnel.wssUrl);
+				if (newTunnel.childPid !== void 0) options.onTunnelChildPid?.(newTunnel.childPid);
+				printAttachBanner({
+					wssUrl: newTunnel.wssUrl,
+					totpEnabled
+				}).then(() => {
+					logInfo("tunnel.up", {
+						totpEnabled,
+						reissued: true
+					});
+				});
+			},
+			onPermanentDrop: (droppedAt) => {
+				tunnelStatus = makeTunnelStatus(false, null, droppedAt, 3);
+				logError("tunnel.down", { msg: `tunnel permanently dropped (${droppedAt}). Restart: npx @ait-co/devtools devtools-mcp` });
+				options.onTunnelDown?.();
+			}
+		});
+		return printAttachBanner({
+			wssUrl: t.wssUrl,
+			totpEnabled
+		});
+	}, (err) => {
+		logError("tunnel.down", { msg: `Failed to open cloudflared quick tunnel: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. The relay is up locally; attach over the public URL is unavailable until the tunnel starts.` });
+	});
+	const connection = createRelayConnection(relay.baseUrl);
+	return {
+		connection,
+		relayOrigin: "intoss-webview",
+		relayHttpUrl: relay.baseUrl,
+		getTunnelStatus: () => tunnelStatus,
+		stop() {
+			tunnelProbe?.stop();
+			tunnel?.stop();
+			connection.close();
+			relay.close();
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { bootRelayFamily, buildRelayVerifyAuth };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=debug-server-DcAKrbnq.js.map