@ait-co/devtools 0.1.101 → 0.1.103

package/README.en.md

@@ -1145,33 +1145,6 @@ Returns the full current mock state (permissions, location, auth, network, IAP,
 | `@ait-co/devtools/in-app` | In-app debug attach — runtime gate (layers B/C) + Chii target.js injection. The consumer wraps the import in `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)` so it is DCE'd from release builds — dogfood builds only |
 | `@ait-co/devtools/in-app/auto` | Self-gating side-effect entry — a single `import '@ait-co/devtools/in-app/auto'` line wires attach + SDK bridge. Active only when `?debug=1` / `?relay=` are in the URL or it is a DEV build; stays dormant on normal production loads. See the [section above](#on-device-debugging-in-one-line) |
 
-## Telemetry
-
-devtools uses a two-tier telemetry model.
-
-### Tier 0 — anonymous usage signal (ON by default, opt-out)
-
-Sends a one-time anonymous ping per calendar day when the panel is opened.
-
-Collected fields: `source`, `version`, `ts` — no PII, no `anon_id`. The server generates an IP+UA daily hash but never stores it.
-
-How to opt out:
-- Panel Environment tab → "Anonymous usage signal (Tier 0)" toggle OFF
-- `localStorage.setItem('__ait_telemetry:t0_off', '1')` (from the browser console)
-- Environment variable: `AITC_TELEMETRY=off`
-
-### Tier 1 — extended telemetry (OFF by default, opt-in)
-
-A consent toast appears on first panel use. Data is only collected if you accept.
-
-Collected fields: `panel_open`, `tab_view`, `session_duration` events + an anonymous UUID (`anon_id`).
-
-How to opt out:
-- Panel Environment tab → "Extended telemetry (Tier 1)" toggle OFF
-- Delete collected data: Panel Environment tab → "Delete my data"
-
-Privacy policy: <https://docs.aitc.dev/privacy>
-
 ## License
 
 BSD 3-Clause

package/README.md

@@ -1185,33 +1185,6 @@ export default {
 | `@ait-co/devtools/in-app` | In-app debug attach — 런타임 gate(layer B·C) + Chii target.js 주입. 소비자가 `if (__DEBUG_BUILD__)`로 import를 감싸 release 빌드에서 DCE — dogfood 빌드 전용 |
 | `@ait-co/devtools/in-app/auto` | Self-gating side-effect entry — `import '@ait-co/devtools/in-app/auto'` 한 줄로 attach + SDK 브리지 설치. URL 파라미터(`?debug=1` / `?relay=`) 또는 DEV 빌드에서만 활성화, 일반 프로덕션 로드는 dormant. [위 섹션](#on-device-디버깅-한-줄-설정) 참고 |
 
-## 텔레메트리
-
-devtools는 두 단계의 텔레메트리를 사용합니다.
-
-### Tier 0 — 익명 사용 신호 (기본 ON, opt-out)
-
-패널이 열릴 때 하루 1회 익명 ping을 전송합니다.
-
-수집 항목: `source`, `version`, `ts` — PII 없음, `anon_id` 없음. 서버가 IP+UA 기반 daily hash를 생성하지만 저장하지 않습니다.
-
-끄는 방법:
-- 패널 Environment 탭 → "익명 사용 신호 (Tier 0)" 토글 OFF
-- `localStorage.setItem('__ait_telemetry:t0_off', '1')` (콘솔에서 직접)
-- 환경 변수: `AITC_TELEMETRY=off`
-
-### Tier 1 — 확장 텔레메트리 (기본 OFF, opt-in)
-
-패널 최초 실행 시 동의 토스트로 묻습니다. 동의한 경우에만 수집됩니다.
-
-수집 항목: `panel_open`, `tab_view`, `session_duration` 이벤트 + 익명 UUID(`anon_id`).
-
-끄는 방법:
-- 패널 Environment 탭 → "확장 텔레메트리 (Tier 1)" 토글 OFF
-- 수집된 데이터 삭제: 패널 Environment 탭 → "내 데이터 삭제"
-
-개인정보 처리방침: <https://docs.aitc.dev/privacy>
-
 ## 라이센스
 
 BSD 3-Clause

package/dist/{chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js → chii-relay-DkTOopRj.js}

@@ -300,4 +300,4 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 //#endregion
 export { startChiiRelay };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-DkTOopRj.js.map

package/dist/{chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js.map → chii-relay-DkTOopRj.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-CUS9FJKB.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). Only ping live sockets.\n        if (client.readyState === 1) {\n          client.ping();\n        }\n      }\n    }, keepaliveIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    port: actualPort,\n    baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,\n    close: () =>\n      new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n        if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {\n          clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);\n          keepaliveHandle = null;\n        }\n        httpServer.close(() => resolve());\n      }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiCA,MAAa,+BAA+B;;;;;;AAO5C,MAAa,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACiCxC,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;;;;;;;;AAS9C,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;AAsBtC,SAAS,sBAA0D;AACjE,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,kCAAkC;AAC/D,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,WACjB,QAAO;SAEH;AAGR,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBT,eAAe,qBACb,MACA,cACA,cACiC;AACjC,KAAI,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACzB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;AAC9B,SAAO;;CAGT,IAAI,WAAmC;CACvC,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa;CAC3B,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAE5B,OAAM,QAAQ,SAAiC,QAAQ;AACrD,aAAW;AACX,SAAO,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;;AAGzC,KAAI;AACF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;WACtB;AAER,QAAM,QAAQ;;AAGhB,QAAO;;AAcT,SAAS,iBAAmC;CAE1C,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,OAAO;AACpC,KACE,OAAO,QAAQ,YACf,QAAQ,QACR,WAAW,OACX,OAAQ,IAA2B,UAAU,WAE7C,QAAO;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyC9D,SAAgB,oBAAoB,QAA+B;CACjE,MAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,KAAK,OAAO;AAC9D,KAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;CAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;CACnB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,KAAa,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAE1B,QAAO,GAAG,OAAO,QADC,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IACJ,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+E1C,eAAsB,eAAe,UAAiC,EAAE,EAAsB;CAC5F,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACtC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAiB;CACrC,MAAM,sBACJ,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBACR;CAEN,MAAM,aAAa,cAAc;CAIjC,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAA6C;AACrE,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAW;AAChC,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;UAChB;;AAiBV,KAAI,WAuBF,YAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;EACrC,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,MAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AAEtB,OAAI,MAAM;AACV,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAMpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;;AAIlC;;EAMF,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAI,aAAa,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAIvD,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAEpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;AAEhC;;AAOF;;GAQF;CAgBJ,MAAM,eAAe,sBAAsB,IAAI,qBAAqB,GAAG;CACvE,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,qBAC5B,gBAAgB,EAChB;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAY,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;EAAiB,MAAM;EAAe,EAC/E,aACD;AAUD,KAAI,YAAY;EACd,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU;AAG5D,aAAW,mBAAmB,UAAU;EAGxC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,aAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAsB,QAAgB,SAAiB;GAK/E,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,OAAI,cAAc,KAChB,KAAI,MAAM;AAEZ,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAOpB,cAAU,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;AACjD,QAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,yBAAyB;MAChE;AACF,qBAAiB,aAAa;AAE9B;;AAIF,QAAK,MAAM,YAAY,qBACrB,UAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;IAE7B;;CAGJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,SAAiB,SAAS,WAAW;AAChE,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3C,cAAW,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AAG/B,WADa,WAAW,SAAS,CACpB,KAAK;IAClB;GACF;CAYF,IAAI,kBAAyD;AAC7D,KAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,oBAAoB,MAAM;EACvD,MAAM,UAAU;AAChB,oBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAClC,QAAK,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,QAEhC,KAAI,OAAO,eAAe,EACxB,QAAO,MAAM;KAGhB,oBAAoB;;AAGzB,QAAO;EACL,MAAM;EACN,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;EAC3B,aACE,IAAI,SAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,OAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,kBAAc,gBAAgB;AAC9B,sBAAkB;;AAEpB,cAAW,YAAY,SAAS,CAAC;IACjC;EACL"}
+{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-DkTOopRj.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). Only ping live sockets.\n        if (client.readyState === 1) {\n          client.ping();\n        }\n      }\n    }, keepaliveIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    port: actualPort,\n    baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,\n    close: () =>\n      new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n        if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {\n          clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);\n          keepaliveHandle = null;\n        }\n        httpServer.close(() => resolve());\n      }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiCA,MAAa,+BAA+B;;;;;;AAO5C,MAAa,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACiCxC,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;;;;;;;;AAS9C,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;AAsBtC,SAAS,sBAA0D;AACjE,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,kCAAkC;AAC/D,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,WACjB,QAAO;SAEH;AAGR,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBT,eAAe,qBACb,MACA,cACA,cACiC;AACjC,KAAI,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACzB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;AAC9B,SAAO;;CAGT,IAAI,WAAmC;CACvC,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa;CAC3B,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAE5B,OAAM,QAAQ,SAAiC,QAAQ;AACrD,aAAW;AACX,SAAO,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;;AAGzC,KAAI;AACF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;WACtB;AAER,QAAM,QAAQ;;AAGhB,QAAO;;AAcT,SAAS,iBAAmC;CAE1C,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,OAAO;AACpC,KACE,OAAO,QAAQ,YACf,QAAQ,QACR,WAAW,OACX,OAAQ,IAA2B,UAAU,WAE7C,QAAO;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyC9D,SAAgB,oBAAoB,QAA+B;CACjE,MAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,KAAK,OAAO;AAC9D,KAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;CAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;CACnB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,KAAa,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAE1B,QAAO,GAAG,OAAO,QADC,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IACJ,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+E1C,eAAsB,eAAe,UAAiC,EAAE,EAAsB;CAC5F,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACtC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAiB;CACrC,MAAM,sBACJ,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBACR;CAEN,MAAM,aAAa,cAAc;CAIjC,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAA6C;AACrE,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAW;AAChC,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;UAChB;;AAiBV,KAAI,WAuBF,YAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;EACrC,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,MAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AAEtB,OAAI,MAAM;AACV,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAMpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;;AAIlC;;EAMF,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAI,aAAa,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAIvD,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAEpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;AAEhC;;AAOF;;GAQF;CAgBJ,MAAM,eAAe,sBAAsB,IAAI,qBAAqB,GAAG;CACvE,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,qBAC5B,gBAAgB,EAChB;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAY,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;EAAiB,MAAM;EAAe,EAC/E,aACD;AAUD,KAAI,YAAY;EACd,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU;AAG5D,aAAW,mBAAmB,UAAU;EAGxC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,aAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAsB,QAAgB,SAAiB;GAK/E,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,OAAI,cAAc,KAChB,KAAI,MAAM;AAEZ,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAOpB,cAAU,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;AACjD,QAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,yBAAyB;MAChE;AACF,qBAAiB,aAAa;AAE9B;;AAIF,QAAK,MAAM,YAAY,qBACrB,UAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;IAE7B;;CAGJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,SAAiB,SAAS,WAAW;AAChE,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3C,cAAW,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AAG/B,WADa,WAAW,SAAS,CACpB,KAAK;IAClB;GACF;CAYF,IAAI,kBAAyD;AAC7D,KAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,oBAAoB,MAAM;EACvD,MAAM,UAAU;AAChB,oBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAClC,QAAK,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,QAEhC,KAAI,OAAO,eAAe,EACxB,QAAO,MAAM;KAGhB,oBAAoB;;AAGzB,QAAO;EACL,MAAM;EACN,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;EAC3B,aACE,IAAI,SAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,OAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,kBAAc,gBAAgB;AAC9B,sBAAkB;;AAEpB,cAAW,YAAY,SAAS,CAAC;IACjC;EACL"}

package/dist/{chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs → chii-relay-P6SKmB1g.cjs}

@@ -300,4 +300,4 @@ async function startChiiRelay(options = {}) {
 //#endregion
 exports.startChiiRelay = startChiiRelay;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chii-relay-P6SKmB1g.cjs.map

package/dist/{chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs.map → chii-relay-P6SKmB1g.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-BVVTS3tE.cjs","names":["require","WebSocketServer"],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). 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+{"version":3,"file":"chii-relay-P6SKmB1g.cjs","names":["require","WebSocketServer"],"sources":["../src/shared/relay-auth-close.ts","../src/mcp/chii-relay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared constants for the relay's named TOTP-auth rejection (issue #478).\n *\n * Before #478 the relay rejected an unauthenticated WebSocket upgrade with a\n * raw `HTTP/1.1 401` + `socket.destroy()`. A handshake aborted that way is\n * indistinguishable from a network failure on the browser side — the\n * WebSocket only ever sees close code 1006, so the phone (env-2 launcher PWA)\n * could not tell \"stale TOTP code\" apart from \"tunnel down\" and stayed\n * silent. The fix is accept-then-close: complete the handshake, then close\n * with an application close code that NAMES the rejection.\n *\n * Three parties share this contract:\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-relay.ts` (Node) sends the close frame / HTTP error body;\n *   - `src/in-app/attach.ts` (browser) observes relay-bound WebSockets and\n *     surfaces the code to the launcher shell;\n *   - `src/mcp/chii-connection.ts` (Node daemon client) recognises the code\n *     as an auth failure on its own `/client` dial (defensive — #439's fresh\n *     code mint means it should not normally hit this).\n *\n * This module is intentionally dependency-free (no Node, no DOM) so it is\n * safe to import from both the browser in-app bundle and the MCP daemon\n * bundle.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: these are fixed enum values. The close reason / error body\n * must never grow to carry a secret, a TOTP code, or a host.\n */\n\n/**\n * WebSocket close code sent by the relay when TOTP auth is rejected.\n *\n * 4000–4999 is the application-reserved range (RFC 6455 §7.4.2); 4401 mirrors\n * HTTP 401 so it reads as \"unauthorized\" at a glance.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE = 4401;\n\n/**\n * Close reason string accompanying {@link RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE}, and\n * the `error` value of the relay's HTTP 401 JSON body. Enum string only —\n * never interpolated with request data.\n */\nexport const RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON = 'totp-rejected';\n","/**\n * Boots the local Chii relay server.\n *\n * Chii (liriliri/chii) is a chobitsu-based CDP relay that lets non-Chrome\n * WebViews (iOS WKWebView / Android WebView — i.e. the Toss app) expose CDP.\n * The relay accepts a `target` websocket from the phone's injected `target.js`\n * and `client` websockets from CDP frontends (our MCP connection).\n *\n * Node-only: `chii` pulls in Koa + ws. Never bundled into the browser/in-app\n * entries.\n *\n * TOTP auth (relay-side, authoritative gate):\n *   When `verifyAuth` is provided, this module gates both inbound surfaces:\n *\n *   - HTTP 'request': a listener registered BEFORE `chii.start({server})`.\n *     Node's `http.Server` calls listeners in registration order; the first\n *     to call `res.end()` wins. Invalid auth → 401 + CORS header + a tiny\n *     JSON body (`{\"error\":\"totp-rejected\"}`) so a cross-origin script\n *     `fetch()` probe can READ the status (issue #478). Valid auth → return\n *     without side-effect (chii's Koa handler serves it).\n *\n *   - WS 'upgrade': after `chii.start()` has registered chii's own upgrade\n *     listener, we take over the upgrade chain (remove chii's listeners,\n *     re-dispatch manually). Invalid auth → accept-then-close: complete the\n *     handshake via a `noServer` WebSocketServer, then immediately close\n *     with code 4401 reason 'totp-rejected' (issue #478). A raw 401 +\n *     `socket.destroy()` only ever surfaced as close code 1006 in the\n *     browser — indistinguishable from a tunnel failure, which left the\n *     env-2 phone UI silent. The explicit dispatch (not listener ordering)\n *     is what keeps chii away from rejected sockets: accept-then-close\n *     leaves the socket alive, so an order-based early-return would let\n *     chii's later listener complete a SECOND handshake on the same socket\n *     — an auth bypass. Valid auth → forward to chii's captured listeners.\n *\n * TOTP code transports (issue #466) — two equivalent ways to carry the code:\n *   1. Query param `at=<code>` — used by the daemon-side `/client` connection\n *      (`chii-connection.ts` appends it; it holds the secret).\n *   2. Path prefix `/at/<code>/…` — used by the phone-side target. Chii's\n *      stock `target.js` derives its WS endpoint from the script `src`\n *      (`scriptEl.src.replace('target.js','')`), so the only way for the\n *      phone to carry a code is to embed it in the script URL path. The\n *      in-app attach injects `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js`; both the\n *      script fetch and the derived `wss://<host>/at/<code>/target/<id>` WS\n *      dial then carry the prefix. The listeners below rewrite the prefix\n *      into the query form (`rewriteAtPathPrefix`) and MUTATE `req.url`\n *      before chii's own handlers (registered later) parse it — chii only\n *      ever sees the stripped URL.\n *\n * Threat model: \"URL leak\" — someone obtains the tunnel URL (Slack paste, QR\n *   screenshot, shoulder-surfing) but does not have the shared TOTP secret.\n *   Rotating 6-digit code makes the URL stale after 30 s.\n *   A determined attacker who extracts the secret from the dogfood bundle can\n *   still compute valid codes; that is out of scope (see umbrella CLAUDE.md §4).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: The secret value and computed TOTP codes MUST NOT appear\n *   in any log, error message, or process output. `verifyAuth` is a black-box\n *   predicate from the caller's perspective; this module only forwards pass/fail.\n */\n\nimport { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server } from 'node:http';\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nimport type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';\nimport type { Duplex } from 'node:stream';\n// `ws` is a direct dependency of this package (NOT a transitive reach into\n// chii's tree — same principle as the ajv incident): the reject path below\n// needs `WebSocketServer.handleUpgrade` to complete a handshake we are about\n// to close with a named code.\nimport { type WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';\nimport {\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE,\n  RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON,\n} from '../shared/relay-auth-close.js';\n\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n\n/**\n * WS keepalive ping interval (ms).\n *\n * Cloudflare proxied connections are dropped after ~100 s of no traffic.\n * 45 s comfortably fits inside that window and lets both the phone-target leg\n * and the daemon-client leg survive idle CDP sessions.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = 45_000;\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of chii's internal WebSocketServer instance.\n *\n * `chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer` holds the real `ws.Server` in `_wss`.\n * `_wss.clients` is the standard `Set<WebSocket>` tracking all live sockets.\n * We access this to ping every connected socket — no chii internals beyond\n * this single field are touched.\n */\ninterface ChiiInternalWss {\n  _wss: { clients: Set<WebSocket> };\n  start(server: import('node:http').Server): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Loads chii's internal WebSocketServer class and returns it together with a\n * flag indicating whether the real class was found.\n *\n * Returns `null` if the internal path is not resolvable (future chii release\n * changes the layout) — callers skip keepalive gracefully.\n */\nfunction tryLoadChiiWssClass(): (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null {\n  try {\n    const mod: unknown = require('chii/server/lib/WebSocketServer');\n    if (typeof mod === 'function') {\n      return mod as new () => ChiiInternalWss;\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Module not found or shape changed — keepalive will be skipped.\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Calls `chii.start()` and returns the chii `WebSocketServer` instance that\n * was constructed during the call.\n *\n * How: `chii/server/index.js`'s `start()` creates `new WebSocketServer()`\n * where `WebSocketServer` is captured from `require('./lib/WebSocketServer')`\n * at module load time. The class reference is stable, so we can temporarily\n * patch `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — which runs *on the instance* —\n * to record `this` before the original `start` runs.\n *\n * The patch is installed before `chii.start()` and removed (via `finally`)\n * immediately after, so concurrent `startChiiRelay` calls nest correctly: each\n * call's patch overrides the previous in the prototype chain for the duration\n * of its own `chii.start()` call, restoring the prior descriptor on exit.\n *\n * If `ChiiWssClass` is null (internal path changed in a future chii release),\n * `chii.start()` runs unpatched and the function returns null — callers skip\n * keepalive gracefully without affecting relay correctness.\n */\nasync function startChiiWithCapture(\n  chii: ChiiServerModule,\n  startOptions: Parameters<ChiiServerModule['start']>[0],\n  ChiiWssClass: (new () => ChiiInternalWss) | null,\n): Promise<ChiiInternalWss | null> {\n  if (ChiiWssClass === null) {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  let captured: ChiiInternalWss | null = null;\n  const proto = ChiiWssClass.prototype as ChiiInternalWss;\n  const originalStart = proto.start;\n\n  proto.start = function (this: ChiiInternalWss, server) {\n    captured = this;\n    return originalStart.call(this, server);\n  };\n\n  try {\n    await chii.start(startOptions);\n  } finally {\n    // Always restore — even if chii.start() throws.\n    proto.start = originalStart;\n  }\n\n  return captured;\n}\n\n/** `chii/server` is CommonJS and shipped without TypeScript types. */\ninterface ChiiServerModule {\n  start(options: {\n    port?: number;\n    host?: string;\n    domain?: string;\n    server?: Server;\n    basePath?: string;\n  }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nfunction loadChiiServer(): ChiiServerModule {\n  // `chii`'s package `main` is `./server/index.js`, exposing `{ start }`.\n  const mod: unknown = require('chii');\n  if (\n    typeof mod === 'object' &&\n    mod !== null &&\n    'start' in mod &&\n    typeof (mod as { start: unknown }).start === 'function'\n  ) {\n    return mod as ChiiServerModule;\n  }\n  throw new Error('chii server module did not expose start()');\n}\n\nexport interface ChiiRelay {\n  port: number;\n  /** Base URL for the relay HTTP/WS server, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:54321`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Secret-free metadata about a single auth rejection (issue #467).\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: this event carries ONLY the surface kind. It must never\n * grow fields for `req.url`, query strings, codes, or secrets — observers\n * (diagnostics counters, console hints) only need \"a rejection happened\".\n */\nexport interface RelayAuthRejectEvent {\n  /** Which inbound surface was rejected. */\n  kind: 'ws-upgrade' | 'http-request';\n}\n\n/**\n * Rewrites a `/at/<code>/…` path-prefixed request URL into the equivalent\n * query-based form, e.g.:\n *\n *   `/at/123456/target.js`        → `/target.js?at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/target/x?url=u`   → `/target/x?url=u&at=123456`\n *   `/at/123456/`                 → `/?at=123456`\n *\n * Returns `null` when the URL does not carry the prefix (including an empty\n * code segment) — callers fall back to the unmodified URL and the existing\n * query-based auth path.\n *\n * Pure string surgery — this function knows nothing about secrets or code\n * validity; verification stays inside the caller-provided `verifyAuth`\n * predicate (which parses the query). The raw path segment is appended\n * verbatim to the query: both path segments and query values are\n * percent-decoded exactly once by their consumers, so no re-encoding is\n * needed (TOTP codes are 6 digits and never percent-encoded in practice).\n */\nexport function rewriteAtPathPrefix(rawUrl: string): string | null {\n  const match = /^\\/at\\/([^/?]+)(\\/[^?]*)?(\\?.*)?$/.exec(rawUrl);\n  if (match === null) return null;\n  const code = match[1];\n  const path = match[2] === undefined || match[2] === '' ? '/' : match[2];\n  const query = match[3] ?? '';\n  const separator = query === '' ? '?' : '&';\n  return `${path}${query}${separator}at=${code}`;\n}\n\nexport interface StartChiiRelayOptions {\n  /**\n   * Local port for the relay. Default 0 (OS-assigned ephemeral port).\n   *\n   * Using 0 means the OS picks a free port — this is the safe default because\n   * a stale cloudflared child process (PPID 1, orphaned after SIGKILL) may still\n   * be holding a fixed port. A fixed port causes EADDRINUSE on the next startup,\n   * which makes the MCP handshake fail with -32000. With port 0 the new relay\n   * always gets a fresh port, making any orphaned process harmless.\n   *\n   * Pass an explicit number to restore fixed-port behaviour (backwards-compatible).\n   */\n  port?: number;\n  /** Bind host. Default 127.0.0.1 (tunnel reaches it locally). */\n  host?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional auth predicate for WebSocket upgrade requests.\n   *\n   * When provided, every inbound WebSocket upgrade is checked by calling\n   * `verifyAuth(req)` before Chii processes it. Return `true` to allow the\n   * upgrade; return `false` to reject with HTTP 401 and destroy the socket.\n   *\n   * The predicate MUST NOT log the secret or any TOTP code — it is a black-box\n   * from this module's perspective.\n   *\n   * @param req - The raw HTTP `IncomingMessage` from the upgrade handshake.\n   *   Inspect `req.url` for query parameters (e.g. `at=<code>`). Path-prefixed\n   *   URLs (`/at/<code>/…`, the phone-target transport — issue #466) are\n   *   rewritten into the query form BEFORE this predicate runs, so a\n   *   query-only predicate covers both transports.\n   * @returns `true` if the upgrade is authorised, `false` to reject.\n   */\n  verifyAuth?: (req: IncomingMessage) => boolean;\n  /**\n   * Secret-free observability callback fired on every auth rejection\n   * (issue #467). Only meaningful together with `verifyAuth`.\n   *\n   * SECRET-HANDLING: the event carries ONLY the rejection kind — never\n   * `req.url`, query strings, TOTP codes, or the secret. Implementations must\n   * keep it that way (e.g. increment a counter + timestamp). Exceptions thrown\n   * by the callback are swallowed so observability can never break the gate.\n   */\n  onAuthReject?: (event: RelayAuthRejectEvent) => void;\n  /**\n   * WS protocol ping interval in milliseconds (issue #483).\n   *\n   * The relay sends a ping frame to every connected WebSocket at this interval\n   * so that Cloudflare's proxied-connection idle timer (~100 s) is reset for\n   * both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg. The peer responds with\n   * a pong automatically (browser / ws library behaviour) — no application\n   * code change is needed on either end.\n   *\n   * Default: 45 000 ms (45 s). Set to 0 to disable keepalive entirely.\n   *\n   * Pass a small value in tests to avoid real-time waits — pair with fake\n   * timers (`vi.useFakeTimers()`) or a short sleep.\n   */\n  keepaliveIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Starts the Chii relay and resolves once listening.\n *\n * Default port is 0 (OS-assigned). With port 0 the OS picks a free ephemeral\n * port on every start, so a stale cloudflared orphan holding any particular\n * port cannot cause EADDRINUSE. The resolved `ChiiRelay.port` and `baseUrl`\n * always reflect the actual bound port.\n *\n * chii.start() is called with `server` (our pre-created httpServer) BEFORE\n * httpServer.listen(). This is intentional: chii attaches its Koa handler and\n * WS upgrade listener to the server object, but the actual TCP bind is\n * performed by our httpServer.listen() call below. The `port`/`domain` values\n * passed to chii.start() are used for display/banner purposes inside chii and\n * do not affect which port the server binds. The connection path (clients\n * connecting to `relay.baseUrl`) always uses the post-listen confirmed port.\n */\nexport async function startChiiRelay(options: StartChiiRelayOptions = {}): Promise<ChiiRelay> {\n  const requestedPort = options.port ?? 0;\n  const host = options.host ?? '127.0.0.1';\n  const { verifyAuth, onAuthReject } = options;\n  const keepaliveIntervalMs =\n    options.keepaliveIntervalMs !== undefined\n      ? options.keepaliveIntervalMs\n      : DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS;\n\n  const httpServer = createServer();\n\n  // Secret-free observability hook (issue #467). Swallow callback exceptions —\n  // a broken observer must never turn into an open gate or a crashed relay.\n  const notifyAuthReject = (kind: RelayAuthRejectEvent['kind']): void => {\n    if (onAuthReject === undefined) return;\n    try {\n      onAuthReject({ kind });\n    } catch {\n      // Ignore — observability is best-effort.\n    }\n  };\n\n  // Register the HTTP-request auth listener BEFORE chii.start() so it fires\n  // first. Node's http.Server emits 'request' to all listeners in registration\n  // order; the first to end() the response wins. Valid requests return without\n  // side-effect so chii's own handler takes over normally — and because\n  // listeners run synchronously in order, mutating `req.url` here (path-prefix\n  // strip, issue #466) means chii's later-registered handler only ever sees\n  // the stripped URL.\n  //\n  // We only register when verifyAuth is provided so the no-auth path is\n  // zero-overhead for tests and local-only dev sessions. (The phone-side\n  // `/at/<code>/` prefix only ever appears when TOTP is armed — the launcher\n  // QR carries the `at` code — so the no-auth path never needs the strip.)\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    // Plain HTTP requests: two cases are gated, everything else passes through.\n    //\n    // Case 1 — path-prefixed form (`/at/<code>/…`): the phone fetches\n    //   `target.js` via `https://<host>/at/<code>/target.js` (issue #466).\n    //   The prefix is rewritten to the query form and then verified; chii's Koa\n    //   static handler sees the stripped URL.\n    //\n    // Case 2 — `/targets` read route (issue #474): without gating this route a\n    //   URL-leaker (threat model: someone who obtained the tunnel URL but not\n    //   the secret) can read session metadata (id/url/title, including any query\n    //   params in the page URL) without a code. Debugger attach stays blocked by\n    //   the WS gate, but /targets is an HTTP read that was previously ungated.\n    //   The `at` code may arrive as a query param (`/targets?at=<code>`) — which\n    //   buildRelayVerifyAuth already handles — or via the `/at/<code>/` path\n    //   prefix (rewriteAtPathPrefix normalises that to the query form first).\n    //\n    // Static assets (target.js, chii front-end HTML/JS/CSS) and any other\n    // non-prefixed, non-/targets request keep today's ungated pass-through — the\n    // phone fetches some via the legacy no-prefix path and gating them would\n    // break env-2/3/4.\n    //\n    // SECRET-HANDLING: We do NOT log req.url or any auth value in this listener.\n    httpServer.on('request', (req, res) => {\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        // Path-prefix form: normalise to query form, then verify.\n        req.url = rewritten;\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // CORS header + tiny JSON body (issue #478): the script URL is\n          // cross-origin from the phone page (tunnel origin ≠ relay origin), so\n          // without ACAO a fetch() probe sees an opaque error and cannot tell\n          // auth rejection from a network failure. The header rides ONLY on\n          // this error response — no relay asset is exposed through it.\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n        }\n        // Auth passed (or was rejected above): return so the path-prefix branch\n        // never falls through to the /targets check below.\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Non-prefixed request: check if this is the /targets read route (issue\n      // #474). Extract the pathname robustly — req.url is a raw path+query\n      // string like `/targets?at=123456` so we split on `?`.\n      const pathname = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];\n      if (pathname === '/targets' || pathname === '/targets/') {\n        // The `at` code must be present as a query param — verifyAuth reads it\n        // from req.url via URLSearchParams, which already handles `?at=<code>`\n        // without any URL rewrite needed.\n        if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n          // Same 401 shape as the path-prefix branch (issue #478 contract).\n          res.statusCode = 401;\n          res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');\n          res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');\n          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON }));\n          notifyAuthReject('http-request');\n          // res.end() wins — chii's Koa handler will not write.\n          return;\n        }\n        // Auth passed: return without ending the response. Node invokes every\n        // 'request' listener in registration order, so chii's Koa listener\n        // (registered later by chii.start) still runs and serves the /targets\n        // JSON — this return only means \"this gate listener is done\", not \"end\n        // the response\".\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Any other non-prefixed request (static assets, chii front-end, etc.):\n      // ungated pass-through to chii. Auth passed: no-op — chii's Koa\n      // 'request' listener (registered below by chii.start) serves the URL.\n      // (Koa skips writing when an earlier listener already ended the response,\n      // so the 401 paths above are safe even though Koa still runs.)\n    });\n  }\n\n  // WS keepalive (issue #483): capture chii's WebSocketServer instance so we\n  // can read `_wss.clients` and send periodic ping frames.\n  //\n  // `chii/server/index.js`'s start() creates `new WebSocketServer()` but\n  // doesn't expose the instance. We capture it by temporarily patching\n  // `ChiiWssClass.prototype.start` — that method runs on the instance, so\n  // `this` gives us the reference we need.\n  //\n  // The patch is installed for the duration of one `chii.start()` call and\n  // removed in a `finally` block, so concurrent relays nest correctly. If the\n  // internal path changes in a future chii release (tryLoadChiiWssClass returns\n  // null), chii.start() runs unpatched and the keepalive loop is silently\n  // skipped — relay correctness is unaffected.\n  const chiiWssClass = keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 ? tryLoadChiiWssClass() : null;\n  const capturedChiiWss = await startChiiWithCapture(\n    loadChiiServer(),\n    { server: httpServer, domain: `${host}:${requestedPort}`, port: requestedPort },\n    chiiWssClass,\n  );\n\n  // WS upgrade gate (issue #478, accept-then-close): take over the upgrade\n  // chain AFTER chii.start() has registered chii's own upgrade listener.\n  // Listener ordering alone protected chii when rejection meant\n  // socket.destroy(); accept-then-close keeps the socket ALIVE, so chii's\n  // listener (which always runs on every 'upgrade' emit) would complete a\n  // second handshake on the rejected socket — frames after our close frame\n  // would reach chii's server-side WebSocket, i.e. an auth bypass. Capturing\n  // chii's listeners and re-dispatching only on auth pass closes that hole.\n  if (verifyAuth) {\n    const chiiUpgradeListeners = httpServer.listeners('upgrade') as Array<\n      (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => void\n    >;\n    httpServer.removeAllListeners('upgrade');\n    // noServer: handshake-only — never binds a port; used purely to send a\n    // spec-compliant close frame with a code the browser can read.\n    const rejectWss = new WebSocketServer({ noServer: true });\n    httpServer.on('upgrade', (req: IncomingMessage, socket: Duplex, head: Buffer) => {\n      // Phone-target transport (issue #466): normalise a `/at/<code>/…` path\n      // prefix into the query form before verification, and strip it from the\n      // URL chii will see. No-prefix URLs pass through untouched (daemon\n      // client query transport — back-compat).\n      const rewritten = rewriteAtPathPrefix(req.url ?? '');\n      if (rewritten !== null) {\n        req.url = rewritten;\n      }\n      if (!verifyAuth(req)) {\n        // Reject: complete the handshake, then close with a NAMED code so the\n        // browser-side observer (in-app attach.ts) can distinguish \"stale\n        // TOTP code\" (4401) from \"tunnel down\" (1006). Raw-401-destroy only\n        // ever produced 1006 client-side — the env-2 silence gap (#478).\n        // We do NOT log req.url or any auth param here to avoid leaking codes;\n        // the close reason is a fixed enum string.\n        rejectWss.handleUpgrade(req, socket, head, (ws) => {\n          ws.close(RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_CLOSE_CODE, RELAY_AUTH_REJECT_REASON);\n        });\n        notifyAuthReject('ws-upgrade');\n        // Early return — chii's captured listeners are NOT called.\n        return;\n      }\n      // Auth passed: hand the upgrade to chii's own listeners (it sees the\n      // stripped URL — same observable behaviour as the pre-#478 ordering).\n      for (const listener of chiiUpgradeListeners) {\n        listener(req, socket, head);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  const actualPort = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {\n    httpServer.once('error', reject);\n    httpServer.listen(requestedPort, host, () => {\n      httpServer.off('error', reject);\n      // httpServer.address() is non-null immediately after the listen callback.\n      const addr = httpServer.address() as AddressInfo;\n      resolve(addr.port);\n    });\n  });\n\n  // WS keepalive interval (issue #483): send a ping frame to every connected\n  // socket on each tick. Both the phone-target leg and the daemon-client leg\n  // terminate as WebSocket connections on this relay, so pinging chii's\n  // `_wss.clients` covers both.\n  //\n  // Per-ping log output is intentionally absent — pings happen every 45 s and\n  // logging each one would flood the MCP console without adding signal.\n  //\n  // `ws` clients respond to ping frames with pong automatically (RFC 6455 §5.5)\n  // — no application code is needed on either end.\n  let keepaliveHandle: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;\n  if (keepaliveIntervalMs > 0 && capturedChiiWss !== null) {\n    const chiiWss = capturedChiiWss;\n    keepaliveHandle = setInterval(() => {\n      for (const client of chiiWss._wss.clients) {\n        // readyState 1 = OPEN (ws library constant). Only ping live sockets.\n        if (client.readyState === 1) {\n          client.ping();\n        }\n      }\n    }, keepaliveIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    port: actualPort,\n    baseUrl: `http://${host}:${actualPort}`,\n    close: () =>\n      new Promise<void>((resolve) => {\n        if (keepaliveHandle !== null) {\n          clearInterval(keepaliveHandle);\n          keepaliveHandle = null;\n        }\n        httpServer.close(() => resolve());\n      }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiCA,MAAa,+BAA+B;;;;;;AAO5C,MAAa,2BAA2B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACiCxC,MAAMA,aAAAA,GAAAA,YAAAA,eAAAA,QAAAA,MAAAA,CAAAA,cAAAA,WAAAA,CAAAA,KAAwC;;;;;;;;AAS9C,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;AAsBtC,SAAS,sBAA0D;AACjE,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAeA,UAAQ,kCAAkC;AAC/D,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,WACjB,QAAO;SAEH;AAGR,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBT,eAAe,qBACb,MACA,cACA,cACiC;AACjC,KAAI,iBAAiB,MAAM;AACzB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;AAC9B,SAAO;;CAGT,IAAI,WAAmC;CACvC,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa;CAC3B,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAE5B,OAAM,QAAQ,SAAiC,QAAQ;AACrD,aAAW;AACX,SAAO,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO;;AAGzC,KAAI;AACF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,aAAa;WACtB;AAER,QAAM,QAAQ;;AAGhB,QAAO;;AAcT,SAAS,iBAAmC;CAE1C,MAAM,MAAeA,UAAQ,OAAO;AACpC,KACE,OAAO,QAAQ,YACf,QAAQ,QACR,WAAW,OACX,OAAQ,IAA2B,UAAU,WAE7C,QAAO;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyC9D,SAAgB,oBAAoB,QAA+B;CACjE,MAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,KAAK,OAAO;AAC9D,KAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;CAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;CACnB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,KAAA,KAAa,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;CACrE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM;AAE1B,QAAO,GAAG,OAAO,QADC,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IACJ,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA+E1C,eAAsB,eAAe,UAAiC,EAAE,EAAsB;CAC5F,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;CACtC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,iBAAiB;CACrC,MAAM,sBACJ,QAAQ,wBAAwB,KAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBACR;CAEN,MAAM,cAAA,GAAA,UAAA,eAA2B;CAIjC,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAA6C;AACrE,MAAI,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAW;AAChC,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;UAChB;;AAiBV,KAAI,WAuBF,YAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;EACrC,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,MAAI,cAAc,MAAM;AAEtB,OAAI,MAAM;AACV,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAMpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;;AAIlC;;EAMF,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,MAAI,aAAa,cAAc,aAAa,aAAa;AAIvD,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAEpB,QAAI,aAAa;AACjB,QAAI,UAAU,+BAA+B,IAAI;AACjD,QAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AACjD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAiB,eAAe;AAEhC;;AAOF;;GAQF;CAgBJ,MAAM,eAAe,sBAAsB,IAAI,qBAAqB,GAAG;CACvE,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,qBAC5B,gBAAgB,EAChB;EAAE,QAAQ;EAAY,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;EAAiB,MAAM;EAAe,EAC/E,aACD;AAUD,KAAI,YAAY;EACd,MAAM,uBAAuB,WAAW,UAAU,UAAU;AAG5D,aAAW,mBAAmB,UAAU;EAGxC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAIC,GAAAA,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,aAAW,GAAG,YAAY,KAAsB,QAAgB,SAAiB;GAK/E,MAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,OAAI,cAAc,KAChB,KAAI,MAAM;AAEZ,OAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,EAAE;AAOpB,cAAU,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAO;AACjD,UAAG,MAAM,8BAA8B,yBAAyB;MAChE;AACF,qBAAiB,aAAa;AAE9B;;AAIF,QAAK,MAAM,YAAY,qBACrB,UAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;IAE7B;;CAGJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI,SAAiB,SAAS,WAAW;AAChE,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3C,cAAW,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AAG/B,WADa,WAAW,SAAS,CACpB,KAAK;IAClB;GACF;CAYF,IAAI,kBAAyD;AAC7D,KAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,oBAAoB,MAAM;EACvD,MAAM,UAAU;AAChB,oBAAkB,kBAAkB;AAClC,QAAK,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,QAEhC,KAAI,OAAO,eAAe,EACxB,QAAO,MAAM;KAGhB,oBAAoB;;AAGzB,QAAO;EACL,MAAM;EACN,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;EAC3B,aACE,IAAI,SAAe,YAAY;AAC7B,OAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,kBAAc,gBAAgB;AAC9B,sBAAkB;;AAEpB,cAAW,YAAY,SAAS,CAAC;IACjC;EACL"}

package/dist/{deeplink-D1HXJ2YG.js → deeplink-B5-Hxu0Q.js}

@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ function buildLauncherAttachUrl(tunnelUrl, wssUrl, totpCode, opts) {
 //#endregion
 export { buildLauncherAttachUrl };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=deeplink-D1HXJ2YG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=deeplink-B5-Hxu0Q.js.map

package/dist/{deeplink-D1HXJ2YG.js.map → deeplink-B5-Hxu0Q.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"deeplink-D1HXJ2YG.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/deeplink.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * URL of the AITC Sandbox launcher PWA.\n *\n * Declared here (not imported from `src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`) to respect the\n * mcp → unplugin layering boundary. unplugin/tunnel.ts declares its own copy\n * for the same reason — keep the two in sync when the URL changes.\n */\nconst LAUNCHER_URL = 'https://devtools.aitc.dev/launcher/';\n\n/**\n * Optional metadata that enriches the launcher deep-link (#498).\n *\n * These fields are added as query params so the launcher PWA can display\n * a recognizable identity (name, icon) without the user having to configure\n * anything extra.\n */\nexport interface LauncherAttachUrlOpts {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name shown in the partner nav bar (`name=` param).\n   * Blank / whitespace-only values are not added.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * Absolute `https://` icon URL for the partner nav bar icon slot (`icon=`\n   * param). Non-https or falsy values are not added.\n   */\n  icon?: string;\n  /**\n   * When `true`, adds `selfdebug=1` to the launcher URL so the launcher PWA\n   * registers its own document as a CDP target (issue #531/#543).\n   *\n   * **Single-attach model**: attaching the launcher self-target causes any\n   * currently-attached mini-app target to be evicted. This is intentional —\n   * `selfdebug` is a \"launcher diagnostics mode\" for inspecting the launcher's\n   * own DOM/console/safe-area, not simultaneous dual-attach.\n   *\n   * When `false` or omitted (default), the param is not added and the output\n   * is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n   */\n  selfdebug?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a launcher PWA deep-link for env-2 MCP-attach (issue #378).\n *\n * The launcher at {@link LAUNCHER_URL} renders tunnelUrl in a full-viewport\n * iframe. `&debug=1&relay=<wssUrl>` is forwarded onto the iframe src so the\n * framed page's in-app debug gate (Layer C) is satisfied and a Chii target.js\n * is injected. `&at=<totpCode>` is added only when a code is provided (same\n * conditional as {@link buildDeepLinkAttachUrl}).\n *\n * When `opts.name` is given (non-blank), it is added as `&name=` so the\n * launcher partner bar shows the app name instead of the generic default (#498).\n * When `opts.icon` is an absolute https:// URL, it is added as `&icon=` so the\n * launcher can render an icon next to the title (#498).\n *\n * Unlike `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` (which splices onto a non-special scheme URL\n * via raw string manipulation), this function uses WHATWG `encodeURIComponent`\n * because the target is a standard `https:` URL.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `totpCode` (when provided) is placed into the `at=` param\n * only — never logged or returned separately. Callers must NOT log the result\n * of this function to stdout/stderr.\n *\n * @param tunnelUrl - The `https://*.trycloudflare.com` app tunnel URL\n *   (`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`). This is the URL the launcher frames.\n * @param wssUrl - The `wss://` relay URL the framed page will attach to.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is appended as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @param opts - Optional app identity hints: `name`, `icon`, and `selfdebug`\n *   (#498, #543).\n * @returns The launcher deep-link URL with `?url=<enc>&debug=1&relay=<enc>\n *   [&at=<code>][&name=<enc>][&icon=<enc>][&selfdebug=1]` params.\n */\nexport function buildLauncherAttachUrl(\n  tunnelUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n  opts?: LauncherAttachUrlOpts,\n): string {\n  let url =\n    `${LAUNCHER_URL}?url=${encodeURIComponent(tunnelUrl)}` +\n    `&debug=1&relay=${encodeURIComponent(wssUrl)}`;\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    url += `&at=${encodeURIComponent(totpCode)}`;\n  }\n  // App identity hints (#498): add non-blank name and valid https icon.\n  if (opts?.name !== undefined && opts.name.trim() !== '') {\n    url += `&name=${encodeURIComponent(opts.name.trim())}`;\n  }\n  if (opts?.icon !== undefined) {\n    let iconParsed: URL;\n    try {\n      iconParsed = new URL(opts.icon);\n    } catch {\n      iconParsed = null as unknown as URL;\n    }\n    if (iconParsed?.protocol === 'https:') {\n      url += `&icon=${encodeURIComponent(opts.icon)}`;\n    }\n  }\n  // Self-debug opt-in (#543): add selfdebug=1 only when explicitly requested.\n  // Without this flag the output is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n  if (opts?.selfdebug === true) {\n    url += '&selfdebug=1';\n  }\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a self-attaching dog-food deep-link.\n *\n * `ait deploy --scheme-only` prints an `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * URL that opens a dog-food bundle on a phone. The in-app debug gate\n * (`src/in-app/gate.ts`) auto-attaches when the entry URL also carries\n * `debug=1` and `relay=<wss-url>`. This helper splices those params (plus\n * `at=<code>` when TOTP is enabled) into the scheme URL; rendering the result\n * as a QR code and scanning it with the phone camera opens the mini-app and\n * attaches it to the live Chii relay. QR is the single entry path — it needs\n * no USB cable, platform CLI, or driver, and works the same on iOS/Android.\n *\n * The Toss app propagates extra query params from the entry deep link into the\n * mini-app WebView's `location.search` (confirmed behavior), so the gate reads\n * them at attach time.\n *\n * TOTP `at=` param:\n *   When a TOTP secret is active, `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` accepts an optional\n *   `totpCode` argument and splices `at=<code>` alongside `debug` and `relay`.\n *   The code must be computed by the caller at call time — do NOT pre-compute\n *   and cache it, because the 30-second window expires quickly. The in-app gate\n *   (`src/in-app/gate.ts` Layer C) validates this code against the baked secret.\n *\n * Why not `URL`/`URLSearchParams`: `intoss-private:` is a non-special scheme.\n * The WHATWG `URL` parser treats such schemes opaquely (no host/path/query\n * decomposition you can rely on across runtimes), so query manipulation via\n * `url.searchParams` is not portable here. We splice the query string directly\n * on the raw string instead, which keeps the scheme, authority, path, and any\n * pre-existing params (notably `_deploymentId`) byte-for-byte intact.\n */\n\n/**\n * Suspicious/generic authority values that indicate a malformed or placeholder\n * scheme URL. These are host strings that will almost certainly cause the Toss\n * app to fail with \"bundle not found\" silently.\n *\n * The expected form from `ait deploy --scheme-only` is:\n *   intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>\n * where `<appName>` is a non-generic string like `aitc-sdk-example`.\n */\nconst SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES = new Set<string>(['', 'web', 'localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'app']);\n\n/**\n * Validates the authority (host) portion of a scheme URL.\n *\n * Returns a warning message if the authority is missing or looks like a\n * placeholder, or `null` if the authority looks valid.\n *\n * Expected form: `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * The authority must be a non-empty, non-generic app name (e.g. `aitc-sdk-example`).\n */\nexport function validateSchemeAuthority(schemeUrl: string): string | null {\n  // Extract authority from `scheme://authority[/path][?query][#hash]`.\n  // We cannot use the WHATWG URL parser for non-special schemes reliably\n  // (see the deeplink.ts module comment), so we parse the raw string.\n  const afterScheme = schemeUrl.replace(/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\\-.]*:\\/\\//, '');\n  if (afterScheme === schemeUrl) {\n    // No `://` found — not a scheme URL at all.\n    return (\n      'scheme_url does not look like a scheme URL (expected `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`). ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only`.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // authority ends at the first `/`, `?`, `#`, or end of string.\n  const authorityEnd = afterScheme.search(/[/?#]/);\n  const authority = authorityEnd === -1 ? afterScheme : afterScheme.slice(0, authorityEnd);\n\n  if (SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES.has(authority.toLowerCase())) {\n    const displayAuthority = authority === '' ? '(empty)' : `\"${authority}\"`;\n    return (\n      `scheme_url authority ${displayAuthority} looks like a placeholder. ` +\n      'Expected an app name like `intoss-private://aitc-sdk-example?_deploymentId=<uuid>`. ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only` — it includes the correct app name as the host.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** A param the helper appends. Existing occurrences are replaced, not duplicated. */\ntype AppendParam = readonly [key: string, value: string];\n\nfunction stripExisting(query: string, key: string): string {\n  if (query === '') return '';\n  return query\n    .split('&')\n    .filter((pair) => pair !== '' && pair.split('=')[0] !== key)\n    .join('&');\n}\n\n/**\n * Splices `debug=1`, `relay=<wssUrl>`, and (optionally) `at=<totpCode>` into a\n * scheme URL's query string, preserving everything else (scheme, authority,\n * path, hash, and the existing `_deploymentId` param). If any of the spliced\n * params is already present it is replaced so the helper is idempotent.\n *\n * @param schemeUrl - The `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>` URL printed\n *   by `ait deploy --scheme-only`. Must already carry `_deploymentId` (Layer B\n *   of the gate); this helper does not invent one.\n * @param wssUrl - The live relay URL (`wss://…trycloudflare.com`) from the\n *   running debug MCP server's quick tunnel.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is spliced as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Pass `undefined` or omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @returns The same URL with `debug=1&relay=<encoded wssUrl>[&at=<totpCode>]`\n *   appended.\n * @throws If `wssUrl` is not a `wss:` URL (the gate rejects anything else, so\n *   producing such a link would be a silent dead end).\n */\nexport function buildDeepLinkAttachUrl(\n  schemeUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n): string {\n  let relay: URL;\n  try {\n    relay = new URL(wssUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL is not a valid URL: ${wssUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (relay.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL must use the wss: scheme, got ${relay.protocol} (${wssUrl})`);\n  }\n\n  const hashIndex = schemeUrl.indexOf('#');\n  const hash = hashIndex === -1 ? '' : schemeUrl.slice(hashIndex);\n  const beforeHash = hashIndex === -1 ? schemeUrl : schemeUrl.slice(0, hashIndex);\n\n  const queryIndex = beforeHash.indexOf('?');\n  const base = queryIndex === -1 ? beforeHash : beforeHash.slice(0, queryIndex);\n  let query = queryIndex === -1 ? '' : beforeHash.slice(queryIndex + 1);\n\n  const appended: AppendParam[] = [\n    ['debug', '1'],\n    ['relay', wssUrl],\n  ];\n  // Only splice `at=` when a code is provided (TOTP enabled). Omitting it when\n  // TOTP is disabled preserves backward compatibility with gate deployments\n  // that do not yet evaluate the `at` param.\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    appended.push(['at', totpCode]);\n  }\n\n  // Always strip the `at` key from the existing query so a stale code from a\n  // previous run is removed even when the caller does not provide a fresh code.\n  query = stripExisting(query, 'at');\n\n  for (const [key] of appended) {\n    query = stripExisting(query, key);\n  }\n  for (const [key, value] of appended) {\n    const pair = `${key}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;\n    query = query === '' ? pair : `${query}&${pair}`;\n  }\n\n  return `${base}?${query}${hash}`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAOA,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoErB,SAAgB,uBACd,WACA,QACA,UACA,MACQ;CACR,IAAI,MACF,GAAG,aAAa,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAA,iBAClC,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAC9C,KAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,aAAa,GACzC,QAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAG5C,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,KAAa,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GACnD,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAEtD,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,GAAW;EAC5B,IAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;UACzB;AACN,gBAAa;;AAEf,MAAI,YAAY,aAAa,SAC3B,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK;;AAKjD,KAAI,MAAM,cAAc,KACtB,QAAO;AAET,QAAO"}
+{"version":3,"file":"deeplink-B5-Hxu0Q.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/deeplink.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * URL of the AITC Sandbox launcher PWA.\n *\n * Declared here (not imported from `src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`) to respect the\n * mcp → unplugin layering boundary. unplugin/tunnel.ts declares its own copy\n * for the same reason — keep the two in sync when the URL changes.\n */\nconst LAUNCHER_URL = 'https://devtools.aitc.dev/launcher/';\n\n/**\n * Optional metadata that enriches the launcher deep-link (#498).\n *\n * These fields are added as query params so the launcher PWA can display\n * a recognizable identity (name, icon) without the user having to configure\n * anything extra.\n */\nexport interface LauncherAttachUrlOpts {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name shown in the partner nav bar (`name=` param).\n   * Blank / whitespace-only values are not added.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * Absolute `https://` icon URL for the partner nav bar icon slot (`icon=`\n   * param). Non-https or falsy values are not added.\n   */\n  icon?: string;\n  /**\n   * When `true`, adds `selfdebug=1` to the launcher URL so the launcher PWA\n   * registers its own document as a CDP target (issue #531/#543).\n   *\n   * **Single-attach model**: attaching the launcher self-target causes any\n   * currently-attached mini-app target to be evicted. This is intentional —\n   * `selfdebug` is a \"launcher diagnostics mode\" for inspecting the launcher's\n   * own DOM/console/safe-area, not simultaneous dual-attach.\n   *\n   * When `false` or omitted (default), the param is not added and the output\n   * is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n   */\n  selfdebug?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a launcher PWA deep-link for env-2 MCP-attach (issue #378).\n *\n * The launcher at {@link LAUNCHER_URL} renders tunnelUrl in a full-viewport\n * iframe. `&debug=1&relay=<wssUrl>` is forwarded onto the iframe src so the\n * framed page's in-app debug gate (Layer C) is satisfied and a Chii target.js\n * is injected. `&at=<totpCode>` is added only when a code is provided (same\n * conditional as {@link buildDeepLinkAttachUrl}).\n *\n * When `opts.name` is given (non-blank), it is added as `&name=` so the\n * launcher partner bar shows the app name instead of the generic default (#498).\n * When `opts.icon` is an absolute https:// URL, it is added as `&icon=` so the\n * launcher can render an icon next to the title (#498).\n *\n * Unlike `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` (which splices onto a non-special scheme URL\n * via raw string manipulation), this function uses WHATWG `encodeURIComponent`\n * because the target is a standard `https:` URL.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `totpCode` (when provided) is placed into the `at=` param\n * only — never logged or returned separately. Callers must NOT log the result\n * of this function to stdout/stderr.\n *\n * @param tunnelUrl - The `https://*.trycloudflare.com` app tunnel URL\n *   (`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`). This is the URL the launcher frames.\n * @param wssUrl - The `wss://` relay URL the framed page will attach to.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is appended as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @param opts - Optional app identity hints: `name`, `icon`, and `selfdebug`\n *   (#498, #543).\n * @returns The launcher deep-link URL with `?url=<enc>&debug=1&relay=<enc>\n *   [&at=<code>][&name=<enc>][&icon=<enc>][&selfdebug=1]` params.\n */\nexport function buildLauncherAttachUrl(\n  tunnelUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n  opts?: LauncherAttachUrlOpts,\n): string {\n  let url =\n    `${LAUNCHER_URL}?url=${encodeURIComponent(tunnelUrl)}` +\n    `&debug=1&relay=${encodeURIComponent(wssUrl)}`;\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    url += `&at=${encodeURIComponent(totpCode)}`;\n  }\n  // App identity hints (#498): add non-blank name and valid https icon.\n  if (opts?.name !== undefined && opts.name.trim() !== '') {\n    url += `&name=${encodeURIComponent(opts.name.trim())}`;\n  }\n  if (opts?.icon !== undefined) {\n    let iconParsed: URL;\n    try {\n      iconParsed = new URL(opts.icon);\n    } catch {\n      iconParsed = null as unknown as URL;\n    }\n    if (iconParsed?.protocol === 'https:') {\n      url += `&icon=${encodeURIComponent(opts.icon)}`;\n    }\n  }\n  // Self-debug opt-in (#543): add selfdebug=1 only when explicitly requested.\n  // Without this flag the output is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n  if (opts?.selfdebug === true) {\n    url += '&selfdebug=1';\n  }\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a self-attaching dog-food deep-link.\n *\n * `ait deploy --scheme-only` prints an `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * URL that opens a dog-food bundle on a phone. The in-app debug gate\n * (`src/in-app/gate.ts`) auto-attaches when the entry URL also carries\n * `debug=1` and `relay=<wss-url>`. This helper splices those params (plus\n * `at=<code>` when TOTP is enabled) into the scheme URL; rendering the result\n * as a QR code and scanning it with the phone camera opens the mini-app and\n * attaches it to the live Chii relay. QR is the single entry path — it needs\n * no USB cable, platform CLI, or driver, and works the same on iOS/Android.\n *\n * The Toss app propagates extra query params from the entry deep link into the\n * mini-app WebView's `location.search` (confirmed behavior), so the gate reads\n * them at attach time.\n *\n * TOTP `at=` param:\n *   When a TOTP secret is active, `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` accepts an optional\n *   `totpCode` argument and splices `at=<code>` alongside `debug` and `relay`.\n *   The code must be computed by the caller at call time — do NOT pre-compute\n *   and cache it, because the 30-second window expires quickly. The in-app gate\n *   (`src/in-app/gate.ts` Layer C) validates this code against the baked secret.\n *\n * Why not `URL`/`URLSearchParams`: `intoss-private:` is a non-special scheme.\n * The WHATWG `URL` parser treats such schemes opaquely (no host/path/query\n * decomposition you can rely on across runtimes), so query manipulation via\n * `url.searchParams` is not portable here. We splice the query string directly\n * on the raw string instead, which keeps the scheme, authority, path, and any\n * pre-existing params (notably `_deploymentId`) byte-for-byte intact.\n */\n\n/**\n * Suspicious/generic authority values that indicate a malformed or placeholder\n * scheme URL. These are host strings that will almost certainly cause the Toss\n * app to fail with \"bundle not found\" silently.\n *\n * The expected form from `ait deploy --scheme-only` is:\n *   intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>\n * where `<appName>` is a non-generic string like `aitc-sdk-example`.\n */\nconst SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES = new Set<string>(['', 'web', 'localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'app']);\n\n/**\n * Validates the authority (host) portion of a scheme URL.\n *\n * Returns a warning message if the authority is missing or looks like a\n * placeholder, or `null` if the authority looks valid.\n *\n * Expected form: `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * The authority must be a non-empty, non-generic app name (e.g. `aitc-sdk-example`).\n */\nexport function validateSchemeAuthority(schemeUrl: string): string | null {\n  // Extract authority from `scheme://authority[/path][?query][#hash]`.\n  // We cannot use the WHATWG URL parser for non-special schemes reliably\n  // (see the deeplink.ts module comment), so we parse the raw string.\n  const afterScheme = schemeUrl.replace(/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\\-.]*:\\/\\//, '');\n  if (afterScheme === schemeUrl) {\n    // No `://` found — not a scheme URL at all.\n    return (\n      'scheme_url does not look like a scheme URL (expected `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`). ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only`.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // authority ends at the first `/`, `?`, `#`, or end of string.\n  const authorityEnd = afterScheme.search(/[/?#]/);\n  const authority = authorityEnd === -1 ? afterScheme : afterScheme.slice(0, authorityEnd);\n\n  if (SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES.has(authority.toLowerCase())) {\n    const displayAuthority = authority === '' ? '(empty)' : `\"${authority}\"`;\n    return (\n      `scheme_url authority ${displayAuthority} looks like a placeholder. ` +\n      'Expected an app name like `intoss-private://aitc-sdk-example?_deploymentId=<uuid>`. ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only` — it includes the correct app name as the host.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** A param the helper appends. Existing occurrences are replaced, not duplicated. */\ntype AppendParam = readonly [key: string, value: string];\n\nfunction stripExisting(query: string, key: string): string {\n  if (query === '') return '';\n  return query\n    .split('&')\n    .filter((pair) => pair !== '' && pair.split('=')[0] !== key)\n    .join('&');\n}\n\n/**\n * Splices `debug=1`, `relay=<wssUrl>`, and (optionally) `at=<totpCode>` into a\n * scheme URL's query string, preserving everything else (scheme, authority,\n * path, hash, and the existing `_deploymentId` param). If any of the spliced\n * params is already present it is replaced so the helper is idempotent.\n *\n * @param schemeUrl - The `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>` URL printed\n *   by `ait deploy --scheme-only`. Must already carry `_deploymentId` (Layer B\n *   of the gate); this helper does not invent one.\n * @param wssUrl - The live relay URL (`wss://…trycloudflare.com`) from the\n *   running debug MCP server's quick tunnel.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is spliced as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Pass `undefined` or omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @returns The same URL with `debug=1&relay=<encoded wssUrl>[&at=<totpCode>]`\n *   appended.\n * @throws If `wssUrl` is not a `wss:` URL (the gate rejects anything else, so\n *   producing such a link would be a silent dead end).\n */\nexport function buildDeepLinkAttachUrl(\n  schemeUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n): string {\n  let relay: URL;\n  try {\n    relay = new URL(wssUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL is not a valid URL: ${wssUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (relay.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL must use the wss: scheme, got ${relay.protocol} (${wssUrl})`);\n  }\n\n  const hashIndex = schemeUrl.indexOf('#');\n  const hash = hashIndex === -1 ? '' : schemeUrl.slice(hashIndex);\n  const beforeHash = hashIndex === -1 ? schemeUrl : schemeUrl.slice(0, hashIndex);\n\n  const queryIndex = beforeHash.indexOf('?');\n  const base = queryIndex === -1 ? beforeHash : beforeHash.slice(0, queryIndex);\n  let query = queryIndex === -1 ? '' : beforeHash.slice(queryIndex + 1);\n\n  const appended: AppendParam[] = [\n    ['debug', '1'],\n    ['relay', wssUrl],\n  ];\n  // Only splice `at=` when a code is provided (TOTP enabled). Omitting it when\n  // TOTP is disabled preserves backward compatibility with gate deployments\n  // that do not yet evaluate the `at` param.\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    appended.push(['at', totpCode]);\n  }\n\n  // Always strip the `at` key from the existing query so a stale code from a\n  // previous run is removed even when the caller does not provide a fresh code.\n  query = stripExisting(query, 'at');\n\n  for (const [key] of appended) {\n    query = stripExisting(query, key);\n  }\n  for (const [key, value] of appended) {\n    const pair = `${key}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;\n    query = query === '' ? pair : `${query}&${pair}`;\n  }\n\n  return `${base}?${query}${hash}`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAOA,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoErB,SAAgB,uBACd,WACA,QACA,UACA,MACQ;CACR,IAAI,MACF,GAAG,aAAa,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAA,iBAClC,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAC9C,KAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,aAAa,GACzC,QAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAG5C,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,KAAa,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GACnD,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAEtD,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,GAAW;EAC5B,IAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;UACzB;AACN,gBAAa;;AAEf,MAAI,YAAY,aAAa,SAC3B,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK;;AAKjD,KAAI,MAAM,cAAc,KACtB,QAAO;AAET,QAAO"}

package/dist/{deeplink-DDOe0FQl.cjs → deeplink-BzdbA1gV.cjs}

@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ function buildLauncherAttachUrl(tunnelUrl, wssUrl, totpCode, opts) {
 //#endregion
 exports.buildLauncherAttachUrl = buildLauncherAttachUrl;
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=deeplink-DDOe0FQl.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=deeplink-BzdbA1gV.cjs.map

package/dist/{deeplink-DDOe0FQl.cjs.map → deeplink-BzdbA1gV.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"deeplink-DDOe0FQl.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/deeplink.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * URL of the AITC Sandbox launcher PWA.\n *\n * Declared here (not imported from `src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`) to respect the\n * mcp → unplugin layering boundary. unplugin/tunnel.ts declares its own copy\n * for the same reason — keep the two in sync when the URL changes.\n */\nconst LAUNCHER_URL = 'https://devtools.aitc.dev/launcher/';\n\n/**\n * Optional metadata that enriches the launcher deep-link (#498).\n *\n * These fields are added as query params so the launcher PWA can display\n * a recognizable identity (name, icon) without the user having to configure\n * anything extra.\n */\nexport interface LauncherAttachUrlOpts {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name shown in the partner nav bar (`name=` param).\n   * Blank / whitespace-only values are not added.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * Absolute `https://` icon URL for the partner nav bar icon slot (`icon=`\n   * param). Non-https or falsy values are not added.\n   */\n  icon?: string;\n  /**\n   * When `true`, adds `selfdebug=1` to the launcher URL so the launcher PWA\n   * registers its own document as a CDP target (issue #531/#543).\n   *\n   * **Single-attach model**: attaching the launcher self-target causes any\n   * currently-attached mini-app target to be evicted. This is intentional —\n   * `selfdebug` is a \"launcher diagnostics mode\" for inspecting the launcher's\n   * own DOM/console/safe-area, not simultaneous dual-attach.\n   *\n   * When `false` or omitted (default), the param is not added and the output\n   * is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n   */\n  selfdebug?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a launcher PWA deep-link for env-2 MCP-attach (issue #378).\n *\n * The launcher at {@link LAUNCHER_URL} renders tunnelUrl in a full-viewport\n * iframe. `&debug=1&relay=<wssUrl>` is forwarded onto the iframe src so the\n * framed page's in-app debug gate (Layer C) is satisfied and a Chii target.js\n * is injected. `&at=<totpCode>` is added only when a code is provided (same\n * conditional as {@link buildDeepLinkAttachUrl}).\n *\n * When `opts.name` is given (non-blank), it is added as `&name=` so the\n * launcher partner bar shows the app name instead of the generic default (#498).\n * When `opts.icon` is an absolute https:// URL, it is added as `&icon=` so the\n * launcher can render an icon next to the title (#498).\n *\n * Unlike `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` (which splices onto a non-special scheme URL\n * via raw string manipulation), this function uses WHATWG `encodeURIComponent`\n * because the target is a standard `https:` URL.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `totpCode` (when provided) is placed into the `at=` param\n * only — never logged or returned separately. Callers must NOT log the result\n * of this function to stdout/stderr.\n *\n * @param tunnelUrl - The `https://*.trycloudflare.com` app tunnel URL\n *   (`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`). This is the URL the launcher frames.\n * @param wssUrl - The `wss://` relay URL the framed page will attach to.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is appended as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @param opts - Optional app identity hints: `name`, `icon`, and `selfdebug`\n *   (#498, #543).\n * @returns The launcher deep-link URL with `?url=<enc>&debug=1&relay=<enc>\n *   [&at=<code>][&name=<enc>][&icon=<enc>][&selfdebug=1]` params.\n */\nexport function buildLauncherAttachUrl(\n  tunnelUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n  opts?: LauncherAttachUrlOpts,\n): string {\n  let url =\n    `${LAUNCHER_URL}?url=${encodeURIComponent(tunnelUrl)}` +\n    `&debug=1&relay=${encodeURIComponent(wssUrl)}`;\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    url += `&at=${encodeURIComponent(totpCode)}`;\n  }\n  // App identity hints (#498): add non-blank name and valid https icon.\n  if (opts?.name !== undefined && opts.name.trim() !== '') {\n    url += `&name=${encodeURIComponent(opts.name.trim())}`;\n  }\n  if (opts?.icon !== undefined) {\n    let iconParsed: URL;\n    try {\n      iconParsed = new URL(opts.icon);\n    } catch {\n      iconParsed = null as unknown as URL;\n    }\n    if (iconParsed?.protocol === 'https:') {\n      url += `&icon=${encodeURIComponent(opts.icon)}`;\n    }\n  }\n  // Self-debug opt-in (#543): add selfdebug=1 only when explicitly requested.\n  // Without this flag the output is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n  if (opts?.selfdebug === true) {\n    url += '&selfdebug=1';\n  }\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a self-attaching dog-food deep-link.\n *\n * `ait deploy --scheme-only` prints an `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * URL that opens a dog-food bundle on a phone. The in-app debug gate\n * (`src/in-app/gate.ts`) auto-attaches when the entry URL also carries\n * `debug=1` and `relay=<wss-url>`. This helper splices those params (plus\n * `at=<code>` when TOTP is enabled) into the scheme URL; rendering the result\n * as a QR code and scanning it with the phone camera opens the mini-app and\n * attaches it to the live Chii relay. QR is the single entry path — it needs\n * no USB cable, platform CLI, or driver, and works the same on iOS/Android.\n *\n * The Toss app propagates extra query params from the entry deep link into the\n * mini-app WebView's `location.search` (confirmed behavior), so the gate reads\n * them at attach time.\n *\n * TOTP `at=` param:\n *   When a TOTP secret is active, `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` accepts an optional\n *   `totpCode` argument and splices `at=<code>` alongside `debug` and `relay`.\n *   The code must be computed by the caller at call time — do NOT pre-compute\n *   and cache it, because the 30-second window expires quickly. The in-app gate\n *   (`src/in-app/gate.ts` Layer C) validates this code against the baked secret.\n *\n * Why not `URL`/`URLSearchParams`: `intoss-private:` is a non-special scheme.\n * The WHATWG `URL` parser treats such schemes opaquely (no host/path/query\n * decomposition you can rely on across runtimes), so query manipulation via\n * `url.searchParams` is not portable here. We splice the query string directly\n * on the raw string instead, which keeps the scheme, authority, path, and any\n * pre-existing params (notably `_deploymentId`) byte-for-byte intact.\n */\n\n/**\n * Suspicious/generic authority values that indicate a malformed or placeholder\n * scheme URL. These are host strings that will almost certainly cause the Toss\n * app to fail with \"bundle not found\" silently.\n *\n * The expected form from `ait deploy --scheme-only` is:\n *   intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>\n * where `<appName>` is a non-generic string like `aitc-sdk-example`.\n */\nconst SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES = new Set<string>(['', 'web', 'localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'app']);\n\n/**\n * Validates the authority (host) portion of a scheme URL.\n *\n * Returns a warning message if the authority is missing or looks like a\n * placeholder, or `null` if the authority looks valid.\n *\n * Expected form: `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * The authority must be a non-empty, non-generic app name (e.g. `aitc-sdk-example`).\n */\nexport function validateSchemeAuthority(schemeUrl: string): string | null {\n  // Extract authority from `scheme://authority[/path][?query][#hash]`.\n  // We cannot use the WHATWG URL parser for non-special schemes reliably\n  // (see the deeplink.ts module comment), so we parse the raw string.\n  const afterScheme = schemeUrl.replace(/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\\-.]*:\\/\\//, '');\n  if (afterScheme === schemeUrl) {\n    // No `://` found — not a scheme URL at all.\n    return (\n      'scheme_url does not look like a scheme URL (expected `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`). ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only`.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // authority ends at the first `/`, `?`, `#`, or end of string.\n  const authorityEnd = afterScheme.search(/[/?#]/);\n  const authority = authorityEnd === -1 ? afterScheme : afterScheme.slice(0, authorityEnd);\n\n  if (SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES.has(authority.toLowerCase())) {\n    const displayAuthority = authority === '' ? '(empty)' : `\"${authority}\"`;\n    return (\n      `scheme_url authority ${displayAuthority} looks like a placeholder. ` +\n      'Expected an app name like `intoss-private://aitc-sdk-example?_deploymentId=<uuid>`. ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only` — it includes the correct app name as the host.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** A param the helper appends. Existing occurrences are replaced, not duplicated. */\ntype AppendParam = readonly [key: string, value: string];\n\nfunction stripExisting(query: string, key: string): string {\n  if (query === '') return '';\n  return query\n    .split('&')\n    .filter((pair) => pair !== '' && pair.split('=')[0] !== key)\n    .join('&');\n}\n\n/**\n * Splices `debug=1`, `relay=<wssUrl>`, and (optionally) `at=<totpCode>` into a\n * scheme URL's query string, preserving everything else (scheme, authority,\n * path, hash, and the existing `_deploymentId` param). If any of the spliced\n * params is already present it is replaced so the helper is idempotent.\n *\n * @param schemeUrl - The `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>` URL printed\n *   by `ait deploy --scheme-only`. Must already carry `_deploymentId` (Layer B\n *   of the gate); this helper does not invent one.\n * @param wssUrl - The live relay URL (`wss://…trycloudflare.com`) from the\n *   running debug MCP server's quick tunnel.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is spliced as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Pass `undefined` or omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @returns The same URL with `debug=1&relay=<encoded wssUrl>[&at=<totpCode>]`\n *   appended.\n * @throws If `wssUrl` is not a `wss:` URL (the gate rejects anything else, so\n *   producing such a link would be a silent dead end).\n */\nexport function buildDeepLinkAttachUrl(\n  schemeUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n): string {\n  let relay: URL;\n  try {\n    relay = new URL(wssUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL is not a valid URL: ${wssUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (relay.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL must use the wss: scheme, got ${relay.protocol} (${wssUrl})`);\n  }\n\n  const hashIndex = schemeUrl.indexOf('#');\n  const hash = hashIndex === -1 ? '' : schemeUrl.slice(hashIndex);\n  const beforeHash = hashIndex === -1 ? schemeUrl : schemeUrl.slice(0, hashIndex);\n\n  const queryIndex = beforeHash.indexOf('?');\n  const base = queryIndex === -1 ? beforeHash : beforeHash.slice(0, queryIndex);\n  let query = queryIndex === -1 ? '' : beforeHash.slice(queryIndex + 1);\n\n  const appended: AppendParam[] = [\n    ['debug', '1'],\n    ['relay', wssUrl],\n  ];\n  // Only splice `at=` when a code is provided (TOTP enabled). Omitting it when\n  // TOTP is disabled preserves backward compatibility with gate deployments\n  // that do not yet evaluate the `at` param.\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    appended.push(['at', totpCode]);\n  }\n\n  // Always strip the `at` key from the existing query so a stale code from a\n  // previous run is removed even when the caller does not provide a fresh code.\n  query = stripExisting(query, 'at');\n\n  for (const [key] of appended) {\n    query = stripExisting(query, key);\n  }\n  for (const [key, value] of appended) {\n    const pair = `${key}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;\n    query = query === '' ? pair : `${query}&${pair}`;\n  }\n\n  return `${base}?${query}${hash}`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAOA,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoErB,SAAgB,uBACd,WACA,QACA,UACA,MACQ;CACR,IAAI,MACF,GAAG,aAAa,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAA,iBAClC,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAC9C,KAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,aAAa,GACzC,QAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAG5C,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,KAAa,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GACnD,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAEtD,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,GAAW;EAC5B,IAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;UACzB;AACN,gBAAa;;AAEf,MAAI,YAAY,aAAa,SAC3B,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK;;AAKjD,KAAI,MAAM,cAAc,KACtB,QAAO;AAET,QAAO"}
+{"version":3,"file":"deeplink-BzdbA1gV.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/mcp/deeplink.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * URL of the AITC Sandbox launcher PWA.\n *\n * Declared here (not imported from `src/unplugin/tunnel.ts`) to respect the\n * mcp → unplugin layering boundary. unplugin/tunnel.ts declares its own copy\n * for the same reason — keep the two in sync when the URL changes.\n */\nconst LAUNCHER_URL = 'https://devtools.aitc.dev/launcher/';\n\n/**\n * Optional metadata that enriches the launcher deep-link (#498).\n *\n * These fields are added as query params so the launcher PWA can display\n * a recognizable identity (name, icon) without the user having to configure\n * anything extra.\n */\nexport interface LauncherAttachUrlOpts {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable app name shown in the partner nav bar (`name=` param).\n   * Blank / whitespace-only values are not added.\n   */\n  name?: string;\n  /**\n   * Absolute `https://` icon URL for the partner nav bar icon slot (`icon=`\n   * param). Non-https or falsy values are not added.\n   */\n  icon?: string;\n  /**\n   * When `true`, adds `selfdebug=1` to the launcher URL so the launcher PWA\n   * registers its own document as a CDP target (issue #531/#543).\n   *\n   * **Single-attach model**: attaching the launcher self-target causes any\n   * currently-attached mini-app target to be evicted. This is intentional —\n   * `selfdebug` is a \"launcher diagnostics mode\" for inspecting the launcher's\n   * own DOM/console/safe-area, not simultaneous dual-attach.\n   *\n   * When `false` or omitted (default), the param is not added and the output\n   * is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n   */\n  selfdebug?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a launcher PWA deep-link for env-2 MCP-attach (issue #378).\n *\n * The launcher at {@link LAUNCHER_URL} renders tunnelUrl in a full-viewport\n * iframe. `&debug=1&relay=<wssUrl>` is forwarded onto the iframe src so the\n * framed page's in-app debug gate (Layer C) is satisfied and a Chii target.js\n * is injected. `&at=<totpCode>` is added only when a code is provided (same\n * conditional as {@link buildDeepLinkAttachUrl}).\n *\n * When `opts.name` is given (non-blank), it is added as `&name=` so the\n * launcher partner bar shows the app name instead of the generic default (#498).\n * When `opts.icon` is an absolute https:// URL, it is added as `&icon=` so the\n * launcher can render an icon next to the title (#498).\n *\n * Unlike `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` (which splices onto a non-special scheme URL\n * via raw string manipulation), this function uses WHATWG `encodeURIComponent`\n * because the target is a standard `https:` URL.\n *\n * SECRET-HANDLING: `totpCode` (when provided) is placed into the `at=` param\n * only — never logged or returned separately. Callers must NOT log the result\n * of this function to stdout/stderr.\n *\n * @param tunnelUrl - The `https://*.trycloudflare.com` app tunnel URL\n *   (`AIT_TUNNEL_BASE_URL`). This is the URL the launcher frames.\n * @param wssUrl - The `wss://` relay URL the framed page will attach to.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is appended as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @param opts - Optional app identity hints: `name`, `icon`, and `selfdebug`\n *   (#498, #543).\n * @returns The launcher deep-link URL with `?url=<enc>&debug=1&relay=<enc>\n *   [&at=<code>][&name=<enc>][&icon=<enc>][&selfdebug=1]` params.\n */\nexport function buildLauncherAttachUrl(\n  tunnelUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n  opts?: LauncherAttachUrlOpts,\n): string {\n  let url =\n    `${LAUNCHER_URL}?url=${encodeURIComponent(tunnelUrl)}` +\n    `&debug=1&relay=${encodeURIComponent(wssUrl)}`;\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    url += `&at=${encodeURIComponent(totpCode)}`;\n  }\n  // App identity hints (#498): add non-blank name and valid https icon.\n  if (opts?.name !== undefined && opts.name.trim() !== '') {\n    url += `&name=${encodeURIComponent(opts.name.trim())}`;\n  }\n  if (opts?.icon !== undefined) {\n    let iconParsed: URL;\n    try {\n      iconParsed = new URL(opts.icon);\n    } catch {\n      iconParsed = null as unknown as URL;\n    }\n    if (iconParsed?.protocol === 'https:') {\n      url += `&icon=${encodeURIComponent(opts.icon)}`;\n    }\n  }\n  // Self-debug opt-in (#543): add selfdebug=1 only when explicitly requested.\n  // Without this flag the output is byte-identical to the previous behaviour.\n  if (opts?.selfdebug === true) {\n    url += '&selfdebug=1';\n  }\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a self-attaching dog-food deep-link.\n *\n * `ait deploy --scheme-only` prints an `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * URL that opens a dog-food bundle on a phone. The in-app debug gate\n * (`src/in-app/gate.ts`) auto-attaches when the entry URL also carries\n * `debug=1` and `relay=<wss-url>`. This helper splices those params (plus\n * `at=<code>` when TOTP is enabled) into the scheme URL; rendering the result\n * as a QR code and scanning it with the phone camera opens the mini-app and\n * attaches it to the live Chii relay. QR is the single entry path — it needs\n * no USB cable, platform CLI, or driver, and works the same on iOS/Android.\n *\n * The Toss app propagates extra query params from the entry deep link into the\n * mini-app WebView's `location.search` (confirmed behavior), so the gate reads\n * them at attach time.\n *\n * TOTP `at=` param:\n *   When a TOTP secret is active, `buildDeepLinkAttachUrl` accepts an optional\n *   `totpCode` argument and splices `at=<code>` alongside `debug` and `relay`.\n *   The code must be computed by the caller at call time — do NOT pre-compute\n *   and cache it, because the 30-second window expires quickly. The in-app gate\n *   (`src/in-app/gate.ts` Layer C) validates this code against the baked secret.\n *\n * Why not `URL`/`URLSearchParams`: `intoss-private:` is a non-special scheme.\n * The WHATWG `URL` parser treats such schemes opaquely (no host/path/query\n * decomposition you can rely on across runtimes), so query manipulation via\n * `url.searchParams` is not portable here. We splice the query string directly\n * on the raw string instead, which keeps the scheme, authority, path, and any\n * pre-existing params (notably `_deploymentId`) byte-for-byte intact.\n */\n\n/**\n * Suspicious/generic authority values that indicate a malformed or placeholder\n * scheme URL. These are host strings that will almost certainly cause the Toss\n * app to fail with \"bundle not found\" silently.\n *\n * The expected form from `ait deploy --scheme-only` is:\n *   intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>\n * where `<appName>` is a non-generic string like `aitc-sdk-example`.\n */\nconst SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES = new Set<string>(['', 'web', 'localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'app']);\n\n/**\n * Validates the authority (host) portion of a scheme URL.\n *\n * Returns a warning message if the authority is missing or looks like a\n * placeholder, or `null` if the authority looks valid.\n *\n * Expected form: `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`\n * The authority must be a non-empty, non-generic app name (e.g. `aitc-sdk-example`).\n */\nexport function validateSchemeAuthority(schemeUrl: string): string | null {\n  // Extract authority from `scheme://authority[/path][?query][#hash]`.\n  // We cannot use the WHATWG URL parser for non-special schemes reliably\n  // (see the deeplink.ts module comment), so we parse the raw string.\n  const afterScheme = schemeUrl.replace(/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+\\-.]*:\\/\\//, '');\n  if (afterScheme === schemeUrl) {\n    // No `://` found — not a scheme URL at all.\n    return (\n      'scheme_url does not look like a scheme URL (expected `intoss-private://<appName>?_deploymentId=<uuid>`). ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only`.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // authority ends at the first `/`, `?`, `#`, or end of string.\n  const authorityEnd = afterScheme.search(/[/?#]/);\n  const authority = authorityEnd === -1 ? afterScheme : afterScheme.slice(0, authorityEnd);\n\n  if (SUSPICIOUS_AUTHORITIES.has(authority.toLowerCase())) {\n    const displayAuthority = authority === '' ? '(empty)' : `\"${authority}\"`;\n    return (\n      `scheme_url authority ${displayAuthority} looks like a placeholder. ` +\n      'Expected an app name like `intoss-private://aitc-sdk-example?_deploymentId=<uuid>`. ' +\n      'Use the URL printed by `ait deploy --scheme-only` — it includes the correct app name as the host.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** A param the helper appends. Existing occurrences are replaced, not duplicated. */\ntype AppendParam = readonly [key: string, value: string];\n\nfunction stripExisting(query: string, key: string): string {\n  if (query === '') return '';\n  return query\n    .split('&')\n    .filter((pair) => pair !== '' && pair.split('=')[0] !== key)\n    .join('&');\n}\n\n/**\n * Splices `debug=1`, `relay=<wssUrl>`, and (optionally) `at=<totpCode>` into a\n * scheme URL's query string, preserving everything else (scheme, authority,\n * path, hash, and the existing `_deploymentId` param). If any of the spliced\n * params is already present it is replaced so the helper is idempotent.\n *\n * @param schemeUrl - The `intoss-private://…?_deploymentId=<uuid>` URL printed\n *   by `ait deploy --scheme-only`. Must already carry `_deploymentId` (Layer B\n *   of the gate); this helper does not invent one.\n * @param wssUrl - The live relay URL (`wss://…trycloudflare.com`) from the\n *   running debug MCP server's quick tunnel.\n * @param totpCode - Optional current TOTP code (6 digits). When provided, it\n *   is spliced as `at=<totpCode>`. Must be computed at call time — it rotates\n *   every 30 s. Pass `undefined` or omit when TOTP is disabled.\n * @returns The same URL with `debug=1&relay=<encoded wssUrl>[&at=<totpCode>]`\n *   appended.\n * @throws If `wssUrl` is not a `wss:` URL (the gate rejects anything else, so\n *   producing such a link would be a silent dead end).\n */\nexport function buildDeepLinkAttachUrl(\n  schemeUrl: string,\n  wssUrl: string,\n  totpCode?: string,\n): string {\n  let relay: URL;\n  try {\n    relay = new URL(wssUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL is not a valid URL: ${wssUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (relay.protocol !== 'wss:') {\n    throw new Error(`relay URL must use the wss: scheme, got ${relay.protocol} (${wssUrl})`);\n  }\n\n  const hashIndex = schemeUrl.indexOf('#');\n  const hash = hashIndex === -1 ? '' : schemeUrl.slice(hashIndex);\n  const beforeHash = hashIndex === -1 ? schemeUrl : schemeUrl.slice(0, hashIndex);\n\n  const queryIndex = beforeHash.indexOf('?');\n  const base = queryIndex === -1 ? beforeHash : beforeHash.slice(0, queryIndex);\n  let query = queryIndex === -1 ? '' : beforeHash.slice(queryIndex + 1);\n\n  const appended: AppendParam[] = [\n    ['debug', '1'],\n    ['relay', wssUrl],\n  ];\n  // Only splice `at=` when a code is provided (TOTP enabled). Omitting it when\n  // TOTP is disabled preserves backward compatibility with gate deployments\n  // that do not yet evaluate the `at` param.\n  if (totpCode !== undefined && totpCode !== '') {\n    appended.push(['at', totpCode]);\n  }\n\n  // Always strip the `at` key from the existing query so a stale code from a\n  // previous run is removed even when the caller does not provide a fresh code.\n  query = stripExisting(query, 'at');\n\n  for (const [key] of appended) {\n    query = stripExisting(query, key);\n  }\n  for (const [key, value] of appended) {\n    const pair = `${key}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`;\n    query = query === '' ? pair : `${query}&${pair}`;\n  }\n\n  return `${base}?${query}${hash}`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAOA,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoErB,SAAgB,uBACd,WACA,QACA,UACA,MACQ;CACR,IAAI,MACF,GAAG,aAAa,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAA,iBAClC,mBAAmB,OAAO;AAC9C,KAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,aAAa,GACzC,QAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAG5C,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,KAAa,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GACnD,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAEtD,KAAI,MAAM,SAAS,KAAA,GAAW;EAC5B,IAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAa,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;UACzB;AACN,gBAAa;;AAEf,MAAI,YAAY,aAAa,SAC3B,QAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAK,KAAK;;AAKjD,KAAI,MAAM,cAAc,KACtB,QAAO;AAET,QAAO"}

package/dist/{devtools-opener-XpwL3fZ9.js → devtools-opener-B8nxrxqu.js}

@@ -1,15 +1,5 @@
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 //#region \0rolldown/runtime.js
-var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
-var __exportAll = (all, no_symbols) => {
-	let target = {};
-	for (var name in all) __defProp(target, name, {
-		get: all[name],
-		enumerable: true
-	});
-	if (!no_symbols) __defProp(target, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
-	return target;
-};
 var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ createRequire(import.meta.url);
 //#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/devtools-opener.ts
@@ -76,6 +66,6 @@ function openUrlInBrowser(url) {
 	return false;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { isAutoDevtoolsDisabled, openUrlInBrowser, __exportAll as t };
+export { isAutoDevtoolsDisabled, openUrlInBrowser };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=devtools-opener-XpwL3fZ9.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=devtools-opener-B8nxrxqu.js.map